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## **Northern Ireland: The Long Road to Peace: How (and why) do radical wings of social movements affect whether the moderate wings achieve their goals?**

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### **Citation**

O'Driscoll, N. (2022). *Northern Ireland: The Long Road to Peace: How (and why) do radical wings of social movements affect whether the moderate wings achieve their goals?*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

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Northern Ireland: The Long Road to Peace

*How (and why) do radical wings of social movements affect whether the moderate wings  
achieve their goals?*



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Bachelor Project: Social Movements and Political Violence

Date: 30/05/2022

Word Count: 7996

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## Introduction

On Saturday 10<sup>th</sup> April 1993, Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn Fein, was spotted leaving the home of John Hume, then leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP). Both men had been meeting in secret for a decade discussing the Troubles and how peace in Northern Ireland can be achieved. The sighting was reported in the *Sunday Tribune* and was the first report of a meeting between one of the alleged leaders of the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and one of the key leaders of the non-violent peace advocating group during the Northern Irish 'Troubles'. The impact of the outing of such secret meetings cannot be underestimated. Evidence of the being mutual respect between one man who condemns the violent nature of the Provisional IRA and the other man who carries the coffins of the leaders of such a group is monumental. Above all else it is absurd and goes against the very nature of the relationship between violent and non-violent groups.

Over the thirty years of the Northern Irish 'Troubles' there has been various similar interactions and exchanges between both violent and non-violent groups. Interactions and exchanges which many would deem key to the achievement of peace in Northern Ireland. This relationship of interactions and exchanges between the violent 'IRA' and non-violent group during the Northern Irish 'Troubles' is the topic of this thesis. This thesis will investigate the influence that the radical group had on the moderate group's goal of achieving peace in Northern Ireland. The scope of this research stems far beyond the case of Northern Ireland. It is influential for all cases in which radical groups influence the moderate groups ability to achieve their goals. Therefore, the research question for this investigation is: *"How (and why) do radical wings of social movements affect whether the moderate wings achieve their goals?"*

Overarchingly, this research will be investigating the presence of spoiler problems during the Northern Irish 'Troubles'. Specifically, how the radical 'IRA' group influenced whether the moderate non-violent group would achieve or not their goal of establishing peace in Northern Ireland. There has been vast prior research into the relationship between radical violent groups and moderate non-violent groups. This research aims to further this prior research by investigating how radical violent groups can influence whether non-violent groups achieve their goal of establishing peace. This research will offer a particularly interesting analysis as the radical group of this case are the major obstacle to peace achievement but also necessary for achieving it. This thesis will conduct a qualitative analysis, specifically theory-testing process tracing. Therefore, building on and improving prior work as it will offer a more detailed analysis of the how and why of the effect. The expected finding of this thesis is that

during the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ the radical group conducted violence to ensure the moderate group would not achieve their goal of establishing peace in Northern Ireland. Due to that fact that they believed such peace would prevent their goal of an United Ireland from being achieved. However, such continued violence was not sustainable for the radical group as they realised their goal would not be achieved through a violent campaign. Therefore, they switched to a political campaign and began dialogue towards peace with the moderate group, dialogue which ensured their conditions to allow peace to be achieved were also heard.

### Literature Review

For the last two decades there has been a vast amount of research conducted on non-violent resistance movements. From how they are defined, their levels of success, to their relationship with violent resistance movements. Below, the previous research on non-violent resistance movements will be outlined and the necessary steps needed to move such previous research forward will be demonstrated. This literature review will begin with non-violent resistance movements due to the focus of this research being on how the goals of non-violent resistance movements can be influenced and sometimes achieved with the help of violent resistance movements. Therefore, before conducting such research a knowledge of the previous research on non-violent resistance movements is needed. Moreover, following the previous research of non-violent resistance movements, the previous literature on the radical flank effect will be outlined. The previous literature on radical flank effects is important to outline because of the research gap which emerges from such previous literature. In which more research needs to be conducted on how the achievement of non-violent groups goals can be influenced by violent groups. Furthermore, the previous literature will demonstrate the necessity to focus such research on case studies such as the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’.

#### *Violence & non-violence*

Previous literature has provided numerous definitions and outlines of what exactly non-violent resistance is. Most famously, Gene Sharp (2003), outlines that non-violent resistance has three general types of behavior. First, non-violent resistance engages in “symbolic protests” e.g., marches. Second, non-violent resistance must practice “noncooperation” e.g., with their opponents. Third, the “active intervention and disruption of the normal operation of the system has been applied in various psychological, social, economic, physical and political forms” e.g., sit-downs. Sharp highlights that non-violent resistance is identified by “the type of action

