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The Role of Intelligence in the Failure To Prevent Genocide: a Comparative Analysis of Rwanda and Srebrenica

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The Role of Intelligence in the Failure To Prevent Genocide: a Comparative Analysis of Rwanda and Srebrenica



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List of abbreviations

ARBiH	Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
BSA or VRS	Bosnian Serb Army or Army of Republika Srpska
CAS	Close Air Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Dutchbat	Dutch Battalion
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OP	Observation Post
RGF	Rwandan Government Forces
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTL	Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
US	United States of America

Introduction

One of the most well-known aspects of the work carried out by the United Nations is their role in international humanitarian intervention through peacekeeping operations. Over the years, the UN has carried out numerous missions, however, these have not always been successful: their reputation with regard to peacekeeping has been significantly damaged by various failed peacekeeping efforts. In my thesis, I will focus on two of these failed missions: UNAMIR in Rwanda and UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, and especially Srebrenica. In both of these cases, which occurred in 1994 and 1995 respectively, the situation escalated completely and genocide occurred, despite the presence of peacekeepers. Early warnings were issued by peacekeepers and other involved actors, however, despite these signs, the United Nations and its member states failed to prevent genocide.

In Rwanda, president Juvénal Habyarimana's plane was shot down on the 6th of April 1994. After this assassination, the country erupted into violence: Rwanda's majority population of Hutus began murdering the minority Tutsis, killing 800,000 to a million people in a period of approximately one hundred days.¹ Months before, in January, UNAMIR's commander Roméo Dallaire had warned UN headquarters in New York that something like this was likely to happen. Based on intelligence provided by an informant within the radical Hutu group, Dallaire knew that lists of Tutsi names were being created, and that large amounts of weapons were stored in Kigali, Rwanda's capital.² Despite his warnings, nothing was done in order to prevent the genocide, and when the violence escalated, large parts of his mission were pulled out rather than reinforced.³ In Srebrenica, a safe area for Bosnian muslims in the eastern part of Bosnia, a battalion of Dutch soldiers was tasked with the protection of the thousands of muslims seeking refuge in the enclave. On the 11th of July 1995, the enclave was occupied by the Bosnian Serb armed forces: Dutchbat was unable to stop them due to a lack of support.⁴ Before the Serbs captured Srebrenica, Dutchbat commander Thom Karremans had repeatedly requested NATO air support, but his requests were denied. When

¹ Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar Strauss and Giroux, 1998), VII, 26.

² Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2004), 142-145.

³ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 150.

⁴ Samantha Power, *"A Problem From Hell": America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 391.

the support finally came, it was not enough and far too late.⁵ By then, the Serbs had already separated the men from the women, and 7,000 to 8,000 muslim boys and men were murdered.⁶

My thesis will provide a comparative analysis of these two cases, focusing on the role of intelligence in these failed peacekeeping missions: how much was known about what was going to happen, and what was done with this information? Through the use of academic books and articles, as well as reports and primary sources with regard to these two missions, I aim to answer my research question: “What role did the availability and supply of intelligence at the United Nations and its member states during the peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Srebrenica play in the failure to prevent genocide in both cases?”. My thesis is divided into four parts: the first chapter will focus on UN peacekeeping and intelligence in general, in order to clarify the context in which my case studies were carried out. The second and third chapters focus on my two cases, UNAMIR and UNPROFOR, respectively. In each of these chapters, the case will be discussed in detail, and I will provide an answer to my research question for each specific case here. Finally, my fourth chapter will provide a case comparison, in order to clearly assess the similarities and differences between the two cases.

While an abundance of academic literature already exists on Rwanda and Srebrenica, a comparative analysis of just these two cases is rare. Much of the literature discussing both cases are books on peacekeeping in general, mentioning both operations in separate chapters, but not actively comparing them. In addition to this, scholars have focused on the role of intelligence in these two cases in the past, but once again, not in a comparative analysis of Rwanda and Srebrenica alone. This is where gaps in the literature thus exist, and where I aim to contribute to the current academic literature on this particular topic. In addition to this, the similarities between the two cases will provide new insight into the general problems that exist with regard to intelligence in UN peacekeeping. Throughout my thesis, I will argue that while intelligence proving that the situation was bound to deteriorate in both cases was widely available, not enough was done with this information. I will demonstrate that in both cases, the mission’s weak intelligence position combined with information-sharing issues and the indifference of the international community played a significant role in the failure to

⁵ Thom Karremans, *Srebrenica: Who Cares? Een Puzzel van de Werkelijkheid* (Nieuwegein: Uitgeverij Arko, 1998), 162, 178.

⁶ Power, “*A Problem From Hell*,” 392 and Metselaar, “Understanding Failures in Intelligence Estimates,” 24.

prevent genocide. Finally, I will draw the conclusion that the availability and supply of intelligence in Rwanda and Srebrenica did not make much of a difference. My general argumentation on the role of intelligence contributes to the academic debate as well, since the combination of these three factors, as well as the idea that the available information did not make a large difference, is a new perspective with regard to the role of intelligence. Despite an abundance of information and warning signs in both cases, the weaknesses that existed with regard to intelligence at the United Nations in combination with the disinterest of its member states caused the international community to fail in preventing these genocides.

Methodology

As clearly mentioned before, this thesis is based on the method of comparative analysis. The reason for this is both to fill the gaps in the literature that exist on this particular topic, as well as the similarities between the two cases. Both were UN peacekeeping missions during the 1990s, and in both cases, genocide occurred whereas it could have been prevented. In my opinion, due to these similarities, a comparative analysis is an interesting method to conduct research into this particular topic. In both cases, I will first discuss and explain the case at hand, then I will examine the available warning signs, and finally, I will look at the role of intelligence in each case as a whole and determine the factors that played a role in the failure to prevent genocide. The reason for this particular method is the similarity that exists in both cases in this regard: while the exact circumstances obviously differed, warning signs existed in both Rwanda and Srebrenica, and the factors that influenced the failures are similar in both cases as well. These elements include the weak intelligence position of both missions, issues with regard to information-sharing and finally, the unwillingness of the international community to act. The decision to incorporate these particular elements was made after thorough analysis of both cases and the literature that exists on these peacekeeping missions. While I already knew similarities existed between these two operations, which is the reason I made the decision to compare the two, the resemblance was even more clear than I previously thought. Therefore, I decided to incorporate these particular three elements in my comparative analysis.

The structure of my thesis is completely based on this comparative analysis: as mentioned in the introduction, I will provide context with the first chapter on UN peacekeeping and

intelligence in general, after which I will discuss each case in-depth in the following two chapters and finally, I will provide a case comparison. The reason I decided on this particular structure is mostly clarity: both cases are rather complicated, and by keeping all sections strictly separated, I aim to propose my arguments in a manner that is as clear as possible.

My research is mainly based on academic books and articles, so secondary sources, however, I have incorporated various other sources as well. Several official reports on both cases were used: the Srebrenica-report focusing on intelligence by Cees Wiebes⁷ and the official UN report⁸ on Rwanda were very valuable to my research, for example. In addition to this, I have used several primary sources from the UNAMIR and UNPROFOR missions in this thesis. The reason for this is my Global Order in a Historical Perspective specialisation: incorporating this historical aspect in my thesis was therefore vital. While my topic itself is already historical - even though these cases both took place in the 1990s, which is relatively recent, it is still history - the use of sources such as the 'Dallaire fax' or cables sent by Karremans during the fall of Srebrenica adds on to this in my opinion, providing more depth than when I would have limited my research to secondary sources alone. This historical approach incorporating primary sources as well as official UN documents and secondary academic literature is the best way to approach this subject in my opinion, because of the wide array of sources and perspectives that are used. The problem with using primary sources from the missions alone, or only official UN reports on the cases, is that bias is very likely to occur: despite the fact that I am using various UN sources with different perspectives, the documents would still be provided by the organisation that conducted two peacekeeping missions that failed to prevent genocide. The UN's role in these missions is so significant that it would have been unwise to rely on their documentation alone. Therefore, in order to overcome this existing bias, I decided to make use of an extensive collection of secondary sources with varying perspectives on the topic as well.

⁷ Cees Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport, Appendix II "Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1991-1995: The role of the Intelligence and security services*, (Amsterdam: The NIOD Institute, 2002).

⁸ United Nations, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* (UN Document S/1999/1257), December 16, 1999.

Literature review

In order to determine what role the availability and supply of intelligence played during the peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Srebrenica and their failure to prevent genocide, evaluating the existing academic literature on these missions was an important step to take. In this literature review, I will analyse some of the main literature that is available on this particular topic, provide an overview of these scholars' main arguments and identify the gaps that exist in the current academic literature. Due to the nature of my topic, this literature review will be divided into three parts: one discussing UN peacekeeping in general, one relating to the mission in Rwanda and finally, one discussing the literature on Srebrenica.

