Civilian Participation in Genocide and Politicide in the 20th Century

Thesis

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"...at the most basic level individual human beings killed other human beings in large numbers over an extended period of time."
– Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men*, xv.

Contents

Introduction

Among mass killings in the 20th century, the 1994 Rwandan Genocide is often seen as unique, "an example of how virtually an entire society can turn to murder" (Valentino 2005, 37). While the killing was planned by Hutu elites, thousands of ordinary civilians joined in the killing alongside the army and militias (Straus 2006, 117-118). Even those most sceptical of mass involvement in the killing allow for a high number of participants of around two hundred thousand (Valentino 2005, 37). While Valentino minimizes this by suggesting that it is "less than 9 percent of the male Hutu population" (37), as Straus points out it is rare for any government to be able to mobilize such a proportion of the population for a state project, let alone one involving murder (2006, 118). Rwanda seems indeed to be an example of how civilians can become a vital part of mass killing. Yet while we have a wealth of knowledge on popular participation in the Rwandan Genocide in particular (Desforges 1999; Fujii 2008; Straus 2006; Yanagizawa-Drott 2014), we lack a comprehensive overview of civilian participation in genocide and politicide in the 20th century.

The issue of civilian participation is at the heart of one of the most important questions when it comes to mass killing – why does it take place? Valentino's 2005 book *Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century* dismisses structural theories of mass killing, and argues that it should be seen as a strategic choice by the leaders of a government to achieve their objectives when other methods have failed (2-3). As a crucial part of this work, he argues that mass killing only requires a small number of participants, and that the majority of the population either indirectly cooperates with the killing or simply stands by (31-39), asserting that "large numbers of civilians almost never play a major role in the killing itself" (35). However, it is possible to accept his thesis that mass killing is a strategic choice – rather than a result of 'primordial hatred' – whilst questioning his argument that civilians rarely take part.

Civilian participation and their mobilisation by the state is an issue that goes unexamined though empirical analysis in the literature. While, as mentioned above, literature on individual instances often makes clear whether civilians participated, there are no broad examinations of the degree to which the civilian population of a state has participated in a mass killing campaign run by its government, or in which cases the government has called upon them to do so. Having no clear overview of these questions makes it impossible to adequately examine potential causes of participation. This work intends to fill that gap by establishing such an overview, and by testing various hypotheses providing the beginnings of

an answer to the research question of under what conditions and in which types of killing do civilians participate in geno-politicide?

The method for answering this question is a broad examination of 21 recognised instances of genocide and politicide between 1955-2002, determining whether the state mobilised the population to participate in the killing, and whether significant numbers of civilians did so. Other factors of these instances are also examined, including the type of regime, the type of killing, and presence of ethnic conflict. This allows for potential explanations of participation to be tested, and for a closer examination of instances in which we see civilian participation. This is by no means an in-depth look into each instance, which would require an immense amount of field research. However, this overview of the historical record through both primary and secondary sources not only allows for Valentino's assertion to be tested, but for greater insight into variance in dynamics across instances of mass killing.

Definitions

Before embarking on a broader discussion of the literature, it is necessary to precisely define the exact terms used and what they are understood to mean. A vast number of terms are used in the literature to refer to mass killing, sometimes to indicate the same phenomenon, and sometimes with crucial and subtle differences. These include: democide (Rummel 1995), genocide (Power 2002), geno-politicide (Harff 2003), genocidal massacres (Kiernan 2009), mass indiscriminate violence (Van der Maat 2015), mass killing (Valentino 2005; Bellamy 2012), and mass atrocities (Osiel 2009). It is therefore important to define exactly which instances of mass killing are taken up in this thesis.

Firstly, the main focus of this work is on campaigns of genocide or politicide directed by the state or "territorially based nationalist or revolutionary movement[s]" (Harff 2003, 58)[1]. This rules out massacres carried out by non-territorially based insurgents, but also "collectively organized massacres and pogroms" (Owens, Su, and Snow 2012, 78). As Owens et al. point out, this second type of killing is a different phenomenon, and can exist alongside a state-led campaign of killing (78). It can be argued that by not considering pogroms, the results of the research will be biased towards the conclusion that civilians rarely participate. However, the focus of this thesis is not the dynamics of how ordinary people can turn to violence, mob

[1] What Harff is highlighting here is "situations in which at least one party to a civil war systematically uses deadly force to destroy the civilian support base of its opponents" (58). This therefore encompasses actors such as UNITA in the Angolan Civil War, or Republika Srpska in Bosnia, and draws a (somewhat arbitrary) line between them and insurgents outside of a state of civil war who do not exercise significant control over territory.

dynamics, or small-scale massacres. What is being investigated is the strategies employed by the state once it has decided to embark on a campaign of genocide or politicide. To what extent do they attempt to mobilise civilians to assist in this effort, and how do civilians respond to this pressure? This also has the practical benefit of allowing for a focus on a clearly defined and accepted range of cases.

Secondly, this research focuses on cases of genocide or politicide, defined by Harff as:

> *"the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents— or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities— that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group."* (2003, 58).

These criteria focus on victims who are targeted on the basis of a self or ascribed group identity – tribe, ethnicity, class, political affiliation – rather than their (alleged) actions. Again, this line can appear somewhat arbitrary. However, I rely here on Harff's distinction that politicide takes place when a government decides that the only way to deal with its opponents is to destroy them to the extent that they cease to function as a group (58). This therefore rules out broader mass killings with no intent of destroying a certain group, defined by Valentino as "the intentional killing of a massive number of non-combatants" (10). Finally, it also neglects predicable, but not intended mass deaths due to disease or famine. This route has been chosen for a number of reasons, among them sheer practicality. Focusing on a clearly defined subset of mass killings – geno-politicides – allows for the issue to be dealt with within the limited scope of this thesis. In addition, working with an existing recognised dataset supports the legitimacy and relevance of the work.

Finally, it is important to clarify four terms: geno-politicide, civilian, participation, and mobilisation. Firstly, despite the unwieldy nature of Harff's term geno-politicide (or "genocide and politicide"), I have chosen to maintain its use, as it is sometimes necessary to differentiate between genocide – targeting "a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group" (United Nations 1951) – and politicide, the victims of which are a politically defined group (Harff 2003). While broader terms such as mass killing or mass atrocities may sometimes be used throughout, these should be understood to be stand-ins for genocidal or politicidal killing, unless otherwise noted. Secondly, civilians are defined as any individual not a member of the armed forces, paramilitary organisations, government organised militia, or law enforcement (ICRC 1977, Article 43, 50). This definition will be further discussed below in

the concepts section. Participation in geno-politicide here refers to active participation. Besides killing, this also includes inciting killing, joining civilian groups directly involved in killing, knowingly providing logistical support for killing (e.g. guarding victims) or identifying victims for killing (see Valentino 2005, 37), as well as rape, torture, or severe physical harm. Specific ways of participation are discussed below under concepts. Mobilisation refers to government efforts to reward, encourage, or coerce participation, and will also be discussed below.

Literature review

Within this thesis a distinction will be made between two categories – civilian participation and civilian mobilisation. Investigating the causes of participation requires two things: understanding how people can commit acts of horrific violence against unarmed strangers, and understanding why they would commit these acts against those specific strangers in those specific circumstances. Civilian mobilisation is a separate, but equally key issue. Here we must investigate why the state decided to mobilise civilians, as well as why this call was one that civilians responded to. In essence this is only three interlinked questions:

- Why do states mobilise civilians to commit violence?
- Why do civilians kill other civilians?
- Why do civilians participate in geno-politicide in response to a specific mobilisation?

In this section I will review the literature on the first two questions. The first to be discussed is the best covered: why people commit acts of violence. This is analysed from both a psychological and a group/societal perspective. The second question is the more strategic one of why governments would seek to delegate or outsource killing. While the literature primarily discusses delegation to militias, I extrapolate certain conclusions to civilian participation on the basis on specific instances. Finally, I will argue that a broad overview of 20th century geno-politicides and the ability to compare between cases is necessary to answer the final question.

Before beginning this discussion, it is worth reiterating that a great deal of the thematic literature on the issue of why individuals – soldier or civilian – participate in mass killing draws heavily on the extremely well studied examples of Rwanda and Nazi Germany.[2] Rarely do scholars studying geno-politicide as a whole use as their primary example killing during

[2] Examples include Semelin 2007, Anderson 2017, Valentino 2005.

the Cultural Revolution in China or the mass killing of communists in Indonesia in 1965-66.[3] This risks either assuming that these cases can serve as models for all other cases of geno-politicide, or in the case of civilian participation that Rwanda in particular is *sui generis*. It is also important to note that, similar to this thesis, the study of genocide is often limited to the 20th century or even the post-Second World War period (Power 2002; Valentino 2005; Rummel 1995; Gerlach 2010; Harff 2003).[4] This is understandable, given the relative lack of older historical data, and the difficulty of assessing whether killing met the criteria of genocide. However, Kiernan's work on genocide throughout history provides ample evidence – though the conclusion is not explicitly drawn – that prior to the 20th century civilians have participated in significant numbers, especially in settler and colonial genocides (2009). Expanding the cases used for theorising further back into history could therefore provide greater insight into this question.

It is after the case of the Rwandan genocide in particular, with its high level of civilian participation, that research has flourished on the dynamics that might bring ordinary people to commit such crimes. One approach taken here is the psychological. This goes back to the famous Milgram experiment, which demonstrated that "the tendency to obey those whom we perceive to be legitimate authorities" could lead people to the point of delivering what they believed to be eventually deadly electric shocks to a stranger (Milgram 1963, 378). The theory that the desire to obey authority will override basic moral considerations such as those against killing is one that we find in Browning's ground-breaking study of German policemen's killing of Jews (2001). The consolation provided to men tasked with executing the women and children of Jósefzów is that "orders are orders" (58) – while some men avoided killing, not a single one attempted to argue against their orders (55-70). Here we also see a perhaps even more powerful factor in convincing people to kill – the fear of the judgement of peers. The most powerful influence on the minds of the police in Jósefzów was the desire not to appear as a 'coward' in front of their fellow soldiers, whom they had just met (71-72). This desire not to stand out from the crowd is something that we see in analyses of the killing in Rwanda as well, where individuals described the fear of rejection or mockery

[3] While Valentino discusses the Cultural Revolution (130-132), he fails to confront the objection to his thesis that it demonstrates, even while describing the lack of control the government had over the Red Guards. He also admits that the Indonesian killings do not fit in his typology of mass killing (70), but does not investigate this further.

[4] See Harff for a discussion of the post-war focus in particular (2003, 59)

as well as the positive feeling of solidarity that the "killer groups" brought (Smeulers and Hoex 2010, 445).

This factor of peer pressure can also be seen on a broader level in societal factors and the power of group bonds. This goes beyond the individual, and looks at the role of group ties and obligations to the community to examine why people participated in the killing. Fujii, for example, highlights the ease with which in the Rwandan Genocide individuals went along with group decisions that Tutsis needed to be killed (2008, 594). Those she calls 'joiners' saw themselves as powerless in the face of the group, especially when confronted by calls to action from family members (2008). The "social order" had changed, and society now revolved around the collective project of killing Tutsis (Smeulers & Hoex 2010, 445). Gong provides insight into similar dynamics of collective violence during the Cultural Revolution, focusing on the importance of groups (2003). Students participating in the killing and torture of 'enemies' found it necessary to commit performative acts of violence in order to demonstrate their commitment to the group, and protect themselves from accusations of weakness (122-125). Gerlach raises this to the level of entire societies with his concept of "extremely violent societies" (Gerlach 2010). His work adds a much-needed degree of complexity to the discussion of mass killing, emphasising the "multi-causal" nature of killing and the need to place it in broader societal context (3).

However, while the above discussion of why civilians may participate provides insight into the group dynamics of such killing, this 'why' is focused on the micro-level decisions faced by individuals once the circumstances have arisen in which they are called upon to join the killing. It does not provide insight into why such circumstances might arise. While Gerlach in particular goes further, arguing that societal factors lead to his extremely violent societies, on the basis of his research it is still hard to explain why some societies become 'extremely violent' and some don't (Finstuen 2012, 174) The discussion must also be combined with the question of mobilisation – what led the government to mobilise these civilians? Participation does not arise in a vacuum. The Chinese state under Mao explicitly called upon civilians to take action against 'class enemies' in an increasingly explicit and strident manner (Dikotter 2016, 53-71). The Rwandan government used the radio to mobilize and organise civilians (Desforges 1999, 190-192). Our knowledge of the micro-level dynamics does not explain the strategic thinking behind mobilising civilians, or what other factors may have led them to participate. It is to this point that we now turn.

The issue of civilian mobilisation immediately raises a difficult question: why would the state be willing to relinquish its monopoly on the use of force (DeMeritt 2015, 432)? This question is mainly raised in the literature with regard to militias, but is surely even more relevant when it comes to civilians. Empowering organised armed groups already poses a challenge to internal sovereignty, but to encourage civilians *en masse* to carry out violence risks chaos, as can be seen in China, where the Cultural Revolution devolved into conflict between the army and various factions of the Red Guards (Dikotter 2016). One obvious reason such mobilisation may take place is that the government simply has no choice. In instances where state power is significantly weakened, militias or mass violence may be the only way for the state to project force (Ahram 2014, 492-493). However, this is by no means a complete explanation, as state violence and civilian or militia violence can also complement each other (Staniland 2015). Here three categories of potential explanations for state mobilisation of militia or civilian violence will be discussed: tactical, deceptive, and ideological.

The first and most discussed explanation in the literature is tactical – when mobilising militias is the most efficient way for a state to achieve its goals. Jentzsch et al., for example, discuss a number of explanations for the use of militias in armed conflicts (2015). One of these is the need for greater efficiency in counterinsurgency (759), which is a finding supported throughout the literature (Biberman 2016, 2). Locally recruited militia will have greater knowledge of their own region and culture, helping the government to be more precise in its counterinsurgency (2016). This is a tactic commonly seen in counterinsurgent geno-politicides, where the state security forces rely on local auxiliaries, often of the same ethnicity as the victims, to assist in fighting, killing, or intelligence gathering (HRW 1993; CAVR 2013). A similar efficiency effect could be expected for civilian mobilisation, especially when the victims are widely scattered amongst those who might be able to kill them, such as in Rwanda (Desforges 1999, 13, 191).

More closely related to mobilisation for geno-politicide is the second category of deception. The main aim here is creating plausible deniability (Jentzsch et al. 2015, 759). By creating greater distance between government perpetrators and victims through the use of intermediaries, governments make it harder to establish accountability (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015). Sometimes this distance may be real rather than a façade, and the government may truly lack operational control of the groups or individuals it has knowingly set in motion (Campbell 2000, 19). This motive of deception is especially relevant in cases of geno-politicide rather than civil war, as it has been suggested that particularly extreme violence is

more likely to be delegated (13).[5] The effect of this delegation when sections of the civilian population are mobilised will only be heightened, as the violence can then more convincingly be portrayed as out of the state's control (Ahram 2014, 493). However, we must question who this plausible deniability is for. Carey et al. discuss both internal accountability in (semi-)democracies and external accountability to international actors (2015, 852-854). Deniability is unlikely to explain this mobilisation in autocracies that do not have to fear foreign intervention, such as China during the Cultural Revolution.

