

The Great Lakes Region's genocides: Rwanda and Burundi



Figure 1UN, Maps, <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm>.

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Abbreviations

BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BNUB	United Nations Office in Burundi
CDR	Coalition pour la Défense de la République
CNDD-FDD	Council National pour la Défense de la Démocratie - Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie
FRODEBU	Front pour la Démocratie du Burundi
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICIB	International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi
Impuzamugambi	Literally: Those who have the same goal
Interahamwe	Literally: those who stand together
JNR	Jeunesses Nationalistes Rwagasore
JRR	Jeunesses Révolutionnaires Rwagasore
MDR	Mouvement Démocratique Républicain
MNRD	Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie
MRND(D)	Mouvement Républicain national pour la démocratie et le Développement
PalipeHutu	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu
PalipeHutu-FLN	Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Libération
PDC	Parti Démocratique Chrétien
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SC	Security Council of the United Nations
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UPRONA	Union pour le Progrès National

Abstract

Ever since the Genocide Convention (1948), the UN has tried to prevent genocides. However, three genocides can be identified in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Burundi 1972, 1993 and Rwanda 1994. Both countries are very similar, and therefore, it is expected that both countries have the same (underlying) explaining factors of genocide. Nonetheless, Burundi's genocides differ in scale and triggers from Rwanda's genocide. Consequently, (a) triggering factor (s) should exist which would clarify these differences. Via a comparative analysis of explaining factors, the combination of the ethnic group in the government (and the military) in relation with the ethnic group divisions in the population, appears to be this factor that influenced the capacity of the absolutely central position of the state in organizing and implementing genocide. This means that in Rwanda, with their Hutu government in combination with a Hutu military and Hutu majority in the population, a genocide of a large scale could have been organized. Burundi did not experience a combination like this, which appears to be the reason why in Burundi only genocides of smaller scales took place.

Introduction

After the horrible events of the Second World War, the international community, the UN, accepted the Genocide Convention in 1948 which was ratified in 1951 (Totten and Parsons, 2004:3-4). In this Convention the definition of genocide is stated (Genocide Convention, 1948): *'In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, as such: a. Killing members of the group; b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e. Forcibly transferring children of the groups to another group.'* *'The following acts shall be punishable: a. Genocide; b. Conspiracy to commit genocide; c. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; d. Attempt to commit genocide; e. Complicity in genocide.'*

According to this Genocide document, the international community should prevent genocide from happening if signs of planning genocide are present. It is said that genocide cannot suddenly come up, it has to be prepared and planned and therefore it can be prevented (Totten and Parsons, 2004:3, Lemarchand, 2004²:395 and Hintjes, 1999:245).

Unfortunately, lots of genocides or acts of genocides can be found in the post-Second World War period. One could interpret this as a failure of the Convention and the UN, because of their passiveness (Jongman, 1996:1-3). In the Great Lakes Region of Africa (see cover picture), three genocides can be identified. The most notable is the Rwandan genocide which occurred from April till July, 1994, in which around 800.000 people, mainly Tutsis, were slaughtered to death by Hutus. Furthermore, from April till July 1972, around a quarter million people, mainly Hutus, were killed by Tutsis in Burundi. In October 1993, also about a quarter million people, mainly Tutsis, were assassinated by Hutus (Lemarchand, 2009:129, 141 and 146).

Rwanda is a country that has experienced a lot of violence and mass killings after their independence in which two separate ethnicities: the 'Hutu' people and the 'Tutsi' people, played an important role. The genocide seems to be the point where these conflicts extremely escalated. In 1990, a civil war had started in Rwanda between these two ethnicities. The international community did not interfere in this conflict, because it had been mediating between the opposite parties for three years (this time period is also called: the Arusha Peace Marathon). In 1993, the civil war was officially ended by the Arusha Declaration, however this was only officially. The opposite parties did not trust this Declaration and violence continued (Jones, 1995:225 and Prunier, 1995:159). The crucial point in this period was the assassination of the president of Rwanda and the president of Burundi who were in the same plane, which was shot down in the airspace above Rwanda in April 1994. After this assassination, the genocide in Rwanda almost immediately started (Jones, 1995:225). Although at that time, it was a mystery who the people behind this attack were, many assumptions about this attack triggered much unrest (Lemarchand, 2004²:402 and Prunier, 1995:216-217).

Rwanda and Burundi are quite similar and comparable countries, sometimes even called a 'Siamese twin'. Therefore, a question that could be posed is whether both countries have had the same explanations and causes for genocide. First of all, the countries are neighbors, are located in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, almost have the same country size (around 27.000 sq. km) and number of inhabitants (between 10.000.000 and 11.000.000 people) (CIA Fact Book¹ and CIA Fact Book²). They also share the same ethnic divisions (84% Hutus and 15 % Tutsis), main religion (Christianity), and have comparable languages (Kinyarwanda and Kirundi). Beside this, they have the same colonial background, since they were part of

Belgian Ruanda-Urundi (Berwouts, 2006:21-26) and share a comparable history (see appendix 1). Both countries also have experienced ongoing civil wars between the ethnicities and, more important for this thesis, genocide which made the implementation of peace difficult (Berwouts, 2006:7 and 21).

However, as previously shown, the genocides in Rwanda and Burundi differ in scale of casualties and time period, which indicates different triggers. The results and causes of these genocides vary, therefore research on these differences is interesting in order to find out how it is possible that two comparable countries experienced genocides in such a different way. The research question of this thesis is: What is/are the triggering factor(s) that explain the different genocides concerning scale and triggers in Burundi in comparison to Rwanda, despite the similarities between these two countries?

No research has been done on the explaining factors of the Burundi genocides which is the reason that information about the explaining factors is harder to come by. Because of this gap in literature, the Burundi genocides will be the focus in this thesis. This statement is supported by Lemarchand as he states that the Burundi genocides got little to no media attention or coverage and is not often studied by scholars. Consequently, the Burundi genocide of 1972 can be called the forgotten genocide (Lemarchand, 2009:72 and 129). Also, Shaw thinks that other genocides than the Holocaust and Rwanda, like the genocides in Burundi, are 'painstakingly uncovered' (Shaw, 2007:6-7). A few scholars have written about Burundi. The greatest and almost single expert on the Great Lakes Region and Burundi is Lemarchand (Totten, Parsons and Charny, 2004:xxii) and therefore his work will be used often in this thesis. For research on the Rwandan genocide, there was a lot of scholarly attention (Hintjes, 1999; Newbury; 1998; Prunier 1995 and Straus, 2006); the most important explanation seems to be the behavior of the Rwandan Government towards ethnic conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis and other (underlying) factors and crises.

Similarly, in 2005, the Burundi parties, 19 political parties (including both Tutsi and Hutu, moderates and extremists and mixed ethnical membership), the Government of Burundi and the National Assembly comprising members of the military and mainly from Tutsi party UPRONA, finally agreed that 'The conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic dimensions; it stems from a struggle of the political class to accede to and/or remain in power' (Daley, 2006¹:674). As a consequence of the Rwandan genocide, in Burundi,

the following assumption is often agreed to by Tutsis: ‘majority rule equals the threat of Tutsi annihilation’ (Lemarchand, 2009:64) referring to the demographics (Hutu 85% and Tutsi 15%). Since no research is done on the explanations of Burundi’s genocide, it is interesting to investigate if these statements are accurate; also in combination with the explaining factors as a result of research on Rwanda’s genocide, which are related.

It is important to gather this information about the Burundi genocides, since Burundian people and the international community fear for another genocide in Burundi. The UN is especially interested in preventing genocide from happening, as they are a mediator in this conflicted country. The UN’s fear is described in the article ‘Burundi on the Brink, 1993-1995: A U.N. Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy’ by Gail Gerhart that ‘shows that the situation in Burundi has been very critical and the UN wants to prevent the country from becoming the next Rwanda (Gerhart, 2000). In 2010, the UN decided to succeed the BINUB by the BNUB with Resolution 1959. The BNUB ‘focuses and supports the Government of Burundi’ in several areas, like impunity and the promotion of dialogue between national actors in order to contribute to peace building (bnub.unmissions.org).

Furthermore, especially after the Rwandan genocide in 1994, ‘Many Burundians express the fear of a “genocide à la manière de Rwanda”’ (Herisse, 2002:9). Some even think that history ‘never repeats itself, but it sometimes rhymes’ (Lemarchand, 2009:110). Also, the media are scared for another genocide. The Economist’s article predicts ‘More blood to come’ in which Rwanda and Burundi show no steps towards real peace after the genocide in 1994. If nothing is done ‘there is a grave risk of fresh killings’ (The Economist, 1995). In an article of The Economist in 1994, a reference is made about danger lying ahead and the UN being scared for ‘another round of bloodletting between Hutu majority and Tutsi minority.’ In this article, the army is seen as a critical factor ‘in deciding whether Burundi again tips over the edge’, because of the fear the army will step in if the government does not do her job (The Economist, 1994).

In order to establish the wish of “Never Again! Plus jamais!” (which was spoken in the remembrance gathering of the Rwandan genocide 10 years after the event) in the Great Lakes Region (Lemarchand, 2009:99), the main explaining factor(s) of the Burundi genocides could contribute to the research in genocide studies in general and possibly to the process of peace settlement and genocide prevention. This testimonial is supported by Hintjes who states that

there are still historians, novelist, journalists, filmmakers and many scholars, who are examining the legacy of the Holocaust in order to draw lessons for humanity (Hintjes, 1999:282). Therefore, a start in examining the Burundi's genocides will hopefully be the beginning of research on this topic in order to learn lessons for humanity and people in the Great Lakes Regions of Africa.

In order to provide more information about this topic and an answer to the research question, the theory is described in which the conceptualization of the term genocide, the justification of genocides in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, explanations of Rwanda's genocide and gaps in theory will be explained. After that, the method section will follow. Next, the research will start with an analysis of similar explanations of genocide, after which the factual differences of the genocides will be derived and analyzed. Finally, the main explaining factor responsible for the differences and the conclusion will be given.

Theory

In this part, the concept of genocide will be described to introduce the topic of this thesis. It will provide information on how the definition of genocide has been created and what the consequences of the introduction of this term have been. It added another punishable international crime against humanity which specifically differs from other acts of violence. There is something unique about this event and it therefore deserves special attention.

Furthermore, naming the three events in Burundi and Rwanda genocide should be justified in order to use these events for this thesis. Although almost no one questions the genocide in Rwanda, using genocide for the events in Burundi is debated. Also, the justification of genocide in those two countries is necessary, since both ethnicities have different opinions about the events.

Next, little attention is given to the explanations of genocide derived from large-N research, as it only offers structural problems causing conflict which is applicable to more countries than Rwanda and Burundi. A literature review of Rwanda's genocide explanations will give information about the unique causes of genocide in this country. Since both countries are quite similar and no case studies of Burundi's genocides are available, case studies about Rwanda's genocide, its explanations and results applied to Burundi's genocides can provide information in order to answer the research question. Moreover, the literature review of Rwanda's genocide explanations elucidated gaps in theory. This will be explained separately to highlight the focus of this thesis.

Concept of genocide

Genocides have played a role in history for a long time. However, the concept of genocide is quite new. Rafael Lemkin, a Jewish scholar from Germany who fled to the United States of America because of the Holocaust, introduced the concept of genocide during the Second World War and soon afterwards the UN came with the Genocide Convention in which its own definition of genocide is described (Shaw, 2007:6-7). After the Holocaust, the term genocide has been widely discussed among countries and scholars. A general acceptance about a definite definition is still not yet available by scholars. And ever since Raphael Lemkin introduced the term 'genocide' in 1944, a heated debate has been going on about the best and most useful definition of genocide (Totten and Parsons, 2004:3-4). Lemkin created this term

by merging the Greek words *genos* (meaning race, tribe) and *cide* (meaning killing) and presented the following definition (Totten and Parsons, 2004:3):

'... the coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions of culture, language national feelings, religion, economic existence, of national groups and the destruction of personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not their individual capacity, but as members of the national group'

In the early post-Second World War period, Lemkin was known as an 'indefatigable champion' of bringing genocide under the attention of the UN and he was eager to convince the international community of the need to call the event of genocide an 'international crime against humanity.' Therefore, he made a draft resolution for the UN (Totten and Bartrop, 2009:3 and 12). The definition of Lemkin is called broad by some, like LeBlanc, because it does not only include killing as a destruction of a group. This can also be found in the definition of the UN (Totten and Bartrop, 2009:9 and 15). Different arguments exist about whether genocide should be called an international problem instead of a national problem in a specific country. A common argument is that 'the practices of genocide anywhere affect the vital interests of all civilized people. Its consequences can neither be isolated nor localized. Tolerating genocide is an admission of the principle that one national group had the right to attack another because of its supposed racial superiority.' In line with this statement, it could call for an invitation of an expansion of such situations crossing borders of the particular state. Genocides are not culture or continental bound (Totten and Bartrop, 2009:9).

