

## Chapter 1- Introduction

“Need an American be ashamed to confess that he wishes his country to become the great empire of the twentieth century, democracy’s greatest empire? That he covets for it a power great as was that of Rome, beneficent as is that of the British Empire, youthful, creative, altruistic as is the that of buoyant America? That he believes this end may be achieved, not by the acquisition of additional territory, not at the cost of his nation’s friends among peoples, but at their gain by rendering the world such service as the world never has had?”<sup>1</sup>

“How does one use the evil of empire to sustain, extend, and guarantee the good of freedom, prosperity, and security. American history continued to be defined by the search for the answer to the question.”<sup>2</sup>

“But the history of the United States is not the story of triumphant anti-imperial heretics. It is the account of the power of empire as a way of life, as a way of avoiding the fundamental challenge of creating a humane and equitable community or culture.”<sup>3</sup>

For this thesis, I will be writing about the conceptualization and transformation of an emerging global power during the 1910s to better comprehend American historical development, empire, and imperialism. My research question is: how was the United States of America during the period of 1910-1919 conceptualized by the authors writing for *The Annals of American*

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<sup>1</sup> Henry A. Wise Wood, ‘Planning the Future America’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* vol 72, (1917) pp. 20.

<sup>2</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America’s Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1980) pp. 1062.

<sup>3</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America’s Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1980) pp. 996-998

*Academy of Political Science*? What were the themes, debates, topics discussed in the context of a changing world? How did these authors view the world and interpret the dramatic political, social, and economic changes taking place at the time. I argue that during this period, a breakdown in geopolitics created an opening that American policy makers, capitalists, intellectuals, and media members began to theorize how America should respond to the breakdown in the old order opened by the European war and social unrest in the forms of revolutions in China, Russia, and Mexico. American global power was theorized as an economic, political, social, juridical, and military global order with the aim of providing order and stability throughout the world. Through the debates on how to provide order and stability for humanity, America as an emerging global power was envisioned between two poles, Christ or Caesar.<sup>4</sup> On the one hand, America was to be a dominant world power imposing its economic, political, and military will to for its own economic and political benefit. On the other, American was to be the leading example for construction of a global order based on liberal enlightenment ideals of liberty, equality, and individual freedom as principles in shaping a world peace and welfare of humanity. Regardless of the form, the authors of these journal articles argue on how American involvement should reshape global affairs.

In many ways, these authors were debating the form and content of American hegemony in the twentieth and twenty-first century. Using Appleman Williams's concept of 'empire as way of life' and Foucault's concept of biopolitics and governmentality, I argue that this American global power was conceptualized in order to provide political order, economic efficiency and organization of humanity and human life itself. With increasing populations, global expansion of

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<sup>4</sup> Algernon S. Crapsey, 'Militarism and the Church', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 66, (1916) pp. 249.

settlement, increase in transportation and communication, and ever more interconnectivity of trade and production, a new global power was ‘called into being’ to provide international order and stability.<sup>5</sup> American global power and influence was to provide order, no longer based on the imposition of sovereignty upon on a foreign territory or peoples (like European Imperial projects had done) but a system of sovereignty through sovereignty, interstate system, market formation, corporate capitalism, and promotion of American democracy and civilization.

I use the term ‘global order’ because in the academic journal used in this thesis as primary source, authors are conceptualizing how America implements order across the physical globe: the land, the seas, and, beginning in the early twentieth century, the skies. This global order comes in three forms: the political, the economic, and the social. The economic global ordering is pursuing control and hegemony over the global market by determining the distribution of capital, labor, and commodities in all directions of space: to the north with Canada and Alaska, to the west with Pacific territories heading towards Asia, in particular Japan and China, to the east with the war reconstruction of Europe, and to the south focusing on Latin America. Political in case of creating an international juridical and political system to order global space and the global human population, in particular, through creating nation-states and international alliances of the rich and powerful nations to control global migration, political instability, and war. Social in terms of combining the economic and political in shaping and structuring humanity itself and creating social order through capitalist political economy, protestant values, race, class, and gender hierarchies. A global order has the ability to be able to dictate, determine, and implement its ordering of global space. This often incorporates many

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<sup>5</sup> Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, (2000) pp. 11

logics of empire by controlling and dominating foreign lands, seas, and peoples. In the case of American global power, this was done in a hybrid form of territorial control, sovereignty through a foreign state, and dictating terms of trade and investment.<sup>6</sup>

It is through an analysis of this moment in American history that arises one of my central arguments in this thesis, that during this period, American intellectuals, journalists, businessmen, and policy makers began to see America as a creditor nation and no longer a debtor nation of European capital and therefore an emerging economic and political power. This shift marked the beginnings of new conceptions of American power in the Western Hemisphere and an emerging influence in global politics. In *The Annals* authors consistently make reference to a need for global order and search for a interstate system based on international law and the sovereignty of nations, in an attempt to make “the world safe for democracy.”<sup>7</sup> No longer a world dominated by European Powers dictating international law by alliances, treaties, and force/coercion. Also, this period seems to represent a disjuncture in American history and historical development, a shift in American isolationism in terms of European politics and alliances, and the envisioning of the ‘American century’.<sup>8</sup>

### ***Historiography***

In this thesis, I will be analyzing various works on American empire and American history on foreign policy and expansion during the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth

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<sup>6</sup> George Steinmetz, *Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective*, *Sociological Theory* 23,4, 2005, 339-67. Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*. London: Verso, 2010, chapters 1 and 4

<sup>7</sup> George W. Kirchwey, ‘Pax Americana’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 72 (1917) p. 42.

<sup>8</sup> Henry Luce, ‘The American Century’, *Society* 31, 5 (1994): 4-11.

centuries. One of the main through lines of this thesis is analyzing the concept of empire outside the European conceptualization of expansion of one civilization over territories and peoples or incorporating other peoples, civilizations, and lands within an imperial project. In many ways, this is an analysis of a conceptualization of American civilization, as contrasting with European imperial visions, and the expansion of this civilization throughout the North American continent, Western Hemisphere, and the globe itself. In an attempt to probe this development and expansion of American civilization, I will be looking at economics, politics, foreign policy, biopolitics/humanity, and discourse. Therefore, the historiography in question reflects this broad and all-encompassing analysis with theorists and historians from various schools and looking at different aspects and periods of American history pertaining to this topic of American empire in the early twentieth century.

One of the difficulties in researching and analyzing American history is often the politics and ideology that are embedded in the view and conceptualization of America itself. American history is often coated in ideology, self-righteousness, and glorification. As Young frames this, in order to “ensure the national repose...To help their countrymen sleep better, historians and politicians have often transformed past unpleasantness into something palatable, and calls to rethink national history are more often calls for nationalist revival than self-criticism”<sup>9</sup>. Writing on the period of the twentieth century Young comments, “...during much of this century the United States has had the power to act on the basis of its imperial self-image. This makes it difficult for the historian attempting to decenter the history of U.S. foreign relations, not to speak

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<sup>9</sup> Marilyn B. Young, “The Age of Global Power”, in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, Berkeley: University of California Press (2002) 290.

of the people on whom its power is visited”<sup>10</sup>. Young continues, “The self-aggrandizement of the truly powerful, the fact of U.S. power combined with the solipsism of the majority of America’s inhabitants, have shaped the history of the past fifty years and more. Efforts to internationalize America’s history, to diversify and multiply its culture, need to keep in mind the reality of American hegemony and its dominant, self-absorbed culture. Of course that hegemony is continuously challenged, both at home and abroad; of course, the United States is not exceptional, only exceptionally powerful.” She goes on to conclude by advising, “De-centering America in one’s head is a good thing. But it does not itself create a world free of its overwhelming military and economic power, and it is crucial to remember the difference or the effort to de-center American history will run the danger of obscuring what it means to illuminate”.<sup>11</sup>

Those writing on American foreign policy and empire, use different frameworks, points of departure, and references to examine the various shapes, forms, movements, and contortions of the United States. Thomas Bender, in his analysis on American history from a global historical perspective, argues for a change in the study of American history. For too long, American history has been analyzed, written, and taught from a American-Centric perspective. This for political or nation building purposes often blinds one to the global forces and structures that have long played a crucial role in the historical development of the United States as a nation-state and global power. He looks at the American historical formation process as a result of its interaction with other nations, empires, global forces and structures occurring within and outside nation

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<sup>10</sup> Marilyn B. Young, ‘The Age of Global Power’ (2002) p. 278.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid*, 291.

boundaries by doing so it attempts to challenge and to deconstruct many notions and discourses of ‘American exceptionalism’. Bender writes, “Historians have been no exception. Most chroniclers of American imperialism, even when highly critical—and perhaps for that reason—limit themselves to questions of intention and morality. But there is more to be examined, a global perspective invites and demands examination of the way American presumptions and policies were understood and affected by them, and how American empire looked from the outside”.<sup>12</sup> From the beginning, American origins were based on global forces that shaped the development of the continent for the next three centuries: European colonial and imperial expansion, Atlantic slave trade, indigenous land appropriation, European and Asian migration flows, growth of the global market, etc.

William Appleman Williams’ work, *Empire as Way of Life*, will provide a crucial historical analysis for this thesis as an overview of American historical development and American Empire. His analysis is based on examining the multiple elements of American society in relation to empire: the political, the economic, the social, and the intellectual. In the context of the US, these elements formed an ‘imperial way of life’, heavily ground in the power of the economic and the political over the social with the help of the intellectual. Writing about early twentieth century American overseas expansion, he remarks, “But the dramatic acceleration and intensification of the imperial outreach made it necessary to develop an appropriate ideology, to coordinate and institutionalize the continental and overseas parts of the imperial political economy, and to devise a military strategy that would preserve and extend the empire without

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<sup>12</sup> Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History*. New York: Hill and Wang (2006) p. 189.

wasting its psychic or cultural or economic substance”<sup>13</sup>. It is this period of American history where intellectual debates and ideas centered around structuring American power abroad and its relations to foreign lands and peoples. He goes on to explain further about the constructing of “coherent global strategy” while maintaining American empire as way of life, “The process of combining and formulating all those elements of American imperialism into a coherent global strategy that could be implemented as policy was guided by several traditional axioms. Various individuals and groups emphasized different themes, and disagreed about tactical matters. Those arguments produced scintillating rhetoric, but the consequential dialogue, while less effervescent, concerned the means not the whether of empire”<sup>14</sup> (Appleman Williams, 1980: 1276-1278). It is precisely this debate over a “global strategy” that the authors in *The Annals* were confronted with and tried to theorize at the time.

Through a process of periodization of American history, Sklar analyzes US history through the lens of ‘market society’ and ‘political society’ as the beginning foundations of a society. For him, US history could be understood through the stages of market development, modes of production, property relations, and labor regimes through the space of continental empire. In particular with this period of U.S history, the formation of corporate capitalism heavily shapes American politics and society not to mention capitalist political economy at home and abroad. Sklar goes on to explain the link between market society, different modes of production, and the stages of political and societal evolution. “In US history, market

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<sup>13</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1980) 1139-1143.

<sup>14</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life* (1980) 1276-1278



development has correlated strongly with societal development. The history of the United States has centred upon the stages of development of a market society, or of market societies codeveloping and interacting within the framework of one governmental system. The history of U.S. politics has been in essential respects a function of these stages of development, codevelopment, and interaction, as an itemization of the major issues in the nation's political history will attest"<sup>15</sup> (Sklar, 1999: 16). Sklar traces these stages of development of the market society through American history but what is key is that each stage of development is followed by a process of territorial expansion and growth in political and military power. In addition, the various modes of productions and property relations throughout the various regions of the continental empire, he concludes that the US is a developing nation based on the transitions, shifts, and evolutions grounded in the foundations of a "market society".