The third category, advanced by Staniland, focuses on the ideology of the mobilising state. Staniland looks at a wider range of government behaviour towards militias, ranging from suppression to collaboration (2015). He highlights how these depend on how the state's ideology and its compatibility with that of a militia affects the "political meaning" given to an armed group (776). This argument can be extended to civilian participation. For example, a communist state that emphasises mass participation in politics may be more willing to mobilise civilians than a military regime. Strauss argues that the Chinese state in the 1950s "[linked] the suppression of counterrevolutionaries...with the mobilization of popular support for the regime" (2002, 82). A government or ruling party driven by ethnic ideology may also be more willing to enable their co-ethnics to carry out violence, as happened in Rwanda (Desforges 1999, 104-105) and Burundi (Lemarchand and Martin 1974, 18). Finally, some states may have a tradition of militia or vigilante violence that ascribes a 'heroic' political meaning to such groups, creating a natural context for the state to mobilise them for geno-politicide (Ahram 2014, 495).

Where these two phenomena of mobilisation and participation come together is in the third question of the specific context of a geno-politicide where civilian participation took place. While governments may attempt mobilisation, and civilians may have the capacity to participate, the conditions must be right in an individual situation for the government to attempt mobilisation, and the civilians to respond.[6] However, as mentioned in the introduction, to answer this question of what conditions are necessary there must be clarity about when civilian mobilisation and participation has actually taken place. Both Valentino (2005, 3) and Gerlach (2010, 12-13) make sweeping statements regarding the lack or

[5] This is questioned by Cohen & Nordås, who demonstrate that specifically sexual violence carried out by militias does not correspond with reduced sexual violence by state forces (2015)

[6] There is also an alternative possibility, which is that civilians will participate whenever governments attempt to mobilise them, and that all that is necessary for participation is incentives or commands from the state. This would suggest we will never see mobilisation without participation

presence of civilian participation, without any reference to work showing this is the case or relying on a small number of cases. Without clear knowledge of in which cases civilian participation took place, and in which cases it didn't, it is impossible to advance explanations that also explain why participation *did not* take place in other instances. This is one of the main aims of this thesis – to provide an overview of civilian participation across geno-politicides throughout the 20th century. With this data, it will then be possible to provide insight into the conditions under which we see these phenomena, and to provide explanations of their processes.

Method

The analysis carried out in this thesis requires specific knowledge of one aspect of a wide range of geno-politicides. In order to achieve results that allow for comparison across a historical range of incidents, the research method used is a focused, structured comparison of 21 different cases of geno-politicide for their degree of civilian participation. The objective of this research method is to provide broad insight into civilian participation across different instances, allowing for an initial testing of the theory that civilians rarely participate in mass killing. On the basis of this research, further work could be done into individual cases to provide the within-case depth that this study lacks. The dataset employed is a sub-set of a list of 37 genocides and politicides between 1955 and 2002 (Harff 2003), one of the more widely used sources in the field (Wayman and Tago 2010). The list covers four categories of killing: genocide, politicide, politicide with communal victims, and genocide and politicide (within the same instance), and is included below. The data behind the list was originally compiled by Harff, Gurr, and Marshall for the then State Failure Task Force in 1994 (now Political Instability Task Force *or* PITF), and is available, in an updated form, along with other PITF datasets, at the Center for Systemic Peace (Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) 2017). Due to practical difficulties in finding data on smaller and less well-known geno-politicides, all incidences with less than 50 000 deaths (or where the average of the estimated range is below 50 000) have been excluded.[7] In addition, to remain consistent with the list used in Harff (2003), and with the literature's general focus on the 20th century, no geno-politicides beginning in the 21st century have been included,

[7] This leads to a slight over-representation of the category "genocide and politicide" (29% rather than 19% of the total), and an under-representation of the category "politicide" (23% rather than 32% of the total). This and any other potential biases will be discussed below under limitations.

Table 1 – Genocides and Politicide from 1955-2002

Country and Dates	**Nature of Episode**	**Estimated Number of Victims**
Sudan 1956-72	Politicide with communal victims	400 000 – 600 000
China 1959	Genocide and politicide	65 000
South Vietnam 1965-75	Politicide	400 000 – 500 000
Burundi 1965-72[8]	Politicide with communal victims	140 000
Indonesia 1965-66	Genocide and politicide	500 000 – 1 000 000
China 1966-75	Politicide	400 000 – 850 000
Pakistan 1971	Politicide with communal victims	1 000 000 – 3 000 000
Uganda 1971-79	Politicide and genocide	50 000 – 400 000
Philippines 1972-76	Politicide with communal victims	60 000
Angola 1975-2001	Politicide	500 000
Cambodia 1975-79	Politicide and genocide	1 900 000 – 3 500 000
Indonesia 1975-92	Politicide with communal victims	100 000 – 200 000
Guatemala 1978-96	Politicide and genocide	60 000 – 200 000
Afghanistan 1978-92	Politicide	1 800 000
El Salvador 1980-89	Politicide	40 000 – 60 000
Uganda 1980-86	Politicide and genocide	200 000 – 500 000
Sudan 1983-2002	Politicide with communal victims	2 000 000
Iraq 1988-91	Politicide with communal victims	180 000
Bosnia 1992-95	Genocide	225 000
Burundi 1993	Genocide	50 000
Rwanda 1994	Genocide	500 000 – 1 000 000
Source: Adapted from Harff 2003, 60, Table 1.		

To ensure the cases are analysed in the same manner, a codebook was used (see Appendix A).[9] Each case was coded for two factors, whether or not civilians were mobilised, and whether or not civilians participated. In addition, political participation was coded separately to civilian mobilisation and participation (see explanation below). Each factor was

[8] In the coding the duration of the killing in Burundi has been reduced to 1972-73. See Burundi's coding entry in Appendix B for discussion.
[9] Further detail on all aspects of the coding discussed here can be found in the codebook

determined through three methods which were coded for. Each method is a separate and independent path to the factor; that is to say that if one method was answered in the affirmative, the factor was coded as present. The sources used for the coding are a mixture of primary and secondary sources. Where possible, primary reports from international institutions, NGOs, or truth commissions were used. Secondary sources were also used. These sources were found through a process starting with encyclopaedic sources (Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network; *A Century of Genocide* by Totten & Parsons), and additional sources were found from the bibliographies of the relevant entries. When necessary, searches for relevant terms were also made through the Leiden University Library. The coding of each instance contains a notes section in which any issues with finding sources are discussed, along with any discrepancies between sources and how they were resolved.

This process allowed each geno-politicide to be coded for whether conditions were present that would mobilise civilians, and whether they participated in the killing. Before carrying out the coding, it was impossible to say whether these factors were independent of each other. Coding in this way also provides additional transparency. The first factor of mobilisation was answered by the following questions:

1. Did the government call on civilians to join the killing?
2. Was there societal/peer pressure on civilians to participate?
3. Were there material incentives for civilians to actively participate?

These questions allow for different methods of mobilisation, from the direct to indirect. All three were answered on a 3-point scale, with an additional score for no evidence:[10]

99: No evidence of this happening (beyond isolated incidents)
0: Clear evidence that it did not happen (beyond isolated incidents)
0.5: Occasional, but inconsistent occurrence across time and space
1: Systematic and consistent occurrence across time and space

[10] An important point to note for both mobilisation and participation is that for nearly all instances it was difficult to find sources that explicitly state these factors were not seen. In this case, sources providing a comprehensive account of the dynamics of the geno-politicide, but not mentioning any civilian participation will be coded as “no evidence”.

Each method of mobilisation is independent, meaning that the score for the factor of civilian mobilisation as a whole is not cumulative. Therefore, a score of 0.5 or 1 for at least one of the methods will lead to a score for civilian mobilisation of 0.5 or 1 respectively.

The second question of participation was answered by the following questions:

1. Did genocidal civilian militias participate in the killing?
2. Did civil society organisations participate in the killing?
3. Did civilians participate in the killing on an *ad hoc* basis?

These questions allow for different methods of participation: by forming civilian led militias to participate in the killing, by participating through existing civil society organisations such as religious or even criminal groups, or by killing in unorganised groups or as individuals. The concepts section below will expand on and justify the definitions of these groups. This factor will be scored in the exact same way as civilian mobilisation. The final factor, political participation, was scored through answering one question: did political parties participate in the killing. As discussed below under the concepts section, this separation of political participation from civilian participation was necessary to ensure greater accuracy in coding. The result of the research into these factors is therefore an overview for each geno-politicide of the extent to which civilians were mobilised to participate, and the extent to which they participated.

Other characteristics of the geno-politicide are also coded for, in addition to these central factors being investigated. This makes it possible to determine whether there are patterns linking geno-politicides involving civilian participation. Established datasets were used to gather this data. These factors, and the datasets, are as follows:

- Duration of killing (CSP 2017)
- The severity of the killing (CSP 2017)
- Type of killing (Harff 2003)
- Regime type (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014)
- Communist regime (secondary literature)
- Presence of revolutionary war (CSP 2017)[11]

[11] Revolutionary war is defined in the dataset as "episodes of violent conflict between governments and politically organized groups (political challengers) that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region" (2017)

- Presence of ethnic war (CSP 2017)[12]
- Presence of pro-government militias (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013)

The factors of communism, revolutionary war and ethnic war will be used – in conjunction with secondary sources – as proxies to identify the three most common types of mass killing Valentino identifies: communist, ethnic and counterguerrilla (2005).

The analysis of data gathered is qualitative rather than quantitative. The results section therefore discusses whether or not the hypotheses can be confirmed, highlights correlations between the civilian mobilisation/participation factor and other factors, and attempts to shed light on interesting conclusions on the basis of theory, rather than carrying out a quantitative statistical analysis. A primary reason for this is the difficulty of getting quantitatively significant results from such a small sample size. In addition, reducing these incidents to a score for a regression analysis would not allow for a proper degree of nuance in covering each instance. Instead, in line with the scope and research objective of this thesis, I aim to provide broad insight into patterns that we see across mass killing.

Concepts

This section will build on the methodology described above to define the terms being coded for, namely civilian mobilisation and civilian participation. This is not merely a methodological question, but one that requires careful consideration of what we mean when we discuss civilian participation in killing. Civilian participation is the most difficult to define, as it touches on often arbitrary distinctions between civilian and combatant, and first requires discussion of the definition of militias. While civilian mobilisation is less conceptually difficult, it is still necessary to clearly define how governments can mobilise their populations. This mobilisation may be direct, as we see in the first method. However, it may also be through the government encouraging and permitting violent dynamics to arise in society, or allowing perpetrators to plunder their victims or take their property.

Government call

The first method through while civilians can be mobilized is through the government calling upon them to participate in killing. This call must be concrete. Civilians can be told publicly through government channels that participation in the killing is encouraged, expected, or a

[12] Ethnic war is defined in the dataset PITF as "episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status." (2017)

duty, such as in Rwanda (Desforges 1999, 190-191). Alternately, the mobilisation can be more direct and private, such as Indonesia, where the military coordinated actions with and requested assistance from civilian militias, political parties and vigilantes (Robinson 2018). The full criteria are as follows:

- Concrete and explicit call by the government or its agents for civilians to participate[13]
- Can take the form of public statements for a broad audience that participation is encouraged, expected, or a duty
- Can take the form of the government or its agents asking or encouraging other organisations or individuals directly to participate – either privately or in public.
- Euphemisms broadly understood by the population as referring to killing – and explained as such in secondary literature – should be coded positively
- If individuals are coerced into participation – by any means – this should be coded positively.

Societal/peer pressure

The second method is through societal or peer pressure. It must be emphasised that this is not pressure from other members of a military unit an individual has joined. As discussed in the literature review, it is a well-known phenomenon that individuals can carry out killing out of fear of the judgement of their peers. However, the focus here is on a wider pressure, arising not from comrades, but from society at large and individuals with whom an individual has no prior relationship. This can take the form of pressure from the local community (Fujii 2008) or a society-wide perception that being a good citizen (or member of an ethnic group) means to participate in killing (Lemarchand 2009, 272). While this pressure stems directly from an individual's fellow civilians, it relies on a government campaign to turn society against a group. The full criteria are as follows:

- Pressure on individual from society as a whole or individuals in the community to participate in the geno-politicide
- *Not* pressure from other individuals within a constituted unit or organisation

[13] Participation in geno-politicide – or 'participation in killing' – here refers to active participation. Besides killing, this also includes inciting killing, joining civilian groups directly involved in killing, knowingly providing logistical support for killing (e.g. guarding victims) or identifying victims for killing (see Valentino 37), as well as rape, torture, or severe physical harm.

- Can take the form of a society wide cessation of ordinary life in which killing comes to dominate society and is even seen as a duty[14]
- Can take the form of civilians pressuring other civilians to join the killing

Material incentives

The third method is motivation by material gains. This involves civilians being able to profit directly through their participation in killing by being able to loot their victims' possessions or property or gain rewards from the government. The connection between killing and reward must be clear and direct. This kind of mobilisation may be less closely linked to either explicit action by the government or other actor in society, and may take the form of an acceptance by the state of looting or forced takeover of property. However, there may also be explicit calls by state actors to loot and plunder (Desforges 1999, 184). The full criteria are as follows:

- Civilians are able to profit directly through participation in the geno-politicide through material gains
- This can take the form of looting or stealing land, property, or goods from victims
- It can also take the form of direct material rewards by the government for participation
- The connection between participation and reward must be direct

Once civilians have been mobilised, it is necessary to examine in what ways they participated. Analysing the participation of civilians and organised groups of civilians in geno-politicide is a discussion which takes place in a grey zone between military and civilian violence, where it can be difficult to determine what civilian participation actually is. This study aims to avoid a focus on the delegation of killing to irregular troops or militias rather than the regular armed forces (see DeMeritt 2015), and instead examine the phenomenon of civilians taking part in killing. The difficulty, however, in defining this phenomenon, is that all civilian participation in violence in an organised fashion often becomes subsumed under the category of militia – and according to the laws of war, these groups are armed forces (ICRC 1977, Article 43). In the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, for example, the following types of organisations are all discussed as pro-government militias: government organised irregular troops, ex-rebels fighting for the government, village defence forces, and

[14] Compare examples of Rwanda (Smeulers & Hoex 2010, 445) or Burundi (Lemarchand 2009, 272)

vigilante groups (Carey and Mitchell 2016). These are clearly extremely different types of organisations with very different internal dynamics – a death squad consisting of ex-soldiers and organised by the intelligence services is very different to civilians who have been provided with arms to defend their village. The broad nature of this term therefore makes it difficult to define the focus of this thesis – the participation of individuals not a member of an IHL defined armed group in killing. In addition, the fact that these definitions largely revolve around participation in an armed conflict is not always appropriate for a situation in which no armed conflict is taking place. This section will briefly provide definitions of militias used commonly in the literature, then discuss how distinctions will be drawn between this type of violence and civilian participation in this thesis.