United Nations peacekeeping

The general topic of UN peacekeeping is relatively broad, and therefore, numerous directions with regard to research topics exist within the academic literature. In order to maintain clarity, I have therefore grouped the various scholars throughout this literature review together based on their main arguments and research. The first group focuses on the successes and failures in peacekeeping operations, often aiming to answer the question of why these operations either succeed or fail or providing suggestions in order to improve peacekeeping. Pär Eriksson belongs to this group: in his article, he focuses on the use of intelligence in peacekeeping operations. He argues that while the traditional view has been that the collection of intelligence and the presence of intelligence services are not necessary in a UN context, peacekeeping has become such a complicated matter that intelligence should be a necessity in order to carry out a safe and successful peacekeeping mission.⁹ He thus advocates for an extended use of intelligence in such peacekeeping operations, in order to improve the missions. Howard also conducts research on the improvement of peacekeeping: in her book *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, she examines various missions as case studies and provides three conditions that combined account for successful peacekeeping. These three factors include consensus among the Security Council members, active learning during the mission and "certain favorable "situational factors" of the country emerging from civil war."¹⁰ Whereas Howard focuses on the factors that make a peacekeeping mission successful, Jett

⁹ Pär Eriksson, "Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 10, no. 1 (1997), 1, 15.

¹⁰ Howard, Lise Morjé, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2.

aims to find out why these operations sometimes fail. In *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, he argues that while we can learn from missions of the past, actually increasing their success will be difficult. According to him, this is due to the UN's organisational structure and the nature of these operations.¹¹ Clearly, Jett approaches the topic more negatively than Howard: the final chapter of his book is even titled ““Inconclusion”—Why Real Reform Might Not Be Possible”.¹² Given the fact that the other scholars of this group are able to provide solutions to improve peacekeeping, Jett's point of view is too pessimistic in my opinion. His criticism is definitely justifiable, however, there are ways to improve peacekeeping: there is a solution. Finally, Doyle and Sambanis also belong to this particular group. In their book *Making War and Building Peace*, they mostly focus on the role of the international community in peacekeeping efforts. According to the authors, three factors determine whether peacekeeping will be successful or not: the amount of available resources after the conflict, the hostility of the involved actors and the assistance provided by the international community.¹³ Doyle and Sambanis also strongly argue that the member states play a vital role in the outcome of a peacekeeping mission: “Blame for such inaction shouldn't lie with the UN, but rather with the individual nations that had the capacity to act but chose not to”.¹⁴ Due to this argument, their point of view also aligns with the following group of scholars.

This second group is of the opinion that the member states of the United Nations play a crucial role in carrying out peacekeeping operations. This group's stance closely aligns with my point of view on this particular topic: as will become clear in the discussion of my case studies, member states have the power to either facilitate or oppose these missions, and they thus exert a large amount of influence on this particular aspect of the UN. In their book *United Nations Interventionism*, Berdal and Economides discuss eight case studies with regard to UN missions in the period between 1991 and 2004. According to these authors, a negative point of view emerged in response to peacekeeping due to both an expanding need for intervention and the occurrence of various failed missions throughout this period.¹⁵ They argue that peacekeeping will be limited and will thus be less likely to be successful due to the reluctance of the major powers to enter into open-ended commitments”.¹⁶ The argument

¹¹ Dennis Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), 5.

¹² Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, 169.

¹³ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 4.

¹⁴ Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, 351.

¹⁵ Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, *United Nations Interventionism, 1991–2004* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1.

¹⁶ Berdal and Economides, *United Nations Interventionism*, 31.

proposed by Malone and Thakur in their article “UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned?” closely aligns with this point of view. These scholars argue that there are several levels at which the failures of peacekeeping can be addressed: at the operational level, the policy level and the managerial level.¹⁷ In their article, they focus on the past failures of peacekeeping, and conclude that the United Nations and its member states have not really learned from these lessons. According to Malone and Thakur, if peacekeeping is to be improved, countries with the adequate resources have to let go of their reluctance to use these for peacekeeping efforts.¹⁸ Clearly, Malone and Thakur agree with Berdal and Economides on the fact that this reluctance plays a major role, and rightly so. Samantha Power also takes this critical stance with regard to the role of member states in her book “*A Problem From Hell*,” focusing particularly on the role of the United States in this matter. According to Power, the US has failed to intervene and prevent genocide on various occasions, not because they were not capable or did not know, but because they did not want to.¹⁹ Her criticism in this regard is not limited to the United States, however. In her conclusion, Power extends her accusations: “The United States is not alone. The states bordering genocidal societies and the European powers have looked away as well”.²⁰ Shawcross follows similar ideas in his book *Deliver Us From Evil*, in which he discusses various peacekeeping operations, including Rwanda and Bosnia. According to Shawcross, while humanitarian assistance is capable of saving people, it also harms the victims, since warlords are able to use this same assistance in order to continue the struggle.²¹ Like the other scholars, he is very critical of the international community’s lack of action during peacekeeping missions such as those in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and states that the main problem in these events was that the major powers simply did not want to act.²²

Totten and Bartrop also follow this line of argumentation in their article “The United Nations and Genocide.” According to them, the United Nations has failed extensively with regard to intervention and preventing genocide in the 1990s.²³ However, Totten and Bartrop argue, these failures should in fact be attributed to the UN’s member states: “it is those states,

¹⁷ David M. Malone and Ramesh Thakur, “UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned?”, *Global Governance* 7 (2001), 12.

¹⁸ Malone and Thakur, “UN Peacekeeping”, 16.

¹⁹ Power, “*A Problem From Hell*”, 508.

²⁰ Power, “*A Problem From Hell*”, 503.

²¹ William Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002) (e-book)..

²² Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil*, epilogue (e-book).

²³ Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop, “The United Nations and Genocide: Prevention, Intervention, and Prosecution,” *Human Rights Review* 5, no. 4 (2004): 10.

themselves, that are responsible for deterring, if not outrightly preventing, in one way or another, the United Nations from acting in a timely and/or adequate fashion. This is particularly true of the members of the UN Security Council”.²⁴

While I definitely agree with the line of thought proposed by this group of scholars, these peacekeeping failures can not be blamed on the member states alone: the UN as an organisation also plays a vital role in this regard. This point of view is reflected by LeBor in his book “*Complicity with Evil*”, in which he argues that the relationship between the Secretariat and the Security Council had a significant influence on failed peacekeeping missions.²⁵ According to LeBor, the United Nations should be capable of making its own decisions and acting in a timely manner in these situations, rather than waiting for the decisions made by the Security Council.²⁶ This particular scholar clearly places the responsibility for these failures at the UN itself, thus opposing the other authors, who argued that the member states were at fault. In my opinion, neither side is completely correct: significant mistakes have been made during failed peacekeeping missions such as the ones in Rwanda and Srebrenica. However, these mistakes were made due to both the internal functioning of the United Nations and the (in)action of member states, not either one.

Rwanda

Since my research focuses on the failed UNAMIR and UNPROFOR peacekeeping missions, several of my sources focus on either one of these two cases. A large amount of literature exists on the topic of the Rwandan peacekeeping operation and the genocide, but I have made a small selection of the books and articles that are most useful to my particular research, and once again I will categorise them with regard to the scholars’ main arguments.

One of the most well-known sources on Rwanda was written by UNAMIR’s commander, Roméo Dallaire. In the book, titled *Shake Hands with the Devil*, Dallaire provides a personal account of the events that occurred during the peacekeeping mission. Throughout the book, Dallaire’s frustration is extremely clear. He argues that his forces were unable to prevent or stop the genocide due to the indifference and self-interest of the international community,

²⁴ Totten and Bartrop, “The United Nations and Genocide,” 8.

²⁵ Adam LeBor, “*Complicity with Evil*”: *The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 7.

²⁶ LeBor, “*Complicity with Evil*,” 268.

losing any chance to make a real difference.²⁷ In addition to this, Dallaire criticises the way in which the intelligence provided by the mission was handled at UN headquarters: according to him, not all of his reports and warning signals were communicated properly. He states: “Rarely did I get any response. Who really read this material in New York and what did they do with it?”²⁸ Clearly, the UNAMIR commander remains critical of the international community and his superiors at the United Nations, arguing that the genocide could have been prevented if they had acted differently. The argumentation proposed by Grünfeld and Huijboom in their book *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda* closely aligns with Dallaire’s point of view. According to these authors, it is clear that the genocide in Rwanda could have been prevented. They state: “despite having the power and instruments available to prevent and stop the genocide, the policies of the third parties-the bystander states and international organizations-could even be said to have promoted it”.²⁹ Like Dallaire, Grünfeld and Huijboom also question the way in which the information provided by UNAMIR was handled at the United Nations. However, they argue that this information was not ignored, but the warnings were not provided to the Security Council or used to take action.³⁰

Another author that argues that the Rwandan genocide could have been prevented, is Philip Gourevitch. In his book *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, which is based on his travels to Rwanda after the genocide, he provides an analysis of the events, along with people’s personal stories.³¹ According to Gourevitch, countless lives could have been saved in Rwanda, with low costs or risks for the Western countries who easily could have acted if they had chosen to do so.³² He is very critical of the inaction of the international community in the matter: in his conclusion, he states “Rwanda became a case study in international negligence”.³³

Clearly, the dominant school of thought with regard to the Rwanda is critical: these scholars are of the opinion that the international community remained indifferent, and that if they had acted properly, the genocide could have been prevented. However, not everyone agrees with this particular line of argumentation. According to Kuperman, even timely action by the UN

²⁷ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 5, 516.