applied” not its beliefs (p. 8). Furthermore, Sharp illustrates that most but not all non-violent resistance movements have two crucial processes. First, “an ability to defy and at times to reverse the effects of repression”. And second, “an ability to undermine and server the sources of power of the opponents” (Sharp, 2003, p. 10). More than a decade later, Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) provide a further definition of non-violent resistance as “the application of unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent” (p. 271). However, this research and previous literature illustrates that to fully understand non-violent resistance one cannot research it alone. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) demonstrate that non-violent resistance must be researched in conjunction with violent resistance. Their findings illustrate that non-violent resistance achieves success fifty-three percent of the time. Whereas, violent resistance only achieves success twenty-six percent of the time. Their research overturns the traditional belief that violent resistance is the best answer to achieving success in resistance movements (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 8-9). In (2011) Chenoweth and Stephan build on this previous research of theirs outlining that continuous politics has seen no moment where violent or non-violent resistance is the only strategy present. Therefore, furthering the previous literature that violent and non-violent resistance need to be researched in tandem. These previous literatures on non-violent and violent resistance demonstrates the importance of looking at violent and non-violent movements together and not separate to fully understand them. Such previous literature indicates a research gap where in which to fully understand non-violent resistance one must also look at it with its violent resistance counterpart.

### *Radical Flank Effect*

Previous literature researching the relationship between violent and non-violent groups have used the radical flank effect for their investigation. The radical flank effect was first theorised and researched by Herbert Haines during his investigation into the American Civil Rights Movement. Haines (1984) found that radical flank effects were unique and critical factors of the American Civil Rights Movement (p. 42). His main finding suggests that positive radical flank effects had a significant impact on increasing the outside funding for moderate civil rights organisations in the 1960s. Haines (1984) underlines that further research needs to be conducted on the presence of radical flank effects in future social movements (p. 42). Schock and Chenoweth (2012) used Haines’ radical flank effect theory to demonstrate that nonviolent movements with no violent radical flank are more successful than non-violent resistance with

a violent radical flank. Additionally, Sutton, Svensson & Davidson (2012) propose the idea that the ability of positive radical flank effects to impact non-violent resistance needs further research. Braithwaite (2014) builds on the above authors through her investigation of the presence of the radical flank effect in the resistance against South African Apartheid. She outlines “if violent radical flanks exist in spite of their opposition to them, they must be reluctant to cast them out of resistance coalitions” (p. 28). Tompkins (2015) complements Braithwaite’s point by illustrating that non-violent resistance groups can use the presence of a radical flank to continue their movement and achieve their goals. McCammon, Bergner and Arch (2015) furthers this point by outlining that “often coalitions (not conflict) among movement groups can produce political victory for collective actors”. They also highlights that more research needs to be conducted on within-movement conflict’s influence. Such research would benefit and further “our understanding of how movements achieve political change (p. 172). Additionally, Schock and Demetriou (2018) build on this point by McCammon, Bergner and Arch (2015) that research must examine within-movement dynamics. Furthermore, how positive and negative radical flank effects operate within-movements. Overall, what emerges from this review of previous literature is the need to investigate the influence of radical groups on non-violent resistance movements. Particularly, how radical groups influence the non-violent groups ability to achieve their goal. There has been little previous research on how radical groups during the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ have influenced the non-violent groups ability to achieve their goal of peace. Tompkins (2015) research on radical flank effects contained a large-N quantitative analysis including the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’. Tompkins’s main finding was that non-violent groups can use the presence of a radical group to achieve their goals (2015, p. 130). However, due to its quantitative nature it did not contain enough rich evidence on how and why radical groups influenced the moderate group’s goal.

The above literature review demonstrates that not only is there a research gap in investigating the relationship between non-violent and violent resistance groups but also in applying such research to the case of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’. Specifically, applying this research in such a way that provides rich evidence which answers the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of the research question not just the ‘what’. This research will provide an answer to this research gap surrounding non-violent resistance groups and how their goals are influenced by violent groups through a qualitative lens.

## Theoretical Framework

A gap emerged from the previous literature surrounding the relationship between radical and moderate groups during the Northern Irish 'Troubles'. Particularly, the influence that radical groups can have on whether moderate groups achieve their goal or not. This radical group influence can take the form of spoiler problems. Therefore, this section will contain the theoretical framework for the study of the presence of the spoiler problem theory in the Northern Irish 'Troubles'.

The spoiler problem theory was first introduced by Stephan Stedman (1997), Stedman theorized that during peace processes following civil war, groups who view peace negotiations as threatening to their power or goals will use violence to subvert aims to achieve peace (p. 5). Peace processes make spoilers as during civil wars it is uncommon for all groups to view peace as favorable. Moreover, if all groups move to view peace as beneficial, they usually disagree over the terms of peace (Stedman, 1997, p. 7). There are various different spoiler problems, from the position of the spoiler, the number of spoilers to the type of spoiler (Stedman, 1997, p. 8). Spoiler position is either inside or outside the peace-process. An inside spoiler will sign a peace agreement but will fail to implement and fulfil the peace-process. An outside spoiler is groups "who are excluded from a peace process or who exclude themselves and use violence to attack the peace-process" (Stedman, 1997, p. 8). To understand why groups, undermine peace processes it is important to understand what type of spoiler problem they are. There are three types of spoiler problem, limited, total and greedy and they each differ in terms of their goals and their level of commitment to a peace-process. Limited spoilers have limited goals e.g., recognition and are open to negotiating and sacrificing their goals. Total spoilers pursue total power, and their goals are not subject to change. Greedy spoilers are in-between total and limited spoilers. Their goals can "expand or contract based on calculations of cost and risk" (Stedman, 1997, p. 10-11). This research will focus on a limited outside spoiler, that being the radical group of this research. The radical group is an outside spoiler as it is excluded from the peace-process and uses violence to attack such peace-process. They're a limited spoiler as they can be included in the peace-process if their "non-negotiable demands can be accommodated by other parties to the conflict" (Stedman, 1997, p. 11).