In his discussion on definitions used in the field, Malejacq highlights a divide between two definitions. The first is provided by Carey et al. (2013), and links the concept of a militia closely to the government, focusing on "pro-government militias (PGMs)" (Malejacq 2017). Carey's exact definition of a PGM is as follows:

> *"1. Is identified as pro-government or sponsored by the government (national or subnational),*
> *2. Is identified as not being part of the regular security forces,*
> *3. Is armed, and*
> *4. Has some level of organisation"* (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013, 250)

This definition is opposed to some degree by Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger in their work on militias in civil wars (2015). They posit a weaker relationship between the state and the militia, which may have its own interests (759). Rather than requiring that the militia be clearly linked to the state, they focus on the fact that they fight the rebels (756). While it is unclear how useful this definition may be in a situation outside of civil war, when the 'enemy' is less clearly defined, this questioning of militias as an arm of the state is important.

While these definitions different in the degree to which they posit a link between the government and militia – with the first assuming the militia operates in support of the government, and the second on the 'mutual enemy' they share (Malejacq 2017) – both demonstrate the close and potentially confusing nature of this connection. This is exacerbated when we also consider death squads, which have played a crucial role in mass killings across the world (Campbell 2000, 1). Campbell highlights the difficult work of differentiating death squads, which generally have the support of both the state and private forces, from vigilantes.

While the latter is more of a "grassroots" effort by private individuals – closer to the topic of this thesis – they are still often connected to government agents (2-3). What he sees as unique about death squads is that they are covert, but not secret, meaning that while their organisation and backing is shrouded in secrecy, their actions are extremely violent and public (4-5).

Given that the difficulty in differentiating between state and civilian is therefore essential to these very concepts, it is important to establish exactly how they will be used in this thesis to ensure that what is measured is the deliberate participation in geno-politicide by individuals who are not members of the security forces. The following section will therefore define the exact criteria that will be used in the coding of geno-politicides. To ensure the highest degree of reliability possible, existing definitions have been used where possible, with additional criteria to focus on civilian participation. Three different possibilities are considered: genocidal civilian militias (GCMs), civil society organisations (CSOs), and ad hoc groups/individuals. All of these are independent ways to measure civilian participation, and the presence of any one of them will be seen as sufficient evidence of this phenomenon. It is important to note that these civilian groups can still operate at the direction of government actors. Examples of this include members of a government militia taking the lead of an ad hoc mob (Smeulers and Hoex 2010, 442), or the army instructing GCMs on who to target (Robinson 2018). Such instructions or directions do not take away the civilian nature of the group. This only happens when the civilian group becomes integrated into the security forces. Finally, the role of civilian members of political parties will also be discussed.

Genocidal civilian militias (GCMs)

One form of civilian killing in geno-politicides may be when civilians form together in armed organised groups to participate in killing. These groups here are termed 'genocidal civilian militias'. Their definition is based on Carey's definition of PGMs, which is useful for its clear criteria. However, similarly to how Jentzsch et al. focus on the anti-rebel role of militias rather than the state connection, I replace this state connection with the requirement that the militia has as its primary goal the killing of the target group. In addition, the group must have been created by civilians with a civilian membership once the killing has started. This is to ensure that the coding reflects groups that formed specifically to participate in the killing – this makes it easier to distinguish between GCMs and PGMs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, to ensure that this group is indeed comprised of civilians (according to the ICRC

definition), they must not be fighting in an armed conflict. Their only violent actions must be directed at the unarmed victims of the geno-politicide. Without this distinction, it is impossible to distinguish pro-government militias who would more commonly be seen as combatants – such as paramilitaries in Bosnia (Helsinki Watch 1992, 36-38) – from civilians who have organised themselves to perpetrate geno-politicide against a civilian population – such as the Red Guards in China (Gong 2003, 120-121). These additional criteria ensure that such a group reflects the knowing and intentional participation of the civilian population in the geno-politicide. The full criteria are as follows:

- Not part of the regular security forces, and membership not drawn from the military, security forces, or law enforcement
- Not created or structured by the government, military or ruling party
- Not fighting in an armed conflict
- Armed
- Has some level of organisation
- Participating in killing of members of the defined target group
- Created at the start of the geno-politicide or once it began
- Created with the most important aim being to carry out geno-politicide
- The majority of members carrying out killing must not be severely coerced[15]
- *Can be* carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members

Civil society organisations (CSOs)

The second phenomenon considered is the participation of existing civilian organisations in the killing. These groups must meet the OECD definition of a civil society organisation: "all non-market and non-state organisations outside of the family in which people organise themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain." (OECD 2011, 10). This includes, among others, "community-based organisations and village associations, environmental groups, women's rights groups, farmers' associations, faith-based organisations" (10). These groups differ from PGMs in that they must have other societal roles or reasons for existence besides fighting, and their members must meet the ICRC definition of civilians. They differ

[15] While all coercion is coded as civilian mobilisation, it is coded differently for participation. Pressure to participate of the sort commonly referred to in the literature, such as peer pressure or losing respect in the community (Browning 1998) will be coded as participation. However, if individuals are forced to take part in the face of serious consequences such as imprisonment, torture, or death (e.g. Guatemala (CEH 1999)), this will not be coded as participation, given that such it describes less the overall conditions of the killing and more the immediate threat.

from GCMs in that they can also have been created before the killing began, and that they must have a purpose beyond killing. Criminal groups or gangs involved in other types of crime besides the killing of the target group – organised crime, extortion, smuggling, etc. – will also be coded as civil society organisations.[16]. The full criteria are as follows:

- Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group
- Created either before or during the geno-politicide
- Meet the OECD definition of a civil society organisation
- Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian
- Not created or structured by the government, military or ruling party
- Must have other societal roles and reasons for existence besides killing
- The majority of members carrying out killing must not be severely coerced
- *Can be* carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members

Ad hoc groups/individuals

The final phenomenon considered is that of ad hoc groups or even individuals participating in the killing. These groups lack the cohesion and organisation of GCMs and CSOs – they have no clear membership for instance. In addition, individuals who join in the killing without belonging to any group will be considered under this category. The full criteria are as follows:

- Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group
- No defined membership or organisational structure
- Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian
- In the majority of cases individuals carrying out killing must not be severely coerced.
- *Can be* carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members

Or

- Individual carrying out killing
- Individual must meet the ICRC definition of civilian

Political parties

[16] See Beittinger-Lee 2013 for a discussion of criminal groups and other 'uncivil' organisations as part of civil society, especially Chapter 2 "An uneasy correlation: (Un)civil Society and Democracy"

Another group that can be comprised of civilians is political parties, both ruling and otherwise, defined here as "any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free), candidates for public office" (Sartori 2005, 56). This is a difficult area methodologically for three reasons. Firstly, the ruling party's organisation may be intertwined with the various militias or security forces serving the government, making it difficult to draw a meaningful line between party and security forces. Secondly, certain wings of the party, if armed, may cross the line into being pro-government militias, as in the case of the Interahamwe in Rwanda, which became a cohesive militia armed and trained by the military and fully subordinated to the government (Desforges 1999, 46; Smeulers and Hoex 2010, 441). Finally, in party-based regimes, the party and government may be indistinguishable, with all government functionaries and civil servants being party members (Sartori 2005, 40). This makes it difficult to determine whether perpetrators were joining in a government led campaign of killing, or part of the government carrying it out. At the same time, it is important to maintain an objective definition of civilian that can easily be replicated, hence the reliance on the ICRC definition. Drawing a distinction between civilian party members and the security forces or PGMs also serves the aim of this research in determining to what extent the perpetrators of geno-politicide can be found outside of those who are employed to carry out violence. Therefore, the participation of members of political parties will be coded separately to that of the military or security forces, but also separately from other civilian participation, to ensure transparency. However, to avoid including the entire government in this category, a line will be drawn between party members or functionaries (civilians) and civil servants or government officials, who for the sake of this research will not be included as civilians. If there is clear evidence that a particular wing of the party has gone beyond any political function to operate as a pro-government militia (as in the case of the Interahamwe), it will not be coded. This aims for a focus on the civilian popular membership of such parties. The full criteria are as follows:

- Organisation meets Sartori's definition of a political party
- Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group
- Carrying out this killing as an organisation, rather than on an individual basis
- Created either before or during the geno-politicide
- Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian
- Members carrying out killing do not have a role in the government
- In the majority of cases individuals carrying out killing must not be severely coerced.

- *Can be* carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members

Hypotheses

The literature on the causes of genocide – as discussed above – is extensive, and provides potential avenues for exploration of civilian participation. The following hypotheses for when civilian mobilisation or participation may take place are based on this existing research. They aim to test the degree to which civilian participation and mobilisation take place, the conditions under which they may take place, and the effect they may have on the killing.

The first hypothesis focuses on Valentino's assertion that "large numbers of civilians almost never play a major role in the killing itself" (Valentino 2005, 35). As discussed above, he argues that mass killing is planned and carried out by a small number of perpetrators, and that little more than passive acceptance is required from the civilian population (31-39). For the purpose of formulation and to ensure a fair test, "major role" will be interpreted as consistent participation. In addition, it seems plausible to interpret "almost never" as ≤ 10% of total cases. In this case that would entail at most two geno-politicides involving consistent civilian participation.

***H1**: ≤ 10% of cases of geno-politicide will involve consistent civilian participation*

The literature review distinguished between civilian mobilisation and civilian participation, and argued that conditions must be right for civilians to respond to the government's attempts at mobilisation. However, it may also be the case that civilians will always respond to mobilisation. Valentino makes clear that it is very rare for civilians to resist a government committing genocide (2005, 38-39). As discussed in the literature review, there are also powerful psychological and group factors that make it difficult for people to resist the pressure to carry out killing. Given these factors, we can suggest that mobilisation will always lead to participation.

***H2:** Mobilisation will be accompanied by a corresponding degree of participation*

A common type of geno-politicide is counter-guerrilla killing, which has been coded for through the proxy variable of the presence of revolutionary war. Counter-guerrilla geno-politicides take place when armies fighting insurgencies attempt to "drain the sea", and separate the guerrillas from their support base by destroying or moving the population (Valentino 2005, 200). These actions are carried out by security forces fighting against the guerrillas among a population opposed to the government. This location of the conflict in

'enemy territory' may reduce the numbers of civilians who would be willing to be mobilised to participate. The fact that this killing also takes place in an active conflict may also limit the killing to combatants, and make it difficult for civilians to become involved. Testing this theory means determining whether revolutionary war was present in the country at the time the genocide began.

H3: *Counter-guerrilla geno-politicides will not involve civilian mobilisation or participation*

Ethnic cleansing geno-politicides involve governing elites deciding that "large-scale violence is the most practical way to accomplish ethnic cleansing" (Valentino 2005, 155), or the "[reorganization] of society at the expense of certain groups" (153). While ethnic cleansing may bring to mind the physical displacement and expulsion of a population, it can also take the form of mass killing if expulsion is impractical or will not alleviate the perceived threat (157). This type of killing has been coded for through the proxy value of ethnic war, assuming that ethnic war is a sign of significant ethnic tensions. While theories highlighting the role of existing ethnic cleavages in society are unconvincing in predicting or explaining genocide (Mueller 2000), they may be able to explain why civilians might take part. Ethnic group identities may make it easier for the population to identify the victim group, and may also lead to greater identification among the section of the population sharing ethnicity with the governing elites (Horowitz 1985, 293-296).

H4: *Ethnic cleansing geno-politicides will involve civilian participation*.

Another way to approach this same question of the mobilising role of ethnicity is through a focus on the nature of the target group, rather than the goals of the perpetrators. Geno-politicides in which the target group is distinguished through their ethnicity – or nationality, religion or race, in the official definition – rather than political beliefs may lead to greater civilian participation. In an autocracy, groups targeted for their political beliefs are most likely to be oppressed simply for their opposition to the regime. Given the lack of threat this poses to the majority of the population, the targeting of political opponents is unlikely to cause such extreme acts as killing among ordinary people. In other words, if the target group is defined solely by their political beliefs, this may fail to arouse sufficient desire for participation among the population.

H5: *Politicides will not involve civilian participation.*

A potential cause of civilian mobilization is a desire to accomplish the killing quickly. Despite the power of the state, sometimes irregular forces may serve as an additional "force multiplier" (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015, 759). This may be especially necessary if the government perceives an acute threat from the target group (Valentino 2005, 68), requiring swift action against the group as a whole If the government does not have the ability to attack or destroy the target group swiftly enough through using the security forces alone, they may attempt to mobilize the civilian population to accelerate the killing.

While this explanation of a potential relationship seems plausible, causation here is tangled. While the desire for swift killing may lead to mobilisation, it is the mobilisation that leads to the actual swift killing. It may also be the case that the choice to mobilise civilians is motivated by other reasons, but leads to a shorter geno-politicide due to the force multiplier effect – thus reversing the causal relationship. The hypothesis therefore makes no suggestion of causation.

***H6**: Geno-politicides involving civilian mobilization will on average be shorter than those that do not*

As mentioned above, the state can have uses for irregular forces. There is substantial literature on the incentives for the state to create and utilise pro-government militias for security or in killing (DeMeritt 2015; Ahram 2011). It is reasonable to assume that these same incentives will also lead governments to encourage the participation of genocidal civilian militias, civil society organisations, or even civilians on an ad hoc basis. This can be caused by the same underlying weakness of the state that makes such delegation necessary, or a similar calculus on behalf of the state that civilians will be more efficient than the security forces.

***H7:** Geno-politicides in countries where PGMs are present will involve civilian mobilisation*

Another form of civilian participation, falling in the grey zone between civilian and state actor, is participation by the mass membership of political parties. This goes beyond the work of parties through their potential role in the government, and involves the participation of the broader party membership with no role in the government. Single party states will make it easier for the architects of genocide in the government to mobilise civilians, though this may depend on the type of party (Sartori 2005, 197-202). The pervasiveness of the party throughout society makes its membership a tempting weapon for the government to use to

further their reach during a geno-politicide. Given their identification with the regime, they will also be more likely to identify with the reasoning for the killing.

H8: *Geno-politicides carried out by single party regimes will involve political participation*

It is reasonable to assume that the abovementioned 'force multiplier' effect of civilian mobilisation will increase the reach of the killing. As accounts from the Rwandan genocide show, once a large number of community members with local knowledge are involved in the killing – even merely by identifying targets – it makes it very difficult for victims to escape (Desforges 1999, 13, 191). This hypothesis therefore reverses the variables and suggests that geno-politicides with civilian participation will lead to more deaths per year than those which do not.

H9: *Civilian participation will lead to a greater monthly average death toll*

Results

As discussed above, with such a small number of cases it is impossible to provide statistical analysis of the hypotheses. This size issue is made more difficult by the degree of variation on certain dimensions, as well as the complexity of the issue being studied and the likely small effects each variable will have (Salkind 2010). Given that this is a sample of 21 cases out of a total population of only 37, the validity of broad quantitative analysis of geno-politicide as a whole can be brought into question. However, the results still provide clear evidence to reject or accept certain hypotheses.

