



## Dutchbat Mission in Bosnia

Failure through the lens of the concept of intelligence cultures

Name: Maartje Kreikamp

Student number: 2106477

Date of admission: June 10, 2018

Course: Master thesis

Program: Crisis and Security Management, MA

Supervisor: L. Van der Heide

Second reader: C. Hijzen

Word count: 25,644



## **Abstract**

Many studies have been conducted on the genocide of approximately 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica while under the protection of the Dutch army. However none of these studies have tried to explain this failure to predict the attack on Srebrenica, in other words the failure of intelligence, using the concept of culture. This study aims to understand the failure of intelligence in Bosnia using the concept of intelligence cultures. To answer the research question, first the concept of intelligence cultures will be explained with help of theoretical insights of many scholars. Second, Warner's framework for the comparing of intelligence cultures will be used to provide background information on the intelligence culture in The Netherlands. Thirdly, the definitions of intelligence by Warner and Davies will be used to analyze the intelligence culture in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia. Lastly, the use of intelligence during the mission in Bosnia will be analyzed, again using the framework by Warner and Davies.

# Table of Contents

<b>Chapter 1: Introduction</b>	<b>7</b>
1.1. Research Question	10
1.2. Sub-questions	10
1.3. Academic and Societal Relevance	10
1.4. Reading Guide	12
<b>Chapter 2: Literature Review</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1. Different Concepts of Intelligence	13
2.2. Intelligence Culture	16
2.3. Intelligence Systems	18
2.4. Comprehensive Framework for Understanding Intelligence Systems	19
<b>Chapter 3: Methodology</b>	<b>21</b>
3.1. Research Design	21
3.2. Sampling of the Case	23
3.3. Data Gathering and Analysis	24
3.4. Operationalization of Concepts	25
3.4.1. Warner’s Framework Explained	26
3.4.2. Operationalization of Davies and Warner	28
3.5. Validity and Reliability	32
3.5.1. Construct Validity	32
3.5.2. External Validity	32
3.5.3. Reliability	33
<b>Chapter 4: Context</b>	<b>34</b>
4.1. Before the Genocide in Srebrenica	34
4.2. The Days of the Genocide in Srebrenica	35
4.3. The Aftermath of the Genocide in Srebrenica	37
<b>Chapter 5: Intelligence System in The Netherlands</b>	<b>39</b>
5.1. History of the Dutch Intelligence Services	39
5.2. Strategy	41
5.2.1. Basic Orientation	41
5.2.2. Objectives	41
5.2.3. Sources of Support or Mediation	42

5.3. Regime	43
5.3.1. Type of Sovereignty	43
5.3.2. Form of Government	44
5.3.3. Oversight	44
5.3.4. Ministerial/Departmental Structure	45
5.3.5. Internal Challenges	46
5.4. Technology	46
5.4.1. Military	46
5.5. Conclusion	47
<b>Chapter 6: Conceptualization of Intelligence</b>	<b>49</b>
6.1. Tasks of the Intelligence Services	50
6.1.1. Military Intelligence Services	50
6.1.2. General Intelligence Service	51
6.2. Definition of Intelligence in The Netherlands	52
6.3. Conceptualization of Intelligence	53
<b>Chapter 7: Dutch Intelligence in Bosnia</b>	<b>56</b>
7.1. Why The Netherlands Needed its own Intelligence Capacity	57
7.2. How was Intelligence Gathered?	58
7.2.1. Human Intelligence	59
7.2.2. Signals Intelligence	60
7.2.3. Open Source Intelligence	62
7.2.3. Imagery Intelligence	62
7.2.4. Conclusion	63
7.3. What was Done With the Information Gathered?	64
7.3.1. Raw Data or Analysis?	64
7.3.2. Quality of the Analysis	65
7.3.3. Compartmentalization Within the MIS	66
7.3.4. Conclusion	66
7.4. Who was the Information for?	67
7.4.1. The Role of the MIS in the Daily Life of the Decision-Makers	67
7.4.2. Critical Information that did not Reach the Minister	68
7.4.3. Conclusion	69
<b>Chapter 8: Conclusion</b>	<b>70</b>

8.1. Limitations of this Study	72
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Attachments</b>	<b>80</b>

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### Netherlands and UN blamed over Srebrenica massacre

The Dutch government and the UN have been criticised for their role in the events leading to the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in a report released today. Some 7,500 Bosnian Muslims were systematically killed by Serb troops who overran the so-called safe enclave, where the UN had pledged its protection to any Muslim who sought sanctuary. (The Guardian, 2002).

In 1995 a Dutch battalion ('Dutchbat') was stationed in Srebrenica, Bosnia, as part of the United Nations (UN) led mission 'United Nations Protection Force' (UNPROFOR). Srebrenica at that time was declared a 'safe area' for Bosnian Muslims during the war between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims (Higgins, 2014). The Dutch mission was 600 lightly armed soldiers strong (BBC, 2012) and had a mandate to provide security for the enclave (NIOD, 2002). However, in the summer of 1995 the Bosnian-Serb army invaded the enclave and, in the days that followed, tortured and killed more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men (Higgins, 2014). The Dutch troops were unable to provide the necessary protection to prevent the genocide on the Bosnian Muslim men. Following negotiations between the UN and the Bosnian Serbs, the Dutch troops were allowed to leave the enclave, leaving behind all their equipment, medical equipment and arms (BBC, 2012).

Since the mission, multiple studies have taken place to investigate the dreadful events of the summer of 1995. In August 1995, the Dutch government asked the Dutch Institute of War, Holocaust, and Genocide Studies (NIOD) to study the matter. The NIOD report took seven years to complete and laid the blame of the failure to protect human life largely on the Dutch government (NIOD, 2002). Furthermore, in 2002 the Dutch government asked for a parliamentary inquiry in response to the NIOD report that came out around that time (Commissie Srebrenica, 2003). And lastly, twenty

years after the massacre in Srebrenica, the NIOD, at the request of the Dutch government, conducted a third study to tackle any leftover questions about the mission in Srebrenica (NIOD, 2016). As said, the first NIOD report laid the blame for a large part on the hands of the Dutch government. Critiques were that decision-making regarding the mission was ill-conceived, the soldiers were not well-prepared, there was no intelligence gathering capacity, overall there was no adequate intelligence available, the soldiers were defenseless because of the limited mandate and military means, poor communications, and false expectations of outside help. As a result of the report, the Dutch Prime-Minister at the time, Prime-Minister Kok, handed in the resignation of his cabinet (Van de Roer, 2002). Veterans of the Dutchbat mission also support the conclusion of the NIOD report. Dutchbat veteran Schuurman states:

“Everyone knew how bad the equipment was: General Couzy, Chief of Staff Van den Breemen, the Minister of Defence. If we had known, we would have never gone to Bosnia. And then they say that we did not give resistance, with that equipment. It was crazy” (Broer & Albrecht, 2002).

As an appendix to the first NIOD report, Cees Wiebes, Dutch researcher and intelligence expert, wrote a 400-page book about the use of intelligence before and during the mission in Srebrenica. According to him, the ill-preparedness the Dutchbat mission faced, had, in large part, to do with the lack of information beforehand and during the mission. In other words, the lack of adequate intelligence about the situation in the enclave. Consequently, Wiebes concludes that there was an intelligence shortage (Wiebes, 2003). He states that “If Dutchbat had had been given its own ‘eyes and ears’ then the preparations might have been discovered in time” (Wiebes, 2003, p. 370). Accordingly, the failure of the Dutchbat mission can be seen as a failure of intelligence. Because how could the Minister of Defense and the Dutch intelligence services not have known that the situation at the enclave was escalating, even after reports from the soldiers at the enclave? As Schuurman states: “At Zvornik I saw a Serbian combat helicopter. If I could have seen this from the bus, the intelligence services could have seen it as well, right?” (Broer & Albrecht, 2002). According to the academic literature, a failure to provide warning or accurate assessment of, for example, military strength is a failure of intelligence institutions to

do their job (Davies, 2004). Concluding, the Dutchbat mission in Bosnia was subject to intelligence failure (Wiebes, 2003).

Many studies and articles have been written about the failure in Bosnia, from many different viewpoints. For example, the official report by the NIOD, which contains a reconstruction of the events leading up to the genocide (NIOD, 2002), the report of the parliamentary inquiry (Commissie Srebrenica, 2003), the report by the NIOD in 2016 about prior knowledge about the attack (NIOD, 2016), and an article that reviews the NIOD report (Brouwer, 2003). Furthermore, the book by Cees Wiebes, which is specifically about the use of intelligence during the mission in Srebrenica (Wiebes, 2003), and lastly, an article with that same focus (Rijsdijk, 2011). Although all these books and articles are informative and important, none of them take the question into account whether the cultural aspect has anything to do with the failure of the mission. Culture can inform certain actions by containing different aspects of norms, values, institutions and different modes of thinking (Duyvesteyn, 2011). It explains why one organization is different from the other while being in the same field or in the same nation (Hall & Taylor, 1996). According to Duyvesteyn, it is only recently that the concept of culture has been introduced in the different fields of the social sciences. Moreover, it is even more recent that the concept of culture has been associated with the field of intelligence studies (2011). The concept that followed from the merge of these notions is the concept of intelligence culture (Davies, 2004). However, few studies have taken intelligence culture into account and the studies that do exist have a strong emphasis on the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). The reason for this bias is the availability of sources and the openness of discussion that exists in these two countries (Duyvesteyn, 2011). Herman also confirms that the literature leans heavily towards US intelligence seen through US eyes (1996). In recent years some attempts have been made to include other nations as well. For example De Graaff, Locke and Nyce's *Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures*, which analyzes and compares 32 European intelligence cultures (2016). However, although the comparison of intelligence cultures across countries is imperative (Warner, 2009), no other efforts have been made to use the concept of intelligence culture to broaden our understanding of a specific case. This study aspires to fill this gap.

The combination of the concept of culture with the concept of intelligence is thus relatively new (Duyvesteyn , 2011). Although a lot has been written on intelligence activities and personalities, not much has been done in regard to intelligence cultures (Warner, 2009). The concept of culture is often used as a context for understanding a phenomenon, instead of discovering a causal and linear relationship with the behavior in intelligence agencies. The reason for this is that culture, although it is also a very popular term, is still a disputed concept. Other factors are that it is very difficult to operationalize the concept of culture and it is hard to prove whether culture has a causal relationship to the phenomenon under research. So instead of proving a relationship, culture is often used as a ‘lens’. This ‘lens’ of culture will also be used in this research to see what the characteristics of the intelligence culture in The Netherlands are and how they apply to the chosen case (Duyvesteyn , 2011). How can the concept of culture in combination with the intelligence services in The Netherlands help to understand the failed mission in Srebrenica?

### **1.1. Research Question**

This study will research the intelligence failure of the Dutchbat mission in Bosnia (1993 – 1995) through the lens of the concept of intelligence culture. In light of the introduction above, the following research question will be answered: How can the concept of intelligence cultures contribute to our understanding of the failure of the Dutchbat mission in Bosnia (1993 – 1995)?

### **1.2. Sub-questions**

In order to answer the research question in a coherent and structured manner, the following sub-questions will be answered:

1. What does the concept of intelligence cultures entail?
2. What was the intelligence culture in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia?
3. How was intelligence conceptualized in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia?
4. How did this conceptualization influence the mission in Bosnia?

### **1.3. Academic and Societal Relevance**

The research question will be answered by analyzing the aforementioned report by Cees Wiebes about the use of intelligence during the Dutchbat mission in Bosnia.

This study will be executed on the basis of theory introduced by Warner and Davies. Eventually the analysis will shed new light on the several ways the reigning culture within the intelligence community in The Netherlands could have influenced the failure of the mission. As said, culture is not simply an act itself; it is the driver behind norms, values, institutions, and ways of thinking (Duyvesteyn , 2011). Therefore, an intelligence failure because of a certain intelligence culture is not as simple to change as a single act or decision is. However, the first step to change is awareness and this study aims to contribute to this awareness. Because of the recent introduction of culture in combination with the concept of intelligence, this study expects these insights on the basis of culture to be an addition to current knowledge.

This research also has further academic and societal relevance. The academic significance lies in its effort to use a relatively new concept, that of intelligence culture, and take a detailed look at the literature about the concept up until this point. Furthermore, this study will use new ideas to analyze a twenty-year-old case in an attempt to provide new insights regarding the mission in Bosnia. The concept of culture can provide us with a new understanding of the why and how of the decision-making process regarding the mission. Besides, as has been argued, the concept of intelligence culture has thus far been used for the study of comparing different intelligence cultures between states. No research has yet been done to use the concept to gain a new understanding of specific cases, such as the case in Bosnia. Furthermore, the use of the two definitions by Warner and Davies (explained in Chapter Two) will provide insight in the practical use of the definitions. The use of the definitions in the case will show whether the definitions are more than just theoretical concepts.

The societal relevance of this study lies in the case selection. The Dutchbat mission in Srebrenica was selected as a case study because of the major failure of the mission and the impact it had on society. Even more than twenty years after the event the mission is still a topical and a sensitive issue. Questions regarding the knowledge of foreign intelligence services of the upcoming attack of the Serbs and the possibility of giving air support are issues that still inspire differences of opinion between many (NIOD, 2016). For the soldiers that were part of Dutchbat, the mission was a traumatic experience. Even more than twenty years after the event the economic and

emotional damage is severe. The soldiers were, until recently, held responsible for the failure of the mission and the genocide (NOS, 2017). Furthermore, the genocide has been called the ‘worst atrocity in Europe since World War II’ (Jones, 2006). This study does not aspire to solve these complex issues, however it does attempt to shed new light on why and how the mission turned out so catastrophic. It will look at the use of intelligence through a different lens than has been done before, in order to gain understanding and to increase the chance that the mistakes that were made before and during the mission will not be made ever again.

#### **1.4. Reading Guide**

This thesis consists of several chapters before the research question will be answered in the conclusion. The first section, the introduction, introduced the research question and the sub-questions. The main aim of this thesis is to gain a new understanding of the failure of intelligence in Srebrenica, Bosnia with the use of the concept of intelligence culture. In order to do so the second section will give an overview of the existing literature about intelligence cultures. It aspires to outline the differences of opinion regarding the concept of intelligence cultures and aims to give a theoretical framework that will be used to analyze the intelligence culture in The Netherlands. The third section describes the research design used for this study. The chapter will describe the methods and it will give an overview of the case. The fourth section will provide an outline of the events leading up to the genocide in Srebrenica and it will describe the events during the genocide. The fifth section will give a description of the intelligence culture in The Netherlands at the time of the Bosnia mission, using the framework by Warner that will be introduced in Chapter Two and Three. The sixth section will outline how the concept of intelligence is defined in The Netherlands around 1993 - 1995. The seventh section will empirically analyze the mission in Srebrenica through the lens of the concept of intelligence cultures, using content analysis and the report by Cees Wiebes about the use of intelligence during the mission. Finally, the eighth section will conclude this study with an answer to the sub- and research questions, a critical discussion of limitations of this study, and it will provide suggestions for further academic research.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

This chapter presents the main concept of this study; intelligence cultures. It will present the different views of different scholars of the concept over the years. This section will strive to answer the first sub-question: ‘What does the concept of intelligence cultures entail?’ To answer this question, first the concept of intelligence will be elaborated on which will lead us directly to the introduction of the concept of intelligence culture, because different concepts of intelligence are already considered as a part of the concept of intelligence cultures. Third, a framework will be given to analyze and characterize intelligence cultures in different systems.

### **2.1. Different Concepts of Intelligence**

Since the Second World War, several scholars have studied the topic of intelligence. Kent, who worked in the strategic office of the United States during the Second World War, was the first who was convinced that intelligence should be an analytical discipline (Davies, 2002). However, even many years later, intelligence is still a young subject. And although intelligence is a significant part of government and a large influence on its success and failure, it has not yet received the attention other government powers have received (Herman, 1996). A reason for the neglect of the concept of intelligence is the differences in terminology. Scholars and governments alike have, and use, different definitions of intelligence. In this section, the different opinions about the concept of intelligence by scholars and governments will be described as well as the consequences of the differences of opinion.