The research question "*How (and why) do radical wings of social movements affect whether the moderate wings achieve their goals?*" has two main concepts: the radical group and the moderate group. Through analysing previous literature and research, conceptualisations of both concepts can be formed for this research. The conceptualisations of both groups will

be based on what they both perceive to be the best form of action to achieve their goals. The radical group believe that radical violence is the best form of action to achieve their goal. Therefore, the radical group of this research will follow the definition of a radical provided by Cross and Snow (2011). A radical is “a social movement activist who embraces direct action and high-risk options, often including violence against others, to achieve a stated goal”. Whereas, the moderate group believe non-violence to be the best form of action to achieve their goal. This research’s conceptualisation of a moderate group action will follow Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) definition of non-violent resistance. That being “the application of unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent” (p. 271).

### *Hypotheses & Variables*

From the previous literature on the relationship between radical and moderate groups, specifically how radical groups can influence the achievement of the moderate groups goal. And from the theory presented in the theoretical framework, two possible hypotheses for answering the research question are offered. *H1: The actions of the radical group resulted in the moderate group achieving their goal of peace. H2: The actions of the radical group resulted in the moderate group not achieving their goal of peace.* The outcome of interest (dependent variable) in this analysis is whether the moderate group succeeds or fails in achieving its goal. The potential explanatory factors for this outcome to occur (independent variable) is the actions of the radical group.

### *Causal Pathways & Indicators*

The casual pathways between these two variables can be separated into two groups. The causal pathway relating to the moderate group achieving their goal and the causal pathway relating to the moderate group not achieving their goal. The causal pathway for moderate goal achievement can be seen as such. First, the radical group commit to non-violence, a ceasefire. This leads to the moderate group inviting the radical group into dialogue with them, such dialogue taking shape through various official and unofficial talks and meetings. These talks and meetings lead to official agreements including the radical and moderate group. All of which leads to the moderate’s goal of peace being achieved. This goal can only be achieved through an official peace agreement which includes the radical group as without such and violence will

continue. This causal pathway can be labelled as *moderate group goal achievement*. The indicators for this causal pathway is evidence of the radical group committing to non-violence, a ceasefire and of the moderate group inviting the radical group into talks. Furthermore, evidence of such talks being seen to lead to agreements which lead to the moderate goal being achieved needs to be seen. The causal pathway for the moderate group not achieving their goal can be seen as such. First, the radical group continue or begin to conduct violence. This leads to the moderate group excluding them or disinviting them from dialogue. Dialogue such as official or unofficial talks and meetings. This leads to no official peace agreement between all groups in the conflict. Resulting in the moderate's goal of peace not being achieved. This causal pathway can be labelled as *moderate group goal failure*. The indicators for this causal pathway is evidence of the radical group conducting violence and evidence of the moderate group excluding them or disinviting them from talks.

## Methodology

### *Research Design & Case Selection*

To answer the question “*How (and why) do radical wings of social movements affect whether the moderate wings achieve their goals?*” this research will conduct a qualitative single within-case analysis of Northern Ireland. Specifically, the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ during the period 1988 to 1998. This time period was chosen for three reasons. First, 1988 marks the beginning of radical-moderate dialogue specially between the group’s key leaders Gerry Adams and John Hume. Second, this time period contains key agreements between the various groups in the Troubles i.e., 1993 Downing Street Declaration and Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Finally, it includes the timeline of the Northern Irish Peace Process, which began in 1993 and ended in 1998. Northern Ireland is a suitable case study to answer this studies research question for two reasons. First, a single case study of Northern Ireland contains all the elements of this research’s causal pathways. It contains a clear radical and moderate group, both groups display evidence of group interaction, and the moderate group has a clear goal it wants to achieve. It also contains all the necessary events, data, and sources to provide an extensive analysis of the causal pathways. Second, due to the nature of the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ and its peace process it will provide an insightful analysis of the presence of spoiler problems for social movement theory.

Northern Ireland is a deeply divided society along an ethnonational cleavage (Bosi & De Fazio, 2017, p. 12). It was born following the 1920 Government of Ireland Act when Ireland was partitioned into two separate entities. The south of Ireland was declared the Irish

Free State, while the six counties of the North remained under British Rule. At that time two-thirds of the Northern Irish population was protestant, loyal to the British Crown. And one-third was Catholic, who identified in all aspects with the Southern Irish Free State (Bosi & De Fazio, 2017, p. 18). The Northern Irish 'Troubles' began in 1968 following the Northern Irish Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. The aim of the Civil Rights Movement was to overturn the institutional discrimination against Catholics in the North. The movement began non-violent through a series of demonstrations and protests but soon turned violent following repression from the British Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). The IRA emerged to counter such repression and the decades long struggle of armed conflict which became known as the 'Troubles' was born (Bosi & De Fazio, 2017, p. 18).