Table 2 – Presence of civilian mobilisation, participation and political participation

	Civ. mob.	**Civ. part.**	**Pol. part.**
No evidence of occurrence (99)	10	9	12
No occurrence (0)	2	2	2
Inconsistent occurrence (0.5)	2	5	1
Consistent occurrence (1)	7	5	6

As Table 2 indicates, the hypothesis that civilians almost never take part in geno-politicide is rejected, as five cases – or approximately 25% of the sample – involved consistent civilian participation. Valentino's assertion is therefore incorrect. However, the majority of cases

(52%) do not involve any civilian participation. The following table provides more information on the cases which do.

Table 3 – Instances of civilian mobilisation, participation and political participation

Geno-politicide	**Civ. mob.**	**Civ. part.**	**Pol. part.**
Sudan 1956-1972	99	0.5	99
Indonesia 1965-66	1	1	1
China 1966-72	1	1	1
Pakistan 1971	0.5	0.5	0.5
Burundi 1972-73	1	1	1
Guatemala 1978-90	1	0.5	99
El Salvador 1980-89	0.5	0.5	99
Uganda 1980-86	99	99	1
Bosnia 1992-95	1	0.5	99
Burundi 1993	1	1	1
Rwanda 1994	1	1	1

Five instances stand out for the degree to which mobilisation and participation was present: Indonesia 1965-66, China 1966-72, Burundi 1972-73 and 1993, and Rwanda 1993. With the exception of the two instances in Burundi, these cases also had at least two of the independent methods of mobilisation or participation coded as present.

Table 4 – Comparison of civilian mobilisation and participation scores

Country	**Civilian mobilisation score**	**Civilian participation score**
Angola	99	99
Iraq	0	0

Uganda 1971-1979	99	99
Indonesia 1975-1992	0	0
Rwanda	1	1
Guatemala	1	0.5
China 1966-1975	1	1
El Salvador	0.5	0.5
Burundi 1972-73	1	1
Burundi 1993	1	1
Cambodia	99	99
Afghanistan	99	99
South Vietnam	99	99
Uganda 1980-1986	99	99
Sudan	99	99
Bosnia	1	0.5
Philippines	99	99
China 1959	99	99
Indonesia 1965-66	1	1
Sudan 1956-1972	99	0.5
Pakistan	0.5	0.5

The hypothesis that mobilisation will be accompanied by a corresponding degree of participation is accepted. As the table above shows, there is only one case in which we see participation without mobilisation, and two cases in which consistent mobilisation produces only inconsistent participation. In all other cases the two factors correspond perfectly.

Table 5 – Counter-guerrilla geno-politicide and civilian participation[17]

	No part.	**Inconsistent part.**	**Consistent part.**	**Cases involving participation**
Rev. war present	3	2	0	40%
Rev. war not present	8	3	5	50%

There is no significant correlation between the presence of revolutionary war and civilian participation, especially given the small number of cases with revolutionary war and the hypothesis is therefore rejected. However, the results may suggest at least a potential connection between counter-guerrilla killing and a lack of some forms of civilian participation, given that there are no instances of consistent civilian participation starting during revolutionary war. In addition, the specific type of inconsistent participation we see in El Salvador and Guatemala is death squads (GCMs) only. We therefore never see CSO or *ad hoc* killing beginning during a revolutionary war.

Table 6 – Ethnic war and civilian participation

	No part.	**Inconsistent part.**	**Consistent part.**	**Cases involving participation**
Ethnic war present	7	4	3	50%
Ethnic war not present	4	1	2	43%

[17] For ease of analysis, the category 'no evidence of participation/mobilisation' has been merged with 'evidence of no participation/mobilisation' from this hypothesis forward.

There is no clear correlation between ethnic war and participation, and the hypothesis that ethnic cleansing geno-politicides will involve civilian participation is therefore rejected. The distribution of the consistent cases in particular, with the truly systemic cases of Indonesia and China lacking any ethnic aspect, draws the hypothesis into question.

Table 7 – Types of killing and civilian participation

	No part.	**Inconsistent part.**	**Consistent part.**
Genocide	0	1	2
Politicide	3	1	1
Politicide with communal victims	4	2	1
Genocide and politicide	4	1	1

H4, the hypothesis that politicides will not involve civilian participation, is also rejected. The instances of participation are relatively evenly spread across each category of killing, and it is clear that in Indonesia and China, as in other politicides, civilians were willing to participate.

Figure 1 – Duration of killing and civilian mobilisation



The scatterplot above displays the duration of killing in months on the Y-axis, with the line at 90.6 indicting the mean duration of all 21 cases. The cases with no civilian participation are distributed fairly consistently, with 41% below the average and 59% above it, whereas 71% of the consistent cases – Bosnia, both instances in Burundi, Indonesia 1965-66, and Rwanda – are well below the average. H5 is therefore accepted, as geno-politicides with civilian participation are on average shorter than those without. However, the fact that there are five cases without participation that are also below average is a clear indication that other factors are necessary to explain this correlation.

The hypothesis that geno-politicides in countries where PGMs are present will involve civilian mobilisation could not be adequately tested, given that data on PGMs was only available for geno-politicides post 1981. This reduced the number of cases for which the hypothesis could be tested to eleven. Of these cases all except one saw the presence of PGMs, and of these only three also had civilian mobilisation. These results therefore tell us little about any possible links between PGMs and mobilisation. Indeed, PGMs are a near constant

factor in states suffering geno-politicide, meaning they are unlikely to be able to predict mobilisation without further research on the interplay between PGMs and armed civilians.

Table 8 – Party-based regimes and political participation[18]

	No pol. part.	**Inconsistent pol. part**	**Consistent pol. part.**	**Cases involving participation**
Party-based regime	7	0	3	30%
Non- party-based regime	11	1	3	26%

H7 was only able to be tested once the regime type variable was simplified, due to the wide range of autocratic regimes that commit genocide. Eight types of regime were found in the instances of genocide analysed, all of them autocratic. These were various combinations of three base types found in Geddes, Wright and Frantz's database (2014): party, personal and military regimes. When separating these into two categories – at least partially party-based regimes and those fully military and/or personal – there are no significant differences in political participation between the two types of regime. H6 is therefore rejected.

[18] The total number of regimes is 25 due to regime changes within country during certain instances of genocide. These regime changes cannot be tied to (immediate) changes in the intensity of the genocide or mobilisation/participation. Burundi in 1993 was left out of the coding for this hypothesis, as the dataset used had no data on the country between 1993 and 1996. The majority of the killing took place during the power vacuum in the immediate aftermath of the assassination of the President (ICIB 2002).

Figure 2 – Average monthly death toll and civilian participation (log. scale)



The hypothesis that civilian participation will lead to a greater average death toll is also rejected, given the lack of clear patterns in the scatterplot above. Here the monthly average death toll has been calculated based on taking the midpoint of the range of estimated deaths for each instance in Harff (2003). A logarithmic scale is used above to best display the wide variation in monthly death tolls. The line across the graph at 5296 is the median (China 1966-75), chosen instead of the mean to avoid distortion from the extreme values of Rwanda and Pakistan. While all the cases with a score of 1 for civilian participation, except China, are above the median, the majority of the cases scoring 0.5 are below average. Without further research, it is impossible to make a causal link between civilian participation and the average monthly death toll.

Discussion

This section will begin by discussing the answer to the question of whether civilians take part in geno-politicide. It will then cover rejected hypotheses for the conditions in which such participation may take place, followed by those conditions that may be connected to

participation. Finally, potential directions for future research based on the results will be outlined.

Do civilians take part in geno-politicide?

The answer to this central question is a nuanced one. Firstly, the data on civilian participation immediately highlights that theories of mass killing focused solely on the strategic calculus of a small group within the state must account for the cases in which civilian participation was essential to the manner in which the killing took place. The hypothesis that civilians "almost never take part" is clearly rejected. The cases of inconsistent civilian participation could potentially be explained by proponents of the strategic view as the work of quasi-civilian death squads or more commonplace ethnic riots, though I believe such a view would oversimplify the results. However, the five cases of consistent participation must be accounted for, and cannot be dismissed as exceptions. The deaths of up to three million people in these five geno-politicides are hard to reconcile with a view of mass killing as "bloody work [carried out with] little more than the passive acceptance of the rest of society" (Valentino 2005, 3).

At the same time, however, theories of mass killing that focus on structural causes must account for the fact that in the majority of cases of geno-politicide the security forces are the sole actors responsible for the killing itself. Gerlach's statement that "a perception of social crisis also helps to explain why the use of violence is so often not just a matter of the state" (2010, 12) may be correct when it comes to passively accepting the use of violence, but not when it comes to committing it. Even in situations where genocide is taking place in a country where ethnic divisions have been exacerbated to the point of actual ethnic warfare, civilians fail to take any part in the killing in half of these instances. The strategic view that mass killing is the work of a relatively small group of people is in the majority of cases correct.

Rejected explanations

Another conclusion the results make clear that there are no simple explanations for why we see mobilisation and participation in a few instances and none in others. A number of these failed explanations are worth highlighting here. Firstly, the link between ethnic divides and mass killing must be severely questioned. The results show no indication that mass killing of ethnically defined victim groups are more likely than other forms of killing to involve civilian participation. People are evidently just as able to kill a member of the political 'other', as the

mass participation in killing of 'counter-revolutionaries' or communists in China and Indonesia demonstrates. Politicides within ethnic groups are equally as likely to see participation as politicides in which the victims also have a different ethnic identity to their killers. In line with Mueller's research (2000), 'ethnic warfare', or ethnic killing by civilians in this case, is not greatly different than non-ethnic killing.

Secondly, there are few links between types of regime or state and participation or mobilisation. As the results show, both party-based regimes and non-party-based regimes have closely similar chances of seeing political participation. In addition, a diverse range of autocratic regimes have carried out geno-politicide and have mobilised civilians. While not tested for given the limited number of communist states in the dataset, of the four communist states that carried out geno-politicide, one saw civilian mobilisation and participation, and three did not – in line with the overall results. While it could be suggested that military regimes would also be unlikely to mobilise civilians, preferring to rely on their own power base in the military, we do see any patterns here either. (Semi-)military regimes in five countries mobilised civilians to some degree, and in Indonesia the military played the key role in mobilising and inciting civilian violence.[19] These results could be interpreted as supporting a focus on the incentives faced by the regime carrying out the killing, rather than the nature of the regime itself.

Finally, the nature of the link between participation and average death toll is unclear due to the highly different results we see for inconsistent and consistent participation. While none of the consistent cases have below average death rates, four of the five inconsistent cases are either approximately average or below average. A potential explanation may be linked to the duration of the killing. The three inconsistent cases with below average death toll (Sudan 1983-2002, Guatemala and El Salvador) all also have above average duration, whereas the four consistent cases that are above average also have a shorter than average duration. It may therefore be the case that the different nature of the killings in Sudan, Guatemala and El Salvador, taking place over a long period, led to a different kind of participation that did not raise the average killing rate, whereas in the shorter geno-politicides civilian participation had the predicted force multiplier effect.

[19] While Indonesia is coded according to the dataset used as a personal regime, the army was the state actor most responsible for planning and carrying out the killing, and indeed the campaign eventually led to the overthrow of Sukarno's personalist regime (Robinson 2018, 6).

Accepted hypotheses

Two hypotheses, however, were at least partially confirmed: an extremely high correlation between civilian mobilisation and participation and a correlation between civilian participation and shorter duration of killing. These are discussed here in reverse order.

The first confirmed hypothesis is the connection between duration and civilian participation. The cases in which we see civilian participation are distributed in a non-average manner, with five of the seven consistent cases taking place in a significantly shorter than average period. Two interpretations of this are possible. The first and most simple interpretation is that mobilisation occurred for reasons unconnected to duration, and due to the force multiplier effect finished the killing more quickly. The second, which connects mobilisation directly to duration, is that mobilisation takes place when the elite perpetrators feel under urgent threat, and seek a force multiplier to neutralise the threat as quickly as possible. Such urgent threats could from outside the regime, in the form of attempted coups or the beginning of civil war (Wayman and Tago 2010, 9; Goldsmith et al. 2013), or even threats from elites within the regime (Van der Maat 2015). This would be supported by the examples of Rwanda, Indonesia 1965-66 and Burundi 1972-73 in particular, as the killing began immediately following the assassination of regime elites in the first two cases, and after an ethnic rebellion in the third (Desforges 1999; Robinson 2018; René Lemarchand 2009).[20] A similar pattern may have taken place in Burundi in 1993, where the killing began after the assassination of the Hutu president by Tutsi soldiers. Given the legacy of the previous genocide in 1972-73 members of the president's party must have seen this as a threat (Lynch 2013), which may explain their role in mobilising killing.

However, while a clear correlation, as an explanation for mobilisation this interpretation of acute threat is insufficient. There are other cases in which the duration was below average, but less or no mobilisation took place. A particularly relevant counter-example is that of Pakistan. There too the victory of the Awami League in national elections posed an immediate threat to the unity of the country and the power of elites (Jahan 2009) – yet the army seemingly had little need for a force multiplier, only mobilising support from political parties on an inconsistent basis. The relative strength of the Pakistani army alone is not

[20] The argument can be made that the genocide in Rwanda was only of short duration due to external factors, namely the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in the civil war. However, given that approximately three quarters of the Rwandan Tutsis were killed in just three months (Desforges 1999, 18), it seems unlikely that the killing would have lasted for much longer, and clear that speed was an aim.

enough to explain this difference, given that Indonesia also had a powerful and modern army when they decided to mobilise their population (Robinson 2018, 45-46). Further research will be needed to consider additional factors that may be necessary for explaining this correlation.

The other confirmed hypothesis, with more far-reaching implications, is the link between mobilisation and participation. We see only two cases in which consistent mobilisation achieves inconsistent participation, Bosnia and Guatemala, and one case of apparently spontaneous participation in Sudan 1956-72.[21] In all other cases there is exact correspondence between the degree of mobilisation and participation. This suggests that the most necessary condition for civilian participation to take place is mobilisation by the government. Again, however, two interpretations are possible. The first is that if the government carries out a mobilisation campaign, this campaign will always have a reasonable degree of success in bringing about participation. An alternative explanation for the connection reverses causation and suggests that if conditions are present that would make civilian participation possible – if people are already willing to kill – the government will take the opportunity to mobilise them. On the basis of this research, the first explanation appears more likely, given the substantial effort that governments have made to mobilise their population, and the degree of low-level coercion that was necessary.