In 1966 Sherman Kent wrote that intelligence is “the knowledge which our highly placed civilians and military men must have to safeguard the national welfare” (Kent, 1966, p. 7). Kent considers intelligence as a kind of knowledge, as a type of organization that produces knowledge, and as an activity that is pursued by the intelligence organization (Kent, 1966). Warner, on the other hand, talks about two other definitions of intelligence on the one hand intelligence is seen as something that informs decision makers and on the other hand intelligence is viewed as an activity (often in secret) that assists “both the informing and execution of decisions” (2009, p. 15); or as Warner states; “warfare by quieter means” (2009, p. 15). In other words,

Warner uses part of Kent's definition (intelligence as a kind of knowledge and intelligence as activity) but states them as two separate definitions that are not used by the same government at the same time. Herman also defines intelligence in two ways, as a spectrum of broad definitions and more narrow definitions of the concept. The more broad definitions see intelligence primarily as all-source analysis while the more narrow definitions emphasize intelligence collection, especially covert information collection. The broad definition is supported by Kent and, as Herman states, is the definition of intelligence used by the US. The narrow approach is favored by the UK (Davies, 2002). In later work Davies calls the approach of the UK an 'integrative intelligence culture' and the approach of the US a 'disintegrative culture' (Davies, 2004).

The question Davies poses is what the consequence of these differences in definitions is in different countries (2002). Davies takes the UK and the US as examples of two states with vastly different approaches to intelligence (2002). The broad definition of intelligence used by US intelligence services defines the concept as a finished product of information that has been put through an analysis process and is made into a product that can be used by decision-makers for advice and options (Davies, 2002). This intelligence process consists of three separate elements; descriptive background, reportorial current information and threats, and the substantive – evaluative analytical process of evaluation and extrapolation (Davies, 2002). The intelligence agencies in the UK on the other hand have a definition built on precedent and convention, a civil law approach. In the UK, raw information is used immediately by decision makers, without an intervening analytical stage (Davies, 2002). Therefore intelligence in the UK is seen more as secret information that is not used daily at the departmental level. In short "the United States approaches information as a specific component of intelligence, while Britain approaches intelligence as a specific type of information" (Davies, 2002, p. 64). Those two different conceptualizations of intelligence have their strengths and weaknesses. Duyvesteyn distinguishes two different weak points in the intelligence cultures of the US (disintegrative) and the UK (integrative). According to her, integrative cultures are prone to groupthink while disintegrative cultures are sensitive to turf wars (2011). Davies explains these weak points further by stating that turf wars are often disagreements between departments, ministries, and

agencies about who is responsible for what. Groupthink occurs when a high degree of collegiality does not inspire divergent opinions (2004).

The consequences of these different definitions of intelligence, integrative/disintegrative (Davies, 2004) and as basis of decision-making or activity (Warner, 2009) can be far-reaching. Governments that use intelligence as the basis for decision-making will assign different tasks to an intelligence service than governments that view intelligence as an activity. Warner states in this regard:

“Adherents of the former [intelligence as basis of decision-making] definition tend to view intelligence as a form of information, which only *informs* policy – and never *executes* it – thus, they would keep intelligence distinct from what they see as the corrupting influence of policy execution. Proponents of the latter view [intelligence as activity], conversely, tend to view activities such as covert action and clandestine diplomacy as well within the fold of “secret intelligence services.” Their argument could (but need not) support an insistence that intelligence services confine themselves to secret means and activities while leaving “merely informational” tasks to the more open agencies of government.” (2009, p. 16).

The two definitions of Davies (disintegrative/integrative) (2004) and the two definitions of Warner (intelligence as a basis of decision-making or as activity) (Warner, 2009) can be put into a table in which different intelligence agencies or countries can be placed according to their concept and use of intelligence (Table One). This table will be used to answer the third sub-question: ‘How was intelligence conceptualized in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia?’. Combining the four different definitions will give a comprehensive view of the way intelligence is conceptualized in The Netherlands.

	Integrative	Disintegrative
Intelligence as activity		
Intelligence as basis for decision making		

Table 1. Conceptualizations of Intelligence (Warner, 2009) (Davies, 2004).

The different conceptualizations that governments have, which have been elaborated on above, find their origin in historical events that were seen as catastrophic by the governments that adapted particular concepts of intelligence. The US and the UK for example, have two very different conceptualizations of intelligence that were partially formed by events in history. For the US this was the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and for the UK this was the Boer War in South Africa from 1899 – 1903 (Davies, 2002). The UK went into the Boer War fully unprepared for the landscape, the guerrilla tactics, and the social organization of the country. Their failure in this war provided the foundation for the first intelligence agency in the UK. Where the conclusion after the Boer War for the UK was that it lacked raw intelligence, the US after Pearl Harbor concluded that it did not lack raw intelligence but rather the means to analyze and interpret raw information (Davies, 2002). Of course these two traumatic events are not the only influence on the conception of intelligence; institutional, constitutional, and governmental factors also come into play (Davies, 2002).

## 2.2. Intelligence Culture

According to Davies, these fundamental differences in the approach to intelligence have influenced the institutions and legislation surrounding the intelligence business. He states that these different approaches and conceptualizations of intelligence are an element of the concept of intelligence culture. As a result Davies concludes that “how we define what it is we think we are doing when we think we are doing intelligence shapes how we do intelligence” (2002, p. 65). In this regard he links the concept of culture to the concept of intelligence. Culture in itself is a contested concept, however for this research the following definition of the phenomenon will be used, given by Duyvesteyn. This definition will be used because Duyvesteyn herself uses this definition of culture in combination with the concept of intelligence. According to

Duyvesteyn culture consists of different aspects such as ‘norms, values, institutions, and modes of thinking that inform action’ (2011, p. 529).

Davies’ definition of intelligence cultures is as follows; ‘the many different ideas of intelligence and their institutional and operational consequences’ (Davies, 2002, p. 65). Duyvesteyn argues that intelligence culture is the perceptions of reality that influence the priority setting and requirements in the intelligence process. Culture guides this formation of preferences at intelligence organizations and therefore defines who they are and what is possible and as a result suggests what should happen (2011). Where Davies sees different concepts of intelligence as an influencing factor, Duyvesteyn speaks about a broader factor, namely ‘perceptions of reality’. Another difference between the two authors is that Duyvesteyn uses the link between the concept of intelligence and strategic culture. Duyvesteyn defines strategic culture as the ‘sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation’ (2011, p. 522). Or, in other words, decision-making of countries can only be understood when taking into account the specific cultural and historical context (Duyvesteyn , 2011). Although Duyvesteyn does not describe the exact linkage between strategic culture and intelligence, it is to be expected that intelligence services or systems can only be understood when the specific cultural and historical context are taken into account. Hall and Taylor do explain the more specific link between culture and organizations. They argue that the reason for the differences between organizations across organizational field or across nation is the difference in culture between those organizations. Procedures and institutional forms within organizations are not simply created because they were the best option, they ‘should be seen as culturally-specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 946).

Duyvesteyn furthermore argues that the intelligence decision-making process can be viewed as a cycle that consists of requirement setting, collection, assessment, and dissemination (Duyvesteyn , 2011). Each of these steps and the definition of intelligence in a specific case are influenced by perceptions of geo-political conditions, according to Duyvesteyn. Furthermore, ideas about rationality and bureaucratic culture also shape and influence the content of intelligence products

(2011). Although Davies has a more narrow definition of intelligence culture (it is only a label for different ideas of intelligence), he too includes the historical component that has influenced the development of the different ideas of intelligence (as illustrated by the examples of the Boer War and Pearl Harbor in the case of the UK and the US) (Davies, 2002). For this study the more narrow definition of intelligence cultures by Davies will be used. This definition is chosen because it is a more narrow definition that fits better into the scope of this research project.

### **2.3. Intelligence Systems**

Although the definition of intelligence culture by Davies is used as a basis for this study, a more comprehensive and operational concept is needed to give an overview of the way intelligence is ordered and organized in The Netherlands. This is where the concept of intelligence systems is introduced. Intelligence systems differ greatly from country to country because of differences in culture. As, as Hall and Taylor argue, differences between organizations, in this case between intelligence organizations, are present because of cultural differences (1996). In that sense, intelligence systems are the outcome of the influence of culture on intelligence organizations. Warner defines intelligence systems as the dealings of secrets and how these are ‘‘organized, treated, and exercised, by plan or by default’’ (Warner, 2009, p. 24). An intelligence system is more than just simply the different components of the way intelligence is organized in a country. It is more than just the agencies, functions, and capabilities. These components are simply part of the intelligence systems as a whole (Warner, 2009). O’Connell likewise argues that states have different approaches to the analysis of information that are founded in their societal, political and historical context. ‘‘National cultural perspectives on the world influence the perception of national threat and opportunity, cultural and ethical boundaries, limits on the pursuit of intelligence information, and the link between intelligence and covert operations’’ (O’Connell, 2004, p. 193). Even when regions share similar characteristics, for example on the European continent, intelligence gathering and its structures can differ greatly (O’Connell, 2004). Even the United States and the United Kingdom, who share common methods, technologies and resources, and have close political cultures and histories, still have clear and profound differences in the way they do intelligence (Davies, 2004).

## **2.4. Comprehensive Framework for Understanding Intelligence Systems**

Both O'Connell and Warner provide frameworks for analyzing intelligence systems. Both scholars also argue that those frameworks should be used to compare different intelligence systems. Notwithstanding O'Connell's and Warner's demand for comparative research, there are multiple reasons for the difficulty of comparative research in the intelligence field (O'Connell, 2004) (Warner, 2009): the difficulty in finding declassified and reliable data, the lack of interest by governments in funding such research, and the divide between academic historians and political science scientists, who should be working together to generalize the findings (Warner, 2009). Another reason is that scholars do not seem to agree on what exactly should be compared when comparing intelligence systems (Warner, 2009). In this study Warner's framework will be used to provide a comprehensive understanding of the way intelligence is done in The Netherlands. Warner's framework is used because it has more practical indicators than O'Connell's framework. Because it will only be used for understanding, more information regarding strategy and public opinion (as is used in O'Connell's framework) will not be necessary for this study.

The framework that will be used for analysis of the intelligence system in The Netherlands will be Warner's 'Strategy, Regime, and Technology' framework. This framework consists of three independent but interlocking variables of how intelligence is done in different contexts. This framework is inspired by and built upon the aforementioned framework of O'Connell. The first variable is strategy. The position a state has to take towards its neighbors and enemies determines the need for intelligence the country has. The second variable is regime. According to Warner, the type and structure of a specific regime affects the intelligence system directly (2009). The third, and last, variable is technology.

“Technology helps to determine the objects of intelligence and the means that intelligence employs. It also helps to determine the numbers and sorts of intelligence officers hired to collect and analyse data as well as to disseminate the resulting reports to decision makers” (Warner, 2009, p. 32).

All three different variables are made up of different factors, which are displayed in Table Two.

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Factors</b>
<b>Strategy</b>	Basic Orientation
	Geopolitical
	Motives
	Objectives
	Sources of Support or Mediation
	Situational
	Strategic Culture
<b>Regime</b>	Type of Sovereignty
	Form of Government
	Oversight
	Ministerial/Departmental Structure
	Internal Challenges
<b>Technology</b>	Information
	Production
	Resources
	Social and Institutional Forms
	Military

Table 2. Strategy, Regime, and Technology Framework (Warner, 2009)

In this chapter (Chapter Two) the concept of intelligence cultures was introduced. The different definitions of intelligence, that simultaneously are a part of the concept of intelligence culture, are elaborated on. Lastly, a practical, comprehensive and operational framework was introduced to analyze intelligence systems. In the next chapter these concepts will be further made operational and the methods of how this study will be executed will be explained.

## **Chapter 3: Methodology**

In the literature review the concept that is used for the analysis of the Bosnia case is introduced, namely the concept of intelligence cultures. Furthermore, a comprehensive and practical framework has been introduced to help analyze intelligence cultures in a comprehensive, cohesive, and logical manner. In this section, the methodology chapter, the methods that will be used for data collection are discussed, including an explanation of the manner in which the concept and the framework of intelligence cultures will be used, a justification of the case selection and the methods, and lastly, the validity and reliability of this research.

### **3.1. Research Design**

This study involves a case study to answer the research question about understanding the failure of the Dutchbat mission in Bosnia, using the concept of intelligence culture. The aim of this research is to use the concepts of culture and intelligence to provide a deepened understanding about the Dutchbat mission in Bosnia and to see if the definitions of Davies and Warner are usable in practice. Given the choice for the Dutchbat mission in Bosnia as a case, a single case study is the most appropriate method. Because of the extreme conditions and failure of the mission the case can test the use of the definitions by Warner and Davies and see if these definitions are able to be used in a practical manner by researchers in a real life situation and cannot only be used in a theoretical manner. The Dutchbat mission in Bosnia is also extensive in scope. Therefore, a comparison between cases is not necessary because the case of Bosnia will give enough information, a new understanding about the mission, and information about the usability of the theoretical concepts.

To further substantiate the choice for a single case study for this research, Yin's theory on research designs is used. Yin argues that the choice which research design is used correlates with the type of research question that is posed, the extent of control the researcher has over events, and the degree of focus on contemporary events instead of historical ones (Yin, 2003). Every different answer to these three situations asks for a different research design and strategy. Yin summarizes this in the following table:

<b>Strategy</b>	Form of research question	Requires control over behavioral events?	Focuses on contemporary events?
<b>Experiment</b>	How, why	Yes	Yes
<b>Survey</b>	Who, what, where, how many, how much	No	Yes
<b>Archival analysis</b>	Who, what, where, how many, how much	No	Yes/No
<b>History</b>	How, why	No	No
<b>Case study</b>	How, why	No	Yes

Table 3. ‘Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies’ (Yin, 2003, p. 6).

“Case studies are generally the preferred strategy ‘when’ ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2003, p. 1). This study attempts to explain why and how the mission in Srebrenica failed using the concept of intelligence culture, fulfilling the first indicator of a case study as stated by Yin. Also, this study is about a case that already happened, showing that the researcher had no further influence on the turn of events regarding the case. Lastly, this study is about a contemporary phenomenon, namely the mission of the Dutch army in Srebrenica and the use of an altogether new concept: intelligence cultures.

The case study is a single case study; only the case of Srebrenica will be analyzed in this study. Yin states that a single case study can be the right choice when three conditions are met. The first condition is that the case represents a ‘critical test of existing theory’ (Yin, 2003, p. 44). This means that the theory of intelligence cultures should have a clear set of proposition and circumstances in which these propositions are believed to be true. However, as we have seen in the literature review, the concept of intelligence cultures is relatively new and is a contested concept. Therefore it is necessary to use a framework for a clear and concise analysis of intelligence cultures. In this study the framework developed by Warner is used (Warner, 2009). The second

condition is that the case is a rare, extreme, or unique event (Yin, 2003). This condition will be elaborated on when the choice for Bosnia as a case study is explained in section 3.2. The third condition is that the case should have a revelatory purpose, meaning that the researcher is investigating a case which was previously inaccessible for investigation (Yin, 2003). In the case of Bosnia, almost the opposite is true. Many studies have been executed on why the Dutch mission failed to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica. However, because of the use of a relatively new concept, intelligence cultures, that has not been used to explain the case of Bosnia before, this study does have sufficient revelatory purpose.

### **3.2. Sampling of the Case**

As said before, the case of Bosnia presents an extreme and unique case in which the practicality of the definitions by Warner and Davies can be tested to its maximum. Yin states as his second condition for single case studies that the case should be a rare, unique, or extreme event. The events and the aftermath of the Dutchbat mission in Bosnia are definitely a rare and extreme event in modern Dutch history. Even in 2011 the case was still under scrutiny when a court case at the Court of Appeal of The Hague ruled that The Netherlands was acting unlawfully when it evicted Bosnian nationals from the compound of Dutchbat in Srebrenica on July 12, 1995 (Nollkaemper, 2011). Nollkaemper states that ‘‘the decision adds another chapter to the tortuous attempt of The Netherlands to cope with its multiple failures, with dramatic consequences, in its policies and decisions regarding the conduct of Dutch peacekeeping troops in Srebrenica in 1995’’ (2011, p. 1).