²⁸ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 208.

²⁹ Fred Grünfeld and Anke Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders* (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), XV.

³⁰ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide*, 105.

³¹ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*.

³² Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, XI.

³³ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 326.

member states would not have made much of a difference in this regard. In his article “Rwanda in Retrospect,” he argues that not even half of the people who became victims of the genocide could have been saved if the international community had intervened in Rwanda.³⁴ In his conclusion, Kuperman states: “even an ideal intervention in Rwanda would have left hundreds of thousands of Tutsi dead”.³⁵ In my opinion, Kuperman is far too pessimistic in this regard: I agree with the first group of scholars instead. If the international community had not been so indifferent to the warning signs that were issued prior to the genocide or the first outbursts of violence that occurred in Rwanda, the genocide could have been prevented and numerous lives could have been saved.

Finally, Herman T. Salton has conducted research on Rwanda as well, however, he focuses on a different aspect of the peacekeeping mission than the other scholars. In his book *Dangerous Diplomacy*, Salton focuses on the role played by the United Nations Secretariat and the decisions that were made at UN headquarters during the UNAMIR mission.³⁶ He argues: “the Secretariat of 1994 was split by internal rivalries and competing agendas that negatively affected the Rwanda operation”.³⁷ Salton thus emphasises the United Nations’ internal problems, which evidently had a significant influence on the outcome of the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, rather than external factors. Since Salton provides such a different point of view with regard to the topic, and because my research focuses on the role of intelligence and what was done with the obtained information subsequently, his work will be very valuable to my research.

Srebrenica

Numerous books and articles have been written on Srebrenica as well: once again, I have made a small selection to use in my research. Like Dallaire, the Dutchbat commander wrote a book regarding his experiences during the mission as well. In *Srebrenica: Who Cares?*, Thom Karremans provides an overview of the events leading up to the fall of Srebrenica and its aftermath, based on the personal notes he made during the mission.³⁸ His work shows significant similarities with Dallaire: it is very personal, and Karremans is very critical of the

³⁴ Alan J. Kuperman, “Rwanda in Retrospect,” *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (2000), 94-95.

³⁵ Kuperman, “Rwanda in Retrospect,” 117.

³⁶ Herman J. Salton, *Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2.

³⁷ Salton, *Dangerous Diplomacy*, 5.

³⁸ Karremans, *Srebrenica: Who Cares?*

international community and his superiors both at the UN and in the Dutch army. He argues that nothing was done in order to prevent the fall of Srebrenica: the requested air support came far too late, and other measures in order to support Dutchbat were not made available either.³⁹ Karremans puts the blame for the events in Srebrenica at the UN, arguing that Dutchbat should not be held responsible. In his conclusion, he states: “the fall of Srebrenica and all of its consequences is a UN-affair”.⁴⁰ Clearly, Karremans places the responsibility for the genocide with the United Nations and the international community, showing similarities with Dallaire and Rwanda in this regard. Rohde’s argument closely aligns with Karremans’ stance on the matter: in his book *Endgame*, he also places the responsibility for the failure to protect the enclave at the international community, and argues that Srebrenica’s fall could have been prevented.⁴¹ According to Rohde, “the fall of the town was the result of poor policy-making and negligence. Lack of attention, incompetence and cowardice led to the fall of Srebrenica”.⁴² Evidently, these authors are critical of the indifference of the international community in the case of Srebrenica, and rightly so: like in Rwanda, the genocide could have been prevented if their self-interest had not prevailed.

Another group of scholars does not really focus on the responsibility for the genocide in Srebrenica, but on the role of intelligence in the matter instead. Clearly, this is absolutely vital to my research, which is why I have incorporated these particular sources. The first author belonging to this ‘intelligence group’ is Erna Rijdsdijk. In “The Politics of Hard Knowledge,” she studies the official Dutch NIOD report which was published with regard to the fall of Srebrenica, and offers a slightly different interpretation.⁴³ The report classifies the events in the enclave as an intelligence failure, which has caused a demand for more intelligence use in UN peacekeeping. Also, the report states that a lack of information is not the problem in this case, but rather the way in which the information is processed and understood.⁴⁴ According to Rijdsdijk, however, “the report builds its claims on a problematic epistemology of intelligence studies”.⁴⁵ Rijdsdijk thus does not completely oppose the outcome of the official report, but does acknowledge some of its flaws and offers a slightly altered point of view.

³⁹ Karremans, *Srebrenica: Who Cares?*, 91.

⁴⁰ Karremans, *Srebrenica: Who Cares?*, 247 (quote translated from Dutch).

⁴¹ David Rohde, *Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II* (Penguin Books, 2012), epilogue (e-book).

⁴² Rohde, *Endgame*, postscript.

⁴³ Erna Rijdsdijk, “The Politics of Hard Knowledge: Uncertainty, Intelligence Failures, and the ‘Last Minute Genocide’ of Srebrenica,” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 5 (2011), 2221-2235.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000416>

⁴⁴ Rijdsdijk, “The Politics of Hard Knowledge,” 2223.

⁴⁵ Rijdsdijk, “The Politics of Hard Knowledge,” 2221.

The point of view taken by Wiebes et al. in their book chapter “Blindfolded in the Dark” aligns more closely with the outcomes of the NIOD report than Rijdsdijk’s arguments. This is perhaps not unsurprising, since Cees Wiebes was one of the main contributors to the report. In this chapter, the authors argue that Srebrenica’s fall was a military intelligence failure, due to “the extremely weak intelligence position of the UN and with the absence of sufficient capacity and the right means to gather and analyse intelligence”.⁴⁶ According to Wiebes et al., the events were not caused by this intelligence failure alone, however, this neglect with regard to intelligence did have serious consequences in this particular case.⁴⁷

Finally, Metselaar draws roughly similar conclusions as Wiebes et al. in his chapter “Understanding failures in intelligence estimates.” According to this author, the involved parties were caught by surprise when the Bosnian Serb army invaded Srebrenica, despite early warnings that an attack on the enclave would likely occur.⁴⁸ Metselaar describes Srebrenica as an intelligence failure as well, and provides two possible explanations for this failure: the Cry Wolf theory and the Noise Barrier theory.⁴⁹ It is clear that the scholars in this ‘intelligence group’ mostly share a consensus with regard to the role of intelligence in the matter of Srebrenica: only Rijdsdijk provides a somewhat altering point of view, but she still mostly agrees with the main consensus in her article. In my opinion, these scholars all provide an accurate picture of what occurred in Srebrenica with regard to the gathering and processing of intelligence, and their work will be very useful for the rest of my research.

Concluding remarks

Due to the division of the literature into these three different components - UN peacekeeping in general, Rwanda and Srebrenica - because of my research, providing one particular dominant school of thought on my subject is rather difficult. However, within these three separate topics, various conflicting and aligning arguments could be identified. Also, it

⁴⁶ Cees Wiebes et al., “Blindfolded in the Dark. The Intelligence Position of Dutchbat in the Srebrenica Safe Area,” in *Perspectives on Military Intelligence From the First World War to Mali: Between Learning and Law*, ed. Floribert Baudet, Eleni Braat, Jeffrey van Woensel and Aad Wever (T.M.C. Asser Press: Springer, 2017), 145.

⁴⁷ Wiebes et al., “Blindfolded in the Dark,” 169.

⁴⁸ M.V. Metselaar, “Understanding failures in intelligence estimates - UNPROFOR, the Dutch and the Bosnian-Serb attack on Srebrenica,” in *The Bosnian Experience*, ed. J.M.L.M. Soeters and J.H. Rovers (Breda: Royal Netherlands Military Academy, 1997), 24.

⁴⁹ Metselaar, “Understanding failures,” 32-36.

becomes clear that gaps in the literature exist: while much has been written on the topics of Rwanda and Srebrenica separately, not many comparisons of the two cases alone exist, especially with regard to the role of intelligence. This is exactly where I aim to contribute to the existing literature: providing a comparative analysis on the role of intelligence in the failed peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Srebrenica.

1. A history of UN peacekeeping

In order to provide a complete understanding of the context in which the UNPROFOR and UNAMIR missions were carried out, this chapter will provide a general explanation and history of UN peacekeeping in general. The practice of peacekeeping since the UN's establishment in 1945 will be discussed, as well as the use of intelligence in these missions. Finally, I will shortly discuss the UNOSOM mission in Somalia, since it had an extensive influence on both of my case studies and other peacekeeping missions.