In all the consistent cases, with the exception of Burundi 1993, which is discussed below, mobilisation was a far-reaching effort by the government to put immense pressure on the population to participate, or at least tolerate public killing. We do not see the government merely giving permission for certain groups to use violence, or simply encouraging killing from the sidelines. Instead the government uses the language of duty or national emergency to convey the urgency and necessity of killing, as happened in Burundi (Lemarchand 1996, 98). In addition, the security forces or pro-government militias almost always take a leading role, starting off the killing, and pushing other to join. In Rwanda, for example, the Interahamwe are described as forming the core of 'killer groups' of civilians (Smeulers and Hoex 2010, 442). Finally, the state can provide the logistical support that civilian killers lack, leading to a close and self-reinforcing cooperation (Robinson 2018). State violence and

[21] In Bosnia there were consistently material incentives to participate, but only inconsistent participation – potentially because material benefits could also be gained without participation through the general redistribution of territory. The Guatemalan government mobilised voluntary death squads, but also created civilian militias through extreme coercion, which were not coded as participation. In Sudan civilians in the south appear to have occasionally killed or raped, seemingly for their own gain, but there was no evidence of a government policy of using civilians. Further detail on these instances can be found in the corresponding coding entries in Appendix B.

civilian violence exist side by side, rather than the government merely allowing civilians to do its work for it.

Another important point to note is the degree of coercion that is present in these cases, indicating that people are rarely eager participants in killing. While forced participation or violent coercion was not coded as participation, peer pressure and the fear of being ostracised or losing status within the community should not be considered as inescapable coercion, given the extreme nature of the acts being committed.[22] What we see in these cases is that people are drawn into participating in acts they would not have carried out in a different environment. Certain perpetrators in Rwanda, for example, present themselves as having had killed because "killing was "the law"" (Straus 2006, 137). During the Cultural Revolution, students desperately seeking membership in the Red Guards killed and tortured to achieve status in a suddenly changed society (Gong 2003, 123). This is the same disturbing conclusion that we see in Browning's *Ordinary Men* (2001) – that most people fear the judgement of their peers more than killing a fellow human being. This suggests that while most civilian perpetrators were not eager to participate, they were also unwilling to go to great efforts to escape having to kill.

These details therefore are not consistent with the theory that civilians are willing to participate and are therefore easy targets for opportunist mobilisation by the state. Instead, this points to a large-scale campaign by the government making great efforts to involve civilians and civilian organisations in the killing. Given the consistency between the factors of mobilisation and participation, these campaigns appear to be highly successful. The implications of this are in line with Milgram or Browning's research. Human beings are relatively easily pressured into committing acts of violence, even individuals who have not been trained or form part of a cohesive unit. However, it is necessary to provide some nuance to this connection through the examples of spontaneous participation in Burundi 1993 and the Cultural Revolution in China. The first is an indication that mobilisation may not always be a necessary element, and the second highlights the complexity of untangling the two factors.

In Burundi the only form of mobilisation coded as present was material incentives, setting it apart from the other four consistent cases. This may be largely due to the fact that the majority of killing took place during a power vacuum lasting three days in the wake of the

[22] Straus differentiates between the motivation of coercion, implying the possibility for direct harm, and that obedience, implying the possibility that not participating may be wrong in some manner (2006, 136).

assassination of the president (ICIB 2002). These three days saw Hutu civilian attacks on Tutsis that were often instigated by (civilian) functionaries of the FRODEBU political party rather than the government (2002). However, there are also patterns of spontaneous violence (ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013), which Lynch connects to lessons communities drew from local events during the 1972-73 genocide. Hutus who had experienced devastating violence in 1972-73 were afraid to attack Tutsis in 1993 in revenge for the assassination of the Hutu president – whereas civilians with other experiences carried out attacks without being mobilised (Lynch 2013). Bundervoet's research into the killing has also shown that wealthier Tutsis were more likely to be targeted, and that the killing was greater in parts of the country where land pressure – a serious problem in Burundi – was greatest (Bundervoet 2009). While his research also suggests an organising role played by FRODEBU, the example of Burundi indicates that in certain circumstances government campaigns may be less necessary to spark civilian participation.

The Cultural Revolution offers a similar cautionary example, with a complex interplay between government mobilisation and spontaneous organisation. A significant proportion of the violence at the beginning of the Revolution was carried out by the Red Guards, student groups backed by the state (Gong 2003, 114). Their origins appear to be largely spontaneous. The first Guard groups were formed in secret, but once they approached the government and were praised by Mao Zedong as part of his effort to neutralise his political enemies, the groups spread explosively across the country (Wang 2003, 35-36). The campaign of violence they then began against those seen as enemies of the revolution went far beyond what Mao had imagined, but was embraced so as not to "dampen the enthusiasm of the Red Guards" (37). By 1967 China had essentially entered civil war between various factions of revolutionaries and the army, each side convinced they were supported by Mao (Dikotter 2016, 145). This example demonstrates both the tendency for violence to grow beyond what its instigators had imagined, as well as the self-reinforcing tendencies of mobilisation and participation together. While the results of this thesis indicate that mobilisation is almost always followed by participation, the causal direction must be treated with caution.

While both the accepted and rejected hypotheses are only a small number of potential explanations for the results, the lack of simple explanations for this phenomenon becomes most clear when we focus on the five cases of consistent participation: China, Indonesia, Rwanda and Burundi 1972-73 and 1993. The three African cases share similarities, revolving around the allocation of political power between ethnic groups. However, the cases in China

and Indonesia could not be more different. With the exception of some attacks on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia,[23] these instances took place entirely within ethnic groups. Neither country was at war at the time, and China even lacked a violent trigger for the killing, compared to the assassination of a number of generals by communists in Indonesia (Cribb 2009). Finally, the Indonesian killings were to some degree unique in the degree to which civil society organisations were among the instigators of the killing rather than merely joining it, with religious groups and political parties eagerly allying with the army to destroy the communists (Robinson 2018, 171-176). Yet these five different cases share a pattern of consistent civilian participation unique among the 21 cases covered in this thesis.

It is clear that future work to further understand the nature of civilian participation in geno-politicide should focus on these five cases to examine why we see these patterns here and not elsewhere. The results of this thesis can provide some suggestions on how to pursue this explanation. The two confirmed hypotheses suggest that mobilisation is the key factor. Firstly, the fact that mobilisation is almost always accompanied by a corresponding degree of participation points in the direction of a focus on elite decision-making. In addition, the shorter duration of episodes involving mobilisation may point towards a link between urgency on the part of elites and the desire for a force multiplier effect. Comparative research focused on this area can draw together insight from each instance on the incentives and constraints faced by the planners of the genocide. This research must also examine similar instances where participation did not take place and establish differences in the conditions faced by those carrying out the killing.

However, it is important to also take into account local factors and avoid a 'one size fits all' explanation. With a relatively small population of cases of geno-politicide, these factors can have a large impact on the overall pattern. A great deal of research has already been done in this area. Straus, for example, argues that a history of conscription for labour, among other factors, may explain the mobilisation of the Rwandan population for killing (2006, 202). Robinson discusses an Indonesian history of mobilising civilian militias (2018, 25), and the impact of land pressure in Burundi has already been mentioned above. These factors are clearly important, and as mentioned in the introduction, there is a wealth of research on each individual case of geno-politicide that can be drawn upon. At the same time, it would be a mistake to examine each case in isolation and attempt to explain the same phenomenon in

[23] The notion that the killing was particularly or disproportionately focused on Chinese has been shown to be a persistent myth (Cribb and Coppel 2009).

different ways in each case. Identifying common factors and patterns will allow for better understanding of geno-politicide, and potentially even how to prevent it.

Conclusion

As outlined above in the discussion, a great deal of research must be done in this field to better understand civilian participation in geno-politicide and the variance in its appearance throughout the 20th century. However, the findings of this thesis are already a contribution to this field. Firstly, the research has been able to create a broad overview of civilian mobilisation and participation across cases, allowing for comparisons to be made and providing clear data on this phenomenon. Secondly, it has shown that while the majority of geno-politicides are carried out by the security forces alone, almost 50% see some degree of civilian participation, and ≈25% involve consistent civilian participation. Finally, two significant connections were found in the study between the conditions in which geno-politicide took place and the degree of participation. Firstly, instances involving consistent civilian participation are on average shorter than those that do not. Secondly, civilian mobilisation by the government is almost always followed by a corresponding degree of participation. No other highly significant results were found, demonstrating that factors such as ethnicity or regime type do not play a role in participation.

This thesis of course has its limitations, mainly due to its limited scope and the depth of research required. Firstly, the thesis relied on secondary sources due to the impossibility of extensive research on 21 cases. While in certain cases primary sources such as truth commission reports were available, in many instances the coding relied on secondary research. This necessarily affects the depth of research, as archival research would be able to better establish government decision making and the degree to which civilians participated.[24] Similarly, the research relied on proxy variables from data sets gathered by others. Again, within the scope of this thesis it was necessary to accept variables such as PITF's ethnic or revolutionary war, rather than carrying in depth research to determine whether a particular genocide was motivated by ethnic cleansing or counterinsurgency. In the worst case, this may have led to coding that incorrectly reflects the reality of the geno-politicide. However, to ensure consistency, it was necessary to adhere to the data sets, rather than creating a large number of exceptions requiring explanation. This also makes the data gathered more suitable for future use.

[24] See Gerlach (2010, 9-11) for a discussion of similar limitations in his work.

Another potential limitation is the focus on a subset of 21 out of 37 cases. As mentioned above, due to scarce literature and limited scope, all cases with less than 50 000 victims were ruled out. It is difficult to state what impact this may have had on the results, and it is possible that geno-politicides smaller in scale have different dynamics. However, the focus on the 21 worst instances of geno-politicide does mean that the results are still significant in attempting to understand the phenomenon, given that they account for approximately 98% of the total death toll of geno-politicides between 1955-2002.[25]

Finally, while directions for future research on the issue of civilian participation have already been outlined in the section above, there are a number of theoretical conclusions that can be drawn which are relevant for the wider field. Firstly, the fact that some geno-politicides rely solely on the security forces, while others involve varying degrees of popular participation, presents a challenge to both theories of mass killing focusing on strategic incentives and theories examining societal factors. Clearly geno-politicide can be both carried out with very little involvement from society as whole, or become an upheaval that takes over all aspects of national life, which has consequences for the way we think of its causes. More research is needed to better understand how the level of civilian participation is connected to the causes of geno-politicide. Secondly, the fact that government campaigns of mobilisation almost always result in success provides further evidence for theories of mass violence that emphasise the susceptibility of individuals to peer pressure, and advances these theories by focusing on civilians rather than individuals in military units. While civilians were eager to participate only in rare instances, a significant number were willing to commit acts of horrendous violence when placed under pressure or given the opportunity to profit. This further complicates the issue of responsibility for mass killing, and presents complex questions in an era of increasing legal accountability for perpetrators of genocide. Future research in the field of civilian participation in geno-politicide to build on the work this thesis has done is therefore highly relevant to the wider field.

[25] Calculated using midpoint of the range of estimated deaths for each instance in Harff (2003).

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Appendix A – Codebook

Country

Enter country name from PITF set

Time period of killing

Enter time period from PITF set

Duration of killing

Enter duration of killing in months

Average severity of geno-politicide

Enter average DEATHMAG score across years from PITF set.

Peak severity of geno-politicide

Enter peak DEATHMAG score from PITF set

Type of killing

Use Table 1 in Harff 2003:
0: Genocide
1: Politicide
2: Politicide with communal victims
3: Both (genocide & politicide)

Regime type

Use Geddes, Wright and Frantz dataset (2014). Enter regime type in words. If multiple regimes, enter all regimes with years in brackets.

Communist state

Use secondary literature:
0: No communist state
1: Communist state

Revolutionary war

Use PITF set:

0: No revolutionary war in the country when the geno-politicide began

1: Presence of a revolutionary war when the geno-politicide began

Ethnic war

Use PITF set:

0: No ethnic war in the country during the geno-politicide

1: Presence of ethnic war in the country during the geno-politicide

Pro-government militias (PGMs)

Use PGMD:

0: No PGMs (for geno-politicides after 1981)

1: Presence of at least one PGM (for geno-politicides after 1981)

N/A: Geno-politicides before 1981

Civilian mobilisation

For this section use the following criteria for the type of civilian mobilisation in each question. The full definitions are provided in the definitions section of the thesis.

Question 1 – government call

- Concrete and explicit call by the government or its agents for civilians to participate[26]
- Can take the form of public statements for a broad audience that participation is encouraged, expected, or a duty
- Can take the form of the government or its agents asking or encouraging other organisations or individuals directly to participate – either privately or in public.
- Euphemisms broadly understood by the population as referring to killing – and explained as such in secondary literature – should be coded positively
- If individuals are coerced into participation – by any means – this should be coded positively.

Question 2 – Societal/peer pressure

[26] Participation in geno-politicide – or 'participation in killing' – here refers to active participation. Besides killing, this also includes inciting killing, joining civilian groups directly involved in killing, knowingly providing logistical support for killing (e.g. guarding victims) or identifying victims for killing (see Valentino 37), as well as rape, torture, or severe physical harm.

- Pressure on individual from society as a whole or individuals in the community to participate in the geno-politicide
- *Not* pressure from other individuals within a constituted unit or organisation
- Can take the form of a society wide cessation of ordinary life in which killing comes to dominate society and is even seen as a duty[27]
- Can take the form of civilians pressuring other civilians to join the killing

Question 3 – Material incentives

- Civilians are able to profit directly through participation in the geno-politicide through material gains
- This can take the form of looting or stealing land, property, or goods from victims
- It can also take the form of direct material rewards by the government for participation
- The connection between participation and reward must be direct

Code each question according to the following:

99: No evidence of this happening (beyond isolated incidents)[28]
0: Clear evidence that it did not happen (beyond isolated incidents)
0.5: Occasional, but inconsistent occurrence across time and space.
1: Systematic and consistent occurrence across time and space.

Civilian mobilisation score
99: No evidence of this happening (beyond isolated incidents)
0: Clear evidence that it did not happen (beyond isolated incidents)
0.5: Occasional, but inconsistent occurrence across time and space
1: Systematic and consistent occurrence across time and space

In the sources section, fill in Yes/No/No evidence with the source and page number.

Question	**Code**	**Sources**

[27] Compare examples of Rwanda (Smeulers & Hoex 2010, 445) or Burundi (Lemarchand 2009, 272)
[28] Isolated incidents are instances of killing large enough to be reported in the literature, but that are not part of a pattern even over a short period of time, and which are limited to less than 5 throughout the geno-politicide. Compare the example of Angola, where only one significant incident of ad hoc violence took place (Heywood 2011, 322).

1. Did the government or government actors call on civilians to join the killing?		
2. Was there societal/peer pressure on civilians to participate?		
3. Were there material incentives for civilians to actively participate?		
Civilian mobilisation		

Civilian participation

For this section use the following criteria for the type of civilian participation in each question. The full definitions are provided in the definitions section of the thesis.

