African Identities: *A New Perspective*

Bert van Pinxteren

African Identities: a New Perspective

Thesis submitted for the Research Master African Studies,

African Studies Centre, Leiden University, the Netherlands by

Bert van Pinxteren

bert.van.pinxteren@upcmail.nl

Supervisors:

Dr. Akinyinka Akinyoade, African Studies Centre

Prof. Dr. Maarten Mous, Leiden University Centre for Linguistics

Third reader:

Prof. Dr. Ton Dietz, Leiden African Studies Assembly

Cover: 'Alkebu-Lan', imaginary map of what Africa could have looked like in the mid-nineteenth Century, if Europe had not become a colonizing power. Map used with permission from its author, Swedish artist ***Nikolaj Cyon***, *http://www.cyon.se*

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African Identities: a New Perspective

0.1 Abstract

The UN Sustainable Development Goals acknowledge 'that all cultures (…) are crucial enablers of sustainable development'. In academic literature on Africa, however, cultural diversity is analysed as a problem, rather than as an enabler. Africa is either seen as one culturally homogeneous whole or as incredibly diverse and fragmented – there seems to be nothing in-between. Therefore, the picture is incomplete at best. Yet information on culture is used as the basis for assertions on Africa and its problems in economic and other areas. This thesis questions both visions of African cultures, using Vansina's theory on the autonomy of cultural traditions as its starting point. Methodically, it uses an approach developed in cross-cultural psychology. Cultures are described here as value systems that serve as common points of reference to peoples. Using the cultural dimensions approach of Hofstede and Minkov a new exploratory analysis has been made of current self-perceptions of Africans, using data from the World Values and Afrobarometer surveys. This leads to information on differences and similarities in cultural values between more than 200 ethnolinguistic groups from over 30 African countries. The information has been partly triangulated through Focus Group Discussions in Ghana and in Southern Africa and by comparing information from those countries with ethnographic and other literature.

The thesis sheds new light on cultural differences and similarities in Africa. It shows that there are considerable cultural differences within Africa; not all cultures in Africa are equally 'collectivist', for example. The essentially Eurocentric shorthand method of equating language with culture cannot be used in Africa: in many cases, cultural areas share different languages; in other cases, one language may be shared by people with different cultures. The thesis shows that such situations may be relatively common in Africa. The thesis calls for a new perspective on African identities and draws attention to the need for rebuilding cultural autonomy, based in African languages.

Keywords: Africa, culture, values, cultural autonomy, cultural dimensions, cross-cultural psychology, Vansina, Hofstede, Minkov, Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland, sustainable development, World Values Survey, Afrobarometer survey, ethnicity, identity, African languages.

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1. INTRODUCTION – theoretical and methodological starting points

> *"We acknowledge the natural and cultural diversity of the world and recognize that all cultures and civilizations can contribute to, and are crucial enablers of, sustainable development."*[1]

Two contradictory narratives on Africa and African identities exist side by side: one claims that Africans have much in common and that there is really one common African culture, the other one that Africa is a continent of infinite cultural diversity (Prah 2008:71). There seems to be nothing in-between. I hold that both these claims have the effect of disempowering Africans[2]: the 'Africa is a country' narrative denies the real cultural differences that exist on the ground. The 'Tower of Babel' narrative leads to the idea that because of its fragmentation, patrimonialism and parochialism are Africa's only future[3].

In order to overcome this contradiction, a new perspective is needed, one that is based on a fresh look at Africa's cultural and linguistic diversity. The aim of this thesis is to explore such a perspective.

In this chapter, I will first outline my theoretical starting point, then my methodological starting point and then give a brief overview of the structure of the thesis itself.

1.1 Theoretical starting point: Vansina's view on cultural autonomy

My theoretical starting point lies in the work of Vansina(1992), who has asked the question that has been asked by so many other authors, namely why, comparatively speaking, Africa seems to have under-performed so dramatically since the end of the colonial period. In his view, the answer *"flows from problems with its basic cultural traditions."*(p9) These problems are not, as many other authors seem to hold[4], related to the content of these traditions. The problem, in his diagnosis, is that the basic cultural units that existed in Africa have been destroyed in the colonial period. In Africa's post-colonial nation states, *"even the basic criteria for perceiving reality are not commonly held by all let alone that there would be consensus on the existing choices, objectives, priorities, standards, ethics and legitimacy on any issue."*(p9) Vansina describes tradition as a cultural phenomenon, referring to *"a pervasive fund of perceptions, concepts, beliefs, values, norms, expectations and practices common to the people within a community or a set of communities."*(p10)

Vansina maintains that there was never one 'African' tradition, nor that there was an innumerable variety of traditions. He identifies North Africa as being part of an unbroken Islamic tradition, within which he does differentiate several sub-traditions. The other traditions he identifies are the

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[1] UN Agenda for Sustainable Development, paragraph 36.
[2] Some would call such ideas, that are difficult to challenge, forms of epistemic oppression – see for example Andrews and Okpanachi(2012) and Gwaravanda(2017).
[3] Both designations have been coined in polemic fashion by opponents of these positions; both can be traced back to Mazrui. 'You are not a country, Africa' is a famous line by Sierra Leonean poet (and Cambridge University fellow) Davidson Abioseh Nicol from the 1930s, quoted in Mazrui (1993: 581). 'Africa is not a country' is also a children's book; www.africaisacountry.com is an influential blogsite showcasing progressive, mainly diaspora writing on Africa. The image of Africa as a 'Tower of Babel', as a continent with tremendous linguistic diversity comes from Mazrui and Mazrui(1998) and was taken up among others by Prah and Miti (2017).
[4] See for example Van der Veen(2004).

Ethiopian one, the pastoral societies of southwestern Africa, the pastoral societies of northern East Africa, and the Madagascar tradition. In addition, he sees a Central Bantu[5] tradition (the topic of his 1990 seminal book, 'Paths in the Rainforest'), encompassing two facets: the tradition of the rainforest and that of the southern Savannas. He sees an Eastern Bantu tradition split up into one of dispersed settlements under chiefs and one with more monarchical, centralized institutions. This latter tradition led to four daughter traditions, including those of Zimbabwe, Botswana and the Swahili East African tradition. In West Africa, he distinguishes one common tradition in trade, but aside from that at least six dominant local traditions. These traditions, Vansina stresses, were all overthrown by violence during the colonial period, overcoming heavy local resistance (p16). By 1920, Vansina asserts, only the heritage of language remained of the older traditions (p17).

A new worldview was propagated, based on European models. After independence, it led to a strong cultural dichotomy, with a disoriented population, governed by a westernized élite. It is this combination of the destruction of cultural autonomy, coupled with a new cultural dichotomy, that, in Vansina's view, is unique to Sub-Saharan Africa and must be held responsible for the poor performance of the subcontinent. This phenomenon of a cultural dichotomy is related to what Bamgbose (2000:112), quoting Scotton, has labelled élite closure. In terms of Bourdieu, one could say that by cherishing a Western education, African élites build up cultural capital and a *habitus* that effectively protects and perpetuates their privileged position (Naidoo, 2004).

The process that Vansina(1992) describes is in itself not unique to Sub-Saharan Africa – but the scale and pervasiveness is. Vansina sketches the outcome of the destruction of indigenous traditions: the *"majority tradition cannot determine its own future. Its world view and its institutions are warped by oppression. Not a favorable climate to develop original solutions to overcome the crisis."* (p21) Vansina does not believe that things will forever stay this way. In his prediction, there *"will emerge two neoafrican traditions built in part on the common Christian or Muslim cultures and in part on the legacy of precolonial traditions. These neoafrican traditions will be carried by African languages. They will not be monolithic.(…) One expects different portions of the elites to be drawn gradually into their majority tradition just as the traders now are. A portion of the intellectual elite will follow soon. In the end the rulers themselves can no longer avoid being drawn into the orbit of the majority. The baneful dichotomy between western influences and the majority tradition can then be expected to end (…) And then Africa south of the Sahara could finally flourish (…)"* (p22/23)

Vansina wrote his analysis almost thirty years ago. If he is right, then something of the development that he predicted should already be visible. Perhaps in some countries or regions, national or regional cultures or traditions are starting to emerge that build on the historical legacy in a new way and that transcend traditional boundaries. Maybe other communities are refocusing on their traditions and rediscovering or reinventing them, perhaps building on a common linguistic resource that has survived. If so, then there must be indications of such developments in people's values and behaviours. But where can we find such indications? What vocabulary can we use to describe such developments, what methods can we use to discover them?

[5] Note that the term 'Bantu' is used by Vansina as an ethnolinguistic designation; here, the term does not have the pejorative meaning it acquired in Apartheid South Africa.

1.2 Methodological starting point: cross-cultural psychology

There is a large body of existing knowledge about Africa and its cultures. However, this knowledge is heavily influenced by the trauma caused by the colonial period and either by the knowledge that was built up in this period or by the radical rejection of this knowledge. Therefore, it would be better to use a different approach, one that is based directly on recent self-perceptions of Africans.

Vocabularies describing cultural values do exist and have been developed in the domains of cross-cultural psychology and intercultural psychology. According to Kendra, "Cross-cultural psychology is a branch of psychology that looks at how cultural factors influence human behavior"[6]. It is related to the field of intercultural psychology. According to Berry, "When individuals who are members of different cultural groups come into contact, the domain of intercultural psychology becomes central to understanding human behavior in all groups"[7]. For cross-cultural research, the focus is on the fact that the societal **mean values** that people belonging to a culture consciously or subconsciously know about and refer to are different between cultures. The basic idea is not that all people who identify with one cultural or ethnolinguistic group individually all hold the same values: the idea is, rather, that they share a 'mental map'[8] of what is seen as 'normal' and know how to position themselves and others in relation to that norm.

The basis of the vocabularies used for describing differences and similarities in value systems was developed through data collected by value survey methods. The most well-known approaches here are those of Hofstede, of Schwartz and the World Values Survey[9]. A major advantage of these approaches is that they are being used worldwide and are still proving their worth. However, they are not uncontroversial – there is observer bias built in and the survey instrument itself may not be culturally neutral. The surveys used may be inappropriate for capturing values held by Africans and may not discriminate well between different African cultures. Yet, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages: cross-cultural psychology provides a well-established method that has proven its usefulness in many different countries and cultures; it is based on self-perceptions of people; it allows comparisons between countries and within countries; it is not weighed down by knowledge built up in the colonial period.

The research that can be carried out within the framework of a thesis such as this one is by definition limited – it cannot provide definitive answers to the questions raised above. Yet, I do hope to be able to survey the terrain and to provide a 'proof of concept' that will hopefully contribute to the debate on African culture and will lead to further research.

1.3 Structure of the thesis

In chapter two, I will use existing literature to elaborate how I see culture and a number of key related concepts, such as the concepts of nation, nationality and ethnic group. I will elaborate on the unit of study in the thesis – what is the level at which I look at culture and what is the basis for choosing to look at ethnolinguistic groups?

[6] https://www.verywell.com/what-is-cross-cultural-psychology-2794903, accessed 16 June 2017.
[7] http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199828340/obo-9780199828340-0042.xml, accessed 16 June 2017.
[8] The term is Hofstede's.
[9] See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org as well as Welzel (2013).

Chapter three is a presentation of the research question.

Chapter four looks at cross-cultural psychology in greater detail, comparing the approaches of Hofstede/Minkov, Schwartz and Inglehart and Welzel. It also gives a brief discussion of the criticisms that have been levelled at cross-cultural psychology.

Chapter five outlines the methods used for the thesis: both a quantitative approach (survey analysis) and a qualitative approach (an attempt at triangulation through desk study and focus group discussions).

Chapter six then presents a number of key results, based on field visits to Ghana and Southern Africa. It also looks at cross-border situations.

Chapter seven is devoted to a number of key conclusions drawn from the research, as well as recommendations for further research.

Chapter eight contains a number of appendices and the bibliography.

2. CONCEPTS OF CULTURE – AND WHY THEY MATTER

Information on ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity within Africa is important: it is used for different purposes and to explain different phenomena. Therefore, a basic understanding of how I use the concept of culture and related concepts, also in relation to other understandings, is necessary. This chapter intends to give a (non-exhaustive) overview.

2.1 Nation, Culture and ethnicity – about the unit of study

In this section, I will explain how I see culture, also in relation to other concepts, such as ethnicity and tribe. I will also define my unit of study.

2.1.1 How I understand culture and ethnicity

Ake(1993:1) referring to the concept of ethnicity, has already pointed out that it is *"phenomenally problematic in Africa".* Culture and ethnicity are seen as sources of problems for Africa. I think a different perspective is possible, one that sees African cultures as a positive source of inspiration (Ayittey, 2010). But what do I mean when I talk about culture? For me, cultures can be characterized by value systems.

In my view, cultures can be described in terms of **value systems that serve as common points of reference to a people**.

This means that I look at culture at the level of societies, rather than at the level of individuals. Yet, the two levels are linked: people who are knowledgeable about a particular culture have a certain mental 'map' of what can be considered 'normal' or 'appropriate' in that culture. How this works was well described by Peterson and Barreto(2014) through their cultural expertise and personal values proposition. Of relevance are the 'Social learning of expertise and values principle' and the 'Personal value principle' (p 1135). The first states that socialization strongly supports expertise on culture, but only moderately supports acceptance of specific aspects of that culture. In other words, individuals can be part of a culture without accepting all of it. This is further elaborated in the second principle, which states that individuals vary in their support or rejection of aspects of their society's culture.

The tradition in which my approach stands has several sources.

Geertz (1973:44) focuses on cultures as 'recipes for the governing of behavior'. Compared to earlier approaches, this implies a shift in emphasis from concrete behaviour to values as the core elements that define cultures. Geertz emphasizes the role of interpretation or 'thick description' as almost the only acceptable way of describing cultures. Even though I appreciate the value of 'thick description', I have two very different objections: first, that it resists scientific generalization (Shankman, 1984; Greenfeld, 2000). Second, that Geertz does not seem to see a role for the self-representation of cultures and for cross-cultural dialogue (Clifford, 1983:133).

Hofstede (2001) has in a way abbreviated the definition of Geertz, seeing culture as '*the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another*'.

These are broad definitions; following them, cultural expression is broader than music, art or literature; it also includes expressions such as language, idiom and gestures.

Vansina (1990), in his ground-breaking 'Paths in the Rainforests', does not use the terms culture, tribe or ethnic group, instead talking about cultural 'traditions'. Vansina argues for the existence and vitality of a single tradition in equatorial Africa (roughly the area now covered by Congo and the DRC). One of the characteristics of tradition, as outlined by Vansina, is the '*fundamental continuity of a concrete set of basic cognitive patterns and concepts*' (p258). However, a tradition can only function if the peoples who carry them '*have the power of self-determination*': *'Given its capacity to accept, reject, or modify innovation, a tradition will not be overwhelmed by another major tradition as long as its carriers still retain enough liberty of choice.' (*p259).

Vansina's definition of 'cultural tradition' is, in my view, close to the definitions quoted above and close as well to my own perspective. As pointed out above, my view is different from Vansina, in that I do not think that it is necessary that everybody within a certain cultural area or tradition *shares* the *same* common beliefs and values – but at least everybody will be *aware* of those common beliefs and values, so that they serve as a common point of reference.

In short, then: I primarily see cultures as expressions of the different creative answers that societies have found to the problems confronting humanity. I think it would be a mistake to leave an appreciation of the importance of culture to populists and xenophobes only.

A concept that is related to culture is that of ethnicity or ethnic group. The term ethnic group is itself not clearly defined[1]. Those that do define it generally use one of two approaches. Ake (1993:2) and others hold to the distinction that ethnicity is descent-based, whereas culture is socially determined. Prah(2008:67) and others feel that the concept of ethnicity emphasizes cultural distinction. I will use this second approach, thereby equating culture and ethnicity.

A major criticism of the use of ethnicity as a category in African studies is the fact that ethnic designations can be seen, at least in part, as creations of colonial times, influenced by the gaze of foreigners, warped and manipulated to serve the needs of missionaries and colonial administrators. Raynaut(2001:15), writing about West Africa, says: *"Frequently, West African ethnic groups first identified by colonial administrators (…) exhibit strong cultural and social internal heterogeneities (in terms of language, religion, family organization, etc.). Yet there are sometimes close relations and similarities between ethnic groups labelled as 'different'."* Africans have pointed to this as well. Asiwaju(1985:3) has already shown how colonial powers sought to separate peoples, in part by giving different names to the same peoples. He also laments the tendency to create "*numerous artificial cover-names for language units which are, in many cases, identifiable as dialects of the same language. This practice has had the effect of exaggerating the picture of cultural diversity in the continent*" (p 252/3). Prah(1998) has echoed and reinforced this criticism, particularly in the area of language diversity.

To my knowledge though, no alternative knowledge base has been produced: there are no contemporary African-based lists of ethnicities or of cultural areas. My position is that in order to arrive at such an overview, an entirely different approach is needed, one that goes beyond self-designations but is still based on modern African self-perceptions. But how can this be done? How can culture be studied productively in an African setting? From what perspectives, using which methods? Here, I will limit myself to a few basic ideas.

Broadly speaking, I can see three different perspectives from which cultures can be studied: the intra-cultural, the extra-cultural and the cross-cultural. An *intra-cultural* perspective is one where

[1] Thus, for example Venkatasawmy (2015:26) in his discussion of ethnic conflict in Africa does not go beyond the statement that " 'ethnicity' is an inevitably elusive concept".

academics basically study and explain their own culture. They may draw in theoretical concepts from abroad, but they use these basically to explain their own culture, possibly in its historical development and in relation to other significant cultures. They do this for an audience that forms part of that same culture. The *extra-cultural* perspective is one in which a culture is studied by somebody who is not from that culture. In cultural anthropology, it is common for a researcher to spend a prolonged period of time immersed in a culture that is not his or her own and in so doing to develop a deep understanding of that culture. The third perspective is the *cross-cultural* perspective, which can be formed by a dialogue between academics with different cultural positions, take the form of a comparison between two or more cultures or a combination of both.

Cultures can be studied by many methods, including ethnography, discourse analysis, value surveys and others. All methods offer a lens on cultures. However, these lenses are always mediated, both by the perspective of the researcher and by the method itself. They are never neutral or value-free. Every method has the dual effect of shedding light on certain aspects and hiding others. The trick is to maximize the enlightening part and to minimize the obfuscation part. There may be no straightforward way of achieving this, in part because the concept of culture itself implies shifting value patterns that can be sketched but not pinpointed. However, it must be possible to at least be conscious and explicit about the background of the researchers, the perspective chosen and the advantages and disadvantages of the chosen method or methods. In order to do this, triangulation seems essential. Such triangulation should be done in a careful way: combining two methods that share the same lens is not likely to lead to a better result. Multi-cultural research teams are better than mono-cultural teams. Using dissimilar methods is better than using similar methods.

Before turning to a further discussion of these ideas, I will first discuss other approaches to culture, some related terms and give some examples of why studying Africa's cultural diversity is important.

2.1.2 Other concepts of culture

Storey (2001), following Williams (1983), gives three broad definitions of the word 'culture': as a process of aesthetic development; as a way of life; and as the product of intellectual and artistic activity (p 1-2). What these definitions have in common is that all of them reduce culture to a set of products: aesthetic developments, artistic works, ways of life. However, none of these definitions pay attention to what in my view underlies these products and to what makes them specific and different: the underlying outlook on life, the underlying value systems. As Miti (2015:3) has pointed out, referring to Africa: *"A popular understanding of culture is that it refers to the ways in which a people's ancestors lived. In other words, culture is taken to be part and parcel of a given people's past."* This is a popular understanding of culture that is based on concepts such as those of Storey.

Appadurai (1996) criticizes the use of the word 'culture' as a noun, because he objects to thinking of culture as some sort of object, as a (fixed) thing. Instead, the looks at the 'cultural' as allowing for a description of differences between different categories of people. He proposes to restrict the use of the term 'culture' to *'the subset of (…) differences that has been mobilized to articulate the boundary of difference'* and thus to demarcate group identity (p13).

Seeing culture as a marker of difference between groups, based on values but expressed in various ways points to a number of difficulties that need to be addressed.

One of the difficulties as mentioned by Appadurai has to do with the tendency to see cultures as static, somehow genetically determined attributes of people (the primordialist perspective). This fallacy has been criticised from many angles, partly, I suspect, by constructing strawman arguments. As Vansina(1990) has demonstrated for Equatorial Africa, cultures are not static – they are constantly

reproduced in complex interactions between local and larger levels and in that process, they also evolve. But because all cultures evolve along lines that are not necessarily or not even primarily convergent, differences between cultures remain as difference – even though the substance of such differences may change as well.

Another difficulty in thinking about culture is related to the tensions between individual values, subcultures and cultures. There is a tendency to confuse and conflate these. To give an example: Hofstede (2001) gives a Power Distance Index of 38 for the Netherlands and of 68 for France (p87). This is interpreted to mean that in French society as a whole, inequality is accepted more than in Dutch society. However, this does not mean that it applies equally to all individuals, to all occupations, to all educational backgrounds or to either gender. It is a comparison of country means. Hofstede makes this point, but it is easily missed.

Then, there is the issue of hybrid and multiple identities. It is often said that people nowadays are more mobile than ever before, that they are subjected to all kinds of influences via the mass media and the internet and that this affects their sense of identity and belonging. Blommaert (2013) refers to this as registers: multiple normative orientations, that people have access to and shift between. There is certainly truth in this and yes, it complicates the picture. It is possible for people to learn to use and be comfortable in different cultures and to use different sets of orientations. It is also possible for people to acquire a hybrid mode that allows them to navigate in different cultural contexts, although not in the same manner in each context. Other coping mechanisms are possible as well. However, this still means that those different contexts, registers or cultures are distinguishable from one another. Even though people may be able to navigate between cultures with greater or lesser ease, this is still an acquired skill. It does not change the fact that this world is characterized in part by cultural difference.

The approaches of Appadurai and Hofstede are different in their basic appreciation: for Appadurai, the mobilization of cultural sentiments and cultural difference spells trouble. His focus is on explaining inter-ethnic violence and he blames 'culturalisms' for playing an instrumental role. For Hofstede, knowledge about cultures and cultural differences is important in order to improve cross-cultural collaboration. My own perspective is closer to that of Hofstede.

2.1.3 Nations, nationalities and peoples

'**Nation**' as a concept itself has different meanings. One is the meaning of the nation state: an officially recognized independent country. But 'nation' can also refer to a group independent of whether or not it is tied to a particular state. Thus, the UNPO, the Unrepresented People's Organisation, states: *'A Nation or People shall mean a group of human beings which possesses the will to be identified as a nation or people and to determine its common destiny as a nation or people, and is bound to a common heritage which can be historical, racial, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious or territorial.'*[2] Here, the words 'Nation' and 'People' are used interchangeably. Ethiopia has also adopted this usage, explicitly recognizing the rights of its nations, nationalities and peoples in its Constitution. '*A "Nation, Nationality or People" for the purpose of this Constitution, is a group of people who have or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.'*[3].

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[2] Article 6 of the UNPO Covenant, http://unpo.org/section/2/1 accessed 17 July 2017.
[3] Article 39.5 of the Ethiopian Constitution, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et007en.pdf accessed 17 July 2017.

As an aside: the historical literature on early African attempts at forming nation states usually lacks any comparison with processes that went on in other parts of the world, for example in Europe. In 1815, around the time that Moshoeshoe I struggled to form a Sotho state, what is now Germany consisted of a loose federation of 39 independent states. As a unified state, Germany was founded only in 1871. Its first leader was Bismarck, who played a key role in the later carving up of Africa. Italy came together a year earlier, in 1870, after several wars led among others by Garibaldi. Greece more or less came together only in 1919. In other words, the processes that went on in the 19th century in Africa are not altogether different from those that went on in Europe in the same period, even though the power relationships and the resulting patterns of domination and resistance were of course quite different. One term that is often used with reference to Africa is the term 'Balkanization', pejoratively referring to the large degree of ethnic diversity (and strife) that characterizes the Balkan area of South-Eastern Europe. It is good to realize that in the racist discourse rampant in Western Europe 150 years ago the peoples of the Balkan area were not considered to be much above Africans.

2.1.4 Ethnic groups, tribes and polities

In colonial days, ethnic groups were labelled as 'tribes'. Later, these same groups were labelled as 'polities' or 'ethnic groups' – so the labels were changed, but they basically apply to the same groups. Because of these colonial origins and their relevance up to this day, I think I need to look into the word **tribe** as well. Schapera (1953, reprinted in Schapera and Comaroff, 1991:30) gives a workable definition of a 'tribe': *"a tribe is a politically independent unit, with its own chief and territories"*. Going by this definition, a 'tribe' is not the same as a cultural unit: indeed, Schapera recognizes that the Tswana form one cultural whole (a people), but that in precolonial times they were divided into independent units – what he then calls tribes. Going by this same definition, then, 'tribes' ceased to exist as soon as territories came under colonial domination.

Schapera builds on the earlier work of Van Warmelo (1937, as reprinted in Hammond-Tooke, 1974). Van Warmelo mentions the difficulties in grouping peoples into tribes. However, he also discusses arranging tribes into larger groups, and mentions five such groups for South Africa, of which Sotho (comprising also the Tswana) is one. However, he immediately says that "It is a misleading over-simplification" (p 58). He mentions that it had been suggested these were all part of a single 'culture province', but does not venture to give an opinion on the matter.

The word 'tribe' has (rightly) become associated with racist thinking (although even today it is not perceived as such in many countries in Africa). Instead, it has become fashionable to use the word '**polity**' – but that amounts to replacing an already imprecise term with one that is even less precise. Wikipedia quotes the definition of Ferguson and Mansbach (1996): *"A polity is any kind of political entity. It is a group of people who are collectively united by a self-reflected cohesive force such as identity, who have a capacity to mobilize resources, and are organized by some form of institutionalized hierarchy."*[4]

What this conceptual imprecision boils down to is that in most cases, the same groups that used to be called tribes in colonial times are currently called polities or ethnic groups. Ethnicity is then equated to language and culture – and there the picture becomes confusing because, as I have shown, the old tribes, morphed into polities, morphed into ethnic groups can not be equated to linguistic or cultural units. My suspicion is that this conceptual unclarity is not accidental – it serves a

[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polity, retrieved 29 March 2018.

purpose, both for the adherents to the 'Africa is a country' and the supporters of the 'Tower of Babel' narrative.

Doornbos and Van Binsbergen(2017:71) (who I would place in the 'Africa is a country' camp) give a good overview of the problems associated with studying tribal and ethnic identity in Africa. They point out how the '*ethnic distinctions non-African scholars imposed in their early twentieth-century pioneering analyses of African ethnicity were often subsequently appropriated as objective truth by African actors (…)'* – the process known as ethnicization. They take issue with the image of Africa as a patchwork of a large number of 'tribes', each with their own territory, culture and language. They also question the absoluteness with which ethnicity is seen, feeling that it is situational in nature. *"An increasing number of situations are constructed (…) primarily in terms of identities other than ethnic, notably in terms of religion, gender, class, professional group and national state."* (p 72) These points may have some validity, but Doornbos and Van Binsbergen risk throwing away the child with the bathwater here. Indeed, in chapter 5 in the same book, Van Binsbergen analyzes the emergence of Nkoya ethnic feeling as a form of false consciousness. Further on, in chapter 8 he discusses the Kazanga festival – there, he seems to accept the legitimacy of the Nkoya approach. This may be precisely what the discussion is about, because in a nutshell, it points to the problems associated with ethnicity:

- Ethnicity and 'ethnic cultures' are exploited by social entrepreneurs to gain social and economic advantage, thereby exaggerating some elements of what is there and suppressing others. To the extent that they are successful in this, it itself influences people's self-perceptions.
- Self-perceptions as such are misleading, to say the least. Everywhere in the world, people in adjacent villages will claim that they are very different from those on the other side of the hill. Even in a relatively homogeneous country like the Netherlands, people perceive cultural differences.[5] Yet seen from a further distance, they may in fact be part of the same cultural area. Most people lack either the perspective or the vocabulary or both to have a useful discussion of these issues. As Minkov(2013:48) points out, if it were different, "*there would be no need for marketing experts, consumer behavior analysts, political scientists, and personality and social psychologists."*
- Cultures evolve over time, at various speeds. Things do not stay the same. Yet that does not mean that over time, all people will be the same culturally. In that sense, an 'end of culture' is just as unlikely as the 'end of history' that Fukuyama proclaimed in 1992.
- But still, that does not mean that culture as a construct is useless, impossible to study or irrelevant. Even when people see their main identity in gender, religious or professional ways, they do so in cultural ways. The average European feminist is different from the average African or North American feminist and these differences can be explained by cultural differences.

What Doornbos and Van Binsbergen fail to see using their neo-Marxist or postmodern frameworks is what Vansina has seen: that cultural autonomy is key to agency and that where cultural autonomy is lost, agency is lost – a phenomenon that has occurred and continues to occur in Africa with particular intensity. It is precisely in re-establishing this cultural autonomy that Africans can seek to overcome some of the limitations placed on them. Long before Doornbos and Van Binsbergen, Ake (1993: 5) already remarked: *"Our treatment of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness reflects this tendency to*

[5] See for example https://mobiliteitsplein.inperson.nl/nieuws/cultuurverschillen-in-nederland.html (retrieved 23 November 2017).

problematize the people and their culture, an error that continues to push Africa deeper into confusion."

2.1.5 Culture and language

Cultural values are is in part expressed through **language**. Yet, there is no complete overlap between language and culture; one cannot automatically proxy for the other. Wierzbicka (1997) holds that it is possible to describe cultures through a study of key words and their meanings in different languages. Davis and Abdurazokzoda (2016) show that there are relationships between how languages are structured and cultural characteristics.

Clifford (1983):136/7) recalls the opinion of Bakhtin: *'A "culture" is, concretely, an open-ended, creative dialogue of subcultures, of insiders and outsiders, of diverse factions; a "language" is the interplay and struggle of regional dialects, professional jargons, generic commonplaces, the speech of different age groups, individuals, and so forth.'*

These are important theoretical insights that deserve further exploration, but are outside of the framework of this thesis.