In order to weigh in on this debate, I use social, economic, and political theory in attempt to provide answers and a better understanding of what the authors of the journal, *American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, actually wrote. I will address the theoretical component of this essay in the next section.

### ***Theory***

American society, politics, and economics was drastically changing, and international shifts, placed the United States in a growing position of power and influence. All the authors publishing with *The Annals* argue and debate about forms and contents of expansion in foreign

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<sup>15</sup> Martin J. Sklar, "Periodization and Historiography: The United States Considered as a Developing Country", In *The United States as a Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992) 16.

trade and foreign direct investment, greater foreign policy, government intervention abroad, and a greater role in shaping human affairs throughout the globe. For this reason, one of the principle approaches I use in this essay is analyzing the American Empire through the lens of Foucault's concepts of biopolitics and governmentality where human life becomes subject and object of politics, state power, and government rationality.<sup>16</sup> As Foucault writes, "But what might be called a society's 'threshold of modernity' has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question".<sup>17</sup> The authors in *The Annals* use the language of race, civilization, welfare of the mankind, development of the nation, peace, order, and human life and property in a very similar way to Foucault's proposal. For that reason, I argue later that American foreign expansion and intervention were conducted for the purpose of maintaining control of the national population through economic forces, concepts of race, and that foreign intervention was essential for maintaining social order in American society and abroad. Furthermore, with the United States emerging as a global power it had become an influential force in shaping global affairs, organizing a system based on managing and controlling the rich and poor nations of the world.<sup>18</sup> It is through this period of the politicalization of human life that human life needed to be organized and administered, even

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<sup>16</sup> For an overview on the theory and debates regarding biopolitics see Timothy Campbell, and Sitze, Adam, *Biopolitics: A Reader*, Durham: Duke University Press (2013).

<sup>17</sup> Foucault, Michel, and Robert Hurley. *The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1: An Introduction*. Vintage Books ed., Vintage Books (1990) p.143.

<sup>18</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford University Press (1980).

more so with the growth of the global market, technology, infrastructure, communication, and transportation. In this interconnected world, life was not only needed protecting in Washington D.C, Atlanta, Chicago, or New York, life needed to be protected from potential or real threats abroad. Hence many authors in this period focused on how America would go about shaping human life domestically and abroad.

For the debates on the ideas of empire, hegemony, and world powers I will use multiple publications in *The Annals* an attempt to better make sense of how authors theorized American world power. To understand the form and content of the juridical order that the *Annals*'s authors conceptualize in the 1910s, I will use Hardt and Negri's work on Empire. In their work, they trace a genealogy of sovereignty, international law, global society, and capitalism in the context of increased and intensified globalization as a process in forming a new world order. Though they write about contemporary times with their framing of current globalization as "Empire", a world state, their analysis on territory, world order, universal values, and intervention is helpful to understand the academic works published in the *Annals* in the 1910s.

Carl Schmitt's *The Nomos of the Earth* explores the historical development of ordering territories and space through ever shifting and evolving international law and sovereignty, provides yet another theoretical point of reference in exploring U.S foreign policy in relation to sovereignty, intervention, and the world markets.<sup>19</sup> Schmitt's writings on international law and sovereignty can provide a key analytical framework for the new types and developments of sovereignty, ordering of space, territory, and law. This is particularly important because one of the common themes of the articles in *The Annals* is the search for and theorizing of new forms of

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<sup>19</sup> Carl Schmitt, and G. L. Ulmen, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, New York: Telos Press (2003).

intervention and influence in state to state relations and the organizing of territory and space. It is no longer through acquisition of new territory and imposition of sovereignty upon another but it is power and influence through sovereignty, trade, sovereign debt, and the interstate system. But this is not only limited to the juridical concept of American world power but also to explore the social factors of what was driving American expansion and intervention abroad.<sup>20</sup>

Common among the debates on US empire and global power status is the question whether the US was an empire or a hegemon.<sup>21</sup> In his overview on the “*Anatomy of Empire*”, Pagden argues that the United States is not an empire. “There is in fact, very little about the objectives, policies, or even ideologies of the modern United States which resembles, except superficially, those of past empires”.<sup>22</sup> An argument that I make throughout this thesis is that beginning with the Monroe Doctrine and overseas expansion at the end of the nineteenth century, US exercised sovereignty through sovereignty. In other words, US foreign policy resulted from an intervention that was implemented through the foreign nation-state and spatial ordering through market formation. For Pagden, past empires, in particular, second empires such as European colonial and imperial empires “shared sovereignty” with the peripheries. Through his interpretation of empire he argues that “...although this inevitably requires a great deal of coercion, and certainly involves a measure of what might be called informal hegemony, it is

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<sup>20</sup> For a strong critique of this use of theory as an ‘assemblage’ of multiple theorists with opposing theoretical and political views, in particular, the use of Carl Schmitt see Timothy Brennan, “The Italian Ideology” in *Debating Empire* ed., Gopal Balakrishnan, London: Verso, (2003) pp. 97-120.

<sup>21</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘A World-system Perspective on the Social Sciences’, *The British Journal of Sociology* 61, 2010, pp. 167. Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World-Economy’, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 24, 1-2 (1983) 100-08. George Steinmetz, ‘Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism’ in Comparative Historical Perspective, *Sociological Theory* 23-4 (2005) 339-67. Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*, Chapters 1 and 4.

<sup>22</sup> Anthony Pagden, *The Burdens of Empire: 1539 to the Present*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2015) pp. 34.

clearly not imperial. For whatever else an empire might be, it is constituted by the exercise of sovereignty, direct or indirect, whole or shared, over a people and its territory. Talk of ‘indirect’ or ‘informal’ or ‘cultural’ may be illuminating, and it may be helpful, but it also, and only, metaphorical. Hegemony, the ability of a state to exercise often unrestrained influence over its politically independent and sovereign allies, is one thing. Imperial rule is quite another”.<sup>23</sup> Though differing on his perspective on the United States as an empire, I still use Pagden’s historical analysis of past empires, in particular, of the Roman Empire, as synonym with civilization, sovereignty and what he calls ‘second empire’ in reference to European commercial sea-based empires which shared sovereignty with local elites and power holders in the periphery. As I interpret the texts, much of the language and policies argued for in the *Annals* are all in all similar to, if not identical, to those regarding past empires.

For an economic theoretical framework, I use Giovanni Arrighi's and David Harvey's respective works on capitalist political economy and political theory in relation to imperialism and world power. I will use Arrighi's work on the historical capitalist development through cycles of capital accumulation.<sup>24</sup> His description of American capitalist development and foreign trade policy during the early twentieth century in the “first phase of capital production and accumulation”, will provide a theoretical interpretation for analyzing the primary sources that focus on economic arguments. Furthermore, Arrighi's analysis on the rise to hegemony in this

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<sup>23</sup> Pagden, *The Burdens of Empire*, (2015) pp. 36.

<sup>24</sup> Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*, (2010) Chapters 1 and 4.

period in relation to the fight over world supremacy in the core countries will assist in interpreting the global context in which the *Annals* authors developed their ideas.<sup>25</sup>

For another economic theoretical perspective, I use David Harvey's analysis of the territorial logics of capitalist accumulation and state logics in the process of capitalist expansion beyond state boundaries. Harvey continues this concept of linking capital accumulation and imperialism through his analysis on the 'territorial logics' of capital production, accumulation, and the state. He argues that capitalist production takes places in time and space imbedded in geography. Through the process of capital accumulation occurring in specific regions, localities which in turn create the tension and push factors of the search for other markets outside of the original locality.<sup>26</sup>

In the following section, I address my methods and sources used in this essay.

### ***Methods and Sources***

In order to answer the research question that guides this essay, I will be analyzing academic journal articles as primary sources. These article focus on the various aspects of American foreign and domestic policies as academics saw it in the 1910s. Specifically, I will be analyzing articles published in the academic journal, *American Annals of Political and Social Science*, a scholarly journal produced by the University of Pennsylvania after the 1890s. The authors come from a wide spectrum of professions and backgrounds, as a result, providing a rich source of material for this period and providing insight into American thought, discourse, and

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<sup>25</sup> I still use both works of Hardt/Negri and Arrighi while taking into considerations their theoretical differences on the historical development of capital and the state in relation to contemporary globalization. See Giovanni Arrighi, "Linages of Empire", In *Debating Empire*, London: Verso, 2003. pp. 29-40. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. *Empire* (2000) pp. 238-240.

<sup>26</sup> David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2003) chapters 2 and 3.

debates. I will be looking at what are these authors saying in regards to this period about America as a nation and growing economic and imperial power. To analyze the discourse and, what is being said, I use close-reading and in-depth analysis of specific passages and quotes from these different authors and diverse articles. The main themes in these articles, in general, are: democracy, American foreign trade policy<sup>27</sup>, world peace<sup>28</sup>, civilization<sup>29</sup>, the Monroe Doctrine<sup>30</sup>, a League to Enforce Peace, the League of Nations<sup>31</sup>, the European war and war mobilization<sup>32</sup>, and economic power<sup>33</sup>, militarism. It is through this analysis of these journal articles that I attempt to address the scholarly debates concerning this period on American foreign policy. The debates concern the ideas of the motivating factors for economic and political expansion abroad in terms of “expansionist rhetoric”, “master plan”, “grand imperial design”, and the “accumulation of calculated decisions”.<sup>34</sup> In particular, the debates around US foreign economic expansion and foreign relations in search of “economic opportunity and

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<sup>27</sup> John Hays Hammond, ‘Wanted-A Foreign Trade Policy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84 (1919), pp. 152–160.

<sup>28</sup> Talcott Williams, ‘An International Court, an International Sheriff and World Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 61 (1915), pp. 274-75.

<sup>29</sup> Joseph I France, ‘American Idealism in the War’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 78 (1918), pp. 32–33.

<sup>30</sup> John H. Latane, ‘The Monroe Doctrine and the American Policy of Isolation in Relation to a Just and Durable Peace’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 100–109.

<sup>31</sup> Theodore Marburg, ‘World Court and League of Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 61 (1915): 276-83.

<sup>32</sup> Talcott Williams, ‘Mobilization of Population for Winning the War’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 78 (1918): 1-6. Miles Menander Dawson, ‘The Dynamics of Mobilization of Human Resources’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 78, (1918), pp. 7-15.

<sup>33</sup> Herbert S. Houston, ‘Economic Pressure as a Means Toward Conserving Peace’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 61 (1915), pp. 270-273

<sup>34</sup> Joseph Fry, ‘From Open Door to World Systems: Economic Interpretations of Late Nineteenth Century American Foreign Relations’, *Pacific Historical Review*, 65-2 (1996), pp. 302.

advantage” as compared to providing “order and stability”. It is through these journal articles that I argue these two are not mutually exclusive, but are in fact very much linked to each other. US foreign policy was constructed in an effort to provide economic opportunity and advantage for American capital interests through the implementation of order and stability. And it is with *The Annals* articles that I try to provide new insights into these historical questions concerning US history during the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era.<sup>35</sup>

The American Academy of Political Science was founded in 1889 by Edmund James, a professor at the University of Illinois. The journal was created a year later with the idea of mixing scholarly research, policy, and practical action while providing a platform for many voices from a variety of academic discourses and professional fields. Many of the founders of the AAPS originated from the University of Pennsylvania. These articles come at a very interesting and crucial time in American history. As many authors point out and explain, America was undergoing a transformation on a variety of different economic, political, and social terrains, nationally and internationally.