The recognition of the UN that the international community should recognize genocide as an international problem was the consequence of Lemkin's eagerness to introduce the concept of genocide and the status of a crime against humanity. After the horrors of the Second World War, the initial resolution of the UN was unanimously accepted until several countries voted against the inclusion of 'political groups' in the definition of genocide. Therefore, in order to come up with a resolution and definition that would be accepted by all members of the UN this part had to be removed from the definition (Totten and Bartrop, 2009:4). Three years after

the Second World War, the UN agreed with a definition of genocide for the international community after a difficult period of heated deliberations and discussions between the member states of the UN. The UN adopted the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (abbreviated as the Genocide Convention) on 9 December 1948 (Totten and Parsons, 2004:3-4 and Leblanc, 2009:16-21). The UN's definition of genocide and the description of punishable acts are specified in the Convention in Article II and III (Genocide Convention, 1948):

'In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, as such: a. Killing members of the group; b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e. Forcibly transferring children of the groups to another group.'

'The following acts shall be punishable: a. Genocide; b. Conspiracy to commit genocide; c. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; d. Attempt to commit genocide; e. Complicity in genocide.'

In relation to this definition, the words 'never again' are often used after acts of genocide or genocide, which indicates that the international community wants to prevent genocides from happening (Totten and Parsons, 2004:4-8 and Jongman, 1996:1-3). Not having a clear and definite definition of genocide that is free from differing interpretations, can be a serious problem for conflict resolution and genocide prevention. Not only because it increases problems in defining genocidal events as genocide and doing research on cases of genocide, but also since it causes problems for the prosecution in cases that involve actions of genocide and it makes research more difficult for scholars who want to study cases of genocide (Totten and Parsons, 2004:4).

Ever since the creation of the UN's definition of genocide, no changes have been made to it. However, discussions by scholars have been going on about the UN's definition of genocide. They often call this definition too broad or too narrow (Totten and Parsons, 2004:3-4). Also, there is criticism on the context in which the definition has been created, mostly because of political pressures that were the basis of the deliberations and discussion about the definition of genocide and the exclusion of political groups (Charny, 2009:36). Furthermore, there is

disagreement about the interpretation of specific parts of the UN's definition, like 'intent,' 'a part' and 'as such' (Bergsmo, 2009: 22-33 and Totten and Bartrop, 2009:34-35). Although discussions are still going on whether the act 'as such' in the definition counts as genocide, in this thesis it is agreed, like Totten and Bartrop do, that the wording 'as such' refers to 'the fact that specific groups are intentionally targeted for destruction, and that the destruction of such groups is not a result of an accident, side effect, or offshoot of another effort' (Totten and Bartrop, 2009:35). Also, Straus states that the statement of Lemkin about intentional group annihilation as a core is significant, because in this way it distinguishes itself as a special type of mass violence (Straus, 2001:363-367). The UN's definition includes this fundamental element.

Although scholars' criticism should be taken seriously, this thesis will not focus on definitional discussions, and therefore, will not start a debate on this theme. Many different definitions exist, but since this thesis is written in the light of international relations and the UN as mediator of conflicts, the internationally accepted UN definition is used. This statement is supported by Leo Kuyper (1981) who recognizes the UN's definition as most often agreed on and useful. He calls for the maintenance, because in reality this definition is used in international relations in practice (Jones, 2006:15-18 and Straus, 2001:362):

'I shall follow the definition of the genocide given in the [UN] Convention. This is not to say that I agree with the definition. On the contrary, I believe a major omission to be in the exclusion of the political groups from the list of groups protected. In the contemporary world, political differences are at the very least as significant a basis for massacre and annihilation as racial, national, ethnic or religious groups are generally a consequence of, or intimately related to, political conflict.'

Kuyper correctly and convincingly explains his argument that although it contains weaknesses, the UN's definition is internationally and generally agreed on and used in reality. In this thesis, defining and explaining the genocides and differences between them will be accomplished by taking the 'intent to destroy' into account. Although the UN's definition is most useful in the context of international relations relating to the difficult dynamics of politics and genocide prevention, the shortcomings of this definition can exclude events that can be called genocide based on other contexts, e.g. domestic, or points of view, like the inclusion of political groups. Scholars are trying to give alternative definitions to overcome

the gaps and weaknesses of the UN's definition, which is used in international relations (Totten and Bartrop, 2009:35). However, problems with defining the three cases used in this thesis as genocide are little, since the core of the UN genocide definition is present, which will be explained further in the thesis.

For this thesis, it is important to understand genocide as a special type of mass violence that distinguishes itself from terms that describe other events that have other explanations, although some of these terms are sometimes considered equal or related (Shaw, 2007:7 and Straus, 2001:363-367). In both countries, Burundi and Rwanda, besides genocides other events of mass violence have also happened, but in this thesis the focus will be on the genocides. The closely related terms but unequal to genocide are for example: ethnic cleansing, massacre and crimes against humanity.

Defining genocides in the Great Lakes region of Africa

Often, scholars compare the Holocaust during the Second World War with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. 'The Holocaust and the Rwanda genocide are two of the most terrifying and complex catastrophes of the twentieth century' referring to several similarities and one could argue that 'the Rwandan carnage [is] a tropical version of the Shoah [total destruction]' (Lemarchand, 2009:91 and 109).

However, more genocides have occurred since 'Nowhere else in Africa [as in the Great Lakes Region] has genocide extracted a more horrendous price in human lives lost, economic and financial resources squandered, and developmental opportunities wasted' (Lemarchand, 2009:30). This thesis concentrates on two particular countries in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, namely 'Rwanda and Burundi: The Genocidal Twins' (Lemarchand, 2009:48). Based on descriptions of genocidal events by scholars (mainly Lemarchand), but also by statements and documents of the UN with evidence of genocides, three genocides can be identified in these two countries. These three genocides will therefore be used. The next section will serve to justify the usage of these three situations in Burundi and Rwanda for an investigation about genocides. Although the genocide in Rwanda is recognized by many, the Burundi genocides are more contested, especially among perpetrators. The diverse interpretations by different ethnicities because of the denial of genocide is also common. There are radically different interpretations among Tutsis and Hutus in both Rwanda and Burundi about the three 'alleged' genocides in the Great Lakes Region between 1962 and 1994 (Lemarchand, 2009:70 and

132). Frequently, it is argued that the events were just an outburst of common anger and not as to say a planned extermination (Lemarchand, 2009:63). Besides this, only the Rwandan genocide is condemned by the UN SC which makes it more difficult to justify the genocides in Burundi, but not impossible as further explained.

Different interpretations of the horrible events with only the 'truth' of the victor in mind is not in favor of a healing process, but causes a spiral of violence and eventually it may lead history to repeats itself (Lemarchand, 2009:78). It is tempting to write the story of the good and the evil, as there are always victims and perpetrators in these horrible events (Lemarchand, 2009:90). However, the objective of this thesis is to objectively explain what happened and for what reasons and in the next parts the three genocides are justified.

Genocides in Burundi

In Burundi, two genocides can be justified, the Burundi genocide in 1972 and in 1993 triggered by different factors, but similar in scale. As explained in previous parts, different interpretations of these events exist. Therefore, in this section support will be provided for calling these events genocide.

Burundi 1972: April - July

Lemarchand uses the following quote to introduce the genocide of 1972 in Burundi: 'Through the spring and summer of 1972, in the obscure Central African state of Burundi, there took place the systematic killing of as many as a quarter million people. Even among the awesome calamities and intensity. Though exact numbers can never be known, most eyewitnesses agree that over a four-month period, men, women and children were savagely murdered at the rate of more than a thousand a day. It was, wrote United Nations observers, a staggering disaster' (Lemarchand, 2009:129). Although it was indeed a staggering disaster, relating to the UN's Genocide Convention, it was actually the first (event that can be called) genocide on the African continent.

Defining the events in Burundi in 1972 genocide can be problematic on definitional grounds. Nonetheless, despite the absence of a justification of genocide by the UN SC in a resolution, the events of 1972 can be called genocide, based on scholarly observation and expertise, and a special UN commission for investigation. According to Lemarchand, the ICIB and the Genocide Convention, this event in Burundi has been the first example that provides 'acts of

violence committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group (Genocide Convention, 1948:Art.II), because the core of the definition of genocide ‘the intent to destroy’, referring to an organized extermination or planned annihilation of one group, was present.

Lemarchand literally states that ‘As much as the scale of the killings ... it is the element of “planned annihilation” (Lemarchand, 1997:100) and he believes that ‘Behind these faceless statistics [about human lives lost] lies a human tragedy of monumental proportions, the scale of which evokes genocide’ (Lemarchand, 1997:xxv). With this statement he also makes clear that the ‘planned annihilations’ in Burundi in 1972 make this event genocide and different from ethnic cleansing, massacre, and mass murder (Lemarchand, 2009:131). The wholesale elimination of Hutus was seen as the final solution of Hutu threats to the survival of Tutsis and partly based on fear. However, not all Tutsis have been involved in the 1972 killings of Hutus (Lemarchand, 1997:101-102). Therefore, according to Lemarchand it goes without saying that ‘the intent of the Burundian authorities [was] to annihilate a major segment of the Hutu population, solely because of the “Hutu-ness,” irrespective of whether they posed a threat to society or the government’ (Lemarchand, 2009:132). He believes that this genocide is a partial genocide as selective educated Hutus were assassinated and the genocidal quality of the killings in Burundi should not be underestimated. According to Lemarchand around 200.000 - 300.000 Hutus were murdered in a four-month period (Lemarchand, 2009:129-132).

Furthermore, the following consequences can be seen as arguments naming these events genocide. Lemarchand points out that after the bloodbath of 1972, Burundi went through a 16-year period of relative peace which indicates the ‘success’ of Micombero’s elimination of educated Hutu. The killing of almost all educated Hutus consequently reinforced the position of educated Tutsi as the dominant class (Lemarchand, 1997:103). Besides this, protests were rare because of the remembrance of the ever-presented threat of another bloodbath. Burundi had now become a Tutsi hegemony and the government became an instrument of Tutsi political elites (Lemarchand, 2009:138).

Statements in an UN document of representative UN researches support Lemarchand’s arguments. However, no UN Resolutions exist about the events of 1972 in Burundi (www.un.org) which makes it difficult to explore what the official statements of the UN were

and whether the Genocide Convention can be applied to this situation according to the UN. On the other hand, at request of the SC, the ICIB investigated the assassination of President Ndadayé in 1993. In their final report, it is stated that ‘The Micombero regime [during the first genocide in 1972] responded with a genocidal repression that is estimated to have caused over a hundred thousand victims ... Hutus with any degree of education who did not manage to flee into exile were systematically killed all through the country, down to high school’ (ICIB, 2002), which shows the core of the UN genocide definition ‘intent to destroy’.

Although Lemarchand and the UN document see the events of 1972 as a genocide, different opinions exist between Hutus and Tutsis. It can be concluded that Western observers and Hutus agree with the classification ‘genocide’ as they think that several facts exist in relation to the killings of Hutu that are well planned and organized and based on evidence (Lemarchand, 1997:91 and 94). However, Tutsis and the government have been denying the genocide ever since. In general, there is a denial of genocide by Tutsis and an acceptance to call the events of 1972 genocide by Hutus and scholars, like Lemarchand, and Western observers. In the genocide of 1972, there was a retributive government (same as in the Rwandan genocide) because of the response to threats to the state. For this reason too, the official statement by Tutsis on the events of 1972 is that they only reacted to the killings executed by Hutus and saved the country from worse situations, like a genocide of Tutsis. They think that the Hutu-insurgency was therefore the beginning of the 1972 genocide. However, the Western observers and Hutus agreed that there was a form of genocide of Hutus and see that the trigger for this genocide was the executed assassination of Hutu President Ngendadumwe by a Tutsi refugee from Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009:119, 132 and 134).

Burundi 1993: October

In the second genocide in Burundi, there are different interpretations of the events among scholars and the two ethnicities, the Hutus and Tutsis. Also, no SC resolutions are present in which genocide is mentioned. However, there is a clear statement referring to genocide by the ICIB in which the ‘intent to destroy’ is again present.

The events of 1993 are often titled something other than genocide. For example Watt comes up with the entitlement ‘la crise’ (the crisis) (Watt, 2008:x). However, since Tutsis and Hutus are both victims of the genocide in 1993, Watt recognizes a double genocide (Watt, 2008:ix). Lemarchand also identifies a genocide in 1993 in Burundi, but he has no clear statements or

opinions about these events and focusses more on the different interpretations of ethnicities (Lemarchand, 2009). Furthermore, in a document of the UN of 2000, the situation is even called 'Burundi's Civil War' (UN, 2000) instead of genocide.