Question 1 – Genocidal civilian militias:

- Not part of the regular security forces, and membership not drawn from the military, security forces, or law enforcement
- Not created or structured by the government, military or ruling party
- Armed
- Has some level of organisation
- Participating in killing of members of the defined target group[29]
- Created at the start of the genocide or once it began
- Created with the most important aim being to carry out geno-politicide
- The majority of members carrying out killing must not be severely coerced[30]
- *Can be* carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members

Question 2 – Civil society organisations:

[29] See footnote 1

[30] While all coercion is coded as civilian mobilisation, it is coded differently for participation. Pressure to participate of the sort commonly referred to in the literature, such as peer pressure or losing respect in the community (Browning 1998) will be coded as participation. However, if individuals are forced to take part in the face of serious consequences such as imprisonment, torture, or death (e.g. Guatemala (Jonas 2009, 319)), this will not be coded as participation, given that such it describes less the overall conditions of the genocide and more the immediate threat.

- Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group
- Created either before or during the geno-politicide
- Meet the OECD definition of a civil society organisation
- Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian
- Not created or structured by the government, military or ruling party
- Must have other societal roles and reasons for existence besides killing
- The majority of members carrying out killing must not be severely coerced
- *Can be* carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members

Question 3 – Ad hoc killing:

- Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group
- No defined membership or organisational structure
- Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian
- In the majority of cases individuals carrying out killing must not be severely coerced.
- *Can be* carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members

Or

- Individual carrying out killing
- Individual must meet the ICRC definition of civilian

According to research, code Question 1, 2 and 3 as follows:

99: No evidence of this happening (beyond isolated incidents)

0: Clear evidence that it did not happen (beyond isolated incidents)[31]

0.5: Occasional, but inconsistent occurrence across time and space[32]

1: Systematic and consistent occurrence across time and space[33]

Civilian participation score

99: At least 1 question coded as no evidence, and all others coded as 0

0: All questions coded as 0

0.5: At least one question coded as 0.5, and none coded as 1

1: At least one question coded as 1

[31] Compare to model example of the Anfal Campaign in Iraq
[32] Compare to model example of Guatemala
[33] Compare to model example of the Rwandan Genocide

In the sources section, fill in Yes/No/No evidence with the source and page number.

Question	**Code**	**Sources**
1. Did genocidal civilian militias participate in the killing?		
2. Did civil society organisations participate in the killing?		
3. Did civilians participate in the killing on an *ad hoc* basis?		
Civilian participation		

Political participation

For this question use the following criteria for political participation. The full definition is provided in the definitions section of the thesis.

- Organisation meets Sartori's definition of a political party
- Carrying out killing of members of the defined target group
- Carrying out this killing as an organisation, rather than on an individual basis
- Created either before or during the geno-politicide
- Members meet the ICRC definition of civilian
- Members carrying out killing do not have a role in the government
- *Can be* carrying out killing at the direction of military or government members

According to research, code political participation as follows:
99: No evidence of this happening (beyond isolated incidents)
0: Clear evidence that it did not happen (beyond isolated incidents)[34]
0.5: Occasional, but inconsistent occurrence across time and space
1: Systematic and consistent occurrence across time and space[35]

Question	**Code**	**Sources**

[34] Compare to model example of the Anfal Campaign in Iraq
[35] Compare to model example of Uganda 1980-86

1. Did political parties participate in the killing?		

Notes

Provide further detail on any coding that could be contested or that requires further explanation, or aspects of the killing that arose during the coding and require further examination.

Sources

Provide a full bibliography of sources used

Appendix B – Individual geno-politicide coding

Country	Sudan
Time period of killing	1956-1972
Duration of killing	186
Average severity of geno-politicide	2.8
Peak severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Type of killing	2
Regime type	Military (58-64) Personal (69-85)
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	N/A
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E. Eprile 1974; Saeed 1982; Poggo 1989
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E. Eprile 1974; Saeed 1982; Poggo 1989
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E. Eprile 1974; Saeed 1982; Poggo 1989
Civilian participation - GCMs	0.5
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	0.5
Civilian participation score	0.5
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E. Eprile 1974 Yes: Saeed 220-227, 231-232; Poggo 341-345

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E. Eprile 1974; Saeed 1982; Poggo 1999
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E. Eprile 1974 Yes: Saeed 220-227; Poggo 341-345
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E. Eprile 1974; Saeed 1982; Poggo 1999
Notes	Due to the vagueness and relative lack of comprehensive sources, it is difficult to code this instance of geno-politicide. Without further information, it is difficult to tell whether the atrocities committed by tribes discussed by Saeed (220-232) should be coded as civilian violence, or whether these were more closely connected to the government. However, given the incidents discussed by Saeed, similar references made by Poggo to traders raping women (341) and merchants described as the "emissaries of [the] government" picking out "ring leaders", (344-345), as well as the emphasis placed by all sources, especially Eprile, on killing committed by soldiers, it seems likely that 0.5 is the most appropriate code for Civ. Part. Q1 and Q3. While the vast majority of the killing may have been carried out by soldiers, it seems likely that there was occasional civilian participation.
Sources	Eprile, Cecil. 1974. War and Peace in the Sudan: 1955-1972. London: David & Charles. Poggo, Scopas Sekwat. 1999. "War and Conflict in the Southern Sudan, 1955–1972." Ph.D., United States -- California: University of California, Santa Barbara.

	Saeed, Abdalbasit. 1982. “The State and Socioeconomic Transformation in the Sudan: The Case of Social Conflict in Southwest Kurdufan.” Ph.D., United States -- Connecticut: University of Connecticut.

Country	China
Time period of killing	1959
Duration of killing	10
Average severity of geno-politicide	4
Peak severity of geno-politicide	4
Type of killing	3
Regime type	Party-based
Communist state	1
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	N/A
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	99
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E. Chen 2006; Norbu 1979; Shakabpa & Maher 2009; van Schaik 2013
Notes	It is somewhat difficult to ascertain which events exactly the dataset focuses on. The description in the PITF dataset is: "Army and security forces suppress counter-revolutionary elements of society, including Tibetan Buddhists, landowners, and supporters of former Chiang Kai-shek regime.". However, Harff refers specifically to a geno-politicide in Tibet (2003, 72). It also proved impossible to find sources discussing what could be considered as a geno-politicide over this limited time frame outside Tibet, given that China was in the middle of the Great Leap Forward, involving tens of millions of deaths which in this dataset are not considered to be geno-politicide. Therefore, the focus has been on events in Tibet. The only actor referred to as carrying out killing in any of the sources is the PLA. All forms of civilian participation have therefore been coded as 99.
Sources	Chen, Jian. 2006. “The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union.” Journal of Cold War Studies 8 (3): 54–101. Norbu, Dawa. 1979. “The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation.” The China Quarterly, no. 77: 74–93. Schaik, Sam van. 2013. Tibet: A History. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.

	Shakabpa, W.D., and D.F. Maher. 2009. One Hundred Thousand Moons: An Advanced Political History of Tibet. Leiden: Brill.

Country	South Vietnam
Time period of killing	1965-1975
Duration of killing	123
Average severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Peak severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Type of killing	1
Regime type	Military
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	1
Ethnic war	0
PGMs	
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	99
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E.: Greiner 2010; Turse 2013; Lewy 1980; Sleezer 1993
Notes	None of the sources consulted demonstrate any evidence that civilians were involved in the killing. The deaths of civilians are attributed to massacres by the military, failure to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and disregard for civilian life during bombardment.
Sources	Greiner, Bernd. 2010. War Without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam. London: Vintage. Turse, Nick. 2013. Kill Anything That Moves. New York: Picador. Lewy, Guenter. 1980. America in Vietnam. A Galaxy Book. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sleezer, Karen. 1993. “Atrocities and War Crimes.” In The Vietnam War: Handbook of the Literature and Research, edited by James S. Olson, 171–92. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Country	Indonesia
Time period of killing	1965-1966
Duration of killing	10
Average severity of geno-politicide	4.8
Peak severity of geno-politicide	5
Type of killing	3
Regime type	Personal
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	0
PGMs	N/A
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	1
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	1
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	1

Civilian mobilisation score	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	Yes: McGregor 2009; Robinson 2018; Cribb 1990; Young 1990; Cribb 2009
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	Yes: Robinson 2018; Cribb 2009 N.E: McGregor 2009; Cribb 1990; Young 1990
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	Yes: Robinson 2018; Young 1990. N.E: McGregor 2009; Cribb 1990; Cribb 2009
Civilian participation - GCMs	1
Civilian participation - CSOs	1
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	1
Civilian participation score	1
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	Yes: Robinson 2018; Cribb 1990; Cribb 2009 N.E: McGregor 2009; Young 1990

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	Yes: McGregor 2009; Robinson 2018; Cribb 1990; Young 1990; Cribb 2009
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	Yes: Young 1990; Robinson 2018. N.E: McGregor 2009; Cribb 1990; Cribb 2009
Political participation	1
Political participation sources	Yes: McGregor 2009; Robinson 2018; Cribb 1990; Young 1990; Cribb 2009
Notes	The Nahdlatul Ulama and its youth movement Ansor were highly involved in the killing, as described in all sources. Given that the group was both a political party and a religious organisation with activities outside of politics, it has been coded as both CSO and political participation. The sources are not entirely in agreement on to what extent the military is to blame for the killings, with Robinson assigning a higher level of responsibility to the military and arguing that little killing took place without their encouragement or permission (2018). Other (older) sources allow more room for spontaneous action. However, whatever the role of the army, it is clear that there was significant participation by civilians who came together in vigilante groups or existing political/social groups to kill.
Sources	Cribb, Robert. 1990. “Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia.” In The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966, edited by Robert Cribb, 1–44. Clayton: Monash University. ———. 2009. “The Indonesian Massacres.” In Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 193–217. New York: Routledge.

	McGregor, Katharine. 2009. “The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966.” Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network. August 2009. http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/indonesian-killings-1965-1966. Robinson, Geoffrey. 2018. The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Young, Kenneth R. 1990. “Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965.” In The Indonesian Killings 1965-1966, edited by Robert Cribb, 63–100. Clayton: Monash University.

Country	China
Time period of killing	1966-1975
Duration of killing	118
Average severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Peak severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Type of killing	1
Regime type	Party-based
Communist state	1
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	0
PGMs	N/A
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	1
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	1
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	1

Civilian mobilisation score	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	Yes: Dikotter ch. 5-7, 10; Gong 2003; Wang 2003
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	Yes: Dikotter ch. 5-6, Gong 2003
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	Yes: Dikotter ch. 7-8; Gong 2003;
Civilian participation - GCMs	1
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	1
Civilian participation score	1
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	Yes: Dikotter ch. 5-7, 10; Gong 2003; Wang 2003

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: Dikotter ch. 6-7, 10; Gong 2003; Wang 2003
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	Yes: Dikotter ch. 5-6; Gong 2003
Political participation	1
Political participation sources	Yes: Dikotter 2016; Gong 2003. N.E. Wang 2003
Notes	In the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, violence spread from student groups who became increasingly violent in attacking class enemies, encouraged to some degree by the government (Dikotter 60-63). The Red Guards began as such a non-governmentally organised militia which spontaneously and autonomously organised (Gong 120), in secret at first (Wang 35), before spreading across the country. It eventually became strongly supported by the government, which officially recognised them and organised mass rallies (Wang 36) – however, they remained a movement outside of clear command and control (Dikotter 2016). By 1967 their violence grew beyond even what the government had imagined, and the army was tasked with bringing them under control (130-131). This then led to violence between the Red Guards and the army until late 1968, when the Red Guards were essentially abolished (177-179). Violence after this point was largely carried out by the state. Despite this complex role the government played, question 1 of civilian participation has been coded in the affirmative. It is clear that the Red Guards were a means by which civilians came together to attack perceived class enemies. While some party members and cadres were the target of attacks in the confusing ideological warfare that went along with the conflict (Gong 2003, 115), party members were also involved in the killing, with certain factions promoting and supporting the Red Guards (Dikotter 2016). Other cadres

	supported attacks on those considered to be part of the opposing factions (Gong 2003, 125) Party 'work-teams' were also involved, especially at the beginning of the violence (Dikotter 2016).
Sources	Dikotter, Frank. 2016. The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962—1976. E-book Edition. Bloomsbury Publishing. Gong, Xiaoxia. 2003. "The Logic of Repressive Collective Action: A Case Study of Violence in the Cultural Revolution." In The Chinese Cultural Revolution Reconsidered, edited by Kam-yee Law, 113–32. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wang, Shaoguang. 2003. "Between Destruction and Construction: The First Year of the Cultural Revolution." In The Chinese Cultural Revolution Reconsidered, edited by Kam-yee Law, 25–57. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Country	Pakistan
Time period of killing	1971
Duration of killing	10
Average severity of geno-politicide	5
Peak severity of geno-politicide	5
Type of killing	2
Regime type	Military-personal
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	N/A
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	0.5
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	Yes: Jahan 2009; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972. N.E.: Bass 2013; Rummel 2009
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: Jahan 2009; Bass 2013; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972; Rummel 2009
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E.: Jahan 2009; Bass 2013; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972; Rummel 2009
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	0.5
Civilian participation score	0.5
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E.: Jahan 2009; Bass 2013; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972; Rummel 2009