The role of intellectuals, writers, and media members have a long history in the development of discourse, ideology and policy in American history, especially in the context of empire and expansion. Beginning with the colonial period, Ben Franklin, John Quincy Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, were all leading thinkers and writers at their time, in terms of politics, economics, and society. This production of knowledge and discourse played a

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<sup>35</sup> For solid overviews of these two periods see- Joseph Fry, ‘From Open Door to World Systems: Economic Interpretations of Late Nineteenth Century American Foreign Relations’, *Pacific Historical Review*, 65-2. (1996), pp. 277-303. Martin J. Sklar, ‘Periodization and Historiography: Studying American Political Development in the Progressive Era, 1890s–1916’, *Studies in American Political Development* 5- 2 (1991): 173-213.



major role in shaping of American foreign policy, economic development, social life, and the US's place in relation to the rest of the world. Most importantly was how these figures viewed, shaped, and constructed the ideas of what America was and what America ought to be in the world using concepts of 'empire of liberty', democracy, Christianity, 'Manifest Destiny', Anglo-Saxon stock, economic and territory expansion.<sup>36</sup>

The A.A.S.P. journal articles are further examples and a continuation of this link between discourse, ideology, and policy making. These articles demonstrate the various components and actors of this triad in play. Professors, researchers, and intellectuals make up the component of knowledge production, in particular theories of economics and sociology, economic and human development, and civilization. These journal articles are very valuable for these multiple reasons. They provide a lens into the thought and events taking shape in America and abroad. They provide a perspective on how American intellectuals, policy makers, bankers, diplomats, senators, the vice president, the attorney general, etc. were internalizing and articulating global events and America's future in the world. A few notable names include: US Vice President Thomas R. Marshall (1913-1921), Charles M. Schwab, Rear-Admiral Colby N. Chester(U.S.N), Oklahoma US Senator Thomas Gore, Governor of Massachusetts Samuel W. McCall, West Virginia Governor William A. MacCorkle, Secretary of State and Secretary of War Elihu Root, George Luis Beer, or Assistant Attorney General Samuel J. Graham.

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<sup>36</sup> Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History*, New York: Hill and Wang, 2006. Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays*, New York: Borzoi Books (1965) Walter LaFeber, "Springboards and Strategies." *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2013) pp. 1–19...."Race for Empire." *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1993) pp. 45–59. William Earl Weeks, *Origins of the American Empire and Union*, In *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2013) pp. 1-33.

As I argue throughout this thesis, these articles taken as historical documents reflect the thoughts, debates, and changes occurring during this period in global history through an American perspective. They demonstrate how global processes, structures, and events were being internalized by the elite these authors belong to. Journal volume 68 entitled “America’s Changing Investment Market” and published in 1916 is just one example of this but a telling one. The volume provides theories of foreign investment, economic internationalism, a symposium on the needs capital investment in China<sup>37</sup>, Russia<sup>38</sup>, Canada<sup>39</sup>, Central and South America<sup>40</sup> to dollar diplomacy, financial imperialism, and America’s ability to provide export capital. A key theme of the volume is the relationship between foreign investment of American bankers, financiers, industrialists, and contractors to the American government. In other words, how will

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<sup>37</sup> Charles Denby, ‘The National Debt of China-Its Origin and Its Security’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916) pp. 55-70.

<sup>38</sup> Samuel McRoberts, ‘Russia’s Future Needs for Capital’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916) pp. 207-15.

<sup>39</sup> O. D. Skelton, ‘Canadian Capital Requirements’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916) pp. 216-25.

<sup>40</sup> William H. Lough, ‘Introduction- Needs for Capital in Latin America: A Symposium’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916) pp. 161-64. Francisco J. Yánes, ‘Venezuela’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 194-95. John H. Fahey, ‘Peru’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 191. Joseph Wheless, ‘Argentina’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 165-67. G. L. Duval, ‘Chile’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 169-71. John Clausen, ‘Guatemala’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 181-84. Edward H. Mason, ‘Colombia’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916) pp. 171-72. Frederick F. Searing, ‘El Salvador’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 178-81. J. C. Luitweiler, ‘Bolivia’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 167-68. A. G. Robinson, ‘Cuba’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 174-75. Andrew J. Peters, ‘Brazil’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 168-69. W. S. Valentine, ‘Honduras’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 185-86. William Wallace White, ‘Paraguay’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 189-90. A. G. Clapham, ‘Panama’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 188-89. F. I. Kent, ‘Ecuador’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 177-78. H. A. Wheeler, ‘Uruguay’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 192-93. Walter Parker, ‘Costa Rica’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 172-74. James J. Shirley, ‘Mexico’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 196-206. Jacob H. Hollander, ‘Dominican Republic’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 176.

the American government respond to the changing American market and what role will it play in the international market and foreign investment. As the forward to the volume indicates in regards to government policy and foreign trade/investment, "...the attempt has been made to keep three questions foremost: what is now being done by government along particular lines, such as the tariff, information service, etc.? What is the effect of such action on export trade? How should the present policy be changed?"<sup>41</sup>

An article published in the same volume by Charles Denby, former United States Counsel General in China further exemplifies the connection between knowledge production, discourse, and policy making. While adding an additional component, personal business and financial interest. Denby writes on the Chinese debt, the investing environment for American capital interests, and the future capital needs of China, while analyzing the Chinese future need for highways near major metropolitan areas throughout the country, Denby acknowledges that, "it is to be noted that for suburban road construction in Peking, two American groups, of which the writer controls one, have contracted with the Chinese government to advance the needed money".<sup>42</sup> Here is a former United States Counsel General, in China, writing an article for an academic journal about the current state of political and economic environment of China and the future capital needs, while at the same time, owning an investment group with business arrangements with the Chinese government. Denby concludes, "China affords a brilliant future for the merchant and for the contractor, if they come sufficiently backed financially. The returns will be certain. China in all cases can give satisfactory security for all she borrows. Back of all

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<sup>41</sup> Front Matter. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68, (1916), I-Vi.

<sup>42</sup> Charles Denby, 'The National Debt of China-Its Origin and Its Security', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 69.

is the guarantee—better than security—the good faith of the Chinese government which has never yet repudiated a debt”.<sup>43</sup>

Beyond the method of discourse analysis, historical research, and the application of social theory, my intention with this thesis is to let these authors speak for themselves, as their words, it provides a window into an important period, when the nation and world was being re-conceptualized. They provide a glimpse into how important intellectuals perceived the United States, American history, American population, American economics and politics, and furthermore, how they viewed the world, nations, and peoples beyond the continental United States. It is through the attempt of study and method of allowing the authors to speak for themselves, that I hope to provide a better understanding of America during the early twentieth century and American empire as a global power. As will be a key theme throughout this thesis, many of the thoughts, desires, concepts, and ideas expressed and proposed in the articles come to fruition and created the basis for American power throughout the rest of the twentieth century.

In this thesis I look at three components of the conceptualizing of the United States as a global power: economic, political, and social. Therefore this essay will have the following structure based on these three components. I argue that all these elements combine to shape human life within a global space by a global power. It is during this period that the US was emerging as a great power in a time of international political and economic breakdown due to world war, national revolutions, social movements, and changing social demographics. The primary sources authors began to envision how the US could provide stability and order nationally and globally. This, I argue, took the form of global governmentality where human

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<sup>43</sup> Denby, ‘The National Debt of China-Its Origin and Its Security’, (1916), pp. 70.

life, humanity becomes the object of government rationality through concepts of race, human development, and contentment through capitalism and democracy. But first, I look at this period of 1910-1919 in the context of the historical development of the United States. This is what I address in the following chapter.

## Chapter 2- From Continental Empire to Global Power

“Colonial America was glorious, but it became greater when it became independent America. Independent America was great, but it became greater when under Jefferson it became continental America. Continental America was great, but it became greater under Lincoln, when it became a consolidated United States of America. It is an infinitely greater fact that, following the splendid message of the President and the concurring sanction of the Congress of the United States, in whose hands the final determination of our foreign policies must rest, this nation became cosmopolitan America.”<sup>44</sup>

“A critical moment, therefore, in the life of the nation is at hand, a moment during which the nation will change its mind; during which it will abandon old and embrace new purposes and choose a new pathway into the future.”<sup>45</sup>

“The world war has come to an end, but war for world dominion has been started on the ashes of the old system.”<sup>46</sup>

In this chapter, I analyze the 1910s in American history from an overall American historical perspective in terms of expansion and civilization in their relation to time and space. Many authors of the *Annals* frame this period as a new phase in American expansion and civilization. Expansion has long been at the heart of the American political, economic, and social experience often framed in terms of American ideology as ‘manifest destiny’, ‘the Western frontier’ and ‘Western expansion’. Along with this belief of predestined continental expansion

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<sup>44</sup> James M. Beck, ‘A Yearning for World Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 213-14.

<sup>45</sup> Henry A. Wise Wood, ‘Planning the Future America’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 20.

<sup>46</sup> “...Let us bear this in mind and let us remember that a well-defined national policy is as essential to success in the contest for national supremacy as a wise military policy was in the war that is happily ended. Failure to prepare for the new contest will be little less reprehensible than was our failure to prepare for the world war. The problems that are presented to us have no counterpart in Europe, Asia, Africa or South America.” Hammond, John Hays, ‘Wanted-A Foreign Trade Policy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84, (1919), pp. 152.

came various interpretations and conceptualizations of American civilization. In this chapter, I frame the period of 1910-1919 as a continuation but also a disjuncture in the expansion of the polity that is the United States of America.<sup>47</sup> I argue that the US historical expansion began with the de-colonization of the Thirteen Colonies and the bid for independence which initiated a process of westward territorial expansion in the form of empire building, with the aid of African slave labor, Indian land appropriation, Northern industrialization, European migration, and capital investment, moving the new nation United States of America from a status of regional hegemon to global hegemony. As Bender advises on writing from a historical perspective in relation to American empire and expansion, “the global historical framing requires that we view the American empire in multiple perspectives, and the narrative is as much spatial as linear”.<sup>48</sup>

This period in American history, I argue, marks a shift in expansion and foreign policy. With the consolidation of American continental empire spanning from the Atlantic to the Pacific, territorial expansion and incorporation of other polities, was not the primary focus of American empire building, but one centered on the creation and opening of foreign markets for American capital and goods, and for America to shape global political spacing and organize humanity. But to focus only on the national element in the development of America as a world power would

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<sup>47</sup> This was also a period of major domestic change: socially, economically, and politically. Sklar writing on American society during this period in American history describes it as so: “In its general historical formation, it was a market society, based on private property, that was undergoing capitalist industrialization and, in its political dimension, the development of liberal democracy in a republican form. In its historically specific stage of development, it was relatively mature industrial capitalist society in an early phase of the corporate reorganization of capitalist property relations. Since social relations in general and governmental in particular were adjusting to the corporate reorganization of the property system, the period may also be designated as the time of the corporate reconstruction of American society.” Martin J. Sklar, ‘Periodization and Historiography: Studying American Political Development in the Progressive Era, 1890s–1916’, *Studies in American Political Development* 5-2 (1991) pp. 65

<sup>48</sup> Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History*. New York: Hill and Wang, (2006), pp. 188

only provide a limited perspective. The formation of American foreign policy and trade was a result of the context of the international economic and political landscape of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Many aspects of foreign policy and foreign trade were based on current geopolitical and global market realities.<sup>49</sup> The hegemonic European imperialist powers (Britain, Germany, and France) throughout the nineteenth century battled, negotiated, and controlled much of the international market and territories for possible economic investment and resource extraction.<sup>50</sup> For the American government and US capital to secure spaces for surplus capital and American goods, diplomacy and government intervention in the foreign arena were viewed as fundamental to national economic and political interests, but most of all, fundamental to national well-being and the preservation and continuation of the ‘American way of life’.