Nevertheless, after Resolution 1012 in 1995 of the UN SC, the ICIB concluded in their final report of 2002, after investigating 'the massacres and other related serious acts of violence that followed after the assassination of President Ndadayé,' that 'acts of genocide against the Tutsi minority were committed in Burundi in October 1993, [and] the Commission believes that international jurisdiction should be asserted with respect to these acts...' (ICIB, 2002). Furthermore, 'if it is decided to assert international jurisdiction regarding acts of genocide in Burundi once a reasonable level of order and security and ethnic harmony are reestablished, the investigation should not be limited to acts committed in October 1993, but should also extend to other acts committed in the past' (ICIB, 2002) which indicates that the events of 1972 can also be called genocide. The term 'genocide' is used in recommendation for further investigation and conflict resolution (ICIB, 2002). Based on this official investigation by objective researchers appointed by the UN, the events of 1993 are genocide and the Genocide Convention can be applied to this situation.

However, according to Lemarchand's research different interpretations exist about the events of 1993 among Tutsis and Hutus. He believes that Hutus mostly deny this genocide, but there is an acceptance of the genocide by the Tutsis. Although both groups blame each other for the events of 1993, the arguments by Hutus and Tutsis do refer to an occurred genocide. Most radical ideologies by Burundian Tutsis only recognize one genocide; the genocide of the Tutsi by Hutus in 1993, since they see this annihilation as planned. Furthermore, according to the (Tutsi) government of Burundi this genocide in 1993 is the only official genocide in Burundi (Lemarchand, 2009:63 and 132). Tutsis believe one version: the all-Tutsi army had no choice but killing the President, since Hutu politicians were planning a genocide of Tutsis. They claim the military prevented an even bigger bloodbath. However, in general Hutus have another version, namely they were scared of another 1972, since the similar political landscape was present. They said that "since 1972 it is our blood that's being spilled! Now we hear that President Ndadayé had been killed. If they did that, that means we are next' (Lemarchand, 2009:75). From Hutu politicians (MNRD) perspectives, genocide of Tutsis was a logical consequence of the assassination of Hutu President Ndadayé. The murder of the President was the cause for the Hutu assumption that you should "Never trust the Tutsi!"

which then can be identified as the trigger for this genocide in which around 300.000 Tutsis were slaughtered to death by Hutu Mobs (Lemarchand, 2009:85, 141, 146 and ICIB, 2002).

In the Burundi genocides, the UN definition of genocide can be used to name the events in 1972 and 1993 genocide, since the ‘intent to destroy’, the most fundamental part of the Genocide Convention, is present in both genocides. Also, scholars, mainly Lemarchand, refer to genocides in Burundi.

Genocide in Rwanda

The genocide in Rwanda, from April till July in 1994, received a lot of international (media) attention; a lot more than the genocides in Burundi. Also, lots of scholars, like Hintjes (Hintjes, 1999), Lemarchand (Lemarchand, 2004²) and many more, and even a Rwandan Tribunal created by the UN, have been investigating the Rwandan genocide, and therefore recognize genocide in Rwanda as the most fundamental part of the Genocide Convention ‘intent to destroy’ is present. The Rwandan genocide has been a genocide at a very large scale (around 800.000 million people were killed) and consequently the international community has spent lots of effort in mediating in the conflict to prevent a genocide of that scale (Lemarchand, 2009:70)

Among scholars and the UN no doubt exists about Rwanda’s genocide in 1994. In this Rwandan case, differently from the Burundian cases, the UN clearly mentions genocide in resolutions. In Resolution 929, the SC already stated the ‘systematic and widespread killings of the civilian population in Rwanda’ (SC Resolution 929, 1994). Moreover, in Resolution 955 the SC actually mentions the word genocide as it is ‘Expressing once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda’ (SC Resolution 955, 1994). Because the SC believes genocide happened in Rwanda in 1994, it agreed with the Rwandan government to the establishment of an international tribunal ‘for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 and to this end to adopt the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda annexed hereto’ (SC Resolution 955, 1994).

Although scholars and the international community, the UN, are united in calling the events in Rwanda in 1994 genocide, there are different opinions and interpretations among Hutus and Tutsis about what happened, similar to Burundi, according to Lemarchand. Some Hutus try to deny this genocide and Tutsis accept calling this event genocide. The trigger for the start of this genocide was the shooting down of the Presidential plane in which President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ntaryamira from Burundi were assassinated. At that moment, it was a mystery who was responsible for this murder. Different stories exist. Although the mystery is now resolved according to a French investigation, it was thought at the time that the attack was executed by Tutsi extremists of the RPF, as part of a plot to invade Rwanda. However, another story exists, in which extreme Hutus from the MNRD who were already planning a genocide were responsible. Hours after the assassination of both presidents, mostly southern, Hutu moderates with linkages to Tutsi-like political (opposition) parties with possible connection to the RPF were slaughtered to death based on well prepared lists of names (Lemarchand, 2009:86 and 102 and NOS, 2012). These killings were finished in several hours. The killing of Tutsi civilians, which was slightly more difficult, started after this. Due to the preparation and the usage of tools, like machetes, hundreds of thousands Tutsi civilians were murdered. Although the Interahamwe was the main ‘organization behind the slaughtering,’ the annihilations ‘gained a moment of its own,’ since participants of the killing were from a broad part of the society, like ‘government officials, town majors and councilors, members of the clergy, teachers, and nurses’(Lemarchand, 2009:86 and 88).

Again based on Lemarchand’s research, the Rwandan genocide is a retributive genocide, because the government and army responded to the invasion of the RPF. Therefore, Hutu extremists call this event a double genocide, since they believed that Kagame with the RPF also planned annihilations of the Hutus in Rwanda during the genocide of 1994 (Lemarchand, 2009:132 and 134). However, scholarly and UN’s research and Tutsis opinions refer to a well prepared and ‘planned annihilation’, not just an outbreak of blind anger as some Hutus claim. Political manipulation by Hutus is the reason behind the ‘systematic massacre of civil populations,’ mostly directed toward Tutsi civilians (Lemarchand, 2009:79; SC Resolution 929, 1994 and SC Resolution 955, 1994).

Explaining the Rwandan genocide

In line with international attention, scholars, like Hintjes, Lemarchand, Prunier, and Straus, have been interested in Rwanda’s genocide because of its large scale as well as for other

reasons (Hintjes, 1999; Newbury, 1998; Prunier, 1995 and Straus, 2006). On the other hand, not much scholarly attention is paid to the Burundian genocides. Research on Burundi is mainly based on history, violence and peace settlement since the late 1990s (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005, Daley, 2006¹; Daley, 2006²; Herisse, 2002; Jackson, 2006; Lemarchand, 1997; Lemarchand, 2004¹; Lemarchand, 2009; Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 2011; and Watt, 2008). Like Lemarchand correctly mentions, a gap exists in literature and research (Lemarchand, 2009:129) in which studies about explaining the genocides in Burundi are still not available.

As mentioned in the introduction, Burundi and Rwanda are similar countries and logically similarities in explanations of genocides should be found. Therefore, a literature review of explanations of the Rwandan genocide could provide information for Burundi's genocides, although explaining the genocides might be complex. Also, by using scholarly descriptive research about Burundi in comparison to Rwanda's genocide explanations, differences can be localized in order to explain the variations in scale and triggers. Accordingly, although Rwanda and Burundi show various similarities, the genocides 'each stand as singular events' with roots in different and specific historical situations' (Lemarchand, 2009:140). In this thesis, the reverse of a part of Hintjes research will be done: explaining Burundi's genocides through Rwanda ('s explanations) (Hintjes, 1999:276).

Hintjes, Straus and Newbury conducted research on the explanations of the Rwandan genocide. In contrast, Prunier, created an informative overview of the Rwandan genocide: facts, related theories, and background, which is less useful for this thesis. The overall result of the first three investigations is that attention must be given to the Rwandan government (politics) as an absolutely central factor in explaining the genocide and that they had to cope with underlying factors – war, ethnic divisions, geography, nature of the society, etc., which had an indirect effect on the genocide organization by the government.

Hintjes

Hintjes explicitly states that the Rwandan state must be seen as an absolutely central explanation of the Rwandan genocide in which the pre-colonial and colonial policies contributed to the state formation (Hintjes, 1999:241). Hintjes believes that a more complex understanding of the causes of the genocide should be elaborated in which she recognizes the fundamental and central role the regime in power played and the Rwandan people themselves

(Hintjes, 1999:243). Therefore, she quoted Mamdani 1996: 'the nature of the Rwandan state must be seen as absolutely central. However, externally influenced or motivated by atavistic loyalties, however obedient to outside forces, the genocide took place under the aegis of the Rwandan state, and Rwandan subjects and citizens were the main actors in the genocide' (Hintjes, 1999:244).

Furthermore, she mentions three broad explanations of the Rwandan genocide that are often used in general. 'These are as follows: (i) a focus on external influences, both colonial and neo-colonial; (ii) a focus on domestic causes, including demographic factors and 'ethnic' conflict; and (iii) a psychological account based on the presumed social conformism and obedience of Rwandans' (Hintjes, 1999:243). These explanations try to show Rwanda as a vulnerable state to colonial and neo-colonial manipulation, as an overpopulated state in which social cleavages closely related to the genocide and a state with the possibility of organizing genocide because of extreme obedience which characterizes the Rwandan very stratified and relatively stable society. Elements of all three explanations can be found in this genocide (Hintjes, 1999:243).

However, blind spots exist in these explanations as one could question the justification of genocide as a response to imperialist intervention and thus lay the responsibility of the genocide internationally. Furthermore, it is also not correct to say that organizing genocide is a response to domestic pressures as 'population pressure' or 'ethnic loyalties'. It is also doubtful to say that social conformism 'may be so marked that even genocidal ideologies may be internalized through obedience' (Hintjes, 1999:243).

Consequently, she believes that although underlying factors are present, it is the state that dealt with them in a certain way. In line with the power, efficiency and the centrality of the state, it was rather easy and seen as a last resort to plan genocide in order to escape all the crises and hold power. By crisis, she means problematic structural adjustment politics, downgraded levels of coffee prices and corrupt politicians not managing the crisis well. Furthermore, the RPF invasion in line with food shortages, the increase of malaria and a great influx of refugees from Burundi worsened the situation in Rwanda. Also, the state expenditure on military issues increased and para-militarisation of the Rwandan society happened at the same time. These crises led to the growth of domestic political opposition and it was becoming more obvious that the government could not protect and provide for their citizens

anymore. In these circumstances, 'extremist politicians and military, as well as some powerful business and media interests, set their faces towards genocide as the only 'final solution' to their [socioeconomic and political] problems' (Hintjes, 1999:265-259).

Accordingly, the initial goal of the Rwandan government was state survival by means of an as complete as possible elimination of the 'perceived' enemy to achieve this objective (Hintjes, 1999:249). Widespread opposition from within one's own group, can be limited by mobilization of vertical social cleavages while the regime is failing. Habyarimana, Rwandan President till 1994, created a common enemy in order to prevent regional and class-divisions' unrest. 'A redefinition of national identity along exclusively racial or ethnic lines thus became the prelude for later implementation of genocide' (Hintjes, 1999:242). The Rwandan state had become 'so powerful and efficient that it crushed and overwhelmed Rwandan society completely' (Hintjes, 1999:245). So, Rwanda illustrated that there is a huge danger when a state is efficient and centralized and does not perform the whole policy of a state, being a protector of its citizens (Hintjes, 1999:245).

Concluding, Hintjes believes that no single and simple explanation exists for the Rwandan genocide in 1994. However, in order to give a satisfied explanation for the genocide, a number of possible explanations that are identified need to be taken into account, like 'the colonial ideology of racial division; the economic and political crises of [the] 1980s and early 1990s; the previously very highly organised nature of Rwandan society; and the fragile regional and class base of a political faction determined to hold on to state power at any cost' (Hintjes, 1999:280). Also, sophisticated propaganda techniques and the escalatory cycle of violence within Burundi and Rwandan were important contributing factors. The racial and ethnic explanations cannot be avoided as well, since the politics of ethnic identification were a central factor in the implementation of plans of genocide. However, the cause was political, not social, but based on ethnic divisions (Hintjes, 1999:281). Although research on genocides is admittedly very difficult in a highly sensitive field, it needs to be understood wherever, whenever and whomever the victims and perpetrators are (Hintjes, 1999:282).

Straus

'In the order of genocide' Straus points out three arguments to explain the Rwandan genocide. By doing field research in Rwanda about its genocide in 1994, the first explanation is that he believes that genocide would not have happened without the context of war – in this case the

civil war. He thinks that 'war provided the essential rationale for genocide: security' and therefore war supported the logic of genocide in which it was predicated to eliminate a threat, acting on self-protection and the 'reestablishment of order' (Straus, 2006:7). Also, war legitimized the killing in genocide, since it is about eliminating opponents. There was a climate of insecurity and uncertainty which was the critical basis for the creation and empowerment of hardliners and killers. Furthermore, the war led to the involvements of the army, soldiers and militias who were specialists in executing the killings. So, specialists were now tangled in the war in a domestic political arena. The gap in authority after the assassination of the President led to power struggles, ruptured political order, calls for violence revenge, anxiety, fear and confusion (Straus, 2006:7).