Furthermore, one of the criteria for the case selection is that the case should have a clear (intelligence) failure. As Wiebes states, the case of Bosnia is an intelligence failure. If the Dutch government had known more about the situation, the troops would have been more prepared for the situation at hand (Wiebes, 2003). Furthermore, the war in Yugoslavia and the resulting genocide were the worst case of mass atrocities in Europe since the Second World War (Traynor, 2010). One last reason for the choice of this case is the availability of information. Because of the numerous reports, parliamentary documents, and studies about the topic, information is widely available. Especially in light of the fact that intelligence agencies are

normally not very transparent, this is an important criteria for the choice for the Dutchbat mission in Srebrenica.

### **3.3. Data Gathering and Analysis**

The research question and the sub-questions of this study will be answered by using content analysis, thus using documents to gather evidence. The Dutchbat mission in Bosnia allows us to use documents for the analysis because of the wide availability of sources. According to Abbott and McKinney, content analysis is ‘‘the study of cultural artifacts, or the things that humans have created, rather than people themselves’’ (2013, p. 316). This ‘content’ can be many things, such as magazines, movies, songs, paintings, and meeting minutes (Abbott & McKinney, 2013). Many studies and recourses about the Dutchbat mission are available. This includes a 4000 page report by NIOD that is based on hundreds of interviews with soldiers, politicians, and intelligence officers (NIOD, 2002). Therefore the added value of interviews and other forms of personal contact with those involved is almost non-existent. Other sources of case study evidence can be archival records, direct observation and participant-observation, and physical artifacts (Yin, 2003). Any form of observation is not possible in the case of Bosnia because the events that are studied for this research are in the past. Archival records and physical artifacts are also not needed for this study because all necessary information is in writing and freely available on the Internet.

Four different types of documents/content are needed to answer the research question and the sub-questions asked in this study. The first sub-question ‘What does the concept of intelligence cultures entail?’ will be answered by using research by scholars who have studied the concept of intelligence cultures. Scholars such as Warner, Davies, Duyvesteyn, Herman, and Kent have all written about intelligence cultures. Their research will be used to give an overview of the current knowledge and it will introduce the frameworks of Davies and Warner that will be used to answer the second, third, and fourth sub-questions.

The second sub-question ‘What was the intelligence culture in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia?’ will be answered by using studies of scholars who have studied the intelligence culture in The Netherlands before. For example, the

*Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures*, by De Graaff, Locke and Nyce will be used. The handbook contains an extended chapter about the Dutch intelligence culture (2016). Furthermore, reports written by the intelligence agencies in The Netherlands around 1993 – 1995 will be used to answer the second sub-question.

The third sub-question ‘How was intelligence conceptualized in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia?’ will be answered by using the second types of documents. This type of documents is mostly written by governmental institutions such as the Ministry of Defense, the Military Intelligence Services (MIS), and the General Dutch Intelligence Service (BVD). The report by Wiebes about the use of intelligence in Bosnia will also be used to answer the third sub-question. However, because the fourth section is about the mission in Bosnia specifically, only the general information about the intelligence services in The Netherlands in the report by Wiebes is used for answering sub-question three. The documents that are used all contain a definition of intelligence or an outline of the tasks of the intelligence services in The Netherlands during the mission in Srebrenica. The definition(s) and tasks given will then be analyzed using the table provided in the literature review (Table One) which is further explained in section 3.4.

The fourth sub-question ‘How did this conceptualization influence the mission in Bosnia?’ uses the last set of documents, namely the information about the mission in Bosnia. The documents used in this section will primarily be the study conducted by Cees Wiebes about the role of intelligence during the Dutchbat mission in Bosnia (Wiebes, 2003). The book by Wiebes will be analyzed using the coding program ATLAS.ti. The codes that will be used for the analysis of the book by Wiebes will be elaborated on in section 3.4 in which an explanation of the operationalization of the different concepts will be given.

### **3.4. Operationalization of Concepts**

To analyze the intelligence culture in The Netherlands, and to answer the second sub-question, a framework is needed. For this study Warner’s framework, as outlined in the literature review, is used. The three variables in the framework are strategy, regime, and technology. In this section the factors that are a part of each variable will be elaborated (Warner, 2009). Secondly, an explanation will be provided on the

definitions by Warner and Davies, and how these definitions will be operationalized to enable the answering of the third sub-question. Thirdly, a further operationalization of the definitions will be given in order to transfer the definitions by Warner and Davies into a coding scheme. This way the fourth and last sub-question can be answered using the document-analyzing program ATLAS.ti.

### **3.4.1. Warner's Framework Explained**

This section aims to explain the different variables and factors of Warner's framework. The first variable is strategy. Strategy has seven different factors; basic orientation, geopolitical, motives, objectives, sources of support or mediation, situational, and strategic culture (Warner, 2009). The first factor, basic orientation, is the attitude the government of the intelligence system has towards other governments. This can be passive, aggressive, or vigilant wariness. The second factor, geopolitical, is the relative power of the state and the power of neighbors, which can have a large effect on the attitude of the state towards other states. The third factor, motives, are the motives the state has to influence other states. Examples are mercantile, imperial, or religious motives. The fourth factor is objectives. Objectives of a state can be survival, defense of the states' interest and allies, and expansion. The fifth factor, sources of support or mediation, means that states are in a web of relationships with other states or intergovernmental institutions. The nature of these relationships can be friendly, neutral, uncaring, or hostile. The sixth factor is situational. This can be defined as the severity of conflict and competition between groups or states. It can range from harmony to hostility and from crisis to war. The seventh factor, strategic culture, is the "sovereignty's historical context and collective perceptions of its place in the world, the shared ethical boundaries of its people and leaders, and the perhaps indefinable quality called 'national character' will all affect its intelligence system" (Warner, 2009, p. 28).

The second variable of Warner's framework is regime. Regime has five different factors; type of sovereignty, form of government, oversight, ministerial/departmental structure, and internal challenges (Warner, 2009). The first factor, type of sovereignty, is the type of state (city-state, nation, empire, non-state actor, international institution) exists within, and affects the intelligence system. The second factor is form of government. Is the government of the state representative,

aristocratic, or tyrannical? The third factor, oversight, is the way oversight over the intelligence agency is managed. Oversight can be exercised by a single ruler, a council, or a team of civil servants. It can be exercised by a long-standing person/group or by a rotating person/group. The fourth factor is the ministerial/departmental structure within the government. The tasks and offices that are specifically created for the states affairs, such as ministries, have an effect on intelligence systems. Departments have tangible (size, resources, legal authorities) and intangible (tradition, clout, degree of professionalism) attributes. The fifth factor is internal challenges. Most states have to endure some form of internal opposition. This can be passive resistance or armed insurrection and anything in between. Internal opposition can be homegrown or foreign-inspired. ‘All are targets of intelligence and therefore potential ‘influences’ on an intelligence system that must devote to them a share of its attention’’ (Warner, 2009, p. 30).

The third variable of Warner’s framework is technology. Technology has five different factors; information, production, resources, social and institutional forms, and military (Warner, 2009). The first factor, information, means that intelligence is also trying to find out what others know. The way others acquire, store, transmit and secure information is important for intelligence work. This will dictate the tactics and techniques used. The second factor is production. The means of production and the wealth of a nation is the foundation of the capabilities of an intelligence system. This may also explain the targets of a nation. An example: ‘intelligence efforts in a society based on restive slave labor will be directed differently than the work of an intelligence system charged with preventing industrial espionage’’ (Warner, 2009, p. 32). The third factor, resources, is the resources (agricultural wealth, mineral stock, human capital) that are available for intelligence work for the state and its rivals. These resources can affect the target list for intelligence work. The fourth factor is social and institutional forms. The way society is socially constructed influences the need for intelligence. Societies that consist of wandering tribes or urban professionals will have different intelligence needs and capabilities. The fifth, and last, factor is the military. The way a state applies violence in an organized manner to achieve certain objectives, shapes its intelligence system. Organization, mobility, and lethality of the state and its rivals will determine the timeliness and precision demanded of

intelligence work, the analytical expertise that is needed, and the human and technical needs for information collection and dissemination (Warner, 2009).

Warner's framework, when fully applied, provides a comprehensive overview of the intelligence system in a certain situation, for example in a state. However, in this study the framework will only be used as a background against which the bigger question about the different concepts of intelligence is posed. Also, it does not fit within the scope of this study to provide an extended overview of all the factors. Furthermore it would not be relevant for this study because the framework does not concern the research question of this study. Lastly, the framework only needs to be applied in full when the study consists of a comparison between different intelligence systems. This study does not consist of a comparison; it is a single case study in which the framework merely acts as background information. Therefore, some of the factors are simply too big, require too much research, or are simply not relevant for the research question posed, or require other forms of research such as interviews, to include in the overview of the intelligence system in The Netherlands. The factors that will be used all provide information about the international position of The Netherlands and they are able to explain the motivation of The Netherlands to participate in peacekeeping missions abroad. The factors that will be used for the overview of the intelligence system of The Netherlands are: basic orientation, objectives, sources of support, type of sovereignty, form of government, oversight, ministerial/departmental structure, internal challenges, and military. These factors will be used to describe the intelligence culture of The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia, this description can be found in Chapter Five.

An important note is also that the aim of the analysis with Warner's framework is not to provide an extensive analysis of the intelligence system in The Netherlands. The objective aims to give the reader an overview of the most important features of the system to gain understanding before exploring the matter of intelligence in-depth in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia.

### **3.4.2. Operationalization of Davies and Warner**

To answer the third sub-question about the way intelligence was conceptualized in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia, it is important to apply a categorization to

the definitions found. This way more structure is given and the way intelligence is defined in a state can be given a name, which makes it easier to work with. In the literature review two different scales of intelligence are introduced. Those two definitions were then placed in a table for a better overview (Table One). The first definition was the integrative/disintegrative definition of Davies (2004) and the second set of definitions (intelligence as activity and intelligence as basis for decision making) is from Warner (2009). The definitions are summed up below:

- Integrative: Emphasize on (covert) intelligence collection (Davies, 2004)
- Disintegrative: All-source analysis (Davies, 2004)
- Intelligence as activity: Covert action and clandestine diplomacy are tasks of intelligence services (Warner, 2009)
- Intelligence as a basis for decision-making: Intelligence as form of information, it informs policy and never executes it (Warner, 2009)

Based on these definitions, one could roughly try to place the UK and the US in the framework of Warner and Davies. The UK sees intelligence more as an activity, because intelligence is based on secret information (Davies, 2002), and it is integrative. While the US sees intelligence as all information that just needs to be processed and analyzed before decision-makers can use it (Davies, 2002). Placed in the table that was constructed in the literature review, the categorization of the US and the UK can be seen in Table Four.

	Integrative	Disintegrative
Intelligence as activity	United Kingdom	
Intelligence as basis for decision making		United States

Table 4. Categorization of intelligence of the UK and The US.

This categorization will also be used in the case of the conceptualization of intelligence in The Netherlands. This will be executed in Chapter Six. To answer the fourth and last sub-question, a further operationalization of the definitions by Warner and Davies is necessary. Sub-question four will be answered by using the coding

program ATLAS.ti. For this reason, the definitions have to be operationalized into codes. In Table Six an operationalization table for the definitions by Warner and Davies is given. Three indicators are developed to use as a guideline while coding the document written by Cees Wiebes. The three indicators are: (1) How was intelligence gathered?, (2) What was done with the information gathered?, and (3) Who was the information for? The first indicator will give information about whether the information is gathered through solely covert operations or if it is gathered using multiple information-gathering means. Thus uncovering if there is an integrative or disintegrative intelligence culture. The second question will uncover whether the information gathered is analyzed or if it is disseminated as raw information. This will also show whether the intelligence culture of The Netherlands is integrative or disintegrative. Lastly, the third question will uncover who the information is for. This sub-question will explain if the information is for the agencies itself, making it an agency that uses intelligence as base for activity, or if the information is given to decision-makers, making it an agency that uses intelligence as a basis for decision-making. The different indicators have different codes that were used to code the report by Cees Wiebes in ATLAS.ti. These codes can be found in Table Five. Furthermore, two more codes were created. One code was called ‘Quality’, which is about the quality of the analysis of the intelligence agencies, and the other code is called ‘other interesting things’, which coded quotes that were interesting as examples and would contribute well to this thesis in Chapter Seven.

Theory	Concept	Definition	Indicators + Codes
<p>Integrative/Disintegrative intelligence culture (Davies, 2004)</p> <p>Intelligence as activity/Intelligence as basis for decision-making (Warner, 2009)</p>	<p>‘Integrative’</p> <p>‘Disintegrative’</p> <p>‘Intelligence as activity’</p> <p>‘Intelligence as a basis for decision-making’</p>	<p>Integrative: Emphasize on (covert) intelligence collection (Davies, 2004)</p> <p>Disintegrative: All-source analysis (Davies, 2004)</p> <p>Intelligence as activity: Covert action and clandestine diplomacy are tasks of intelligence services (Warner, 2009)</p> <p>Intelligence as a basis for decision-making: Intelligence as form of information, it informs policy and never executes it (Warner, 2009)</p>	<p><i>Integrative/Disintegrative:</i> How was intelligence gathered? [CODE: Activity Analysis]</p> <p><i>Integrative/Disintegrative:</i> What was done with the information gathered? [CODE: Disintegrative Analysis]</p> <p><i>Intelligence as a basis for decision-making/Intelligence as activity:</i> Who was the information for? [CODE: Decision Analysis]</p>

### **3.5. Validity and Reliability**

Yin states that every research design should be maximized by doing four quality tests. These tests are: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability. According to Yin, internal validity should only be measured when there is a causal relationship to be proven in the study. However, this research is looking for an understanding of the case of Bosnia through the lens of intelligence culture. Consequently, no causal relationship needs to be proven. Therefore, only construct validity, external validity, and reliability will be measured here.

#### **3.5.1. Construct Validity**

Construct validity is when the “correct operational measures for the concepts being studied” are established (Yin, 2003, p. 33). In other words, do you measure what you aim to measure in the way your concepts are operationalized? Because the concept of intelligence culture is relatively new, there is no specific theory available that gives already used and proven operational measures about conceptualization of intelligence in different countries. Nonetheless, there is theory available about the analysis of intelligence systems. The theory by Warner is used to gain understanding about the intelligence system in The Netherlands. Due to the relatively new concept, construct validity is not the strongest point of this study. However, construct validity is guarded by carefully composing the needed framework about conceptualization of intelligence, based on the existing literature.

#### **3.5.2. External Validity**

External validity is the question whether the study’s findings can be generalized (Yin, 2003). External validity is difficult to achieve in a single case study because the findings are contextualized and bound to the specific case of intelligence use in Bosnia. However, the aim of this research is not to generalize the findings of this study, the aim is to gain contextualized insight as well as to contribute to our understanding of the failure of the mission in Bosnia simultaneously through the lens of the concept of intelligence cultures. Even though the findings regarding the Bosnia case are difficult to generalize, the findings regarding the broader analysis of intelligence culture in The Netherlands can be used for further research.

### **3.5.3. Reliability**

Reliability is defined as showing that the data collection in the study can be repeated by another researcher with the same results (Yin, 2003). The reliability of this study will be guaranteed by writing out every step that has been taken in this study. Careful documentation of the analysis and the choices that are made will make this study more reliable. Another point that makes this research reliable is the method chosen for this study. The chosen method of research in this study is document analysis. Due to the fact that documents do not change and are not dependent on the approach or opinion of the researcher, this is a good method to make research reliable.

In this chapter, the methodology chapter, the way this research will be conducted was explained and the choices that were made regarding the research design were justified. Furthermore, the framework about intelligence systems by Warner is elaborated on and the framework by Warner and Davies is made operational by introducing indicators and codes for the analysis of the report by Wiebes. Lastly, the quality of this study was justified by executing three validity and reliability tests. Before the sub-questions in this study will be answered, the next chapter will first pay attention to the context in which the Dutchbat mission took place. It will describe the preamble of the conflict in Yugoslavia, the events during the genocide, and the aftermath of the genocide.