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: Jahan 2009; Bass 2013; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972; Rummel 2009
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	Yes: Jahan 2009; Bass 2013. N.E. Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972; Rummel 2009
Political participation	0.5
Political participation sources	Yes: Jahan 2009; Ahmed 1996; ICJ 1972 N.E. Bass 2013; Rummel 2009
Notes	References are made in different sources to rioting and ad hoc attacks on Bengali civilians by the Muslim minority of Bangladesh (Bass 2013, chapter 4, 5; Jahan 2009, 252). However, no sources contains detailed information on these incidents, merely alleging that they took place, making it difficult to determine how extensive these were. Detailed accounts are made of the role played by the Pakistan military, which used tanks and bombers to attack civilians (Bass, chapter 4, 5; Jahan, 259.) Bass also states that US diplomats on the ground "saw the civil war as primarily the result of Yahya's assault on the Bengali population, not as an inchoate spasm of violence in which all sides were matched in bloodshed" (chapter 5). Given the overwhelmingly dominant role played by the military, ad hoc violence has been coded as 0.5. Mention is made by a number of authors of the armed groups Al Badr and Al Shams and "armed volunteers" called Razakars. Jahan refers to the former two as "armed vigilante groups" (251), though they appear to have been drawn from Muslim political parties (Ahmed 1996, 101; ICJ 1972, 44-45). It is difficult to exactly classify these groups. With regards to the Razakars, in Gates & Roy's "Unconventional Warfare in South East Asia", they describe these groups as being created by the government as a paramilitary force, and led by specially chosen army officers (2014, 117). They were trained by the army, and had other duties besides killing. Ahmed also mentions that official Pakistani Army regulations gave officers the same

	authority over the Razakars as Pakistani soldiers (112). The Razakars have therefore not been coded as civilian participation. However, the al-Badr group (Al Shams is not referred to in other texts) appears to have operated as a death squad wing of the Jamaat-e Islam, though in close cooperation with the army. Given the overlapping role of the army in their operations, and no suggestion these raids were systematic and consistent across time and space, especially compared to the overwhelming responsibility of the army discussed in all sources, this has been coded as 0.5 for political participation. The role of the army in recruiting and mobilising these groups has been coded as 0.5.
Sources	Ahmed, Ziauddin. 1996. "The Case of Bangladesh: Bringing to Trial the Perpetrators of the 1971 Genocide." In Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences, edited by Albert J. Jongman, 95–115. Leiden: PIOOM. Bass, Gary J. 2013. The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide. Kindle edition. Vintage. Jahan, Rounaq. 2009. "Genocide in Bangladesh." In Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 245–66. New York: Routledge. Gates, Scott, and Kaushik Roy. 2014. Unconventional Warfare in South Asia: Shadow Warriors and Counterinsurgency. Burlington, Vermont: Routledge. International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). 1972. The Events in East Pakistan, 1971: A Legal Study. Geneva. Rummel, R. J. 2009. Death by Government. Revised edition. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Country	Uganda
Time period of killing	1971-1979
Duration of killing	98
Average severity of geno-politicide	3
Peak severity of geno-politicide	3
Type of killing	3
Regime type	Personal
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	0
PGMs	N/A
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	99
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E: A.I. 1978, 1979, Kasozi 1994
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	99
Notes	
Sources	Amnesty International. 1978. “Human Rights in Uganda.” AFR 59/O5/78. ———. 1979. “Amnesty International Report 1979.” Kasozi, A.B.K. 1994. The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985. Montreal ; Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Country	Philippines
Time period of killing	1972-1976
Duration of killing	45
Average severity of geno-politicide	2.3
Peak severity of geno-politicide	2.5
Type of killing	2
Regime type	Personal
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	N/A
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	99
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E. Aijaz 2000; Gutierrez 2000; Lidasan 2013; McKenna 1998
Notes	The McKenna article describes a pattern of violence beginning in the late 60s in which armed gangs of Christians organised by settlers – and potentially also politicians – attacked Muslim civilians as well as Muslim armed groups, with the government taking their side (McKenna 1998, 154-155). Lidasan similarly describes the formation of Christian militias by civilians (2013, 102). This would be coded as 1 for GCMs. However, this took place before the beginning of the geno-politicide as coded by Harff, and is described as "sporadic fighting by Lidasan (102), with around 1500 people killed by the end of 1971 (106). According to McKenna, there is then a 6 month lull with no sectarian violence, followed by the imposition of marital law, which he sees as the spark for large scale violence (156). The main actor after this appears to have been the army. In Lidasan's source as well, the Ilaga militia is no longer mentioned after the army imposes martial law. Ahmad does mention a government consolidation of "the most reactionary" Christians into the Civilian Home Defense Force (26), but this group was "tightly controlled" by the armed forces, and appears to have taken part in fighting (26). He too focuses on the government once martial law is imposed. For these reasons, the conclusion has been drawn that while violence started due to civilian participation, it became a geno-politicide due to the army, and the geno-politicide was carried out by the army. Civilian participation has therefore been coded as N.E.

	The violence appears to have had a settler colonial dynamic (Lidasan 76-80)
Sources	Ahmad, Aijaz. 2000. “The War Against the Muslims.” In Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines, edited by Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch, 21–38. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy. Gutierrez, Eric. 2000. “In the Battlefields of the Warlord.” In Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines, edited by Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch, 39–84. Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for Popular Democracy. Lidasan, Nasser Pendatun. 2013. The Complexity of Armed Conflict in Mindanao: Beyond Economic Deprivation, Discrimination, and Inequality. Old Dominion University. McKenna, Thomas M. 1998. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. First edition. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Country	Burundi
Time period of killing	1972-1973
Duration of killing	21
Average severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Peak severity of geno-politicide	4
Type of killing	2
Regime type	Party-military
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	N/A
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	1
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	1

Civilian mobilisation score	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E.: Lemarchand 2008; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & Martin 1974 Yes: Lemarchand 2009
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: Lemarchand 2008, 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & Martin 1974
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E.: Lemarchand 2008 Yes: Lemarchand 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & Martin 1974
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	1
Civilian participation score	1
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E.: Lemarchand 2008; Lemarchand 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & Martin 1974

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: Lemarchand 2008; Lemarchand 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & Martin 1974
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E.: Lemarchand 2008 Yes: Lemarchand 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & Martin 1974
Political participation	1
Political participation sources	Yes: Lemarchand 2008; Lemarchand 2009; Kay 1987; Lemarchand & Martin 1974
Notes	In this instance the coding of the genocide is not in line with the sources. The dataset treats all instances of ethnic violence in Burundi from 1965-1973 as one incident. This leads to a pattern of killing consisting of one episode in 1965 (4000-8000 dead) of Hutus killing Tutsis, followed by six years (1 year of 1000-2000, 3 of 300-100, and 2 of 0-300) of low level violence. In 1972 there is then a sudden outbreak of anti-Tutsi violence killing around 1000 people. The Tutsi government then retaliated by killing hundreds of thousands of Hutu in ’72 and ’73 (Lemarchand 2008). Sources focus solely on this genocide, and the killing that preceded it is seen as necessary context, but not as part of the genocide (2008). For this reason, lack of information on the previous killing, and the fact that the death toll of the previous killing was below 50 000 dead, only 1972 and 1973 have been coded. Lemarchand describes the majority of the killing as being carried out by the army and the youth wing of the ruling party, the JRR (2008). However, he also emphasises the fear that meant “the killing of Hutu seemed to have become part of the civic duty expected of every Tutsi citizen” (2009, 272). He describes ordinary men being handed out rifles, students beating their classmates to death, and refugees carrying out much of the killing in the north. In the absence of any evidence that these were organised militias

	created by civilians in order to kill, this has been coded as 1 for ad hoc killing. The JRR has been coded under political participation, in the absence of evidence that it was a pro-government militia rather than a wing of the political party.
Sources	Kay, Reginald, and René Lemarchand. 1987. "Burundi since the Genocide." Article; Article/Report. London : Minority Rights Group. https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/45053025. Lemarchand, René. 2008. "The Burundi Killings of 1972." Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network. June 2008. http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/burundi-killings-1972. ———. 2009. "The Burundi Genocide." In Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 267–82. New York: Routledge. Lemarchand, René, and David Martin. 1974. Selective Genocide in Burundi. Minority Rights Group.

Country	Angola
Time period of killing	1975-1994
Duration of killing	228
Average severity of geno-politicide	3
Peak severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Type of killing	1
Regime type	Party-based/rebel group
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	1
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E. Brinkman 2000; Heywood 2011; HRW 1989; HRW 1999
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E. Brinkman 2000; Heywood 2011; HRW 1989; HRW 1999
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E. Brinkman 2000; Heywood 2011; HRW 1989; HRW 1999
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	99
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E. Brinkman 2000; Heywood 2011; HRW 1989; HRW 1999

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E. HRW 1989; HRW 1999 No: Brinkman 2000
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E. HRW 1989; HRW 1999 No: Brinkman 2000 Yes: Heywood 2011 (One instance)
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E. Brinkman 2000; Heywood 2011; HRW 1989; HRW 1999
Notes	The politicide in Angola was carried by both the government and the rebel group UNITA (Harff 2003), the latter of which ruled over a varying but substantial territory (HRW 1989). The mutual politicide has been coded as one event, and given that no civilian participation was found on either side, this does not obscure any differences between the two sides to the conflict. Brinkman's article discusses refugees' memories of torture and mutilation in the Angolan War. She explicitly assigns responsibility for the killing and atrocities committed to soldiers (predominantly from UNITA), and the accounts of the war discuss interactions between soldiers and civilians (2000, 8). Therefore, the answer to Civ. Part. 2 and 3 have been coded as No, and the rest as N.E. The only mention of civilian participation is one incident in Heywood article, in which she describes one night in 1992 on which people went door to door in certain cities attacked those they believed to be UNITA sympathisers, in the wake of UNITA's leader rejecting the election results (322). Given the ad hoc nature of the weapons – "kitchen knives, pistols, clubs, machetes" (322) – and the fact that the violence took part over one night, this has been coded as ad hoc violence. Given the fact that it is one incident in one source, ad hoc violence has been coded as 99. No other sources refer to any violence carried out by civilians, and refer only to state/military agents of the government or UNITA.

Sources	Brinkman, Inge. 2000. “Ways of Death: Accounts of Terror from Angolan Refugees in Namibia.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 70 (1): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.2307/1161399. Heywood, Linda M. 2011. “Angola and the Violent Years 1975-2008: Civilian Casualties.” Portugese Studies Review 19 (1–2): 311–32. Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1989. Angola: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides. New York. ———. 1999. Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process. New York.

Country	Cambodia
Time period of killing	1975-1979
Duration of killing	45
Average severity of geno-politicide	4
Peak severity of geno-politicide	5
Type of killing	3
Regime type	Party-based
Communist state	1
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	0
PGMs	N/A
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	99
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E.: Kiernan 2009; 1996; Hinton 2004
Notes	Given the way Cambodia was run under the Khmer Rouge, it is very difficult to distinguish between state, party and military. In Kiernan's work on the regime, for example, it is impossible to determine whether party members acted under the authority of the party or that of the state, and indeed whether there was any difference. The same overlap between the power of the state and that of the party cadres is seen in Hinton 2004 (156-157). While there was a division between party members and the army (Kiernan 2009, 263; Hinton, 87), it is unclear whether those carrying out killing were part of the internal security forces or armed party members - and again, there does not appear to have been much difference. Given the absence of participation by civilian members of the party who were not members of the government or directly working for the state (as we see in cases such as Burundi or Indonesia), political participation has been coded as no evidence.
Sources	Hinton, Alexander Laban. 2004. Why Did They Kill?: Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kiernan, Ben. 1996. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79. First Edition edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

	———. 2009. “The Cambodia Genocide 1975-1979.” In Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 283–313. New York: Routledge.

Country	Indonesia
Time period of killing	1975-1992
Duration of killing	200
Average severity of geno-politicide	1.6
Peak severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Type of killing	2
Regime type	Party-personal-military
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	0
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	0
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	0
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	0

Civilian mobilisation score	0
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985 No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009
Civilian participation - GCMs	0
Civilian participation - CSOs	0
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	0
Civilian participation score	0
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009
Political participation	0
Political participation sources	N.E.: Durand 2011, A.I. 1985. No: CAVR 2013, Dunn 2009
Notes	Part 8 of the 2013 CAVR report assigns responsibility in great detail for killings and other atrocities. They find that the overwhelming majority of the killing was carried out by either the Indonesian security forces or militia groups "almost entirely armed, funded and controlled by the Indonesian military" (2276). There are no mentions of civilian participation, and therefore the CAVR's findings have been coded as 'No' rather than N.E. Dunn similarly makes clear that the Indonesian forces were "[directly] responsible for the killing in East Timor" (2009, 230).
Sources	Amnesty International. 1985. "East Timor Violations of Human Rights: Extrajudicial Executions, 'Disappearances', Torture and Political Imprisonment." London. Dunn, James. 2009. "Genocide in East Timor." In Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 218–44. New York: Routledge. Durand, Frédéric. 2011. "Three Centuries of Violence and Struggle in East Timor (1726-2008)." Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network. October 14, 2011. https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/three-centuries-violence-and-struggle-east-timor-1726-2008.

	The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). 2013. “Chega!: The Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR).” Jakarta: The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). http://chegareport.net/Chega%20All%20Volumes.pdf.

Country	Guatemala
Time period of killing	1978-1990
Duration of killing	149
Average severity of geno-politicide	1.2
Peak severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Type of killing	3
Regime type	Military (1978-1985), indirect military (1985-1990)
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	1
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	1
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	Yes: Jonas 2009, Valentino 2006
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: Jonas 2009, Valentino 2006, CEH 1999
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E.: Jonas 2009, Valentino 2006, CEH 1999
Civilian participation - GCMs	0.5
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	0.5
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E.: Jonas 2009, Valentino 2006, CEH 1999

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: Jonas 2009, Valentino 2006 Yes: CEH 1999
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E.: Jonas 2009, CEH 1999, Valentino 2006
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E.: Jonas 2009, CEH 1999, Valentino 2006
Notes	The case of the PACs, "civilian self-defense patrols", is difficult to code (Jonas 2009, 319). They were comprised of civilians – up to one million of them – but were highly coercive. The army forced people to join and even kill others with threats of fines or being treated as an enemy of the state (319). This goes beyond societal/peer pressure, and into the realm of express coercion by the government, with severe consequences for disobeying. The CEH report indicates that 18% of "human rights violations and acts of violence" were committed by the civil patrols (1999, 86). However, on the same page the report indicates that they see the violence carried out by the civil patrols as falling under the responsibility of the state. Given this conclusion, and the strong indication given by Jonas (2009) and Valentino (2004) that civilians did not join this groups with the goal of participating in killing, and that they were a tool of the military, these groups have not been counted as civilian participation. However, they have been coded as an affirmative answer to the question of whether the government called upon civilians to join the killing. The CEH report discusses the role of death squads, stating that they were "initially criminal groups made up of private individuals who enjoyed the tolerance and complicity of state authorities", but "later various actions committed by these groups were a consequence of decisions by the Army command, and that the composition of the death squads varied over time as

	members of the military were incorporated, until they became, in some cases, authentic clandestine military units" (36). The CEH report also discusses the role of "economically powerful people" who committed (or commissioned) acts of violence (44). These acts were mostly committed jointly with the state. The violence committed by these people presumably accounts for a part of the 4% of violence seen as the responsibility of "unidentified armed groups, civilian elements and other public officials" (86). Therefore this has been coded as evidence that civilians occasionally but inconsistently formed militias and organised groups (0.5) for question 1 of civilian participation.
Sources	Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations (CEH). 1999. "Guatemala: Memory of Silence." Commission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations. Jonas, Susanne. 2009. "Guatemala: Acts of Genocide and Scorched-Earth Counterinsurgency War." In Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 314–43. New York: Routledge. Valentino, Benjamin A. 2005. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Country	Afghanistan
Time period of killing	1978-1992
Duration of killing	168
Average severity of geno-politicide	3.8
Peak severity of geno-politicide	4.5
Type of killing	1
Regime type	Party-personal
Communist state	1
Revolutionary war	1
Ethnic war	0
PGMs	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; Arreguin-Toft 2005
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; Arreguin-Toft 2005
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; Arreguin-Toft 2005
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	99
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; Arreguin-Toft 2005