During the Northern Irish 'Troubles' there was a variety of violent radical groups on both sides. There was the various violent protestant groups of the unionist side for example Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA)/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). Both these groups were categorised as terrorist groups by the British Government. However, this research will focus on the radical Catholic group of the time not the protestant groups. The main radical Catholic group during the 'Troubles' was the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The PIRA was the militant wing of the political party Sinn Fein. Therefore, for this research Sinn Fein will also be classified as part of the radical group (Gregory, 2010). The overarching movement during the Northern Irish 'Troubles' was the non-violent movement. This movement rejected violence and believed resistance to British repression and occupation should be through non-violent political means. A key leader of this group and the non-violent initiative during the Troubles was John Hume. Following, the groups achievement of increased rights for the Catholic minority, the group's main aim became peace across Northern Ireland and the end of paramilitary violence.

### *Methods*

As outlined previously this research will take a qualitative approach. Furthermore, the logic of inference will be process tracing, specifically theory testing process tracing. Process tracing is a tool used to study in depth single case studies by making within case causal inferences about causal mechanisms (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 2). Theory-testing process tracing is when a researcher takes a theory from existing literature and analyses whether there is evidence of such theory, and its causal mechanisms existing within a case. This allows the researcher to access if evidence indicates that the hypothesized causal mechanism connecting both the dependent

and independent variable exists and operates as theorized (Beach & Pederson, 2013, p. 11). Such analysis allows the researcher to investigate whether the causal mechanism results in the independent variable producing the dependent variable. The researcher can go further than simply investigating mere associations between the independent and dependent variables (Beach & Pederson, 2013, p. 11). Theory-testing process tracing is the most suitable for this research as it will be testing for the presence of the spoiler problem theory. By conducting qualitative research specifically process tracing one will be able to find rich extensive evidence to answer the research question. Investigating the presence of the spoiler problem theory in the Northern Irish 'Troubles' is not a simple task therefore a simple 'what' answer is not sufficient. This research question will need a 'how' and 'why' answer in order to make causal inferences about the presence of this causal mechanism. 'How' and 'why' answers which can be found through qualitative theory testing process tracing. The presence of the spoiler problem theory in Northern Ireland needs to be studied through 'how' and 'why' questions for three reasons. First, it is necessary in order to understand how the spoiler problem influenced the Northern Irish 'Troubles', furthermore, why such influence came to fruition in Northern Ireland. Second, by asking 'how' and 'why' questions about the presence of the spoiler problem in Northern Ireland, one can apply such answers to other cases similar to Northern Ireland where spoiler problems exist. Finally, to investigate causal pathways, particularly this research's causal pathways one needs 'how' and 'why' answers, because 'what' answers will inform one that those pathways exist but not 'why' and 'how' they exist.

#### *Data Collection*

To answer the research question "*How (and why) do radical wings of social movements affect whether the moderate wings achieve their goals?*" all data will be collected from the CAIN archive. The CAIN archive is the Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland archive. It is a collection of source material and information on the politics of Northern Ireland, specifically the Troubles from 1968 to the present day. The CAIN archive contains a variety of different source material from media reports to speeches. Therefore, providing this research with a range of different types of sources to ensure an extensive analysis. This paper will analyze both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources will range from autobiographies, speeches, radical and moderate group statements, and agreements e.g., Good Friday Agreement. The secondary sources will be journal articles and books which will hold up and reinforce my primary sources. These types of sources are suitable for a variety of reasons. First,

the primary sources of speeches, autobiographies and statements will allow me to understand the perceptions that each group have about each other. Such perceptions are necessary to investigate this research's causal pathways as whether group's have good or bad perceptions of each other will indicate whether they will be open to dialogue with each other. Second, such primary sources will give me evidence of group interactions. Evidence of group interactions is necessary for this research's causal pathways as they indicate when groups choose to engage or disengage in dialogue. Finally, primary sources of agreements e.g., 1998 Good Friday Agreement will provide evidence of how such group interactions influenced the peace agreement in Northern Ireland. Therefore, this evidence will tie all of the elements of the causal pathways together and indicate how the moderate group's goal was influenced by the radical group. Altogether, the secondary sources will reinforce and build on the evidence the primary sources will provide.

### Analysis

To find an answer to the research question the below analysis will conduct theory-testing process tracing by investigating for the presence of this papers causal pathways and the spoiler problem theory.

#### *Historical background*

Before 1988, the beginning of the scope of this research, the 'Troubles' had plagued the people of Northern Ireland for twenty-four years. From the Civil Rights Campaign of the late sixties, the dark years of internment between 1971 and 1975, to the continuous paramilitary bombing of the 1980s, the 'Troubles' engulfed everything and everyone in Northern Ireland. Over the twenty-four years before 1988, both the radical group and the moderate group evolved along with the events of the 'Troubles'.