## **Chapter 4: Context**

Before the analysis of this study starts, it is important to first elaborate on the circumstances and the actual events of the genocide. In this chapter the events leading up to the genocide will be highlighted, the days of the genocide will be elaborated on, and the aftermath will be explained briefly. For a clear understanding of the conflict a timeline is presented with all the major dates leading up to the genocide in Srebrenica, the timeline can be found in attachment A.

### **4.1. Before the Genocide in Srebrenica**

With the death of president Tito in May 1980, the state of Yugoslavia, which consisted of the Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, lost a strong leader (NIOD, 2002). President Tito had, in his 35 years in power, walked a fine line between managing the regional differences in the republic of Yugoslavia (Chenoy, 1996) but also maintained an independent foreign course between the Communist powers on the one hand and the Capitalist powers on the other hand (NIOD, 2002). After his death, Tito was praised for his presidency all over the world. A Dutch newspaper proclaimed that Tito was ‘the man who had forged Yugoslavia out of six republics, two autonomous provinces, five different peoples, four languages, three religions, two alphabets and one political party’ (NIOD, 2002, p. 12).

After Tito’s death the new leaders were unsuccessful in developing structural solutions to the issues that arose during the last years of Tito’s life (NIOD, 2002). Economic problems (Chenoy, 1996) and difficulties created by the 1974 Constitution, which implemented decentralization of political and economical power, caused tensions between the different nations within the Republic. However, it took eleven years before the tensions resulted in outright war because of the threat of Soviet invasion and the capital injected by the West before the fall of the Soviet Union. Because of increasingly economic and political self-sufficiency and ethnic tension, some of the republics within Yugoslavia started to rebel against Yugoslavia (NIOD, 2002). On 25 June 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence (Chenoy, 1996). However, for the Serbs in Yugoslavia the disintegration of Yugoslavia was not

at all preferable. The Serbs were scattered all over Yugoslavia, so Yugoslavia was the only state where all the Serbs were able to live together (NIOD, 2002). The Serbs felt there were only three options left ‘a radical about-turn from the path of disintegration through democratic reform and the guaranteed protection of minority rights; an about-turn from the path of disintegration by means of violence; or the creation of a Greater Serbia to which parts of other republics with a Serbian majority would be added’ (NIOD, 2002, p. 61).

After the declaration of independence of Croatia and Slovenia it became clear which path Milosevic, the Serb nationalist leader, had chosen. Milosevic had no objection to Slovenia leaving Yugoslavia, but for Croatia, where 650,000 Serbs lived, the situation was different, and after 25 June 1991, violent conflict began. Milosevic stated: ‘the borders will be adjusted and the Serbian enclaves will be secured. This is inevitable and is non-negotiable’ (NIOD, 2002, p. 9). Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina also had to remain part of the state of Yugoslavia. In April 1992, the conflict spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina after Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence on 3 March 1992. The official start of the war was the siege of Sarajevo on 2 April 1992 (Srebrenica 95, 2016). UNPROFOR, who was already active in Croatia, rapidly became active in Bosnia as well after they got involved in the war. The Netherlands contributed to the UNPROFOR mission from the start and was the fourth largest supplier of troops to UNPROFOR. The largest part of the Dutch contribution consisted of the unit, which was called ‘Dutchbat’ in UN jargon, which was stationed in Srebrenica in East Bosnia (NIOD, 2002). The mission consisted of about 600 lightly armed Dutch soldiers (BBC, 2012). In 1993 the UN had declared the enclave of Srebrenica a ‘safe area’ where Bosnian Muslims could reside safely (Higgins, 2014). The role of the Dutch mission was providing security (NIOD, 2002). The mandate of the Dutch UNPROFOR troops was to use force in self-defense only (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). The commander of Dutchbat was Lieutenant Colonel Karremans and his Deputy Commander was Major Franken (Higgins, 2014).

#### **4.2. The Days of the Genocide in Srebrenica**

In the safe area around Srebrenica, tens of thousands Bosnian Muslim civilians had taken refuge after earlier violence by Bosnian Serbs in North-Eastern Bosnia (BBC,

2012). However, in July 1995, sixteen months after the deployment of the Dutch troops, the safe area was overrun by Serb troops (NIOD, 2002). From 6 to 8 July 1995, Bosnian Serbs attacked the Srebrenica




Figure 1. Map of the UN safe area.

enclave. The Dutch infantry forces were there to provide security for the enclave but their fuel had run out and there was no fresh food in the enclave since May last. On 9 July, thousands of refugees fled the advancing Serbs. Dutch observation posts were attacked and 30 Dutch soldiers were taken hostage and one soldier was killed when Bosnian Muslims fired on retreating Dutch troops (BBC, 2012). The next day, Dutch commander Karremans asked for UN air support and he told Bosnian town leaders that a massive air strike would be launched against the Serbs if they would not withdraw from their positions the following morning. However, on 11 July it became clear that the Serb forces did not withdraw and that the request for close air support had been submitted on the wrong form and no NATO air strikes were possible that day. Later that day, about 20,000 refugees fled to the main Dutch base in the enclave, Potocari. Around 14:30, two Dutch F-16's dropped bombs on Serb positions. However, Serbs responded with threats to kill the Dutch hostages and to continue attacking refugees, resulting in the suspension of further air strikes. The commander of the Serb troops demanded that all Bosnian Muslims had to hand over their weapons to guarantee their lives (BBC, 2012).

On 12 July 1995, Srebrenica fell into the hands of the Serbs. Buses arrived to take women and children to Muslim territory; an estimation of the number of deported

women and children is about 23,000. Men from 12 - 77 were taken prisoner for interrogation. 15,000 Bosnian Muslim fighters were fired upon trying to flee through the mountains during the night (BBC, 2012). The next day, on 13 July 1995, the Dutch soldiers handed over 5,000 Muslims who were previously sheltered at the base at Potocari. In exchange they received fourteen Dutch soldiers that were taken hostage. That day the first killings of unarmed Muslims took place in a warehouse in Kravica. In the days after, the Dutch troops were permitted to leave the enclave, following negotiations between the UN and Bosnian Serbs (BBC, 2012). The five days after Bosnian Serb forces captured the enclave, it is estimated that more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men were killed (BBC, 2012).

### **4.3. The Aftermath of the Genocide in Srebrenica**

Before the Dayton agreement put an end to the war in Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs tried to hide the evidence of the mass killings by reburying the remains of the victims. Furthermore, the Serb leadership encouraged Serb residents to move to the area of Srebrenica and lay claim on the land. They did this by building their own churches, ‘renaming the streets, and adorning schools with Serbian Orthodox iconography. In the immediate postwar years, the Cyrillic alphabet widely replaced the Latin script in both the public and private sectors’ (Nettelfield & Wagner, 2013, p. 12). Even nowadays, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims have fundamentally different ideas about the events in July 1995. Many Serbs even go as far as denying that the genocide ever took place. Studies have been conducted about the happenings and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was founded to bring perpetrators of war crimes to justice (Nettelfield & Wagner, 2013).

The lives of the Dutch soldiers that were part of Dutchbat during the genocide were also changed forever. Many of them suffered and still suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and some have committed suicide. The Dutch soldiers are, in many places, still blamed for the dreadful events in 1995. International courts have labeled the mass killings as genocide. In 2015, 7,000 bodies have been discovered buried in a total of 93 graves (Corder & Cohadzic, 2015).

This chapter has provided the context in which the Dutchbat mission in Srebrenica took place. The events leading up to the genocide were described, such as the death of

Tito and the subsequent disarray and power vacuum. Secondly, the events during the days of the genocide were described and the role of the Dutchbat soldiers was highlighted. Lastly, the aftermath of the genocide was elaborated on. Focusing on the beliefs of the local population and the influence the events had on the Dutch soldiers. In the next chapter, Warner's framework will be used to describe the intelligence system in The Netherlands at the time of the Bosnian war. First an overview will be provided about the historical development of the intelligence agencies in The Netherlands and then the simplified framework and its factors will be described.

## **Chapter 5: Intelligence System in The Netherlands**

This chapter will analyze the intelligence system in The Netherlands at the time of the Dutch involvement in the war in Bosnia from 1993 - 1995. Thus answering the second sub-question; what was the intelligence culture in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia? To answer this question, first a short overview of history will be given of the establishment of the Dutch intelligence agencies up until the Bosnian war. Secondly, the intelligence system in The Netherlands during the war will be described, using Warner's framework about intelligence systems.

The concept of intelligence system has been developed because a comprehensive and more operational concept was needed to study intelligence cultures. As has been highlighted before, intelligence systems are the outcome of the influence of culture on intelligence organizations. Intelligence systems can differ greatly between countries because of the influence of culture (Warner, 2009). The concept of intelligence systems can be defined as the dealings of secrets and how these are "organized, treated, and exercised, by plan or by default" (Warner, 2009, p. 24). Warner's framework consists of three variables of which each has their own contributing factors. These variables and factors are: strategy (basic orientation, objectives, and sources of support or mediation), regime (type of sovereignty, form of government, oversight, ministerial/departmental structure, internal challenges), and technology (military). This simplified framework will be used to give a description of the intelligence system in The Netherlands. The aim of this chapter is not to give an extensive and complete overview of the intelligence system in The Netherlands, but to give an impression and context for further analysis.

### **5.1. History of the Dutch Intelligence Services**

Shortly after World War I, the first intelligence service in The Netherlands was established. The primary reason for the establishment of the first intelligence service in The Netherlands was the attempt to set up a revolution by social-democratic leader Pieter Jelles Toelstra. The new central security service aimed to prevent further attempts to revolutions by assessing rumors about coming problems and troubles (De Graaff, Nyce, & Locke, 2016). The Netherlands, that had taken a neutral stance up to

and including World War II, allowed foreign intelligence services to conduct their operations on its soil. However, there were three conditions: to operate without violence, to refrain from spying against The Netherlands, and foreign services had to share the gathered information with the Dutch government. However, in 1939, just before the outbreak of World War II, the Nazi's kidnapped two British intelligence officers in Venlo, The Netherlands. A Dutch intelligence officer was with the two British officers at the time of the kidnapping. Six months later, the Nazis used this incident to argue that The Netherlands was no longer neutral because of their dealings with British intelligence officers, which resulted in the invasion of the Nazis in the country. This event would later be the cause of the establishment of several new intelligence services after the Second World War, so that The Netherlands would no longer be dependent on foreign intelligence services for information (De Graaff, Nyce, & Locke, 2016).

During the war the Dutch government was in exile in the UK. The Dutch government in the UK had to start Dutch intelligence operations in occupied territory from scratch. The first years, the intelligence organization was largely dependent on the UK for operations in the occupied territory. However, in 1944, three separate services were established to ensure that more effective intelligence operations could be executed. After the war, the government sought a new form for a more productive and efficient intelligence service, so that they would no longer be at the mercy of foreign intelligence services and to prevent events such as the one in Venlo in 1939. Finally, in 1949, the *Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst* (BVD – Internal Security Service) was established, which fell under the jurisdiction of the minister of interior. The second agency that was founded was the *Inlichtingendienst Buitenland* (IDB – Foreign Security Service), which fell under the office of the Prime Minister. However, the latter, the IDB was never very successful and was abolished in 1994, during the time of the conflict in Bosnia (De Graaff, Nyce, & Locke, 2016).

Thirdly, the military intelligence services were founded in 1949. The newly established military intelligence agencies were divided into three separate intelligence services, these agencies fell under the ministry of Defense. The Army Intelligence Service, the Navy Intelligence Service, and the Air Force Intelligence Service. In 1987, both the civil intelligence services and the military intelligence services were

reorganized as a result of the changing world and the changing threats at the end of the Cold War. During the reorganization, all of the intelligence organizations were internally split into project teams and they became more transparent to the public about the tasks and activities of the intelligence services. Among other things they did this by publishing annual reports. Furthermore, the military intelligence services were merged into one military intelligence organization. They became the *Militaire Inlichtingendienst* (MIS – Military Intelligence Service) and were placed directly under the minister of defense. However, it took until 1999 for the MIS to become one cohesive intelligence service instead of three intelligence services under one name (De Graaff, Nyce, & Locke, 2016).

## **5.2. Strategy**

### **5.2.1. Basic Orientation**

The attitude the Dutch government had towards other governments is largely neutral (De Graaff, Nyce, & Locke, 2016). As De Graaff, Nyce and Locke write in their history of the Dutch intelligence system, The Netherlands has been largely neutral throughout history (De Graaff, Nyce, & Locke, 2016). During the Cold War The Netherlands was part of the Western countries alliance against the Soviet Union. This could be described as a vigilant wariness attitude towards the communist countries, because they kept a sharp and distrustful eye on the Soviet Union but they did not openly attack. The intelligence services at that time were mainly investigating communist parties and activist groups within The Netherlands (De Graaff, Nyce, & Locke, 2016). In the nineties, the attitude of the Dutch governments towards other countries was also largely neutral and had a passive stance towards other countries. The defense strategy became the promotion of western values such as the international rule of law and the promotion of stability in other countries (Korteweg, 2011), as will be further explained in the next section.

### **5.2.2. Objectives**

Promoting the rule of law and projecting stability in the world were the objectives of the Dutch government. These objectives indirectly improved the defense of the territory by promoting peace in the world. Article 97 of the Dutch constitution states that the military is there to “defend and protect the interests of the Kingdom and to support and promote the international rule of law” (Korteweg, 2011, p. 235).

According to Korteweg, there are three causes that explain the Dutch orientation towards stability in the world and the promotion of the international rule of law. The first cause is that maritime commercialism is very important for the Dutch economy. Therefore, it is important that there is stability anywhere on earth so that trade can flourish. This emphasis on trade also explains the avoidance of force in international dealings that the Dutch display and it shows that the Dutch would rather have good trade than territorial expansion, which is also evident historically. The second cause is internationalist idealism. Promoting the rule of law comes close to promoting world peace and has an idealistic element to it. The third cause why The Netherlands' objective in the nineties became the promotion of stability in the world, is neutralist abstentionism. This means that The Netherlands has, as much as possible, chosen a course of a neutral stance and tries not to choose a side when a conflict arises (Korteweg, 2011).

The promotion of stability and the rule of law in the world were also apparent in the Dutch involvement in peacekeeping operations throughout the nineties. Until the war in Bosnia, these peacekeeping operations were relatively risk-free. This partially explains why the Dutch military went into the conflict unprepared for the hostility and severity of the situation. Korteweg argues that the start of the war in Bosnia made clear that the intensity of conflict around the world was increasing and that relative risk-free peacekeeping was no longer a possibility, "high-intensity capabilities were a necessity in order to project stability" (Korteweg, 2011, p. 251).

### **5.2.3. Sources of Support or Mediation**

The Bosnian war in the nineties commenced just a few years after the end of the Cold War that held the world in its grip for numerous decades after the Second World War. The Netherlands was, and still is, a member of the western led alliance of NATO. NATO aspires to have a close cohesion between members and "develop collective capabilities to address common security threats" (Korteweg, 2011, p. 12). In the Cold War and shortly thereafter, many of the NATO members were countries of 'the West' that had values that were founded on the principles of democracy, liberty, and the rule of law (Korteweg, 2011). Therefore, those relationships with NATO countries were mostly friendly during the nineties. Furthermore, The Netherlands depended greatly on the US for its security (Korteweg, 2011). In the Cold War, the Dutch government

had turned itself away from all bonds with countries within the Soviet Union. However, according to the NIOD report of 2002, Yugoslavia at that time was the only country in Eastern Europe that was independent from the Soviet Union. The Dutch government admired that independency. When officials of the two states visited each other, the relations between the two were even called friendly. Even though there was some form of contact between the two states, The Netherlands did not have further policies regarding Yugoslavia and there was little attention for the country in the political and public debate (NIOD, 2002). In conclusion, the relationship between Yugoslavia and The Netherlands was marked with friendliness when there was contact. When no contact existed between the two countries, The Netherlands was largely uninterested in Yugoslavia. The UN, which was also the initiator of the UN mission in Bosnia in which The Netherlands participated, was also present on the international stage. However, because the UN is a partnership of sovereign states, it has as much power as the states participating are willing to give. As becomes clear in Cees Wiebes book about the use of intelligence in Bosnia; states were often very much looking out for their own interest instead of the interest of the UN (NIOD, 2002).