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; Arreguin-Toft 2005
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; Arreguin-Toft 2005
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E.: Braithwaite 2012; Kakar 1997; Valentino 2009; Dorronsoro 2005; Arreguin-Toft 2005
Notes	None of the sources consulted refer in any way to civilians participating in atrocities or mass killing. Civilian deaths are attributed to frustrated individual soldiers or units deliberately killing civilians and a disregard for civilian life when attacking villages. (Braithwaite 2012, 225-235), a policy of genocide (Kakar 1997) or a "systematic policy of killing civilians" (Valentino 2009, 218).
Sources	Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. 2005. “The USSR in Afghanistan: The Afghan Civil War, 1979–1989.” In How the Weak Win Wars, 169–99. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Braithwaite, Rodric. 2012. Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-1989. London: Profile Books. Dorronsoro, Gilles. 2005. Revolution Unending : Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present. CERI Series in Comparative Politics and International Studies. New York: Columbia University Press. Kakar, M. Hasan. 1997. Afghanistan : The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982. 1997. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press. Valentino, Benjamin A. 2005. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Country	El Salvador
Time period of killing	1980-1989
Duration of killing	101
Average severity of geno-politicide	1.4
Peak severity of geno-politicide	2.5
Type of killing	1
Regime type	Party-military (1980-1982) Indirect military (1982-1989)
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	1
Ethnic war	0
PGMs	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	0.5
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009
Civilian participation - GCMs	0.5
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	0.5
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	Yes: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E.: CTEL 1993; Stanley 1996; Mazzei 2009
Notes	The Truth Commission Report is a highly extensive account of the violence. Section IV.A describes 85% of the violence as being carried by agents of the state (military, security forces, or death squads) (1993). Section IV D.2 of the Report describes the composition of the death squads, who carried out more than 10% of the killing catalogued by the Commission. 'Civilian' death squads were recruited by the security apparatus, individual members of the security forces, or "private and semi-official armed groups", such as wealthy landowners or businessmen. These groups were linked closely to the official security forces. There were also 'official' death squads, made up of members of the intelligence or security forces. The Commission further comments that "while it is possible to differentiate the armed forces death squads from the civilian death squads, the borderline between the two was often blurred... Frequently, death squads operated in coordination with the armed forces and acted as a support structure for their activities. The clandestine nature of these activities made it possible to conceal the State's responsibility for them" (CTEL, 1993 126). This is supported by Stanley (1996, 192), who also states that "by far the greater part of the killing was being carried out by official agencies [as opposed to private death squads]" (228). Given the involvement of civilians in these death squads – both in joining government efforts, and in beginning their own, this is seen as an affirmative answer to Civ. Part. Q1. However, as there were both civilian and military death squads, the lines between them were blurred, and attempts

	were made to bring them under government control (Stanley, 1996 192) it has been coded as 0.5. It is interesting to note that this is a case where the civilian perpetrators are wealthy people using their power to assist a political/military cause they support – rather than civilians on the ground taking part.
Sources	Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (CTEL). 1993. "From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador." S/25500. United Nations. Mazzei, Julie. 2009. Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? : How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. Stanley, William. 1996. The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Country	Uganda
Time period of killing	1980-1986
Duration of killing	73
Average severity of geno-politicide	3.2
Peak severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Type of killing	3
Regime type	Personal
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	99
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E. Kasozi 1994; Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987
Political participation	1
Political participation sources	Yes: Kasozi 1994. N.E.: Amnesty International 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987
Notes	Due to the lack of sources on this geno-politicide, Amnesty International yearly reports were consulted for every year of the geno-politicide, and no evidence of civilian participation was found. Kasozi, however, highlights in detail the role of UPC (ruling party) members in carrying out killing, describing "party functionaries" as "a key element in the destruction of life and property." (1994, 151). Political participation has therefore been coded as 1.
Sources	Amnesty International. 1981. Amnesty International Report 1981. London: Amnesty International Publications. ———. 1982. Amnesty International Report 1982. London: Amnesty International Publications. ———. 1983. Amnesty International Report 1983. London: Amnesty International Publications. ———. 1984. Amnesty International Report 1984. London: Amnesty International Publications. ———. 1985. Amnesty International Report 1985. London: Amnesty International Publications.

	———. 1986. Amnesty International Report 1986. London: Amnesty International Publications. ———. 1987. Amnesty International Report 1987. London: Amnesty International Publications. Kasozi, A.B.K. 1994. The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985. Montreal ; Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Country	Sudan
Time period of killing	1983-2002
Duration of killing	229
Average severity of geno-politicide	3.8
Peak severity of geno-politicide	5
Type of killing	2
Regime type	Personal (1983-1985), Military (1985-1986), Personal (1986-2002)
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	99

Civilian mobilisation score	99
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	99
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E.: Salih 2015; HRW 1996; UN 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2002
Notes	Similarly to the first geno-politicide to take place in Sudan, this instance also saw the participation of tribal militias that can sometimes be difficult to distinguish from civilians. However, in 1989 the government passed the Popular Defence Forces Act, which gave tribal (and other) militias official recognition, and declared them to be paramilitary groups that operated alongside the army (Salih 2015, 111). The fact that these militias operate under the command of the government is confirmed by HRW (1996) and the UN special rapporteur (Biro 1996). These militias have therefore not been coded as civilian participation.
Sources	Human Rights Watch. 1996. “Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in Sudan.” Human Rights Watch. Salih, M.A. Mohamed. 2015. “Regimes of Truth: On Genocide in the Nuba Mountains.” In Sudan’s Killing Fields: Political Violence and Fragmentation, edited by Laura Nyantung Beny and Sondra Hale, 99–116. Trenton: The Red Sea Press. United Nations. 1994. “Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan : Report of the Special Rapporteur, Gáspár Bíró, Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/60.” E/CN.4/1994/48.

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Country	Iraq
Time period of killing	1988-1991
Duration of killing	40
Average severity of geno-politicide	3.9
Peak severity of geno-politicide	4
Type of killing	2
Regime type	Personal
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	0
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	0
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	0

Civilian mobilisation score	0
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994.
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994.
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994.
Civilian participation - GCMs	0
Civilian participation - CSOs	0
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	0
Civilian participation score	0
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994.

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994.
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994.
Political participation	0
Political participation sources	No: Hiltermann 2008; Leezenberg 2009; HRW 1993; HRW 1994.
Notes	All sources cited are extremely clear in stating that the killing was centrally organised and carried out by the military. A great deal of secrecy and bureaucratic language was employed (Leezenberg 2009, 398; HRW 1994) to provide deniability, making it clear that civilians were not called upon to join the killing. The only forces besides the secret police and the military were Kurdish irregular troops, but it is clear that these troops were under the direct command and control of the Iraqi army, had other functions beyond killing, were secretive about the fact that they were involved in killing, and in fact did not often do so directly, and most importantly, no mention is made of recruitment rising once the killing began. Therefore, all sources have been coded as 'No'.
Sources	Hiltermann, Joost. 2008. "The 1998 Al-Anfal Campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan." Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network. February 3, 2008. https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/1988-anfal-campaign-iraqi-kurdistan. Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1993. "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds." New York. ———. 1994. "Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own Words." New York.

	Leezenberg, Michiel. 2009. “The Anfal Operations in Iraqi Kurdistan.” In Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons, 3rd ed., 385–403. New York: Routledge.

Country	Bosnia
Time period of killing	1992-1995
Duration of killing	42
Average severity of geno-politicide	3.4
Peak severity of geno-politicide	4
Type of killing	0
Regime type	Party-personal (Serbia)
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	1

Civilian mobilisation score	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E.: United Nations 1994. Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: United Nations 1994. Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	Yes: United Nations 1994; Helsinki Watch 1992; Power 2002. N.E. Oberschall 2014; Hoare 2000
Civilian participation - GCMs	0.5
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	99
Civilian participation score	99
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	Yes: United Nations 1994. N.E.: Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: United Nations 1994; Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	N.E.: United Nations 1994; Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000
Political participation	99
Political participation sources	N.E.: United Nations 1994; Sudetic 2010; Power 2002; Helsinki Watch 1992; Hoare 2014; Oberschall 2000
Notes	Power describes a pattern of killing by the perpetrators, in which artillery would strike villages, paramilitaries would enter the village to kill or expel the inhabitants, and finally a number of the paramilitaries and regular troops would carry out looting (2002, 266). All sources note the participation of Serbian paramilitary groups in the conflict and in atrocities. These groups have not been classified as civilian participation, due to the fact that they were involved in fighting against Croatian and Bosnian forces, and can therefore be considered combatants rather than civilians (Helsinki Watch 1992, 36-38). They were also armed and extensively trained by the (Bosnian) Serbian government (Oberschall 2000, 986). Oberschall describes this process of government training as follows: "[the militiaman] became encapsulated in a quasi-military unit subject to peer solidarity and ethnic loyalty. He was trained in weapons and indoctrinated with the beliefs and norms of the crisis frame about other ethnics" (997). However, a UN investigation into the ethnic cleansing carried out in the first phase of the war discusses numerous times the role of armed civilians working alongside the paramilitaries and guarding camps, making a distinction between these (local) civilians and the militias (United Nations 1994, 29, 31-32, 51). Given the reliability of this source, and the possibility

	that the description in other sources of paramilitaries may potentially cover such groups as well, participation of GCMs has been coded as 0.5. It has not been coded as 1 due to the emphasis in other (academic) sources on the overwhelming role of the trained paramilitaries. Numerous sources mention the outside view of the war as being caused by 'primordial hatred' in which neighbours attacked each other (Power 308, 327; Hoare 2014, 519) - which would seem to suggest civilian participation. However, this is not borne out by this evidence and the sources. Indeed, Oberschall explicitly states that this view is wrong, and that the perpetrators were uniformed and unfamiliar to the victims (2000; 982-983). This does not mean that there was no civilian support for the policy of ethnic cleansing (Oberschall 2000) - but the image of neighbour killing neighbour is incorrect. However, it is also important to note Oberschall's calculation that 10-20% of the Bosnian Serb male population between 15-35 were militiamen (998). While their participation cannot be coded as civilian, it may be worth further investigating this. There is evidence in a number of sources that civilians profited from looting non-Serbian properties, or by taking them over. This has been coded as a positive answer for the potential for civilians to gain by participating.
Sources	Helsinki Watch. 1992. “War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina.” Human Rights Watch. Hoare, Marko Attila. 2014. “Towards an Explanation for the Bosnian Genocide of 1992–1995.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 14 (3): 516–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12111. Power, Samantha. 2002. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. 1 edition. New York: Basic Books.

	Oberschall, Anthony. 2000. “The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (November): 982–1001. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198700750018388. Sudetic, Chuck. 2010. “The Srebrenica Massacre (July 11-16, 1995).” Sciences Po Mass Violence and Resistance - Research Network. July 2010. http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/srebrenica-massacre-july-11-16-1995. United Nations. 1994. “Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992).” S/1994/674. United Nations.

Country	Burundi
Time period of killing	1993
Duration of killing	3
Average severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Peak severity of geno-politicide	3.5
Type of killing	0
Regime type	N/A
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	0
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	99
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	99
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	1

Civilian mobilisation score	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	N.E.: ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; UN 1995
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	N.E.: ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; UN 1995
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	Yes: Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; ICIB 2002; UN 1995
Civilian participation - GCMs	99
Civilian participation - CSOs	99
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	1
Civilian participation score	1
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	N.E.: ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; UN 1995

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	N.E.: ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; UN 1995
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	Yes: ICIB 2002; Lynch 2013; Bundervoet 2009; UN 1995
Political participation	1
Political participation sources	Yes: ICIB 2002; Bundervoet 2009 N.E. Lynch 2013; UN 1995
Notes	The ICIB and Bundervoet sources make clear that FRODEBU functionaries were involved in orchestrating and coordinating the killing (Bundervoet 2009, 371-374; ICIB 2002, 278, 283, 297, 303). Lynch does not mention this, and the 1995 UN report's authors were unsure as to the extent to which FRODEBU was involved.
Sources	Bundervoet, Tom. 2009. “Livestock, Land and Political Power: The 1993 Killings in Burundi.” Journal of Peace Research 46 (3): 357–76. International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi (ICIB). 2002. “International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi: Final Report.” S/1996/682. United Nations. Lynch, Meghan. 2013. “Civilian-on-Civilian Violence: An Ethnography of Choices during Civil War.” Ph.D., United States -- Connecticut: Yale University. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1495967341/abstract/7F56D96AD8944088PQ/1. United Nations. 1995. “Report of the Preparatory Fact-Finding Mission to Burundi.” S/1995/157. http://undocs.org/S/1995/157.

Country	Rwanda
Time period of killing	1994
Duration of killing	4
Average severity of geno-politicide	5
Peak severity of geno-politicide	5
Type of killing	0
Regime type	Party-military
Communist state	0
Revolutionary war	0
Ethnic war	1
PGMs	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call	1
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure	1
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives	1

Civilian mobilisation score	1
Civilian mobilisation - Government call sources	Yes: Desforges 158, 176; Straus 2006; Smeulers & Hoex 210. N.E. Fujii 2008
Civilian mobilisation - Societal/peer pressure sources	Yes: Desforges 182-183, Fujii 2008, Straus 2006, Smeulers & Hoex 2010
Civilian mobilisation - Material incentives sources	Yes: Desforges 187-188, Fujii 2008, Straus 2006, Smeulers & Hoex 2010
Civilian participation - GCMs	1
Civilian participation - CSOs	1
Civilian participation - Ad hoc killing	1
Civilian participation score	1
Civilian participation - GCMs sources	Yes: Desforges 179, Fujii 2008, Smeulers & Hoex 210. N.E. Straus 2006.

Civilian participation - CSOs sources	Yes: Desforges 197, Straus 2006, Fujii 2008. Unclear: Smeulers & Hoex 210
Civilian participation - Ad hoc sources	Yes: Desforges 197, Fujii 2008, Straus 2006. Unclear: Smeulers & Hoex 210
Political participation	1
Political participation sources	Yes: Desforges 197, Straus 71-72, 82, 108 N.E. Smeulers & Hoex 2010; Fujii 2008
Notes	There was undoubtedly a significant degree of coercion and fear involved in civilian participation in the killing (see Straus 2006, Fujii 2008), which would not be counted as voluntary participation. However, all sources provided convincing evidence that enough people participated out of their own free will, or when simply standing aside would have been enough. Straus describes a pattern of momentum, as men said "since we have killed, so must you" (89), but this relied on enough civilians joining in the first place. The research by Smeulers & Hoex focuses on the micro-dynamics of the genocide, and they describe a particular pattern in which members of the Interahamwe militia took the lead in forming groups and killing within them (2010, 442). This is describing as being a top-down process (446). However, given the sudden influx of civilians into Interahamwe organised groups, this has been coded as a positive answer to C.I. question 1. It has been coded as 'unclear' for the other two questions, as the authors do not mention other ways of group formation that are described by other authors. As mentioned in the thesis itself, the Interahamwe have been coded as a PGM based on sources (Desforges 1999, 46, Smeulers & Hoex 441), as well as the fact that they are coded as such in the PGM database. For the political participation question, other members of the MRND party were focused on

Sources	Desforges, Allison. 1999. “Leave None to Tell the Story : Genocide in Rwanda.” Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/1999/03/01/leave-none-tell-story/genocide-rwanda. Fujii, Lee Ann. 2008. “The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide.” Security Studies 17 (3): 568–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410802319578. Smeulers, Alette, and Lotte Hoex. 2010. “Studying the Microdynamics of the Rwandan Genocide.” The British Journal of Criminology 50 (3): 435–54. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azq004. Straus, Scott. 2006. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Appendix C – Coding references

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