The 'Tower of Babel' narrative is mirrored also in the different accounts that exist on the number of languages in Africa. It is good to realize that the taxonomy of African languages itself is a legacy of how others (initially mostly missionaries) have described Africa – it is not a product of African agency. Prah (1998) has challenged the portrayal by the Ethnologue[6] and others to depict Africa as an area of almost infinite linguistic diversity.

2.1.6 Conclusions

When I look at culture, then, I look at larger units or traditions, that may encompass speakers of several languages and any number of polities. I use cultural or ethnic groups interchangeably. My way of looking at culture is mainly through looking at value systems. I think the definitions of Geertz and Hofstede are related and are related as well to Vansina's way of looking at 'traditions'. I have contrasted this way of looking at culture to the more artefact-oriented approach of Storey and to the more negative approach of Appadurai. Culture may be tied to nationality or to language – but it need not be. With Vansina, I do not subscribe to the one polity-one language-one culture idea. I have taken issue with the approach that denies the importance of looking at ethnicity and culture. I have suggested that there are several ways in which culture can be studied. For this thesis, I will choose a cross-cultural approach. This will be explored further in chapter 4.

From a methodological point of view, a direct study of cultural areas is not very well possible because, as indicated above, the knowledge base does not exist. As outlined in chapter 5, for lack of a better alternative I will start by using existing ethnolinguistic group designations.

In the remainder of this chapter I will look at several areas where knowledge about cultural differences and similarities is used, to illustrate the importance of such knowledge and the importance of establishing an up-to-date knowledge base, as free as possible from the preconceived ideas of colonial times.

[6] https://www.ethnologue.com/

2.2 On ethnic fragmentation and how Africa is viewed in economic literature

In this section, I will discuss some examples of how information on ethnicity is used in economic literature on Africa.

An appropriate starting point is Easterly and Levine's 1997 study, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." William Easterly is a professor of economics at New York University; Ross Levine is professor at the business school of the University of California. According to Google scholar, this article was cited nearly 6,000 times since its original publication – one can safely say that it was successful and influential[7]. The abstract is clear about what the article sets out to do: *"In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, economic growth is associated with low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure. Africa's high ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of most of these characteristics."* (p 1203)

The authors explain how they measure ethnic fragmentation: *"To assess the hypothesis that ethnic divisions influence economic growth and public policies, we assemble a diverse set of measures of ethnic diversity. We focus most of our attention on a measure of ethnolinguistic diversity, ETHNIC, that measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to different ethnolinguistic groups. ETHNIC is derived from Soviet data collected in the early 1960s."* (p 1206). The Soviet data they refer to is in fact the data contained in the 1964 *Atlas Narodov Mira* (Atlas of Peoples of the World). The *Atlas* lists a total of 910 ethnic groups for the entire world, as of 1961. In most cases, ethnicity is determined on the basis of language. The *Atlas* was very much welcomed when it first appeared, because it was the first and most thorough publication of its kind. It continues to be used to this day, in part because the information has been digitized and put online by the GREG project of Harvard University[8]. However, the Atlas does not provide much information on its data sources and the criteria used to for deciding what is an ethnic group and what is not. It is certain that it is not the work of ethnographically trained spies sent by Khrushchev to map the world. Instead, it seems that the work is based on census and comparable data collected in the decades before publication. Therefore, it is based on secondary data that was produced in colonial times and is thus affected by the needs and preferences of missionaries and colonial administrators. On the other hand, the *Ethnologue* holds that there are over 2,000 African languages. Therefore, those who maintain that Africa has a very high number of ethnic groups would probably feel that the number of ethnic groups in the *Atlas* is understated.

A study that builds on this is the 2003 study by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg. These are all accomplished and respected economists, working at Harvard University, Stanford and the World Bank. The article was cited in 4635 times[9] – again, an influential contribution to international development economics. This article looks back at Easterly and Levine's study and mentions some of the problems of using *Atlas* data. The main issue that they point out is that for some countries (such as the USA), racial criteria should be used to complement linguistic criteria – for Sub-Saharan Africa, this is less relevant. They decide instead to base their data on 1055 linguistic groups listed in the 2001 *Encyclopedia Brittannica* (p159) and in the end use a list of 650 ethnic

[7] As an illustration: Jan Vansina's most-quoted work is on oral tradition – it was cited 2428 times according to Google Scholar on 16 May 2018.
[8] https://worldmap.harvard.edu/data/geonode:Naradov_Mira_GREG accessed 16 May 2018. For Africa, see https://worldmap.harvard.edu/maps/121
[9] As of 15 May 2018.

groups in 190 countries or dependencies (p 160). They point out that the country source data for the various measures of ethnic or linguistic diversity are very similar. Therefore, it is perhaps not so surprising that on economic growth, their data broadly confirms the findings of Easterly and Levine.

A recent study in the same tradition is from 2016, by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, influential economists linked to Brown University in the USA and the London Business School. In spite of being recent, this article has already been cited 200 times. They use a different data set, namely that of the Ethnolinguistic Map of G.P. Murdock of 1959. This map, however, is based on sources that must be similar to those of the *Atlas* and the *Encyclopedia*, namely on material brought together in colonial times, between 1860 and 1940 (p 1811). This map has also been digitized, by the same Harvard group[10]. They come to a longer list of African ethnicities: 825 in total. This number does include significant double-counting, though, because it includes all groups that are spread over more than one country – 266 in total.

Their findings are similar – if anything, the image from earlier studies is reinforced: the incidence, severity, and duration of political violence are all higher for partitioned homelands. These also experience frequent military interventions from neighbouring countries. Split groups are often entangled in a vicious circle of government-led discrimination and ethnic wars. Respondents from survey data identifying with split ethnicities are economically disadvantaged. (p 1802)

2.3 The literature on investment and cultural distance

Another use that has been made of ideas on culture and ethnicity, although not specifically on Africa, is the literature on cultural similarity and cultural distance. The idea here is that when considering investment decisions, company executives are more likely to invest in countries that are culturally more similar to their own. The reverse could also be true: that investments are most likely to succeed if the country invested in is culturally closer to the country of the investor.

An early example of this type of work is that of Zeitlin(1996), building on the work of Hofstede(1980). He performs cluster analysis on the variables used by Hofstede for constructing his original four dimensions and plots cultural distance. Thus, he claims to be able to predict the amount of culture shock that is likely to occur in contacts between two different cultures. A further step in this area was taken by Kogut and Singh(1998). They propose an algorithm for calculating the distance between any two cultures, again based on the Hofstede dimensions; this algorithm has been widely used by others. They find that cultural difference does influence the mode of investment by other countries in the US.

The work of Kogut and Singh led to much other work, having been cited more than 6000 times up to May 2018. To get a taste of this, it is interesting to zoom forward to the work of Drogendijk and Slangen(2006). They review some of the literature and the criticism that of course also was levelled at Kogut and Singh. They analyse investment decisions by Dutch multinational enterprises and find that indeed, there is a correlation between the type of investment decision and cultural difference as defined in the Hofstede model.

Beugelsdijk and Klasing (2016) propose a different approach, advocating not only the use of cultural distance between countries, but also the use of intra-country cultural variation. Obviously, a combination of the Beugelsdijk approach with the literature cited above on Africa would be

[10] https://worldmap.harvard.edu/africamap/

interesting: it suggests that foreign investment in parts of Africa might be low both because of cultural distance issues but also because of the large ethnic fragmentation levels that exist within these countries.

2.4 Intercultural management literature

It is well-known that people who travel from one cultural context to another are likely to perceive differences that hinder effective communication – this is what is commonly known as 'culture shock'. There is a widespread perception that some form of prior training or orientation can help to give individuals both the knowledge and the skills that can help them to make this process easier to handle. That is why even in a highly academically-oriented curriculum like that of the Research Master Africa Studies of Leiden University there is one module that tries to prepare students for fieldwork making use of vocabulary from the field of cross-cultural psychology.

There are few examples of this dealing specifically with Africa. In South Africa after Apartheid, there have been attempts to come to terms with the cultural diversity of the country; some of those are discussed in section 6.2.1.2. Rarick et al(2013) have tried to do this in respect of Uganda. Bobina and Grachev(2016) give an overview of differences and similarities in Southern Africa, making use of project GLOBE data. An African perspective is provided by Tabulawa(2013). He explains the inappropriateness of Western-imposed models of learner-centred pedagogy for a country like Botswana by looking at cultural differences. Gervedink Nijhuis et al(2012) use the Hofstede dimensions for discussing the difficulties of a joint curriculum development programme in Ghana. Vonk(2016), making use of the Hofstede dimensions, shows how knowledge of Ghanaian culture is relevant for organisational development interventions there. Finuras(2013) has related cultural values to confidence in institutions, comparing Lusophone Africa with Portugal.

2.5 Conclusions: why investigating culture is relevant

In chapter 1, I outlined my theoretical starting point. This is the theory of Vansina, which holds that Africa is unique because of the extent of the destruction of its indigenous cultural traditions. Vansina stresses the key importance of cultural autonomy for development. I pointed to the need to find a middle ground between the two contradictory narratives, one that sees 'Africa as a country', with basically one common culture, the other that sees Africa as a 'Tower of Babel', with a seemingly endless cultural variety. These ways of looking at culture in the African context ingore the issue of the destruction of cultural autonomy and the need for building new African traditions, as called for by Vansina.

In this chapter, I have tried to unpack the term 'culture' and related terms, such as ethnicity. I look at larger cultural units, described in terms of value systems that serve as common point of reference for a people. The main lens I use for studying cultures is a cross-cultural one.

In sections 2.2 and 2.3, I have demonstrated how influential bodies of economic and management literature rely heavily on knowledge that was produced in the colonial era for their descriptions of culture and their assessment of the effects of cultural fragmentation and cultural distance on Africa. These studies do point out the comparative advantage cultural unity can have.

Section 2.4 examined the intercultural management literature and has shown how knowledge of cultural differences is important for all kinds of situations of intercultural contact.

How, then, to describe cultural differences and similarities in practical terms? How can one base research on the current self-perceptions of Africans themselves? What are the questions to ask and the methods to follow? To that, I can only give exploratory answers – starting with a description of my main research question, in the next chapter.

3. RESEARCH QUESTION

My theoretical starting point is the prediction of Vansina that new African traditions will start to emerge, carried by African languages. But I do not know how such new traditions will begin to manifest themselves. Will it be through a cultural unity that is based on communities that share linguistic similarities? Will it be through the emergence of national cultures, diverging from those of their neighbours? Can both processes occur, or will there be other processes at work? How will they be contested? For the time being, I do not know how to search for that.

However, my methodological starting point is that it is necessary to look at recent self-perceptions of Africans and that cross-cultural psychology may offer a way there, one that is not weighed down by knowledge built up in the colonial period. This is what I will set out to do, without making any assumptions about what the results will be in terms of the development of new African cultural traditions as predicted by Vansina.

My view, as outlined in chapter two, is that cultures can be described in terms of value systems that serve as common points of reference to a people. But if this is true, how to go about arriving at such descriptions?

Smelser (1992:20) holds that a positivistic, objective description of cultural traits is an illusion, as it is always also determined by the viewpoint of the observer of that culture. He also points to the eternal vagueness of the concept. However, he does not go so far as to say that culture cannot or should not be studied at all. Rather, he sees culture as a 'heuristic device' in scientific investigation (p. 23). However, he does feel that 'certain rules for the empirical description of culture' can be developed. Parts of a culture should, he suggests, be disaggregated and treated as variables, rather than as global attributes of a society or group. Hofstede (2001:2) would in fact seem to agree with this approach, in the sense that he also holds that cultures are indeed constructs, that do not 'exist' in an absolute sense.

In cross-cultural psychology, the main approach to describing cultures and cultural similarities and differences is via the use of value surveys. For the African situation, there are two such surveys that are relevant. One, smaller in Africa but more explicitly oriented towards values, is the World Values Survey[1]. Started in 1981, it now covers 80 countries on all continents, using a common questionnaire and using nationally representative samples. The other survey, which covers a larger number of African countries but is not specifically focused on values, is the Afrobarometer survey[2]. This survey, started in 2000, also works with nationally representative samples and extends to over 30 African countries. Its motto is: "Let the people have a say."

Both surveys allow for disaggregation of the data in various ways, one of them by ethnic and linguistic groups. Even though, as I have argued, the ethnolinguistic distinctions in Africa are heavily influenced by the colonial period, this type of disaggregation can serve as a starting point from which to analyse the emergence or existence of distinct cultural areas in different parts of Africa. These surveys, then, although of course limited by their focus and the questions they ask, serve as a basis for analysing current self-perceptions of Africans in many parts of the continent. Even though for some countries analyses have been implemented at the ethnolinguistic level in addition to the national level, the body of knowledge on this for Africa is still very limited.

[1] http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
[2] http://www.afrobarometer.org

Since every method has its in-built bias and indeed every researcher brings a risk of bias, it is important, where possible, to try some form of triangulation, preferably by using dissimilar methods[3]. Such triangulation may or may not prove to be productive – in that sense as well, this research is exploratory.

Therefore, I have tried for this thesis to use a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches, leading to the following research questions:

- How do ethnolinguistic groups self-report on their cultural values via the World Values and Afrobarometer surveys? What are the main commonalities and differences between such groups and between groups and the national level?
- How do people self-assess similarities and differences in values in their country via focus group discussions?
- How do the results from the above compare with insights obtained from ethnographic studies and from interviews with key experts in the field?

I realize that there are limitations. These limitations are related to the intellectual, financial and temporal resources available to me as a budding researcher, to the surveys used, the disaggregation allowed by the survey material and the coverage of the surveys themselves. Therefore, the research done for this thesis should be seen as an exploratory 'proof of concept' – more and better research would be needed in order to get a more precise, finely-grained and more complete picture. Yet, I intend to prove my point: this type of research can shed new light on cultural similarities and differences in Africa, is useful for policy development and implementation and brings to light patterns that were not visible so clearly before and that are relevant for building the new Africa that so many in and outside of the continent are devoting their energies to.

[3] One way of describing this is as a combination of -emic and -etic approaches. The terminology is originally from linguistics – see Peterson and Pike(2002) for a good introduction.

4. A CLOSER LOOK AT CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

So far, I have outlined my theoretical and methodological starting points, I have outlined my view of culture and related concepts and formulated my research questions based on that. My approach is based on cross-cultural psychology. However, that is a field within which there are different approaches and which has also been criticized as such. Therefore, I will examine some of those approaches and criticisms in this chapter, before coming to a statement of my position.

The first part of this chapter contains a brief overview of the three most important approaches used in cross-cultural psychology: that of Hofstede/Minkov, of Schwartz and of Inglehart and Welzel. There are other approaches as well – a full overview is provided in Minkov(2013). I will also pay some attention to the exploratory work of Noorderhaven and Tidjani(2001), due to its focus on Africa.

The second half of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the immanent and transcendent criticisms that have been made of cross-cultural psychology and its various approaches. At the end, I will clarify my own position.

Common to the cross-cultural approach is the use of various methods of data reduction. Thus, it does not lead to full descriptions of cultures; those have to be obtained through other methods. But this approach does help us understand and predict what may happen in certain situations, as outlined for example in section 2.4. In that sense, as pointed out by Minkov(2013:5), it can be a major cognitive tool that helps to understand the complex world around us.

4.1 Cultural dimensions: three main approaches

4.1.1 Hofstede/Minkov

The original Hofstede dimensions are based on surveys collected by Hofstede in the 1970s. He originally suggested four dimensions that could describe differences and similarities between cultures. They are[1]:

"**Individualism** (IDV) is the extent to which people feel independent, as opposed to being interdependent as members of larger wholes.
Individualism does not mean egoism. It means that individual choices and decisions are expected. Collectivism does not mean closeness. It means that one "knows one's place" in life, which is determined socially. With a metaphor from physics, people in an individualistic society are more like atoms flying around in a gas while those in collectivist societies are more like atoms fixed in a crystal.
Power Distance (PDI) is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.
This dimension is thought to date from the advent of agriculture, and with it, of large-scale societies. Until that time, a person would know their group members and leaders personally. This is not possible where tens of thousands and more have to coordinate their lives. Without acceptance of leadership by powerful entities, none of today's societies could run.
Masculinity (MAS) is the extent to which the use of force is endorsed socially.
In a masculine society, men are supposed to be tough. Men are supposed to be from Mars, women from Venus. Winning is important for both genders. Quantity is important and big is beautiful. In a feminine society, the genders are emotionally closer. Competing is not so openly endorsed, and there is sympathy for the underdog.

[1] Descriptions taken from http://www.geerthofstede.com, accessed 9 May 2017.

This is NOT about individuals, but about expected emotional gender roles. Masculine societies are much more openly gendered than feminine societies.
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. Uncertainty avoidance has nothing to do with risk avoidance, nor with following rules. It has to do with anxiety and distrust in the face of the unknown, and conversely, with a wish to have fixed habits and rituals, and to know the truth."

Hofstede realized that his findings might be constrained by the questions asked in his surveys. In his later work, he pointed to the Chinese Values Survey, which asked different questions. They led to a fifth dimension, the dimension of **Long- versus Short-Term Orientation** (LTO) (Hofstede 2001:351). Later, Michael Minkov, using data from the World Values Survey (WVS), found a dimension that he called *'monumentalism versus flexhumility'* and that was related to LTO. Hofstede and Minkov decided to join forces and came to new LTO scores, using WVS data (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov 2010:253).

Minkov et al(2017b), using data from a new study undertaken with commercial funding, proposed a new conceptualisation that reflects national differences in high versus low self-regard and self-confidence, being always the same person versus being flexible and adaptable, and liking to help people versus being reluctant to do that. The Short-Term or 'Monumentalist' pole here stands for high self-confidence, being always the same person and being helpful. I have taken this conceptualisation as being the most recent. The name is, in my view, far from clear. Mediacom, the company funding the study, called it 'Fix or Flex'. For the purpose of this thesis, I will continue to use LTO.

In his analysis of WVS data, Minkov also found indications of a sixth dimension, **Indulgence versus Restraint** (IVR). "Indulgence is about the good things in life. In an indulgent culture it is good to be free. Doing what your impulses want you to do, is good. Friends are important and life makes sense. In a restrained culture, the feeling is that life is hard, and duty, not freedom, is the normal state of being."[1]

4.1.2 Schwartz

Where Hofstede's dimensions were first found in the data and then related to theoretical work by others, Schwartz has taken the opposite approach: he starts with a theoretically ordered model of human values, and then finds confirmation in survey data (Schwartz, 2006).

Schwarz has defined ten values which, in this theory, are universal but ordered differently in different societies[2]:

"Self-Direction
Defining goal: independent thought and action--choosing, creating, exploring. Self-direction derives from organismic needs for control and mastery and interactional requirements of autonomy and independence.
Stimulation
Defining goal: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. Stimulation values derive from the organismic need for variety and stimulation in order to maintain an optimal, positive, rather than threatening, level of activation. This need probably relates to the needs underlying self-direction values.

[2] Taken from Schwartz (2012).

Hedonism

Defining goal: pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself. Hedonism values derive from organismic needs and the pleasure associated with satisfying them. Theorists from many disciplines (e.g., Freud, 1933; Williams, 1968) mention hedonism.

Achievement

Defining goal: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards. Competent performance that generates resources is necessary for individuals to survive and for groups and institutions to reach their objectives. As defined here, achievement values emphasize demonstrating competence in terms of prevailing cultural standards, thereby obtaining social approval.

Power

Defining goal: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. The functioning of social institutions apparently requires some degree of status differentiation (Parsons, 1951). A dominance/submission dimension emerges in most empirical analyses of interpersonal relations both within and across cultures. To justify this fact of social life and to motivate group members to accept it, must treat power as a value. Power values may also be transformations of individual needs for dominance and control. Value analysts have mentioned power values as well.

Both power and achievement values focus on social esteem. However, achievement values (e.g., ambitious) emphasize the active demonstration of successful performance in concrete interaction, whereas power values (e.g., authority, wealth) emphasize the attainment or preservation of a dominant position within the more general social system.

Security

Defining goal: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self. Security values derive from basic individual and group requirements. Some security values serve primarily individual interests (e.g., clean), others wider group interests (e.g., national security). Even the latter, however, express, to a significant degree, the goal of security for self or those with whom one identifies.

Conformity

Defining goal: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms. Conformity values derive from the requirement that individuals inhibit inclinations that might disrupt and undermine smooth interaction and group functioning. As I define them, conformity values emphasize self-restraint in everyday interaction, usually with close others.

Tradition

Defining goal: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion provides. Groups everywhere develop practices, symbols, ideas, and beliefs that represent their shared experience and fate. These become sanctioned as valued group customs and traditions. They symbolize the group's solidarity, express its unique worth, and contribute to its survival. They often take the form of religious rites, beliefs, and norms of behavior.

Tradition and conformity values are especially close motivationally; they share the goal of subordinating the self to socially imposed expectations. They differ primarily in the objects to which one subordinates the self. Conformity entails subordination to persons with whom one frequently interacts—parents, teachers, and bosses. Tradition entails subordination to more abstract objects—religious and cultural customs and ideas. As a corollary, conformity values exhort responsiveness to current, possibly changing expectations. Tradition values demand responsiveness to immutable expectations from the past.

Benevolence

Defining goal: preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the ‘in-group’). Benevolence values derive from the basic requirement for smooth group

functioning and from the organismic need for affiliation. Most critical are relations within the family and other primary groups. Benevolence values emphasize voluntary concern for others' welfare.
Benevolence and conformity values both promote cooperative and supportive social relations. However, benevolence values provide an internalized motivational base for such behavior. In contrast, conformity values promote cooperation in order to avoid negative outcomes for self. Both values may motivate the same helpful act, separately or together.

Universalism

Defining goal: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of *all* people and for nature. This contrasts with the in-group focus of benevolence values. Universalism values derive from survival needs of individuals and groups. But people do not recognize these needs until they encounter others beyond the extended primary group and until they become aware of the scarcity of natural resources. People may then realize that failure to accept others who are different and treat them justly will lead to life-threatening strife. They may also realize that failure to protect the natural environment will lead to the destruction of the resources on which life depends. Universalism combines two subtypes of concern—for the welfare of those in the larger society and world and for nature."

Schwartz(2012:9) orders these values along two opposing dimensions: self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus conservation.

4.1.3 Inglehart and Welzel

Analysis of WVS data made by political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel asserts that there are two major dimensions of cross cultural variation in the world[3]:

"1. Traditional values versus Secular-rational values and

2. Survival values versus Self-expression values.

Traditional values emphasize the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and traditional family values. People who embrace these values also reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide. These societies have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook.
Secular-rational values have the opposite preferences to the traditional values. These societies place less emphasis on religion, traditional family values and authority. Divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide are seen as relatively acceptable. (Suicide is not necessarily more common.)

[3] Taken from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org, accessed 9 May 2017.

Survival values place emphasis on economic and physical security. It is linked with a relatively ethnocentric outlook and low levels of trust and tolerance.
Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, growing tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life."

The WVS leads to a map of societies along these dimensions. The map below is based on the last round of the survey (Wave 6):



4.1.4 Noorderhaven and Tidjani

Noorderhaven and Tidjani (2001) have explored the possibility that just like the Chinese Value Survey found additional dimensions, the same might be true for Africa, if one were to use questions developed by African researchers. They found dimensions such as belief in human goodness and importance of traditional wisdom. One dimension they felt might be very important was what they called '*jealousy*', which gave different scores for West and Eastern/Southern African countries (p46). Unfortunately, their exploratory research was not followed up – it would be interesting if this would be done some day.

4.1.5 Connections between the different approaches

If one surveys what the proponents of the different approaches write about one another, one comes across numerous references where authors point how what others measure is really part of or closely related to what they measure. Hofstede (2001:221) points out that three of the Schwartz dimensions (which he calls categories) are related both with one another and with IDV. He also feels

that Inglehart's survival versus self-expression values has elements of several of his dimensions (2001:223). In a way, this is logical, as also explained in the next section. These dimensions are constructs that help describe and understand certain aspects of cultures and it is logical that they would be partially overlapping and contain similarities.

4.2 Criticisms of the cultural dimensions approach

Geert Hofstede is a much-cited and prolific author. It is no wonder that the Hofstede model and competing models of describing and comparing cultures using a number of dimensions have been criticized in various ways. There is a rich literature on this, impossible to treat completely within the framework of this thesis. A broad distinction can be made between immanent criticisms (basically saying that what was done could be done better if handled differently) and transcendent criticisms (basically saying that what was done should not be done at all). I will mention a number of the most salient criticisms of either type and in doing so try to state my own position.

4.2.1 Immanent criticisms

McSweeney (2002) feels that for most countries, the size of the samples used by Hofstede are too small and cannot be seen as representative of the countries as a whole. This is compounded by the problem that initial respondents were all employees of a specific multinational corporation – IBM. Furthermore, the differences found are attributed by Hofstede to differences between national cultures, not to differences in organisational culture within IBM. Hofstede(2002) defends his choices; according to him, organisational culture is related more to practices, whereas national culture looks at the level of values. McSweeney feels this distinction cannot be clearly made. Hofstede also points out that samples can be small, as long as they are well matched and cover many countries. His results do not describe cultures as such, but they do describe relevant differences and similarities.

McSweeney also points out that only certain questions were asked. To derive a description of culture from such a limited set of questions is of necessity incomplete. This is also a main argument of Schwartz (1992) against Hofstede's method: he feels that it is necessary first to develop a theory that covers the full spectrum of human values, before trying to categorize national cultures. Hofstede (2001) does not deny that additional dimensions could exist – however, he feels candidates should be backed up by empirical evidence.

Hofstede claims that replications have largely confirmed his findings; but McSweeney points out that there have also been replication studies that did not (fully) replicate his findings. He points to the problem that the same question may have a different meaning in different countries.

A further problem that McSweeney points to is the issue that the original questionnaires were distributed in workplace situations; the assumption that the differences found there apply equally in other situations is, in his view, unfounded.

Smith (2002) and others have argued that cultures and cultural values change constantly and that therefore, descriptions based on research done decades ago have little value today. Hofstede (2002) responds to this by saying that value orientations are formed early in life in most people, are transmitted by parents to their children and that therefore, although they change, the pace of change is relatively slow. Beugelsdijk et al (2015) have shown that although values change, the differences between cultures do not, or less so.

Dahl (2014) feels that Hofstede uses a descriptive and essentialist approach to culture. He sees value in this for describing cultural differences, but feels that it ought to be complemented by what he feels should be a 'dynamic constructivist' approach.

Minkov (2018) has proposed a major revision of the Hofstede model; in his analysis, PDI forms part of the IDV dimension. He proposes to only keep IDV and his *Monumentalism versus flexhumility* as meaningful dimensions.

4.2.2 Transcendent criticisms

A first type of criticism is the point of view that culture, let alone national culture, is not a useful concept at all. Saint-Jacques (2012:48) posits: *"A nation or an ethnic group cannot be considered as a single unit."* Anderson (1991) feels nations are 'imagined communities'. Wallerstein (1990) is 'skeptical that we can operationalise the concept of culture . . . in any way that enables us to use it for statements that are more than trivial' (p 34) (both cited in McSweeney, 2002). McSweeney points out that it is only useful to talk about national culture if it actually explains or predicts something, such as educational achievement or levels of corruption. However, he feels that in most if not all cases, non-cultural (e.g. economic or political) elements may have a greater explanatory power (p 109). Even where cultural factors do play a role, these may be determined by subcultures within nations, rather than by a national culture as such. Hofstede (2002) does not deny this, but maintains that national culture is a legitimate unit of study as well, and often the only one available for comparison.

McSweeney further argues that any questionnaire distributed internationally will produce differences in response patterns. However, it is wrong to assume that these differences point to the existence of different national cultures. This cannot be established through questionnaires alone. Therefore, the fact itself that differences are found does not justify the conclusion that those differences are due to differences in national culture. Hofstede (2001) concedes this point to the extent that questionnaires should not be the only way of measuring cultural differences – however, he maintains that they do yield reliable approximations if matched samples are used.

McSweeney also points out that it might be quite acceptable in societies that individuals switch between different value systems, a point which Hofstede would miss. Even if uniform national cultures would exist – which McSweeney doubts – it is wrong to assume that these cultures could be measured and recorded via narrow sets of questions or that Hofstede has in fact managed such a feat. Smith (2002) makes a slightly different but related point. He suggests that measuring national means might be useful where cultures are relatively homogeneous, but that it might say little in countries or cultures where the differences within a population are very large.

Jackson (2011) criticizes Hofstede's theory for not providing an indication for what action should be taken and for its inability to deal with multi-layered multicultural contexts. He feels that in studying cultures, it is all too easy to overlook power relationships and to ignore interactions between different levels. He therefore calls for an analysis that looks at cultural interfaces at organizational and individual levels, rather than at cultures as distinct entities. Following Flyvbjerg, he criticizes positivist social science in general and calls for a more action-oriented, context-specific type of social science. He calls attention to the need to look at what happens at cross-cultural interfaces and feels this is particularly relevant for Africa. He feels that answers from Hofstede-type questionnaires fail to make sense in such situations. However, Jackson's alternative has not proven itself yet. My position is that even in multicultural contexts (and perhaps especially in such contexts), an instrument that provides a way of describing and discussing the different cultures at play is an important starting point.

Fougère and Moulettes (2007) dig deeper, using a postcolonial perspective. They contend that *"Hofstede discursively constructs a world characterised by a division between a 'developed and modern' side (mostly 'Anglo-Germanic' countries) and a 'traditional and backward' side (the rest)"* (p1). Illustrative of their critique is the title of one of the sections in their paper: "Power Distance: Being modern is being equal" (p 8). Through their critique, they hope *"to open up for an alternative knowledge production that includes rather than excludes and banalises rather than exoticises the other."* (p 16) This critique is relevant: in fact, it holds true for all approaches that aim to map or categorize value patterns across nations. There is no value-free or culturally neutral way of doing these types of comparisons. The best one can hope for is to be open to criticisms and open about one's own background. However, the same is true for almost any other type of work in this area, including qualitative work. Spivak (cited in McLeod, 2010: 222) has come up with the notion of 'strategic essentialism'. As long as the type of knowledge production Fougère and Moulettes call for has not yet gained pride of place, then some strategic – or in Smelser's term, heuristic way of dealing with cultures and their values can still be productive.