1.1 UN peacekeeping since 1945

The United Nations was officially established in October 1945, just after the end of the Second World War. One of the UN's main objectives since the very beginning has been the maintenance of peace on an international scale,⁵⁰ and peacekeeping missions play a significant role in this. In its early years, however, the UN did not carry out many peacekeeping operations: apart from two observer missions, UNTSO in Israel and UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan, not much effort was put into peacekeeping yet.⁵¹ The first armed peacekeeping mission, UNEF, started in 1956, and focused on the Suez Crisis in Egypt.⁵² With this particular operation, the United Nations established three rules for peacekeeping: the UN must remain completely impartial, the use of force should be limited and all involved actors must agree on the operation.⁵³

After the UNEF mission, various other operations were launched throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in countries such as Congo, the Dominican Republic, Yemen and Lebanon.⁵⁴ While the United Nations thus engaged in peacekeeping early, these first decades did not see the abundance of peacekeeping operations that we know today. This surge in missions occurred after the Cold War ended: according to Jett, more operations were launched during the first five years after the Cold War than in all the years before.⁵⁵ A significant reason for this lack

⁵⁰ "History of the United Nations," United Nations, accessed April 2, 2023.

<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un>

⁵¹ Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, 23, and "Our History," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed April 2, 2023.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history>

⁵² United Nations Peacekeeping, "Our History."

⁵³ Howard, *UN Peacekeeping*, 13.

⁵⁴ Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, 23-26.

⁵⁵ Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, 27.

of peacekeeping and intervention was the stalemate that existed within the Security Council as a result of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, during which both extensively used their veto rights to block each others' decisions.⁵⁶ However, according to Jett, other factors played a role in this massive expansion with regard to peacekeeping as well. First of all, the intervention by the international community after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait demonstrated that countries were capable of swift and successful intervention. Also, a change occurred in the amount of conflicts that erupted, as well as the nature of these conflicts, and finally, there was simply more demand for peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War.⁵⁷ According to the UN, the way in which these missions were conducted after the Cold War ended changed significantly as well. These operations transformed "from "traditional" missions involving generally observational tasks performed by military personnel to complex "multidimensional" enterprises".⁵⁸ This is confirmed in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping, commonly known as the Brahimi Report. According to this report, peacekeeping missions became far more complex and volatile after the Cold War due to the changed nature of the conflicts.⁵⁹

It thus becomes apparent that the end of the Cold War had a significant influence on both the amount of UN peacekeeping missions that were launched throughout the world and the way in which these particular missions were conducted. The nature of the international sphere in the 1990s caused the operations to become more complicated, and these developments significantly impacted my case studies as well.

⁵⁶ Totten and Bartrop, "The United Nations and Genocide," 9.

⁵⁷ Jett, *Why Peacekeeping Fails*, 27.

⁵⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping, "Our History."

⁵⁹ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (UN Document S/2000/809), August 21, 2000, 3.

1.2 The use of intelligence in UN peacekeeping missions

The way in which the United Nations has made use of intelligence before and during their peacekeeping missions, or rather has not, has long been a subject of criticism. As has become clear in the previous section, peacekeeping operations have become far more volatile and complicated since the end of the Cold War, and gathering as much information as possible seems crucial in these circumstances. However, the UN has not really changed their approach, and various scholars have heavily criticised the UN for being wary of using intelligence, arguing that many of the failures with regard to peacekeeping could have been prevented through a stronger focus on intelligence and the gathering of information in general.

Cees Wiebes is one of these critics: according to him, “the use of intelligence in peacekeeping operations has always been difficult. All those involved understood well enough that some intelligence input had to exist, but the UN in New York never took any substantial action to improve the existing situation”.⁶⁰ While most large-scale peacekeeping operations did have intelligence staff on the ground, the amount of officers and their actual impact was usually very limited. The UN’s disinterest with regard to intelligence is not the only reason for these problems: most missions were also limited due to their mandate, according to which they had to remain impartial and abide by the country’s laws and regulations.⁶¹ Due to these restraints, peacekeepers were often dependent on the information provided by foreign intelligence services like the CIA, who could easily decide not to share their information, or only parts of it.⁶²

Despite the large changes that occurred with regard to peacekeeping after the Cold War, the UN’s stance on intelligence has not improved much, Wiebes argues. Efforts to improve the situation have been made in the past, however, they did not make much of a difference, and he does not expect large improvements in the near future.⁶³ His argument with regard to the limits of intelligence in peacekeeping is shared by Eriksson, who argues that the UN’s point of view towards intelligence has been negative: it is often believed that intelligence is not

⁶⁰ Cees Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport*, 21.

⁶¹ Cees Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport*, 24.

⁶² Cees Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport*, 21-22.

⁶³ Cees Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport*, 23-30.

necessary, or even illegitimate in the context of the United Nations.⁶⁴ According to Eriksson, this view could seriously endanger both the operation's success and the lives of the peacekeepers involved.⁶⁵

Clearly, serious issues with regard to intelligence exist within peacekeeping operations: the UN's approach with regard to intelligence in combination with the limits that are often caused by the mandate cause the UN's intelligence position to be significantly weak. Large changes with regard to intelligence gathering would have to be made in order to conduct successful and safe peacekeeping operations in the complicated post-Cold War context. As stated in the Brahimi Report: "United Nations forces for complex operations should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount an effective defence against violent challengers".⁶⁶

1.3 Crossing the Mogadishu line": the influence of UNOSOM II explained

Finally, in order to completely understand the context in which the UNAMIR and UNPROFOR missions operated, it is necessary to provide a concise explanation of the events that occurred during the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia in 1993, since these developments had a significant influence on the international community's opinion with regard to peacekeeping, and thus on my case studies as well.

In response to the political turmoil, civil war and famine which erupted in Somalia in the early 1990s, the United Nations decided to intervene. In April 1992, UNOSOM I was deployed, and this operation would be carried out until March 1993, when it was succeeded by the UNOSOM II mission. Between December 1992 and May 1993, the UNITAF mission was also in place in Somalia. According to Howard, "UNOSOM I was a simple, limited UN peacekeeping force; UNITAF was a US-led multinational force that had Security Council authorization; and UNOSOM II was a UN multidimensional "peace-enforcement" mission, and took over the responsibilities of both prior missions".⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Eriksson, "Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations," 1.

⁶⁵ Eriksson, "Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations," 15.

⁶⁶ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, X.

⁶⁷ Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, 23.

In June 1993, over 20 UNOSOM II peacekeepers from Pakistan were killed in Somalia.⁶⁸ After this, the United States decided to send in US Army Rangers, who would operate independently from the UNOSOM II mission. On October 3, however, 18 of these same rangers were taken as hostages and then murdered in the streets of Mogadishu.⁶⁹ This occurred on live television, and therefore greatly impacted the popular opinion on an international level, and especially in the United States.⁷⁰ In response to these failures, the US withdrew its troops from Somalia in March 1994, after which other Western states soon followed. In May 1995, the UNOSOM II mission collapsed altogether.⁷¹ The failure of the mission in Somalia had a tremendous influence on the peacekeeping operations that would be carried out after October 1993, thus including the missions in Rwanda and Srebrenica. The US in particular lost interest in participating in peacekeeping almost completely due to the apparent risks, but other involved Western states such as France, Germany, Italy and Belgium⁷² were affected by the events of the mission as well. This significantly weakened the missions that followed after UNOSOM II, and with devastating consequences. As Doyle and Sambanis state in their book, for example: “the Rwanda genocide was the stepchild of the disaster in Mogadishu”.⁷³

⁶⁸ Berdal and Economides, *United Nations Interventionism*, 129.

⁶⁹ Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, 27.

⁷⁰ Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, 27.

⁷¹ Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, 28.

⁷² United Nations Geospatial Information Section, “UNOSOM II deployment as of September 1993 (Cartographic material),” (Map E416/10/1993), September 1993.

⁷³ Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, 284.

2. UNAMIR: Rwanda, 1994

2.1 The case

Long before the UNAMIR mission was deployed in Rwanda, the African country was one of the numerous Western colonies. In 1885, Rwanda was attributed to Germany, and after the First World War, the rule was taken over by Belgium.⁷⁴ The Rwandan population could be divided into three main ethnic groups. During the early years of Belgian colonisation, Hutus represented around 85% of the population, Tutsis roughly 14%, and the minority Twa around 1%.⁷⁵ As a result of the Belgian policy, the differences between the Hutu and Tutsi populations expanded. Tutsis gained supremacy over the Hutus as a result of the different tasks that were assigned to both groups: Hutus generally worked on the land, while Tutsis held control over these pieces of land, for example. In 1933, the Belgians introduced identity cards in Rwanda, which officially registered anyone as either Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, causing the existing differences and discrimination to deepen further.⁷⁶

Due to the tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi groups, violence erupted on several occasions in the second half of the twentieth century. In late 1959, an uprising by Hutus, who had gained more influence and power over the years, caused the death of hundreds of Tutsis and thousands fled the country in response.⁷⁷ In 1962, Rwanda officially became independent, and the country's first president Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, implemented policies which benefited the Hutu population at the expense of the Tutsis.⁷⁸ Violent outbursts continued to occur after independence, however, and in 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana overthrew Kayibanda in a coup. Habyarimana's presidency marked the beginning of a relatively stable period in Rwandan history, even though it would not last very long.⁷⁹

In 1990, this period of relative peace came to an end when the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a group of armed Tutsi rebels, invaded Rwanda. A civil war followed, but with intervention of the international community, peace negotiations were held in Arusha, Tanzania in

⁷⁴ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 53-54.