Global order is not only grounded on power, force, and wealth, but on a conceptualization of morality, order, peace, and civilization. As Hardt and Negri articulate in their analysis of empire in relation to civilization and expansion in regards to time and space, which are based on ‘two fundamental tendencies,’ they write,

From the beginning, then, Empire sets in motion an ethico-political dynamic that lies at the heart of its juridical concept. This juridical concept involves two fundamental tendencies: first, the notion of a right that is affirmed in the construction of a new order that envelops the entire space of what it considers civilization, a boundless, universal space; and second, a notion of right that encompasses all time within its ethical foundation. Empire exhausts historical time, suspends history, and summons the past and future within its own ethical

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<sup>49</sup> Bender, *A Nation Among Nations*, (2006), pp. 180-22

<sup>50</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, and Newton, F., *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, New York, N.Y.: Vintage Books, (1989), chapter 3.



order. In other words, Empire presents its order as permanent, eternal, and necessary.<sup>51</sup>

A polity that is the United States of America is based on a form of ordering and structuring territory, populations, space, and time. In other words, it is a political, juridical, economic, and social structuring of human interaction and coexistence, human life itself. It is not only human life that needs to be organized and structured but natural life or biological life. This structuring and organizing of human life had taken on global dimensions through the control of global flows of commodities, capital, and labor through political and juridical spacing of territories and peoples, military networks, technologies, interpretations of lifestyles, civil life, entertainment, food, clothing, science, health, education, and other forms of knowledge production.<sup>52</sup> But with many forms of power and order, there is consistent breakdown, disruptions, disorder, and chaos. American political, economic, and social expansion has been based on this pursuit of a global order used as an answer to this inherent contradiction of disorder and breakdown.

Within the logics of spacial and social orderings, whether in the form of an empire or a global power, there is an ordering of life, space, and time. Empires of the past were often characterized by hierarchies in terms of social hierarchies, territorial hierarchies, and temporal hierarchies.<sup>53</sup> In the context of the US domestic and global ordering, there has been a social hierarchy in the form of race, class, and gender. Territorial hierarchy which includes the multiple

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<sup>51</sup> Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, (2000), pg. 11.

<sup>52</sup> D. W. Ellwood, 'America and Europe, 1914–1945' In *The Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914-1945*: Oxford University Press, (2016).

<sup>53</sup> George Steinmetz, 'Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperialism in Comparative Historical Perspective', *Sociological Theory* 23-4, (2005), pp. 339-67. Anthony Pagden, *Introduction: Anatomy of Empire from Rome to Washington, The Burdens of Empire: 1539 to the Present*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2015), pp. 1–44.

binaries of metropole-colony, core-periphery, urban-rural. This ordering was truly embedded into the Earth itself, through a multiplicity of environmental transformations: urban development, port development, dams and reservoirs, industrialization, mineral extraction, petroleum exploration/extraction, monoculture/cash crop systems, bio-chemicals and pesticides, and industrialized agriculture (dairy farms, poultry, etc.).<sup>54</sup> And finally, a temporal hierarchy based on concepts, discourses on histories, the pasts of the dominant majority and ‘other’ peoples, and the attempt to control and define the present and future. This often comes in the form of what is presented as official interpretations of history: how the past is framed, who is included-excluded, what is included-excluded, how the past is memorialized-remembered, how the past shapes present and future.<sup>55</sup>

Many of the authors in *The Annals*, refer to this period in terms of past American historical development and looking towards the future. The debate on empire consists of an analysis of inside-outside, whether it be territory or society (peoples). Also, empire is a question of constant extension and motion to maintain, escape, and overcome societal configurations, contradictions, and injustices that often lead to the foundation of the empire in the beginning. In the context of an American Empire, it has often been defined by capitalist political economy, private property, market society, colonial, racial and class hierarchies. From this starting point, land, resources, and wealth were the prime movers and objects of empire building. This often leads to extension or expansion of sovereignty or juridical right across various territories and

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<sup>54</sup> Michael Adas, ‘From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American Experience into World History’, *The American Historical Review* 106-5 (2001), pp. 1692–1720.

<sup>55</sup> Anibal Quijano and Michael Ennis, ‘Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America’, *Nepantla: Views from South* 1-3, (2000), pp. 533-80.

large distances, done for imperial motives to maintain access to resources and wealth or resolve military conflicts to maintain order. In the first section of this chapter I will examine the debates around American empire building through the lenses of continental expansion through a historical overview. For the second section I focus of the discourses on American civilization in regards to American expansion.

### ***Expansion as Stages in American History***<sup>56</sup>

From the inception of the United States of America, the American empire has been based on territorial, economic, and political expansion beginning with the dispute and confrontation over the Proclamation line of the British after the Seven Years War with the French, which limited territorial expansion west of the Appalachian Mountains.<sup>57</sup> “The story of American empire dates from the initial European settlement of the western hemisphere. With their utopian dreams and material ambitions, English settlers in North America took possession of lands they alleged to be empty and unused. The American *national* experience thereafter focused on territorial expansion and on developing global markets for agricultural, manufactures, and investment”.<sup>58</sup> From the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and Manifest Destiny of 1848 to the territorial expansion of the nineteenth century with the appropriation of Indian lands throughout the west of the Mississippi to the Pacific and leading up to the annexation of Cuba, Philippines, Guam, and

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<sup>56</sup> Martin J. Sklar, "Periodization and Historiography: The United States Considered as a Developing Country." In *The United States as a Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1992). pp. 1-36.

<sup>57</sup> Anthony Pagden, 'Law, Colonization, Legitimation, and the European Background', In M.Grossberg & C. Tomlins edition, *The Cambridge History of Law in America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2008), pp. 1-31

<sup>58</sup> Bender, *A Nation Among Nations*, (2006), pp. 188.

Hawaii further represent how territory and expansion were part of the process of empire building. Throughout the nineteenth century visions and discourses shaped how expansion was realized.<sup>59</sup>

This continuation of continental expansion took on economic, social, and political significance, Vevier writing on the Antebellum period, argues that,

...the nation-continent created through the interaction of foreign policy and territorial expansion that resulted in the acquisition of contiguous territory in North America. In turn, it projected the concept of the second American world, the continental domain that was fated to extend its influence over the entire world through the expansion of commerce and control of international communications. The relations of both worlds were reciprocal. All this, however, depended upon realizing the economic implications of the central position conferred upon the United States through its expansion in North America and the significance of this event in the general expansionist history of the European world.<sup>60</sup>

Again, economic and territorial expansion throughout the North American continent were often viewed as a continuation and spread of the European world and civilization, in particular, the Anglo-Saxon race. It was viewed that the White European settlers were fulfilling the Old World desire of the early modern period of linking Europe with India, Asia. America was the bridge

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<sup>59</sup> Allan Greer, 'Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of North America', *The American Historical Review* 117-2, (2012), pp. 365-86. Walter Williams, 'United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism'. *The Journal of American History*, 66-4, 1980, pp. 810-831. Jane Burbank, 'Empires across Continents: The United States and Russia'. In *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Walter LaFeber, 'Springboards and Strategies', *The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2013), pp. 1-19. Walter LaFeber, 'Race for Empire', *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2, 1993, pp. 45-59. Walter LaFeber, 'Conclusion: The 1865-1913 Era Restated', *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2, (1993), pp. 234-239. Charles Vevier, 'American Continentalism: An Idea of Expansion 1845-1910', *The American Historical Review*, 65- 2, (1960), pp. 323-335. Brian DeLay, 'Indian Politics, Empire, and the History of American Foreign Relations,' *Diplomatic History* 39, 5, (2015), pp. 927-42.

<sup>60</sup> Charles Vevier, 'American Continentalism: An Idea of Expansion, 1845-1910', *The American Historical Review*, 65-2 (1960), pp. 329-330.

between the two continents by the process of ‘conquering’ the western frontier with territorial purchases, settler migrations, and indigenous land-appropriation which helped shape American society, mentality, and future foreign policy. “This consolidation of the continent, training of military force, contradictory feelings about immigrants, and above all, racism not only characterized these late nineteenth-century decades but were central in shaping U.S foreign policy then and in the new century”.<sup>61</sup> American imperialism, in the traditional form of European imperialism of territorial appropriation, reached its climax with Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘civilizing mission’ of rescuing peoples from barbarism and darkness, although racism would still define American foreign policy throughout American history.<sup>62</sup>

At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was a gradual change in American imperialism and American Empire building. By this time, American capitalism shaped by the transformation of the corporate form of capital accumulation, in many sectors such as transportation, industry, manufacturing, service, and agriculture.<sup>63</sup> “The United States, it has been said, was the first twentieth-century nation. The century has been shaped by scientific

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<sup>61</sup> Walter Lefebver, ‘Race for Empire’, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2, (1993), pp. 45.

<sup>62</sup> Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History*, New York: Hill and Wang, (2006). pp. 180-220. Gerald Horne, ‘Race to Insight: The United States and the World, White Supremacy and Foreign Affairs’, *In Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, edited by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2004), pp. 323-35. Thomas McCarthy, ‘Social Darwinism and White Supremacy.’ *In Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2009), pp. 69-95.

<sup>63</sup> Sklar, Martin J. ‘Periodization and Historiography: The United States Considered as a Developing Country’, *In The United States as a Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1992) 1-36. Alfred D. Chandler, ‘The United States: Engines of Economic Growth in the Capital-Intensive and Knowledge-Intensive Industries’, *Big Business and the Wealth of Nations*, edited by Alfred D. Chandler et al., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1997), pp. 61–101. Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*. London: Verso. (2010), chapter 4.

innovation, rationalized and globalized industrial processes, multinational corporations, centralized political authorities built on modern communications, military interventionism, fervent nationalism, deadly racism, and — of considerable significance—revolution. During the 1865-1913 years, all of these could be found in US foreign policy. And all were closely related in that policy”.<sup>64</sup>

Furthermore, this time was marked by the titans of industry often referred to as ‘robber barons’, led by notable names like Carnegie, Mellon, Morgan, Rockefeller, Stanford, Vanderbilt, etc., had achieved a firm grip on American politics and society. As a result, this led to the development of major class antagonism throughout major US cities and rural areas. These multiple tensions on various fronts created pressure which produced calls for safety valves for capital accumulation and social unrest. Appleman Williams describes the imperial way of life as being unable to resolve domestic problems, as it looks abroad as a safety-valve thereby externalizing the internal inequalities and contradictions to a foreign setting. “Empire turns a culture away from its own life as a society or community. Ultimately, everything is seen primarily in terms of foreigners; the culture considers itself embattled and beleaguered, and hence unable to define or deal with reality in ways that are appropriate and effective”.<sup>65</sup> The use of empire as means of managing domestic social tensions at home reminds one of Cecil Rhodes with his sentiment that empire was an answer to this domestic problem. “The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become

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<sup>64</sup> Lefeber, ‘Conclusion: The 1865–1913 Era Restated’,(1993), pp. 239.

<sup>65</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1980). pp. 1190

imperialists”.<sup>66</sup> In American imperialism was no different, empire had been constructed as means to overcome the weaknesses, ills, and social turmoil of capitalist political economy in a colonial setting, a society formed by a coloniality of power where social hierarchies are determined by class and race.<sup>67</sup> “The empire as a territory and as activities dominated economically, politically, and psychologically by a superior power is the result of empire as way of life... from the beginning the persuasiveness of empire as a way of life effectively closed off other ways of dealing with the reality that Americans encountered”.<sup>68</sup>

Beginning in the 1890s market crisis, American capital interests and American policy makers were again setting their eyes on expansion in the form of foreign markets, a new frontier. “The evidence very strongly indicates that the agricultural majority of the population, largely composed of small to medium-sized dirt farmers, was the dynamic element in the shift from continental to overseas empire. However paradoxical it may appear, the essence of it is simple: The American farmer was a capitalist businessman whose welfare depended upon free access to a global marketplace, and who increasingly demanded that the government use its powers to ensure such freedom of opportunity”.<sup>69</sup> Imperialism and capitalism have often been linked to each other in practice and in theory. The respective logics of the two, often intertwining and

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<sup>66</sup> Full quote- “My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced by them in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.” Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, (2000). pp. 232.