Inglehart and Welzel(2005) hold that the WVS shows that all cultures evolve and converge towards greater self-expression and more secular-rational values. Tausch (2015) has re-analysed the WVS data and other data as well and criticizes Inglehart and Welzel as well as Hofstede for their assumptions that the value of religion and spirituality is declining. Tausch confirms a number (but not all) of the Hofstede dimensions and suggests a number of additional dimensions, such as economic permissiveness.

4.3 Conclusions; my position

In the above, I have already given pointers to my position. I think the criticism that 'culture' as a concept is unusable, though understandable from the point of view of its conceptual diffuseness, is not good social science. People feel and experience culture and cultural differences and because they do, it is a legitimate topic of investigation. Even if we maintain that people can switch between different cultural identities in our globalizing world, that does not mean that those individual identities or cultural patterns disappear. With Smelser and Hofstede, I think cultures can and should be studied as constructs that say something about social reality. Unfortunately, this can never be done in a vacuum – the postcolonial critique of one-sided, 'Anglo-Germanic' discourses should be taken into account. I think, though, that this criticism is more valid for the WVS and for Schwartz than for Hofstede – although his approach is not immune to it either.

The critique that it may be wrong to assume the existence of a 'national' culture especially in multicultural and multi-ethnic countries should also be taken seriously, especially for Africa. It could be that in some countries, something akin to a distinct national culture has in fact emerged. In others, this may not have happened at all, or to a much lesser extent. This makes my research all the more relevant.

Of the three approaches outlined above, my preference is the oldest of these methods, the Hofstede/Minkov approach. This is because it is the only approach that arose from serendipity: the Hofstede dimensions of culture were distilled out of a data set that was not set up with the express purpose of finding such dimensions. In that sense, it is the most bottom-up of existing approaches. It is also in principle open to new contributions: Hofstede has taken on board the contributions from the Chinese Values Survey and from Michael Minkov and is open to further developments in and amendments to his theory, which is grounded in an empirical approach.

The Schwartz approach is a theory-first approach. This has an inherent drawback, in that it is closed to representations of reality that might not fit within the theory. The Inglehart/Welzel approach, in my view, suffers from a heavy ideological bias that sees Northwestern Europe as the apex of civilisation. This is visible most clearly in Welzel(2013). In his view, human emancipation is what everybody wants – and what is most advanced in Europe, but spreading from there to the rest of the world.

Both Minkov(2018) and Inglehart and Welzel seem to favour reducing the data to two dimensions. For the time being, I do not want to go along with this idea. I think it may not offer sufficient differentiation between cultures and therefore lead to over-simplification and to a tunnel vision that tries to squeeze everything into its approach. A two-dimensional approach also does not take account of the experience of cross-cultural management, which makes good use of more dimensions. I do not believe that cross-cultural studies have reached their apex in the work of Hofstede and Minkov. It is very well possible that future research may show up different, additional or fewer dimensions. For the time being, though, I think it is the best we have.

5. METHOD

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4, I have taken a closer look at the cultural dimensions approach that has been pioneered by Hofstede and developed further in cross-cultural psychology. I have examined the criticisms made of this approach and defended my choice for using the cultural dimensions as developed by Hofstede and Minkov.

This chapter covers the two types of analysis I have carried out: a quantitative analysis and a qualitative analysis.

For the **quantitative** analysis, I have compared published country scores on the Hofstede/Minkov dimensions with other data from existing surveys. Based on this, I have been able to calculate Hofstede/Minkov dimension scores for a large number of African countries and ethnolinguistic groups that have not yet been covered by the literature on cultural dimensions. Even though the method described in this chapter is unique, it uses the basic techniques and indicators of reliability that have been outlined in Minkov's 2013 handbook on cross-cultural analysis.

The idea behind my re-analysis of survey data is that cultural dimensions can 'shine through' in many different surveys (as suggested in Hofstede 2001:465); my assumption here is that average answers to any set of questions are different in different cultures. Therefore, it may be possible to find indications of the Hofstede/Minkov cultural dimensions (or indeed other dimensions) even in surveys that were not developed with the previous intention of measuring or finding such dimensions.

For the **qualitative** analysis, I have held eleven focus group discussions in four countries (Ghana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland). In addition, I have interviewed a number of cultural experts and have carried out a limited literature review that provides a historical and cultural context to the quantitative findings and the findings from the focus groups.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 gives an overview of the surveys I have used and briefly recaps my motivation for choosing ethnolinguistic groups as the unit of study, building on the argument developed in chapter 2. Section 5.3 looks at the World Values Survey data at the national level, section 5.4 at the ethnolinguistic group level. Section 5.5 then continues with a major extension of the data that was made possible by relating the WVS data to the data from the Afrobarometer survey. In section 5.6 I discuss the method chosen for the qualitative research that I have undertaken in Ghana and Southern Africa to try to triangulate the quantitative research. Finally, section 5.7 presents some methodological conclusions. Two technical appendices give more data on the quantitative and qualitative analyses.

5.2 Why and how to use surveys and why look at ethnolinguistic groups?

As outlined in chapter 4, the cultural dimensions approach as based on the pioneering work of Hofstede starts with asking the same value-related questions to matching samples of individuals from a large number of different countries. Such surveys are difficult to organize and implement, and therefore there have not been many of them. Therefore, an alternative approach, pioneered among others by Minkov, has been to re-analyze existing surveys.

The most important of these existing surveys is no doubt the World Values Survey[1], which was started in 1981. According to the WVS website, it *"consists of nationally representative surveys conducted in almost 100 countries which contain almost 90 percent of the world's population, using a common questionnaire. The WVS is the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever executed, currently including interviews with almost 400,000 respondents. Moreover the WVS is the only academic study covering the full range of global variations, from very poor to very rich countries, in all of the world's major cultural zones."* The WVS is organized into waves, one approximately every five years: the first one, implemented from 1981 to 1984, covered only ten countries. Currently (2018), the 7th wave is being implemented. It is expected to last until the end of 2019 and to cover up to 80 countries. The data in this thesis is taken from the 6th wave, which was implemented from 2010 to 2014 and for some countries from the 5th wave, implemented from 2005 to 2009.

Another potential source of relevant survey material is the series of 'Barometer' surveys that are being implemented around the world. These surveys have all been inspired by the Eurobarometer survey, which was established by the European Commission in 1974[2]. Barometer surveys now also take place in the Arab region, in Asia and in Latin America. In Africa, there is the Afrobarometer survey[3], which was started in 2000. Round six has provided the data for this thesis. It ran in 2014 and 2015. It is important to note that although these surveys inspire one another, they are run as independent projects. Therefore, the overlap in questions between them is limited.

Typically, a key way in which these surveys have been used in cross-cultural psychology is that question responses from different countries have been compared using some form of factor analysis (Hofstede 2001:31; Minkov 2013:149). The outcomes of the factor analysis are then compared to other analyses to conclude that these factors either correlate strongly with measurements obtained in other ways or that they do not. In the latter case, new cultural dimensions are sometimes proposed. It is in fact through such a factor analysis of the World Values Survey and the Chinese Culture Connection that Minkov and Hofstede identified the two dimensions that were added to Hofstede's original four; these are Long-Term Orientation (LTO) and Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR) (Hofstede, 2001:464 and Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010:280).

Another way in which these surveys have been used is by showing correlations between one or more cultural dimensions and differences in responses to certain questions between countries (see De Mooij and Hofstede, 2011 for an overview using the Eurobarometer survey).

In this study, I use the surveys in yet another, related way, one which I have not come across in the literature[4]. It uses four steps:

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[1] http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org

[2] http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Archive/index accessed 19 April 2018

[3] http://www.afrobarometer.org

[4] For a related approach, see Kaasa, Vadi and Varblane(2014), who have been able to use European surveys both to get new data on Hofstede dimensions for a number of European countries and to get data on regions within countries. Their method, however, is different from mine. Beugelsdijk, Maseland and Van Hoorn (2015) have managed to replicate the IDV, PDI, UAI and IVR dimensions in earlier waves of WVS data using statistical techniques; however, their correlations vary between 0.67 and 0.77 for all but the IVR dimension, all lower than the correlations I am able find with my method. For IVR, almost the same data set was used as the set that was used for the original calculations and they find a not-surprising correlation of 0.92, compared with my correlation of 0.88 with Minkov's latest figures, that are based on a different data set.

1) replicating the Hofstede/Minkov dimensions in the WVS data for overlapping countries ('anchoring', as described by Hofstede (2001:464)[5];
2) using this replication for calculating scores for countries and ethnolinguistic groups for which no Hofstede/Minkov dimension data are available yet;
3) replicating this information in the Afrobarometer data for overlapping countries and groups; and lastly,
4) using this replication for calculating scores for new countries and ethnolinguistic groups.

The next sections detail this process.

Using this approach has advantages and disadvantages; a fuller discussion is provided in section 5.7. A major advantage of my approach is that it is based on recent self-representations of modern-day Africans and does not rely in that sense on mediation by others. This is possible by using a method from cross-cultural psychology that has proven its worth and has been widely used all over the world. Thus, it squarely situates African cultures within the spectrum of cultural diversity worldwide.

As outlined in chapter 4, I have chosen to concentrate on the six dimensions of culture as described in Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) and in Minkov et al (2017a, 2017b). Hofstede himself has developed a number of survey questions that are most clearly related to these six dimensions. Together, these questions form his Values Survey Module (VSM)[6]. Some of the VSM questions are directly related to questions from the World Values Survey (WVS) that was described in chapter 4.1; others questions are not so directly related.

One of the disadvantages of my approach is tied to the limitations of ethnolinguistic group designations that are evident from an examination of survey data. Thus, the Afrobarometer survey mentions a large number of different ethnolinguistic groups in a country like Lesotho but treats large groups like the Akan or the Yoruba that are known for having important subdivisions as one. My suspicion is that in most cases, the Afrobarometer and WVS designations overstate the number of ethnolinguistic groups. Still, this is better than understating it, because aggregation of data is always a possibility. An example of this is given in Hofstede et al (2010b). They analysed cultural dimensions at the state level in Brazil. What they then found is that for Brazil, it was possible to identify five larger subcultures, each made up of a number of different states.

For Africa, a disaggregated approach was also chosen by Minkov and Hofstede (2012). They took WVS wave 5 data and looked at 299 in-country regions (as defined in the WVS) from 28 countries in different continents, including 64 regions from seven sub-Saharan African countries. They used data from three groups of questions, on 'personal values', 'values for children' and 10 questions borrowed by the WVS from the cultural values approach of Schwartz. Cluster analysis was performed on the data and the distances between the data from the various regions were computed. What they found is that for most countries, including for most of the African countries, regions clustered together at the national level. Their conclusion, based on this research, was that national culture is a meaningful concept, even in countries with ethnolinguistically mixed populations.

From a conceptual point of view, I think the approach taken here by Minkov and Hofstede is valuable, but not entirely convincing. My main doubt is about the validity of taking in-country regions as their basic unit of study. These regions have of course been designated in historical and political

[5] Compared to Hofstede/Minkov, I have reversed the scores for IDV and LTO; this makes for better scale alignment (i.e. extreme scores all oriented towards the same end of the scale) – see p90 for more information.
[6] http://geerthofstede.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/VSM-2013-English-2013-08-25.pdf Note that there have been several editions of the VSM.

processes in ways that are very different from country to country and may or may not be in some way related to ethnolinguistic differences. Thus, Minkov and Hofstede use 12 regions for a small and homogeneous country like Rwanda, but 4 regions for a large and diverse country like Ethiopia. If regions are formed in such a way as to split up, rather than unite ethnic groups, it should come as no surprise that the regional averages are not very different from the national averages. If country A has two ethnic groups that are spread equally over two regions, then the score for each region will be the same as the national score, no matter how different the two ethnic groups may be in reality. In some countries, this way of forming regions may have been employed, in others not. This obviously has the potential of hiding real within-country cultural differences from sight.

In addition, Minkov and Hofstede do not provide any information on whether or not they have checked that the regional samples are as representative as the national samples are. My own analysis has shown that representativity at the sub-national level cannot be assumed in WVS data. It is unclear how this has affected their data, but it is certain that it must have.

Yet even with the limitations that the Minkov/Hofstede setup entails, they find that three out of the 13 regions from Burkina Faso and three out of the 9 regions from Zambia do not cluster neatly with the other regions from those countries. This therefore begs the question – what picture would emerge from a study looking at the ethnolinguistic level? This is what I have attempted to do in this research project.

5.3 First step: WVS data analysis – national level

Two of the Hofstede/Minkov dimensions (IVR and LTO) were derived by Minkov from the World Values Survey (WVS), so one would expect a close conceptual overlap between the VSM and some of the WVS questions. However, in order to do identify these dimensions, Minkov used combined data from the first four waves of the survey, collected between 1981 and 2004.

In order to get the largest possible overlap between the published Hofstede/Minkov scores and the WVS scores, I have used data from WVS wave 6 (2010-2014) or, for countries not included in wave 6, data from wave 5 (2005-2009). This yields between 31 and 47 overlapping countries. Finding a correspondence between the published scores and the WVS wave 6 or wave 5 data is not automatic, because not all questions were asked in all WVS waves or in all countries. Furthermore, it could be that the results from a single wave show erratic responses that are not visible when combining results from different waves.

The aim was not to find a perfect match between the Hofstede/Minkov scores and scores derived from the WVS data – the aim was, rather, to find as good a correlation as possible. To my knowledge, there is no ready-made statistical procedure that can answer these questions instantly. Therefore, a number of successive trials were needed to achieve the best correlation. The common method employed for all dimensions is as follows:

- First, the most relevant WVS questions were identified. These are the questions that at face value are conceptually related to the questions in Hofstede's Value Survey Module and to the questions asked in the Minkov et al study. The national mean score for each question was computed for every overlapping country. Then, correlations between these national means and the Hofstede/Minkov scores were computed.

- Those questions that showed the best correlations were then taken as the basis for further processing. In line with the procedure outlined by Hofstede for his Value Survey Module[7], the scores were weighed in an iterative process that involved two basic steps, described in the technical appendix (8.1). This led to improved correlation levels of above .8, with p generally <0.001. High correlations are important in order to enable a meaningful replication and extension of the data in the next phase, the Afrobarometer extension. The last step at this stage was to convert the scores based on mean scores into a scale compatible with the Hofstede scale range of between zero and 100.

- For every dimension, this led to a list of WVS questions to be included in the calculation, the weights and a way of converting the raw scores into scores compatible with the Hofstede range.

After establishing correlations between the Hofstede/Minkov scores and WVS data for IVR and LTO, a further question was whether it would be possible to find any of the other four dimensions, using the same method. A fuller explanation is given in the quantitative technical annex to this chapter.

5.3.1 Long-Term Orientation (LTO)

For LTO, I used the most recent conceptualisation by Minkov et al (2017b), i.e. their related concept of 'monumentalism versus flexibility'; monumentalism corresponds to a short-term orientation. Minkov constructs the LTO scores based on seven questions:

'Monumentalist' side	'Flexible' side
I would feel bad if I had to pretend	I can pretend without feeling bad
I have strong values guiding my behavior	My behavior depends on the situation
I like to help	I rarely agree to help
I have unique good qualities	I am an ordinary person
I like to compete	I hate to compete
Good things come from my actions	Good things are luck
I am always the same person	I am different at home and outside

Minkov et al have published factor scores, which range from 234 to -187.

There are 31 WVS countries for which Minkov has published a score, three of them from Africa: Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria has been excluded from the correlation calculation, because of problems in the Nigerian data that are discussed in the technical appendix. For South Africa, the Minkov scores are for the majority black population.

[7] https://geerthofstede.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Manual-VSM-2013.pdf The formula for PDI in the VSM (p7) is: *"PDI = 35(m07 – m02) + 25(m20 – m23) + C(pd), in which m07 is the mean score for question 7, etc. The index normally has a range of about 100 points between very short term oriented and very long term oriented countries. C(pd) is a constant (positive or negative) that (…)can be chosen by the user to shift her/his PDI scores to values between 0 and 100."* My weighing factors are mentioned in the technical appendix, section 8.1.

The original LTO scores as given in Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010, p253) are derived from three questions, as measured by the WVS in waves one through four: thrift as a desirable quality for children (V17); national pride (V211); and the importance of service to others. The first two questions have also been asked in WVS waves 5 and 6, with individual moderate to low[8] correlations between the Minkov data and WVS scores: .57 and .45. The third question was not asked in later WVS waves. However, two other WVS questions, not included in the original Minkov calculation, also showed low or moderate correlations. These are perseverance as a desirable quality for children (V18, correlation -.42) and obedience as a desirable child quality (V21, correlation .51).

Conceptually, the WVS questions and the new Minkov questions have only a partial overlap. Thus, national pride could be seen as being related to strong values; perseverance might be linked to enjoying competition. However, as Minkov et al have shown, the two measures are strongly related. For this research, as explained, I have sought to relate WVS questions to the new Minkov scores.

Taking the average of the values for each variable improved the correlation to .81. In order to further improve the correlation, an iterative process was followed, consisting of two stages. Stage one involved weighing each one of the three questions slightly differently (more or less in the same way as scores are weighed in the VSM). At this stage, I found that for LTO, there is a systematic bias in two of the variables, necessitating the introduction of tipping points in these two variables (V17 and V21). This stage led to a stronger correlation between the Minkov scale and my WVS-derived scale, but with a systematic bias: a number of the lower values were too high, whereas some of the higher values were too low, compared to the Minkov scores. In order to correct for this, a tipping point was introduced, with different correction factors for the two parts of the scale. This led to a strong correlation *r* of 0,90, p<0.001. Recalibrating the value range led to a range of between 5 and 100.

The three graphs below illustrate this process. The first graph shows the 'raw score': it gives the average national scores for the three WVS variables, compared to the Minkov scores[9]. The second graph shows the 'adjusted weights', the scores after weighing the variables. The third graph shows the scores after introducing the scale tipping point and shows the values in reversed order.

[8] I follow the convention whereby a Pearson's *r* of <0.3 stands for no correlation, >0.3 <0.5 for low correlation, >0.5 <0.7 for moderate correlation, >0.7 <0.9 for strong correlation and >0.9 for very strong correlation.

[9] The country codes are the Internet country codes as published by IANA, see https://icannwiki.org/Country_code_top-level_domain



Graph 5.1 – Raw LTO scores compared to the Minkov data.



Graph 5.2 – LTO scores compared to the Minkov data after weighing.



Graph 5.3 – LTO scores compared to the Minkov data after adjusting the scale.

If the correlation would be perfect, then the dots would follow a diagonal line. The spread away from the diagonal indicates less-than-perfect correlation. As the graphs show, each of the successive steps leads to the dots being grouped closer to a diagonal line – in other words, the correlation increases with every step (to 0.90 in the last step).

5.3.2 Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR)

For IVR, my starting point were the IVR scores as published on the website of Geert Hofstede[10]. I used the scale as normalized by Hofstede to a range between zero and 100. There are 47 WVS countries for which Hofstede has published an IVR score, with a range from zero (Pakistan) to 97 (Mexico). This includes 11 African countries: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Hofstede's Value Survey Module constructs the IVR scores based on four questions:

11. Importance of keeping time free for fun
12. Importance of moderation: having few desires
16. Are you a happy person?
17. Do other people or circumstances ever prevent you from doing what you really want to?

To me, this seems conceptually clear: indulgence is associated with the importance of having fun and being happy; restraint is associated with moderation and feeling inhibited to follow real desires.

In the WVS, there are three questions that are conceptually related to the four questions above:

V6: importance of leisure time
V10: Taking all things together, would you say you are happy?
V55: Feeling of control over life.

[10] http://geerthofstede.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/6-dimensions-for-website-2015-12-08-0-100.xls retrieved 13 February 2018

For these three questions, the correlations were computed between the average national responses to the individual questions and the national IVR scores. These showed moderate to strong correlations of between .65 and .70. A similar process was followed as with LTO, leading to a strong correlation *r* of 0.88, $p<0.001$, with a value range of between zero and 97.

5.3.3 Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV)

Given the success obtained with the first two dimensions, it was interesting to see if similar results could be obtained for any of the other four Hofstede/Minkov dimensions. An important dimension in this regard is individualism versus collectivism (IDV). Africa is frequently characterized as being on the 'collectivist' side and it would be interesting to see if the WVS confirms this picture.

The latest study detailing this dimension is by Minkov et al (2017a). Minkov constructs the IDV scores based on seven questions:

I am very religious - I rarely observe religious rules
I would like to achieve fame - Fame and glory are useless to me
I arrive on time - I am often late
I avoid conflicts - I will argue
I would like to be a boss - I prefer to mind my own life
I would make people follow all laws - I would let people break useless laws
I can do favors just to see friends happy - I do favors only for favors

To me, this seems conceptually clear: the more individualist people are also less religious, can manage to arrive on time, mind their own lives, determine themselves which laws to follow and are not particularly concerned about making friends happy.

Minkov has published IDV scores for the same 31 WVS countries that were used for LTO. Again, I have excluded the score for Nigeria and taken the score for the black population of South Africa.

It turned out to be possible to construct a related scale based on three WVS questions and the composite 'Autonomy Index', which the WVS calculates on the basis of the answers to questions on desirable qualities for children. The three questions are:

V8: Important in life: Work
V49: One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud
V71: It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things

Of these, V49 has by far the strongest correlation, $r = -0{,}83$. In the first stage of scale construction, therefore, V49 weighs much more heavily than the other questions. Again, a similar process was followed, leading to a scale with a range between zero and 68 and a strong correlation of .88, $p <0.001$.

5.3.4 Power Distance (PDI)

For PDI, my starting point were the PDI scores as published on the website of Geert Hofstede. I used the scale as normalized by Hofstede to a range between zero and 100. There are 32 WVS countries for which Hofstede has published an IVR score, with a range from 22 (New Zealand) to 100 (Malaysia). Only one of them (Morocco) is African.

PDI is constructed on the basis of VSM questions 2, 7, 20 and 23. These are:

02. have a boss (direct superior) you can respect
07. be consulted by your boss in decisions involving your work
20. How often, in your experience, are subordinates afraid to contradict their boss (or students their teacher?)
23. An organization structure in which certain subordinates have two bosses should be avoided at all cost

It is clear how these questions would relate to the power distance index: people valuing a boss they can respect and subordinates who are not inclined to contradict their bosses, as well as an aversion against having two bosses can be associated conceptually with high power distance. Consultation between boss and employee would be associated with low power distance.

Six WVS questions have been used to approximate PDI:

V9: importance of religion
V16. Importance of Tolerance and respect for other people as a quality of children
V49: One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud
V79: Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one's religion or family.
V138: How essential is it for democracy that people obey their rulers?
V145. Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?

V138 was not asked in round 5 of the WVS. Because it weighed heavily in the final scoring (see appendix 1 for details), PDI could not be calculated for countries that were not included in Wave 6.

The strongest individual correlations are with the importance of tradition, the importance of making one's parents proud and the importance of people obeying their rulers (all .56). Conceptually, being religious is related to high power distance (V9, 145). Filial loyalty (V49) and the importance of obeying rulers (V138) are likewise related to high power distance. Greater tolerance and respect for others is associated with lower power distance.

Again, a similar process was followed, leading to a scale with a range between 22 and 81 and a strong correlation of .87, $p < 0.001$.

5.3.5 MAS/FEM and UAI

I have tried to find a similar correspondence between WVS data and the remaining two Hofstede dimensions, Masculinity/Femininity and Uncertainty Avoidance. However, the questions that seem conceptually related did not yield significant correlations – the range was between -.25 and +.17, with most correlations closer to zero. Minkov (2013: 163) has already pointed to the potential problem that the range of questions asked in the WVS is different from that in the VSM.

It is important to keep in mind that Hofstede has documented these two dimensions in his publications and that it is entirely possible that two countries are similar on the four dimensions I was able to replicate in the WVS data, but different on the remaining two dimensions. The graph below, showing Russia versus Slovakia, illustrates the point. As pointed out in the introduction, this research is exploratory, and does not offer the final word.



5.4 Second step: WVS data analysis at the ethnolinguistic group level

The next step in the data analysis is to use the method applied at the country level at the ethnolinguistic group level as well. This has to start with an examination of the differences in the ethnolinguistic group samples. The WVS samples are supposed to be representative of all people of age 18 and older residing within private households in each country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language. Therefore, they meet the requirement that Hofstede (2010) has stressed, namely that care should be taken that differences in samples are due to cultural differences, not to something else (like differences in gender composition). Based on the WVS sampling procedure, it is safe to assume that differences in WVS answers between countries are due to differences between those countries, not to differences in sampling. However, the WVS makes no claims about the samples being representative at the ethnolinguistic group level and a quick analysis of those samples showed that in fact, they are not – it is not a requirement in the WVS sampling protocol. Therefore, as explained below, some form of correction was necessary in order to ensure a fair comparison of like with like.

At the ethnolinguistic group level, it is possible to control for gender, age, education, income level, urban/rural as well as for other variables. However, increasing the number of such variables has its disadvantages: it introduces an upward pressure on the minimum sample size that is needed for every ethnolinguistic group; it also increases the number of weights applied in individual cases. Weighing factors introduce a certain level of artificiality to the data, because it means that certain groups are made more important than in the actual data, others less important. Another issue is that, of course, real differences may exist within countries for example in the education levels of specific ethnolinguistic groups. Compensating for that could mean that perceived differences on the ground, although perhaps partly due to differences for example in educational level, are glossed over. In addition, differences such as in educational level might themselves be related to differences in value systems between ethnolinguistic groups.

For these reasons, I have chosen to introduce weighing factors only for two variables: age (below thirty and thirty and above[11]) and gender.

For Ghana, I have tested whether or not this makes a difference for a number of questions, using the *t*-test. A t-test is a common statistical procedure that can be used to determine whether or not the difference between answers that two groups of people give to a certain question is statistically relevant – or not. When comparing gender, the differences were not significant for most questions. However, for the question on freedom and control over own life (V55), there was a significant difference: on average, women experienced less control over their own lives (M=7.31, SE=1.96) than men (M=7.56, SE=1.97). This difference was significant: $t(1550) = 2.43$, $p < 0.05$. When comparing age, differences were significant for more questions. For the question on freedom and control over own life, on average, people of below 30 experienced less control over their own lives (M=7.26, SE=1.97) than older people (M=7.7, SE=1.93). This difference was significant: $t(1550) = 4.38$, $p < 0.001$.

It is of course not certain if differences that are significant in one country are significant in other countries as well. In order to be on the safe side, I have decided to split all ethnolinguistic group samples into four subgroups: men under 30, men 30 and above, women under 30, women 30 and above. I have weighed the data from each subgroup in such a way that the averages correspond to the national average in the sample. Because of demographic differences within South Africa, weights were determined not based on the national sample, but based on the Blacks, Whites and Coloureds as separate groups.

For the Ga ethnolinguistic group of Ghana, this meant the following:

	Ghana-national			**Ghana-Ga**			
	n	**%**		**n**	**%**	**Weight**	**Adjusted %**
Men < 30	492	31.7		44	29.0	1.095	31.7
Men ≥ 30	288	18.6		37	24.3	0.762	18.6
Women < 30	446	24.7		31	20.4	1.409	24.7
Women ≥ 30	326	21.0		40	26.3	0.798	21.0
Total	1552	100.0		152	100.0		100.0

In most cases, this operation makes very little difference: either because the answers to the questions are not significantly different or, when they are, because corrections in one or the other direction even out. However, cases are thinkable when this operation does make a difference and for those cases, the procedure helps to ensure that differences at the ethnolinguistic group level are not artefacts of sampling differences.

Hofstede (2001:463) recommends a sample size of at least 20 and preferably 50 per group. In order to include as many groups as possible and for pragmatic reasons, I have taken a minimum sample size of 39 as the cut-off point for including ethnolinguistic groups in the analysis. Groups with a sample size below 50 have been *italicized* in all tables and have not been included in the graphs.

In order to distinguish ethnolinguistic groups, the most direct WVS question was V254: *"Code ethnic group by observation, modify for your own society."* This question could be used only for Ghana and Nigeria. For Burkina Faso, Mali, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the answers to this question

[11] It would also have been thinkable to choose a different cut-off point or to make a split over several categories. This cut-off point splits the samples from most countries reasonably well and was therefore chosen for pragmatic reasons.

were contaminated by a racist reading of the question: answers were given in racial ('white', 'black'), rather than in ethnic categories. For Ethiopia and Rwanda, the most common answers were 'Ethiopian' or 'Rwandese'. For those countries, V247 (V222 in Wave 5) was used instead: *"What language do you normally speak at home?"*. In Rwanda, the three answers to V247 were English, French, Kiswahili or Kinyarwanda (the great majority); therefore it was not possible to distinguish between ethnolinguistic groups in Rwanda. For the other countries, my assumption is that the language spoken at home gives a reasonable indication of the ethnolinguistic group.

For South African coloureds and whites, it was possible to combine V254 and V247 and thus to obtain scores for Afrikaans- and English speaking coloureds and whites.

In this manner, and using the algorithm developed for the national-level scores, it was possible to derive scores for 42 African ethnolinguistic groups on IDV, IVR and LTO. For PDI, data was available for 23 ethnolinguistic groups.

Note that this same procedure could also be used for WVS countries in other parts of the world. I have done this for Switzerland and the USA, giving results as listed below:

	PDI[12]	IDV	LTO	IVR
Switzerland		12	68	77
Switzerland-French		11	83	86
Switzerland-German		10	59	85
Switzerland-Italian		21	65	80
Largest difference		11	**24**	19

USA	52	18	72	83
USA-Black	71	29	83	86
USA-White	52	13	68	82
USA-Hispanic	52	41	83	91
Difference	19	**28**	15	9

The differences in scores found between the French and the German-speaking Swiss confirm differences already found by Hofstede in the 1970s. In the US, sadly, cultural differences are aligned to differences in skin pigmentation.

Of course, the range of the countries that are both in WVS and in the Minkov study, although fairly large, still has its limits. It is therefore possible that extending the scale to new countries or to individual ethnolinguistic groups will lead to scores that are outside of the zero to 100 range.

In fact, for LTO, Ghana scored 102. Several ethnolinguistic groups scored even higher: the highest-scoring group are the Lozi of Zambia, with a score of 114.

[12] The references to the dimensions have been colour-coded for easier reading.