⁷⁵ United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda* (New York: United Nations, 1996), 7.

⁷⁶ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide*, 28-29.

⁷⁷ United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 8.

⁷⁸ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide*, 31.

⁷⁹ Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," 95.

1992-1993.⁸⁰ On the 4th of August 1993, the RPF and the Rwandan government signed the peace agreement, which would be known as the Arusha accords.⁸¹ The terms included a power-sharing agreement between the government, opposition parties and the Tutsis, as well as the creation of a peace force in order to oversee whether both parties would adhere to the agreement.⁸² This mission, the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda or UNAMIR, was deployed after its mandate was approved by the Security Council in October 1993, and its commander was Canadian major general Roméo Dallaire.⁸³

UNAMIR encountered difficulties from the very beginning: the disaster in Mogadishu months before, in combination with a general disinterest in Rwanda by the international community, had a negative impact on the mission. As a result of this indifference, UNAMIR lacked personnel in both amount and quality: Dallaire's initial recommendation for the mission was 5,500 troops, but the Security Council eventually agreed with a maximum of 2,548 troops, which would be deployed in several phases.⁸⁴ In addition to this, resources such as proper vehicles, spare parts and medicines were extremely difficult to obtain.⁸⁵ Clearly, the UNAMIR mission was thus not optimally equipped to carry out their mission in Rwanda.

On the 6th of April 1994, the situation in Rwanda escalated completely. President Habyarimana's plane was shot down over Kigali, killing all passengers on the plane. To this day, it remains unclear who was behind the attack exactly, but it seems likely that Hutu extremists wanted to assassinate Habyarimana in order to cause the Arusha Accords to fail.⁸⁶ The assassination was the start sign for an extremely violent killing campaign. The Rwandan radio station RTLTM called for every Hutu to kill their Tutsi neighbours, and lists of names of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were broadcasted, along with their addresses.⁸⁷ A day later, ten Belgian soldiers from Dallaire's force were murdered, and the Belgian government pulled all of their troops from Rwanda a week after. In addition to this, the UNAMIR force was brought down by another 90% in late April, leaving the peacekeepers with only a fraction of their original force, which had already been too small.⁸⁸ As a result, the remaining UNAMIR

⁸⁰ United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 15-19.

⁸¹ United Nations, *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, 6 and Power, "A Problem From Hell," 336.

⁸² Power, "A Problem From Hell," 336.

⁸³ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 92-96.

⁸⁴ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 75, 82-86.

⁸⁵ Salton, *Dangerous Diplomacy*, 62.

⁸⁶ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide*, 153-154.

⁸⁷ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 261 and Power, "A Problem From Hell," 333.

⁸⁸ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 149-150.

troops were unable to intervene and stop the genocide: apart from various small rescue missions, they were not able to make a significant difference.⁸⁹ The international community refused to do anything in order to stop the killing, and the genocide would not come to an end until early July, when the RPF invaded Kigali.⁹⁰ By then, it was already far too late: in around 100 days, approximately 800,000 people had been killed in Rwanda.⁹¹

2.2 Warning signs

Months before the genocide in Rwanda actually started, clear warning signs were present on several occasions. Dallaire attempted to act on these warnings in order to prevent an outburst of violence, but was limited by his mandate and by the fact that the UN headquarters in New York refused to cooperate. In January, UNAMIR was approached by an informant inside the Habyarimana government.⁹² This informant revealed that lists of names of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were being made and that large amounts of weapons were stored in arms caches in the capital Kigali.⁹³ In addition to this, the informant warned that Hutu extremists intended to set up a trap and kill Belgian soldiers, because they expected that this would cause the Belgians to withdraw from UNAMIR completely.⁹⁴ As we now know, this exact plan would be carried out in the early stages of the genocide, and the outcome would be exactly as intended by the extremists. In the fax sent to UN headquarters in response to the informant's revelations, Dallaire requested both permission to take action and raid the arms caches in Kigali, as well as the informant's protection and evacuation.⁹⁵ The response to this cable sent by Dallaire, now known as the 'genocide fax', was an order from New York, signed with the names of Kofi Annan and Iqbal Riza, to stand down and not take any action yet.⁹⁶ Dallaire's continued attempts to persuade the people at UN headquarters failed, and he regards this inaction in New York as a consequence of the UNOSOM mission.⁹⁷

⁸⁹ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 259.

⁹⁰ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 161 and Power, "A Problem From Hell," 380.

⁹¹ United Nations, *Report of the Independent Inquiry*, 3.

⁹² Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, 31.

⁹³ Roméo Dallaire, Code Cable from Dallaire to Baril. Fax No: Most immediate; Cable: 212-963-4652. "Request for protection for informant," January 11, 1994.

⁹⁴ Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," 113.

⁹⁵ Dallaire, "Request for protection for informant," January 11, 1994.

⁹⁶ Kofi Annan, and Iqbal Riza, Code Cable from Annan to Booh-Booh. Fax No: Most immediate; Cable: 74. "Contacts with informant," January 10, 1994 (date in New York due to time difference).

⁹⁷ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 146-147.

While the information provided by this informant was the most clear warning UNAMIR received in the months leading up to the genocide, several other warning signs were present as well. The situation with regard to security had been deteriorating in Kigali and other parts of Rwanda for quite some time: two Rwandan political leaders were murdered during this period, and one of the military observers from the UNAMIR mission was wounded.⁹⁸ When a curfew was implemented in Kigali in late February, the situation stabilised slightly, however, tensions were still very much present.⁹⁹ In addition to the clearly deteriorating situation overall, UNAMIR's intelligence contingent recruited another informant in February. This informant was one of the members of the *interahamwe*, the extremist group who would carry out the majority of the murders during the genocide. This person confirmed most of the other informant's information, and revealed that the people who were organising the killings were the brothers-in-law of President Habyarimana.¹⁰⁰ The warning signs in the period leading up to the genocide were thus abundant: two informants with significant revelations, in addition to an overall deteriorating situation, combined with the fact that the people behind the plans were known. Whereas one would expect the UN or its member states to act on this information immediately, the headquarters in New York refused to grant permission for the plans proposed by Dallaire in order to prevent total escalation.¹⁰¹ Despite Dallaire's numerous attempts to gain assistance or expand the mission, the UN and its members failed to respond to these warnings, and the consequences were absolutely disastrous.

2.3 The role of intelligence in Rwanda

Warning signs with regard to what was about to happen in Rwanda were thus very clear, so what went wrong exactly? Why was the UN, the most important representative of the international community as a whole, unable to prevent or at least stop the genocide while they were clearly warned that the situation would likely escalate? The answer to this infuriating question is threefold: the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide was influenced by UNAMIR's weak intelligence position, problems with regard to information-sharing and finally, the international community's unwillingness to act.

⁹⁸ United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 34.

⁹⁹ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 194.

¹⁰⁰ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 179-180.

¹⁰¹ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 105.

Firstly, UNAMIR's position with regard to the gathering and analysis of intelligence was relatively weak. The part of the mission in Rwanda concerned with intelligence was very limited: UNAMIR's intelligence unit was composed of very few intelligence officers.¹⁰² In fact, these officers were not even a direct part of the UNAMIR mission. Dallaire had requested the instalment of an intelligence unit on several occasions, but UN headquarters refused, since they believed the gathering of intelligence was not in line with carrying out a peacekeeping mission. This sentiment clearly reflects the general UN perspective on intelligence, which I discussed in the previous chapter. Due to this limitation, Dallaire decided to ask for Belgian assistance: they provided a small team of two intelligence officers who would provide information for the UNAMIR mission, reporting back to both Dallaire and Belgian military headquarters.¹⁰³ The information gathered by this small intelligence team and the other peacekeepers on the ground would be reported to Dallaire, who would then pass on important information to the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Rwanda, Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, as well as to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York.¹⁰⁴ The Belgian military intelligence service was thus quite active in Rwanda in the months prior to the genocide, and they had already published reports on the Hutu extremists in Rwanda much earlier, in 1992. The French intelligence services had already identified these extremists a year before that, in 1991.¹⁰⁵ In addition to this, the CIA predicted in late January of 1994 that if the situation in Rwanda escalated further, five hundred thousand people could die and the Arusha Peace Agreements would fail completely.¹⁰⁶ While UNAMIR's intelligence position was weak, foreign intelligence services had thus clearly obtained concerning information before the genocide, reporting back to their own governments, major powers such as France and the United States, and yet nothing was done in order to prevent the outbreak of violence.