The second main factor according to Straus was the nature of the Rwandan state institutions. He mentioned the depth and resonance of the Rwandan state at local level whereby the hardliners in control of the state could easily and with great capacity enforce their decisions countrywide. The hardliners could associate the killings with authority and therefore equated violence to the de facto policy. Furthermore, the long history of Rwanda's obligatory labor (imposed by the state) contributed to large-scale civilian mobilization during the genocide. This is the reason why a lot of African states are weak and the Rwandan state was strong, because of its effectiveness of civilian mobilization. In line with the mobilization, the geography of Rwanda: greatest population density, lot of developed ground and small territory means no place to hide or escape, which is the reason for rapid and intensive killings. So, the country's geography contributed to the capacity of the state for social control and civilian mobilization (Straus, 2006:8).

Straus believes that the third main factor is ethnicity. However, neither ethnic prejudice, preexisting ethnic antipathy and manipulation from racist propagandas, nor nationalist commitments were the primary causes. He believes that just because of the idea that Tutsis were alike, were equated and labeled as 'the enemy' and many Hutus accepted that claim, the process of collective ethnic categorization happened. Although categories preexisted the genocide, labeling the Tutsis as enemies, was fatal. This can be based on the following principles: '(1) wartime uncertainty and fear, (2) social pressure; and (3) opportunity' (Straus, 2006:8-9). Hutus tried to protect themselves by killing and this was less costly than not to kill (Straus, 2006:9).

Furthermore, Straus disagrees with many scholars who emphasize the utopic ideologies and authoritarian regimes as the main explanations for genocide, because he thinks that in the Rwandan case the leaders only wanted to win a civil war and not restructure the society radically. He makes the difference clear by saying that the Rwandan state's capacity in enforcing decisions and mobilizing the citizenry was critical, not just the authoritarian regime itself. Additionally, he believes that the genocide was created by top-down instrumental decision-making and helps to understand under what conditions leaders prefer to use violence as a strategy. One of the conditions was the eroding power of the leaders by the Arusha Accord and therefore the leaders were eager to fight a defensive war in order to save their powerful position (Straus, 2006:11).

Newbury

Newbury tries to understand the genocide from four main themes as factors: ethnicity, material elements, ecology, and gender. Although it gives a different look on the genocide, he admits that these factors are not unique to Rwanda per se. He believes that social conformations and how these factors interact is how history emerges and genocide can be explained (Newbury, 1998:96-97). Additionally, the main argument of Newbury is that the genocide must be seen as a political process of planning, calculating, organizing and implementing as part of the political problem.

First of all, ethnicity could be seen as an influential factor in the Rwandan society, however, it was not a determining factor of social interaction or a causal factor of political struggle. Changes in the meaning of ethnicity, established by colonial power and the Rwandan society, were 'intimately related to changes in power relations' and an ethnicized version of politics emerged (Newbury, 1998:88 and 95). Secondly, external influences, like international economic turmoil and the compulsory "Structural Adjustment Program", had major effects on politics, especially in combination with external involvement: the process of democratization and international trade of arms that broaden the political basis of the Rwandan government. Thirdly, arms were given to the youth. This was easy because of the unemployed - and unable to marry - young men (gender issues because of the crises) who were eager to find a goal and sense of belonging in life. Finally, ecological factors, like high population density, land hunger, contributed to the genocide, however via the political policies of the Rwandan government. So, these factors are also contributing and help explain the type of crises, but do not explain or justify genocide in itself (Newbury, 1998:88-95).

Prunier

Prunier is more focused on the history of a genocide (Prunier, 1995:xi). He describes what happened in years before the genocide and during the genocide. Although it is a very informative book, no arguments or explanations of Rwanda's genocide are presented that is useful for this thesis. However, he describes the strong authoritarian state tradition with root in the history of Rwanda's culture and there is a strong acceptance of group identification as significant factors of genocide. He also mentions that the 'overriding feature in the mechanisms of the genocide was geographical', because he believes that the dense population, the garden-like landscape and the 'virtual absence of wild country' together with close relations with neighbors, there was no way to escape genocide or violence (Prunier, 1995:245 and 253).

Concluding, underlying factors are not direct causes for the organization of genocide. All these authors think that it is the state's reaction to these underlying difficult factors as crises that is responsible for the genocide organization and implementation which is the main explanation. Its goal of holding power had been an important factor in planning genocide and strengthening divisions in the society. The state's reaction to crises and its capability must be central in this research and could also explain why genocide happened in Burundi. However, small alterations in this factor can also clarify the difference in scale of the genocides. Like Hintjes mentions, the path of history could explain the power relations in politics and can be accountable for the difference in triggers.

Gaps in theory

The literature review shows gaps and tensions in literature. First of all, problems among conceptualization of genocide could be seen as tensions between the UN's definition and alternative definitions created by scholars. The UN definition is created on the basis of political dynamics and pressures and excludes political groups in the definition of genocide. This, among other issues, could be problematic in calling certain events genocide. However, in international relations and politics the definition of the UN is used in practice. This definition is used in this thesis, since it is not problematic for the justification of genocides in Burundi and Rwanda.

Furthermore, a gap exists in literature about Burundi and its genocides. The UN and the media have paid more attention to the Rwandan genocide which is in line with the choice of

researchers to investigate the Rwandan genocide more often. So, the following quotes by Watt are correct: Burundi lies 'in the shadow of Rwanda' and 'Burundi is often forgotten' (Watt, 2008:ix). Because of Burundi's less favored position in research, it is necessary and interesting to conduct research about Burundi's genocides. Based on this gap in literature, the thesis will conduct research on these genocides; however, it will be in relation to Rwanda's genocide because of the most likely similarities in explanations and much research on this event.

Conclusion theory

In the previous paragraphs, the theory about genocides was discussed. According to the presence of the fundamental part 'the intent to destroy', three genocides in the Great Lakes region; Burundi 1972, Burundi 1993 and Rwanda 1994, can be identified after the justification by using scholarly expertise and UN documents. The thread of the theory was the unprivileged position of Burundi in scholarly research. Since there is a lack of knowledge about the genocides in Burundi, more attention should be paid to these for several reasons (contribution to genocides studies and genocide prevention). The Rwandan genocide is used more often in research and explanations for this genocide are easier to come by. One could question whether the main explaining factor of the Rwandan genocide, the Rwandan government who responded to several crises, correspond with the main explaining factor(s) of the Burundian genocides, because of the countries' great similarities. It is also interesting to find out whether this factor is responsible for the difference in scale and triggers of Burundi's genocides in comparison to Rwanda's genocide. In the next part, the research methods are explained.

Research design

The research question of this thesis is: What is/are the triggering factor(s) that explain the different genocides concerning scale and triggers in Burundi in comparison to Rwanda, despite the similarities between these two countries?

No research has been done on the triggering factors of Burundi's genocide, so no detailed structure of research can be created beforehand. However, large-N research about structural factors explaining genocide is available. Since the number of these factors is very large, they are listed in appendix 2. They will serve as a guide in the comparative analysis of the three case studies: the genocides in Burundi and Rwanda.

The literature review on the Rwandan genocide as well as the statement of Burundi's parties provide the leading and most important explaining factor: the behavior and reaction of the state to several crises, the underlying factors, in the country – ethnic conflict, war, land hunger, political power struggles, etc. Since Burundi and Rwanda are comparable countries and both experienced genocide, it seems likely that they both have had the same leading triggering factor. However, if this is not the case it could explain the differences in scale. The different paths of history can elucidate the different triggers. A comparative analysis of explanations of genocide of both countries is justified as shown by the quote of Bauer by Lemarchand: 'The only way to clarify the applicability of definitions and generalizations is with comparisons' (Lemarchand, 2009:109).

Although it is not easy to start a research without knowing what to look for in detail, the following construction is used: similarities in which possible factors, that seem most likely to explain the genocides are tried to localize. If factors are almost the same in both countries, this will support the main argument, since this could not explain the difference in scales and triggers. Afterwards, the factual differences are described: the triggers and scale. Then, the element that clarifies the difference will be tried to find. It seems that historical background referring to the creation of politics elucidates the dissimilar triggers. To explain the unlike scales, special attention is paid to the state. The research is conducted by means of a literature analysis of primary documents, of the UN, and scholarly descriptive literature on Rwanda's and Burundi's historical developments till 1994, which is mainly directed by Lemarchand; leading scholar in research on the Great Lakes Region of Africa and Burundi. Other forms of research go beyond the time available for this thesis.

Research

The research will start with a comparative analysis of explaining factors of the three genocides which are most significant during investigation: geography and population density; ethnic conflict and regional cleavages; war and violence; politics of exclusion: poverty, education and land; military and militias; impunity and radicalization of refugees. All explanations are seen as underlying factors that contributed to the organization and implementation of the genocide. However, they are similar in the three case studies of genocide. Therefore, although it could partly explain the context in which genocides were able to organize, it demonstrates that those underlying factors cannot clarify the difference in triggers and scale. This observation indicates that other factor(s) that do elucidate the differences should be available.

In the second part of the research, the different triggers and scales are further described and analyzed. Next, the causing and explaining factors are provided and explained wherein it is argued that the path of history explicates the different triggers. The main explaining factor for the difference in scale is the ethnic group in power in combination with the ethnic group division in society.

Similarities

Geography and population density

Many scholars, like Hintjes (1999), Lemarchand, (1995 and 2009), and Newbury (1998), highlight the geographical facts that contributed to a problematic situation, reason for conflict, for the state and a possibility for the organization of genocide in such a rapid time. Although it has affected the situation and possibility the organization of genocide in Rwanda, it cannot explain the differences in triggers and scale. Rwanda and Burundi have similar geographical facts and population density as partly explained in the introduction.



Figure 2 Rwanda
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html>



Figure 3 Burundi -
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html>

Both countries are located in the Great Lakes Region of Africa as the cover picture of the thesis shows. As the pictures alongside illustrates, Rwanda and Burundi are neighbors, have the same country size and are landlocked. Furthermore, according to the CIA Fact Book, both countries

also have the same amount of available land for agriculture, 45- 36%, and the population is predominantly rural. Both countries are mountainous and mostly covered with grassy uplands and overgrazing and soil exhaustion is problematic. Rwanda has the greatest population density of Africa of 474 people per sq. km and Burundi follows with similar statistics: 411 people per sq. km. The countries have 10-11 million inhabitants in which the following ethnic division is equal: 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsis and 1% Twa (CIA Fact Book¹ and CIA Fact book²). Prunier (1995) states that the Rwandan landscape and the population density made escape from violence and genocide impossible. When scholars argue that these facts count as underlying factors for conflict in Rwanda, it should also be the same for Burundi and thus those factors do not explain the differences.

Ethnic conflict and regional cleavages

Problems related to ethnicity and regional cleavages are mentioned in all investigations, case studies on Rwanda and large-N research (see appendix 2). Especially in the Rwandan case, this factor seems to be very important, since the genocide was mainly committed by one ethnicity against the other ethnicity. Disagreement exists about whether to name the social groups ‘ethnicities’, but, if believed, this will only support the argument that ethnicity itself cannot be the main explaining factor of genocide. Although ethnic conflict is an underlying factor causing war and an indirect cause for genocide, it cannot be a direct cause for (the Rwandan) genocide, like Hintjes (1999) and Newbury (1998), Straus (2006) mentions. From the following analysis of ethnic conflict and regional cleavages in Rwanda and Burundi, it is argued that ethnic divisions and ethnic conflict can have contributed to a situation in which genocide could be organized and implemented easier. However, since the ethnic conflicted situations, between Hutus and Tutsis, are present in both countries, it is not the triggering factor that explains the difference between the Rwandan and Burundi’s genocides.

According to general research, the sense of ‘wanting to belong to an ethnic group’ is not equal to conflict and competition which supports the arguments of scholars in the theory. Lonsdale makes a distinction between ‘moral ethnicity’ which means “a positive force which creates communities from within through domestic controversy over civic virtue” and political tribalism defined as “the use of ethnic identities in political competition with other groups” (Lemarchand, 2009:49). Ethnocentrism was a functional ideology with a belief in the rights of one’s own group and has affected the group struggle for wealth and power. Together with the individual search for security, it flourishes best in a conflict situation (Herisse, 2002:5). Similarly, Lemarchand states that ethnicity is not just the cause for conflict, but conflicts are based on different identity markers because of the fluid political field in the conflict. It can, therefore, be argued that the attribution of the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi to ethnic problems between Hutu and Tutsi is inaccurate (Lemarchand, 2009:7).