### **5.3. Regime**

#### **5.3.1. Type of Sovereignty**

The type of sovereignty (whether the state is a city-state, nation, empire, non-state actor, international institution) that the intelligence system in this study is part of is the nation-state of The Netherlands. According to Van Deth and Vis for a country to be officially recognized as a nation-state it has to meet the following three prerequisites. The first prerequisite argues that the state needs to have a certain territory that consists of a demarcated piece of land. The second is that there should be humans present in that territory. The third prerequisite is that there should be a sovereign power in the territory. This means that there is one power that does not have to hold itself accountable to another higher power within the territory (Van Deth & Vis, 2006). The Netherlands, and 190 other states, meet the three criteria and can, therefore, call themselves a nation-state. The Dutch nation-state has existed at least since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, although sometimes in slightly difference forms but still meeting the three, abovementioned, criteria (Van Deth & Vis, 2006). It is for this reason that the intelligence system in the Dutch nation-state, exists. It is an

intelligence system for the benefit for the people that call themselves Dutch and live in the territory of The Netherlands. The implications for the intelligence system is that the intelligence agencies are in service for one government with the same objectives, and not, for example, in service for an international institution where multiple countries and interest can play a role. Furthermore, there is a very clear demarcated territory that needs to be protected through the gathering of intelligence, which also make the objectives and the territory for the intelligence services very clear.

### **5.3.2. Form of Government**

The foundation of the form of government in The Netherlands as we know it was founded in 1848 by Thorbecke. In that year a constitutional change took place that decreased the power of the king and increased the power of Parliament. In the year 1848 the Kingdom of The Netherlands became a decentralized unitary state, a parliamentary democracy, and the concept of ministerial responsibility was implemented (Van Deth & Vis, 2006). Although some details may have changed, the foundation of the representative constitutional democracy now is the same as it was in 1848. The implication of the parliamentary democracy for the intelligence agencies in The Netherlands is that agencies need to be transparent, open, and they have to be accountable to Parliament. The reason for this is that Parliament consists of representatives of the Dutch people who in turn choose the members of Parliament. This openness and transparency can be difficult in the case of intelligence agency because of the secretive nature of their work. For that purpose The Netherlands has found ways to exercise oversight that still is accountable to Parliament, but is also able to hold onto the secretive nature of the intelligence agencies. This oversight of the intelligence agencies is elaborated on in the next section.

### **5.3.3. Oversight**

Intelligence gathering may infringe on civilian rights. Therefore it is important that there is an oversight organ that checks if the services legally move aside civilian rights. In The Netherlands, the first parliamentary committee for the overseeing of the intelligence service was established in 1952. The committee consisted of the leaders of the five largest political parties in Parliament. The minister would give the leaders confidential information, which they were not allowed to share with other parliamentarians (Hijzen, 2014). This way, the committee consisted of multiple politicians that were alternately rotating when the party leader left. However,

especially in the first few years of the committee the parliamentary control executed by the committee went only so far as to research complaints by Dutch citizens. Later, in 1968, the committee extended its oversight to other intelligence organizations such as the IDB and the three military intelligence agencies. Moreover, they began writing declassified reports that were used to inform Parliament. However, over the years the committee “never managed to cause much trouble for the responsible politicians” (Hijzen, 2014, p. 232). Reasons for this were that the result of the appointment of parliamentary leaders as members of the committee was that parliamentary leaders are often very busy. Consequently, they were not always present when committee meetings were held, if they were held at all. Furthermore, the parliamentary leaders were often not intelligence experts and had too little information to make critical remarks (Hijzen, 2014). In the period of the Bosnian War in particular, the BVD used a soundboard group of civilians that together formed a representative view of society. The members were appointed for a period of three years (BVD, 1993).

#### **5.3.4. Ministerial/Departmental Structure**

In the period of the Bosnian war, two consecutive cabinets were in office. The first one was cabinet Lubbers III that governed until 1994 (Parlement.com), and the second one was cabinet Kok I that governed from 1994 onwards (Parlement.com). The BVD in the period of 1993 – 1995 fell under the minister of interior. The minister was responsible for the BVD and determined its policies (BVD, 1993). This ministry did have a relative small budget compared to some of the other ministries. The ministry of interior affairs had a budget of 4,7 billion guilders from a total ministerial budget of 209,4 billion guilders (Rijksoverheid, 1992). The division of the budget within the BVD in 1993 was: Personnel; 44,4 million guilders, equipment; 16,6 million guilders, and secret endeavors; 4,1 million guilders (BVD, 1993). There were 580 individuals working at the BVD divided over six departments. The Military Intelligence Services fell under the minister of defense. The budget for that ministry was 14,1 billion guilders in 1993 (Rijksoverheid, 1992). Because the budgets of the ministries of the two intelligence services were relatively small, the MIS and the BVD both did not have a large budget to spend. During the nineties further budget cuts were made, especially in the ministry of defense causing decreases in budget for the MIS. The money available for the intelligence services affluence the intelligence system because more money means more capabilities and thus more information and

intelligence available. The small budget available for the intelligence services in The Netherlands during the nineties also show that there was not a large interest in the services and their value for decision-makers was not yet established (Wiebes, 2003). More about this lack of interest will be in Chapter Seven.

### **5.3.5. Internal Challenges**

In Warner's framework, internal challenges are challenges that form a threat to the national security within the territory. These threats can either be homegrown or they can be foreign-inspired (Warner, 2009). The Dutch BVD was the service that was responsible for the internal security of the Dutch state. The challenges the BVD was facing during the Bosnia conflict were the left and right extremist, IRA and ETA terrorism, unwanted influencing of minorities in The Netherlands from their motherland, and countries from the Middle East trying to gain goods and knowledge for the production of several types of weapons, such as biological, chemical, and conventional weapons (BVD, 1993). These challenges were extracted from a report in 1993 (BVD, 1993). Four years later a new report was published that stated that the challenges and threats for the Dutch society were slightly altered (BVD, 1997). Violent political groups and terrorism was still a focus point. Therefore, developments abroad were carefully monitored so they did not have an unexpected impact on Dutch society. Further points of attention were illegal weapon trafficking within the territory, activities from foreign intelligence services in The Netherlands, and the integrity of the Dutch government (BVD, 1997). As these challenges suggest, most of the challenges have foreign roots but do form an internal threat to Dutch society. However, they are not necessarily violent, despite the presence of the threat of violence.

## **5.4. Technology**

### **5.4.1. Military**

The end of the Cold War was also a trigger for the renewed assessment of military power as an instrument for state power. Because the threat of the Soviet Union and a nuclear war receded, the military would be used to "protect stability and strengthen the international rule of law" (Korteweg, 2011, p. 215). The military became an instrument of liberal interventionism to support the international rule of law. Furthermore, The Netherlands harbored the ambition to be part of a core group of

Western nations that were actively shaping the world of international relations. In that core group, The Netherlands became the bridge-builder among the powers in Europe and the US and promoted international rule of law and advocated stability rather than power. (Korteweg, 2011) Consequently, after the Cold War The Netherlands transformed to a country that wanted to increase the ability to provide for its own security and took steps away from territorial defense. However, The Netherlands as a medium power, could not provide for its own security through solely military means. They did not desire to fight wars more effectively; rather they worked towards this goal by increasing its influence in the international context. In this context, the military became a more useful political tool. The military itself became a broader expeditionary force of limited size, which was able to contribute to operations everywhere in order to promote the international rule of law (Korteweg, 2011). The implications for the MIS is that they were more focused outwards, on conflicts outside The Netherlands that could potentially form a threat for stability in the world and indirect towards the Dutch national security (MIVD).

Because of the more limited size of the military, caused by the international objectives and the need for a smaller and more flexible army, defense budgets were decreased from 1989 onwards. Starting 1989 there was a real decrease in defense budgets of 9,1% in 1992 and a 18,0% decrease in 1993. Because the increasing importance of flexible, mobile and deployable assets to perform expeditionary missions the army had to become lighter and smaller (Korteweg, 2011). These budget cuts also severely influenced the budget available for the MIS. Capabilities that were indispensable did not get the financial aid that they needed to come into their full potential (Wiebes, 2003). More about this will be presented in Chapter Seven of this study.

## **5.5. Conclusion**

During the Dutch involvement in the war in Bosnia from 1993 – 1995, The Netherlands was looking for its new place in the world. The country wanted to maintain its largely neutral stance but simultaneously promote the international rule of law and stability in the world. Overall, The Netherlands was a country that was very much focused abroad, because of the large export quota and the focus on national defense through the improvement of foreign conditions. The budgets for the military

were adjusted to these new circumstances and large budget cuts were issued in the years before the Bosnian war. Therefore the intelligence services had relatively low budgets, which also shows the limited value and interest of decision-makers for the products of the intelligence services. Only after 2001 when the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York happened the budgets increased (De Graaff, Nyce, & Locke, 2016).

In this chapter, first the history of the Dutch intelligence agencies was described. Secondly, Warner's 'strategy, regime, and technology' framework was used in a simplified manner to gain insight into the intelligence system in the Netherland during the war in Bosnia. In the next chapter, a first step will be made towards conceptualization of intelligence. The different tasks and definitions used by the intelligence services in The Netherlands during the nineties will be elaborated on. To do this the two definitions of intelligence by Warner and Davies are used.

## Chapter 6: Conceptualization of Intelligence

This chapter will attempt to answer the third sub-question posed in the introduction of this study: How was intelligence conceptualized in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia? First, the tasks of the intelligence services in the Netherland around the time of the Bosnian war and the way they define intelligence will be analyzed. Looking at the tasks the intelligence services in The Netherlands had during the mission in Bosnia is relevant for this study because tasks of intelligence services say much about how intelligence is defined in a system. For example, when a task of a service is the planning and execution of covert actions abroad, it stands to reason that the intelligence culture is a more integrative one. While if the tasks are more about gathering all kinds of information such as open source information, not only clandestine information, it then tends to be a disintegrative intelligence culture.

Secondly, the definition of intelligence the intelligence services used during the war in Bosnia will be elaborated on. However, because the intelligence agencies during the war in Bosnia only just started to be more transparent, no reports or other information are available that contain the definition of intelligence that was used by the intelligence agencies at that time. To remedy this lack of information, another report that was published after the war in Bosnia that contains this information and definitions by Dutch scholars, will be used. Finally, the table that was presented in the operationalization section of Chapter Four and which is presented below (Table Six) will be used to categorize the conceptualization of intelligence in The Netherlands. This will be done in the final part of this chapter where an answer to the third sub-question is given as well.

	Integrative	Disintegrative
Intelligence as activity		
Intelligence as basis for decision making		

Table 6. Framework for characterizing intelligence culture

As described in the methodology section of this study, this analysis will be executed by using the two definitions by Warner and the two definitions by Davies. Davies introduces the integrative and disintegrative characteristics of intelligence culture while Warner introduces intelligence as activity and intelligence as basis for decision-making.

- Integrative: Emphasize on (covert) intelligence collection (Davies, 2004)
- Disintegrative: All-source analysis (Davies, 2004)
- Intelligence as activity: Covert action and clandestine diplomacy are tasks of intelligence services (Warner, 2009)
- Intelligence as a basis for decision-making: Intelligence as form of information, it informs policy and never executes it (Warner, 2009)

By examining the tasks and definitions of intelligence of the intelligence services in The Netherlands, an attempt will be made to characterize the intelligence culture in The Netherlands using the definitions by Warner and Davies.

## **6.1. Tasks of the Intelligence Services**

### **6.1.1. Military Intelligence Services**

In 1987 a new Intelligence and Security Services Act was approved by Parliament and implemented. This act decreed that the three military intelligence services were to be merged into one military intelligence service. The new Intelligence and Security Service Act also defined the tasks of the Military Intelligence Service; three separate tasks can be defined. The first task is the gathering of data about the potential of foreign armed forces, which are necessary for the right structure and deployment of the Dutch armed forces. The second task is the performance of safety investigations of, for example, military personnel that need a high security clearance. The third task is the gathering of data that is needed to take the following three measures: (1) To prevent activities that might harm the safety and preparedness of the armed forces, (2) to safeguard the secret data regarding the armed forces, (3) the promotion of the right mobilization and concentration of the armed forces (Overheid, 1987).

In his book about the use of intelligence in Bosnia, Wiebes states that in practice the gathering of intelligence included ‘‘the entire intelligence process from gathering

(basis) data, evaluating, processing and documenting the data, to producing and distributing intelligence tailored to the users” (Wiebes, 2003, p. 92). In 1993 a change to the Intelligence and Security Service Act was made. The intelligence Services, the MIS and BVD, could no longer actively recruit and work with agents in other countries. The services could now only make use of ‘passive’ human sources; for example, displaced persons from the region under investigation that resided in The Netherlands. Only when the national interests were at stake, offensive use of human sources could be made (Wiebes, 2003).

### **6.1.2. General Intelligence Service**

The new Act for the Intelligence and Security Services that was implemented in 1987 also defined the tasks for the General Intelligence Service in The Netherlands, the BVD. Those tasks were, (1) the gathering of data about organizations and individuals that are suspected to be a threat to the national security. (2) Performing safety investigations on individuals. (3) The promotion of measures that help secure information that has to be kept a secret for the national interest and for social life (Overheid, 1987). Just as the MIS, the BVD was told in 1993 that they were no longer allowed to make use of offensive human resources. Only when the national interest was at stake could they use offensive human sources, in all other cases they were only allowed to make defensive use of sources, for example working with nationals from the country of interest who already resided in The Netherlands (Wiebes, 2003). In the annual report of the BVD one of the tasks of the service is also described as the processing of acquired data (BVD, 1993).

The BVD states in an information brochure in 1993 that they are there to give information and security advice to the government and governance organizations at all possible levels, civil society and to sectors in business (BVD, 1993). This information and advice is given so that those organizations can take the appropriate steps to prevent security risks. The brochure states: “the BVD has an information and advice giving task and explicitly does not have any judicial powers” (BVD, 1993, p. 7). This means that the BVD is not authorized to track down or arrest individuals. The brochure also states that the BVD in 1993 used open sources as much as possible for the gathering of information. These open sources could be newspapers, magazines, and freely accessible computer files. Other sources, that are not freely accessible, are

for example the population register. The BVD has access to this register but regular citizens do not. Only when the open sources do not deliver enough information more covert means were used. This included phone taps, following suspects, and looking for information in person (BVD, 1993).

## **6.2. Definition of Intelligence in The Netherlands**

Before an attempt is made to define intelligence from the perspective of the intelligence services in The Netherlands, first Dutch scholars who have provided a definition of intelligence will be elaborated on. Because these scholars are Dutch and they do research and live within the Dutch context, it is worth a try to find out the definition of intelligence they provide in their studies. The definition of intelligence is a contested definition and is different in many countries. In The Netherlands several scholars defined intelligence, two of them are De Graaff en Wiebes. De Graaff for example states that intelligence is ‘the gathering of information, analysis of that information, contra intelligence (frustrating the intelligence efforts of other parties), and covert operations’. However, De Graaff also states that the latter category, covert operations, never had great meaning in the Dutch context. Emphasis was placed on the other categories of gathering and analysis of data (De Graaff, 2011). Wiebes, in his book on the use of intelligence in the war in Bosnia, states that the following definition is the most appropriate in the Dutch context: “Intelligence as information that is gathered, organized and analyzed for players or decision-makers” (Wiebes, 2003, pp. 14 - 15). Wiebes also states that intelligence is a process that can be called an intelligence cycle. This cycle consists of the planning of the intelligence operation, the gathering of data, the processing of the received data, the analysis of the data that results in a finished intelligence product, and lastly the dissemination of the product among the consumers (Wiebes, 2003).