5.5 Third and fourth step: Afrobarometer data analysis

The Afrobarometer survey is a pan-African survey on public attitudes in Africa. It's mission is *"Let the people of Africa have their say."* Since its beginning in 1999, it has been implemented in 37 countries throughout Africa. Currently, round 7 of the survey is underway.[13]

In order to extend the data set, I attempted to establish a correlation between the WVS scores and Afrobarometer responses for those countries and ethnolinguistic groups that occur in both surveys. There are between 29 and 47 countries or ethnolinguistic groups that are included both in the WVS data and in the Afrobarometer survey data. The procedure outlined above was repeated, this time extending the calculations to the much larger number of countries and ethnolinguistic groups covered by the Afrobarometer survey. Note that it could be that information on additional dimensions of culture can also be extracted from the Afrobarometer data. However, that was not part of this research effort.

The same method was used as with the WVS for distinguishing ethnolinguistic groups; details are given in appendix 1. The question that was used to make the split was, in most cases, Q87: "What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?[14]" However, in some cases Q2 was (also) used: "Which language is your home language?" (More details and the reasons are given in appendix 1.)

Ethnolinguistic groups were split up, as in the WVS analysis, in four sub-categories, of men under 30, men 30 and above, women under 30 and women 30 and above. Correction factors were established so that each of the subgroups were weighed in the same proportions as the national samples.

5.5.1 LTO

There are 41 countries and ethnolinguistic groups that are both in the WVS and in the Afrobarometer survey with sufficient sample sizes. The value range is between 60 (White English-speaking South Africans) and 114 (Zambian Lozi).

It turned out to be possible to construct a scale for LTO based on ten Afrobarometer questions:

- Q4b. Your present living conditions
- Q10a. How often felt unsafe walking in neighbourhood
- Q26b. Citizens avoid criticizing government
- Q35. Opposition parties examine government vs. cooperate
- Q42b. People must obey the law
- Q52k. Trust traditional leaders
- Q69a. Who responsible: MPs do jobs
- Q69c. Who responsible: president does job
- Q71a. People can fight corruption
- Q75a. Right or wrong: not paying for the government services

Those who feel less safe walking in the neighbourhood also tend to be less 'monumentalist'. On the other hand, those who are more 'monumentalist' are less likely to approve not paying for government services. Conceptually, it seems that those wo are more monumentalist seem to feel more secure as part of the community and place a higher absolute value on community norms. These Afrobarometer items seem to measure this.

[13] Information taken from http://www.afrobarometer.org/about/our-history, retrieved 7 February 2018.
[14] http://afrobarometer.org/data/merged-round-6-codebook-36-countries-2016 retrieved 13 February 2018.

The best individual correlation between a question and the index was Q75a, *r* = .56. The lowest correlation was with Q42b, *r* = -.01. However, removing that question from the set gave lower overall correlations.

In the same way as for the WVS questions, an iterative process was followed, consisting of two stages. Stage one involved weighing each one of the ten questions slightly differently. At this stage, a systematic bias was found in two of the variables. Therefore, tipping points were introduced for these variables. In the second stage, a remaining systematic bias was corrected in a similar manner. This led to a strong correlation *r* of .87, $p<0.001$, with a range of values between 51 and 114. For more information, see appendix 1.

The next step was to use the same method as followed for the WVS and to extend the analysis to all ethnolinguistic groups that could be extracted from the Afrobarometer Wave 6 survey.

Again, it is possible that adding new countries will lead to scores that are outside of the zero to 114 range. For LTO, this is what happened. Several countries show as more 'monumentalist' than the value of 114 that was found in the WVS data for the Lozi of Zambia. In the Afrobarometer data, country scores above 100 were registered for Ghana (106), Mauritius (108), Sierra Leone (104), Tanzania (107), Zambia (104) and Zimbabwe (101). The highest-scoring ethnolinguistic group was for the Lala of Zambia, with a score of *126*[15].

5.5.2 IVR

There are 42 countries and ethnolinguistic groups that are both in the WVS and in the Afrobarometer survey with sufficient sample sizes. The range of WVS values is from zero (Egypt) to 92 (White English-Speaking South Africans).

It turned out to be possible to construct a scale for IVR based on three questions:

- Q4a. Country's present economic condition
- Q5. Your living conditions vs. others
- Q38. President free to act vs. obey the laws and courts

Conceptually, it is not so clear to me how opinions about the President are related to Indulgence versus Restraint. Yet, this combination of questions gave the best correlation. What can be said is that those who are more indulgent tend to be more optimistic about their own living conditions, but less optimistic about the economy as a whole.

The best individual correlation between a question and the index was Q4a, *r* = -.57. The lowest correlation was Q38, *r* = -.28. Removing that question from the set and replacing it by other questions gave lower overall correlations.

Again, an iterative process was followed, consisting of two stages. Stage one involved weighing each one of the three questions slightly differently. This stage led to a strong correlation *r* of .84, but with a systematic bias: the lower and higher values were too low, compared to the WVS, but some of the middle values were high. In order to correct for this, three tipping points were introduced, with four different correction factors for four parts of the scale. This led to a very strong correlation *r* of .91, $p<0.001$, with a range of values between zero and 88. For more information, see appendix 1.

[15] Sample size is minimal, n=39

The next step was to use the same method as followed for the WVS and to extend the analysis to all ethnolinguistic groups that could be extracted from the Afrobarometer Wave 6 survey.

Of course, the range of the countries that are both in WVS and in the Minkov study, although fairly large, still has its limits. It is therefore possible that adding new countries will lead to scores that are outside of the zero to 100 range. For IVR, this is what happened. However, whereas for LTO the top part of the scale was too low (leading to scores of above 100), the reverse was true for IVR. Several countries show as more restrained than what can be shown at the minimum of the scale: Namibia scored -2. As with LTO, this effect was stronger at the ethnolinguistic group level. The lowest score was for the Luguru of Tanzania, with a score of -29.

5.5.3 IDV

As with LTO, there are 41 countries and ethnolinguistic groups that are both in the WVS and in the Afrobarometer survey with sufficient sample sizes. The values range between 43 (White Afrikaans-speaking South Africans) and 96 (the Dogon of Mali).

It turned out to be possible to construct a scale based on four questions:

- Q10a. How often felt unsafe walking in neighbourhood
- Q26d. Citizens request personal assistance from elected leaders
- Q52k. Trust traditional leaders
- Q89e. Neighbours: immigrants and foreign workers

Statistically, comparing many countries, IDV and PDI are related, although the two scores can be different from each other in individual countries. Like with PDI, in more collectivist countries citizens expect personal assistance from leaders more (Q26d). They place more trust in traditional leaders (Q52k). Who their neighbours are is more important to them (Q89e).

The best individual correlation between a question and the WVS scale was Q89e, r = .73. The lowest correlation was Q52k, r = -.44.

Again, an iterative process was followed, consisting of two stages. Stage one involved weighing each one of the four questions slightly differently. At this stage, a systematic bias was found in one of the variables. Therefore, a tipping point was introduced for this variable. This stage led to a correlation r of .88, but with a systematic bias. In order to correct for this, two tipping points were introduced, with three different correction factors. This led to a very strong correlation r of .92, $p<0.001$, with a range of values between 42 and 96. For more information, see appendix 1.

5.5.4 PDI

For PDI, there are 29 countries and ethnolinguistic groups that are both in the WVS and in the Afrobarometer survey with sufficient sample sizes. The value range is not large, from 69 (Egypt) to 106 (the Swazi of South Africa).

It turned out to be possible to construct a scale based on seven questions:

- Q3. Overall direction of the country
- Q26d. Citizens request personal assistance from elected leaders
- Q26f. Citizens agree with community on political issues
- Q37. Parliament makes laws vs. president does
- Q68a. Performance: President

- Q69c. Who responsible: president does job
- Q75a. Right or wrong: not paying for the government services

Conceptually, there seems to be a clear relationship between these questions and PDI. Groups that value power distance more seem to be more inclined to expect personal assistance from leaders. They are less inclined to hold the President responsible for doing his job.

The best individual correlation between a question and the WVS scale was Q37, r = -.71. The lowest correlation was Q75a r = -.02.

A similar iterative process was followed in two stages. Stage one meant weighing each one of the eight variables differently. At this state, a systematic bias was found in four of the variables. Therefore, tipping points were introduced for these variables. This stage led to a correlation of .88, but with systematic bias at the bottom end of the scale. In order to correct for this, two tipping points were introduced, with three different correction factors. This led to a strong correlation r of .89, $p<0.001$, with a range of values between 63 and 89. For more information, see appendix 1.

5.6 Qualitative research – Ghana and Southern Africa

5.6.1 Focus Group Discussions

5.6.1.1 Focus group questions

At the start of the research, I hypothesized that focus group discussions (FGDs) would be a valid way of discovering ethnic similarities and differences. In Africa, many people are multilingual – in fact, multilingualism is seen as a common characteristic that differentiates Africans from Europeans (Bokamba, 2014). I assumed that because of this multilingualism, Africans are also familiar with ethnolinguistic groups besides their own. The idea was to mobilize this knowledge by asking FGD participants to describe relative differences between the group they identify with most and other groups they are familiar with. In a monocultural environment, people are generally not well able to identify what distinguishes their culture from other cultures. However, this could well be different in Africa.

The country chosen initially for FGDs was Ghana. This was because out of the African countries where the World Value Survey has been carried out, it is relatively easily accessible. WVS sample size was sufficient for comparison between a manageable number of four ethnolinguistic groups: the Akan, Mole-Dagbani, Ewe and Ga-Adangbe. The choice of Ghana might itself influence the interpretation of the quantitative research results. Therefore, the possibility was kept open in the research design to repeat the exercise for Ghana in another country.

Focus Group Discussions were designed in such a way that participants would be prompted to describe similarities and differences in terms as close as possible to those used in the analytical framework – so instead of having the researcher mediation in the phase after the data collection, here it was introduced at the stage of data collection itself. The hope was that this would give FGD participants at least some chance to directly comment on the usefulness and understandability or otherwise of the analytical framework employed by the researcher.

Note that this is indeed exploratory research. Focus groups have been used before to discuss differences in cultural values (Grözinger, 2016), but not by asking participants to refer directly to the terms of the analytical framework.

The FGD design went through two stages. In June 2017, a trial FGD took place in Leiden with three PhD students from Ghana. In that discussion, participants were asked to reflect directly on the Hofstede/Minkov cultural dimensions and to offer comparisons between their own culture in relation to Akan culture they were familiar with as well, and with their perception of Dutch culture. This offered a number of interesting insights. One of those was the realisation that the dimensions as described by Hofstede/Minkov are fairly abstract and not easy to introduce within the space of a few minutes. It places heavy requirements both on the ability of the interviewer to explain the concepts and on the ability of the FGD participants to understand and reflect on them. Therefore, a different approach was taken for the actual FGDs.

The approach taken made use of the fact that the information on differences and similarities in value systems that was obtained from the first iteration of my re-analysis of the World Values Survey (see 5.3) was based on ten WVS questions. In the WVS, these questions refer to the individual. For the FGDs, the questions were adapted, to ask participants for their perceptions of their culture in general. They were also given a different order, one that was thought would lead to the most natural flow of the conversation.

As an example: one the WVS questions used for measuring Long-Term Orientation (LTO) is question V17[16]:

"V211. How proud are you to be [French]*? (Read out and code one answer):
1 Very proud
2 Quite proud
3 Not very proud
4 Not at all proud
5 I am not [French]* (do not read out! Code only if volunteered!)
* [Substitute your own nationality for "French"]"

For the FGDs, this became question 1: "How proud are most people in your culture to be [Ghanaian]?" A change of focus from a question about how the individual feels (as in the WVS) to how people perceive their culture (as in the FGDs) is potentially not without consequences – these are discussed below. A full list of the original WVS questions that were used and the questions as asked in the FGDs is given in Appendix 2.

5.6.1.2 Focus group setup

FGDs were set up with the help of local facilitators. In Ghana, these consisted of personal contacts I made through NGO networks I have been involved in, a contact at the Institute of African Studies in Accra and a contact I established with teacher training staff at the University of Education in Winneba after a google search. For Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland most contacts were made with teacher training staff at different universities after google searches for such staff. Typical guidance given to facilitators was as below:

"A group should be composed of between five and seven people. Gender, age or background does not make so much difference, but it is important that everybody feels free to speak out. So, just one younger person in a group of older persons, or just one woman with a group of men, or just one Ewe-

[16] WVS questions taken from the WVS 2010-2012 Wave, revised master, June 2012 , as available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp, retrieved 3 August 2016. Information on the correlations between the answers to individual questions and the Hofstede/Minkov scores is given in section 5.3.

speaker in a group of Akan-speakers might be less ideal. All Akan-speakers or all Ga-speakers, for example, would be fine. But there is one other important thing: everybody should be reasonably fluent in English, because the discussion will have to be in English.

I would like to record the discussion using my laptop and later transcribe it, but I will make sure the contributors stay anonymous in the report I will have to write.

I expect that the discussion will take around 90 minutes. If you have a meeting room or something like that available for such a discussion, that would be great - it would be good if we could meet in a place where there is not too much noise or interference from other people. Of course, I could also look for somewhere myself."[17] In addition, facilitators were sent a one-page summary of the research project (appendix 4).

5.6.1.3 Focus group conduct

The general conduct of the FGDs followed the setup as suggested by Ritchie and Lewis (2003). Focus groups are appropriate for research into perceived differences in cultural values, because "In responding to each other, participants reveal more of their own frame of reference on the subject of study. (…) the perspective is less influenced by interaction with the researcher than it might be in a one-to-one interview." (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:171).

All groups started with an introductory phase, in which I briefly introduced myself, my background and the research project. I clarified that my interest in culture is not so much in art or in traditional ways of doing things, but in how people think and feel today. I explained that in order to explore that, I would ask a number of questions. Questions of this type are being asked all over the world, and typically, people from different countries give slightly different answers. I explained that there were no right or wrong answers and that participants should feel free to share their opinions. I asked for permission to record the sessions and explained that they would remain anonymous: their names would not be used in the report.

The first question was about national pride. In most cases, I split this into two questions: one about the pride in being a national of the country, and then tied to that about the pride in being a member of one's ethnic group (for Lesotho and Swaziland, these two coincided).

During the FGDs, I normally took some notes of the flow of the discussion. At the end, I thanked participants and also allowed some time for free discussion or for participant questions to me. FGDs normally took between 1 and 1.5 hours. All FGDs were audio recorded and transcriptions were made.

As the FGDs progressed, I became aware of the fact that some questions were more readily understood by participants than others. Also, some questions were interpreted in different ways by various participants. Therefore, I developed a set of further prompting questions that were asked in most FGDs. A list of those is also provided in appendix 4.

All questions were asked in the same order, with one exception. In the first FGD, it became obvious that it would be easier to ask participants to mark their answers to the question on child qualities for children individually. This broke the flow of the discussion. Therefore, in all FGDs after the first one, this question was asked last and was not used for group discussion.

The current iteration of my analysis of the WVS questions for the Power Distance (PDI) dimension is based on a different configuration of questions than the earlier one. I found that it would have been

[17] E-mail message sent by me, 31 August 2017.

useful to include questions on the importance of religion, on the frequency of attending religious services and on the importance of tradition in the set of questions. The question on the importance of respect for authority could have been omitted. However, in the interest of comparability, the original questions were kept for all the FGDs.

5.6.1.4 Focus group round 1 and 2

The first round of four FGDs took place in Ghana in September/October 2017. Two FGDs had participants from one ethnolinguistic group each, two had a mixed composition. The results of the Ghana field visit were evaluated. In the meantime, an initial analysis was completed of the relationship between WVS questions and Afrobarometer questions. Given the correlations found (see 5.5), a larger group of countries and ethnolinguistic groups could be considered. The decision was taken to try to extend the analysis to three ethnolinguistic groups that each are present in two countries: the Tswana, Sotho and Swazi of Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. The Southern African groups score differently from the Ghana groups on three dimensions and also show differences among themselves. Therefore, this would give an opportunity to check if the approach tried in Ghana would yield different answers when tried in a different cultural context. In order to make for a better comparison, an attempt was made to increase the number of FGDs with participants from only one ethnolinguistic group. In the end, seven FGDs took place in three out of the four countries in February/March 2018.

The analysis of the FGDs is based on a comparison of the answers provided to the questions in the different groups, as outlined in 6.1 and 6.2.

5.6.1.5 Discussion

As pointed out above, there is an important distinction between the questions as asked in the Focus Groups and the questions as asked in the World Values Survey. In the WVS, individuals are asked how *they* feel. I did not ask FGD participants how they felt, but I asked about the situation in their culture, as they know it. Minkov (2013:47) defines a stereotype as *"a general statement about a complex entity, such as a nation or a society."* Taken in that sense, I have researched stereotypes. Minkov takes issue with the view that *"ordinary people are so knowledgeable about the culture that they live in that they can provide a reliable account of it through stereotypical descriptions."* According to him, "*it is impossible to predict behaviors in a wide range of situations without sophisticated scientific studies. Otherwise, there would be no need for marketing experts, consumer behavior analysts, political scientists, and personality and social psychologists.*" However, this does not mean that any and all stereotypical descriptions are nonsense. *"Generally speaking, stereotypes may be valid if they describe some salient practices or strong taboos in a particular society, especially if there is a high level of agreement among the respondents."* Minkov concludes: *"In the absence of a good methodology for the extraction of meaningful information from generalized statements about people, researchers are probably best advised for the time being to refrain from using such items unless they can clearly and convincingly demonstrate by means of empirical analyses what the items actually measure."* (p 50)

There may be some merit in this. On the other hand, the approach of cross-cultural psychology that relies on value surveys has itself been heavily criticized, both conceptually and in terms of methodology, as discussed in chapter 4. It is for that reason that some form of triangulation was attempted – and I think it has been successful at least to some extent.

5.6.2 Expert interviews, literature study

I sought to complement and contextualize the results obtained from focus groups and value survey analysis with feedback from experts in the field and from desk research, using a selection of available historic and ethnographic literature. The idea was that this might also allow me to identify possible 'blind spots' in the identification of key values obtained through the other methods.

In Ghana, one meeting took place with a group of cultural experts. Two individual experts were interviewed and a handful of shorter conversations took place.

In Botswana, one meeting took place with a group of cultural experts. In the other countries, a handful of shorter conversations took place. In addition, I profited from two longer conversations with Prof. K.K. Prah on the wider context of my research.

5.7 Some methodological conclusions

In my quantitative analysis, I have developed an innovative way of using existing survey material. This has enabled me to use Afrobarometer survey data for analysis, something not yet done in cross-cultural psychology.

As I had hoped, it turned out to be possible to replicate the Hofstede/Minkov dimension scores for the IVR and LTO dimensions in the WVS wave 5 and 6 data. For IVR, I used the work done by Hofstede and Minkov on wave 1-4 of the WVS data. For LTO, I used the new conceptualisation of LTO ('monumentalism') and the new data, as published by Minkov et al (2017b). By comparing a large number of countries that are both in the Hofstede/Minkov data sets and in the WVS, I was able to anchor a number of WVS variables to their data. I did this by following an elaborate and iterative procedure that led to correlations between Hofstede/Minkov scores and my scores of around 0.9.

To my surprise, it was possible to do this for two other Hofstede/Minkov dimensions as well, PDI and IDV. For IDV, I used the new work by Minkov et al (2017a). Using the same procedure, I was able to achieve similarly high correlations.

This was not possible for the remaining MAS/FEM and UAI Hofstede dimensions.

After developing the algorithm for replicating the Hofstede/Minkov scores in WVS data at the country level, I used it also to do this at the level of ethnolinguistic groups.

Again using the same method, it turned out to be possible to replicate these four dimensions in the Afrobarometer round 6 data, again showing strong correlations. This enabled me to develop a major extension to the data, leading to new information on 35 African countries and over 200 ethnolinguistic groups in Africa. This is based on information as provided directly by Africans themselves. It is also recent, because it is based on data collected after 2010.

The strength of the analysis is clear when comparing the data obtained from the WVS, the Itim study[18] and the Afrobarometer survey for the few countries and ethnolinguistic groups that overlap. It shows a large overlap in the scores, based on data taken from three different surveys, asking different questions, at different points in time and with different sampling techniques.

The data clearly shows that in Africa, there are a number of ethnolinguistic groups that are more 'monumentalist' than those found anywhere else in the world. Likewise, there are a number of ethnolinguistic group that are more restrained than those found anywhere else in the world.

[18] Information about the Itim study is included in Appendix 1.

However, the results on individual ethnolinguistic groups should be treated with a bit of caution. As is clear for example from graph 5.3 above, the overall correlation between the published scores and my new scores is good. But on individual countries and groups, there are differences. Most of these differences are minor, but some are not. Therefore, for individual groups my data should be used as a starting point. Further research would be needed to validate the information given about individual groups.

A question that may be asked is about the most appropriate scaling for these dimensions. Hofstede has published data based on a range that is roughly between zero and 100 and data that is normalized to between zero and 100. Minkov has published raw factor scores, which have a much larger range of around 500 points. Having precise and distinct figures is handy when trying to establish correlations between the dimensions and other data, such as GDP or educational performance. However, how precise can the data be and still remain replicable? All sampling techniques and all samples have their limitations. This can be illustrated by an example from Botswana. In the Afrobarometer survey for Botswana , Karanga and Kgalagadi are listed both as a language and as an ethnic group, but the numbers of language speakers are not identical to the ethnic belonging. This also means that the results are marginally different, as seen in the table below:

	LTO	IVR	IDV	PDI
Karanga speakers	65	30	67	69
Karanga ethnic group	52	15	68	72
Kgalagadi speakers[19]	*105*	*-18*	*55*	*68*
Kgalagadi ethnic group	96	-4	60	68

The largest differences are in IVR, logical because IVR is the scale that shows the greatest variability overall. But are the Karanga speakers culturally different from the Karanga as ethnic group? It could well be that these are artefacts that are created by trying to use a scale that shows too much differentiation in respect of actually meaningful differences on the ground. I will return to this further down.

Comparing data from quantitative research with data obtained through qualitative research is not a straightforward matter. I tried to establish a link between the two ways of data gathering by basing my eleven Focus Group Discussions in part on the same World Values Survey questions that formed the basis of quantitative analysis. However, for the FGDs I depended on the possibilities of the local facilitators I was able to find. Therefore, the FGDs had heterogeneous compositions. No attempt was made to ensure participants form a representative sample of a larger population. In a number of FGDs, participants were matched in the sense that they were all language students in teacher training colleges – but this was not the case for all FGDs. An important difference between the WVS questions and the FGD questions is that the WVS questions asked about an individual's feelings, whereas the FGD questions sought to establish participants' perceptions of the general situation in their country or ethnolinguistic group.

The consequence of this, as pointed out by Minkov(2013) is that FGDs can be used only to differentiate values systems of ethnolinguistic groups where they are quite different and where the

[19] Figures here are in italic, because the sample size of the Kgalagadi speakers is below 50 (n=48). Note that both Karanga and the Kgalagadi are minority languages in Botswana. Chebanne(2016) gives data from the 2001 census: Karanga speakers make up less than 8%, Kgalagadi speakers less than 3% of the population. Setswana speakers are close to 80%.

perception of such differences is widely shared among and between the groups. However, the hope seems justified that for this purpose, at least, FGDs can be used and can be a tool of some importance in helping to validate or otherwise the results of the quantitative analysis. For that, however, it is important to test the approach in settings that at face value are culturally different.

Asking survey questions in an FGD setting has another advantage: it may shed light on possible misunderstandings, on differences in interpretation and on perceptions of what a question means that are informed by differences in culture or in background of different peoples. In other words – a Dutchman who claims to be 'happy' may have a different state of mind than a Ghanaian who equally claims to be 'happy'. Exploring differences in interpretation in a FGD setting may shed light on this. Some insights into whether and how this happened will be provided in the next chapter.

On the whole, the conceptual frameworks used by authors of books I read or by the experts I interviewed were different from the cultural dimensions framework of cross-cultural psychology and difficult to relate directly to it. However, ideas from the literature and inputs from experts were important for providing an overall context to the research and helped to get a better insight into gaps in the existing knowledge about cultural differences and similarities in Africa.

6. KEY RESULTS

In chapter 4, I have defended my choice for using the Hofstede/Minkov dimensions of culture as a starting point and outlined what they stand for. In chapter 5, I have given a detailed description of the quantitative analysis that I have done, which led to dimensions scores for four of the Hofstede/Minkov dimensions that could be derived from the World Values Survey (WVS) data and subsequently from the Afrobarometer data. I have also outlined my qualitative research approach, which consists of focus group discussions, expert interviews and meetings and desk study (chapter 5.6).

Qualitative research has been done in Ghana and in Southern Africa. For Ghana, the main focus was on the Akan and the Ewe, with less attention paid to the other ethnolinguistic groups. For Southern Africa, the focus was on the Sotho, Swazi and Tswana of South Africa and of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana.

In the first two sections of this chapter, I will compare the results of the quantitative analysis with the results of the qualitative research, divided into focus groups and interviews on the one hand and literature study on the other hand. Section 6.1 deals with Ghana, section 6.2 with the Sotho, Swazi and Tswana. Section 6.3 is based purely on the quantitative analysis and describes a number of different cultural configurations of ethnolinguistic groups that live in more than one country. This then leads in section 6.4 to a number of conclusions on how to understand cultural similarities and differences in Africa in general.

6.1 Ghana

The WVS analysis for Ghana gave the following scores:

	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
Ghana	85	88	102	80
Ghana-Akan	87	86	101	86
Ghana-Dagomba	82	81	112	78
Ghana-Ga	86	87	96	88
Ghana-Ewe	67	89	107	90

In words: Ghana is a high power distance society, with the Dagomba and the Ewe possibly being on the lower side and the Akan being the most accepting of power differences. Ghana is also a highly collectivist society, with the Dagomba being relatively the least collectivist and the Ewe the most, although the differences here are small. Ghana is a society where people have a fairly fixed and inflexible idea of themselves (high on LTO), with the Ga scoring relatively lower. Ghana is on the indulgent side of the spectrum, with the largest difference occurring between the Dagomba and the Ewe. Overall, though, the **similarities**, at least on these four dimensions, seem to be greater than the differences; there are no stark contrasts, with one group being on one extreme of the scale and another being the complete opposite. Note that WVS data only contain information for the four major ethnolinguistic groups of Ghana. The field visit took place before the Afrobarometer analysis

was undertaken. The Afrobarometer data contain information for four additional ethnolinguistic groups. Those are presented below, but were not taken into account for the qualitative analysis.

The four Focus Groups were quite different in composition:

FGD1: 4 men, 3 women; 4 Akan, 1 mixed, 1 Grusi, 1 Ewe. Age range 25 to 77.

FGD2: 4 men, 2 women; Ewe. Age range 20s to 50s.

FGD3: 11 men, 2 women; Akan. Age range 20 to 45.

FGD4: 3 men, 3 women; 1 Akan, 1 Ewe, 4 mixed. PhD students. Age range 20s to 40s.

This means that the Akan and the Ewe were well-represented, but the Ga-Adangbe and the Dagomba were not so well represented. Professionally, FGD 1 was made up of professionals related to the environmental movement; FGD 2 was made up of young media professionals; FGD3 was made up of students hoping to become language teachers; FGD 4 was made up of PhD students.

In the following, I will try to synthesize the information obtained through the focus group discussions (FGDs), the expert interviews and the literature. This section has seven sub-sections: one for each of the four Hofstede/Minkov dimensions for which I have quantitative data. Each of these sub-sections starts with a review of the quantitative data, then the image that came from the focus groups and interviews, and then the information from the literature. Then come two sub-sections for information not included in the discussion on dimensions as evident from the discussions and interviews and from the literature. Lastly, I will try to present some conclusions and further questions.

Focus group discussion in Ho, Ghana, 29 September 2017.

6.1.1 LTO

For Long-term Orientation (LTO), or 'Fix vs Flex', the scores are as follows:

	WVS score	Afrobarometer score
Ghana – national average	102	106
Group with highest score	Dagomba: 112	Ewe: 114
Group with lowest score	Ga: 96	Gonja: 75
Largest difference	16	39

In the WVS analysis, LTO is related to national pride. In addition, it is related to the child qualifies of thrift, perseverance and obedience; of these, thrift weighs the most heavily in the calculation.

Focus Groups were unanimous: Ghanaians are very proud of their nationality. There is strong national feeling. When I offered an alternative view (it is more important that we are all children of God), participants persisted. In FGD4, J said: *"The Gold Coast was a model colony, right from the 18th century. So yeah, we have that sense of pride. We boast about it. We have that more than the Nigerians. In terms of regional division, they seem to be more rich and powerful. But in terms of our historical antecedent, the Ghanaian is a very proud person."*

The 'fixed or flex' spectrum is less easy to introduce and immediately discuss as a concept. Obviously, Ghanaian society is changing. Still, respondents seem to place Ghana on the fixed end. In the cultural expert meeting, P said: *"I would say, African cultures are very rigid. In Africa you can't decide what you want to be. You have to conform to norms."* (This then led to a discussion on gay and lesbian rights.) The NGO director, looking back to the 1990s, said: *"Socially, it hasn't changed very much. But politically and economically, the changes have been a lot. (…) the culture is very much the same. People relate to their peers almost the same, the values are more or less the same, socially it hasn't changed very much."*

In the literature, I found an illustration of the fact that the Asante are very much on the Fixed side of the Fixed-Flex spectrum in Müller (2013): she points to the importance of the Adinkra symbol of the crocodile, which according to her means that one should stick to one's own divine function regardless of the environment (p 12).

6.1.2 IVR

For Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR), the scores are as follows:

	WVS score	Afrobarometer score
Ghana – national average	80	72
Group with highest score	Ewe: 90	Akan: 84
Group with lowest score	Dagomba: 78	Frafra: 37
Largest difference	12	47

As explained in chapter 5.5, all focus groups were asked to discuss ten questions, derived from the WVS. In the WVS analysis, IVR is related to the feeling of happiness, the importance of leisure time and the overall feeling that people have control over their lives.