The moderate group of this research, the non-violence advocating group changed in composition and size since its early days in 1964. The moderate group was born during the 1964-1972 Civil Right Campaign, through fighting the institutional discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland. The group remained non-violent even when faced with heavy repression both physically and mentally by the British government and unionist majority (Coy, 2007, p. 16-17). Following the Civil Rights Campaign and the beginning of the violent 'IRA' the moderate group made several attempts to achieve their goal, of establishing peace in Northern Ireland. Through various talks, meetings and agreements e.g., 1985 Anglo-Irish

Agreement, attempts were made by the moderate group to override the violent rhetoric of the 'IRA' with non-violent political answers to stability in Northern Ireland (Todd, 2011, p. 842). Unfortunately by 1988, the beginning of the scope of this research, the moderate group have been unsuccessful in achieving their goal of peace in Northern Ireland.

The radical group the 'PIRA' began in Belfast in 1969 as a breakaway group of the IRA. This breakaway group expanded across the whole island of Ireland and grew to become the main IRA group for decades to come (McKearney, 2011, p. 62). This new wave of republicanism in Northern Ireland was built on the age old tradition of Irish republicanism. Fighting to address political, social and economic repression in Northern Ireland (McKearney, 2011, p. 65). The 'PIRA' like their previous IRA counterparts were committed to a campaign of violence. Striving solely to rid Ireland of British presence in order to establish a unified, independent Irish state (Hume, 1996, p. 69-70). Between 1969 and 1988 the 'PIRA' engaged in countless violent actions ranging from bombings to shootings. Their most significant being the 1974 Birmingham bombings, the 1984 Brighton bombing, and the 1987 Enniskillen bombing. As of 1988 the 'PIRA' were in the midst of an intense violent campaign with no sign up of them reducing their violent action or committing to a ceasefire.

Without, a non-violent commitment, the moderate group refused to talk to the radical group. For a peace agreement to be achieved all groups, radical and moderate, needed to be sitting around the table. Therefore, as of 1988 the moderate group's goal of achieving peace in Northern Ireland seemed nearby impossible. The below analysis will begin with the radical group continuing their violent campaign to undermine any attempts at radical-moderate dialogue and peace achievement.

### *1988-1993*

St Patrick's Day 1988, with the background of increased radical violence and little radical-moderate dialogue, John Hume writes Gerry Adams, then leader of Sinn Fein a letter. This letter soon became the first indication of sufficient radical-moderate dialogue the 'Troubles' had seen to date. This letter contained the basic principles for future radical-moderate dialogue and the future of the Northern Ireland peace process (Hume, 1996, p. 93). The letter was the catalyst to numerous secret meetings between the pair where they discussed how exactly the Northern Irish 'Troubles' could come to an end and the moderate goal of peace could be achieved. However, such meetings remained secret, in order to protect both men from the

vilification of their respective groups and until together they could come up with a solution to the Northern Irish problem (Hume, 1996, p. 94).

The Hume/Adams meetings, however, between 1988 and 1993 remained the sole dialogue between both radical and moderate groups. Between this time period there remained continuous IRA violent action. The most significant of them being the 1993 Shankill Road Bombing (McKittrick & McVea, 2002, p. 193). Due to such violent attacks, the moderate non-violent group refused to engage in dialogue with the radical group unless such violent action ended. Peter Brooke then Secretary of State in Northern Ireland stated in a 1989 interview that if there was an end to violence he would consider engaging in dialogue with Sinn Fein (Ni Aodha, 2019). This statement by Peter Brooke provided the radical group with the option to seek a non-violent path to mean their demands. Furthermore, this interview demonstrated that the moderate group had opened the door to the possibility of dialogue if violence ceased.

However, for now the radicals continued to be excluded from moderate led talks and meetings due to their continued violence. The most significant of these being the Brooke/Mayhew talks between 1991 and 1992. The Brooke/Mayhew talks included all the major parties in Northern Ireland except Sinn Fein. The objective of the talks was to generate a more secure agreement to replace the 1985 Anglo Irish Agreement. However, talks failed due to a lack of trust between all parties involved and most significantly due to the continuous paramilitary campaigns of violence (O'Grady, 2001). The Brooke/Mayhew talks demonstrated that without all parties including the radical group involved no agreement on peace in Northern Ireland could be reached.