Although it would have been best to include the definition of intelligence that the BVD and the MIS used in the period 1993 – 1995 in this section, this information is unfortunately not available. During this period of time the intelligence services only just started to be more transparent. The reports that were published only state the tasks of the services and not the definition of intelligence they were working with. The services do not provide a clear definition themselves of the concept of intelligence, not in the annual reports of that time and not in other documents. A later report of the

MIS, in 2012, does provide a definition of intelligence. It states that intelligence is the result of knowledge, interpretation, and understanding of the activities, capabilities, and intentions of all the actors and factors that can influence the operation. It also states that intelligence comes about through the gathering and processing of information (Ministerie van Defensie, 2012). For this analysis the definition of intelligence by the MIS in 2012 is used instead of definitions of intelligence around the time of the Bosnian War because of the unavailability of sources. Although it is likely that the definition of intelligence, often used unconsciously, is not changed over the years, the use of a definition from 2012 does make the conceptualization of intelligence less reliable. However, the definition of 2012 together with the definitions by the Dutch scholars and the tasks of the intelligence services during the war in Bosnia, will provide enough information to draw reliable conclusions about the characterization of intelligence in the Netherlands around the time of the Dutch mission in Srebrenica.

### **6.3. Conceptualization of Intelligence**

After explaining the tasks of the intelligence services in The Netherlands in 1993 – 1995 and the definition of the concept of intelligence in The Netherlands it is now time to categorize the conceptualization of intelligence in The Netherlands using the framework that was introduced earlier. The first set of definitions that is used in the framework is the definitions by Davies (2004). The integrative (emphasize on covert intelligence collection) and the disintegrative (all-source analysis) intelligence culture. Because of the use of multiple sources of information for intelligence, The Netherlands has a focus on all-source intelligence product, as opposed to intelligence that is gathered through solely covert and clandestine means. Therefore the intelligence culture in The Netherlands can be characterized as a disintegrative intelligence culture. As De Graaff states, covert intelligence collection has never played a big role in the Dutch context (De Graaff, 2011). Furthermore, the use of human sources abroad was even decreased from 1993 onwards, it was no longer allowed unless national security was in danger. As described above, intelligence in The Netherlands was more about gathering data from mostly open sources and analyzing this information in order to use it.

The definition that Wiebes uses in his report and the intelligence cycle he describes and the definition provided by De Graaff, both show that analysis plays a big role in the Dutch context (De Graaff, 2011) (Wiebes, 2003). Furthermore, the definition provided by the MIS in 2012 also places emphasis on the interpretation and processing of information (Ministerie van Defensie, 2012). The information is first processed and analyzed before it is disseminated to the decision-makers. The tasks of the BVD described above also show that analysis was carried out with the raw information. The BVD describes in its annual report of 1993 that one of their tasks is the processing of acquired data (BVD, 1993). In conclusion, the decision-makers received a finished product and not the raw information. This also can be described as an aspect of a disintegrative culture because in a disintegrative culture information is analyzed in order to disseminate a finished and analyzed intelligence product opposed to an integrative culture where intelligence (through mainly covert operations) is given to decision-makers as raw material (Wiebes, 2003).

The second set of definitions is the definition by Warner (2009). Intelligence as activity (covert action and clandestine diplomacy are tasks of intelligence services) and intelligence as a basis for decision-making (intelligence as a form of information, it informs policy and never executes it). The Dutch conceptualization of intelligence from 1993 – 1995 is more about intelligence as a basis for decision-making than intelligence as an activity. This also fits within the conclusion by Wiebes that intelligence is a process. After analysis the intelligence is disseminated amongst the users, it is thus not directly used by the producers of the finished intelligence product. Furthermore, as stated above, the Dutch intelligence services have no judicial powers. They can only provide information and advice to other organizations that will then execute measures that are based on the given intelligence. The intelligence services themselves cannot track down or prosecute individuals. Furthermore, again, covert actions, as De Graaff states, have thus far not played a large role in the Dutch intelligence community (De Graaff, 2011). The abovementioned information also characterizes the intelligence culture in the Netherlands around 1993 – 1995 as intelligence as a basis for decision-making. The Dutch intelligence agencies cannot make their own executive decisions; they are there in an advisory role. Furthermore, no covert operations were done which also characterizes the intelligence culture of The Netherlands as a culture based on intelligence as a basis for decision-making.

The Dutch conceptualization of intelligence can thus be defined as disintegrative and intelligence as a basis for decision-making. Using the framework, the Dutch intelligence concept can be characterized as seen in Table Seven.

	Integrative	Disintegrative
Intelligence as activity		
Intelligence as basis for decision making		The Netherlands

Table 7. Dutch Conceptualization of Intelligence.

In this chapter, the conceptualization of intelligence in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia was examined. First the tasks of the MIS and BVD were elaborated on and then the definitions these services use were explained. Because no information was available about the definition the agencies used at the time of the war, a report was used that was written after the war in Bosnia. Using the definition of intelligence in The Netherlands and the tasks of the intelligence services during the Bosnian War, this information was used to characterize the intelligence culture in The Netherlands. In conclusion, The Netherlands has a disintegrative intelligence culture that also uses intelligence as a basis for decision-making. In the next chapter, the Dutch involvement regarding intelligence in the war in Bosnia will be analyzed. For this analysis the report by Cees Wiebes about intelligence during the war in Bosnia is used. The conceptualization of intelligence in The Netherlands of this chapter will be used as a basis for the analysis of the Dutch mission in Srebrenica.

## **Chapter 7: Dutch Intelligence in Bosnia**

In this chapter the fourth and last sub-question ‘How did this conceptualization influence the mission in Bosnia?’ will be answered. To answer this question the definitions by Warner and Davies were operationalized in the methodology section (Chapter Three) into three questions. These three questions are: (1) how was intelligence gathered? (2) what was done with the information gathered?, and (3) who was the information for? Using the content analysis program ATLAS.ti, the report by Cees Wiebes was analyzed with help of these three questions/indicators.

The report by Wiebes consists of 402 pages that were analyzed using the three indicators/questions. Next to these questions, two other codes were used that said something about the quality of the analysis of the intelligence services and about interesting points that did not fit within the other codes but were interesting for this study. In total, 278 quotations were distinguished. The first indicator (how was intelligence gathered?) was quoted 91 times in the report (code name: Activity Analysis). The second indicator (what was done with the information gathered?) was quoted 46 times in the report (code name: Decision Analysis). The third indicator was quoted 50 times in the report (code name: Disintegrative Analysis). Seventeen quotes were distinguished that said something about the quality of the analysis (code name: Quality) and 73 quotes were distinguished that were otherwise interesting for this study (code name: Other Interesting Things). The first indicator produced much more quotes than the second and third indicator. The reason for this is that it is a much broader topic, there are many ways of gathering information, and the report by Wiebes had larger parts of the report focused on intelligence gathering than about what was done with the information gathered.

The quotes were gathered and processed by following the case study protocol (this can be found in attachment C). First the textual source (report by Cees Wiebes) was downloaded. Secondly, the report was close read and codes were assigned to words, sentences, and paragraphs. Thirdly an overview was created of all the quotes and color codes were assigned to quotes with the same indicator (this can be found in attachment D). Lastly the results were written down by following the structure of the three indicators/questions above. This chapter will build on the previous chapter

because the notion of The Netherlands as a disintegrative intelligence culture and intelligence as a basis for decision-making will be used as a starting point. The structure of this chapter will follow the indicators used for the analyses. First the question ‘how was intelligence gathered?’ will be answered, then the question ‘what was done with the information gathered?’ and lastly, ‘who was the information for?’. All the three different chapters will elaborate on topics that can be distinguished within the indicators and they will conclude with a conclusion that brings together the theory of Davies and Warner and the information from the analysis.

### **7.1. Why The Netherlands Needed its own Intelligence Capacity**

The Dutchbat mission in Bosnia between 1993 – 1995, was part of a UN peacekeeping mission. UNPROFOR was supported by air support provided by NATO. In the case of NATO, it is a ‘stubborn myth’ that NATO has its own independent intelligence gathering and analyzing capacity (Wiebes, 2003, p. 39). The organization is in fact completely dependent on the intelligence provided by its member states. The UN peacekeeping missions are likewise dependent on participating parties for its intelligence. However, although the UN is dependent on intelligence agencies for information it makes no particular effort to gather intelligence from others. The culture within the UN is that of a resistance to intelligence, intelligence has a negative undertone in the UN context and is linked to ‘‘illegal and shady operations’’ (Wiebes, 2003, p. 21). A reason for this is that the UN is an organization based on ‘‘impartiality, transparency, and international law’’, and therefore for the UN to be gathering intelligence on its own members does not fit into the culture of openness the UN pursues (Wiebes, 2003, p. 24). Another reason for the UN dependent information position is that countries did not find the UN trustworthy of classified information. The UN was often identified with information leaks and UN personnel was not used to the handling of classified material. Furthermore, equipment used during the mission often did not have the right security and could be tapped without much effort. Wiebes states:

‘‘In no way did the UN prepare effectively for dealing in a systematic and well thought-out way with secret intelligence: neither in the area of gathering, nor of its dissemination within the UN bureaucracy. There are no guidelines regarding the question of how information is to be gathered, what material must remain

secret, which classification levels should be attached, and when documents can and should be released.” (Wiebes, 2003, p. 24).

The UN thus had a difficult position at the start of the conflict and the UNPROFOR in Bosnia. It had no intelligence capacity of its own, NATO also could not share much intelligence because it also did not have independent intelligence, there was no intelligence structure within the UN on how to handle classified material, and they had no secure operating material. On top of that, other countries with independent intelligence gathering capabilities did not share much intelligence with the UN. This resulted in the fact that UN troops, where Dutchbat was a part of, were sent into the mission in Bosnia almost blind.

Many within the UN were of the opinion that in peacekeeping missions no intelligence was needed. However, Bosnia and the enclave of Srebrenica were never fully considered to be a ‘safe area’. The enclave existed because the Serbs allowed it and the Dutch soldiers in the enclave were basically hostages (Wiebes, 2003). The Dutchbat mission was sent into hostile territory. Major-general Van Kappen, who was a military advisor to the UN Secretary-General from July 2015 onwards, stated that the lack of intelligence in the UN context is an important cause of the failure of many of the UN operations. According to Wiebes, the complexity of the peacekeeping missions and the situations they interfere with, increasingly ask for more intelligence and intelligence capacity within the UN (Wiebes, 2003).

As a result of the information position of the UN and NATO, many contributing countries had to rely on their own intelligence. The US, the UK, France, Germany, and some Scandinavian countries all had some form of intelligence capacity and structure within the former Yugoslavia. Another way to gather intelligence was via liaison with other intelligence agencies. We will see later that The Netherlands had difficulties with both ways of intelligence gathering and therefore did not have sufficient intelligence during the Dutchbat mission in Srebrenica (Wiebes, 2003).

## **7.2. How was Intelligence Gathered?**

The Netherlands had several intelligence-gathering capabilities in the case of Bosnia. The different forms of intelligence were: Human Intelligence, Signals Intelligence,

and Open Source Intelligence. Next to these three intelligence-gathering capabilities, The Netherlands also had access to the use of Imagery Intelligence.

### **7.2.1. Human Intelligence**

Human Intelligence (Humint) can be defined as the gathering of information through person-to-person contact. This contact can happen through the agencies agents, reports from attaches, other reports, debriefing of displaced persons, emigrants, deserters, (captured) soldiers, and released hostages. The secret operations regarding Humint are often executed by agents of intelligence agencies who gather information that is not available from open sources. In The Netherlands, the Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services determined in 1993 that the Intelligence Agencies in The Netherlands (BVD and MIS) could no longer make use of offensive human sources such as recruitment and working with agents in other countries. Consequently, the clandestine and secret Humint operations did not occur in the case of Bosnia. However, human sources were made use of in a more passive way, such as the debriefing of displaced persons and contact with the local population (Wiebes, 2003).

The BVD was only concerned with the influence the conflict in Bosnia had on the national security of The Netherlands. They were monitoring Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb, Serb, and Croat support groups in The Netherlands, especially after the placement of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in The Hague. Within the BVD it was Team Adriaan who was responsible for this and one of their responsibilities was to debrief Yugoslav displaced persons in The Netherlands. Several translators were part of the team and they also monitored telephone traffic within The Netherlands. The Humint gathered by Team Adriaan of the BVD was also sent to the Military Intelligence Service (MIS). However, the MIS was not allowed to interrogate the displaced persons themselves on specific military aspects. Therefore, much of the useful military intelligence was lost (Wiebes, 2003). The MIS also used Humint through the debriefing of returning Dutchbat soldiers and the reports of soldiers still deployed in Srebrenica. Canbat, the Canadian troops who were placed in Srebrenica before the deployment of the Dutch troops, made use of Humint coming from the local population, local informants, NGO's, and representatives of the warring parties. According to Wiebes, this "Humint proved to be the best (and almost exclusive)

source of intelligence’’ for the Canbat soldiers (Wiebes, 2003, p. 113). During the first rotations of the Dutchbat troops (Dutchbat I and Dutchbat II), contact with the local population was good and intelligence was gathered. However, during the third and last rotation (Dutchbat III), the contact with the local population was limited by the Dutchbat commander Karremans because of security reasons. Although there was some regular contact with the locals at a few observation posts, generally the intelligence gathering via Humint was severely restricted during Dutchbat III (Wiebes, 2003).

### **7.2.2. Signals Intelligence**

Signals Intelligence (Sigint) involves the gathering of ‘‘information from electromagnetic transmissions (of any type whatsoever) aiming to intercept electronic message and data traffic and is always conducted under the greatest secrecy by technical means’’ (Wiebes, 2003, p. 194). The Netherlands did make use of this form of intelligence gathering, however there were several problems that complicated the gathering of Sigint.

Although the MIS became one intelligence agency in 1987 during reorganization, the different branches of the MIS still all had their own Sigint gathering capabilities. The MIS/Army had the 898<sup>th</sup> Royal Netherlands Army Signals Battalion, the MIS/AirForce had the First Air Force Signals Group, and the MIS/Navy had the Royal Netherlands Navy Technical Information Processing Centre (TIVC). Only in 1996 were the three cells merged into one Sigint gathering department (Wiebes, 2003). One of the problems for the MIS was that there were not enough Serbo-Croat translators. Only in 1994 did the training for new translators start, which resulted in a slow start for the gathering of Sigint. Furthermore, there was no coordination whatsoever between the three Sigint cells. Also, the Ministry of Defense did not contribute priority to the gathering of Sigint, making the future of the cells an insecure one. Especially between 1993 and 1995 the Ministry of Defense did not have any interest for Sigint, which was considered as too expensive. Financial cutbacks made the situations for the gathering of Sigint even more difficult. Internally, the intelligence that was produced was often not disseminated because, for example, the MIS/Navy Sigint cell had the tendency to keep the information ‘‘close to its chest’’ (Wiebes, 2003, p. 101). Another problem was that the capabilities that were present

often were still oriented on the East-West axis. Although the focus on the Soviet Union fell away with the fall of the Iron Curtain, it was difficult to intercept messages in the Balkans when the antenna of the MIS/Army was still oriented towards the former Soviet Union. Another difficulty was that the warring parties in Bosnia made use of walkie-talkies. Intercepting messages from these devices was only possible with separate analysis capacity and it was necessary to be in Bosnia to use them (Wiebes, 2003). The Sigint capabilities of the MIS overall did not seem to be that impressive. However, during the years of the conflict and the Dutch deployment in Srebrenica there were two options for improving the information position of Dutchbat in the regard of Sigint (Wiebes, 2003).

In 1994, just before Dutchbat I was about to leave for Srebrenica, the US approached the Dutch MIS with an offer that would have resulted in a better intelligence position. The US had the same problem as the Dutch; the walkie-talkies that were used by the combating groups were difficult to intercept. To overcome this problem the Americans wanted to set up a reception and transmission installation across the area. One of these installations would be stationed at Srebrenica. The equipment was as large as two suitcases and Dutchbat I probably would have been able to bring the suitcases without suspicion of the warring groups. One of the suitcases was for the interception of traffic and the other suitcase had a direct link to a satellite. In turn for services provided to the US, the intercepted messages would have been shared with the MIS and more US intelligence would have been shared with the Dutch, for example Imagery Intelligence from satellites (Wiebes, 2003). However, the head of the MIS/Army, General Bokhoven, and other commanders in the Dutch armed forces (the minister of defense was not notified of the offer), rejected the offer. Bokhoven viewed the offer as ‘‘an offensive intelligence task that did not fit the context of UNPROFOR, and also felt it was more suitable for the intelligence services of other countries.’’ (Wiebes, 2003, p. 240). General Couzy, the commander in chief of the Dutch Army supported this decision and stated: ‘‘no spying for the Americans [...] this was a peacekeeping mission and not a war’’ (Wiebes, 2003, p. 241).