<sup>67</sup> Anibal Quijano, and Michael Ennis, ‘Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,’ *Nepantla: Views from South* 1, 3, (2000) pp. 533-80.

<sup>68</sup> Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life*, (1980), pp. 44.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 1006

cooperating with one another. This link between capitalism and imperialism frequently is framed as tension between inside-outside and push abroad as a measure for the inherent weakness and contractions of a capitalist market economy.<sup>70</sup> Rosa Luxemburg in her analysis on capitalism and imperialism, writes on the internal logics of capital accumulation formed through the interaction between the inside/outside, capitalist societies and non-capitalist societies.

But then capitalist production does not aim at its products being enjoyed, but at the accumulation of surplus value. There had been no demand for the surplus product within the country, so capital had lain idle without the possibility of accumulating. But abroad, where capitalist production has not yet developed, there has come about, voluntarily or by force, a new demand of the capitalist strata. The consumption of the capitalist and working classes at home is irrelevant for the purposes of accumulation, and what matters to capital is the very fact that its products are ‘used’ by others.<sup>71</sup>

David Harvey continues this concept of linking capital accumulation and imperialism, inside-outside, through his analysis on the ‘territorial logics’ of capital production and accumulation in relation to the state. In the contemporary political structures of territories, the state becomes the primary focus of interaction and order for political territories. “Much has therefore depended on how the state has been constituted and by whom, and what the state was and is able to be prepared to do in support of or in opposition to processes of capital accumulation”.<sup>72</sup> In this period of analysis, 1880-1914, the access to territory, labor, and resources became even more acute when dealing with imperial practices in international relations. “And, of course, when it

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<sup>70</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism: A popular outline*. New York: International Publishers, (1939). Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Empire of Capital*. Paperback ed., Verso, (2005). Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri. *Empire*. (2000), pp. 221-240. Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*. London: Verso, (2010), chapters 1 and 4. David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2005).

<sup>71</sup> Rosa Luxemburg, ‘The Accumulation of Capital’, edited by Dr. W. Stark, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd (1951). pp. 427.

<sup>72</sup> David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2005), pp. 91.



comes to struggles over hegemony, colonialism, imperial politics, as well as over more mundane aspects of foreign relations, the state has long been and continues to be the fundamental agent in the dynamics of global capitalism”.<sup>73</sup> Through these multiple push factors of capital territorial logic and state territorial logic converge together in imperial foreign policies. “The tendency towards spatial dynamism given by the competitive search for profits is countered by the bundling together of monopoly powers in space. It is from exactly such centres that imperialist practices and calls for an imperial presence in the world typically emanate”.<sup>74</sup>

American expansion was based on, as Bender explains, opportunity and material abundance, the drive for territory was grounded in the quest for the “American Dream” shaped American culture and politics. Furthermore, this drive for more formed concepts and perspectives on time itself, “that encourages escape from the past, starting over, expanding one’s horizons and, ultimately, empire...Americans came to associate the meaning of America with an entitlement to unrestricted access to land and markets. Land, freedom, opportunity, abundance, seemed a natural sequence, which nourished something of an American compulsion to use new lands and opportunities to achieve wealth”.<sup>75</sup> A main argument throughout this thesis is that this period in American history, and global history in general, was a period of chaos, shifts, and transition. With multiple social, political, and economic transformations occurring throughout the global space, *The Annals* authors reflect this in their writing on the times.

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<sup>73</sup> Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, (2005), pp. 91.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, 97.

<sup>75</sup> Bender, *A Nation Among Nations*, (2006), pp. 187.

For many of them, this period represented an opening, an opportunity for American civilization to take center stage in global affairs. Joseph France writing on American involvement in World War I reflects this way of framing the global events taking place at the time and their relationship to American historical development.<sup>76</sup>

If this present tremendous process of mutation in the world's affairs may not be properly called a revolution, yet we must have the faith and vision to perceive that it is but one of those vast and violent stages of evolution through which the race moves on resistlessly toward better conditions and to higher state of physical, moral and social development. We must realize that we are living in an unprecedented period of political and social nascency. We must believe that within the huge and fateful alembic of this war, there are taking place elemental changes in the structure of our civilization which mark the everlasting finality of much which must no longer be in the established social orders of the world, and that at the last, there will come forth that new, more highly cooperative and efficient democracy which shall more closely approximate that ideal of government of which the statesmen and the seers of every age have dreamed and for which so many sacrifices, through all the centuries, by earth's devoted martyrs have been made.<sup>77</sup>

France continues this teleological framing in relation to American history as a “national evolution”,

First, pioneers in the vast isolations of the bleak shores and pathless wilderness of a discovered continent; then colonies expanding over the silent wastes, hand touching hand; next a confederation, hands clasped in fellowship, mutually sacrificing, cooperating for liberty; then a federation of sovereign states, with liberty achieved and secured, slowly cementing into a more nearly perfect union; and now, at last, the long awaited consummation of the plan, the true and final integration of those states into that mighty nation which, with her full found and invincible powers, now so valiantly puts on her armor and assumes this weighty responsibility for the welfare of the world; may this be our national evolution.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Joseph I. France, ‘American Idealism in the War’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 78, (1918), pp. 32–33.

<sup>77</sup> France, ‘American Idealism in the War’, (1918), pp. 32.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 32

Often in the writing and conceptualizing American historical development and expansion there is a tendency to frame in a telos or for it to follow a series of stages of development. This idea of the U.S. coming of historical age as part of long historical process of manifesting a destiny for the benefit of the world and humanity.

The following passage by Thomas P. Gore, United States Senator of Oklahoma, articulates this coming of age for the United States as taking its true place as a world power. Furthermore, he writes on the role of American civilization and American world power through the process of historical development in the process of becoming a world power,

The United States became a world power when in its very cradle it drove the British Lion—if I may say so—halt and bleeding from the Thirteen Colonies, when it triumphed in arms over an embattled empire, the mightiest upon the globe. The United State was acting as a world power when it refused to submit to the multiplying injuries and insults of the Barbary States and rescued the commerce of Christendom from a tolerated piracy which had continued for centuries. That the United States is a world power was further evidenced when in a second passage at arms with Great Britain it abrogated the pretensions of that and other countries in regard to the impressment of sailors and seamen and established in theory, if not in fact, the freedom of the seas. It was the voice of a world power when the United States proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine and placed itself as a bar in the pathway of the holy alliance in its effort to resubjugate the emancipated Spanish colonies in America. By that one act alone the United States erected a permanent safeguard in the new world against the ambition and encroachment of the old, gave the western hemisphere an identity and destiny of its own. When the United States prevailed upon Japan to unbolt the doors of that

hermit kingdom to the advent of western civilization it breathed the breath of a new life into the dead and dying Orient.<sup>79</sup>

With the consolidation of a continental empire and expanding political and economic activity abroad, American sovereignty and power had to protect American life and property in foreign lands while at the same time shaping a political, juridical, economic, and social order in an effort to reshape those foreign lands favorable to American interests. This comes by the way of spreading American civilization in order to provide security and order through the managing the welfare of humankind. And this creates the debates surrounding America as a world power, in the context of shape and form, with what end in mind, in the name of America or in the name of liberty, justice, and freedom.

### ***Civilization***

Settlement and conquest of land throughout the North American continent lead to economic development, expansion, and political power. The concept of race and Anglo-Saxon superiority mixed with the Puritan Christian concept of providence, mission, and manifest destiny combined with a national ideology creating a foundation for imperial expansion at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. American economic expansion into

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<sup>79</sup> "...I cannot accept the theory that United States became a world power as a consequence of the Spanish-American War. The character of a nation as world power must be determined by two considerations. First, the character of the ends which it seeks to accomplish in world politics. Second, the character of the means which it employs for the accomplishment of these ends. The effect of a nation's activities as a world power depends not entirely upon its own intentions or the character of its means and its ends, but depends largely upon the opinion, indeed, I may add, upon the suspicions, which other nations may entertain as to its intentions, its means and its ends. World power must be exercised through one of two forces, or through a combination of two forces. I mean moral forces and military force." Thomas P. Gore, 'The True Basis for America's World Influence', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66, (1916), pp. 132.

Asia and South America were buttressed on multiple beliefs and interpretations of human progress and civilizing mission while also fulfilling American concept of “manifest destiny”.

America was, in this ideology, the last outpost of the westward expansion of civilization carried by Aryan peoples from the ancient Near East into Greece and Rome, further extended by teutonic tribes into Britain, and bourne baby Anglo-Saxon from there to America. The manifest historical destiny of the American branch of this family, was now to extend that civilization, in its fully developed form, to the utmost boundary of the Western world. There would then only remain the historical task of projecting it across the Pacific to complete the circle of civilization.<sup>80</sup>

Many of the writings in *The Annals*' articles use this language and are a continuation of these ideas. These beliefs and notions are similar with previous forms of imperial ideologies and civilizing missions. Whether it be Roman conceptions of citizenship and the civilized world to the European notions of bringing the enlightenment to the dark masses of the world with their own individual nationalistic characteristics and particularities. For these American theorists, writers, and policy makers, civilization took the form of a market based economy, professionalization, protestant Christianity, economic rationality, and republican governance and democracy. The vision for the American empire was global and a continuation, reincarnation of previous Western empires. These interpretations as the foundations of an advanced and civilized society was the recipe for the non-white and non-European peoples of the world.

A common theme in these articles is the use of language that references empires and imperial civilization of the past. Furthermore, the discourse of global expansion and past empires fits into the narrative of American destiny as a great civilization and an expression of the greatness of the Anglo-Saxon stock, the ‘white race’ and Western Civilization. It was the United

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<sup>80</sup> Thomas McCarthy, ‘Social Darwinism and White Supremacy’, In *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2009). pp. 72-3.

States that had “the largest group of educated members of the white race to be found anywhere in the world. They constitute the only great two-ocean nation and are astride the temperate zone; they are industrious, ingenious, enterprising. They possess an aptitude for the farm, the forest, and the mine, the laboratory, the factory, and the sea, and occupy a territory rich in every natural resource. They are peace loving and benevolent”.<sup>81</sup> It is at the same time a continuation of the greatness of western civilization and the United States fulfilling its destiny as a world civilization. Dutton references the ancient civilizations of Rome and Byzantium when writing on American nation building.

For nearly one hundred and fifty years we have been engaged in building a nation. At the bottom of all our endeavors there was a religious spirit and we have developed a tradition for honesty and fair dealing. We fought for liberty and for the preservation of the Union. As we review the history of those conflicts our conscience is clear. Great benefits have come to the world because liberty and union have triumphed on this continent. Other occasions where we have taken up arms we do not review with the same complacency. Our territory is vast and full of potential wealth and no longer can we say of different sections of our domain that the inhabitants are English or Dutch or Spanish. America is the home of all peoples and our large cities are more cosmopolitan than were ancient Rome or Byzantium. Of some countries it may be said that there are more their people in American than in the home land.<sup>82</sup>

As Dutton’s words show, and for many of other primary source others, America was the new Rome, it was new cradle of human civilization and progress.