The consensus in the FGDs was that people in Ghana are happy, though maybe not *very* happy. As P said in FGD1: *"With the kind of peace and freedom we have in this country, I think people are just happy. When you go abroad, you want to come back."* Also, as F pointed out in FGD3: *"If I belong to a family who loves me without money, I have a full life, so I'm happy without the money. Somebody with more money might not be happy."* There were some qualifications, though, like the one of M2 in FGD2: *"If you want to go to University, but there is no money for you to go, you may be alright living with your family, but you won't be happy."* S in FGD4 mentioned: *"I know there are people in war-torn areas and I don't think they are happy. There are people close to where I come from, the Chereponi side, there are conflicts in that area, but I don't think they are happy."* In the same FGD, E added: *"There are people who are making it, and they are happy. But there are also people who are*

not making it. They are very sad. So it depends on the person's situation." J agreed, saying: *"Some people have no support, the state has cut off the social amenities, so it becomes questionable. For example there is the teeming youth who are unemployed is becoming like sitting on a time bomb."* In general, the PhD students in FGD4 were the most theoretically-minded of the groups I spoke to and they were more sceptical of this type of sweeping statement. Yet, J, in FGD4, commented: *"I would say that generally, a lot of people are content. They don't express anger, don't go after what they ought to be having. Content is what I would rather say."*

Some participants were a bit unsure about the meaning of 'leisure time' and opinions were divided on this topic. Thus, A, in FGD1, stated: *"Not really important, because we Ghanaians have a way of having leisure during working hours. So no real special time for leisure."* In the same FGD, P voiced an opposite opinion: *"Very, very important. Many people love it. Though they are hardworking, they want to find time to have a good time."* C tried to put this into perspective: *"What one would consider as leisure is debatable. In Akan, there is no distinction. For children, play time is also exercise. We also build it into the social aspect, social obligations in Akan culture, feed into what is described as leisure. E.g. naming, marriage parties. Our culture is also built into these social activities. Strictly speaking, leisure is necessary. But whether people recognize it as very important is where I have a doubt."* In FGD2, participants pointed to the importance of the various festivals and affirmed that young people participate in those. In FGD3, A seemed to state something others also felt: *"The truth is, it is not valued as of now. All the time is used for something."* In FGD4, J said: *"Traditionally, just like work, Ghanaians have always had that sense of work and leisure. Work hard, play hard. In the village, people for example still sit around to tell stories. But work, work, work, has become mandatory of urban dwellers. In the seventies, the five-day work week was introduced. But gradually, it is eroding. But in weekends, we have church ceremonies, birthday parties, marriages, naming ceremonies… However, people always have work sitting on their laps."*

The 'control over own life' question was also a bit difficult to understand for some respondents. Most feel that they do have a measure of control over their own lives and that their hard work and their choices can make a difference. Several participants pointed out that city life gives more freedom than life in the rural areas. M2 in FGD3 added information here: *"Nowadays, we have educational rights. But still, you can never become a traditional leader if you are not from the royal family. Being royal is the most important. But politically, with education, you can become the President, or a minister."* As O said in FGD2: *"Here people aspire to great heights. The hope and believe is that you can make a good life for yourself. So people do not feel restricted, you can do anything."* In FGD4, participants pointed to the difference between what people believe and what the real situation is. Still, as G summed it up: *"Generally, we have the view that what you do today can have an impact on what happens to you. Growing up, you are trained; we believe that if you toe a certain line, you have a higher chance of being successful. So someone from a poor family may not have the resources to educate their child, but if they manage to make the sacrifice, they believe that in the future that child may not be in the same situation."*

This dimension was not discussed very clearly in the other meetings – the discussion here tended to drift into other areas.

6.1.3 IDV

For Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV), the scores are as follows:

	WVS score	Afrobarometer score
Ghana – national average	88	87
Group with highest score	Ewe: 89	Ewe: 94
Group with lowest score	Dagomba: 81	Frafra: 71
Largest difference	8	23

Individualism/collectivism is associated with the questions on the importance of making one's parents proud, with the importance of work, and to a lesser extent with the importance of being rich and the 'autonomy index', compiled from the pattern of answers to the question on child qualities.

Focus Groups were unanimous in the importance of making one's parents proud. In FGD4, S added: *"Not just your parents, it's about the family. There are certain things I wouldn't do, not just because it would bring shame to me, but shame to the family."* E said: *"In most of our societies, our parents are measured by what their children come out to be. I've seen it in different contexts. They even call the parents based on the work the children do, calling a parent for example 'doctor's mother'."*

When the question was first asked, there was agreement in all FGDs about the importance of work, partly also because work provides the means for supporting a family. As J explained in FGD3: *"When we talk about work, in the Akan society, it is something very important. We have a tradition that when you are born into the society, and you are a male, they will put in your hand a machete, which signifies that you have to work hard. If you are a lady, they will put in your hands a broom or a basket, which signifies that you are to work hard. So one of the first things, after you are born, is to show you hard work, of which the machete is a symbol. So, we were born to work hard."* However, when prodded further, FGD participants acknowledged that work was not the *only* important thing in life. In FGD4, S explained it this way: *"I think work is very important. But many people do what is needed to feed the family, but they don't go beyond that. Of course in the North you have to work, also for your in-laws, because there is betrothal. But at a certain point, people get to be content."* R added: *"Where I'm from, work is also equally important. You learn from your relatives so that you grow up to become a responsible person. They don't believe in fishing for you, but in teaching you how to fish. But apart from work being important, we also believe in some form of entertainment. You need to also relax. So you find the men sitting outside under the trees, relaxing, going over the day. Even when they are sitting – if somebody is a wood carver, like my uncle, he comes along for a chat, but still continues to work. So, work is important, as well as entertainment and rest."*

The importance of being 'rich' was acknowledged in all FGDs, but with some nuances and qualifications in some groups. In FGD1, A said: *"In my culture being rich is not having all the luxury, but having people around you, being able to help them."* In FGD3, M2 put it this way: *"We value good name. So a good name is better than riches. We also value hard work. But at the end of the day we really admire those who are rich. But we really give respect to those who work hard."* In most FGDs, the discussion on this question turned to differences in how ostentatious the various groups are – more about that further down.

The Individualism/Collectivism dimension, like PDI, is relatively easy for people to understand and relate to. When discussed directly, FGDs placed Ghana on the high Collectivism side of the spectrum.

There were some nuances, though. P, in FGD1, said: *"We Ga and Fanti, we are to ourselves, we don't want to help the other family members. It is myself, my wife and my children."*

In the meeting of cultural experts, it was pointed out that marriage is a case in point: marriage is an affair that involves bonding two families as much as establishing a bond between individuals. H did notice a shift, though: in the old days, *"the girl would have to abide. But today, the lady or the boy can decide to say no or yes."* Respondents saw a shift towards more individualism. In the trial FGD, A put it this way: *"In Ghana collectiveness still permeates. Sometimes people who are more individualistic have a problem when it comes to the larger society. Funerals are very important, marriage rites, naming ceremonies. If you carve out yourself as an individual you run into problems when it comes to these issues. People may not come to the funerals. This acts as a check to those who try to go the more individualistic way. Otherwise, with advent of modernity, there might be more individualism."* The NGO director said: *"In the rural areas, somebody who doesn't know you can discipline your child. In Accra, if you discipline somebody's child, you will be challenged. So I think the collective way of living is now prevalent in the rural areas. In the urban areas, it is more individualistic – mind your own business."*

Both Müller (2013) and MacGaffey (2013) show the importance of the extended families, partly through their descriptions of succession rules.

6.1.4 PDI

For Power Distance, the scores are as follows:

	WVS score	Afrobarometer score
Ghana – national average	85	89
Group with highest score	Akan: 87	Akan: 90
Group with lowest score	Ewe: 67	Kusaal: 65
Largest difference	20	25

Power distance is associated with tolerance and respect for others (this is a quality for children that tends to be chosen more often in countries with low power distance), with the importance of making one's parents proud and the importance of obeying rulers. It is also related to religious feeling. For the quantitative WVS analysis, the question on respect for authority was not needed in the last iteration. However, I have tried to interpret the answers to that question under this dimension.

In most FGDs, these questions were answered in ways that one would expect for cultures where PDI is high. *"You obey before you complain."* (S, FGD1). However, there were differences between the Akan and the Ewe group. For example, A, FGD3 (the Akan students) said: *"I think that with Akans, with our way of choosing leadership, we believe that by the time a leader comes out, he already has the know-how. So we believe that even the Gods vest them with extra wisdom. So whatever they say, you have no say. That's what you have to do. If you don't do that, and you don't have your punishment physically, we believe that you will get it spiritually. So you have no other choice."* The statements in the Ewe group (FGD2) were not as strong, leaving more room for dissent; as R said: *"Agree with respect. If you are rich, or an authority, I will respect you. But in politics, if you want to share ideas, even though I am nobody, I can still say something that is very important that can help the discussion. It is wrong not to take that seriously because I am nobody. So respect should be reciprocal."* In the same group, E said: *"Sometimes the chief wants to use the money raised for*

example as a medical fund for something else. You know he's wrong – and he's a ruler – but you can't obey him, because he's wrong. When he's right, you obey."

In the meeting of cultural experts, a number of examples were given to illustrate the respect for authority that is part of Ghanaian society, such as the addressing system. However, speaking on the Ewe, W added an important nuance: *"The power comes from the people. So among the Ewes, the Chief can be questioned by ordinary people, but with decorum. The individual has the right to question the decisions of the chief and will not be punished. But still, he should show decorum."*

The cultural experts also pointed out some nuances, or coping mechanisms, that can be used in some situations to deal with rigid power differences: F pointed out that grandparents can act as playmates for their grandchildren and that much more freedom is allowed in such a relationship. W mentioned *"the kind we call 'joking relationships', like the one I have with F. Among the chiefs, it is there. Even among the young, or among the tribes, when there is joking relationship, we defy all hierarchy."*

The Power Distance dimension is relatively easy for people to understand and relate to. When discussed directly, FGDs placed Ghana on the high Power Distance side of the spectrum.

Lawrance (2005) and Nugent (2005) point to the different history of the Ewe: the partially different precolonial history, the period of German colonization of Togo and the influence of the Basel missionaries on the development of language and education. In the process, Nugent portrays the Ewe identity as a relatively recent phenomenon.

6.1.5 Other differences and similarities as evident from FGDs and interviews

When asked whether or not there are important differences in Ghana between the different cultures, respondents usually answered in the affirmative. When asked to elaborate, most respondents started to explain and give examples about differences in the material culture: clothing, food. They also explained about differences in language, marriage rites, inheritance systems and other similar customs.

Respondents easily moved to a discussion of perceived differences between 'Africans' and 'Europeans' or even 'Westerners'. Salient differences that were mentioned included the respect people have for old age and the importance of spirituality in Africa.

One area where FGD participants saw clear differences between different ethnolinguistic groups was in the tendency to '**show off**', or in being ostentatious. Here, the clearest distinction was seen between the Asante and most other groups. Most participants made a distinction here between the Akan in general and the Asante in particular and felt that the Asante were most inclined to show their wealth and boast about it. The other groups show off less. For the Ewe, this was related to a fear of inciting jealousy. M2, in the Akan FGD3, said: *"We like to splash, and to buy expensive things."* Being more or less ostentatious is related to the Hofstede dimension of Masculinity versus Femininity.

There were some discussions about the distinction between living for today and preparing for later without clear differences between groups. E, in FGD2, said: *"You see, Ewes are always trying their best to have money, they want to save and have something for themselves in the future."* But this was not unique; in FGD3, M2 said: *"There's a saying in Akan that if you get money, you use it a bit, but not all in one day."* This may be related to what Rushton (cited in Minkov, 2014) has called Life Histories: as life expectancies increase, so does the need to save and plan for later. Yet there is another explanation: in regions with harsh and unpredictable climatic conditions, like in Northern Ghana, disaster preparedness is necessary. As A said in the Trial FGD: *"Do people have the idea of*

saving culturally speaking? In North in all communities people were conscious of that. People used to save through animals".

FGD4 spent some time discussing gender differences (related to the Hofstede **MAS-FEM** dimension). There were contrasting views: G said *"the Akans for example have a definition of who a man is. A man should exhibit bravery. You should have control over your family. You should sit comfortably when the woman does the housework. In your home, there are certain things you are not supposed to do, such as washing or cleaning. That is culture. So that is how an Asante man should act."* J, on the other hand, said: *"I was brought up in a home where we were taught to play a dual role. Because a parent can't be with you all the time, so learn to do a woman's job as well as a man's job."* In general, though, the impression is that it is accepted in Ghanaian society that gender roles are different. In the trial FGD, J said: *"Some Southerners have tried to exaggerate the role of women, e.g. the Asantewaa, in Asante history. But by and large society is dominated by the men."*

Hofstede has distinguished four, later six dimensions. However, he also sees the possibility that others might find more and other dimensions. This idea is developed more fully by Minkov (2013), who gives an overview of studies done in this area, the different dimensions that were found and the relations between them.

A common distinction that is made is the one between low-context and high-context cultures, as first mentioned by Hall (1976), mentioned in Samovar, Porter and McDaniel (2012). Hofstede (2001:212) considers this an aspect of collectivism versus individualism, with high-context communication fitting the collectivist society. This may be related to the differences mentioned by some respondents to the tendency to be less or more direct. As A said in the trial FGD: *"Northerners are known to be very honest. They are called Pepe, because they want to do everything in a genuine way."* The NGO director said: *"The Asantes are very direct and sincere. If he says it's black, it's black. If you're a boss in a company and an Asante tells you what is going on, that's the truth. The Fanti on the other hand are much more indirect."*

Dr. Atsiatorme brought in the aspect of African ontologies and epistemologies and discussed common African perceptions of God as being both positive and negative. He characterized the Ewe as believing in the correspondence theory of truth, the Akan as believers of the coherence theory of truth. He felt that the influence of the Europeans had led to a schizophrenic society, that does not manage to synthesize the indigenous and the new elements into a coherent new whole.

6.1.6 Lessons from the literature

The anthropological literature concerning Ghana – or at least the selection I read – suffers from a few problems that stand out when trying to analyse cultural similarities and differences. Perhaps the most important of them is that most books and articles are monographs discussing a single ethnolinguistic group and that no systematic comparison is undertaken with other groups. What *is* frequent is that anthropologists take issue with earlier or other anthropologists. Thus, ascertaining who might be closest to the truth becomes a matter of judging who writes more convincingly - attempts at outside validation are lacking.

Another problem I have is that the dialogue between those studied and the student is missing. Toumey (1993, p 70) has coined the term of the "anthropologist as entomologist". He uses it in the sense of the anthropologist describing his or her objects of study in a dispassionate way. This may be equally unjust both to the anthropologist and to the entomologist. But there is another sense in which the term can be used: anthropologists seem to have a tendency to write their findings in a

place far removed from where they did their study and not to take the trouble to consult those studied on their findings.

Of course, nowadays Ghanaians are quite capable of reading what is being written about them and of reacting. As Atsiatorme has pointed out, this has given rise to a school of African writing that can be seen as apologetic: trying to demonstrate that Africans are neither primitive nor backward.

An early example of this can be seen in the work of E.A. Ammah (2016). In this book, there is a review first published in 1941 of a book published in 1940 by British Anthropologist M.J. Field on the Ga people and customs. On p. 111, Ammah directly challenges a number of assertions Field makes about the Ga, for example that their identity is a relatively recent construct and they do not have a paramount chief (and therefore belong to the group of acephalous societies). He also challenges Field's description of many Ga activities being imbued with magic.

This example illustrates the difficulty with trusting the anthropological gaze: the distinction between a hierarchically organized society and one that has a more grassroots organisation is an important cultural distinction, also in the Hofstede model (PDI). So which one are we to believe?

The importance of magic is another important issue. Many anthropologists have a tendency to create separate cosmologies for the cultures they study, thus (perhaps inadvertently) 'othering' African cultures. Ammah, on the other hand, stresses the practical aspects of some of the rituals and shows how they fulfil functions that are common to most societies, in ways that do not depend to the extent suggested by Field on spiritual notions.

It could be (but there is no way of being certain) that this same problem applies to the work of Müller (2013). She goes to great lengths to explore and explain the religious/spiritual aspects of Asante chieftaincy, introducing the concept of 'Sunsum', roughly equivalent to soul (of a person, but also of the nation). Taking a gender-conscious view, she maintains that the leadership roles in Asante society were and are shared by a ruling pair, made up of the Asantehene and the Asantehemmaa, in line with the male ancestral spirit (Nyame) and the female ancestral spirit (Ngame). She stresses the matrilineal nature of Asante society and describes how that was threatened by the preference of the British for patrilineal systems. In that sense, she also criticizes the work of earlier anthropologists.

In a similar vein MacGaffey's 2013 book about the Dagbon gives a history of chieftaincy developments in the Dagbon area. It criticizes earlier anthropology and seeks to explore the spiritual dimension of chieftaincy, asking for more attention to the position of the 'Tindana' earth priests. It shows how the recent scarcity in land has increased conflicts in the region and changed chieftaincy. MacGaffey argues that power in Dagbon society essentially comes through 'Nam', the spiritual power that is created through the rituals. He points out that some of this magic is so dangerous that it is best not talked about. This type of discourse could also be seen as 'othering'.

MacGaffey shows the similarities in many ways between the Dagbon and neighbouring peoples: the Nanun, Mamprugu and Tallensi.

To me, it is interesting that Ghanaian authors, such as Tonah (2016) analyse chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana in terms of conflict theory, without recourse to descriptions of Sunsum or Nam.

That being said, there are elements in the literature that support the findings that come out of the WVS analysis, as mentioned in earlier sections. In addition, Stokroos (1998), in comparing the education systems of four African countries, finds that Ghana has best succeeded in integrating elements of African culture into its educational system. It could be that this has helped to

accommodate ethnic differences in Ghana. Nanbigne mentioned in conversation that his research into Ghanaian folk tales shows large similarities, more than differences.

6.1.7 Discussion and conclusions

Where the WVS data gives information on four ethnolinguistic groups, the Afrobarometer data provides information on eight groups. This complements and nuances the picture obtained through the WVS. The Afrobarometer figures are given below:

	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
Ghana	89	87	106	72
Ghana-Akan	90	89	108	84
Ghana-Dagomba	86	84	98	39
Ghana-Ga	86	90	100	77
Ghana-Ewe	70	94	114	79
Ghana-Frafra	77	71	91	37
Ghana-Gonja	86	82	75	44
Ghana-Dagaari	74	86	101	58
Ghana-Kusaal	65	85	77	72

There is a pattern here, shown more clearly when plotted in a radar chart:



The Afrobarometer data suggests that a number of groups (the Gonja, the Frafra and the Dagomba) are notably more restrained than the Akan, Ga, Ewe and Kusaal. There is a remarkable difference between WVS and Afrobarometer data in the IVR score of the Dagomba – without further research, it is impossible to say which of the two is correct. Of all the Ghanaian groups, the Gonja seem to be the least 'monumentalist'.

The Akan, Dagomba, Ewe and Ga together form the great majority of the Ghanaian population; the Akan alone count for around 50%. It should come as no surprise, then, that the Akan scores are close to the national average. The analysis of WVS data has shown large similarities between ethnolinguistic groups on the four dimensions that I discussed. A partial confirmation has been found in the Focus Group discussions. It seems easier to find such confirmations for those dimensions where the groups score close to one extreme of the scale – which is the case for PDI, IDV and LTO. For PDI, it was possible to find support in the FGDs for the difference that was found between the Ewe and the other ethnolinguistic groups: this difference seems to be large enough to be noticeable using this method. In section 6.2, I will compare the answers obtained in Ghana to answers from countries with a very different score on IVR.

The Afrobarometer data suggest that the national average hides important differences within the population, especially between the Akan and some of the smaller ethnolinguistic groups. These distinctions did not clearly come out of the qualitative research, probably due to the limited representation of minority groups in the focus groups; further research would be needed here.

The approach of talking about the dimensions and asking the questions that they are related to seems to be fruitful; whereas a free discussion on cultural differences and similarities leads either to a discussion of differences in material culture or to very general stereotyping, the discussion on the dimensions and the related question leads to answers that are comparable and nuanced.

In his analysis, Minkov stresses the value of mapping cultural dimensions for predicting for example educational achievement or economic growth. However, there is another large area of practice in which the Hofstede dimensions are widely used. This is the area of cross-cultural management and in general the area of preparing people for cross-cultural contact, as discussed in section 2.4. For Ghana, Gervedink Nijhuis et al. (2012) and Vonk (2016) have shown how useful it is to take account of differences, for example in Power Distance, between the Netherlands and Ghana when doing joint curriculum development work or adapting a Dutch training programme to a Ghanaian audience.

However, in that context – but also in the context of trying to discuss these cultural dimensions as I tried to in Focus Groups, it becomes relevant to have an idea of how precise the scores are in actual practice. What is the just-noticeable difference (JND), the point at which different scores become relevant for example for cross-cultural training?

What I saw in the Focus Group discussions is that the difference in PDI between the Akan and the Ewe is indeed noticeable. Other differences on these four dimensions did not stand out very clearly. The difference on PDI between the Akan and the Ewe is 20 points on the 100-point WVS and Afrobarometer scales. I therefore propose as a rule of thumb, and until further research shows otherwise, that a difference of around 20 points on a 100-point scale more or less constitutes the just-noticeable difference, that will come out when researching stereotypes (as defined by Minkov, see section 5.6). In the next section, I will explore differences and similarities as evidenced through Focus Group discussions held in the culturally different setting of Southern Africa.

In spite of the WVS findings and as illustrated by the Afrobarometer data, Ghana is a country with obvious ethnolinguistic diversity; this is not only obvious to the visiting Dutchman, but to Ghanaians

themselves as well. Yet, perception of ethnolinguistic diversity is not a reliable way of assessing the magnitude of such differences. But which differences are due to environmental factors and which point to fundamentally different value orientations that necessitate, for example, a different approach to management? What level of abstraction is needed before one can differentiate 'European' from 'Asian' or 'Black African' culture in a meaningful way, if that is indeed possible? In order to discuss such issues, the cultural dimensions vocabulary, as pioneered by Hofstede, is useful.

Cultural similarity does not mean that cultural background or ethnicity becomes unimportant. Clark (2010) has analysed leadership structures in the Kumasi central market. Beek and Thiel (2017) have done the same for Makola market in Accra. Both find that ethnicity is an important factor in these structures, although we have to dig into the footnotes to find this information in the article of Beek and Thiel[1]. These authors are at pains to downplay the ethnic element – but it is so visible that they cannot ignore it altogether.

The real question is how to discuss and assess the differences and similarities in a rational way and how to find a conscious, positive way of taking them into account and making use of them. I think the Ghana field visit has illustrated that the Hofstede/Minkov dimensions can provide valuable insights in such a discussion and assessment.

6.2 SeSotho, Swazi, Tswana

Where the last section started with a discussion of the dimension scores and a report on the FGDs and ended with a discussion on the literature, this section approaches the things the other way around: it starts with a discussion of selected literature, to then move on to a report of the FGDs and other field visit discussions. Lastly, I will try to present some conclusions and further questions.

6.2.1 Understanding Southern African cultures: a look at the literature

Southern Africa is one part of Africa that can be characterized by a centuries-old history of dramatic and violent changes. In South Africa, the settler model of colonialism has led to particularly trenchant attempts at social engineering that can be understood as direct attacks on previously existing indigenous cultures. This has been accompanied by massive economic change and upheaval. The entire process has found its apex in 'Apartheid', a unique system of institutionalized racism that has profoundly influenced developments on the entire Southern African subcontinent. It has also led to sustained, sophisticated and diverse forms of resistance.

It is impossible here to give an overview of the literature on Southern Africa. In order to sketch a general framework, I will make use of the work of Mamdani (1996) and attempt to give a very sketchy characterization of the literature. I will then examine attempts at using and replicating the Hofstede framework in South Africa in a bit more detail. I will end by examining a few aspects of Tswana, Sotho and Swazi culture as evident from the literature.

6.2.1.1 South Africa: the manipulation of ethnic and racial categories

Mamdani's 'Citizen and Subject' (1996) is interesting, because it discusses the South African experience as part of the broader African experience with colonialism, thereby linking South Africa to

[1] In fact, the patronizing tone in the footnote is so obvious that it is interesting enough to quote: *"Another condition required for market leadership is Ga ethnicity, which is in stark contradiction to the ordering idea of Ghanaian statehood as it formally prohibits the formation of organisations based on ethnic identity."*

the rest of the continent. His central thesis is that in South Africa (but elsewhere in Africa as well), *ethnic* identity was reproduced and bent to suit the objective of dominating a rural population at minimal cost, using manipulated versions of 'customary' law. *Racial* identity, on the other hand, was needed in order to separate the 'modern', 'democratic' sector from the dominated and ethnically fragmented sectors of society. Understanding this mechanism, Mamdani argues, is key to building a successful counter-movement. However, following the line of reasoning of Neocosmos (1995:43), who discusses and critiques the 'Invention of Tradition' school of thought of Hobsbawm and Ranger, this does not mean that ethnic identity is by definition artificial or that ethnically-based movements are all anti-democratic.

Historically, anthropology has been very much influenced by the prevailing government needs and intellectual climate, as was shown for example by Gewald (2007) for Rhodesia and Leach (1984) more generally. Nowhere was this evident more strongly than in South Africa, where a whole strand of Afrikaner anthropology (*'Volkekunde'*) developed that has now been relegated more or less in its entirety to the scrapheap of history[2]. Unfortunately, as Sharp (2002) has shown, the countermovement in anthropology has tended to denigrate the importance of indigenous cultures, in favour of an assimilationist approach that equally seems to miss the mark.

How have attempts to manipulate race and ethnicity, different in rural and in urban areas (but of course not unconnected to each other), as well as attempts at resisting this, influenced present-day perceptions of cultural diversity in South Africa? What has been the influence of the end of Apartheid? Has the Apartheid experience helped to forge a new national identity in South Africa? What has this meant for the cultural identity of groups like the Sotho, Swazi and Tswana, that now live in two different countries? What seems certain is that the autonomy of these cultural traditions, in the sense used by Vansina(1992) and as discussed in section 2.1, must have been seriously compromised. It is difficult to move much beyond that statement on the basis of the existing ethnography, encumbered as it is by the tremendous weight of competing ideologies.

However, there have been a number of studies that have sought to replicate the work of Hofstede for South Africa; I will briefly discuss them here.

6.2.1.2 Hofstede and South Africa

The Hofstede dimensions have been used in South Africa after the end of Apartheid, at a time when Black Economic Empowerment became important. Managers started to experience the intricacies of managing in a situation of cultural diversity and needed instruments for coping with this that transcended the racial distinctions that were instrumental for Apartheid itself. The Hofstede cultural dimensions, commonly used in international management and not tainted by the South African ideological debates, seemed well-suited for this purpose.

A first study is that of Thomas and Bendixen (2000). They interviewed 586 middle managers in South Africa, using the 1994 edition of Hofstede's Values Survey Module (VSM94), which at that time measured five dimensions. The sample was divided into seven ethnolinguistic groups, of which three were black: Xhosa, Sotho (encompassing SeSotho, Pedi and Tswana speakers) and Zulu. Care was taken that at least 20 men and 20 women were contained in every sample. The results were surprising: they showed on the whole a very low score on Power Distance and a very high score on Individualism (meaning that managers were very individualist) and on the whole, only limited

[2] This is probably unfortunate, because there may have been work done that still has analytical value today. One example is Van Warmelo (1937), who discusses the difficulties involved in classifying cultural groups in Southern Africa.

differences between the various ethnic groups. In addition, the overall picture was close to that of several northern European countries. This led Thomas and Bendixen to the happy conclusion that management in South Africa was effective, that effective management could be learned and that a diverse management team would not be a hindrance to corporate performance.

Quick on the heels of Thomas and Bendixen was a dissertation by Sithole (2001). He also used the VSM94, this time distributing it to 572 employees of the South African Ports Authority. He divided his respondents according to race: Asian, Black, Colored and White. Contrary to Thomas and Bendixen, Sithole found significant differences between the four groups on a number of dimensions. For all groups, he found a much higher score than Thomas and Bendixen on Power Distance. He saw a combination of traits closer to those of Latin America and some Asian countries, rather than to northern Europe (p 69). He supposes that the differences found between his study and Thomas and Bendixen might be caused by sampling effects: Thomas and Bendixen concentrated on management, which in South Africa is dominated by whites. He supposed that managers from other backgrounds might have adapted to the dominant management culture (p 68).

Then, Kruger and Roodt (2003) distributed the VSM94 to 231 female managers in a South African telecommunications company, 42% of them Afrikaans. They tried to establish the validity of the VSM94 as a test tool and found it wanting, in line with some of the criticisms discussed in section 4.2. This criticism is of limited importance, because it uses ideas on test construction for individuals on test construction for measuring cross-cultural differences – which predictably leads to the types of results they obtained.

Nkosi and Roodt (2004) looked at a different instrument, the Culture Assessment Instrument, that is aimed at assessing organisational culture. They found that in South Africa, there are differences in how people answer this questionnaire, related to language and to race. However, they do not interpret the meaning of these differences.

Urban, Van Vuuren and Howen (2008) report on distributing the VSM94 to 210 MBA students, divided in to Blacks, Caucasians and Indians. They do not give information on the gender distribution within each subgroup. They find different scores for these three groups, but are distrustful of the VSM94 for similar reasons as Nkosi and Roodt(2004).

Adams, Van de Vijver and De Bruin (2012) took a different approach: they collected free self-descriptions of Asian, Black, Coloured and White racial groups in South Africa. These were then coded and analysed. They found many similarities. “The most salient difference between the African and White groups was that the African group was more likely than the White group to specify target persons in relational self-descriptions. This suggests a stronger in-group–out-group distinction in the African group.” (p 377)

So, all in all, the questions I asked above about how attempts to manipulate race and ethnicity have influenced present-day perceptions of cultural diversity in South Africa, about the influence of the end of Apartheid and about whether the Apartheid experience helped to forge a new national identity in South Africa cannot be answered via the existing literature on the Hofstede dimensions and South Africa? This literature also does not give a conclusive answer on what all this has meant for the cultural identity of groups like the Sotho, Swazi and Tswana, that now live in two different countries. I will return to this later, but first turn to a discussion of some of the literature on Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

6.2.1.3 Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland

What is clear from my look at the historical literature on the three countries is that throughout the colonial period, the leaders of these countries were acutely aware of the existential threat that the Boer advance and the expansion of colonial South Africa posed to them. The threat of Boer domination served to unify them, to mobilize their resources, to develop their skills in warfare as well as in diplomacy – and it also drove them in the hands of the British. In order to safeguard even a limited degree of independence, they were forced to make and to accept huge concessions. Thus, large and fertile stretches of land that were once part of the Sotho, Swazi and Tswana polities are currently part of South Africa[3].