Another chance to improve the information position of Dutchbat and the MIS could have been the use of the Dutch Post Office satellite reception station in Burum (Friesland). All international official communication traffic went via that station.

Valuable intelligence could then be obtained through the satellite. However, even if the MIS had enough technical capabilities to pull this off, there was only a small chance that the Dutch minister of defense Voorhoeve, would have approved of this plan (Wiebes, 2003).

### **7.2.3. Open Source Intelligence**

Open Source Intelligence (Osint) is the information that is gathered from open sources, for example newspapers, magazines, books, radio, and television. The MIS made good use of Osint; some parts of the MIS were even forced to use Osint as their main intelligence capability. Because of the compartmentalization in the MIS and within the separate divisions (MIS/Army, MIS/Navy, MIS/Air Force), not all intelligence, such as Sigint and Humint, were available to all departments. For example, the MIS/Coordination division (responsible for the coordination between the three intelligence branches of the Armed Forces) did not have access to Sigint or Humint on its own. Therefore eighty per cent of its intelligence came from Osint. Furthermore, the problems because of the lack of translators also hit the Osint gathering. Only in 1994 a start was made with the training of new translators. The MIS/CO did invest in the development of open sources. They had access to commercial data banks, international professional journals, magazines and newspapers. They also made a habit of making use of Osint before using other intelligence sources such as Sigint and Humint (Wiebes, 2003).

### **7.2.3. Imagery Intelligence**

Another Dutch capability that was deployed in the war in Bosnia was Imagery Intelligence (Imint). Imint are photos made by satellites, espionage aircrafts and unmanned aircrafts. The Netherlands had dispatched four Dutch RF-16s to Villafranca airbase from where they could execute missions above Yugoslavia; these aircrafts could take photos in daytime and during the night. However, no intelligence about the preparations of the Serb offensive was noticed because just around the time that preparations for the Serb offensive were underway (11 June – 30 June), no flights were carried out by the Dutch RF-16s. In the regard of Imint, the Dutch also had opportunity to increase their information position. Although the four aircrafts were under command of UNPROFOR, the Dutch government could have still used the aircraft to gather their own intelligence. However, no orders in this regard were given by the Dutch Defense leadership; ‘‘The Netherlands never ordered flights for its own

purposes; it always adhered strictly to orders.” (Wiebes, 2003, p. 291). Other countries did not feel such restrictions, France, for examples, used their own capabilities to fly Imint flights for their own intelligence position (Wiebes, 2003).

#### **7.2.4. Conclusion**

As we go through the different intelligence capabilities The Netherlands had at its disposal during the conflict in Bosnia, it becomes clear that clandestine and covert actions were not often used by The Netherlands in the conflict in Bosnia. Even when the opportunities arose, for example when the MIS was asked to smuggle to suitcases into Srebrenica or when the MIS was in the position to use Imint capabilities without UNPROFOR knowledge, the Dutch government did not make use of them (Wiebes, 2003). This means that there was no emphasis on covert intelligence collection or secret and clandestine information, which confirms that the mission in Bosnia did not have an integrative intelligence culture. Furthermore, because of the use of multiple forms of intelligence, such as Humint, Sigint, and Osint, the intelligence that The Netherlands had was based on multiple sources. This fits the description of a disintegrative intelligence culture, because in a disintegrative intelligence culture the intelligence agencies make use of all sources of information, not only of clandestine or secret information (Davies, 2004).

Although there was indeed use of multiple forms of intelligence gathering, the MIS came across multiple difficulties. It seems that some of the leadership was not convinced of the use of intelligence and were leaning more towards the view of the UN that intelligence does not belong in a peacekeeping operation. Several opportunities that could have made the information position of Dutchbat better were thwarted because of that. Examples are, of course, the suitcases, but also the ban on contact with the local population during Dutchbat III, the reluctance to use the RF-16s for national interests, the disinterest for certain forms of intelligence gathering such as Sigint, and the connecting decrease in financing. Another difficulty was the ban on the use of offensive Humint (the recruitment of agents in another country). The compartmentalization between the different branches of the MIS also gave difficulty because not all departments had the access to the intelligence that they needed. This compartmentalization and rivalry between the different branches does actually fit rather well with the concept of a disintegrative intelligence culture. As said

previously, disintegrative intelligence cultures are sensitive to turf wars; which department is responsible for what? Fierce competition about responsibilities ran high between departments (Davies, 2004). The MIS was not one harmonious organization but rather an organization made out of building blocks of smaller departments with their own interests, sources, and goals (Wiebes, 2003).

### **7.3. What was Done With the Information Gathered?**

In the report by Wiebes, a definition of intelligence is used that states that information turns into intelligence by organizing and analyzing it. This is also what the Dutch MIS did when raw data came in.

#### **7.3.1. Raw Data or Analysis?**

On multiple occasions the report states that there were analysts working at the different departments of the MIS who analyzed the information and delivered a report or finished intelligence product. Wiebes states: ‘Analysts play a key role in this process, because they have to assess the information and the source for reliability, substance and relevance, and to compare it with data that became available earlier. They process the information.’ (Wiebes, 2003, p. 18). Often it is the case that intelligence failures are not caused by a lack of information but rather by a lack of processing and analyzing of this information into usable intelligence (Wiebes, 2003). An example that shows the analysis capacity of MIS is that the MIS/Army had a Situation Centre that was responsible for producing finished intelligence. They drafted Intelligence Summaries that consisted of processed intelligence about Yugoslavia and the rest of the world. Another example of two different types of analysis is the difference between the analysis of Sigint and Imint. Sigint information was coded and afterwards was sent to the encryption analysis section where they attempted to break the code with computers. As stated, the Dutch did not have their own Imint. However, at one occasion they were allowed to analyze and look into Imint from the US. Although important details were missing, a team of Dutch analysts was able to look at the photos and interpret them for a short period of time (Wiebes, 2003).

In principle, all of the branches of the MIS had roughly the same raw information. Despite the similarity of the raw information, analysis and the finished intelligence could differ between the three branches because they all looked at the data through

different eyes (Wiebes, 2003). Although there were differences in the analysis, it was preferable to the distribution of raw intelligence. The IDB (Foreign Intelligence Service), which was disbanded in 1994, often distributed raw intelligence, however this was not successful:

“The ministries were at a complete loss to know how to deal with unprocessed data from agents and informants. When the messages were processed, it often led to bureaucratic arguments and competence disputes, especially between the IDB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which saw this information as a threat to its own diplomatic reporting.” (Wiebes, 2003, p. 83).

### **7.3.2. Quality of the Analysis**

Although the information gathering capabilities of the Dutch were not impressive, both the MIS/Army and the MIS/CO produced a large amount of reports and intelligence summaries. There were daily messages that gave insight in the current developments and that presented forecasts, there were weekly editions that gave an overview of the past week and also presented a forecast, there were monthly summaries, and annual summaries. Also, the MIS/Air Force produced the Deny Flight Intelligence Summary every day. Although the strength of the MIS was in its analysis, in general there was not enough unique raw intelligence to turn into unique and interesting intelligence reports. The minister of Defense even stated that the information of the intelligence services did not go above the level of a good newspaper. According to Wiebes, this statement might be slightly exorbitant, however it is clear that The Netherlands had not much to offer intelligence wise. Further difficulties arose because of this, because intelligence liaisons with other countries were on the basis of *quid pro quo*. This means that intelligence from other agency can only be received if you have meaningful intelligence to trade for it. “The MIS’s foreign counterparts could only benefit from sound analyses on the basis of a good foreign intelligence source, and in view of the fact that none existed where The Netherlands were concerned” (Wiebes, 2003, p. 96). This made the MIS uninteresting for foreign intelligence services and it decreased the information position of the MIS even further. Officials from foreign intelligence services stated that they even saw some reports with the explicit notion “Not for Dutch Eyes”

(Wiebes, 2003, p. 96). Sometimes the MIS did receive intelligence from foreign intelligence services; however, this was always finished intelligence and not raw information. The MIS itself was also secretive and hesitant in sharing its own finished intelligence. The reports that were produced by the MIS often did not reach the information office of the UNPROFOR. The staff that worked there could not remember seeing a single intelligence report from the Dutch MIS (Wiebes, 2003). Furthermore, the MIS/Navy also kept the Sigint that was available within the MIS.

### **7.3.3. Compartmentalization Within the MIS**

Also in the analysis stage compartmentalization is apparent, both between the two intelligence services (BVD and MIS) and within the MIS. The BVD and the MIS did not always share the same views on the conflict in Bosnia, especially the political-military analysis of the BVD led to different opinions of the BVD and the MIS. However, most of the compartmentalization was within the MIS. For example, the MIS/Army did give some intelligence to the MIS/CO, however this was only finished intelligence and not the raw material. Therefore the MIS/CO was not able to make analysis of its own and they had to completely rely on the information provided by the MIS/Army. The MIS/Army also had a tight reign on the contacts the MIS/CO had with the Dutch staff officers, the MIS/CO was not allowed to make direct contact with them in any way. Between the three branches of the MIS and the MIS/CO, and within the MIS/Army there was a "fierce level of competition" (Wiebes, 2003, p. 114). For example, when the MIS/Army talked about helicopters in one of their reports, the MIS Air Force was not happy about it (Wiebes, 2003).

### **7.3.4. Conclusion**

The information that is gathered from the different intelligence capabilities of The Netherlands is clearly not distributed as raw information but rather as a finished intelligence product that is analyzed by analysts of the intelligence agencies in The Netherlands. This can be concluded by the large amount of analysts in the employment of the MIS and the BVD and the reports that were regularly produced (Wiebes, 2003). An analysis on the grounds of multiple sources fits within the description of a disintegrative intelligence culture (Davies, 2004). In the past, the IDB (disbanded in 1994) did make use of raw information, which was then immediately distributed. The use of raw information by decision-makers fits better with the integrative intelligence culture (Davies, 2004). However, this practice of the IDB is

no longer in use because it was not successful, caused confusion among decision-makers, and because the IDB was disbanded in 1994 (Wiebes, 2003).

Lastly, also within the analysis stage there are notions of compartmentalization that also suit the description of a disintegrative culture. Turf wars between and within the different MIS branches and the MIS/CO existed. Intelligence was in many instances only transferred as a finished intelligence product. This way some departments, such as the MIS/CO, were completely dependent on the analysis of other departments. Sources were also kept solely for the profit of one branch; for example, the MIS/CO was not allowed to get into direct contact with Dutch staff officers in Yugoslavia (Wiebes, 2003).

#### **7.4. Who was the Information for?**

The definition that is used by Wiebes in the report about the use of intelligence in Bosnia states not only that information is turned into intelligence by organizing and analyzing it, but also that the intelligence is meant for decision-makers. In the case of Dutchbat in Bosnia, the intelligence that was produced was meant for the Armed Forces commanders, high up officials within the Ministry of Defense, and for the Minister of Defense.

##### **7.4.1. The Role of the MIS in the Daily Life of the Decision-Makers**

In the report by Cees Wiebes it is shown that the intelligence produced by the MIS is meant for decision-makers such as the commanders of the different branches of the armed forces and the minister of defense (Voorhoeve and Ter Beek). The MIS/Army, MIS/Air Force, and the MIS/Navy all reported directly to the commander of their respective armed forces branch. The MIS/CO reported directly to minister Voorhoeve and other decision-makers; “The MIS/CO reported directly and through special briefings to the Ministers Ter Beek and Voorhoeve, the senior ministry officials and military officers.” (Wiebes, 2003, p. 123).

The MIS/CO, as said, reported directly to the minister. However, the MIS/CO did not have direct access to raw information. They only received finished intelligence products from the MIS/Army and were almost completely dependent on them for their information. The MIS/COs own analyses, that were sent to the minister, were based on Osint for about 80 per cent. Therefore the MIS/CO was at a constant

disadvantage in relation to the MIS/Army. Voorhoeve stated: ‘‘I did receive some analyses from time to time, a few reports, which were more extensive than the daily situation reports, but they came from the Defence Staff.’’ (Wiebes, 2003, p. 121). Although the MIS/CO reported to the officials directly, nothing was ever directly requested by the senior Ministry of Defense officials regarding the decision to deploy soldiers to Bosnia. The MIS/CO played no central role in the ‘‘daily political life of the Ministers Ter Beek and Voorhoeve’’ (Wiebes, 2003, p. 124). Not only the MIS/CO was left out of the decision, no risk analysis was made beforehand about Srebrenica by any of the MIS branches. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army said that he did not ask the MIS/Army for a risk analysis, he stated: ‘‘I did not give such an order. Simply because I did not need it.’’ (Wiebes, 2003, p. 121). Neither did the minister or Commander Couzy order extra effort and investment for intelligence above the effort that was already made. Thus, the MIS did not play any role in the conflict in Bosnia, regarding the decision-making. Moreover, Voorhoeve confirmed that the service was never accepted as a serious discussion partner by political decision-makers. Lastly, the Head of the MIS did not have close contact with Minister Voorhoeve. There existed no regular pattern of reporting (Wiebes, 2003).

#### **7.4.2. Critical Information that did not Reach the Minister**

Not only did the MIS not have a large role in the daily political life of the decision-makers, when they did give advice it was often not listened to. On multiple occasions, the head of the MIS verbally advised the senior defense staff officials not to go to Bosnia. Furthermore, there was some critique given about the light arms the soldiers were armed with. Another example is that when the Dutchbat commander Karremans sent a warning to the Ministry of Defense about the expected attack on the enclave, the warning seem to be ignored and ‘‘no further action was taken’’ (Wiebes, 2003, p. 313). The warning also never came under the attention of Minister Voorhoeve, the commander of the Army thought it not necessary to inform the minister about the warning send by Karremans. The letter did also not reach the MIS/Army who could possibly have given extra attention to possible preparations for an assault on the enclave. Another moment when the minister was not informed is when the Americans made the request for the suitcases with Sigint equipment. The commanders of the Armed Forces took the decision by themselves to no accept the offer by the

Americans to place Sigint equipment in Srebrenica. They did not deem it necessary to inform the Minister about the request (Wiebes, 2003).

### **7.4.3. Conclusion**

The intelligence produced by the MIS was meant for decision-makers of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense. The Intelligence Services did not make any decisions themselves; they solely had an advisory role. This shows that the intelligence culture is indeed, also during the mission in Bosnia, a culture based on intelligence as a basis for decision-making. Although the MIS had an advisory role, they did not play a large role in the daily political life of the decision-makers. They were not asked for a risk analysis or any advice regarding the deployment of soldiers in Bosnia. The service was not even considered to be a serious discussion partner for the decision-makers. It seems that the decision-makers did not take the role and the intelligence of the MIS very seriously and there was a certain notion of disinterest regarding their advice and reports. When there was critical information the information was not brought under the attention of the Minister of Defense. Examples are the warning sent by Karremans about the pending attack on the enclave and the offer for unique Sigint capabilities by the Americans (Wiebes, 2003).

In this chapter the report by Cees Wiebes was analyzed on the basis of the definitions of intelligence by Davies and Warner. This analysis was structured by three questions/indicators; how was intelligence gathered?, what was done with the information gathered?, who was the information for?. Each section was concluded by bringing the analysis together with the theories of Davies and Warner. In the next chapter the research question of this study will be answered, limitations of this study will be described, and suggestions will be made for further research.

## **Chapter 8: Conclusion**

In the last chapter of this study, the research question that was posed in the first chapter of this study will be answered. After answering the research question the limitations of this study will be highlighted and recommendations for further research will be given. The research question that will be answered in this chapter is the following: How can the concept of intelligence cultures contribute to our understanding of the failure of the Dutchbat mission in Bosnia (1993 – 1995)? To answer this question, several sub-questions were posed and answered in previous chapters of this study. These sub-questions were: (1) What does the concept of intelligence cultures entail?, (2) what was the intelligence culture in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia?, (3) how was intelligence conceptualized in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia?, and (4) how did this conceptualization influence the mission in Bosnia?