According to Dallaire, his mission's intelligence position was undermined further by the temporary Rwandan seat on the Security Council. He argues that these representatives shared information with the Hutu extremists in Rwanda: "There I was with my small team of intelligence officers who were risking their lives for crumbs of information, while the extremists had a direct pipeline to the kind of strategic intelligence that allowed them to

¹⁰² Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 195.

¹⁰³ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide*, 59.

¹⁰⁴ Salton, *Dangerous Diplomacy*, 72, 166.

¹⁰⁵ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide*, 67.

¹⁰⁶ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide*, 273.

shadow my every move”.¹⁰⁷ The limitations of UNAMIR’s intelligence position are also pointed out by Wiebes in his Srebrenica report. He states: “at a lower level the provision of intelligence to the troops on the ground during the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia would also be woefully inadequate (as had been the case in Rwanda)”.¹⁰⁸

In addition to this weak intelligence position on the ground, the analysis of intelligence at the higher levels of the United Nations during the UNAMIR mission would prove to be insufficient as well. Problems with sharing information existed on two levels: between member states and the UN, and between the different departments of the UN. According to Salton, numerous member states, such as the United States, France and Belgium, obtained intelligence through their embassies in Kigali. Generally, however, states are reluctant to share their information with the UN. This is the case due to the fear that this shared intelligence will not be handled adequately. In addition to this, member states sometimes make the decision to not share all of their information with the United Nations directly as a way to maintain pressure on the UN, and according to Boutros-Ghali, this occurred in the case of Rwanda as well.¹⁰⁹ The other information-sharing issue existed within the UN itself: according to Salton, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations failed to communicate with each other effectively in this regard. He states: “the intelligence gathered by one department was not directly or efficiently passed on to the other”.¹¹⁰ Problems with the gathering of information on the ground thus existed, and when this intelligence obtained by either the UNAMIR peacekeepers or the embassies of Western countries was provided to UN headquarters, this did not guarantee that it was passed on to the proper echelons due to these significant information-sharing issues.

Finally, the sad truth about the Rwandan case is that the indifference of the international community played a crucial role in the failure to prevent the genocide. While problems with regard to intelligence gathering and analysis clearly existed as well, the warning signs were crystal clear, and should have provided enough incentive for the UN and its member states to take action. They failed to do so however, not because they did not have enough information or resources, but because they did not want to act. Due to the disastrous consequences of the UNOSOM II mission a year before, the US did not want to get involved in another African

¹⁰⁷ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, 195.

¹⁰⁸ Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport*, 12.

¹⁰⁹ Salton, *Dangerous Diplomacy*, 167.

¹¹⁰ Salton, *Dangerous Diplomacy*, 168.

peacekeeping mission. In response to the ten Belgian peacekeepers that were killed in early April, Belgium pulled out of the UNAMIR mission, and by the time France finally responded through Opération Turquoise in late June, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans had already been killed.¹¹¹ As stated by Power in *“A Problem From Hell”*, this failed response was “not a lack of knowledge or influence but a lack of will”.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You*, 149-150, 155.

¹¹² Power, *“A Problem From Hell,”* 508.

3. UNPROFOR: Srebrenica, 1995

3.1 The case

Several years before the fall of Srebrenica, in the summer of 1991, war erupted in Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on June 25th, 1991, and fighting started shortly afterwards.¹¹³ Croatia's independence was recognized by the European Community in January 1992, and according to LeBor, "This left Bosnia with two choices: declare independence or remain in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia".¹¹⁴ In March, 99.4% of the population voted in favour of independence in a referendum, but in response to this, a Bosnian Serb state within Bosnia was declared by Serb nationalists.¹¹⁵ In early April, Bosnian independence was recognized by the European Community and the United States, and the violence in Bosnia intensified.¹¹⁶

In early 1992, the situation in the former Yugoslavia was thus chaotic, and would soon become even more violent. In February, the mission known as UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force, had been approved by the Security Council. This mission would be deployed to Croatia, in order to oversee the ceasefire that had been established and provide aid with regard to peace negotiations. UNPROFOR's headquarters was established in Sarajevo in March, due to the neutrality of that location at the time.¹¹⁷ Several months later, in August, the mission's mandate was expanded to Bosnia: this part of the peacekeeping effort would be known as UNPROFOR II.¹¹⁸

UNPROFOR encountered numerous problems during their mandate, which would end in 1995. Despite the size of the operation, it was poorly equipped and its mandate was very limited.¹¹⁹ In addition to this, due to the complexity of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the fact that the peacekeeping mission was carried out in several countries at the same

¹¹³ Rohde, *Endgame*, preface (e-book).

¹¹⁴ LeBor, "*Complicity With Evil*," 26.

¹¹⁵ Power, "*A Problem From Hell*," 248-249.

¹¹⁶ Kofi Annan, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica*, (UN Document A/54/549) November 15, 1999, 9.

¹¹⁷ Annan, *Report of the Secretary-General*, 8.

¹¹⁸ Berdal and Economides, *United Nations Interventionism*, 70-71.

¹¹⁹ Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, 167.

time, the operation's mandate changed continuously.¹²⁰ As Shawcross states in his book *Deliver Us From Evil*: "UNPROFOR's task was virtually impossible".¹²¹

On the 16th of April 1993, the town of Srebrenica was declared a safe area. Resolution 819 was passed by the Security Council, which demanded that the Bosnian Serbs would have to withdraw, cease their attacks on the town, and that UNPROFOR units would be deployed to Srebrenica.¹²² This town, a Muslim enclave, is located in the east of Bosnia, and in July 1995, Srebrenica's population counted approximately 40,000 people due to the presence of over 30,000 refugees from the area.¹²³ Several weeks later, in early May, resolution 824 was passed and various other safe areas were declared as well: these included Zepa, Gorazde, Sarajevo, Bihac and Tuzla.¹²⁴ On the 8th of May, both Zepa and Srebrenica were also declared Demilitarized Zones.¹²⁵

As a result of resolution 819, Canadian troops were deployed to Srebrenica in order to monitor the safe area. Almost a year later, in March 1994, they were replaced by a larger mission: Dutch battalion or Dutchbat, which counted 570 personnel.¹²⁶ Dutchbat's objectives in Srebrenica were threefold: "to deter attacks, as outlined in the resolutions of spring 1993; to facilitate humanitarian aid; and to demilitarize the enclave".¹²⁷ The Dutch troops stationed in Srebrenica were replaced twice, and in January 1995, Dutchbat III was deployed to the Bosnian enclave, headed by commander Thom Karremans.¹²⁸

Dutchbat III was thus stationed in Srebrenica in early 1995, and encountered various problems. First of all, the Bosnian town is located in a valley, thus surrounded by higher positions, and these positions were occupied by the Bosnian Serbs.¹²⁹ Therefore, the people inside the town were more or less trapped. Secondly, despite the fact that the town was an official safe area, the Serbs surrounding Srebrenica started to use their position in order to maintain pressure on the Dutchbat troops. In February 1995, the first convoy delivering

¹²⁰ Berdal and Economides, *United Nations Interventionism*, 68.

¹²¹ Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil*, chapter 6 (e-book).

¹²² United Nations, "Security Council Resolution 819," (UN Document S/RES/819), April 16, 1993.

¹²³ Karremans, *Srebrenica: Who Cares?*, 38.

¹²⁴ United Nations, "Security Council Resolution 824," (UN Document S/RES/819), May 6, 1993.

¹²⁵ Karremans, *Srebrenica: Who Cares?*, 24.

¹²⁶ LeBor, "Complicity With Evil," 71-72.

¹²⁷ LeBor, "Complicity With Evil," 72.

¹²⁸ Wiebes et al., "Blindfolded in the Dark," 154.

¹²⁹ LeBor, "Complicity With Evil," 38, 66 and Karremans, *Srebrenica: Who Cares?*, 175.

supplies to the enclave was prevented from entering Srebrenica, and various others followed. Srebrenica was thus completely locked off from the rest of Bosnia, and as a result, Dutchbat lacked resources such as ammunition, fuel, electricity and food.¹³⁰

The situation in Bosnia as a whole, as well as the area surrounding Srebrenica, continued to deteriorate in the months prior to July: numerous UNPROFOR troops were taken hostage, limiting the mission further.¹³¹ In early July, the situation became even more tense. Karremans notified UNPROFOR headquarters on the 7th of July that the Bosnian Serb troops were directly firing at and shelling the town,¹³² and two days later, he reported that the Serbs had taken over several positions in the enclave.¹³³ On the 11th of July, Srebrenica was overrun completely, and was now under control of the Bosnian Serb army, led by Ratko Mladic.¹³⁴ In the days following the fall of the enclave, the men were separated from the women and children, and 7,000 to 8,000 Muslim boys and men went missing, murdered because of their ethnicity.¹³⁵ The genocide of Srebrenica was another painful chapter in the history of UN peacekeeping: due to their limited mandate and resources and a lack of support, Dutchbat was unable to prevent the massacre. In 1999, Kofi Annan took the responsibility for the failure of Srebrenica and the mistakes that were made,¹³⁶ but by then it was already far too late for the people of Srebrenica. What role did intelligence play in this tragedy? Was the Serb attack a true surprise, or could the UN and its member states have acted more in a more timely manner?