However, different groups or ethnicities can be manipulated and used for immoral goals and in the end alter perceptions of the other (ethnicity). A distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ can be created by this manipulation (Lemarchand, 2009:50). A difference should be made between invented and imagined communities or ethnicities. By some scholars, like Lemarchand, Belgium contributed to the creation of imagined ethnicities in the case of Rwanda and Burundi based on the Hamitic myth. This myth, studied by d’Hertefeld, can be divided in different themes: ‘the celestial origins of the Tutsi; the fundamental and “natural” differences among Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa; the superior civilization that the Tutsi brought to Rwanda; the threat of divine sanctions against those brazen enough to revolt against the monarchy; and the notion of divine kinship” (Lemarchand, 2009:52- 53).

Furthermore, Lemarchand believes, differences in social realities between Hutu and Tutsi are unconvincing anyhow for showing the dissimilarities between them (Lemarchand, 2009:9). The assumption that Tutsis are tall, light skin and graceful and the Hutus short and stocky is ambiguous, because of intermarriage for example. Intermarriage was even a way to get upward on the social ladder. Moreover, by some it is argued that there is evidence that ethnicity was not even a problem before colonization, since a white father stated that ‘In Burundi the Tutsi is not above the Hutu; the first has no authority over the second, unless such authority has been delegated to him. In everyday life they are on an equal footing’ (Lemarchand, 1997:7-8 and 34). Throughout the years, Hutus and Tutsis even developed the

same language, a common culture and the same spiritual beliefs, political institutions and cuisine (Herisse, 2002:5).

However, the European colonizer fundamentally changed this Hamitic myth: for them the Tutsi were related to the Europeans, because of their origins. The adaptation of this reasoning created the illusion that the Tutsis are “born rulers, superior in every respect to the ‘dark agriculture’ masses.” Based on this assumption, the Tutsis became the highest administrators for the indirect rule used by Belgian colonizers (Lemarchand, 2009:54-55). The European version of the myth created favorable positions and ways of life for Tutsis. However, after independence this myth was used to describe the Tutsis as foreigners which was ‘the embodiment of the worst’ (Lemarchand, 2009:58).

In addition, memory in relation to ethnicity is of great importance in conflict societies. The subjectivity of memory which can be ethnic, collective or individual, can lead to major problems and conflicts. Differing memories means that the past is seen through different lenses by Hutus and Tutsis in which selectivity of remembering past events plays a major role. Furthermore, the way in which those in power enforce or manipulate memories should also not be forgotten. In a situation like this, the enforced memory’s creation of victims and perpetrators does not have a positive effect on the possibility of peace in the future (Lemarchand, 2009:101 and 105).

In the time of the genocide in Burundi in 1972, an important cause for conflict was ethnicity being used for the legitimization of political and economic power in which Tutsi dominance strengthened the identities of Hutus (Daley, 2006¹:669-670). However, ethnic conflict was also triggered by economic and social cleavages. Four divisions have been dominant: ethnic, clan-based, regional and class-based (urban versus rural elites). The twofold competition between Tutsis (its elites) and between Tutsis and Hutus influenced and strengthened each other (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:4-5).

Also, the Burundi genocide of 1993 is marked by this fact. Intra-Tutsi competition had been a critical factor in the crystallization of Hutu-Tutsi relations. None of the conflicts were consistent and the back-and-forth movement between clans, regions and ethnicities contributed to the crystallization. This process removed the membership in a ‘national community and deleted national cohesion’ (Lemarchand, 1997:15, 77 and 85). Besides this,

ethnic mobilization with regard to politics was the rational response to self-interest in electoral politics and gaining public goods and services in the modern sector. Ethnic mobilization was instrumentally used by Tutsis to claim that there was no real discrimination, and a non-ethnically based majority in politics was the basis for a healthy democracy (Lemarchand, 1997:30-31).

Conflicts within and between ethnic groups that contributed to the growth of bonded social capital until 1994, manifested themselves in a negative way as the manipulation of ethnicities and the continual waves of violence. The in-group mobilization of Hutus and Tutsis funded and created killings in 1965, 1972 and 1993 (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:6). Symbols of superiority and inferiority had been used as weapons in conflicts and created hardened ethnic differences (Herisse, 2002:6).

Similarly, in Rwanda 1994, the manipulation of ethnicities, in which there was a distinction between 'good' and 'bad', was created. Besides ethnicities, other cleavages also contributed to the process that led towards genocide as was the case in the time period of Burundi's genocides. Regional and political cleavages between Hutus from the north and the south resulted in an ongoing struggle for power. Hutus killed Hutus based on the struggles between the different regions in which their political culture was very important. In the Second Republic, Hutus from the MDR were seen as Hutu moderates with close links to Tutsis and the President's party, while MRND(D) was made up of strict Hutus. In their struggle for power, techniques, practices and pattern of behavior were well developed before the genocide. So, although it is often argued that ethnicities have been the root cause for the genocide of 1994 in which 'mass murder ... [was] clearly aimed at a specific ethnic community' according to Lemarchand, this in itself does not accurately explain the genocide. Also, because ethnicities in Rwanda as well as in Burundi all have the same culture, language, national territory, customs and share a history of peaceful relations (Lemarchand, 2009:50, 82-83, 93-94 and 100).

War and violence

Staus (2006), but also Hintjes (1999), argues that the context of war and violence is necessary for and contributes to the likelihood of genocide. In Rwanda, he states that war, violence and insecurity have been very much present. Also, Burundi experienced this throughout post-independence years in the society and in politics. Lemarchand describes the war and

conflicted situation in Burundi as ‘an unbroken chain of causality linking one act of violence to the next’ (Lemarchand, 1997:76), ‘deep-seated historical conflicts can come to the fore in the context of profound social-political change’ and ‘history of conflict and antagonism fuels a power struggle that end in genocide’ (Lemarchand, 1997:3). Furthermore, the history of violence also created the possibility of mythmaking in Burundi and this was also a ‘constructive element of further violence’ (Lemarchand, 1997:xi). Besides violence in the society, Daley believes that colonialism set foundations for elite power struggle (Daley, 2006¹:661). There was a lot of political violence between different groups along various cleavages, especially along ethnicities. Killings of educated Hutus and Hutu politicians occurred in 1965 and 1969 (Lemarchand, 2009:134-135) and made the population susceptible to ‘ethnically framed political appeals’ (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005).

Politics of exclusion: poverty, education and land

Although the government of Burundi and Rwanda differ in ethnic background of those in power, both governments share the same style of politics, namely politics of exclusion in which wealth, education and land depended mostly on ethnicity as explained by Hintjes (1999) and Newbury (1998). The following analysis shows that Rwanda and Burundi are also similar when it concerns these factors, which can partly explain the genocide. Consequently, the style of governance cannot be the main factor that elucidates the difference in triggers and scale.

First of all, in Burundi, governmental institutions were very weak in the period before 1972. The ethnically inclusive government during Rwagasore’s leadership was short-lived because of authoritarianism, corruption and nepotism. Leaders were self-serving, corrupt and unresponsive (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:7). Moreover, cleavages themselves do not lead to violent and brutal conflict. However, the social opportunities in relation to exclusion and inequity in a context of extreme poverty and resource scarcity are significant (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:6). The state was responsible for the treatment of social differences in which exclusion, competition and authoritarianism were based on inter-ethnic relations (Daley, 2006¹:663). The First Republic, with Micombero as head of the state, (Lemarchand, 1997:78) excluded Hutus from being involved in the government or government institutions (Lemarchand, 2009:134), economical as well as social. The economic depressions and the concentration of economic and political opportunities in the hands of the elites led to conflicts about access to land and land erosion in relation to the population growth. This reached a very

high level in the genocide of 1972. 'The lack of human security also deepened the poverty and increased the potential for ethnically based mass mobilization.' These factors lay behind the struggle for controlling the state machinery. State control meant access to wealth and education (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:6-9).

Moreover, this style of politics continued after the genocide of 1972 until at least 1993. However, poverty was even increasing, which affected the severity of the situation even more. In the Third Republic, poverty was a major problem; Burundi had one of the lowest GDPs in Africa (ICIB, 2002), malnutrition among children, endemic diseases as HIV/AIDS, scarcity in education and health facilities and low food production (Lemarchand, 1997:122 and Lemarchand, 2009:163) with a tripled growth of the population since independence (ICIB, 2002) which led to worsened ethnic tensions and problematic politics of exclusion. Furthermore, economic hardship caused by decreasing coffee prices and land scarcity, in combination with returning refugees were also a major source of conflict between ethnicities (Lemarchand, 1997:122).

Similarly, as described in the theory, Rwanda also experienced politics of exclusion in which the Hutu majority repressed and politically, socially and economically excluded the Tutsi minority (HRW, 1999:222-232 and Lemarchand, 2009:35-36, 79-81 and 117). Furthermore, extreme poverty, economic motivations, led to Tutsi killings to protect their property and land in order to survive. The impunity of stealing property, and approval by the government, strengthened this behavior. Small amounts of available land in combination with a high population density, created a hunger for land and the opportunity to 'grab land from... neighbors.' This was the same for Tutsi and Hutu alike (Lemarchand, 2009: 93-94 and 124-126).

Impunity

In relation with politics of exclusion in the context of violence, conflict and war; impunity strengthened the behavior of the government and local population. This is not explicitly described by scholars in the theory, but inevitable in the analyses after research on common underlying explaining factors. Burundi as well as Rwanda experienced impunity before and during genocides. In the Rwandan case, Lemarchand even argues that impunity had had a great impact on the calculation, organization and implementation of genocide.

In Burundi, the waves of successive violence and revenge or pre-emptive killing along the absence of any kind of judicially impartially and legal accountability created a ‘culture of impunity’ along ‘deeply ingrained inter-ethnic grievances, and mutual fear and mistrust’ (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:7 and Watt, 2008:37). The inability of the judicial system, with corrupt courts, to provide basic protection and impartial adjudication led to the lack of citizen confidence. The traditional courts’ system ‘the abashingantahe’ lost its traditional power to resolve disputes (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:7). The army of Burundi benefited the most of impunity (Lemarchand, 1997:xii-xiii).

The same is true for Rwanda, since the lack of functioning justice systems had caused a history of impunity. Later crimes can be caused by earlier unpunished crimes in the past. The leaders of Rwanda could rule without being held responsible for their deeds. This definitely had an impact on the calculations of beliefs, motives and the possibility of reaching the goals of the leaders of Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009:127).

Military and militias

In The Economist article (1994) mentioned in the introduction, the military is seen as a critical factor of bloodshed. Besides this, Straus recognizes the important role of the military in Rwanda as backup of the government, because they filled up the gap when the government was weak after the assassination of the President in Rwanda. Furthermore, Hintjes believes that citizens have been a major contributing factor to the genocide in Rwanda and this is in line with Newbury’s argument that it was easy to find soldiers for militias, which also played a significant role in the Rwandan genocide. There has been a close link between the army, militias and citizens. Although some factual differences exist, the military and militias have had the same role in both countries as they were involved in the organization of genocide and the same ethnicity was in power in the government and the army, in 1994 and 1972.

Firstly, the Burundian government was ‘a mixed assemblage of civilians and army men.’ The army acted as ‘the ultimate arbiter of conflict within and outside the government’, which started with the violence of the military in 1965 and 1969 and the most extreme form in 1972 (Lemarchand, 2009:159). Micombero’s coup created a close link between government and army, since the army fully backed the government and Capt. Micombero combined the functions of prime minister and Minister of Defense (Lemarchand, 1997:74 and 99). The Minister of Justice Simbanaiye, man of the army, was the main architect of the killings in

1972. His goal for the killings was to establish peace for the next 30 years and a lot of Tutsis though their survival was at stake. In order to survive, eliminating Hutus was the only practical action (Lemarchand, 2009:138).

Furthermore, before this genocide, both the government and the army were in Tutsi hands and consequently Hutu militias were created. In 1966, the army went through a major transformation. Since the army was a significant instrument of coercion for the Tutsis in power, the majority of the Hutu troops in the army were eliminated. As a reaction, an armed Hutu rebellion was created and seen as the only possibly alternative for the Tutsi hegemony (Lemarchand, 1997:86-87). Furthermore, army units and youth groups connected with the ruling party UPRONA (Tutsi), like the JRR, were the key participants in the genocide in Burundi. Because of horizontal and vertical connections between the militia and army, a lot of civilians were involved in the conflict and killings. They were caught in an infernal machine and therefore the act of killing became realistic and even an almost routine-like activity (Lemarchand, 2009:62 and 137). In contrast, JNR was a Hutu radical organization responsible for riots in 1962 and murder, the urban setter and the incubator of ethnic violence. This violence was the reason for crisis within UPRONA in which also Hutus were represented (Lemarchand, 1997:63-65).