The first sub-question outlined the concept of intelligence culture and introduced a framework for the characterization of an intelligence culture. The concept of intelligence culture was defined as “how we define what it is we think we are doing when we think we are doing intelligence shapes how we do intelligence” (Davies, 2002, p. 65). The framework that was developed introduced the two different sets of characterizations for intelligence cultures. First, the integrative and disintegrative intelligence culture and second, the intelligence culture with intelligence as a basis for decision-making and intelligence as activity. The second sub-question was answered using a simplified version of Warner’s framework for comparing intelligence systems. It shows that The Netherlands, since the end of the Cold War, has had a focus on the promotion of the rule of law and stability in the world. This explains its involvement with peacekeeping operations. The third sub-question uses the framework introduced in the literature review and uses it to characterize the intelligence culture in The Netherlands. The Netherlands has a disintegrative intelligence culture because of its use of multiple sources and its hesitancy to make use of covert or clandestine operations. In 1993, the offensive use of Humint abroad was even restricted. Furthermore, it became clear that The Netherlands has an intelligence culture where intelligence is the basis of decision-making instead of intelligence as a basis for activity. The intelligence agencies do not have a mandate to make decisions or

policies. These decisions are to be made by the political and administrative leadership. The finished intelligence is therefore disseminated among the top politicians and officials of the ministries.

In the use of intelligence in the case of the deployment of the Dutchbat mission to Srebrenica, Bosnia, the disintegrative intelligence culture and the characterization of intelligence as basis for decision-making are clearly coming forward in the report of Cees Wiebes about the mission. The Dutch made use of multiple sources for intelligence, such as Sigint, Humint, and Osint, although the use of Humint was strictly restricted to the use of defensive Humint. Furthermore, the finished intelligence was presented to the decision-makers as reports, which they could then use to make a decision. Although in theory this situation did not appear to be that bad, in practice the Dutch MIS came across many difficulties. The compartmentalization between and within the different branches of the MIS restricted the exchange of raw intelligence. There was also a level of fierce competitiveness between the branches that fits with the notion of turf wars within a disintegrative culture. Another difficulty was the disinterest that The Netherlands seems to share with the UN regarding the use of intelligence in peacekeeping missions. Although The Netherlands had multiple opportunities to improve their information position, it was not done because leadership did not deem it necessary. This disinterest also showed in the ignoring of the MIS, as a serious discussion partner for decision-makers. The decision-makers rarely consulted the MIS and there never was an official risk analysis about the deployment of the troops and the security situation of the enclave beforehand. Some crucial information did not even reach the top of the decision-makers, such as the Minister of Defense.

It seems that the culture about intelligence in The Netherlands during the war in Bosnia can be characterized as a struggle for recognition. Many decision-makers and commanders did not realize the importance of intelligence for peacekeeping missions. Either because they agreed with the UN and followed their lead in trying to restrict the use of intelligence, or because the reports and the intelligence community in general were not taken seriously as discussion partners and advisors. This ignorance about the importance of the intelligence translated itself in decreasing financial means. Furthermore, the compartmentalization and the leftovers of the Cold War

hindered a smooth internal organization of the intelligence agencies. If we look at the capabilities at The Netherlands' disposal, the Dutch intelligence services, the commanders, and the political decision-makers could have had a much better information position. The ignorance about intelligence in The Netherlands might very well be one of the reasons for this lack of information. The Dutch intelligence culture that is struggling for recognition by policy-makers and other high officials has made the mission in Bosnia an intelligence failure. As Schuurman stated in the introduction of this study; "At Zvornik I saw a Serbian combat helicopter. If I could have seen this from the bus, the intelligence services could have seen it as well, right?" (Broer & Albrecht, 2002). Yes, The Netherlands could have been more involved and could have had a better information position, however they choose, often very consciously, to not gain more information. Culture has influence the lack of capabilities and it was also the culture within The Netherlands that drove the commanders to be the good person in the classroom by not producing much intelligence like the UN wanted. However this 'good boy' attitude and ignorance have backfired tremendously when it became clear that trying to be the good person can turn you, unwillingly, into the bad person.

### **8.1. Limitations of this Study**

This study has been executed to the best of the authors' abilities and with the greatest care for the truthfulness and reliability of the information and analysis presented. However, as in every study, it also has its limitations. First of all, the research field of intelligence agencies is a difficult one. First hand information, in the form of interviews, is difficult to come by. Therefore, this research has been conducted through the use of a report that was written seven years after the events in Srebrenica by Cees Wiebes. The disadvantage is that only one report was used for the main empirical analysis section of this study. Although Wiebes has doubtlessly done his best to be as impartial as possible, it is not unlikely that some personal opinion and preference have been present in his report. Another report would probably represent another author's opinion or preference, this would probably have given a more well-rounded analysis about the case because of the differences in views these authors might have. However, this limitation has been countered by careful use of multiple sources throughout the study, especially in answering the second and third sub-question. This multitude of sources has aimed to contextualize and support the

conclusion drawn by Wiebes. Another limitation is that this author did not have any influence on the way the interviews that Wiebes did for his report, were conducted. Although there were many (hundreds) interviews conducted, making the outcome and analysis more reliable, this research is only based on the finished analyzed product (the report), not on the raw information and the transcripts of the interviews.

Thirdly, in many instances, Wiebes himself was also not completely sure about the conclusion he makes after consulting his many resources. The secretiveness of the topic ensures that there will always be some information that was held back because of restriction and classified material. Using the concept of intelligence culture, it therefore remains difficult to draw strong conclusions. Another reason for this is the secretiveness of intelligence agencies and because of the contested concepts of culture and intelligence. This limitation has been mitigated by carefully operationalizing the concept into practical indicators and using all information that is available at the time of this study. The fourth limitation is the lack of definitions of intelligence by the intelligence agencies during the war in Bosnia. However, as has been told, this limitation has been countered by using a definition from 2012 by the MIS, drawing information from the tasks of the intelligence services, and using definitions of Dutch scholars. Lastly, it is possible that the indicators and codes used for this analysis have missed certain information. Although human errors and misinterpretations can always be present in a study, reliability in this study has been strengthened by being transparent about the methods used and describing every step that has been taken.

Despite the limitations listed for this study a conscious effort has been made to overcome them or at least make their influence as small as possible. Examples are the transparency and the effort to find solutions for limitations, such as the use of multiple sources to contextualize and verify. Although it is difficult to draw strong conclusions in this field of research, the findings of this research are both interesting and new. The struggle for recognition the intelligence services in The Netherlands had in the years of the war in Bosnia shed a new light on the failure of the mission. It shows that the use of a new concept, intelligence culture, can give interesting new insights into a case that has been studied often. This research has also provided a way to make the concept of intelligence culture operational. It shows that a theoretical concept can turn

into a practical and usable concept for research and that real and useful results can be found using concepts that were mostly theoretical before.

As said, although the concept of intelligence culture has not been used in research often, this research has shown that, given the right operationalization, conclusions can be drawn with the help of the concept of intelligence culture. However, this is one way to use the concept, doubtlessly there are many more ways to operationalize the concept and use it to explain cases or to compare intelligence cultures around the world. Not only to explain intelligence cultures connected to countries, but also to international organizations, intergovernmental institutions and business. There is a whole new world to discover using the concept of intelligence cultures before we can decide what the best way is to use and operationalize this concept. A concrete idea for future research is a study about the intelligence culture of the UN. This research has shown that the UN has a dislike for the use of intelligence while it is obviously vital in many instances, even in peacekeeping operations. The dislike of intelligence is something that could be defined as a part of the (intelligence) culture of the UN. It would be interesting in further research to find out more about this culture and how this dislike has been developed.

Another recommendation for future research would be a case study about a more recent case in The Netherlands. Although this case study of Bosnia has provided valuable results, it does not say much about the current intelligence culture. An interesting question could be if the Dutch intelligence services are still struggling for recognition nowadays or if they have gained more recognition. It would be specifically interesting how the attack on the Twin Towers in New York has influenced the importance and recognition of the intelligence services. Lastly, an interesting research idea is what the events were in Dutch history that has shaped and influenced the intelligence culture in The Netherlands. As written in this study, the Boer War largely influenced the intelligence culture of the UK while the intelligence culture in the US was influenced by the attack on Pearl Harbor. It would be interesting to see what events have influenced the development of the Dutch intelligence culture.

## Bibliography

- Abbott, M. L., & McKinney, J. (2013). *Understanding and Applying Research Design*. John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated.
- BBC. (2012, May 17). *Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica*. Retrieved April 9, 2018, from BBC.com: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18101028>
- Broer, T., & Albrecht, Y. (2002, April 13). *Het verhaal en de nooit gepubliceerde foto's van een Dutchbat soldaat*. Retrieved February 28, 2018, from Vrij Nederland: <https://www.vn.nl/het-verhaal-en-de-nooit-gepubliceerde-fotos-van-een-dutchbat-soldaat/>
- Brouwer, J. W. (2003). Gedegen en evenwichtig? Het NIOD-rapport nader beschouwd. *Low Countries Historical Review* , 118 (3), 293 - 307.
- BVD. (1993). *BVD Jaarverslag 1993*. Ministry of Interior. The Hague: Ministry of Interior.
- BVD. (1993). *Een boekje open over de BVD*. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst. Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken.
- BVD. (1997). *Zicht op de BVD*. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Binnenlandse Veiligheids Dienst. Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken.
- Chenoy, A. M. (1996). The European Union and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. *International Studies* , 33 (4), 441 -453.
- Commissie Srebrenica. (2003, January 27). *Overheid.nl*. Retrieved March 21, 2018, from Enquete Srebrenica: <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-28506-3.html>
- Corder, M., & Cohadzic, A. (2015, July 9). *Srebrenica 20 years after the genocide: The Dutch peacekeepers still haunted by memories of the massacre*. Retrieved April

9, 2018, from INDEPENDENT:

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/srebrenica-20-years-after-the-genocide-the-dutch-peacekeepers-still-haunted-by-memories-of-the-10378913.html>

Davies, P. H. (2002). Ideas of Intelligence; Divergent National Concepts and Institutions. *Harvard International Review* , 24 (3), 62 - 65.

Davies, P. H. (2004). Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* , 17 (3), 495 - 520.

De Graaff, B. (2011). De Nederlandse Inlichtigen- en Veiligheidsdiensten: Nooit te oud om te leren. *Groniek: Historisch Tijdschrift* , 193, 249 - 261.

De Graaff, B., Nyce, J. M., & Locke, C. (2016). *Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Duyvesteyn , I. (2011). Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Some Observations. *Intelligence and National Security* , 26 (4), 521 - 530.

Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. *Political Science* , 936 - 957.

Herman, M. (1996). *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Higgins, N. (2014). The Responsibility of The Netherlands for the Actions of Dutchbat: An analysis of Nuhanovic and Mustafic. *International Criminal Law Review* , 14 (3), 641 - 659.

Hijzen, C. (2014). More Than a Ritual Dance. The Dutch Practice of Parliamentary Oversight and Control of the Intelligence Community. *Security and Human Rights* , 24 (3 - 4), 227 - 238.

Jones, G. (2006). *Srebrenica: Worst European Atrocity Since World War II*. Retrieved March 22, 2018, from CNN:  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/05/26/Serbia.Mladic.Srebrenica/index.html>

Kent, S. (1966). *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Korteweg, A. R. (2011). *The Super Power, The Bridge Builder, and the Hesitant Ally: How Defense Transformation Divided NATO (1991 - 2008)*. Leiden: Leiden University Press.

Ministerie van Defensie. (2012). *Joint Doctrine Publicatie 2: Inlichtingen*. Den Haag: Ministerie van Defensie.

MIVD. (n.d.). *Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst*. Retrieved May 24, 2018, from Ministerie van Defensie:  
<https://www.defensie.nl/organisatie/bestuursstaf/eenheden/mivd>

Nettelfield, L., & Wagner, S. (2013). Introduction. In L. Nettelfield, & S. Wagner, *Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide* (pp. 1 - 30). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

NIOD. (2016). *De val van Srebrenica: Luchtsteun en voorkennis in nieuw perspectief*. Retrieved March 21, 2018, from NIOD.nl:  
<https://www.niod.nl/sites/niod.nl/files/Rapport-Verkenning-NIOD-De-val-van-Srebrenica-Luchtsteun-en-voorkennis-in-nieuw-perspectief.pdf>

NIOD. (2002, April 10). *Srebrenica Report: Press Release*. Retrieved March 21, 2018, from NIOD.nl: <https://www.niod.nl/en/srebrenica-report/press-release>

NIOD. (2002). *Srebrenica: Reconstruction, Background, Consequences and Analysis of the Fall of a Safe Area*. NIOD.

Nollkaemper, A. (2011, July 8). *Dual attribution: liability of The Netherlands for removal of individuals from the compound of Dutchbat*. Retrieved April 5, 2018, from Sharesproject.nl: <http://www.sharesproject.nl/dual-attribution-liability-of-the-netherlands-for-removal-of-individuals-from-the-compound-of-dutchbat/>

NOS. (2017, June 27). *Dutchbat-veteranen dienen schadeclaim in voor trauma's Srebrenica*. Retrieved March 22, 2018, from NOS.nl: <https://nos.nl/artikel/2180181-dutchbat-veteranen-dienen-schadeclaim-in-voor-trauma-s-srebrenica.html>

O'Connell, K. M. (2004). Thinking about Intelligence Comparatively. *Brown Journal of World Affairs* , 11 (1), 189-199.

Overheid. (1987, December 3). *Wet op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten*. Retrieved April 18, 2018, from Overheid.nl: <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0004244/2001-09-01>

Parlement.com. (n.d.). *Kabinet-Kok I (1994 - 1998)*. Retrieved April 13, 2018, from Parlement.com: [https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvvu/kabinet\\_kok\\_i\\_1994\\_1998](https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvvu/kabinet_kok_i_1994_1998)

Parlement.com. (n.d.). *Kabinet-Lubbers III (1989 - 1994)*. Retrieved April 13, 2018, from Parlement.com: [https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvw3/kabinet\\_lubbers\\_iii\\_1989\\_1994](https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhronvw3/kabinet_lubbers_iii_1989_1994)

Rijksoverheid. (1992). *Miljoenennota 1993*. Ministry of Finance. Den Haag: Rijksoverheid.

Rijsdijk, E. (2011). The Politics of Hard Knowledge: Uncertainty, Intelligence Failures, and the 'Last Minute Genocide' of Srebrenica. *Review of International Studies* , 37, 2221 - 2235.

Srebrenica 95. (2016). *Timeline*. Retrieved April 6, 2018, from Srebrenica95.com: <http://www.srebrenica95.com/english.html>

The Guardian. (2002, April 10). *Netherlands and UN Blamed over Srebrenica Massacre*. Retrieved March 2, 2018, from The Guardian:  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/10/warcrimes1>

Traynor, I. (2010, June 10). *Srebrenica genocide: worst massacre in Europe since the Nazis*. Retrieved April 9, 2018, from The Guardian:  
<https://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/jun/10/hague-bosnian-serb-srebrenica-genocide1>

United Nations Department of Public Information. (1996, September). *Former Yugoslavia - UNPROFOR*. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from United Nations:  
[http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof\\_b.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm)

Van de Roer, R. (2002, April 19). *Kok moet echte verantwoording afleggen*. Retrieved February 27, 2018, from NRC: <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2002/04/19/kok-moet-echte-verantwoording-afleggen-7586284-a804854>

Van Deth, J. W., & Vis, J. C. (2006). *Regeren in Nederland: Het politieke en bestuurlijke bestel in vergelijkend perspectief*. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Warner, M. (2009). Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems. In G. F. Treverton, & W. Agrell, *National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects* (pp. 11-37). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wiebes, C. (2003). *Intelligence and the War in Bosnia*. LIT Verlag.

Yin, R. K. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. London: Sage Publications.

## **Attachments**

Attachment A – Timeline Siege of Srebrenica

Attachment B – Table of Warner’s Framework

Attachment C – Case Study Protocol

Attachment D – Report of Quotes from ATLAS.ti