¹³⁰ Power, "A Problem From Hell," 391.

¹³¹ Karremans, *Srebrenica: Who Cares?*, 131-136.

¹³² Thom Karremans, Code Cable from Karremans to Headquarters UNPROFOR, "Deteriorating situation in SREBRENICA," (No. TK95112), July 7, 1995.

¹³³ Thom Karremans, Code Cable from Karremans to Headquarters UNPROFOR, "Deteriorating situation in SREBRENICA," (No. TK95113), July 9, 1995.

¹³⁴ Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport*, 327.

¹³⁵ Power, "A Problem From Hell," 392 and Metselaar, "Understanding Failures in Intelligence Estimates," 24.

¹³⁶ Malone and Thakur, "UN Peacekeeping", 11.

3.2 Warning signs

While the attack on Srebrenica in July 1995 may appear sudden, several warning signs were in fact present in the period before the Serbs occupied the enclave. First of all, the overall deteriorating situation due to the Serbs' surrounding of the town and their increased violations of the safe area principle were a warning sign. The fact that the situation was becoming more tense was reported by Karremans on several occasions, but his superiors at the UN did not act on this information.

In early June, Karremans asked for assistance in order to improve Dutchbat's resources, and already warned that the Serbs were unlikely to withdraw: "I am strongly convinced that the BSA will proceed their offensive operations,"¹³⁷ he stated in his fax to UNPROFOR headquarters. In his fax of July 7th, he referred back to this particular warning, reporting that the situation had become "critical" and ending his cable with the words "On behalf of the population of the enclave of SREBRENICA, I would like to ask your assistance by all means: ground and air."¹³⁸ Clearly, Karremans was worried about Srebrenica's fate weeks before the actual attack, and expressed those concerns several times, however, the UN and its member states did not act upon these warnings. Even when he officially asked for support by any means, no one responded.

In 1994, it became possible for peacekeepers in Bosnia to appeal for 'Close Air Support' provided by NATO if they or the enclaves they were protecting were endangered. Before this could be carried out, however, both head of the UN mission Yasushi Akashi and NATO commanders would have to approve.¹³⁹ In Srebrenica, CAS was requested by Dutchbat on several occasions, but their requests were denied. On the 6th of July, Karremans requested assistance for the first time, and did so again several times in the following days. The reason why NATO did not respond to these requests by Dutchbat is because the UN force commander, Bernard Janvier, who was in charge of calling for NATO's support, rejected

¹³⁷ Thom Karremans, Code Cable from Karremans to Headquarters UNPROFOR, "Deteriorating situation in SREBRENICA," (No. TK9588), June 4, 1995.

¹³⁸ Karremans, "Deteriorating situation in SREBRENICA," July 7, 1995.

¹³⁹ Power, *"A Problem From Hell,"* 392.

them.¹⁴⁰ Eventually, NATO provided Close Air Support, but “the provided air support was too little, too late,”¹⁴¹ and the enclave fell nonetheless.

Another warning that could have changed the fate of the people that were murdered in Srebrenica was the information held by the United States. According to Wiebes, American satellites had taken photos of the events surrounding the fall of Srebrenica, but this intelligence was never shared with the Dutch peacekeepers on the ground.¹⁴² As was the case in Rwanda, intelligence sharing thus proved to be a problem in Bosnia as well.

Finally, as stated by Rijdsdijk, “The crimes committed by Serb forces do fit in a pattern of violence in what was openly called the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Bosnia”.¹⁴³ Before the massacre of Srebrenica, ethnic cleansing already occurred in Bosnia: various concentration camps, controlled by the Serbs, existed in which prisoners were held in absolutely inhuman conditions.¹⁴⁴ While this information could not have predicted the fall of Srebrenica in detail, it should have made the Serbs’ intentions more clear, and the international community should have acted far more timely on the available information.

3.3 The role of intelligence in Srebrenica

While the warning signs in Bosnia may have been slightly less clear than those in Rwanda, the question of why the UN and its member states did not act on the information that was available is very relevant here as well. As was the case with UNAMIR, the fact that the UNPROFOR was unable to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica was influenced by three different factors. These factors are identical to those that influenced the failure in the case of Rwanda: Dutchbat’s position with regard to intelligence was insufficient, problems with regard to information-sharing existed and the UN and the international community in general made the decision not to act.

¹⁴⁰ Power, *“A Problem From Hell,”* 397.

¹⁴¹ Karremans, *Srebrenica: Who Cares?*, 199 (quote translated from Dutch).

¹⁴² Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport*, 312.

¹⁴³ Rijdsdijk, “The Politics of Hard Knowledge,” 2229.

¹⁴⁴ Power, *“A Problem From Hell,”* 269.

First of all, the intelligence position of Dutchbat during their deployment in Bosnia was simply weak. As previously established, the United Nations' critical attitude with regard to intelligence has often created problematic situations with regard to the intelligence positions of peacekeepers, and this was the case in Srebrenica as well. As mentioned by Wiebes in his report on Srebrenica: "the provision of intelligence to the troops on the ground during the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia would also be woefully inadequate".¹⁴⁵ Due to these limitations, Dutchbat was unable to monitor events outside of Srebrenica, and their intelligence was thus mostly limited to the information that was available inside the enclave.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, they could not anticipate developments outside of the safe area, even though this was vital due to the fact that the town was surrounded by the Bosnian Serb armed forces. The limited information that was gathered by the UN peacekeepers in Srebrenica was reported back to Karremans, who would then draw up reports to be sent to the UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo.¹⁴⁷ In addition to that of Dutchbat, NATO's intelligence position was relatively weak as well: the organisation has no intelligence department of its own, and is thus completely dependent on the intelligence that is shared by its member states.¹⁴⁸ The Dutch Military Intelligence Service was also not adequately prepared for the conflict in Bosnia: the service did not start training people in the Serbo-Croat language until 1994, for example. This insufficient preparation was also a problem for other Western intelligence services involved in Bosnia, which also included the UK's Secret Intelligence Service or MI-6 and both the CIA and NSA of the United States.¹⁴⁹ The intelligence that was gathered by these agencies was usually reported back to their own governments, and some of the information was shared with other involved countries, but problems certainly existed with regard to this cooperation.

During the UNPROFOR mission, issues with regard to information-sharing existed on various levels. As mentioned in the previous section, the United States had obtained photos of the area around the enclave before, during and after the final Serb attack on Srebrenica. However, the U.S. did not share this information with the Netherlands. This problem existed between other countries related to the UNPROFOR mission as well. According to Wiebes et al., for example, problems with sharing intelligence existed between NATO members and

¹⁴⁵ Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport*, 12.

¹⁴⁶ Wiebes et al., "Blindfolded in the Dark," 163-164.

¹⁴⁷ Karremans, "Deteriorating situation in SREBRENICA," July 9, 1995.

¹⁴⁸ Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport*, 51.

¹⁴⁹ Wiebes, *Srebrenica-rapport*, 47-52.

non-members: staff originating from countries with a NATO membership refused to share information with others who were from non-NATO states.¹⁵⁰ The problems with regard to this particular aspect of intelligence are also pointed out by Shawcross. According to him “this failure of intelligence sharing was an endemic weakness of UNPROFOR”.¹⁵¹ Clearly, the problem of information-sharing was a significant issue during the mission: if more intelligence had been shared, the warning signs would have been more clear and the boys and men of Srebrenica might still have been alive today.

Finally, as was the case in Rwanda a year before, the unwillingness of the international community to act and prevent the genocide in Srebrenica played a major role in the failure to do so. Various warnings that the situation would likely escalate were present in the summer of 1995, and Karremans directly asked his superiors for help on several occasions. Due to the inaction by the higher levels of the United Nations and the international community in general, no response to these requests came until it was far too late.

¹⁵⁰ Wiebes et al., “Blindfolded in the Dark,” 165.

¹⁵¹ Shawcross, *Deliver Us From Evil*, chapter 6 (e-book).