Throughout 1993 the *moderate group goal failure* causal pathway of radical violence and radical exclusion from moderate talks and meetings continued. With no hope for a IRA ceasefire and a signed peace agreement by all parties, the achievement of the moderate group's goal was a distant dream. All parties needed to be part of the agreement because without all-parties agreeing to the conditions of the agreement violence would continue. A glimmer of hope emerged in April 1993, however, when the secret meetings between John Hume and Gerry Adams were exposed. The secret meetings between both men came under severe criticism by individuals and a number of parties. Such criticism led to both men releasing a joint statement explaining their meetings and the objective behind them. The first statement was released on April 24<sup>th</sup> and outlined that both men "engaged in a political dialogue aimed at investigating the possibility of developing an overall political strategy to establish justice and peace in Ireland" (Hume & Adams, 1993). The pair continued to meet and on September

25<sup>th</sup> they released their second joint statement. The statement outlined the Humes/Adams Initiative. The Humes/Adams Initiative was never published but it would become the foundation of future peace talks. The main objective of Humes and Adams meetings was to ensure a “total cessation of violence and the establishment of a dialogue process” (Hume, 1996, p. 95). A key element of the dialogue process would be the inclusion of all parties involved in the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ including the radical group.

Significantly, Hume in his 1996 autobiography outlined that without such secret meetings between him and Gerry Adams the Joint Declaration of December 1993 would never have been established. Due to the fact that the foundation and core principles of such declaration all stem from his secret meetings with Gerry Adams (Hume, 1996, p. 95). The Joint Declaration of December 1993, just like John Hume and Gerry Adams did in their meetings, addresses the reasons the IRA engage in armed struggle and reduces the IRA’s legitimacy on such reasons. The Joint Declaration states that the British government “have no selfish, economic or strategic interest in Northern Ireland. Their primary interest is to see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the people who inhabit the island” (Downing Street Declaration, 1993). Furthermore, it outlines, “The British government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone by agreement between the two parts respectively to exercise their right to self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given north and south to bring about a united Ireland if that is their wish” (Downing Street Declaration, 1993). Both these statements outline to the radical group, the IRA that their reasons for armed struggle are no longer justified. Opening the radical group up to the opportunity to commit themselves to nonviolence, thus, opening the door to the chance for dialogue with the moderate group.

It is clear from the above analysis that between 1988 and 1993 *moderate group goal failure* was the dominate causal pathway. Between this five year time period there was continuous IRA violence. With no sign of such violence ending or the IRA committing themselves to a ceasefire, the moderate group refused to engage in radical-moderate dialogue, therefore, leading to a lack of an overarching peace agreement between all parties involved in the conflict. Resulting in the moderate group’s goal of peace in Northern Ireland not being achieved. The only glimmer of possible *moderate group goal achievement* between 1988 and 1993 were the John Hume and Gerry Adams secret meetings. However, it cannot be classified as the full causal pathway for three reasons. First, radical violence was still continuing during this time. Second, even though elements of the secret meetings can be found in the Joint

Declaration of 1993, such an agreement did not include all parties i.e., the radical group. And, third, the secret meetings and the agreement did not lead to peace in Northern Ireland, therefore the moderate goal was not achieved.

#### *1994-1995*

The pattern of continuous radical group violence continued well into 1994. A IRA ceasefire seemed very unlikely. Therefore, the moderate group continued to exclude the radical group from all-party talks and meetings. Between January and August, *moderate group goal failure* was the dominate causal pathway.

However, on the 31<sup>st</sup> August 1994 that all changed. In a statement to the media, the IRA announced a “complete cessation of military activities” (IRA, 1994). This date indicated a commitment by the IRA to non-violence and opened the moderate group to the choice to include the radical group in all-party peace talks. The IRA decided to commit to a ceasefire as they could no longer see their violent campaign achieving their goal of a United Ireland. Therefore, they committed themselves to non-violence and a political strategy to achieve their goal (Mole & O’Connor, 2019). Radical-moderate meetings began on September 6<sup>th</sup> when Gerry Adams, John Hume and then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds met in Dublin. Following the meeting they all publicly shook hands for the first time. Moreover, on October 21<sup>st</sup> John Major then British Prime Minister announced exploratory talks between the British Government and Sinn Fein. Such talks began on December 9<sup>th</sup> and the Sinn Fein delegation was led by Martin McGuinness, the Vice President of Sinn Fein (Bew & Gillespie, 1999). The last four months of 1994 illustrates the presence of the beginning of the *moderate group goal achievement* causal pathway. Once the IRA announced their ceasefire there were immediate radical and moderate meetings. Such radical-moderate meetings brought the hope of a peace agreement forward which would eventually lead to the achievement of the moderate group’s goal of peace in Northern Ireland.

A similar pattern of the beginning of a successful *moderate group goal achievement* causal pathway continued into 1995. The radical group met with a series of different moderate group parties to discuss the conflict and the necessary steps needed to move forward into substantive talks on a peace process. The radical group met with both British and Irish governments, and Northern Irish Office Officials. A significant moment during this time was January 15<sup>th</sup> when the British Government lifted the ban on ministers meeting with the radical group Sinn Fein (McKittrick & McVea, 2002, p. 296). This opened the radical-moderate groups

up further as it allowed the radical group to meet with leading members of the British government side of the moderate group. A move which would not have been made if the radical group were not committed to non-violence.