In section 2.1, I have outlined the approach of Vansina (1992), whose understanding of 'traditions' is close to my understanding of culture. He has demonstrated the importance of cultural autonomy in retaining a people's ability to adapt to changing circumstances on its own terms.

For Southern Africa, the struggle to retain cultural autonomy and the way in which culture has helped to adapt to changes has been examined most clearly in the work of Gulbrandsen (2012).

In his book, Gulbrandsen contrasts the relative success of Botswana as a nation state with the difficulties experienced by many other African nation states and seeks to find an explanation. He feels Botswana's success should be understood as the result of the interplay between Western (global) forces and indigenous structures of power. He points to the importance of *'symbolic conceptions and hierarchies of authority rooted in indigenous polities'.* (p1) In my terminology, therefore, he looks at the importance of Tswana culture, without, however, mentioning that as such. Thus, the 'social', as mentioned in the title of the book, should be seen as shorthand for *'symbolic conceptions', 'rooted in indigenous polities'* – in my words, then, the book tries to explain the success of Botswana out of the interplay between worldwide developments and the autonomous reaction of Tswana culture.

In the analysis of Gulbrandsen, the key to the success of Botswana as a state lies in the fact that immediately before and after independence, traditional and modern elites came together in a 'grand coalition', based on an *'obsession with the accumulation of cattle'* (p111). It is because this coalition was in place that the state was able to deal productively with the later wealth that came from diamond mining, in contrast with the situation in other diamond-rich African countries.

This analysis, in my view, is too easy. Are the Tswana the only ones in Africa that are interested in accumulation of cattle? Of course not – there are many cattle-based polities in Africa. What, then, makes the case of Botswana so unique? Gulbrandsen's book provides clues to an answer but he does not explicitly give the answer.

This becomes clear when Gulbrandsen analyses the countervailing forces in Botswana. Gulbrandsen shows how the 'grand coalition' led to a great increase in wealth for elite sections of society, at the same time increasing inequalities in the country. This inequality leads to resistance, a resistance that is possibly capable of undermining the state. Here, Gulbrandsen uses the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari, and calls attention to threats to the state that can occur outside of the state, with 'war machine'-like potentialities, in the form of '*assemblages of power of a rhizome type that are antihierarchical, deterritorializing and operating in highly unpredictable ways from the point of view of the state*' (p17). The example he gives is the series of events following the tragic murder of Segametsi in 1994. This girl is alleged to have been murdered in order to use her body parts to

[3] An interesting description of what this meant for one of Botswana's groups is given in Morton(1985).

magically give additional strength to already powerful people in the community. The outrage created by this, seen by Gulbrandsen as the emergence of a class consciousness, was the start of popular opposition to the continuing enrichment of the elites and their growing corruption. He explains the role played by indigenous notions of occult practices in light of the specific cosmologies of power among the Tswana and the Sotho-speakers in general (p292/308).

What makes the Botswana case specific, then, is more than the fact that people in Botswana are interested in cattle accumulation. The specificity of the Botswana case lies in its relative cultural homogeneity: in Botswana, state formation that is rooted in indigenous conceptions of authority is possible because these conceptions are shared by a large majority of the people living in Botswana. Likewise, resistance to this authority can also be rooted in indigenous conceptions, for the same reason, the relative cultural homogeneity of the country. Gulbrandsen alludes to the cultural homogeneity in Botswana when he discusses the attitudes in the country towards egalitarianism (in my terms, Power Distance). He points to the cultural unity of Botswana in this respect, in that none of the communities in the country subscribe to radical egalitarianism, '*the San-speaking peoples being an obvious exception*' (p284).

It is interesting to compare the approach of Gulbrandsen with that of Eldredge(2007) on Lesotho. Both stories relate the struggle of the peoples of Botswana and Lesotho to retain a maximum of independence and to ward off the danger of being incorporated into the Union of South Africa. However, where Gulbrandsen's approach looks more at the cultural and spiritual side of things (the 'social'), Eldredge take more of a historical approach, focusing on the diplomatic efforts of the Sotho leadership and on the power struggles that went on in SeSotho society and between the SeSotho and the British – the discourse of power. Thus, on p 151, Eldridge mentions that chief Letsienyana *'set up housekeeping with a woman ineligible to become his wife'*, without elaborating (it is explained in Machobane(1990)). Also, in several places Eldredge mentions the problems of alcohol abuse – a problem that, one suspects, may have occurred in Botswana as well, but is never mentioned by Gulbrandsen.

One of the elements of the Tswana tradition, as Gulbrandsen points out, is the extensive use of public debate and consultation through the *kgotla* assemblies. Leaders in the Tswana tradition, should follow the oft-quoted maxim that the *kgosi* (king) is the king by virtue of the people (p 196). The colonial period has not been able to destroy the *kgotla* system.

In sum, then, Botswana society is by no means free of conflict and change. However, by and large, it has been able to keep its autonomy (as described by Vansina) intact. Because of this, it has been able to make use of the opportunities that presented themselves. In terms of explaining Botswana's success, its cultural integrity can be seen as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for success.

The comparison of the literature on Botswana with that on Lesotho and Swaziland brings to light a number of similarities, but differences as well.

In all three countries, it has been possible to keep a degree of cultural autonomy intact. Eldredge (2007), Machobane (1990) and Gillis (1999) all describe how the British tried in various ways and with various degrees of success to impose their own model of governance on these communities (the famous Lugard-style 'indirect rule'). All these attempts were met with tenacious resistance and the authors demonstrate how cultural autonomy has been kept (although they do not use that term). Nevertheless, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were of course affected by the tremendous changes over the period, including the loss of land and the impact of developments in South Africa.

The effects of these changes were not the same in the three countries. Thus, Botswana is now a republic; Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy with a ceremonial function for the monarch; Swaziland is a monarchy with considerable powers for the king and the royal family.

As Eldredge(2007:12) says, *"Part of the project of colonizers was to destabilize African cultural systems, to undermine them, and to replace them."* For Lesotho, she shows the centrality of African initiatives and agency in trying to preserve indigenous SeSotho culture, values and institutions. Machobane(1990) shows this in greater detail for the SeSotho legal system, where he discusses the origins, changes to and uses made of the *Lerotholi* code, an codification of the indigenous legal system. The SeSotho were united in their defence of their autonomy and tried to resist the imposition by the British of a system that sought to give chiefs ever greater authoritarian powers. However, in other respects, they were divided among themselves and there were also major divisions between the ruling families and ordinary people; the convergence of interests that was evident in Botswana never really took place in Lesotho.

Gillis(1999:4) points to some of the differences between Swazi culture and other cultures in the area. One of these is that the wide consultation process that was part of Sotho culture was not part of Swazi and Zulu traditions in the same way. In the case of the Swazi, this may in part explain the tendency for an oligarchy to develop, centred on the royal Dlamini family, that could lose touch with the wider population. As a comment in the Times of Swaziland puts it: "*The underlining factors behind all these crises can be traced back to bad leadership, corruption and mismanagement, which has kept Swaziland into perpetual underdevelopment in spite of all the efforts to give the country a breath of development.*"[4] Nevertheless, as Gillis stresses, the Swazis place great value on their independence, which is tied in their minds to the King and the royal house.

It is difficult to draw very precise conclusions from the literature in terms that are relevant for my cross-cultural psychology approach. However, it seems logical to assume, as Malan(1985:33) already pointed out, that the cultural unity of the SeSotho, Swazi and Tswana has been broken. It has been preserved in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The Sotho-Tswana, who once were part of one cultural tradition, were fragmented. It could be, though, that they have still preserved some common cultural features. One difference between the Sotho and Tswana one the one hand and the Swazi on the other that has been pointed out is the tradition of popular consultation through the *Kgotla* system that is part of the Sotho-Tswana tradition, but not of that of Swaziland. Does that mean, for example, that Power Distance is lower in Botswana and Lesotho than in Swaziland?

For South Africa, a new cultural identity must have emerged after the loss of cultural autonomies that existed earlier. How can this be characterized? Are there still differences between different groups of Black South Africans? These are some of the questions that the next section will seek to explore.

6.2.2 Swazi, SeSotho and Tswana: results from the field visit

As in Ghana, I depended for the selection of FGD participants on personal contacts and Internet searches. The contacts that led to actual FGDs were the following:

- A lecturer in Tswana at the North Western University, Mafeking Campus, SA;
- A lecturer in Sotho at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, SA;
- A research manager in the Department of Social Development of Mpumalanga Province, Mbombela, SA;

[4] Times of Swaziland, 12 March 2018, p 19.

- A lecturer in Public Finance and Accounting at the Tshwane Technical University, Mbombela, SA;
- A hotel manager, Sidvokodvo, Swaziland;
- A lecturer in Swazi at the William Pitcher College, Manzini, Swaziland;
- A lecturer in Sotho at the Lesotho College of Education, Maseru, Lesotho.

These contacts led to some diversity in FGD composition:

- A mixed-gender group of 7 Tswana speakers in Mafeking, consisting of 5 lecturers and two students;
- A mixed-gender group of 8 Sotho speakers in Bloemfontein, consisting of 3 lecturers and 5 students;
- A mixed-gender group of 10 Swazi speakers in Mbombela, consisting of 2 social workers and 8 support staff;
- A mixed-gender group of 5 first year students of Public Finance and Accounting with different Black South African backgrounds in Mbombela;
- A mixed-gender group of 11 Swazi speakers in Sidvokodvo, consisting of 3 secondary school students, 3 university students and 5 workers in various occupations; mostly from the same family;
- A mixed-gender group of 7 Swazi speakers in Manzini, consisting of students training to be secondary school teachers in Swazi and English;
- A female-only group of 10 Sotho speakers in Maseru, consisting of first year students training to be secondary school teachers in Sotho, plus one teacher.

Dr. Kgomotso Theledi and other FGD participants in Mafikeng, South Africa, 19 February 2018.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to have a FGD in Botswana; the meeting that took place there was an expert meeting of a somewhat different nature. Therefore, a direct comparison involving Botswana is not possible.

This section has five sub-sections: one for each of the four Hofstede/Minkov dimensions for which I have quantitative data. Each of these sub-sections starts with a review of the quantitative data and compares that with the image that came from the focus groups and interviews. In all cases, I will give the Afrobarometer[5] scores for the three ethnic groups in both countries and add, for the sake of comparison, the average scores for the Black South African population and the average score for Ghana.

Then there is a sub-section for information not included in the discussion on dimensions as evident from the discussions and interviews and from the literature.

[5] Because Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are not in the WVS, Afrobarometer scores are the only scores available for these countries.

6.2.2.1 LTO

For Long-term Orientation (LTO), or 'Fix vs Flex', the scores are as follows:

LTO											
Sotho-SA	Lesotho		Swazi-SA	Swaziland		Tswana-SA	Botswana		SA-Black		Ghana
77	94		68	77		51	49		75		106

South Africa scores high on LTO, but not as high as Ghana. If the hypothesis advanced in section 6.1.7 is correct, then this should be visible in the FGDs. The Tswana of Botswana and South Africa score lowest on LTO; this might also be visible in the FGDs. Lesotho scores highest on LTO – it could be that this is visible in the FGDs.

In the WVS analysis, LTO is related to national pride. In addition, it is related to the child qualifies of thrift, perseverance and obedience; of these, thrift weighs the most heavily in the calculation.

The differences in the scores are partly reflected in the difference in the answers in the FGDs. One type of answer is the one given in Lesotho. As K said: *"We are proud of being Basotho, because Basotho people have ethics and good manners. They are cooperative. We even share with other people."* This is an unqualified affirmation of pride.

Contrary to what one might expect, this type of answer was also given in the South African (Swazi) FGD. H said: *"As South Africans, in general we are just a proud nation. I have not met a South African who says he's ashamed to be South African. We have our differences, but as a nation we are proud. And as Swazi, at times you don't even notice that you're speaking different languages. Everyone is proud to have their own language."*

Another type is an affirmation of pride that is not totally unqualified. In conformity with the picture presented above, the Swazi were proud of their nationality, but also pointed to the difficulties the country has. As N said in the first Swazi FGD, *"Very proud. Very excited that I'm a Swazi. Most people are. But we are not in heaven. There are some problems. It is there, but it doesn't affect us much. We feel that we are better off than the other African countries, in our own understanding."* In the second Swazi FGD, this was expressed through different opinions: Na said: *"For me, Swazis are very proud. They like their attire, their language and culture. The young ones grow up knowing everything about their background, their origin."* However, Nk commented: *"For me, they are not so proud. For most parents want their children to be in English-medium schools."*

In the South African FGDs, this question was answered both in terms of pride of belonging to one's ethnolinguistic group and in terms of being South African. Here, the pride was seen as being conditional. As M said in the mixed group of South African students: *"I think it depends. Compared to Americans, people who are rich and all that, that are having life easy, being a South African, you might say, I wish I was one of them. It also depends on the kind of political leaders you have. Under the former President, people were always bothered. But now, I think people start to be proud."* A similar sentiment was expressed in the South African Tswana group: SL said: *"If you had come three weeks earlier, it was slightly embarrassing to be South African, although culturally there was still reason to be proud of living in SA. Different cultures have been able to come together after being Balkanized under Apartheid. We recognize ourselves as coming from the same. So we are proud in the sense of having no apprehensions, no fear."* A similar type of answer was given in the South African Sotho group. S summarized: *"So we are proud to be South African, because we can be different. Even though we are different, we see ourselves as one. The umbrella that is SA has many cultures embedded in it, that we recognize and we see ourselves as one."*

In conclusion, then, three types of answers were obtained in the FGDs, corresponding to three levels of the LTO dimension:

- Very high LTO – unqualified national pride – as found in Ghana and in Lesotho
- High LTO – national pride, but not wholly unqualified – as found in Swaziland
- Moderate LTO – conditional - as found in most of the South African FGDs.

6.2.2.2 IVR

For Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR) the scores are as follows:

IVR											
Sotho-SA	Lesotho		Swazi-SA	Swaziland		Tswana-SA	Botswana		SA-Black		Ghana
33	-1		34	29		29	28		38		72

There is little difference between the various groups in Southern Africa, but as a whole, the region seems to be much less indulgent than Ghana. Lesotho seems to be on the extreme restrained side – perhaps this is reflected in the FGDs. In the WVS analysis, IVR is related to the feeling of happiness, the importance of leisure time and the overall feeling that people have control over their lives.

On the happiness question, the South African groups were more guarded and qualified in their answers than groups in Ghana, Swaziland and Lesotho. M, in the South African mixed group said: *"It depends more on what happiness means. If I'm South African and I don't have anyone working, there's no hope, there's nothing, I wouldn't say I'm happy. But if you are someone who is working, then you might be happy. In rural areas now, people who have no agriculture, they are not happy."* J, in the South African Sotho group explained: *"Given the context of oppression and the context of having to prove ourselves academically, I feel that my being a Mosotho as a tool… I'm lagging behind, somehow, because I'm forever fighting to find myself and to be accepted and to raise my voice, so that people can begin to listen to what I'm saying. So in that sense I feel that I'm forever evolving, sometimes in hostile circumstances. And then you don't feel happy at the end of the day. Not that I don't love who I am, but it's just that it's forever a struggle to find myself, in academia, in research, and sometimes even in religious contexts."*

This is a restrained answer. Paradoxically, the group in Lesotho seemed less restrained here. In that group, Mg for example said: *"Most of the time, I think we are happy. For us to be rich, you have to have cattles, sheep, houses and a plantation. That makes us happy in our culture. But on the other hand, you have to take care of those cattles."* The answer most consistent with a restrained attitude came from C in the expert meeting in Botswana, who said: *"Botswana is NOT happy. We have lost our links within the community; Botswana is a miserable place, people do not care for one another anymore."*

Most groups felt it was important to balance work and leisure. Slightly different answers were given in the Lesotho and South African Sotho FGDs. In Lesotho leisure time was associated first of all with community activities. Individual leisure time was seen as necessary, but not as very important. In the South African Sotho group, leisure was associated somehow with laziness, something they rejected. As T said: "*As a culture, please trace it back, we are not a lazy nation, as many of the researchers might want it to be. Had we been left with our original ways of life, we wouldn't be bad off."* In the same group, S said: *"I don't live in Bloemfontein. So the only time I have is in the weekends. As I take the bus, I have to get the bus at 6 am. So in terms of leisure, usually during weddings and funerals, is the only time we get together as families and as a culture."*

Like in Ghana, the question on 'feeling of control over one's own life' was difficult to understand for some. In Lesotho and in Swaziland, chieftainship is still important (in Swaziland more so than in Lesotho) and still depends on family background. N in the first Swazi FGD put it succinctly: *"If you are not born by a chief, you should never try to become one…"* Aside from this, however, most participants felt that there was a large measure of control over own life. As B said, in the same group: *"I think the passion that you are born with, it kind of directs you to that path that God has already set for you. So in our culture, we appreciate that you try to achieve that dream that you have. So we do encourage those dreamers. There are programmes now that try to ensure that. So in your example, I believe that we are more like the US. There is not really much that is already determined before you are even born."* H in the South African Swazi group said: *"We find that more and more children from poor backgrounds are becoming successful. It is expected now. We expect you to shoot up and be more successful. We expect you to try."* However, in the mixed South African group one participant qualified this. U said: *"In my admission* [to University]*, I wanted to do teaching, and I had sufficient points. Yet I did not get admitted but some others with fewer points did. So that someone had to give money. It's some sort of corruption. So I didn't like that. The level of education you get still depends on whether you have money."* T, in the South African Sotho group, gave a different type of caution: *"Our choices are limited by the rules, that we decide among ourselves. That is how it is in African cultures. Our problem is we understand freedom out of context. We are only free to choose for as long as we are within the bounds. By being educated, we will benefit. If we look at it that way, it is not about you – it goes back to the community. We get educated, so that we can take our social responsibility."*

Overall, this supports the impression that the Southern Africans are more restrained than the Ghanaians. However, it does not clearly support the differences in scores between the individual Southern African groups.

6.2.2.3 IDV

For Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV), the scores are as follows:

IDV											
Sotho-SA	Lesotho		Swazi-SA	Swaziland		Tswana-SA	Botswana		SA-Black		Ghana
64	58		53	71		55	66		58		87

The Southern African groups are all more or less in the same band and clearly less collectivist than the Ghanaians. The possible exception is Swaziland. Does this appear from the FGDs?

Individualism/collectivism is associated with the questions on the importance of making one's parents proud, with the importance of work, and to a lesser extent with the importance of being rich and the 'autonomy index', compiled from the pattern of answers to the question on child qualities.

On the importance of making parents proud, Ghanaians mostly volunteered additional information on the importance of parents in the choices children make. Southern African participants affirmed the importance of making one's parents proud, but in addition mostly talked about the possibility of negotiation between parents and children and about the need for parents to be supportive. As P said in the south African Tswana group: *"Our parents have hopes for us. But it is not necessary for a child to push herself to become that. Sometimes I will sit down with my parents and let them know why I do things and where my passion is. Then they will tend to understand."* This same sentiment was echoed by B in the first Swaziland group: *"We don't exactly want to use the path that they have set; we also want to make our own path."*

On question 6 (the importance of being rich), Southern African participants saw this as less important than the Ghanaians. L, in the South African Swazi group, put it this way: "*It is not [important], but if we are rich, it commands respect of the community. They will look up to you as a person and expect you to assist the community. You can then even be elected to be somebody that leads them one day. But just to be rich is not that much important."* In the first Swaziland group, T summarized: *"Most Swazis are humble people."* In the second Swaziland group, there were different opinions. N said clearly: *"In Swaziland, a man who has a lot of cows, that is a symbol of wealth. That man is greatly respected."* However, Nk felt: *"For me, it is important just to be useful members of the community. Not to strive to be rich."*

A last item of WVS analysis that is linked to the IDV dimension is the 'Autonomy Index', that is calculated from the average times the child qualities of independence and perseverance are mentioned versus the number of times faith and obedience are mentioned. This yields a score that theoretically can vary between 1 and 4 – the lower, the more autonomy. Autonomy is then related to individualism, less autonomy to collectivism. I have done this calculation for the Focus Groups as well. The South African Tswana score: 2.7; the SA Sotho: 1.9; the SA Swazi: 2.4 the SA mixed group: 2.4. The two Swazi groups scored higher: 2.9 and 2.7. The Lesotho group scored highest: 3.6. This outcome (with the exception of the Lesotho answer) is in line with the other data: the South Africans seem more individualist than the Ghanaians: the Ghanaian groups scored between 2.1 (for the PhD students) and 3.7. The two Swazi groups scored in the same range as the Ghanaian groups. However, one should recall that the FGD participants are not a representative sample of their population.

Combined, the difference that was expected between Ghana and Southern Africa did indeed show in the FGDs.

6.2.2.4 PDI

For the Power Distance Index (PDI), the scores are as follows:

PDI											
Sotho-SA	Lesotho		Swazi-SA	Swaziland		Tswana-SA	Botswana		SA-Black		Ghana
88	69		89	72		78	71		86		89

For me, these scores are somewhat counter-intuitive. I would have expected a lower PDI score for Southern Africa than for Ghana, with the possible exception of Swaziland. Instead, all Southern African group score more or less the same, with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland scoring lower than the others. What came out of the FGDs?

Power distance is related to the questions on the need to obey rulers and the need to make one's parents proud. In this context, I also asked a question on the importance of respect for authority, but this question in the end was not needed for the WVS analysis (as explained in appendix 1).

On the need to obey rulers, all groups gave answers that qualified this need, with the exception of those in Lesotho. There, Mg summarized the position in a way similar to Ghana: *"Here you obey before you complain."*

I discussed this issue with in the expert meeting in Botswana. They were surprised by the lower score on PDI compared to South Africa, because they feel that as a whole, Botswana is more conservative than South Africa. On the other hand, they did say that the *Kgotla* system is still alive and changing with the times. Nowadays, women can also speak at the meetings. It remains possible, if done respectfully, to disagree with the Chief and the Chief does not always get his way. In some areas, it is

also extended to the smaller-scale wards, where consultation takes place at the grassroots level. On the other hand, the experts warned against too romantic a picture of the *Kgotla* system and hinted that it was being manipulated behind the scenes by the men in power, who often did not even come to the meetings.

In the South African Tswana group, Sh said: *"We don't like dictatorship or authoritarianism. We are essentially a democratic tribe. We even have proverbs for that."* In the Sotho group, S said: *"Authority means that respect is earned. Children should be taught discipline, but from there comes respect, not only for teachers, but for every person. You have to be the leader who also shows respect. So it's a process."* This sentiment was echoed in several other groups.

The picture in the Swazi groups was somewhat mixed. Th in the first Swaziland group said: *"Sometimes what helps is the appreciation – you have to appreciate this thing they ask of you, even if it is not ok. After the appreciation, whatever you say after that, the person will have to listen to you. Then the person may be able to realize, no, I made a mistake. The manner of communication can make it work."* The picture was different in the second Swaziland group, where Sh said: *"I think that here in Swaziland, most of the time, you obey them just to maintain peace in the country, even if you don't agree with what they are doing."* A similar sentiment was expressed in the South African Swazi group. Is said: "*Our culture is based on the Bible, which makes us respect authority. Even before, our culture was more similar to the Bible."* L added: *"Sometimes you don't even tell them that you don't obey. You agree. We are bred so that we won't say no."*

As explained above, the responses on making one's parents proud also showed somewhat less of an inclination to respect power differences than those from Ghana.

All in all then, the Focus Group Discussions run counter to the Afrobarometer scores and would support the idea that in fact, the PDI in Southern Africa is lower than in Ghana, with the Swazi scoring the highest in the region. Further research would be needed to establish what comes closer to the truth.

6.2.2.5 Other differences and similarities

The free discussion showed some interesting points. One thing I noticed were the different sentiments shared by the lecturers in Mafeking and in Bloemfontein. The Mafeking campus is new and virtually black-only. The Bloemfontein campus has a long tradition and is very mixed. It seems that the Bloemfontein lecturers felt that had to fight an uphill battle, something not expressed in the same way in Mafeking. As T mentioned, *"When you come to a space like this, it's where you find differences. One example: here at the University, I argued against the use of Afrikaans as the second language. That is still going on. It is in that kind of context that the happiness is compromised. Then you can't really claim to be happy as a cultural person, especially not as a suffocated culture or language. I can't explain science to my African students in my language! Because if I try that, then if there are English or Afrikaans speakers, they are the first ones to run to the dean."* J concurred: *"I am teaching my language in another language. In fact, I am using Afrikaans and English in teaching Sesotho. So I am not happy at all academically."*

In the FGDs, a division was visible between the younger 'born free' generation and the people who grew up under Apartheid. Be, in the mixed South African group, remarked: *"The born free whites, they get the idea. But the older ones, they are not getting the idea."* In most groups, the older participants discussed the difficult experiences of racism and oppression. The younger participants respected this, but conveyed the idea that things are changing and seemed optimistic that a new South African identity was forming.

Generally, participants were happy with the country they were in – South Africans were happy they were not of Lesotho or Swaziland or Botswana; the people from Lesotho and Swaziland were happy they were not South Africans. Perhaps because I spoke to people with an interest in language, several participants stressed the importance of that. In the South African Tswana group, SI remarked: *"In the past there were two languages that were said to be official, English and Afrikaans. Now, the constitution has recognized the indigenous languages that were cast aside in the past. I am proud of our multilingualism and multiculturalism."* Groups perceived differences in mentality between the South Africans and the others. Their neighbours generally described the South Africans as lazy and arrogant, expecting their government to take of everything. The South Africans felt there is a difference in mentality between those 'born free' and those who grew up under Apartheid. Regarding the difference between the Swazi of South Africa and of Swaziland, Tu in the South African Swazi group said: *"Swazis in Swaziland, they are too different from us. Because in South Africa, we are diverse and mix with other cultures, like here. The way they do things is different. We are supposed to have the same culture, but because of diversity, we are mixed a little more with other cultures."*

I asked several groups whether they saw any differences in mentality between different ethnolinguistic group in South Africa. In the South African Tswana group, participants felt bad about common perceptions of differences between the Nguni and the Sotho-Tswana. SI said: *"That's old-fashioned stereotyping. It cannot be true. It's about ideas who are stupid and who are smart – but they are wrong."* O added: "*The Tswana are timid, the Zulus are stiff-necked, those are the stereotypes flying around. They are all over the world."* However, in the South African Sotho group Z, who has a mixed background, said: *"I have to act differently if I am with different family members, who have different backgrounds. For example, when I'm with Xhosa relatives, I can kiss my grandfather. But when I'm with Tswana, I cannot kiss a male. But you learn how to behave in different situations."* In the same group, S added: *"Division is no longer about colour, it is about language. We have coloureds and black people who speak Afrikaans fluently – they can be free with the whites, because of the language. But if you don't know the language, you can see the division among the two."* Z added: *"Even among the blacks, Xhosas tend to go with Xhosas. We want to be in our comfort zone. Here I have friends from different groups, but they are different groups."* This may be related to the linguistic differences between Xhosa and Sotho. In the South African Swazi group, most people had a different perception. H remarked: *"We are so used to it. When somebody doesn't understand, we normally switch to another language. Here, it's often SiSwati, because it's what most people speak. What makes it easy is that some of the languages relate to each other. So the Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi and a bit of Ndebele, you can understand."*

6.2.3 Discussion and conclusions

Based on the Ghana field visit, I had expected that differences in Afrobarometer scores of around 20 points would also be visible in the FGDs in Southern Africa. To some extent, this has happened – but the results are not conclusive in all cases.

The Afrobarometer scores on the LTO and IDV dimensions were largely found as well in the FGDs. For IVR, a difference was visible between the Ghanaian and the South African answers, but differences between individual Southern African groups were not clearly seen. For PDI, the FGD discussions would support a lower score on PDI in Southern Africa than in Ghana, running counter to the Afrobarometer scores.

Keeping this in mind, what can we learn from the Afrobarometer scores for each of the three ethnolinguistic groups? Below, the picture is presented in five radar graphs: one for each of the three

groups in the two countries, one for the three South African groups together with the average score for all Black groups in South Africa and one for the three groups that are not South African.







From these graphs, the picture emerges that the Sotho and Swazi are indeed culturally different in the two countries, but each in their own ways: the Sotho in Lesotho score much lower on Indulgence and much higher on 'Monumentalism' than their South African counterparts. The Swazi and the Tswana both score lower on PDI than their South African counterparts – but this would require further research – and are more collectivist than their South African counterparts. The Tswana of Botswana seem closer to their South African counterparts than the other groups are.


Sotho, Swazi and Tswana in South Africa
PDI
100
80
60
40
20
0
IDV
LTO
IVR
South Africa-Tswana
South Africa-Sotho
South Africa-Swazi
South Africa-Black


Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
PDI
100
80
60
40
20
0
IDV
LTO
IVR
Botswana-Tswana
Lesotho
Swaziland

The South African groups resemble one another more than the three countries do. Linguistically and historically, the Sotho-Tswana have common roots. However, the history of the region has led to a separation, so the Sotho of Lesotho and the Tswana of Botswana should now be considered culturally separate groups who are different from each other on the LTO and IVR dimensions (and less so on PDI), whereas the Sotho and Tswana of South Africa, even though different from one another on the LTO dimension, seem to be part of one relatively new South African identity.

Both the analysis of the Afrobarometer data and the Focus Group Discussions are exploratory in nature, as explained in chapter 3 and have their flaws and inherent inaccuracies. To my knowledge, this type of research has not been done before. However, I think I have demonstrated that the approach holds promise and would deserve to be extended, backed by more resources. I will return to this in chapter 7.

Returning to the questions asked in section 6.2.2.1 above, my exploration of cultural differences and similarities seems to justify some cautious conclusions: indeed, a new identity has formed in South Africa. In this region, it seems that national borders have also become cultural borders; this could be an indication that the predictions of Vansina as sketched in chapter 1 are becoming a reality here.

6.3 Data on some ethnic group across borders

6.3.1 Introduction

In the last section, I showed how in Southern Africa there are some situations where the linguistic situation and the cultural situation do not overlap.