Likewise, before the second Burundi genocide, the army was never stopped in its involvement in Hutu-Tutsi conflicts and dealt with the crisis of 1988 and the abortive Hutu uprising in 1991. In 1989, there was another unsuccessful coup by army men which once again shows the close link between government and army. Lemarchand states that 'given the nature of the menace, any attempt to restructure the predominantly Tutsi army would have suicidal consequences for the Tutsis majority' (Lemarchand, 1997:xvi, 140 and 142). Tutsis saw the army as their only source of security against Hutu vengeance. They believed the army prevented more bloodshed and was able to stop the killings of Tutsis (Lemarchand, 1997:xxxiii). From historical events; however, it can be concluded that: 'the army ... is the root of all tensions!' (Lemarchand, 1997:135). However, in the genocide of 1993, Hutu politicians and militias were responsible and consequently the all-Tutsi army stopped the Tutsi killings (ICIB, 2002).

Correspondingly, in Rwanda, the military and militias with close links to the civilian population had been a critical factor in the genocide. The military had a great role in initiating

and directing the slaughters. Besides killing civilians, the military gave permission to kill other commanders, such as militias, and civilian administrators. Soldiers, National Police and local police forces, men of the Presidential Guard and paracommandos carried out the killing stepwise in the neighborhoods that were commanded by the military. The military also had a role in mobilizing the population and insisted the civilian population be involved in the killing. Besides the military, other forces were involved in the process of genocide. The striking force of the genocide had been the militias. The Interahamwe was heavily influenced by the MRND and existed of 30.000 soldiers. The Impuzamugambi, soldiers trained by the Congolese, was also directed by a party, the CDR, but during the genocide parties were not of great importance since their ultimate goals was killing the Tutsis (HRW, 1999:222-232 and Lemarchand, 2009:94-95).

Radicalization of refugees

In line with the major role of militias, both countries struggled with refugees and their radicalization as Hintjes already explained in her research on Rwanda. Likewise, Burundian Hutu refugees triggered refugee radicalism. In Tanzania, where they found asylum, an armed wing of PalipeHutu-FLN was created and was a rival of the radical CNDD-FDD (offshoot of the FRODEBU party with Tutsi elements). The PalipeHutu was the greatest threat to the Tutsi government and therefore the all-Tutsi military engaged in major violence against Hutus (Lemarchand, 2009:145 and 161). For Buyoya, it was hard to control the border issues. Border areas had been a great place for the development of ideas and activities of PalipeHutu and can be named 'a political space of dissence' (Lemarchand, 1997:120). There were major differences between Hutu and Tutsi militias. The UPRONA militias were 'self-defense teams' with close cooperation with parental organizations and backed up the all Tutsi army. This created the possibility of successful use of (threats of) violence against the Hutu population. However, the FRODEBU militias were 'armed bands' and had broken all ties with FRODEBU (Lemarchand, 1997:xviii). Because of the militias, a close relationship existed between the civil population and militias in which they are heavily armed (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:8).

In the same way, in Rwanda there were militias from the Tutsi-side. The children of the Tutsi refugees in Uganda formed the RPF which, believed by some, triggered the beginning of the organization of the genocide after its invasion. This invasion created suspicion among Hutus

that every Tutsi was connected to with the RPF and was thus a major danger to the regime (Lemarchand, 2009:119).

Differences: Triggers and scale

The previous factors cannot explain the major difference in scale and triggers in genocides in Rwanda and Burundi, although they are very similar countries, because of similar factors and facts. Before the research on the factual differences, they are firstly accurately described.

The trigger for the Burundian genocide in 1972 was the executed assassination of the Hutu President Ngendadumwe by a Tutsi refugee from Rwanda. Tutsis from Rwanda experienced horrible deeds against them and this created fear (Lemarchand, 2009:119). Also, it is believed that a plot by Tutsis from Muramvya, who felt excluded in sharing power, was the reason for Hutu insurrection (Watt, 2008:33). Some believed that Zaire's head of state and its army were involved in supporting the Hutu insurrection (Lemarchand, 1997:95-96). According to this execution, a Hutu-led insurgency came up and killed hundreds of Tutsis and moderate Hutus who did not want to join the rebellion. The rebellion declared an independent state called République de Martyazo. The Burundian army brought this declaration to an end and heavily put down the insurrection of the Hutu rebellion. The army was consulted by the all-Tutsi government. The Hutu insurrection solidified the different Tutsi groups and they tried to act as one (Lemarchand, 2009: 134-136 and 137). Almost immediately, the army and the JRR began to organize the extermination of a quarter million – all Hutu suspected to have taken part in this rebellion (Lemarchand, 1997:96).

The trigger the genocide in 1993 was the assassination of President Ndadayé in 1993, probably executed by the army. Because of this murder, the most vicious and intractable civil wars of the continent unleashed. It is estimated that 300.000 Tutsis were slaughtered to death by Hutu mobs organized by Hutus in the government and Hutu militias and citizens. Furthermore, Hutus were also killed by the all-Tutsi army as a reaction to the killing of Tutsis (ICIB, 2002 and Lemarchand, 2009:141 and 146).

The organization of the Rwandan genocide in which 800.000 people, mainly Tutsis, died, started in 1992. Fourfold the amount of activities or actors were present: the azaku (the 'little house' in Kinyarwanda), which was the core group of the planners. President Habyarimana and his wife, three brothers in law (Zigiranyirazo, Rwabukumbam, and Sgatwa) and a group

of trusted advisers (Nzirorera, Serubuga, and Gashumba) had been involved; ‘rural organizers’ consisting of around two or three hundred men with special communal and prefectural functions, ‘militias’ (the Interahamwe) of around 30.000 trained ground troops who were in charge of the actual killings; and ‘the presidential guard’ who were only selected from northern Hutus and trained to provide ‘auxiliary slaughterhouse support to civilian death squads. The last one was a ‘perfect’ organizational structure to help reach the genocide goal (Lemarchand, 2009:64-85) in which the capability to organize the genocide seem to be a significant fact.

Explaining differences

Path of history: different triggers

Hintjens already mentioned that colonial power influenced the way the structure of politics got created after independence in Rwanda which led to certain events in history. The path of history (a summary is given in appendix 1) seems to be most likely to explain the triggers, as significant differences can be found in history in Rwanda and Burundi in which the state has a crucial role. The main difference in history is the presence of another ethnicity; the Ganwa (often seen as Tutsis) in Burundi, that had the power and seemed to soften Tutsi-Hutu relations after independence, which in turn made it possible for Tutsis to gain power. In contrast, colonizers helped the Rwandan Hutus with its revolution to take power after years of repression by the Tutsis and the colonizers. In sum, this shaped the division in the creation of politics and therefore the different triggers in genocide as will be now explained further.

Genocide Burundi 1972

A crucial difference in the post-colonial Kingships is that in Burundi the Ganwa, a different ethnicity but often regarded as Tutsis, and the Tutsis themselves were in power. The royal family only existed of Ganwas. Furthermore, the King, mwami, shared by all Burundians had a significant position. The monarchy gave meaning to traditional order. All ‘ethnicities shared the same ‘symbolic universe,’ ‘they all identified with the mwami’ and agreed with the power relations inside this monarchical system (Lemarchand, 1997:36). However, different regions were governed by princes from several clans or by independent chiefs. The struggle for power was between different clans, Bezi and Batare; rarely between Hutus and Tutsis (Lemarchand, 1997:27 and 37). Also, the monarchy provided a national identity and bridges over cleavages. The Burundians were capable of resolving conflicts non-violently. However, this capacity

disappeared in the colonial period and afterwards, because of fear and distrust between ethnicities and the end of the monarchy (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:6).

In contrast, in Rwanda only the Tutsis were in power. In the 19th century, both Burundi and Rwanda became colonies of Germany and Belgium and the two countries became one district with a double kingdom: Rwanda-Urundi. In 1930 in Burundi, the Belgium colonizers governed via indirect rule and shifted power to Ganwas (King with royal families) and Tutsis based on the Hamitic theory. However, in Rwanda the indirect rule was only applied via Tutsi power as a different development took place. In the mid till late 1950s, the Hutu-manifest was created, which stated that the country needed more democratization and power for Hutus. This manifest was supported by Belgium and the Christian Churches. Also, in 1959, the Hutu revolution began, which was the start of ethnic conflict and political and ethnic assassinations. The Hutus received help from Belgium troops to restore peace (see appendix 1; Berwouts, 2006:50; Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:24; HRW, 1998:12; Lemarchand, 2009:114; Verlinden, 1996:25-49 and Watt, 2008:40).

Dissimilarly, after the end of the Second World War, all power in Burundi shifted to the Ganwa and Tutsi. Burundi experienced a political power struggle between different Ganwa clans, but the Crown Prince wanted to create a constitution in which the basis for political parties was created. The first election was won by Ganwa Prince Rwagasore, with a political, in that time, multi-ethnic party called UPRONA. However, Prince Rwagasore was killed soon afterwards by the opposition party, PDC. In Rwanda, the Tutsi repression was established which created an exodus of Tutsis to neighboring countries like Uganda and Burundi. Fearing that this could also happen in Burundi and the presence of Rwandan Tutsi refugees, a shift of power to UPRONA Tutsis started to take place (see appendix 1; Berwouts, 2006:50; Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:24; HRW, 1998:12; Lemarchand, 2009:114; Verlinden, 1996:25-49 and Watt, 2008:40).

In both countries, the 'ethnicities' had been manipulated and used for political power and objectives which caused Ganwa related unrest in Burundi (Lemarchand, 1997:4-5 and 41). Also, Rwanda and Burundi shared 'the back-and-forth dialectic of ethnic conflict in which ethnic conflict in one state affects the other state (Lemarchand, 2009:139). The Hutu revolution in Rwanda hardened the ethnic cleavages in Burundi. Besides the fear created by this revolution, also the 150.000 Rwandan refugees effected Burundi's politics, as well as

ethnic polarization (ethnic hatred) and implications of majority rule (Lemarchand, 2009: 36-37, 60 and 139). Before independence, there was a struggle for power between the UPRONA party (more Tutsi focused) and PDC (more Hutu focused) and the capture of the state was their main goal. There was an alleged plot of the PDC, supported by Belgians (since they saw the revolution in Rwanda as a role model), to kill prince Rwagasore. The death of Rwagasore was a critical element in the background of the Hutu-Tutsi problem (Lemarchand, 1997:51, 57 and 61).

Consequently, this assassination had ‘a disastrous effect on national unity’ (Lemarchand, 1997:24). Furthermore, the introduction of Christianity and Belgium colonizers added to the ruination of the system of traditional institutions of the King, who was directly related to Imana (God), and the intermediaries between Imana and Burundians, who were the guardians and protectors of peace and justice and cared about communal work. This traditional system was replaced by modern incapable institutions such as political parties, justice systems, military, etc. (Herisse, 2003:3-4 and (Lemarchand, 1997:35).

Furthermore, Rwagasore’s death created sharp polarizations between ethnicities: ‘a crisis of confidence in the ability of Hutu and Tutsi elites to resist the demonstration effect of the Rwanda revolution,’ ‘a crisis of authority within the ruling Hutu and Tutsi elements’ and most importantly ‘a crisis of legitimacy, culminating in the abolition of the monarchy in 1966, following a Tutsi-led coup within the army’ (Lemarchand, 1997:59). The Burundian version of the ‘king’s dilemma’ was about the extreme failure of creating unity during ethnic polarization (Lemarchand, 1997:60). The Crown’s choice of selecting a Tutsi as Prime Minister whilst there was a Hutu majority caused ethnic tensions and an attempted coup, with Tutsi killings by Hutus. The army responded and ‘in turn trigger[ed] an immediate and brutal retaliation.’ Under Capt. Micombero’s leadership, a Tutsi coup was successful. All Hutu leaders were killed and Tutsis got all the power. The army, JNR militants and politicians, all of them of Tutsi origins, had emerged as ‘a kind of surrogate government.’ Rural region Hutu-Tutsi relations stayed ‘remarkably free of overt animosity’ (Lemarchand, 1997:70-72).

In sum, the path of history in Burundi before 1972 played a major role in the way the genocide could get triggered. The Ganwa ethnicity made Hutu-Tutsi relations less hardened around the time of independence and made it possible for Tutsis, although they had been the minority group in Burundi, to gain power. Furthermore, the Hutu revolution in Rwanda and

the refugees of its related violence played a role in the trigger of the first genocide in Burundi, since a Rwandan Tutsi killed the elected Hutu President followed by a Hutu insurrection. Killings by Hutus triggered the Tutsi government and army to organize genocide.