However, this pattern of successful radical-moderate group dialogue was put in jeopardy when the question arose of the decommissioning of the IRA weapons. Sinn Fein were also brought into this question when they accepted that they had an influence on paramilitary weapons (Bew & Gillespie, 1999). A plan was put in place by Patrick Mayhew, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland outlining a three-point-plan on the decommissioning of IRA weapons. Mayhew further stated that the radical group could only enter into substantive talks with the moderate group if the IRA began the decommissioning of weapons (Mayhew, 1995). Such statement was met with frustration by the radical group with Gerry Adams ruling out the decommissioning of IRA weapons. He further went on to state that the question of decommissioning of weapons as a precondition for the radical group to enter substantive talks was never mentioned by the British government prior to the 1994 ceasefire. And, furthermore, that if it was the IRA ceasefire would never have taken place. On July 15<sup>th</sup> John Hume outlined that he believed the IRA would get rid of their weapons if Sinn Fein were included in talks and meetings (McKittrick & McVea, 2002, p. 297). Significantly, Albert Reynolds, the Irish Prime Minister at the time of the Joint Declaration of 1993 stated that the question of radical group weapon decommissioning had not been raised prior to signing the Declaration and if it had been raised he would not have signed the Declaration (Reynolds, 1995). Fortunately, on November 3<sup>rd</sup> the Building Blocks paper was published which outlined a solution to the question of the decommissioning of radical group weapons and the inclusive of Sinn Fein in all-party talks. The paper outlined that “all party preparatory talks and an independent international body to reconsider the decommissioning issue will be convened in parallel by the two governments” (Northern Irish Office, 1995). Therefore, the paper suggested a twin-track process in which the radical group can enter all-party talks simultaneously while an independent international body investigating the decommissioning of weapons is held. Shortly, following the announcement of the ‘twin-track’ plan to deal with the decommissioning issue, a plan was made for all-party talks including the radical group to begin in January 1996 (McKittrick & McVea, 2002, p. 298).

1995 began with the beginnings of a *successful moderate group goal achievement* causal pathway. However, the question of the decommissioning of weapons put the fulfilment of the moderate group goal achievement on hold as talks had to be suspended. Only to be put

back on track by the Building Blocks plan. A plan which made the chance of the moderate group's goal being achieved possible. With the announcement of all-party talks with the aim of a peace agreement the chance was more and more likely at the end of 1995.

### 1996

Following the announcement at the end of 1995 that all party-talks would begin in early 1996, the year began with hope and optimism for the moderate group that their goal of peace in Northern Ireland would be achieved. With the IRA ceasefire holding, radical and moderate dialogue moved to preparatory talks for the all-party meetings set to begin in February. On January 24<sup>th</sup> the Michell Report on Decommissioning was published. The report included the six principles for which parties were allowed enter into the all-party talks. The main point of the report outlined that the decommissioning of radical group weapons would take place during all-party talks not before or after (International Body on Arms Decommissioning, 1996). Sinn Fein and the moderate groups welcomed the report.

However, crisis struck on February 9<sup>th</sup>, when the IRA released a statement, ending their ceasefire, following an IRA bomb which exploded in London (IRA, 1996). Due to the end of the IRA ceasefire the radical group were excluded from all-party talks for peace. As the moderate group prepared for talks to begin hope for a renewed IRA ceasefire seemed impossible with the IRA stating in March that a renewed ceasefire had little prospect (McKittrick & McVea, 2002, p. 299-300). IRA bombings continued throughout March, April and May. Leading figures from the moderate group including Michael Ancram, then Political Development minister at the Northern Ireland Office outlined that if the IRA restored its ceasefire and Sinn Fein agreed to the Mitchell Principles, then the radical group would be invited back into all-party talks. Following such statement Gerry Adams, then President of Sinn Fein outlined that he was prepared to accept the Mitchell Principles if all other parties agreed to them too (McKittrick, 1996). Now, all that remained for the radical group to return to all-party talks was a renewed IRA ceasefire. The all-party talks commonly referred to as the Stormont talks began officially without the radical group on June 10<sup>th</sup>. Throughout the rest of 1996 various members of the moderate group called on the radical group to renew their ceasefire but all attempts failed (Bew & Gillespie, 1999). 1996 began with the hopeful beginnings of the *moderate group goal achievement* causal pathway but ended with the *moderate group goal failure* causal pathway.

1997-1998

The *moderate group goal failure* causal pathway continued throughout 1997. The IRA refused to call a renewed ceasefire and the radical group remained excluded from the Stormont talks. With little hope for an all-party peace agreement, achievement of the moderate group's goal of peace in Northern Ireland was unlikely.

Throughout, the beginning of 1997 members of the moderate group called on the IRA to declare an immediate ceasefire. In the Spring, Marjorie Mowlam, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland outlined that in the event of an IRA ceasefire Sinn Fein would be invited to join the Stormont talks (Mowlam, 1997). In July, the British Government promised Sinn Fein that following an IRA ceasefire they would for certain have a seat at the table during the Stormont talks (Bew & Gillespie, 1999). Following these promises of inclusion at the Stormont talks both Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, then Vice-President of Sinn Fein called on the IRA to renew its ceasefire (McKittrick & McVea, 2002, p. 302). The moderate group's calls for ceasefire were answered on July 19<sup>th</sup> when the IRA announced their renewed ceasefire from July 20<sup>th</sup> (IRA, 1997). Following, this announcement the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Marjorie Mowlam officially invited Sinn Fein to the all-party talks at Stormont on September 15<sup>th</sup> (Mowlam, 1997). Subsequently, Sinn Fein signed the Mitchell Principles and all-party talks resumed on September 15<sup>th</sup> with the radical group included (The Economist, 1997).