On the one hand, the SeSotho of Lesotho, the SeSotho and the Tswana of South Africa and the Tswana of Botswana can be said to be speaking the same Sotho-Tswana language. Even though there are minor differences, Sotho-Tswana is intelligible with little effort across the three countries. Yet culturally, these groups have become separated.

The converse also occurs: the South African Swazi speak a different language from the Sotho and the Tswana, but culturally, they are close and can be said to be part of the same South African culture.

This situation is not unique to Africa: long ago, Hofstede (2001:63/64) has already documented it for Belgium. The Dutch speakers of Belgium and those of the Netherlands, although they speak the same language, are culturally different. Conversely, the Belgian Dutch and the French speakers, although the languages are quite different, together are part of the same culture.

How prevalent would both situations be in Africa, a continent marred by ‘partitioned Africans’, to use the term coined by Asiwaju(1985)? Has national culture trumped ethnicity across the continent, as Minkov and Hofstede(2012) have asserted? MacLean(2010) has investigated this for the Akan in Ghana and in Côte d’Ivoire, and she finds, to her surprise, that indeed the Akan of Ghana are different from those in the neighbouring country. Englebert(2011), pointing to the work of Nugent(2002), feels that in fact this situation is quite common; he is not surprised. Vansina (1990) documented the existence in the past of an ‘Equatorial tradition’ that covered peoples speaking many different languages. Does that still exist today?

The Afrobarometer analysis I have undertaken allows me to compare a number of cross-border situations. It illustrates the point that Southern Africa is not unique and that in fact, both situations found there are also found in other parts of the continent.

6.3.2 Partitioned Africans

In the tables that follow, the Afrobarometer scores on the four dimensions are given for some ethnolinguistic groups from West, Eastern and Southern Africa. (Central Africa is unfortunately not well represented in the Afrobarometer survey). Differences of 20 or more have been highlighted in green – as a rule of thumb, I consider that where those differences occur, groups are culturally different. (My impression is that this boundary is too strict, but further research would be needed to determine this.)

6.3.2.1 West Africa

Bénin and Togo: the Adja and the Fon

Code	Name	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
BJA	Benin-Adja	88	78	79	43
BJF	Benin-Fon	84	95	78	56
TGA	Togo-Adja	67	82	66	47
Largest difference		**21**	17	13	13

Ghana and Togo: the Ewe

Code	Name	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
GHE	Ghana-Ewe	70	94	114	79
TGE	Togo-Ewe	73	91	74	73
Largest difference		3	3	**40**	6

Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana: the Akan

Code	Name	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
CIA	CdI-Akan	67	94	80	25
GHA	Ghana-Akan	90	89	108	84
Largest difference		**23**	5	**28**	**59**

In section 6.3.1 I outlined two situations: one where groups that speak the same language are nevertheless culturally different, and the other where groups speak different languages yet share the same culture. Both situations seem to occur in West Africa. The Adja and Fon are closer to one another than the other groups (with the possible exception). Adja and Fon are both Gbe languages. Prah(2012:302) considers both to be part of the same language.

6.3.2.2 Eastern Africa

Kenya and Uganda: the Acholi, Langi and Luo

Code	Name	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
UGAch	Uganda-Acholi	68	74	69	30
UGLa	Uganda-Langi	71	75	73	23
KELu	Kenya-Luo	78	67	81	37
Largest difference		10	8	12	14

Mozambique and Tanzania: the Makonde

Code	Name	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
MZMk	Mozambique-Makonde	55	60	100	-2
TZM	Tanzania-Makonde	84	75	109	25
Largest difference		**29**	15	9	**27**

Even though they are known under different names, the Acholi, Langi and Luo are all Luo peoples who seem to have been able to keep their cultural likeness intact, although they live in two different countries. This seems to be different for the Makonde.

6.3.2.3 Southern Africa

Botswana and South Africa: the Tswana

Code	Name	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
BWT	Botswana-Tswana	71	66	49	28
ZATsw	South Africa-Tswana	78	55	51	29
Largest difference		7	11	2	1

Lesotho and South Africa: the SeSotho

Code	Name	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
LS	Lesotho	69	58	94	-1
ZASo	South Africa-Sotho	88	64	72	33
Largest difference		19	6	**22**	**34**

Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia: the Chewa/Nyanja/Tumbuka

Code	Name	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
ZMN	Zambia-Nyanja	89	56	101	35
MWC	Malawi-Chewa	71	62	35	51
MWT	Malawi-Tumbuka	65	76	50	40
MZNy	Mozambique-Nyanja	48	27	66	-22
Largest difference		**41**	**49**	**67**	**73**

South Africa and Swaziland: the Swazi

Code	Name	PDI	IDV	LTO	IVR
ZASw	South Africa-Swazi	89	53	68	34
SZ	Swaziland	72	71	77	29
Largest difference		17	19	9	5

The groups that overlap in South Africa have been discussed in section 6.2. It seems that the Nyanja/Chewa and the Tumbuka of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are culturally quite different from one another.

6.4 Discussion and conclusions

In the foregoing chapters, I have outlined the importance of re-examining cultural differences and similarities in Africa, I defended my choice for using the Hofstede/Minkov approach as developed in cross-cultural psychology and I showed the method I developed for analysing World Values and Afrobarometer survey data.

In this chapter, I have presented some of the key results of my analysis and I have explored some of the further analysis that could be carried out based on the data.

Through desk study, a short fieldwork period in Ghana and expert interviews, I explored whether or not and to what extent it would be possible to triangulate the survey-based approach through a different, qualitative method. For Ghana, I found that the FGDs did not bring to light large cultural differences. The exception is that the difference in Power distance (PDI) between the Akan and the Ewe was indeed noticeable in the FGDs. Based on the findings, I proposed that a difference of around 20 points on a 100-point scale more or less constitutes the just-noticeable difference between ethnolinguistic groups.

For Southern Africa, I found that the SeSotho, Swazi and Tswana of South Africa groups resemble one another more than the three countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) do. Linguistically and historically, the Sotho-Tswana have common roots. However, the history of the region has led to a separation, so the SeSotho of Lesotho and the Tswana of Botswana should now be considered culturally separate groups who are different from each other on the LTO and IVR dimensions, whereas the SeSotho and Tswana of South Africa, even though different from one another on the LTO dimension, seem to be part of one relatively new South African identity.

I based my eleven Focus Group Discussions in part on the same World Values Survey questions that formed the basis of quantitative analysis. The approach of talking about the dimensions and asking the questions that they are related to seems to be fruitful; whereas a free discussion on cultural differences and similarities leads either to a discussion of differences in material culture or to very general stereotyping, the discussion on the dimensions and the related questions leads to answers that are comparable and nuanced.

The FGDs in Southern Africa largely confirmed the outcomes that I had expected after the Ghana field visit, but the results are not conclusive in all cases.

The Afrobarometer scores on the LTO and IDV dimensions were largely found also in the FGDs in Southern Africa. For IVR, a difference was visible between the Ghanaian and the South African answers, but differences between individual Southern African groups were not clearly seen. For PDI, the FGD discussions would support a lower score on PDI in Southern Africa than in Ghana, running counter to the Afrobarometer scores.

These results are not entirely unexpected: in chapter 5, I have already outlined that my methods are constrained by the limitations inherent in using existing datasets that were not conceived for the purpose of my investigation and by other resource limitations. There is a level of imprecision that is in part related to the subject matter itself and in part to the research methods used. Still, I have argued that the method is good enough to discern general patterns and to address the research question as posed in chapter 3.

Boosted by the results from the field visits, I have explored an additional analysis of the quantitative data, with interesting results. In 6.3, I compared a number of ethnolinguistic groups who have been partitioned by national borders. As in Southern Africa, I found a number of situations where groups share the same language, but not the same culture. I also found the converse: situations where different ethnolinguistic groups share the same culture. Further analyses such as a cluster analysis would be possible as well, but they fall outside the scope of this thesis.

These results then allow me to combine the insights of chapters 4, 5 and 6 with the issues raised in the introduction and in chapter 2 and to suggest some more general conclusions and ideas for further research. This is the topic of the next chapter.

7. CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Some key points from the research

In the introduction, I pointed out how two contradictory narratives exist about Africa: the 'Africa is a country' narrative that claims that Africans all largely resemble one another and the 'Tower of Babel' narrative that claims Africa is a continent of infinite cultural diversity. There seems to be nothing in-between. Both of these tropes have the effect of disempowering Africans, blocking African agency in matters of culture and language. I called for a new perspective, one based on a fresh look at Africa's cultural and linguistic diversity.

In order to arrive at such a perspective, my theoretical starting point is that of Vansina (1992) on cultural autonomy. Vansina holds that Africa was never a cultural whole and describes a limited number of cultural traditions of precolonial times, that lost their autonomy due to the violent European conquest and domination in the colonial period. He predicted the emergence of several new African traditions, based on African languages, that would again have autonomy. I assumed that indications of such developments might be visible now, but that there is a need for a method to search for them and a vocabulary for describing them.

These considerations led to the following research questions:

- How do ethnolinguistic groups self-report on their cultural values via the World Values and Afrobarometer surveys? What are the main commonalities and differences between such groups and between groups and the national level?
- How do people self-assess similarities and differences in values in their country via focus group discussions?
- How do the results from the above compare with insights obtained from ethnographic studies and from interviews with key experts in the field?

I outlined some of the limitations to my research, related both to the survey material used as the basis and to resource limitations. The research I undertook should be understood as a 'proof of concept', hopefully leading to further and better research.

I outlined how, from a methodological point of view, the approach of cross-cultural psychology, based as it is on self-perceptions of people around the world as evidenced in value surveys, might provide both a research method and a vocabulary. Various criticisms have been levelled at cross-cultural psychology. I reject the idea that it is useless to talk about 'culture' at all, although I do think conceptual clarity is very important in this context (and often lacking). With Smelser and Hofstede, I think cultures can be studied as constructs that help us understand social reality.

I compared three key approaches within cultural psychology and defended my choice for using the oldest of these, the Hofstede/Minkov approach: it is still evolving, it is in principle open to new inputs from other cultures and it is multi-dimensional. I argued why it would be important to ty to triangulate the data from the survey-based analysis of cross-cultural psychology in some way and explained how I sought to do that through Focus Group Discussions, expert interviews and desk study.

I was able to anchor a number of WVS variables to the Hofstede/Minkov dimension scores for the dimensions of Long-Term Orientation (or 'Fix or Flex')(LTO), Individualism/collectivism (IDV), Power Distance (PDI) and Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR), with correlations of around 0.9 between my scores, based on Waves 5 and 6 of the World Values Survey, and the Hofstede/Minkov scores for

between 29 and 47 overlapping countries. It was not possible to do the same for the Hofstede dimensions of Masculinity/Femininity and Uncertainty Avoidance.

Based on the calculation for the overlapping countries, it was possible, using the same method, to compute scores for 42 African ethnolinguistic groups on the LTO, IDV and IVR dimensions and for 23 groups for the PDI dimension.

Using a similar method, it then turned out to be possible to replicate the IVR, LTO, IDV and PDI Hofstede/Minkov dimensions in the Afrobarometer round 6 data, showing strong correlations between the WVS-based and the Afrobarometer-based scores. This enabled me to develop a major extension to the data, leading to new information on 35 African countries and over 200 African ethnolinguistic groups. This is based on information provided directly by Africans themselves. It is also recent, based on data collected after 2010.

Comparing data from quantitative research with data obtained through qualitative research is not a straightforward matter. I tried to do this by holding eleven Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in four different countries: Ghana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland. I based my Focus Group Discussions in part on the same World Values Survey questions that formed the basis of quantitative analysis. The approach of talking about the dimensions and asking the questions that they are related to seems to be fruitful; whereas a free discussion on cultural differences and similarities leads either to a discussion of differences in material culture or to very general stereotyping, the discussion on the dimensions and the related questions leads to answers that are comparable and nuanced. Ideas from the literature and inputs from experts were important for providing an overall context to the research and helped to get a better insight into gaps in the existing knowledge about cultural differences and similarities in Africa.

The combination of quantitative analysis with fieldwork in Ghana showed that there is a national culture developing in Ghana, dominated by the Akan, who make up around 50% of the population. However, it also seems from the quantitative data that there are some differences, notably in that some of the smaller groups seem to be more restrained than the average for Ghana. I found that on Power Distance, the difference between the Akan and the Ewe was noticeable also from the Focus Group discussions; I hypothesized that a difference of around 20 points on a 100-point scale would constitute the just-noticeable difference (JND).

For Southern Africa, I focused on three ethnolinguistic groups that straddle borders: the SeSotho, Swazi and Tswana. It is clear that in South Africa, the autonomous cultural traditions that existed before must have been seriously compromised, to say the least, in the violent and pervasive colonial and Apartheid eras. But has this led to the emergence of a new national identity in South Africa, or have the ethnolinguistic groups been able to keep their identities intact, even though they are separated by country borders? Several studies have tried to use the Hofstede dimensions in South Africa. However, they are inconclusive on this point.

The work of Gulbrandsen(2012) on Botswana is especially relevant. He shows how the success of Botswana as a state is tied to the relative cultural homogeneity of the country: in Botswana, state formation that is rooted in indigenous conceptions of authority is possible because these conceptions are shared by a large majority of the people living in Botswana. Likewise, resistance to this authority can also be rooted in indigenous conceptions, for the same reason, the relative cultural homogeneity of the country. By and large, Botswana has been able to keep its autonomy (as described by Vansina) intact. Because of this, it has been able to make use of the opportunities that presented themselves. In terms of explaining Botswana's success, its cultural integrity can be seen as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for success. This is partly confirmed by the literature on

Lesotho and Swaziland. There, cultural autonomy remained relatively intact as well – however, both countries are not doing nearly as well as Botswana. This may be largely related to differences in the natural resource base between the countries.

It stands to reason to assume that the cultural unity of the SeSotho, Swazi and Tswana has been broken. Indeed, in my research, I found that the South African groups resemble one another more than the three countries do. Linguistically and historically, the Sotho-Tswana have common roots. However, the history of the region has led to a separation, so the SeSotho of Lesotho and the Tswana of Botswana should now be considered culturally separate groups who are different from each other on the LTO and IVR dimensions, whereas the SeSotho and Tswana of South Africa, even though different from one another on the LTO dimension, seem to be part of one relatively new South African identity. In Southern Africa, it seems that national borders have also become cultural borders. However, more research, using more refined methods and more resources would be needed to gain a better understanding of this.

I have examined the quantitative data on some ethnolinguistic groups that are split by national boundaries. They show that Southern Africa is not unique: there are ethnolinguistic groups in Africa that speak different languages, but still seem to be part of the same cultural tradition such as the Shona and Ndebele of Zimbabwe. On the other hand, there are also ethnolinguistic groups that seem to be part of two different cultures such as the Akan of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. This may in fact be a sign that the theory of Vansina is true: in some areas, national cultures seem to be emerging. However, this process is far from even; developments in one part of Africa cannot easily be generalized to the rest of the continent. Thus, the Acholi, Langi and Luo of Kenya and Uganda exhibit stronger cultural similarities. Of course, cultural autonomy is no guarantee for a peaceful, conflict-free development. In fact, many of the authors I cited have described the internal conflicts that have played havoc in African societies; Appadurai (2006) has tried to understand this in a larger context. But that should not lead us to feel cultural autonomy is unimportant or that cultural traditions in Vansina's sense should not be studied. Progressive-thinking people make a mistake if they leave the study of cultural values out of their work or limit themselves to class consciousness only.

Etounga-Manguelle (2000) has asked if Africa needs a 'cultural adjustment programme'. I think this may not be needed, because African cultures, like all cultures, are constantly changing and adapting. However, attention to the development of cultural autonomy is certainly needed.

Coming back to the 'Africa is a country' and the 'Tower of Babel' tropes, I think my research, though limited, has succeeded in its mission of showing 'proof of concept'. It is possible to assess cultural similarities and differences in Africa using the instruments of cross-cultural psychology. There *do* seem to be signs of new cultural traditions forming in Africa, traditions that overcome the narrow ethnolinguistic boundaries that often have been put in place in colonial times. In some cases, these seem to conform to national boundaries – in other cases, they do not. In those latter cases, some form of far-reaching regional autonomy may be the only way forward, although that represents an entirely different topic.[1]

7.2 Directions for further research

The findings of my exploratory research support the idea that a new perspective on African identities is necessary and possible. In many, but not in all cases the ethnolinguistic groups that have been

[1] See for example Van Erk (2015) for a discussion of some of the do's and don'ts.

defined in colonial times seem to have lost their relevance; for some countries, ethnolinguistic groups seem so similar that one wonders about the usefulness of the distinctions.

However, important cultural differences in Africa remain and it is important to create new knowledge on what these differences are and on where the main distinctions lie. Without such knowledge, attempts to build stronger pan-African collaborations or stronger grassroots-based democratic structures will remain founded on quicksand.

The data set that I created may be used for further forms of analysis, such as a cluster analysis and a comparison between continents.

It would be useful to include a new version of the VSM in the next wave of the WVS and Afrobarometer surveys, a version that takes some of the last Minkov findings on board. This would be important as well in order to try to generate data on the MAS/FEM and UAI dimensions. Care should then be taken that the sampling is refined, so that it becomes representative also of major in-country ethnolinguistic groups.

It would also be useful to continue where Noorderhaven and Tidjani (2001) left off, and to explore if values held by some groups in Africa should be taken on board when researching cultural dimensions.

The Focus Group discussion method I employed was a relatively coarse one. It would be interesting to explore if a better method could be developed of asking questions of groups with a more controlled and perhaps more representative composition.

7.3 Final – some points of wider relevance

Lastly, a brief discussion is in order of the wider relevance of my research, and here I would like to make three points.

The first point is related to language. One of the reasons that is often cited for maintaining the privileged position of the former colonial languages is their importance for maintaining national unity. However, in many cases, this is not necessary. As Buzási (2016) has shown with her 'Index of Communication Potential', there are many African countries where one or a few indigenous languages are spoken as mother tongue or as a second or third language by almost the entire population. As both the literature and my data show, for example, the Akan of Ghana are culturally different from those in Côte d'Ivoire. This will not change if the position of Twi is strengthened in both countries – it will not lead to a threat to national unity. Rather, using one or a few indigenous languages will strengthen the possibilities for the emergence of cultural autonomy.

The second point is related to the dangers of over-generalization. The idea that somehow, 'tribes' will disappear and coherent 'nations' will appear is partly based on how Europeans popularly perceive their own history: in pre-Christian times, in Europe there lived primitive, heathen tribes – who then (fast forward) morphed into the civilized nations we know today. The idea that somehow, Africa is 'behind' in this but that eventually, it will catch up is again a counterproductive trope. It could be that in some countries, such developments do occur. But there is no way of generalizing. The Afrobarometer survey is possible only in those countries in Africa that have a minimum level of peace and security. What would the situation be like in countries that are not included in these

surveys? It could well be that some of Africa's 'failed states' will never work within their present boundaries.[2]

The last point is related to paragraph 28 of the UN Agenda 2030 (UN 2015:12): *"We commit to making fundamental changes in the way that our societies produce and consume goods and services."* For too long, the West has been held up as a shining example of peace and prosperity that the rest of the world should seek to emulate. What has been ignored is that this prosperity has been achieved at tremendous cost, not only to colonized peoples, but also to the natural resource base of our world. If 'fundamental changes in the way that our societies produce and consume' are needed, that is tantamount to saying that fundamental cultural change is needed, perhaps not first of all in Africa, but first of all in the West. Perhaps those that sing the praises of 'African' values of community, humane-ness and Ubuntu are a bit too romantic about it – but it is certainly conceivable that the world can learn something from African cultural approaches. However, these should, first of all, be allowed to find and develop a new autonomy.

[2] Adebajo (2010) has called for a "New Berlin Conference" to address some of these problems.

8. Appendices

8.1 Additional material on the quantitative analysis

In the WVS and the Afrobarometer survey, not every question was asked in every country. In those cases, I used a value for my calculation that was taken from the country or ethnolinguistic group that scored the most similar on all the other questions relevant for that dimension. This same value was then used for all ethnolinguistic groups from that country. This means that the scores for certain dimensions in a few countries should be treated with some caution. Specifically, this concerns:

- Morocco for PDI in the WVS;
- Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Swaziland and Tunisia for PDI in the Afrobarometer data;
- Algeria, Cape Verde, Egypt, Mauritius, São Tomé and Sudan for IDV in the Afrobarometer data;
- Cape Verde, Mauritius, Mozambique, São Tomé and Principé and Swaziland for LTO in the Afrobarometer data.

For all these countries there was only one missing value, with the exception of LTO for Swaziland, for which there were three missing values.

In most cases, the scores on the individual variables are the statistical mean for that variable, as calculated in SPSS. Raw scores were calculated by multiplying the scores with their weights and then taking the average. The general formula for converting these scores to a range that fits with a scale running from zero to 100 is:

$$S_{Dim} = Min_{ref} + ((R - Min_{raw})/F)$$

In this formula, S_{Dim} stands for the score on a particular dimension; Min_{ref} stands for the minimum Hofstede/Minkov score for the range of countries and groups that overlap (meaning either the overlap between Hofstede/Minkov countries and the WVS countries, or the overlap between WVS countries and ethnolinguistic groups and Afrobarometer countries and ethnolinguistic groups). R stands for the raw score. Min_{raw} is the lowest raw score for the range of countries and groups that overlap.

F in this formula is $\Delta_{raw}/\Delta_{ref}$, where Δ_{raw} is the difference between the highest and the lowest value in the range of raw scores for overlapping countries and groups and Δ_{ref} is the difference between the highest and lowest value in the range of Hofstede/Minkov or WVS scores for overlapping countries and groups.

The Hofstede scores are already in a zero to 100 range. The Minkov scores were converted to that same range.

The effect of this is that the minimum WVS score on any dimension is equal to the minimum score on that dimension in the overlapping group of countries for which I have a Hofstede/Minkov score.

Each score was then multiplied by a final factor, depending on its position in relation to one or more tipping points for the scale of that dimension. An example is given below.

In some cases, I preferred to reverse the scale. There, $S_{Dim} = 100 - (R - Min_{raw})/F$. In theory, the Hofstede/Minkov dimensions are independent of each other. In practice, however, within the universe of 59 countries for which scores are known for the six dimensions, some combinations of scores occur more frequently than others. Because there are six scales with two ordering options each (zero-100 or 100-zero), the possible number of scale configurations is $2^6 = 64$. One way of

optimizing the scale configuration is by picking the configuration with the lowest possible average standard deviation between the values for each country. In the original Hofstede scale, this average is 18.4. In the configuration I have chosen, the values for the LTO and IDV dimensions are inverted compared to the Hofstede scales (so a value of zero becomes 100, 80 becomes 20, and so on). This leads to an average standard deviation of 16.1. In my case, it also has the effect that a country like Ghana, which scores close to one of the extreme ends of the scale on all dimensions, scores towards the same end of the scale on all dimensions.

WVS

The table below shows which WVS wave 6 variables were included and the weight given to the variables. Column 1 shows the variable. For every dimension, column TP shows the 'tipping point' for those variables where this is applicable: values above this point were multiplied by the factor in column W1, values at or below with the factor in column W2. In For IVR, there are no tipping points. For PDI, variables V9 and V145 have two tipping points: TP1 gives the highest value, TP2 the lower one, leading to three multiplication factors.

Dim:	LTO			IVR	IDV			PDI				
Var:	W1	W2	TP	W	W1	W2	TP	W1	W2	W3	TP1	TP2
V6				0.95								
V8					-1.10	-0.80	3.40					
V9								-3.00	-5.90	-3.10	2.80	2.40
V10				1.00								
V16								-1.70	-2.30		2.80	
V17	1.20	1.75	2.30									
V18	0.40											
V21	0.60	0.30	2.20									
V49					-4.50			1.75				
V55				0.80								
V71					-2.00							
V79								1.00				
V138								3.70	3.50		2.70	
V145								-6.60	-0.40	1.70	2.60	1.50
V211	1.10											
Y003					-0.40	-0.10	2.50					

Variable weights and tipping points.

The table below gives the scale tipping points and the weights, used after the calculation of the raw scores. For LTO, there is no scale tipping point.

	IVR		IDV		PDI	
	TP	W	TP	W	TP	W
>	67	1.03	20	1.00	55	1.50
>	61	0.92				
remaining		0.78		1.40		0.75

Scale tipping points and weights.

An example: for Ghana, the raw IVR scores are 3.39, 3.34 and 2.97 for V6, V10 and V55. Using the factors given above, this leads to scores of 3.22, 3.34 and 2.38. The average gives the raw score of 2.98.

Δ_{raw} is 1.035. Δ_{ref} is 98. F = $\Delta_{raw}/\Delta_{ref}$ = 0.0107. Min_{ref} = 0. Min_{raw} = 2.16

S_{IVR} = 0 + ((2.98 – 2.155)/0.0107) = 77.4

Because 77 is above the scale tipping point of 67, the value is multiplied by 1.03, giving a final score of 79.7, rounded off to 80.

For **LTO**, the calculation is based on four questions. For question V211, the statistical mean was taken. For the other three questions, SPSS gave the percentage of respondents that reported a certain child quality as being important. These percentages were multiplied by 0.04, so that a 100% score would yield a score of 4. For question V21, the scores were in the opposite direction. In order to correct for this, the negative of the score was taken and 4 was added to all scores (so that a score of 0% would be translated into 4).

The Minkov factor scores range from -187 to 234 for the overlapping countries; my scores from 1.05 to 2.23. The overall minimum score of Minkov is -207, the maximum 234. In this scale, -207 stands for highly 'monumentalist'. I would like the scale to be reversed. Therefore, a scale has been chosen that will make -207 equal to 100, 234 equal to zero. In my scale, then, -185 translates to 95.5.

For **IDV**, the calculation is based on three WVS questions and the WVS 'autonomy index' (V8, V19, V71 and Y003). For V8 and V19, the statistical mean was taken. In the WVS, question V71 has six possible answers, as opposed to four possible answers for most other questions. In order to compensate for this, the scale was reconfigured, leading to a maximum score of 4 and a minimum of 1. (I later came to the conclusion that this step was not necessary, but here it has been done this way). Y003 had five possible answers, and the same procedure was followed as for V71.

For **PDI**, it was more difficult to achieve a satisfactory level of correlation; the process had several iterations. At face value, V69 (greater respect for authority) seemed conceptually related. However, the correlation between this factor and the Hofstede index is a weak .33 and in the end, it was not needed for the best solution I found. In its final iteration, PDI is based on six questions. For V9 and V49, the statistical mean was taken. V79, V145 and V138 had respectively 6, 7 and 10 possible answers. In order to compensate for this, these scales were reconfigured, leading to a maximum score of 4 and a minimum of 1. For V16, SPSS gave the percentage of respondents that reported a certain child quality as being important. This percentage was multiplied by 0.04, so that a 100% score would yield a score of 4.

Hofstede Insights

The data used by Minkov for IDV and LTO are based on a study he conducted for **Itim**, an agency that provides among other things cross-cultural training in organisational management. It merged in 2017 to become Hofstede Insights[1].

The study was funded by Mediacom, a large multinational advertising and marketing agency. This data is proprietary. However, I was given access to the data from the three African countries included in the study (Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa) upon signing a non-disclosure agreement.

[1] https://www.hofstede-insights.com/

The data for Nigeria showed that the sample was not representative at the ethnolinguistic group level: the Hausa formed only 2.4% of the sample – a percentage that is clearly not representative. In order to deal with that, I have calculated separate scores for the Yoruba and the Igbo, the only two ethnolinguistic groups that were included in the sample in sufficient numbers. The same split into four groups was used as for the WVS analysis and correction factors were applied in the same way.

Minkov has taken data for the South African blacks only, but in fact the sample included answers from many more whites than from blacks. It was possible to compute separate scores for the South African Sotho, Xhosa and Zulu and for the Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking whites as well as for Indians. The South African Blacks, Sotho, Xhosa and Zulu, Afrikaans and English-speaking whites and the Nigerian Igbo and Yoruba together gave eight groups that were used as the basis for calculating related scores for the South African Indians, for Kenya as a whole and for the Kalenjin, Kamba, Kikuyu, Luhya and Luo.

Using essentially the same method as for the WVS, the same four dimensions could be found as in the WVS data, with correlations r between WVS-based and Itim-derived scores of around 0.9. For IDV, LTO/MON-FLEX and IVR, $p < 0.001$, for PDI $p < 0.01$. The scores have been included in Appendix 3.

Afrobarometer

In most countries, I used Q87 (ethnic group) to make the distinction between ethnic groups. Below is a list of countries where I (partly) did something different:

Algeria

40% of respondents say they feel a national identity only. Therefore, the only separate group that was analysed was that of the Berber speakers (based on Q2).

Botswana

Q2 (language) and Q87 (tribe or ethnic group) do not always give the same numbers, even where the name of the language and the name of the ethnic group is the same. This could be related to prevalent bilingualism in minority ethnic groups, but I have not investigated this.

For Botswana, I separated out the Karanga as ethnic group (Q87) and the Karanga speakers (Q2); I did the same for the Kgalagadi. The results are not very different, but see section 5.5.

Burundi

Q87 was not asked in Burundi, no ethnolinguistic split has been made.

Cape Verde

Cape Verde is ethnolinguistically homogeneous and this is reflected in the answers; no ethnolinguistic split has been made.

Egypt

Q87 was not asked. All respondents are Arab speakers.

Madagascar

It would be possible to prepare separate scores for a fairly large number of ethnic groups in Madagascar. I have not done this.

Morocco

As in Algeria, the only separate group that was analysed was that of the Berber speakers, based on Q2.

São Tomé and Principé

The questions on language and ethnicity did not get meaningful responses. It would be possible to split Portuguese and Criollo-speakers, but I did not do this.

Sudan

Question Q87 was not asked, the language of almost all respondents is Arabic.

South Africa

For South Africa, Q102 (race) was also taken into account. The answers for South Africa-Black come from the group that were identified as Black by answering this question. The individual ethnolinguistic groups were taken from Q87.

For the Coloureds and the Whites Q102 was combined with Q2, giving separate data for Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites and coloureds.

For the Indians, Q87 was used.

Swaziland

Almost all respondents give only a national identity.

Tunisia

Question Q87 was not asked, the language of almost all respondents is Arabic.

Zimbabwe

The Shona, Zezuru, Karanga, Manyika and Ndau were taken together as Shona.