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<sup>81</sup> Henry A. Wise Wood, ‘Planning the Future America’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 21.

<sup>82</sup> Samuel T. Dutton, ‘The United States and the War’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 13–14.

George Luis Beer writing before the American entrance into the war, theorizes an ‘effective alliance’ between the British Empire and the United States. He provokes the common themes of the Anglo-Saxon civilization as taking the reins in the organization of humanity.

An effective alliance between the British Empire and the United States would mean the harmonious cooperation of one-third of the population of the globe, of whom about 155 millions are Caucasians of the most progressive and democratic type...Until some system of world-organization is established, the English-speaking peoples must place maintain reliance upon their united strength to withstand the dangers to which their common civilization is still exposed. Such an alliance made merely for defensive purposes and seeking to secure peace, order, and justice throughout the world would facilitate the formation of some organization for the still inchoate world-community. It would naturally attract to itself the nations of like mind and could be made the foundation-stone for that federation of all the world of which statesmen, philosophers, and poets have dreamt.<sup>83</sup>

It is this expansion of “American civilization”, the American way of life through the extending maritime trade and foreign investment that produced a need to create a political, juridical, military, social organization throughout the globe in order to protect and continue American life and property. To be able to protect American life and property, the rest of the world had to be restructured and reorganized to fulfill this goal. In other words, the rest of humanity had to learn how to behave and cooperate. In the following chapter, I explore this new stage in American history, the United States as an emerging economic global power.

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<sup>83</sup> “... But before such an event can even come within the range of practical politics, the prevailing concept of unlimited state sovereignty must be greatly modified. Though the individual’s complete liberty of action is theoretically restricted by his membership in the state, it is only by means of it that he can find the true freedom essential to his fullest development. Similarly, the state is part of a real but still unorganized world-community and it cannot without devitalizing its life seek to evade the responsibilities resulting from this fact. Ultimately, it is hoped, Mazzini’s dream will come true and the self-regarding nationalism of the present day will be replaced by a world-system of which each unit shall be dedicated to the mutual service of mankind as a whole. The initial step toward this goal cannot, however be said to have been taken until Great Powers like the United States are ready to emerge from their self-regarding isolation and to contract binding and durable ties with those of like mind for the maintenance of the public right of the world.” George Louis Beer, ‘America’s International Responsibilities and Foreign Policy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66, (1916), 90-91.

### Chapter 3- Cujus Regio, Ejus Economia<sup>84</sup>

“We must recover our maritime supremacy, and become the world’s chief sea carrier. Once again must the American flag be the flag oftenest seen upon the waters of the earth.”<sup>85</sup>

“We cannot follow the example of any other nation. If we would succeed, we must lead. Our economic position is as distinct fundamentally as is our country’s position geographically. The war has given us an unprecedented handicap over every other nation in the world. Our foreign commerce has jumped by leaps and bounds until we have almost monopolized the world trade in many lines.”<sup>86</sup>

“In the new era we must, as a nation, recognize that the beneficial by-products of foreign trade are immensely valuable to the economic life of the United States. We must, as a nation, make selfish private profits from overseas sales easier to obtain. We must, as a nation, recognize the value of intelligent cooperative efforts by our manufactures in their quest for new markets beyond our borders.”<sup>87</sup>

In this chapter, I focus on the economic component of American empire and global power through the debates about the expansion of foreign trade and foreign investment. A common theme throughout the articles in *The Annals*, and American history in general, is the interconnectedness of economics, politics, and society in relation to foreign policy. I argue that American economic and political development throughout the course of American history and

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<sup>84</sup> Carl Schmitt, and G. L. Ulmen. *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. New York: Telos Press. (2003) pp. 256

<sup>85</sup> Henry A. Wise Wood, ‘Planning the Future America’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 21.

<sup>86</sup> John Hays Hammond, ‘Wanted-A Foreign Trade Policy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84, (1919), pp. 152.

<sup>87</sup> Walter F. Wyman, ‘Readjustment of American Industries Through the Development of Foreign Trade’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 82, (1919), pp. 20.



the development of a capitalist society, have been used as means to an end in the construction and spread of American civilization, power, security, and order, domestically and abroad.<sup>88</sup> It was believed that the American way of life was the answer to the chaos and instability in the world. American civilization based on market economy, individualism, Protestant Christianity, republican democracy, and Anglo-Saxon patriarchy was to be an example to the world and for the welfare of humanity.<sup>89</sup> It is during this period that American economic activity accelerated its expansion abroad creating debates among the primary sources authors of how to address this expansion. Within these debates on whether the US should exercise dominance over the market for its own economic, social, and politic benefits.<sup>90</sup> “There must be no internationalism in our economic policy”.<sup>91</sup> Or should policy makers and US business leaders work together in international cooperation for the overall benefit of the global market and other nations.<sup>92</sup> Furthermore, many of the authors call for an increased role of the US government in facilitating

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<sup>88</sup> I use Sklar’s interpretation of capitalism as a working definition: “It conceives capitalism as a complex of social relations, expressed in evolving class formations and relations, modes of consciousness, patterns of authority, and relations of power.” Martin J. Sklar, ‘Periodization and Historiography: Studying American Political Development in the Progressive Era, 1890s–1916’, *Studies in American Political Development* 5, 2, (1991), pp. 62-3.

<sup>89</sup> Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World : The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (1999). William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life : an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford University Press, (1980).

<sup>90</sup> John Hays Hammond, ‘Wanted-A Foreign Trade Policy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84, (1919), pp. 152–160. Roland G. Usher, ‘The International Right America Must Champion’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 49–57.

<sup>91</sup> John Hays Hammond, ‘Wanted-A Foreign Trade Policy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84, (1919), pp. 153.

<sup>92</sup> Edward A Filene, ‘International Business Coöperation’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 82, (1919), pp. 135-42. Elihu Root, ‘Individual Effort in Trade Expansion’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 37, 3, (1911), pp. 1–6. E. E. Pratt, ‘The Economic Factors in an Enduring Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 136-39.

and defending foreign trade and investment.<sup>93</sup> Up to this period, the relation between US foreign trade and investment linked with the US Foreign policy was Dollar Diplomacy in Central and South American and the Open Door Policy in Eastern Asia, specifically China. It is during this period that foreign trade and foreign investment accelerated due to advancements in domestic agriculture and industrial production and transportation infrastructure and communication and the development of the corporate form of capitalism. As result of corporate capital and overall increased agricultural and industrial production along with financial capital, foreign trade was the answer and the search for new markets for American goods and capital created an intensified push abroad. With all this change and flux, American business culture and society was still adapting to this new demand of foreign trade and investment.

### ***The Great Opening***<sup>94</sup>

European powers for the half-century before the writings in *The Annals* had expanded across the globe, incorporating vast amounts of territories and lands and, as a result, being hegemonic in the global politics and global trade, with Great Britain leading the way. But these articles demonstrate an opening for the US to start playing a bigger role in the foreign arena in the context of World War I. As a result of the war, the European powers were no longer hegemonic in global politics and global trade, with Great Britain losing its global hegemony.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> John Hays Hammond, 'Wanted-A Foreign Trade Policy', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84, (1919), pp. 152–160. Huntington Wilson, *The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment*, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 68, (1916), pp. 298–311. Roland G. Usher, 'The International Right America Must Champion', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 72, (1917), pp. 49–57.

<sup>94</sup> In reference to the 'Great Shift'. Ellwood, D. W. "America' and Europe, 1914–1945.' In *The Oxford Handbook of European History, 1914-1945*. : Oxford University Press, (2016).

<sup>95</sup> Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*. London: Verso, (2010).

“It is certain, however, that nothing less will rehabilitate the badly battered and now heavily mortgaged British Empire”.<sup>96</sup> As mentioned previously, the war caused a major shift in the global market and the power dynamics of the core, and as a result, forming a new center in the United States within the global market. To use world systems terminology, the US went from the status of semi-periphery, exploited and exploiter, to the position of core, hegemonic in the world economy.<sup>97</sup> After the outbreak of the war in Europe the US slowly went from a debtor nation to a creditor nation, “principally owing to the fact that vast exports of munitions, etc., have been made to belligerent countries, thus creating an abnormal trade balance in her favor. With this shifting of international balances, large amounts of gold have been received from debtor nations, a considerable volume of American securities held abroad have been absorbed by the New York market and large loans made to the belligerent nations, as well as to Canada and other countries of the American continents”.<sup>98</sup> As Arrighi describes the US economy was already becoming a major hub and focal point in the global economy, “By the time the struggle for world supremacy began, the US domestic economy was well on its way to being the new center of the world economy- a center connected to the rest of the world-economy not so much by trade flows as by more or less unilateral transfers of labor, capital, and entrepreneurship flowing from the rest of the world to its political jurisdiction”.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> W. R. Lawson, ‘The British Treasury and the London Stock Exchange’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68, (1916), pp. 92.

<sup>97</sup> J. Fry, ‘From Open Door to World Systems: Economic Interpretations of Late Nineteenth Century American Foreign Relations’, *Pacific Historical Review*, 65-2, (1996), pp. 277-303.

<sup>98</sup> E. L. Stewart Patterson, ‘London and New York as Financial Centers’ *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68, (1916), pp. 275.

<sup>99</sup> Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*, (2010), pp. 62.

Many articles cover the European war occurring at this time, provide an insight into the American perspective and thinking surrounding the war in terms of global trade and their positioning within the global market. Furthermore, many of the authors often looking beyond the present state of the war to speculate and conceptualize the post-war development.<sup>100</sup> In particular, the role and standing the United States will assume after the war, considering the developing position of industrial and agrarian strength in the global economy as a result of the war and the potential for economic growth in the reconstruction period following the end of the war. Head of the Federal Reserve Board, Paul M. Warburg, expresses his perspective on the outlook of American financial capital in the years to come.

It is inevitable, if our banks and bankers continue to show the same spirit of enterprise and patriotism they have demonstrated during the war, that in the financing of the world's current trade we shall have a very large share. As a matter of fact, we owe it to the world to bear a substantial portion of this burden. To that end the discount rates of the federal reserve banks and the policy of the Federal Reserve Board with respect to acceptance transactions must continue to be liberal. I can well foresee the time when American dollar acceptances will be outstanding to the extent of more than one billion dollars in credits granted all over the globe.<sup>101</sup>

As Warburg expresses, the war drastically changed the economic environment, both domestically and globally in relation to the US. It was the moment for policy makers, industrial, and financial leaders to seize the moment for the benefit of the US dollar. The war provided an opening and a

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<sup>100</sup> George E. Roberts, 'America's Ability to Make Foreign Investments', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 287–297. Paul M. Warburg, 'Some Phases of Financial Reconstruction', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 82, 1919, pp. 347–373. Henry A. Wise Wood, 'Planning the Future America', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 72, 1917, pp. 19–23.

<sup>101</sup> Paul M. Warburg, 'Some Phases of Financial Reconstruction', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 82 (1919), pp. 349.

changing geopolitical landscape in the post-war period. Patterson continues this theme by speculating on the future of the global economy and what part the US will play.

Will these wartime opportunities, when peace is declared, be sufficient to retain for New York the position which London with all her advantages took centuries to acquire? Before New York can do this to any great extent the United States must learn to think internationally and not provincially. It must increase its foreign trade tremendously and revise its navigation and alien labour laws and its tariff, all with a due regard to the comity of nations; sound permanent banking and currency systems, removed from legislative tinkering must also be established, and finally foreign banks should be encouraged to establish branches in New York and other centers without unnecessary restrictions as to the business they may undertake.<sup>102</sup>

But at this point, the U.S was still a developing industrial nation with a population lacking in foreign experience and areas of domestic investment were still profitable. In the following section, I look at how the authors portray the state of affairs in the U.S. economy and nation. For many authors, argue for a change public in attitudes, practices, and perspectives, both private and public.