4. Discussion: case comparison

In order to clarify the context in which the UNAMIR and UNPROFOR missions were carried out, the history of peacekeeping and its use of intelligence were discussed, as well as the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia, due to its significant influence on the peacekeeping efforts that followed. After this contextualisation, both case studies were discussed: first Rwanda and then Srebrenica. For both cases, I examined the case at hand, the warning signs that existed and finally the role of intelligence in the case in general, in which I identified three factors that played a role in the failure to prevent genocide. These included the weak position of the mission with regard to intelligence, issues with information-sharing and the unwillingness of the international community to act. In this section, I will actively compare both of my case studies. While clear similarities exist between the two cases, mainly with regard to the three factors mentioned above, they are also quite different in several ways. What can we learn from the differences and similarities that exist between these two peacekeeping missions, and what conclusions can we draw from these case studies about UN peacekeeping in general?

With regard to the cases itself, numerous differences clearly exist. Rwanda is a former colony in Africa, where ethnic differences had long played a vital role in the high levels of violence that existed in the country. Civil war between the Rwandan government headed by president Habyarimana and the rebel group Rwandan Patriotic Front or RPF erupted in the early 1990s, but the UNAMIR mission was deployed as a part of the 1993 Arusha Accords. Once the UNAMIR troops thus arrived in Rwanda, the country's civil war was officially over. In Bosnia on the other hand, the war was still very much ongoing when the UNPROFOR II mission was deployed. The nature of the conflict, which had erupted as a result of the collapse of Yugoslavia into various independent countries, was also very different. However, large similarities between the two missions are also apparent, which is the reason why I decided to conduct a comparative analysis on this particular topic. In both Rwanda and Srebrenica, ethnicity played a large role in the conflict: in Rwanda, the relations between the Hutus and the Tutsis caused problems, and in Bosnia, major difficulties existed between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims. In addition to this ethnic component, it is clear that in both cases, genocide occurred while UN peacekeepers were already on the ground, and in both cases, this could have been prevented.

In both Rwanda and Srebrenica, warning signs on the forthcoming escalations were present, which is where they are similar. However, the clarity of these warnings was slightly different in both cases. In Rwanda, the exact plans for the genocide were known through the informant that came forward in January 1994, as a result of which commander Dallaire sent his 'genocide fax' to UN headquarters in New York. In addition to this information, the situation with regard to security had been deteriorating for months before the genocide actually started, and in February, another informant shared intelligence on the genocide plans with UNAMIR. In the Rwandan case, UNAMIR and UN headquarters thus almost exactly knew what was going to happen. In Srebrenica, the warning signs were also quite clear, but these occurred closer in advance to the actual fall of the enclave. While the fact that the Serbs surrounded the enclave and actively undermined Dutchbat was a clear warning, this was a relatively stable situation at times as well: the first convoy headed for Srebrenica was blocked by the Serbs in February, months before the fall of the enclave.¹⁵² However, in June, several weeks before the Serbs captured the town, commander Karremans already clearly warned that he expected the Serb forces to advance further, and called for support in order to improve the situation.

Finally, as already became clear in the previous section, the three factors that I identify as contributors to the failure to prevent genocide are identical in both cases. The intelligence position of both the UNAMIR and the UNPROFOR II missions was very weak, mostly as a result of the negative stance the United Nations has towards the use of intelligence in general. Also, problems with regard to information-sharing existed in both cases. This contributed to the insufficient intelligence position of the peacekeepers on the ground, and to the general inaction in both cases as well. If all involved actors had actively shared information with each other, the warning signs had been even more clear, and these genocides could have perhaps been prevented. Finally, the painful truth is that the international community failed to prevent the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica because they simply did not want to intervene. As a result of the UNOSOM II mission, the United States and other Western countries had lost most interest in peacekeeping, and did not want to spend troops and resources on such missions again. In both cases, warning signs were clear and troops were already present: the international community could have acted and prevent genocide, if only they had wanted to.

¹⁵² Karremans, *Srebrenica: Who Cares?*, 96.

While this thesis only focuses on the UNAMIR and UNPROFOR II missions and the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, some general conclusions about the topic of UN peacekeeping can be drawn. Firstly, the point of view on intelligence that exists within the United Nations, which believes that intelligence is not a necessary aspect in peacekeeping operations, is seriously problematic. The missions examined in this thesis both had a significantly weak position with regard to intelligence, and this was largely a result of the UN's aversion towards intelligence. If the UN wants to successfully intervene in conflicts and aim for peace, their troops should be much better informed before and during their deployment. Secondly, the international community plays a vital role in the success of peacekeeping missions. Their interest or indifference can either make or break a mission, which can have serious consequences, as we have seen in these two case studies. The UN member states, and especially the major powers such as the United States and the European states have a responsibility, and they can not simply look away during conflicts in other countries simply because they do not care enough to intervene. These two missions did have a significant impact on peacekeeping at the UN: in 2000, the Brahimi Report was published, which extensively reviewed the organisation's peace operations.¹⁵³ The report was critical with regard to the peacekeeping experiences of the 1990s, and called for large changes in order to improve peacekeeping, including aspects such as "renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support".¹⁵⁴ In response to the Brahimi Report, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1327, which regarded the improvement of peacekeeping operations.¹⁵⁵ However, the resolution did not mention the need to improve intelligence capabilities anywhere, so it seems that the UN's perspective on intelligence remained unchanged in the aftermath of the report. Despite this, the failed peacekeeping missions of the 1990s did thus have a serious impact on the UN, and caused the organisation to recognize the need for change to some extent.

¹⁵³ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, I.

¹⁵⁴ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, VIII.

¹⁵⁵ United Nations, "Security Council Resolution 1327," (UN Document S/RES/1327), November 13, 2000.

Conclusion

To conclude, the availability and supply of intelligence in the Rwanda and Srebrenica cases did not make much of a difference. While the failure to prevent genocide during the UNAMIR and UNPROFOR missions was heavily influenced by the weak intelligence position of these missions, as well as problems with information-sharing on various levels, the indifference of the international community also played a major role. In both cases, clear warning signs existed, yet the United Nations and its member states made the decision not to act, and genocide was not prevented or stopped where it should have been.

For my research on this topic, I conducted a comparative analysis of the failed UN peacekeeping missions in Rwanda in 1994 and in Srebrenica in 1995. While numerous differences exist between these two specific cases, they are also very similar in various ways, which is why I made the decision to compare these two missions. In both conflicts, ethnicity played a major role in the hostilities. In both cases, the commanders warned UN headquarters in New York on several occasions that the situation was likely to escalate completely. In both cases, evidence existed that something terrible was about to happen, and the international community chose to look away instead of intervene. Throughout this thesis, I aimed to answer my research question: “What role did the availability and supply of intelligence at the United Nations and its member states during the peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Srebrenica play in the failure to prevent genocide in both cases?”. I have argued that while enough intelligence warning that the situation was going to deteriorate was available, simply not enough was done with this information. As a result of the comparison of the UNAMIR and UNPROFOR missions, I have determined three main factors that played a major role in the failure to prevent genocide in both cases. These include the insufficient intelligence position of both missions, mostly as a result of the UN’s aversion towards intelligence, issues with information-sharing and the inaction of the international community.

As I have demonstrated through the contextualisation of my case studies in my first chapter, the failure of the UNOSOM II mission in 1993 especially influenced the member states’ indifferent stance on peacekeeping. Most Western states simply lost interest in actively participating in peacekeeping efforts due to the events in Mogadishu, and the UNAMIR and UNPROFOR missions suffered from this as a result. This indifference of the international

community with regard to the horrors that occurred in Rwanda and Srebrenica during the 1990s, in combination with the intelligence weaknesses that exist at the United Nations caused the failure to prevent these genocides. While plenty of intelligence and warning signs were available, this information was not acted upon, so the availability and supply of intelligence did not make much of a difference.

While this research only incorporated two case studies on the role of intelligence in UN peacekeeping and the failure to prevent genocide, as a result of the clear similarities between Rwanda and Srebrenica, some general conclusions on the topic can be drawn. Firstly, the United Nations' stance on intelligence is a problematic one, and the lack of intelligence during peacekeeping missions as a result of this aversion can seriously weaken such missions, thus limiting their chances of success. As stated by Eriksson: "this approach could very well jeopardize both the life of the peacekeepers and the success of an operation".¹⁵⁶ Secondly, these case studies have also demonstrated that UN member states play an absolutely vital role in peacekeeping. Their interest or disinterest with regard to a mission can heavily influence its outcome: if the international community had been more interested in intervening in Rwanda or Srebrenica, the missions' resources would have been much better, thus improving their chances of a successful operation, and thousands of Rwandans and Bosnian Muslims might still be alive today. In these two cases, the international community chose not to do so, however. The UN and its member states neglected its responsibilities with regard to safeguarding peace in the world, and hundreds of thousands of people were murdered because of their ethnicity as a result. In the future, the international community must do better in peacekeeping operations, and a change in the United Nations' opinion towards the use of intelligence in their missions would be an important first step to take.

¹⁵⁶ Eriksson, "Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations," 1.

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