The following two tables show the weighing for each variable, the variable tipping points and the scale tipping points, in the same way as shown for the WVS calculation above.

Dim:	LTO			IVR			IDV			PDI		
Var:	W1	W2	TP	W1	W2	TP	W1	W2	TP	W1	W2	TP
Q3										-2.00	-1.00	1.60
Q4a				1.30	1.40	1.90						
Q4b	0.50											
Q5				-1.75								
Q10a	2.00	2.50	1.30				-1.15	-1.15	0.97			
Q26b	-1.50											
Q26d							-1.30			-3.10		
Q26f										0.25		
Q35	2.25											
Q37										-2.70	-4.10	2.30
Q38				0.60								
Q42b	1.00											
Q52k	-0.50						-0.25					

Q68a										-0.75	1.00	2.70
Q69a	2.00											
Q69c	-0.80	-0.30	2.10							-6.00		
Q71a	1.00											
Q75a	-2.50									4.10	3.80	2.50
Q89e							0.40	0.30	2.70			

Variable weights and tipping points.

	LTO		IVR		IDV		PDI	
	TP	W	TP	W	TP	W	TP	W
>	90	1	55	0.95	87	0.94	86	1.01
>	81	0.87	38	0.75	82	1.11	81	1.04
>	61	1.05	28	1.00				
remaining		0.85		1.75		0.97		0.97

Scale tipping points and weights.

It is interesting to note that the results from Kenya were quite different from those obtained in an earlier study by Ketter and Arfsten (2015). The face validity of their data seems limited to me. In their data, the three pastoral peoples (the Somali, the Turkana and the Masai) seem to have little in common. The three central Bantu-speaking groups that inhabit the centre of the country (the Kikuyu, the Meru and the Kamba) also seem to be very different. The coastal, muslim Mijikenda seem most closely related to the inland, Christian Kamba. The article gives information about the age composition of the samples, but not about the gender composition. It turns out that Ketter and Arfsten did not collect gender data about their sample.[53] I have therefore excluded their data from further analysis.

[53] Michael Arfsten, e-mail communication, 5 December 2017.

8.2 Additional material on the qualitative analysis

The following table provides: 1) the question as asked in the World Values Survey; 2) the question as asked in the FGDs; 3) the dimension(s) for which it is relevant; 4) the additional prompts that were used in most FGDs. The order of the questions is the order in which they were asked during all FGDs after the first.

WVS question	FGD question	Dim	Prompt(s)
V211. How proud are you to be [French]*? (Read out and code one answer): 1 Very proud 2 Quite proud 3 Not very proud 4 Not at all proud 5 I am not [French]* (do not read out! Code only if volunteered!) * [Substitute your own nationality for "French"]	How proud are most people in your culture to be [Ghanaian]?	LTO	One could also say: "We are all children of God – our nationality is not very important…"
V10. Taking all things together, would you say you are (read out and code one answer): 1 Very happy 2 Rather happy 3 Not very happy 4 Not at all happy	In your culture, do most people think they are happy?	IVR	Of course, nobody is happy all the time. If you've just broken a leg and you are in hospital, then you will be unhappy.
For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is (read out and code one answer for each): Very important Rather important Not very important Not at all important V8. Work	How important is work in your culture?	IDV	Let me give a stereotypical example. In some cultures, like the Chinese, work seems to be everything. No matter when you look, people are always at work. In other cultures that I will not mention, people are just lazy. What's it like here?
For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is (read out and code one answer for each):	How important is leisure time in your culture?	IVR	There can be several types of leisure time, like attending social functions such as weddings or

Very important Rather important Not very important Not at all important V6. Leisure time			funerals, or going to festivals, or going out with friends in the weekend for a drink. What will you do this weekend?
For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree? (Read out and code one answer for each statement): Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree V49. One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud	In your culture, would people agree with the following statement? One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud.	IDV, PDI	- It could be that your parents want you to become one thing, but you have a different idea. Then you may not be able to make them proud. How would you handle that? - In some countries, the parents are supposed to support their children and the main goal might be to be proud of one's self, not to make the parent proud.
Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? (Code one answer for each description): V71. It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things.	Do you think your culture can be described by the following statement? In my culture, it is important to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things.	IVR	Also, in some cultures, people like to show off: they like expensive cars and gold watches and such things. In other cultures, people know of course who has got money, but the rich are reluctant to show it. What is it like here?
I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? (Code one answer for each): Good Don't mind Bad V69. Greater respect for authority	If there would be greater respect for authority, in my culture that would be seen as: Good Neutral Bad.	--	

Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy” (read out and code one answer for each): V138. People obey their rulers.	How important is this in your culture? People should obey their rulers.	PDI	There are different ways of looking at this. In some cultures, they say that you should obey before you complain. In others, they say that you should use your brain and that you should only obey if you think the ruler is right.
V55. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "no choice at all" and 10 means "a great deal of choice" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out (code one number): No choice at all A great deal of choice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	In some cultures, people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while in other cultures people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. What is it like in your culture?	IVR	- Let me give an example. In some countries, like in the United States, there is the strong believe that any newspaper boy can become the President of country, even though it never really happens. They believe that the choices **you** make as an individual determine what you will become in life. But in India, they used to have the caste system. There, you could never become a Priest if you are not born in the right caste. - There are also some Christian churches where they believe that even before you were born, God has already made his plan for you and that you are predestined to this.
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five! (Code five mentions at the maximum):	Which are the top-five qualities that children should learn at home?[54] __ Independence	Thrift; Determination; Obedience: LTO	

[54] For IVR, the WVS ’Autonomy Index’ is relevant. It is computed by comparing the number of times Faith and Obedience are mentioned versus the number of times Independence and Determination/Perseverance are mentioned.

Mentioned Not mentioned V12. Independence V13. Hard work V14. Feeling of responsibility V15. Imagination V16. Tolerance and respect for other people V17. Thrift, saving money and things V18. Determination, perseverance V19. Religious faith V20. Unselfishness V21. Obedience V22. Self-expression	__ Thrift, saving money and things __ Hard work __ Determination, perseverance __ Feeling of responsibility __ Religious faith __ Imagination __ Unselfishness __ Tolerance and respect for other people __ Self-expression __ Obedience		

8.3 List of scores

The following table contains all scores, either those obtained from other sources or calculated for this thesis.

An explanation by column:

- Column 1, code: the first two letters are the Internet ccTLD code for the country, the following letters are a code for the ethnolinguistic group. Column 2 then provides the country and ethnolinguistic group name as used in the surveys.
- Columns 3 and 9 provide the scores as provided by Minkov for LTO and IDV. The scores in **bold** are the factor scores as published by Minkov. The other scores are either Minkov scores recalculated to a zero to 100 range or the scores computed by me on the basis of the Itim data (for Kenya and its ethnolinguistic groups, for the Igbo and Yoruba of Nigeria and for a number of South African ethnolinguistic groups except the South African Blacks)
- Columns 6 and 12 provide the scores as published by Hofstede and Minkov for the four dimensions for those countries that are also included in the World Values Survey. Data for Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa are scores computed by me on the basis of Itim data.
- Columns 4, 7, 10 and 13 provide the scores as calculated by me using the WVS data.
- Columns 5, 8, 11 and 14 provide the scores as calculated by me using the Afrobarometer data.

The scores in *italics* are based on a sample size of less than 50 (but at least 39).

Dimensions:		LTO			IVR			IDV			PDI		
Code	Name	H/M	WVS	AB	H/M	WVS	AB	H/M	WVS	AB	H/M	WVS	AB
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
DZ	Algeria		88	96	32	34	30		74	65		59	61
DZB	Algeria-Berber			96			11			69			65
BJ	Benin			72			33			96			86
BJA	Benin-Adja			79			43			78			88
BJB	Benin-Beriba			77			31			87			74
BJD	Benin-Ditanari			77			4			88			74
BJF	Benin-Fon			78			56			95			84
BJP	Benin-Peulh			78			12			88			78
BJYa	Benin-Yao			82			4			88			70
BJY	Benin-Yoruba			84			33			93			76
BW	Botswana			51			22			65			71
BWKa	Botswana-Karanga (lang)			65			30			67			69
BWKaT	Botswana-Kalanga (ethn)			52			15			68			72
BWKg	Botswana-Kgalagadi (lang)			*105*			*-18*			*55*			*68*
BWKgT	Botswana-Kgalagadi (ethn)			96			-4			60			68
BWKga	Botswana-Kgatla			47			30			59			71
BWKh	Botswana-Khurutshe			*72*			*14*			*73*			*75*
BWKw	Botswana-Kwena			77			13			72			73
BWMm	Botswana-Mmirwa			45			18			70			77
BWMo	Botswana-Morolong			*95*			*17*			*73*			*69*

Dimensions:		LTO			IVR			IDV			PDI		
BWNk	Botswana-Ngwaketse			73			11			58			66
BWNw	Botswana-Ngwato			36			15			62			72
BWS	Botswana-Sarwa			*96*			*-16*			*57*			*63*
BWT	Botswana-Tswana			49			28			66			71
BWTs	Botswana-Tswapong			44			9			59			73
BF	Burkina Faso		82	79	18	21	20		77	79			69
BFF	Burkina Faso - Fulfulde		68	*76*		77	*48*		67	*68*			60
BFB	Burkina Faso-Bissa			51			5			77			74
BFGm	Burkina Faso-Gourmatche			71			11			56			73
BFGo	Burkina Faso-Gourounsi			*71*			*40*			*95*			*85*
BFMa	Burkina Faso-Marka			*74*			*2*			*95*			*70*
BFM	Burkina Faso-More		82	78		28	11		77	75			67
BI	Burundi			106			9			93			76
CM	Cameroon			85			52			70			68
CMBm	Cameroon-Bamiléké			77			53			76			72
CMBs	Cameroon-Bassa			*77*			*41*			*72*			*70*
CMBe	Cameroon-Beti			84			71			72			64
CMK	Cameroon-Kapsiki			*100*			*59*			*57*			*50*
CMM	Cameroon-Mafa			96			18			69			71
CMP	Cameroon-Peule			120			42			95			61
CV	Cape Verde			51			37			59			61
CI	Côte d'Ivoire			82			38			78			68
CIA	CdI-Akan			80			25			94			67
CIG	CdI-Gur			73			10			78			67
CIK	CdI-Krou			73			38			69			76
CIMN	CdI-Mandé-Nord			79			5			79			67
CIMS	CdI-Mandé-Sud			72			19			91			68
EG	Egypt	**-111**/76	100	98	4	0	6	**-141**/68	55	65		63	63
ET	Ethiopia		60		46	37			64				
ETA	Ethiopia-Amharic		63			49			62				
ETG	Ethiopia-Gurage		*73*			*49*			*55*				
ETO	Ethiopia-Oromo		58			50			68				
ETS	Ethiopia-Sidama		56			30			58				
ETT	Ethiopia-Tigrinya		69			52			72				
GH	Ghana		102	106	72	80	72		88	87		85	89
GHA	Ghana-Akan		101	108		86	84		86	89		87	90
GHDga	Ghana-Dagaba			101			58			86			74
GHD	Ghana-Dagomba		112	98		78	39		81	84		82	86
GHE	Ghana-Ewe		107	114		90	79		89	94		67	70
GHF	Ghana-Frafra			*91*			*37*			*71*			77
GHGa	Ghana-Ga		96	100		88	77		87	90		86	86
GHGo	Ghana-Gonja			*75*			*44*			*82*			86

Dimensions:		LTO			IVR			IDV			PDI		
GHK	Ghana-Kusaal			*77*			*72*			*85*			65
GN	Guinea			73			39			94			75
GNG	Guinea-Guerzé			96			55			86			78
GNK	Guinea-Kissien			92			49			75			69
GNM	Guinea-Malinké			73			20			84			70
GNP	Guinea-Peulh			84			15			75			89
GNS	Guinea-Soussou			50			15			82			86
KE	Kenya	38		80	83		29	63		67	77		69
KEKal	Kenya-Kalenjin	*44*		75	*82*		37	*91*		94	*85*		71
KEKam	Kenya-Kamba	8		83	78		29	28		60	73		72
KEKi	Kenya-Kikuyu	48		51	83		29	48		70	74		70
KEKii	Kenya-Kisii			74			60			67			77
KELy	Kenya-Luhya	31		76	82		65	59		66	78		71
KELu	Kenya-Luo	46		81	89		37	79		67	71		78
KEMS	Kenya-Maasai/Samburu			71			40			66			71
KEME	Kenya-Meru/Embu			67			11			53			68
KEMi	Kenya-Mijikenda			50			20			48			74
KES	Kenya-Somali			108			29			64			60
KET	Kenya-Turkana			78			14			64			65
LS	Lesotho			94			-1			58			69
LSL	Lesotho-Letebele			82			0			56			72
LSMof	Lesotho-Mofokeng			77			-4			60			67
LSMh	Lesotho-Mohlakoana			116			-11			59			70
LSMok	Lesotho-Mokoena			77			12			55			70
LSMos	Lesotho-Mosiea			74			-7			59			63
LSMot	Lesotho-Motaung			75			12			51			72
LSMotl	Lesotho-Motloung			107			-20			55			68
LR	Liberia			73			31			78			87
LRBa	Liberia-Bassa			96			34			75			76
LRBe	Liberia-Belle			*40*			*37*			*67*			87
LRGb	Liberia-Gbandi			*51*			*38*			*96*			*91*
LRGi	Liberia-Gio			71			36			78			87
LRGo	Liberia-Gola			91			42			83			88
LRGr	Liberia-Grebo			46			63			91			88
LRKi	Liberia-Kissi			66			21			60			87
LRKp	Liberia-Kpelle			80			22			91			87
LRKh	Liberia-Krahn			49			48			70			85
LRKu	Liberia-Kru			77			61			74			87
LRL	Liberia-Lorma			48			43			96			88
LRMd	Liberia-Mandingo			72			43			92			87
LRMo	Liberia-Mano			71			29			82			78
LRV	Liberia-Vai			78			53			76			91
MG	Malagasy			42			30			58			78

Dimensions:		LTO			IVR			IDV			PDI		
MW	Malawi			45			41			65			72
MWC	Malawi-Chewa			35			51			62			71
MWL	Malawi-Lomwe			48			56			64			71
MWM	Malawi-Mangan'ja			77			53			70			70
MWN	Malawi-Ngoni			50			32			61			75
MWS	Malawi-Sena			44			56			62			66
MWT	Malawi-Tumbuka			50			40			76			65
MWY	Malawi-Yao			50			69			64			73
ML	Mali		83	82	43	37	29		86	92			87
MLB	Mali-Bambara		84	83		48	48		85	82			87
MLBo	Mali-Bozo			*75*			*60*			*76*			*88*
MLD	Mali-Dogon		*75*	72		*47*	29		*96*	94			87
MLM	Mali-Malinke		*79*	81		*36*	32		*84*	88			*88*
MLMi	Mali-Mianka			81			12			74			85
MLP	Mali-Peul		81	75		49	29		95	96			87
MLSe	Mali-Senufo			*107*			*31*			*95*			*86*
MLSo	Mali-Soninke			78			36			84			88
MLrh	Mali-Sonrhai			71			11			54			88
MU	Mauritius			108			44			76			73
MUC	Mauritius-Creole			110			20			93			68
MUH	Mauritius-Hindu			111			24			77			76
MUM	Mauritius-Muslim(Creole)			111			30			76			89
MUT	Mauritius-Tamil			122			40			76			78
MA	Morocco			75	25		0			66	70		62
MAB	Morocco-Berber			113			-15			60			55
MZ	Mozambique			79			22			51			63
MZA	Mozambique-Ajaua			21			-10			54			46
MZB	Mozambique-Bitonga			*105*			*52*			*61*			*53*
MZCha	Mozambique-Changana			91			31			61			54
MZCho	Mozambique-Chope			73			49			63			52
MZChu	Mozambique-Chuabo			79			-3			38			52
MZL	Mozambique-Lomue			65			0			34			49
MZMk	Mozambique-Makonde			100			-2			60			55
MZMa	Mozambique-Makua			73			15			58			51
MZN	Mozambique-Ndau			73			-8			53			51
MZNy	Mozambique-Nyanja			66			-22			27			48
MZS	Mozambique-Sena			82			-4			49			50
NA	Namibia			76			-2			76			74
NAD	Namibia-Damara			74			8			70			68
NAH	Namibia-Herero			100			-8			77			72
NAK	Namibia-Kavango			70			-8			96			75
NAN	Namibia-Nama			77			-2			74			65

Dimensions:		LTO			IVR			IDV			PDI		
NAW	Namibia-Wambo			78			-4			77			76
NE	Niger			73			2			93			72
NEF	Niger-Fulfulde			71			11			72			68
NEH	Niger-Haussa			71			7			92			75
NEK	Niger-Kanuri			*83*			*-7*			*72*			76
NES	Niger-Songai/Zarma			78			-3			88			76
NET	Niger-Tamasheq			98			-12			74			78
NG	Nigeria		101	90	84	77	59	-291	87	78		85	89
NGEd	Nigeria-Edo			71			47			71			88
NGEf	Nigeria-Efik			*93*			*62*			*71*			63
NGF	Nigeria-Fulfulde		*84*			*80*			*89*			*87*	
NGH	Nigeria-Hausa		107	97		82	59		72	71		85	87
NGIbi	Nigeria-Ibibio		*85*	74		79	66		76	77		78	76
NGId	Nigeria-Idoma			98			62			73			75
NGIg	Nigeria-Igbo	60	101	97	87	88	67	92	92	94	82	87	89
NGIj	Nigeria-Ijaw			*99*			*55*			*59*			71
NGN	Nigeria-Nupe			*135*			*23*			*78*			101
NGT	Nigeria-Tiv		*90*			*75*			*90*			82	
NGU	Nigeria-Urhobo			*78*			*56*			*92*			89
NGY	Nigeria-Yoruba	60	94	99	77	70	67	84	87	86	83	84	88
RW	Rwanda		84			46			66			87	
ST	São Tomé and Principé			82			61			68			60
SN	Senegal			73			37			69			69
SND	Senegal-Diola			*79*			*19*			*73*			73
SNMB	Senegal-Mandinka/Bambara			75			44			61			88
SNP	Senegal-Pulaar/Toucouleur			76			26			69			71
SNW	Senegal-Wolof			70			47			69			69
SL	Sierra Leone			104			62			94			68
SLF	Sierra Leone-Fulla			99			47			88			63
SLK	Sierra Leone-Kono			74			21			72			46
SLL	Sierra Leone-Limba			112			48			84			75
SLM	Sierra Leone-Mende			96			60			97			61
SLS	Sierra Leone-Susu			121			87			74			71
SLT	Sierra Leone-Temne			113			70			95			76
ZA	South Africa		0	78	63	44	34		0	56		83	86
ZACA	SA Coloured-Afrikaans		94	74		51	34		57	49		79	87
ZACE	SA Coloured-English		95	82		78	60		56	42		82	87
ZAB	South Africa-Black	**-126**/79	76	75	57	54	38	**-105**/61	62	58	79	84	86
ZAI	South Africa-Indian	65	65	78	73	73	68	92	92	56	82		89
ZAP	South Africa-Pedi		75	77		50	29		57	49		84	88
ZASh	South Africa-Shangaan			83			39			60			87

Dimensions:		LTO			IVR			IDV			PDI		
ZASo	South Africa-Sotho	*93*	69	72	*50*	50	33	*66*	65	64	77	82	88
ZASw	South Africa-Swazi		*85*	68		*45*	34		*48*	53		*89*	89
ZATsw	South Africa-Tswana		69	51		50	29		55	55		81	78
ZAV	South Africa-Venda		61	51		50	37		73	60		89	87
ZAWA	SA-white-Afrikaans	88	72	72	92	87	73	43	43	53	87	85	88
ZAWE	SA-white-English	101	60	52	91	92	88	52	55	47	79	83	89
ZAX	South Africa-Xhosa	*83*	77	79	50	50	40	*47*	46	59	68	68	78
ZAZ	South Africa-Zulu	80	80	74	51	54	37	62	65	56	75	77	74
SZ	Swaziland			77			29			71			72
TZ	Tanzania			107			35			73			75
TZZ	Tanzania_Zigua			*98*			*20*			*67*			*76*
TZCh	Tanzania-Chaga			102			24			74			85
TZF	Tanzania-Fipa			72			26			95			72
TZG	Tanzania-Gogo			135			6			62			75
TZH	Tanzania-Ha			115			12			69			86
TZHy	Tanzania-Haya			95			54			78			73
TZHe	Tanzania-Hehe			100			-5			63			68
TZIq	Tanzania-Iraqw			77			54			79			77
TZL	Tanzania-Luguru			144			-29			62			60
TZM	Tanzania-Makonde			109			25			75			84
TZMw	Tanzania-Mwera			*121*			*6*			*95*			*86*
TZNg	Tanzania-Ngoni			92			2			77			74
TZNk	Tanzania-Nyakyusa			95			38			94			76
TZNw	Tanzania-Nyamwezi			102			10			59			77
TZNh	Tanzania-Nyiha			*91*			*17*			*92*			*74*
TZP	Tanzania-Pare			*109*			*53*			*71*			*77*
TZSa	Tanzania-Sambaa			121			17			77			72
TZS	Tanzania-Sukuma			123			29			71			87
TG	Togo			84			37			82			72
TGA	Togo-Adja			*66*			*47*			*82*			*67*
TGB	Togo-Ben(Mola)			75			-5			88			68
TGE	Togo-Ewe			74			73			91			73
TGIf	Togo-Ife(Ana)			*80*			*68*			*82*			*75*
TGIl	Togo-Ilposso			*74*			*59*			*95*			*68*
TGK	Togo-Kabye			72			38			86			68
TGL	Togo-Lama(Lamba)			82			26			82			69
TGM	Togo-Mina			66			68			93			87
TGN	Togo-Nawdem(Losso)			71			35			83			67
TGO	Togo-Ouatchi			74			53			93			86
TGT	Togo-Tem(Kotokoli)			79			35			91			68
TN	Tunisia			51			68			63			88
UG	Uganda			74			27			70			66
UGAch	Uganda-Acholi			69			30			74			68
UGAl	Uganda-Alur			97			-5			77			65

Dimensions:			LTO			IVR			IDV			PDI	
UGAt	Uganda-Ateso			49			11			91			67
UGG	Uganda-Ganda			68			37			72			66
UGGi	Uganda-Gishu			83			17			73			72
UGKa	Uganda-Karamajong			97			-5			58			61
UGKh	Uganda-Khonjo			97			11			64			64
UGKi	Uganda-Kiga			131			-9			57			69
UGLa	Uganda-Langi			73			23			75			71
UGLu	Uganda-Lugbara			84			-3			73			65
UGNe	Uganda-Nyankole			103			0			62			71
UGNo	Uganda-Nyoro			73			5			93			63
UGS	Uganda-Soga			71			47			73			62
UGT	Uganda-Tooro			94			11			64			70
ZM	Zambia		97	104	42	42	32		64	65			75
ZMB	Zambia-Bemba		94	104		44	36		69	68			71
ZMK	Zambia-Kaonde		94	*97*		28	*39*		65	*66*			78
ZMLa	Zambia-Lala			126			*41*			*54*			71
ZML	Zambia-Lozi		114	104		37	29		73	66			85
ZMNa	Zambia-Namwanga			*124*			*83*			*66*			76
ZMNg	Zambia-Ngoni			*78*			*14*			*52*			88
ZMN	Zambia-Nyanja		95	101		44	35		58	56			89
ZMT	Zambia-Tsonga		100	103		39	39		60	66			75
ZW	Zimbabwe		97	101	28	46	37		81	77		80	72
ZWN	Zimbabwe-Ndebele		100	93		54	28		76	79		78	71
ZWS	Zimbabwe-Shona		97	102		51	29		82	76		80	73
ZWT	Zimbabwe-Tonga			107			-1			71			64
AR	Argentina	**-80**/69			62			**-5**/40			49		
AU	Australia	**41**/43			71			**83**/21			38		
AZ	Azerbaijan				22								
BY	Belarus				15								
BR	Brazil	**-83**/70			59			**-56**/50			69		
BG	Bulgaria	31			16			70			70		
CA	Canada				68			80			39		
CL	Chile	**-153**/85			68			**-8**/40			63		
CN	China	**134**/22			24			**-31**/45			80		
CO	Colombia	**-182**/92			83			**-81**/56			67		
CY	Cyprus				70								
EE	Estonia	18			16			40			40		
FI	Finland	62			57			37			33		
FR	France	37			48			29			68		
GE	Georgia				32								
DE	Germany	**46**/41			40			**102**/17			35		
HK	Hong Kong	**199**/8			17			**-5**/40			68		
HU	Hungary	42			31			20			46		

Dimensions:		LTO			IVR			IDV			PDI		
IN	India	**17**/48			26			**-101**/60			77		
ID	Indonesia	38			38			86			78		
IR	Iran	86			40			59			58		
IQ	Iraq				17								
IT	Italy	39			30			24			50		
JP	Japan	**234**/0			42			**42**/30			54		
JO	Jordan				43								
KG	Kyrghyzstan				39								
MY	Malaysia	**-1**/52			57			**-89**/57			100		
MX	Mexico	**-104**/75			97			**-63**/52			81		
MD	Moldova				19								
NL	Netherlands	**87**/32	69		68	70		**182**/0	0		38	24	
NZ	New Zealand	**37**/43			75			**68**/24			22		
NO	Norway	65			55			31			31		
PK	Pakistan	50			0			86			55		
PE	Peru	**-187**/93			46			**-117**/63			64		
PH	Philippines	**-4**/52			42			**-126**/65			94		
PL	Poland	**9**/50			29			**-15**/42			68		
RO	Romania	**-64**/66			20			**-19**/42			90		
RU	Russia	**48**/41			20			**-21**/43			93		
RS	Serbia	48			28			75			86		
SG	Singapore	**89**/32			46			**-29**/45			74		
SI	Slovenia	51			48			73			71		
KR	South Korea	**174**/13			29			**25**/33			60		
ES	Spain	**2**/51			44			**58**/26			57		
SE	Sweden	**21**/47			78			**133**/10			31		
CH	Switzerland	26	68		66	77		32	12		34		
CHF	Switzerland-French		83			80			11				
CHG	Switzerland-German		59			85			10				
CHI	Switzerland-Italian		65			80			21				
TW	Taiwan	**175**/13			49			**-43**/48			58		
TH	Thailand	**87**/32			45			**-121**/64			64		
TT	Trinidad and Tobago	87			80			84			47		
TR	Turkey	**-52**/63			49			**-18**/42			66		
UA	Ukraine	**19**/47			14			**14**/36					
UK	United Kingdom	49			69			11			35		
UY	Uruguay	74			53			64			61		
US	USA	**11**/49	72		68	83		**33**/32	18		40	52	
USB	USA-Black		83			86			29			71	
USH	USA-Hispanic		83			91			41			52	
USW	USA-White		68			83			13			52	
VN	Vietnam	43			35			80			70		

8.4 One-page project summary sheet

(Several versions of the sheet were produced for the different stages of the project. Reproduced here is the version used at the start of the project, before the first field visit to Ghana.)

AFRICAN LANGUAGES AND CULTURES: A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH

Summary of research project, Bert van Pinxteren, African Studies Centre, Leiden University, the Netherlands.

v817

THE PROBLEM

In policy debates on Sub-Saharan Africa, the ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity in Africa has been seen as a problem to be overcome, rather than as a resource to be harnessed. Not enough study has been done into the positive sides of language and culture and into how cultures and languages are perceived and used by Africans today. Ideas on cultures and language that go back to colonial times are still prevalent.

Two separate research avenues are part of this project: one dealing with language, the other with culture.

OBSERVATORY OF AFRICAN LANGUAGE USE

The plan is to establish an ***observatory of indigenous African language use*** as an online resource, showing how Africans use indigenous languages in a number of key domains. These will be domains where language policy and practice intersect:

- Education (at various levels);
- Language(s) of instruction and communication in the police and military;
- Legal: language(s) allowed to be spoken in court, language(s) allowed for reporting and written deliberations;
- Sub-national governance: languages used for debating and reporting in city, county, district or provincial/state legislature meetings;
- Healthcare: language(s) used for reaching out to young or expectant mothers;
- Surveying: language(s) used for major surveys like the Demographic and Health Surveys;
- Media: language(s) used in mass media.

Phasing (tentative)

Pilot phase: Initial database design and exploration of web interface and hosting possibilities – September 2017 to March 2018.

Data collection: March 2018 to March 2019.

Initial publication(s): towards the end of 2019.

Institutionalisation, seeking a permanent home for the *observatory*: early 2020.

How you can help

Information needed for the observatory is available, but not accessible through one database. **Collaborators are needed** to help establish and test the best database structure and web interface and to provide information on individual languages.

AFRICAN CULTURES BASED ON SELF-REPORTS

Culture here is seen as the value system that serves as common point of reference for a people. Cultures the world over have been characterized in terms of dimensions such as Individualism versus Collectivism or Indulgence versus Restraint. These dimensions have been developed through research by Hofstede, Minkov and others. Today, they are widely used in cross-cultural training and international management consultancy. They are based on how people self-report on their values through surveys such as the World Values Survey.

These surveys will be re-analysed for Africa at the level of ethnolinguistic groups, in order to establish if and how individual groups are different from or similar to the national averages.

For one or two countries, the data will be compared to data available through ethnographic literature, expert interviews and focus group discussions. An attempt will be made to document shifts in values over time.

This should contribute to a vision of African cultures as a dynamic resource and to more explicit attention for culture in policy debates on Africa.

Phasing

A field visit to Ghana is planned for September /October 2017.

A second field visit is foreseen for February /March 2018.

Target completion: June 2018.

How you can help

Contacts are needed for setting up expert interviews and focus group discussions in **Ghana** and one other African country.

OUTCOMES

Several outcomes are targeted:

- A web-based information source for information on African languages (the *observatory*).
- Publications in peer-reviewed scientific journals.
- A Master and a PhD Thesis at Leiden University.

SUPERVISORS

Prof. Dr. Maarten Mous, Leiden University Centre for Linguistics.

Dr. Akinyinka Akinyoade, African Studies Centre, Leiden University.

CONTACT

bert.van.pinxteren@upcmail.nl

https://www.linkedin.com/in/bert-van-pinxteren-b18bb62

https://africanations.wordpress.org

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