### *Change in the Air*

As a result of global change in the period immediately after 1914, opportunities arose for policymakers in Washington as well as financial, agriculture, and manufacture leaders, and America as a whole to capitalize. Though a new period of economic growth and expansion had begun in the U.S. due to the war, the American economy and nation was still experiencing major

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<sup>102</sup> E. L. Stewart Patterson, 'London and New York as Financial Centers' (1916), pp. 276.

transformations domestically with continental market development in full process.<sup>103</sup> As mentioned earlier, there seems to be a gap between the content of what many of the authors are portraying as compared to the historiography. At this point, there is a tension between the economic and political preparedness at home and profitability of expansion abroad, a tension between profitable opportunities abroad as compared to overseas. To be able to take advantage of the opening and opportunity created by the war in Europe, a change in American perspective to foreign investment and trade was needed. This included, government support in foreign investment and trade policy, a change in American business practices in terms of approaches to foreign investment, and a new international perspective in ways of viewing and dealing with ‘other’ people and foreign lands. The following passages express the changing economic culture and environment at the time.

Schoff writing before the outbreak of the war express this tension between domestic and foreign investment facing the American business and financial environment at the time,

Interest in foreign investments is a new feature, comparatively speaking, in American business. Until recent years the United States sought capital and had no reserve to offer for financing enterprises beyond its own borders. Word of golden opportunities, promising returns even beyond those anticipated from the domestic field, was met by the objection that American savings should be employed as a matter of patriotic principle in American undertakings, and that every bridge or

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<sup>103</sup> “What part will the United States be able to play in this situation? We know that in the past it has been a borrowing country, a field of investment for the old countries of Europe. No other country has grown so rapidly in population, and this growth, while stimulated by the demands of capital striving to take advantage of the opportunities present here, has in turn created an enormous demand for capital to build the cities and the railways, and provide the accommodations and facilities required by a population of 100,000,000 people. The result has been that nowhere else have the rewards of capital been so great as here, and there has been little inducement for American investors to go away from home.” George E. Roberts, “America's Ability to Make Foreign Investments.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68, (1916), pp. 287.

railroad or street-car line built in a foreign country meant one less at home, of which we stood in greater need.<sup>104</sup>

This tension and American business mentality continued through the war years as Wise Wood writes on organizing the national economy in order to capture the opportunity provide in the global market. For Wise Wood, America needed to put in the various sectors of the domestic economy, as he argues,

This we may easily do if we but set our industrial house in order, if we but hasten to learn and apply to our needs the lessons of class cooperation that the warring nations are teaching us, and turn our government into a great industrial warder and schoolmaster. The industrial armies of the other peoples have been drained by the war, and for more than a generation will be without the vigor that once was theirs. We shall be required to supplement their efforts, and supply to their own peoples and to the other peoples who have depended upon them that which they no longer will capable of producing. If we but grasp these, our opportunities, we shall become the world's foremost manufacturing nation.<sup>105</sup>

Roberts continues this theme by addressing the perception of Americans' inexperience in foreign capital investments and diplomacy abroad as a hurdle to overcome.

I would repeat, then, that this question, whether we are in position to make extensive investments abroad is one of comparative opportunities and cosmopolitan education. We have ample capital to allow of our making extensive investments abroad. Our own capital equipment is greater per head than that of any other country, and naturally there are larger profits to be made in building up the equipment of others than in increasing our own. The chief obstacle to our making investments abroad is the lack of experience in foreign operations. We are not accustomed to distant investments. Even at home our investments are

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<sup>104</sup> Wilfred H. Schoff, "Investment of American Capital in Latin-American Countries", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 37- 3 (1911), pp. 61.

<sup>105</sup> Henry A. Wise Wood, 'Planning the Future America', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 21.

chiefly local. We have spread out over a great country, every part of it has been developing, and there have been many opportunities for local investment.<sup>106</sup>

As these authors express this was a period of great change within the United States and it required to adapt to the globalizing world in order to keep up with the times. The western frontier was consolidated, as a result, growth through territorial market expansion had to be achieved through overseas expansion creating new global frontiers and points of economic and cultural exchange.<sup>107</sup> This meant that American business leaders and American population to adapt to this new relationship with the “foreign”.

This new emphasis on American economic and political focus on the world outside of the continental United States was referred to as “internationalism.” The geographical location of the US provided key advantages through its empire building but it was limited in dealing with ‘others’ with the major exception of Native peoples. This led many authors to promote the idea of cosmopolitan education, a change in American outlook was viewed as key to foreign trade development. Furthermore, a change in perspective of the ‘foreign’ and the ‘international’, many of the authors lament the provincial perspective and outlook of the American populace. This is also reflected in the business community where business leaders are not taking the initiative of investing and trading abroad. Secretary of State and Secretary of War, Elihu Root, writes:

The basis of all permanent commercial intercourse is benefit to both parties—not that cutthroat relation which may exist between enemies, where one is trying to do the other— and a relation upon, mutual respect, good understanding, sympathy, and friendship, and the way to reach the condition which is thus essential is by

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<sup>106</sup> Roberts, George E., ‘America's Ability to Make Foreign Investments’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 295-296.

<sup>107</sup> Nathan J. Citino, ‘The Global Frontier: Comparative History and the Frontier-Borderlands Approach’, In *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2004), 194-211.



person intercourse and acquaintance between the men of Anglo-Saxon or German or Norse, or whatever race they may be, peopling the United States, and the men of the Latin-American race peopling the countries of the South. This is something, my friends, in which our people are very deficient. So long we have been separated from the other nations of the earth that one of our faults is a failure to appreciate the qualities of the people who are unlike us.<sup>108</sup>

With this new and increasing economic potential and development due to war production, massive shift in financial credit, and gold reserves, in addition to the declining economic power of the British and French empire. American policymakers and business leaders saw a primary need in restructuring and overhauling how America was conducting its economic development, domestically and globally. This included creating diplomatic and consular services, foreign economic information gathering, advancement in international communications, overhauling and increasing transportation infrastructure through shipping lines and port construction, and creating foreign banking services, and increasing the cooperation between the public-private sectors in foreign states. All of this done in the effort to order and structure American economic foreign trade by facilitating and maximizing the flows of information, goods, and capital.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Passage continued...“I have often had occasion to something that Bret Harte said about the people of a frontier western camp, to whom came stranger who regarded by them as having the defective moral quality of being a “foreigner.” Difference from us does not involve inferiority to us. It may involve our inferiority to somebody else. The sooner our business men open their minds to the idea that the peoples of other countries, different races and speaking different languages and with different customs and laws, are quite our equals, worthy of our respect, worthy of our esteem, regard, and affection, the sooner we shall reach a basis on which we can advance our commerce all over the world.” Elihu Root, ‘Individual Effort in Trade Expansion’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 37- 3, (1911), pp. 5.

<sup>109</sup> “The nation’s surplus capital must be set to work for the nation wherever beyond the seas good returns in interest and trade are forthcoming. And selected youth must be especially trained for the handling of America’s banking and commercial interests abroad, trained in the languages, manners and customs, tastes and prejudices, of all foreign peoples. This work there should be created a great national institution, subsidized by the government, with training field stations in all countries. Such an institution could provide us also with consuls, many of whom are foreign citizenship and their loyalty not always depended upon. Thus we shall be make able to satisfy at our profit the needs of all nations, and draw an ever increasing income from the industry of other peoples.” Wise Wood, *Planning the Future America* (1917), pg. 22.

In this process of expanding foreign trade comes a need for economic structure and support system in terms of political and diplomatic backing, security, banking resources, and shipping and transportation infrastructure. In particular, the banking sector and American financial capital had much room for growth and expansion during this period, in order to spread the power of the dollar and support growing foreign markets for American goods. A key for this was the expansion of American banking and American financial capital. The following passages address the banking and financial environment of American foreign investment and a lacking of a financial infrastructure. “In order to become the world’s foremost manufacturers and merchants, we must become the world’s chief bankers. Where foreign enterprises may borrow, there will be trade. The American banker and American salesman must go abroad hand in hand. We must assist and encourage them as the pioneers of the new world-dawn industrial life into the enjoyment of which America is about to enter”.<sup>110</sup> For Wood, the American banking industry was crucial for the expansion abroad in the creation of new foreign markets for American goods. Schoff writing before the outbreak of the war in Europe, expresses some of the weaknesses of American financial infrastructure and organization in Latin America and American business mentality.

Of more importance is the reason, also frequently urged, that there are no American banks. This is very near the root of the matter. For while in matters of exchange alone, it is entirely feasible under existing facilities to finance any transaction of international trade with our sister republics, the absence of American banking houses means the absence of Americans interested in making loans and investments, in creating those conditions of prosperous development which in turn create a market for foreign goods and lead the beneficiary to turn naturally for advice and for trade to his benefactor. This is the weakest point in our present relations with Latin America. Our position is selfish. We offer a

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<sup>110</sup> Wise Wood, ‘Planning the Future America’ (1917), pp. 22.

surplus stock of goods, not always in a way to suggest interest in continuous relations, and we tender no assistance that can be compared with that offered by our competitors. Investment of capital in legitimate development is the surest way to bind these republics to us in friendly relations and in mutual commerce.<sup>111</sup>

These passages not only reflect the current status of American financial mentality and financial infrastructure abroad but also the drive for more. Not only a desire for more expansion but also the highlighting the social and intentional construction of the market, revealing the ‘non-naturalness’ of the market. In other words, American economic expansion was not the result of a natural process but one of intent, design, and planning.

### ***Corporate Development***

The war in Europe was not the only push factor in the drive abroad in the search of new markets and access to resources. Capitalist development was already transforming American society and capitalism in many sectors of the economy, domestically and globally. One of the major push factors abroad was the restructuring of American capitalism at this time, in particular, the rise and development of the corporate form along with technological advancement.<sup>112</sup> Both Sklar and Arrighi, write on the US form of hegemony in the global market as ‘superseding’ or ‘a stage pushing beyond capitalism’. With the increasing centrality and importance of the US in the global economy, the question at this time was how the US would shape, mold, and interact in the market. As some authors in *The Annals* articulate, the market should benefit directly US interests and in the process ‘push beyond capitalism’ and ‘supersede’ the market for American

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<sup>111</sup> Schoff, “Investment of American Capital in Latin-American Countries” (1911), pp. 62-63.

<sup>112</sup> Alfred D. Chandler, *The United States: Engines of Economic Growth in the Capital-Intensive and Knowledge-Intensive Industries, Big Business and the Wealth of Nations*, edited by Alfred D. Chandler et al., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1997) pp. 61–101.

interests. As Arrighi writes, "...the market is superseded by vertical integration...The leading and dominant agency of that supersession was finance capitalism as such in any of its variants, but the corporate capitalism that in the United States through the formation of vertically integrated bureaucratically managed, multi-unit business enterprises".<sup>113</sup> As Sklar frames it, corporate capitalism represented a new form of property relations and capital accumulation, representing a new stage in national and economic development, "...a stage pushing beyond capitalism, and hence at the same time, the emergence of an early state of a modern, highly industrialized, public economy with strong associational and integrative, or socialized, characteristics, permeating not only enterprise relations but also broader socio-political relations, on a national and transnational plane".<sup>114</sup> The formation of the corporation fundamentally changed and restructured the market, property relations, modes of production, and relations between capital and labor. The new restructuring of capitalism and the global market by US corporations demanded a more active role by the US government and US foreign policy to help pave the way for US hegemony, this transition also came with contradictions and inherent weaknesses.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*, (2010), pp. 297.