Genocide Burundi 1993

After the first genocide, another coup that had taken place in 1976 by Bagaza's coup established the Second Republic. He wanted to create a coherent and organized state in all sectors of national life to restore national unity. Bagaza banned all references to ethnic identities as to avoid ethnic discrimination. However, this was only officially; in practice, selectivity in education and governmental institutions in favor of Tutsis was a reality. For all his ruling years, the Hutus were repressed and had a marginalized position (Lemarchand, 1997:107-116).

Furthermore, because of Bagaza's decision to introduce early retirements in the army, Buyoya's coup in 1987 created the Third Republic, which showed the close link between government and army. This Republic was characterized by change and continuity. Buyoya wanted normalization of the church state relations in which education would be available again. However, Hutus were still repressed which hardened intra-Tutsi relations (Lemarchand, 1997:116-119).

Moreover, based on international pressure, Buyoya started the process of democratization and liberation so the country could become a multi-party democracy. Hutu and Tutsi extremists opposed this change (Lemarchand, 1997:131-132) and Hutus were still repressed by Tutsi minority (Lemarchand, 2009:35), although the period 1991-1993 meant hope and change for Hutus who were now allowed to have jobs in media, town, political and civil organization (Watt, 2008:43). However, hate propaganda against Hutus can be found in the document 'Seventeen rules of Tutsi conduct' in which remarkable statements can be found, such as: 'Do not trust a Hutu or anyone supposed to be one... Try to locate Hutu residences so that you will know, when the time comes, whom to save and whom to liquidate,' 'stay armed so as not to be caught by surprise,' 'Some Hutu look like Tutsi, and their job is to spy on us; be careful!,' and 'There are subtle ways to exterminate Hutu people... kill them' (Lemarchand, 1997:xvii).

In 1993, Buyoya held elections. Results of the votes showed division between ethnicities, although compulsory mixed membership in parties (Watt, 2008:43). 'Hutu' party FRODEBU

won the elections and Ndadayé became President. The PalipeHutu party was not officially recognized for elections (Lemarchand, 1997:142-144). After elections, Ndadayé successfully suppressed a coup and was inaugurated in July 1993 (ICIB, 2002). Buyoya believes that Ndadayé's regime was based on ethnically based management and that it was the root for the genocide (Watt, 2008:44). Some processes and policies had been a major source of unrest: the liberalization of the media, contracts that economically effected the army and Tutsi elites, almost all governmental functions in the commune and colline having been taken over by FRODEBU authorities, and Hutus in exile returning and planning changes for the military (ICIB, 2002). However, power-sharing in the cabinet was created, 15 Hutus and 7 Tutsis became ministers with a Tutsi woman as Prime Minister (HRW, 1998:19). The planned army recruitment especially created fear among Tutsis for potential threats towards the Tutsi population (Lemarchand, 1997:18 and Watt, 2008:44).

Concluding, the trigger of the genocide in 1993 is the assassination of the Hutu President who was elected after the introduction of democratization by Buyoya. Extremists on the Hutu side seem to have wanted a revenge for all the years of Hutu repression and started to implement genocide after the assassination of their elected Hutu President, many decades before. Also, the army and Tutsi extremists appeared to be skeptical about this power-sharing in politics. They have also been scared for a genocide (of Tutsis). So, the context of violence, killings, fear of mutual killings and the international pressure to great power-sharing in these circumstances seem to be the underlying factors which generated the triggers.

Genocide Rwanda 1994

The main difference, as previously described, between Burundi and Rwanda is that the Hutus easily got power after independence and ruled until the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda. The help of Belgium and the possibility to stay in power, as the majority group, in a context of ethnic conflict and war, seems to be of great importance. However, the RPF attacks which conducted fear of losing power for those in government appears to be the first real trigger to organize genocide by the Hutu government. The assassination of the Hutu President apparently was the turning point, where this fear became reality. Soon afterwards the genocide begun.

With support of the church and Belgium, Hutus created the Manifest in which demands for emancipation were stated. After the death of King Mutara Rudahigwa (by some believed murdered), the Hutu revolution began in 1959. Tutsi rights and the royal family got abolished.

Local elections were won by Hutu parties and Kayibanda became Prime Minister. The revolutionary heritage was unique to Rwanda and took place together with a civil war and brutal actions against ethnicities. The conflict for power was between ethnicities (Lemarchand, 2009:115, 135, 143 and Verlinden, 12-23).

Furthermore, after independence, national elections were won by Hutu party MDR and Kayibanda became President of the First Republic as a single-party state. Between 1963 and 1967, there were brutal reactions by the Rwandan government on an aborted raid by Tutsi refugees of the Hutu revolution. This caused Tutsi killings, their exodus to neighboring countries and Tutsi discriminations. Besides these ethnic conflicts, great tensions between political Hutu elites from the north and the south had created a great chaotic situation between 1971 and 1973. In this period, intra-Hutu elites' assassinations and killings of Tutsis occurred throughout the country. On 5 July 1973, General-Officer Habyarimana became President after a coup and the Second Republic was born. He brought 'peace, order' and wealth in again a single-party state with all power to the MRND. In 1975, unity within the party was created. In the following years, from 1978 until 1988, only Habyarimana could be elected and had great support. In 1989, a special commission with the help of UNHCR tried to resolve the refugee problem in a disturbed system of ethnic conflict and regional cleavages (Lemarchand, 2009:135 and Verlinden, 1996:25-49).

Moreover, in 1990, President Habyarimana started a 'real' process of democratization. Soon afterwards, in October, the RPF, which was made up of children from Tutsi refugees in Uganda, tried to invade Rwanda. This was the start of a guerilla war and power struggles between Hutus and their parties. Politically ethnic assassinations and radicalization against Tutsis were widespread between 1990 and 1994. A multi-party democracy was established after the Arusha Accords which were signed after negotiations between 1992 and 1993. However, this caused 'murderous calculus of political advantage that had been unleashed by electoral competition' (Lemarchand, 2009:95) with the genocide as its climax, despite the presence of UN peace keepers. The President and its entourage were scared of cooperation with the RPF, which could threaten their power. From 1993, an intern struggle in political parties about political reforms went on together with hatred against Tutsis, which was also presented on the radio and after the assassination of the President the genocide started (Lemarchand, 2009:95 and Verlinden:25-49).

The combination of ethnic power relations in politics and the ethnic division in population: different scales

The previous parts have shown that the different triggers can be explained by different paths of history influenced by several factors. Also, throughout the research ethnicity and the government/state, but also civilians, seem to be significant explaining factors of genocides in the Great Lakes Region. Although both countries show similarities in ethnicity and governmental style, a major difference exists between the ethnic group in power, linked to the path of history, in relation with the division of ethnic groups in the society. Governments in both countries are responsible for planning, organizing and implementing genocide of the other major ethnicity in the country; however, the previously explained combination can be an answer for the difference in scale between the Rwandan genocide and Burundi's genocides. In Rwanda, the ethnic majority had been in power, the Hutus, and it was backed by the all-Hutu army and many Hutu civilians (85% of the population). In Burundi, the ethnic minority was in power, Tutsis, and was backed by an all-Tutsi army and a minority in the civilian population (Tutsis: 15%) (1972). It seems that the Rwandan state was most capable of organizing genocide and the mobilization of its citizenry like Straus mentions, because of the ethnic divisions in the society; and so the ethnic majority in power equals the population. Also, the army appears to have had a crucial role.

Burundi

The Tutsi government believed that the physical elimination of educated Hutus was necessary for the survival of Tutsis. The active involvement of communal and provincial authorities in the killings and massacres had a great influence in the incitements of these deeds (Lemarchand, 2009:xiv and 138). Furthermore, the civic duty of Tutsi citizens is described by Greenland: "The government radio broadcasts encouraged the population to "hunt down the python in the grass," an order which was interpreted by Tutsi in the interior as license to exterminate all educated Hutu, down to the level of secondary, and in some cases even primary school children. Army units commandeered merchants' lorries and mission vehicles, and drove up to schools, removing whole batches of children at a time. Tutsi pupils prepared lists of their Hutu classmates to make identification by officials more straightforward" (Lemarchand, 1997:98). This quote shows that there was symbolization, dehumanization, hate propagandas and planning and organization of genocide by the government and army. Also,

the demonized mythmaking served for legitimatizing violence and constructed identities according to the norms of the dehumanizing myth (Lemarchand, 1997:xvii).

Furthermore, the dynamic of the twofold competition within the Tutsi community and between Hutus and Tutsis was essential for the centrality and instrumental use of the state. There was a struggle for control over the party, the army, the government, the civil service and parastatal organizations. This dynamic culminated in the killings of 1972 (Lemarchand, 1997:77). However, this information only shows the government's capability of preparing genocide, but not to the extent of the Rwandan one.

Moreover, in 1993, the best failed coups in history took place. Ndabayé was assassinated. This was widely announced on the radio and the killings of Tutsi almost immediately began. The army responded heavily and killed Hutus. This shows that the military had the psychological, and the government the official control of the country (HRW, 1998:20, ICIB, 2002 and Lemarchand, 1997:17). It was a failed coup because international pressure and the cutting off of all aid forced the army to restore the civil government (HRW, 1998:19). A double plot seems to be the case in the genocide of 1993. Hutu politicians and local leaders were involved in the Tutsi killings based on a plot to eliminate Tutsis according to prepared lists with Tutsi names; however, the other plot of the army against the government seems to be the cause of the elimination of the President. For both plots evidence can be found (HRW, 1998:20-21, Lemarchand, 1997:xv and Watt, 2008:49). Again it shows the government's capability, but it also demonstrates the un-necessity of the official army to organize and implement genocide. Again, it seems most likely the ethnic divisions in the society are an important factor in determining the scale of genocide.

Rwanda

The genocide of Rwanda showed how powerful a government and its army can be when it exists of the ethnic majority and is also backed by the ethnic majority in the population. Mobilization, as Straus explained, was an important capability of the Rwandan state, but they also had a great audience who listened to the hate programs of the government and its supporters. The organization of the genocide was in the hands of the akazu, the killing machine and the political elite of northern Hutus surrounding President Habyarimana (Lemarchand, 2009:93 and Verlinden, 1996:25-49), in which the hate propaganda machine spread by radio station Radio Milles Collines played a great role. The Hutu-controlled media promoted genocidal murder in a quick way during the genocide. Constant fear was exploited

by this propaganda and this was a significant factor in the construction and methods of organizing genocide (Lemarchand, 2009:93 and 118-119). The 'Ten Commandments of the Hutu' listed assumptions based on racial principles, such as: 'The Tutsi are the embodiment of malice and wickedness... The Tutsi never change [referring to inyenzi meaning cockroach]... Their long-term strategy is the creation of a Hima empire in the heart of the continent [Tutsi master plan]... Given the mortal threat facing the Hutu majority, it is imperative to delineate tribe from nation and for the Hutu to rediscover true identity as Bantu [only ethnicity is natural, not nationality]... In these conditions, vigilance is the key. Watch out for spies and be particularly wary of Tutsikazi (Tutsi females)' (Lemarchand, 2009:60-61). This shows that symbolization and dehumanization had been present in the genocide of 1994. Also, a great part of the population was involved, since 85% was Hutu, and it was expected that they turned their backs against the ethnic minority Tutsi.

Conclusion

The genocidal twins in the Great Lakes Region of Africa are the main topic of this thesis. Both countries are very similar on several themes, and therefore, it seems logical that they also have similar explanations for their genocides; in Burundi in 1972 and 1993 as well as in

Rwanda in 1994. However, it is remarkable that the genocides in Burundi have unlike triggers and such different scales than the Rwandan genocide (see table 1).

Table 1 Significant differences genocides in the Great Lakes Region of Africa

Country/genocide	Rwanda 1994	Burundi 1972	Burundi 1993
Ethnicity in government	Hutu	Tutsi	Hutu/Tutsi
Ethnicity in army	Hutu	Tutsi	Tutsi
Ethnic majority in population	Hutu	Hutu	Hutu
Genocide of ethnicity	Tutsi	Hutu	Tutsi
Number of casualties	800.000	250.000	250.000
Time period	3 months	3/4 months	3/4 days

Because Rwanda and Burundi are so similar, research on the Rwandan case is used for investigating the Burundi genocides, which still have a downgraded position in scholarly research. From research on Rwanda applied to Burundi’s genocides, it is argued that indeed similar underlying factors are found that explain the context in which genocides could easier be organized: geography and population density; ethnic conflict and regional cleavages; war and violence; politics of exclusion: poverty, education and land; military and militias; impunity and radicalization of refugees. These factors are all present and alike in both countries, so they cannot explain the different triggers and scale.

Interestingly, it is most likely that the triggers are just caused by different paths of history, although both countries have the same pre-colonial and colonial background. The ‘extra’ ethnicity (Ganwas) and the influences of Belgium and the Church seem to have determined the way politics are constructed in Burundi and Rwanda after independence. Also, the influences of back-and-forth exchanges of refugees, war and fear appears to have had a major impact as well.