Between September 15<sup>th</sup> 1997 and February 20<sup>th</sup> 1998 in the light of an IRA ceasefire the moderate and radical groups continued their dialogue through the multi-party talks towards a peace agreement. However, such successful dialogue came to a standstill on February 20<sup>th</sup> when Sinn Fein were expelled from the multi-party talks. Due to allegations made by the British and Irish governments that the IRA killed two people on February 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>. The moderate group outlined that if there is no further breach of the IRA ceasefire during the following two weeks, Sinn Fein would be allowed to re-enter talks. Sinn Fein re-joined the multi-party talks on March 23<sup>rd</sup> following no further breach of the IRA ceasefire (Bew & Gillespie, 1999). The *moderate group goal achievement* causal pathway was back on track. Finally, on April 10<sup>th</sup> 1998 following 30 years of conflict and 10 years of radical/moderate dialogue a peace agreement, the 'Good Friday Agreement' was signed. The Agreement outlined a plan for sustained peace in Northern Ireland. Through developing a Northern Ireland Assembly and a North-South Ministerial Council peace between both unionist and nationalists in Northern Ireland would be achieved (Good Friday Agreement, 1998). On May 22<sup>nd</sup> a referendum was held on both sides of the island, North and South to ensure an all-island

approval of the agreement. Overwhelming, both sides of the island approved the agreement with Northern Ireland voting 71.12% Yes (Somerville & Kirby, 2012, p. 250). A historic united vote by both Unionists and Nationalists in a country who for so long were divided.

Due to the IRA ending their violent campaign to undermine the peace process through a sustained ceasefire, the radical and moderate groups were able to engage in dialogue leading to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement for peace. Without this commitment to non-violence by the radical group and inclusion of the radical group in dialogue with the moderate group, the agreement towards peace could not have been achieved. Due to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the people of Northern Ireland after 30 years of violence were able to live together in peace. Moreover, the moderate group were able to achieved their goal of peace in Northern Ireland.

### Findings

The above analysis found that between 1988 and 1997 *moderate group goal failure* was the dominate causal pathway and that the spoiler problem theory was present. Between those years the radical group conducted violence in order to undermine the moderate's goal of peace. Their failure to commit themselves to non-violence resulted in the moderate group excluding them from all-party talks. Exclusion from all-party talks which led to no all-party peace agreements and the goal of the moderate group not being achieved. The only glimpse of a *moderate group goal achievement* causal pathway during those years were the Hume/Adams secret meetings. That causal pathway failed as no all-party peace agreement was reached and the moderate goal was not achieved. However, in 1998 the *moderate group goal achievement* causal pathway can be seen. The radical group realized that their violent campaign was no longer sufficient, they committed themselves to non-violence through a ceasefire and they engaged in radical-moderate dialogue. Radical-moderate dialogue which led to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and the moderate goal of peace in Northern Ireland being achieved. Moreover, the spoiler problem was overcome.

### Conclusion

The above qualitative analysis provided an answer to the research question, "*How (and why) do radical wings of social movements affect whether the moderate wings achieve their goals?*" through investigating the presence of spoiler problems during the Northern Irish 'Troubles' between 1988 and 1998. The analysis found that without the radical group stopping their violent campaign to undermine the peace process, committing themselves to non-violence and

engaging in dialogue with the moderate group a peace agreement and goal of the moderate group could not have been achieved. Therefore, the hypothesis *'the actions of the radical group resulted in the moderate group achieving their goal of peace'* can be accepted. There are two limitations to this research. The analysis was conducted on a single case study and across a ten-year time frame. Both elements of the analysis restrict and reduce the scope of the research. Such limitations lead to two recommendations for further research. First, extending the study across a wider time-period, which would further reinforce the answer to the question by providing more evidence. Second, extending the analysis beyond a single case study would provide extensive external validity for the findings. Furthermore, this research has two academic implications. First, it provides a detailed analysis of the role the radical group played during the Northern Irish peace process. A detailed analysis which is needed to demonstrate the influence the radical group had on whether the peace process was successful or not. Second, the outcome of this analysis can be used to demonstrate how moderate groups can sometimes need radical groups to achieve their goals. Particularly, if the barriers to achieving such goals are built by the radical group.

The signing of the Good Friday Agreement on April 10<sup>th</sup>, 1998 will forever be a significant day in the history of Northern Ireland. A day that without both groups putting aside their differences and engaging in dialogue would not have been possible. The agreement has never been more in danger than it is today. A danger that without individuals putting aside their differences and engaging in dialogue as they did in 1998, will never be overcome.

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