However, the different paths of history cannot elucidate the different scales of genocide. Since the underlying factors, which are also often mentioned in large-N research on genocide, are comparable in both countries, something else should exist that counts for the difference in scale. *The ethnic group in power (government and state) in relation with the fact that this ethnic group is also the majority of the population, gives the impression to be the explaining*

main factor for the difference in scale, since it determines the capacity of the government in planning, organizing and implementing genocide to a great extent. This was the case in Rwanda 1994 in contrast to Burundi 1972 and 1993 (see table 1). In Burundi 1972, the ethnic minority was in power and this ethnic group was also the minority in society. With this combination, the government was capable of organizing a genocide of a smaller scale. Concluding, the role of the populations and its demography in ethnic group divisions, is significant in explaining the difference in scale in the genocides in Burundi and Rwanda. The role of the army is most probably also very great. This will now be discussed.

Based on this main conclusion, more attention should be paid to Burundi's genocide of 1993 because of differing facts. The following findings can be described based on this genocide:

1. The Government does not need the military to plan genocide. This means that government and the military are not self-evidently related in cases of organizing/implementing genocide. A Hutu-government can plan, organize and implement genocide with help of the civil population and militias.
2. The army has influences on the duration of genocides and therefore partly effects the amount of casualties. However, if there was an all-Hutu army, the genocide would have lasted for a longer time in all probability and more people would have been killed.

So, it can be concluded that the civil population – with ethnic divisions – has been a major factor in explaining the scale of genocides, but the army is also directly related to the amount of casualties.

With hindsight on the research, there has been one major problem which may have influenced this investigation. Unfortunately, little literature about Burundi and its genocides can be found. Whether this is caused by the fact that scholars are more interested in the Rwandan genocide, because of its greater scale, or definitional problems – labeling genocide to the events in Burundi – is unclear. In any way, more research is necessary in order to come with more findings on the Burundi genocides in which more themes of these genocides are often less studied as well. So, more themes are available for research than the fact that these genocides are lesser in scale compared to Rwanda's genocide. It is desirable to have more literature than Lemarchand as the main expert on the subject.

The current situation in Burundi and Rwanda should be taken seriously by the international community, especially because of the UN's definition, in which it is stated that genocide should be prevented if signs of planning genocide are present, since the combination of ethnicities in power in the government and the military as well as the demography of ethnic groups may create an environment in which genocide may occur again.

In Rwanda, Tutsi president Kagame, also leader of the RPF, has been head of the state in a multiparty system since the victory of the genocide (CIA Fact Book¹). The Tutsi army, the Rwandan Defense Forces, still is ethnically imbalanced in favor of Tutsis and RPF members as the military elites are the leaders (www.fdu-rwanda.org). This means that the leaders of the government and the military have the same ethnic background (comparable to Burundi 1972), which created an environment in which conflicts occur and genocide can be organized in a small time period, but only when a triggering spark is present.

After the genocide of 1993, there was no victor which made reconciliation difficult in Burundi. In 2010, the Hutu party got power as a single party with a Hutu President, since the opposition stepped away. In contrast, the army still exists mainly out of Tutsis, although some Hutu rebellions are integrated in the army (www.allafrica.com). This situation seems dangerous, since a combination like this was very deadly and resulted in a genocide in 1993 of just a few days, but – again – only when a triggering spark is present.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 Overview history Rwanda and Burundi

Burundi		Rwanda	
Period	Event	Period	Event
Since time immemorial	Twa pygmy (hunters and gatherers) Original population	Since time immemorial	Twa pygmy (hunters and gatherers) Original population
7th century	Hutu Bantu (farmers) arrived	7th century	Hutu Bantu (farmers) arrived
13th century	Tutsi (cattle farmers) arrived	13th century	Tutsi (cattle farmers) arrived
16th century	First kingdoms of Urundi	16th century	First kingdoms of Rwanda
17th century	Ganwa/Tutsi have power	17th century	Tutsi have power
19th century	Kingdom present shape	19th century	Kingdom present shape
1858-1892	European explorers	1858-1892	European explorers
1894	Rwanda- Urundi: Colony of Germany	1894	Rwanda-Urundi: Colony of Germany
1901	Usumbura (Bujumbura) capital of Rwanda-Urundi	1908	Rwanda exclusive status and Kigali becomes capital of Rwanda
		1910	Rwanda loses territory (conference in Europe; definitive boundaries of the colonial territories)
1914	First World War; Germany loses power	1914	First World War; Germany loses power
1919	Treaty of Versailles; Belgium territory	1919	Treaty of Versailles; Belgium territory
1923	League of Nations defined this area as Belgium mandate: double kingdom of Ruanda-Urundi	1923	League of Nations defined this area as Belgium mandate: double kingdom of Ruanda-Urundi
1925	Rwanda-Burundi becomes administrative area of Belgium-Congo (Zaire)	1925	Rwanda-Burundi becomes administrative area of Belgium-Congo (Zaire)
1930	Power shift to Ganwa (king) and Tutsis (based on Hamitic theory). Colonizers believe Ganwa is a privileged group of Tutsi (HRW, 1998:12)	1930	Power shift to Tutsis (king) (based on Hamitic theory)
1945	End of Second World War; creation of UN; all power to Ganwa and Tutsi (Berwouts, 2006:50)	1945	End of Second World War; creation of UN
		1954-1959	Hutu manifest: democratization, more power Hutus; Belgium and Christian church

			support for Hutus
1950s	Political power struggle between Ganwa-clans Crown prince wants constitution and he created the basis for political parties	1959	Hutu revolution: start of ethnic conflict and (political and ethnic) assassinations; restored order by Belgium-Congo troops; help from the Church (Lemarchand, 2009:114)
1961 (September)	1 st parliamentary elections won by Ganwa prince Rwagasore (son of Mwami Mwambutsa) with political multi-ethnic party Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA)	1960	Tutsi repression and exodus to neighboring countries like Uganda and Burundi; some Tutsis call this 1st genocide in the Great Lakes Region (Lemarchand, 2009:114);
1961 (October)	Prince Rwagasore assassinated probably by opposition party PDC; start power shift to UPRONA (Tutsis) based on Hutu revolution in Rwanda and Tutsi refugees in Burundi from Rwanda		
1962 (1 st of July)	Independence; Monarchy under King Mwambutsa IV (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:24).	1962 (1 st of July)	Independent Rwanda (Verlinden, 1996:8-24)

1962-1965	Five different governments equal in ethnicity	1963-1967	Attacks from Tutsi refugees; Tutsi killings; Tutsi exodus; Tutsi discrimination
1965	Hutu Prime-Minister Ngendandumwe assassinated The Hutu/Tutsi division 'became the dominant lens through which Burundi political conflict came to be viewed (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:6).	1965 and 1969	Hutu President Kayibanda has power
1965	Elections based on ethnicity differences; Hutu wins majority; but King Mwami Mwambutsa chooses a Tutsi Prime-Minister; Hutu part of Gendarmerie revolt; Abrasive reaction of army. Tutsi minority is scared for a Hutu revolution as in Rwanda (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:6).		

1965-1969	Subsequent assassinations and communal massacres (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:6).		
1966	Shift of Crown; end of monarchy; 1 st coup by Lt. Micombero: first President of Burundi (Tutsi from the south); military dictatorship; ongoing power struggle between Tutsi elites; Marginalization of old elites and old Ganwa elite became irrelevant, a buffer between Hutu and Tutsi removed (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:6).		
1972	Dominant party is UPRONA of Tutsis; one party state; Hutu rebellion attacks in the south of Burundi; reaction was extermination of Hutu-elite (100.000-300.000 deaths); first genocide in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (Watt, 2008:24), however known as 'accident de parcours' of Micombero regime	1971-1972	Great tensions between political elites (north and south cleavages)
1972	End Hutu-elite	1973	Chaotic situation: intra Hutu elites try to assassinate each other and Tutsi are murdered everywhere in the country
1976	Coup by Bagaza (Tutsi from same area); palace revolution; Second Republic; land reforms; (bloodless coup (Watt, 2008:39)).	1973 (5 th of July)	Juvénal Habyarimana (from the north and old Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff) takes power; 2 nd Republic; he brings order and 'peace' and welfare
1979	No acknowledgement of ethnicities anymore: President only talks about Burundians; conflict with the Church: all missionaries had to leave (Church is pro-West and pro-Hutu) However, Hutu repression and politics of exclusion (Watt, 2008:40)	1975	Unity party Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND)
1987	Coup by Buyoya without	1978, 1983, 1988	Only Habyarimana is

	violence; Third Republic Ethnic killings (Watt, 2008:41)		electable but he has great support
1988	Unrest because of remembrance of 1972 genocide of Hutus and tensions of Rwandan Tutsi refugees; very hard reaction of all Tutsi military Subsequent assassinations and communal massacres (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:6).	1989	Special commission in order to solve refugee problem; rapport with UNHCR; ill regime of Habyarimana because of ethnic conflict and regional cleavages
1990	Democratization process started with the project for Charte de 'Unité (Charter of Unity)	1990	Democratization process started by statement of Habyarimana
1990-1993 1991 1992	Unrest and ethnic and political conflict Subsequent assassinations and communal massacres (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:6). New constitution providing a multiparty system (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:24).	1990 (October)	Invasion of Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) which exists of children of Tutsi refugees in Uganda.
1993 (June)	First free elections with multiparty system; Hutu Ndabayé wins; Buyoya accepts this victory	1990-1994	Guerilla war of RPF, power struggles between Hutus and Hutu parties; politic ethnic assassinations; radical situation against Tutsi
1993 (October)	President Ndabayé was assassinated probably by Tutsi extremists in the army; Tutsi assassinations throughout the country; 2 nd Genocide in the Great Lakes Region of Africa; involvement of the army to protect the Tutsi populations	1992-1993	Arusha Accords for peace between all the parties; followed by UN peacekeeping force to ensure the implementation of the Accords
1994 (January)	Newly chosen Hutu President Ntaryamira	1993	Intern struggle in political parties about political reforms; hatred against Tutsi also on the radio
1994 (6 th of April)	Assassination of President Ntaryamira and Rwandan President Habyarimana	1994 (6th of April)	Assassination of President Habyarimana and Burundian President Ntaryamira
1994	The assassination did not lead to a new great upheaval of violence, although assassinations	1994 (April-July)	Genocide of Tutsi; won by the RPF; 3 rd Genocide in the Great Lakes Region of Africa

	and murders are daily routine		
1994 (October)	Appointment of President Ntybantunganya; tension between Hutu majority in politics and all Tutsi army; violence between extremists of both ethnicities		(All information: Verlinden, 1996:25-49; unless otherwise stated)

Appendix 2 Overview explanations genocide

The main factor **history** has the following sub-factors:

- Problematic history of violence (Harff and Gurr, Shaw and Straus)
- Historical context: post-colonial problems (Harff):
 - Problematic structure of the society (Harff)
 - Colonial liberalization (Harff)
 - Racial division (Harff)
 - Problematic economic development (Harff)
 - Problematic foreign intervention (Harff)

The main factor **politics** has the following sub-factors:

- Problematic state institutions (or regime) (Shaw)
- Problematic policies:
 - Discriminatory strategic policies (by state) (Harff and Gurr)
 - Political scarcity (Smith) / problematic economic power relations (Shaw)
 - Abuse of modern politics (democratization) (Shaw)
- Problematic (political and military) leaders:
 - Problematic motives, beliefs and goals (Valentino) / Problematic motives as eliminating threats based on belief, theory or ideology (Chalk and Jonassohn in Jones 2006)
 - Psychological scarcity (Smith)
- Problematic elites: Existence of radical elites running party states (Shaw)
- Problematic military: Militants forming violent militaries (Shaw)
- Problematic support: Mass support for policy, leaders and/or elites (Shaw)
- Problematic combination of state (institutions), leaders and elites:
 - Polarization of groups: hate propagandas (Standon)
 - Organization of genocide (Standon)
 - Preparation of genocide (Standon)
 - (Denial of Genocide (Standon))

The main factor **domestic** has the following sub-factors:

- Society
 - Problematic social relations (Shaw)
 - Ethnic conflicts (Staub) & Socio spatial exclusion (Shaw)
 - Socio-economic problems/developmental problems (Shaw)
 - Problematic classification: us vs. them, symbolization of groups in society
 - Dehumanization of groups in society (Standon)
 - Problematic cultural and personal preconditions (Staub)
 - Culture and psychology: culture of terror (Shaw)
 - Socialized organized military power (Shaw)
 - Problematic societal-political organization (Staub)
 - Difficult life conditions life threatening (Staub)
- Environment and geography
 - Ecological destruction and abuse (Charny)
 - Material scarcity (Smith) / limited resources (Shaw)
 - Geographical problems (Shaw)

The fourth main factor **international** has the following sub-factors:

- Dysfunctional international economic system (Shaw)