<sup>114</sup> Martin J. Sklar, 'Periodization and Historiography: The United States Considered as a Developing Country', In *The United States as a Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992), pp. 24.

<sup>115</sup> "...and of the centralization in the United States of the liquidity, purchasing power, and productive capacity of the world economy. But once the destruction and centralization had become as complete as they possibly could, US corporate business was powerless to create the conditions of its own self-expansion in a chaotic world. No tax subsidy, insurance scheme, or exchange guarantee was sufficient to overcome the fundamental asymmetry between the cohesiveness and wealth of the US domestic market and the fragmentation and poverty of foreign markets" Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*. London: Verso (2010), pp.304

This also links to Harvey's concept of spatio-temporal fix, in that capital is invested, in many ways, embedded into the geography limiting its rate of profit therefore creating a push for more profitable areas for capital investment outside of the territorial space of original investment and production. Harvey states, "But the really big issue is what happens to surplus capitals generated within sub-national regional economies when they cannot find profitable employment anywhere within the state".<sup>116</sup> Roberts articulates this 'big issue' by citing the law of diminishing returns in domestic investment, production, and accumulation.

There is a sense, of course, in which we can always use all of our capital at home. This will be so if we are indifferent to the rate of return. If the returns are as good at home as abroad, nobody will advise going abroad. But with capital increasing faster than population, the law of diminishing returns is constantly operative, and the accumulations available for investment will decline until they are in equilibrium with the home demand. On the other hand, people who go abroad for advantageous investments, and give a hand in developing the efficiency and wealth of other people, will find their own industries stimulated, and actually have more capital to invest both at home and abroad.<sup>117</sup>

Through the process of capital accumulation occurring in specific regions, localities which in turn create the tension and push factors in the search for other markets outside of the original locality. This push factor of capital found a welcoming host in Washington policy makers in providing service and protection in terms of creating a political and diplomatic international system allowing for the creation of new markets and outlets for surplus capital.

The market based political economy as often been a means to end rather a system of production and distribution of surplus goods and services. With the push of constantly seeking

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<sup>116</sup> David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2003) pp. 107.

<sup>117</sup> Roberts, George E., 'America's Ability to Make Foreign Investments', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (1916), pp. 295.

new markets to quench the thirst for new wealth and resources but also to maintain social order and tranquility, in particular, in a industrializing post-colonial society and immigrant nation. “It is vital to the industrial peace; social contentment and prosperity of the nation that unemployment of labor reduced to a minimum. This can be effected in a large measure by the restriction of immigration and by the development of foreign markets to insure uninterrupted operation of our industrial plants”.<sup>118</sup> As a consequence of this constant search for capital accumulation and outside competition, markets are no longer being sought only on the continent but abroad, in foreign territories. “The United States has no real choice. Either it must be content to face nation-wide unemployment or it must be a serious exporter. The one way that it can become a serious exporter in competition with England, France, Italy, Belgium, and later with Germany, lies in the acquisition of world trade ambitions by myriads”.<sup>119</sup> Sklar highlights the link between corporate capitalism, government intervention, and the push abroad, “Moreover the global dimension inherent in the large corporate economy stimulated new kinds of international relations and perspectives among capitalists, workers, reformers, intellectuals, professionals, and political leaders, in a context favorable to growing government involvement in international investment management, development planning, and sociopolitical reform”.<sup>120</sup> This corporate development, in many ways, changes Ardent’s formulation of European colonialism as

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<sup>118</sup> John Hays Hammond, ‘Wanted-A Foreign Trade Policy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84 (1919), pp. 155.

<sup>119</sup> Walter F. Wyman, ‘Readjustment of American Industries Through the Development of Foreign Trade’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 82 (1919), pp. 29.

<sup>120</sup> Martin J. Sklar, ‘Periodization and Historiography: The United States Considered as a Developing Country’, In *The United States as a Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1992), pp. 24.

the emigration of “superfluous capital, superfluous men” to an emigration of “superfluous capital, specialized/technocratic men”.

In thinking about these “new kinds of international relations and perspectives” on future economic trade and capital accumulation, space and geography became a focal point in theorizing and promoting the search for new potential markets for American goods and capital.

It is to the so-called “backward nations” of South America, Africa, and to Russia that American must look for her future markets. These countries possess enormous natural resources, as yet undeveloped, and consequently of present value. Their people lack purchasing-power, and because of the low standards of living there is but little demand for foreign goods. The exploitation of the countries would involve the expenditure of colossal sums of money. Where is the money to come from? Obviously European financial centers can no longer provide capital, and it is to the United States that they must look for financial assistance.<sup>121</sup>

As consequence of the war and the changing economic status of the U.S. in the global market, this created a drive and a push outwards. The breakdown in international system, internal demand, and external global competition formed an environment of expansion beyond the continental borders. With these multiple transformations and expansion abroad, to take advantage of the chaos in the global market increased government intervention was needed to provide support, protection, and stability for American trade and financial interests abroad. But government intervention in market expansion has long been at the heart of US politics, foreign policy, and society. In the following section, I explore in more depth this relationship between American trade, financial interests, and foreign policy by looking at the policy of Dollar Diplomacy.

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<sup>121</sup> Hammond, ‘Wanted-A Foreign Trade Policy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84 (1919), pp. 156.

## *Dollars for Bullets*<sup>122</sup>

In this period of changes and shifts, as reflected by the debates in *The Annals* articles, government intervention was crucial if America was to fully take advantage of its new economic position within the global market. Even before the beginning of the war in 1914, American government intervention and business interests dominated Latin America through the use of US sovereignty and financial capital. The policy of dollar diplomacy shifted US imperialism in one not based on territorial expansion but through the interstate system and market formation, by imposing US capital, trade, fiscal rationality on other foreign states while “maintaining” the foreign state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.<sup>123</sup> For a receiving state of an American loan, there were the two forces of imperialism at play being capital and the state, in this case the US State Department. Carl Schmitt’s writings on the changing forms of territorial acquisition and the ordering of space during this period provides a solid interpretation in understanding the forms of sovereignty and international law in relation to U.S. economic imperialism. Schmitt describes the dynamic of US policy that emphasized a separation of politics and economics in the forming of spatial order and international law.

This separation appeared to express the famous, traditional and typical maxim: as much trade as possible, as little politics as possible. Internally, that meant the dominate of an economy free the state, and in the same sense, of a free society over the state. Externally, it did not constitute a rejection of custom duties, protectionism, and economic autonomy (United States foreign policy was characterized more by highly protection policy). Rather, it constituted an indirect method of exerting political influence. The most important characteristic of this influence was that it was based on free trade, i.e. on the trade free of the state, on

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<sup>122</sup> Martin J. Sklar, ‘Dollar Diplomacy According to Dollar Diplomats: American Development and World Development’, *The United States as a Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1992), pp. 78–101.

<sup>123</sup> Frederick McCormick, ‘The Open Door’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 39 (1912), pp. 59.



an equally free market as the constitutional standard of international law, and on ignoring political territorial borders by utilizing such devices as the ‘open door’ and ‘most favored nation’. Thus, in the sense of the separation of politics and economics, official absence meant only political absence, with unofficial presence meant an extraordinary effective—economic presence and, if need be, also political control.<sup>124</sup>

This quote by Schmitt highlights the link between the economic and the political, in particular, how the two are often linked together in the ordering of space. It was through the foreign state that American sovereignty exercised control to carve out markets for its surplus goods and capital, whether this be in China through the Open Door Policy or in Latin America with Dollar Diplomacy. The key is the ordering of space and for American imperial power this was done through foreign policy, the extension of sovereignty in foreign lands, and foreign trade and investment. Furthermore, the military does not play a leading role in this form of imperial politics but an enforcing role. It is to provide order and stability for the protection of American investments and interests, the process of capital accumulation to be carried out and the foreign state comply with this process. It should be noted that these articles are arguing for an increased intervention by the government in foreign trade and a change in foreign policy to benefit foreign market creation and investment for US interests. The export of capital, goods, services and in particular, financial capital, with the backing of the state on to colonial territories or developing nations are used as mechanisms, leverage to open doors to other nations’ resources, wealth, and

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<sup>124</sup> Carl Schmitt, and G. L. Ulmen. *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. New York: Telos Press (2003) pp. 255

forms of sovereignty.<sup>125</sup> Huntington Wilson in his articulation of dollar diplomacy provides a Washington D.C. policymaker's interpretation and framework of this new kind of global ordering and economic imperialism.

Wilson articulates Dollar Diplomacy as "(...) a diplomacy of common sense in the highest of that term...a diplomacy determined by the application of scientific principles and sound economic thinking to plain facts studied and understood as they really are; a diplomacy preferring to build for the long future, rather than to dogmatize for the moment's expediency; preferring the truth to a beautiful idealization not resting upon truth".<sup>126</sup> In the case of dollar diplomacy it was the Department of State charged with the responsibility of foreign trade diplomacy and foreign expansion.

Wilson argues that dollar diplomacy is part of an "international biology". A concept based on 'survival of the fittest' or 'might is right' in the context of the international state system, where the strong states dominate the weak states by a process of natural selection. Wilson writes

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<sup>125</sup> Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History*, New York: Hill and Wang, (2006). D. Pletcher, Reciprocity and Latin America in the Early 1890s: A Foretaste of Dollar Diplomacy. *Pacific Historical Review*, 47-1, (1978), pp. 53-89. Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World : The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, (1999). Martin Sklar, 'Dollar Diplomacy according to Dollar Diplomats: American development and world development'. In *The United States as a Developing Country*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1992), pp. 78-101. William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life : an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford University Press, (1980). Colin D. Moore, State Building Through Partnership: Delegation, Public-Private Partnerships, and the Political Development of American Imperialism, 1898-1916, *Studies in American Political Development*, 25-1 (2011) pp. 27-55.

<sup>126</sup> Huntington Wilson, 'The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68, 1916, pp. (300).

of “the law of national survival,” a “sort of international biology.”<sup>127</sup> He continues, “The march of civilization brooks no violation of the law of survival of the fittest. Neighboring countries comprise an environment. The strongest will dominate that environment... The biological law of the tendency to revert to the lower type as the higher attributes are disused, is at work among nations; and nature, in its rough method of uplift, gives sick nations strong neighbors and takes its inexorable course of private enterprise and diplomacy as its instruments”.<sup>128</sup> Wilson is referring to the Latin American states in relation to the US, and America’s ‘responsibility’ to these states in the process of their economic and social “development”. “Service to humanity is not mentioned separately because charity begins at home; because it is America’s first duty to serve America; because America, as a government, can amply serve humanity in spheres and in ways in which America also serves itself; because if it does that, the service to humanity may be considered by diplomacy, which is not, by the way, an eleemosynary institution, as merged in the service of America, that is, in American political advantage”.<sup>129</sup> This concept of dollar diplomacy is picking and choosing what investors and what investments to support in foreign territories that will benefit the United States for its economic and political advantage.

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<sup>127</sup> “Here a natural law and a political theory work together, as is the case whenever the political theory is sound. There are so many analogies between biology and international evolution that one may invoke a sort of “international biology.” The march of civilization brooks no violation of the law of the survival of the fittest. Neighboring countries comprise an environment. The strongest will dominate that environment. Sentimental phrases about the sovereignty of weaker countries will no more permit them to run amuck with impunity than ranting about individual rights will permit an outrageous citizen to annoy municipality and escape the police. The biological law of the tendency to revert to the lower type as the higher attributes are disused is at work among nations; and nature, in its rough method of uplift, gives sick nations strong neighbors and takes its inexorable course with private enterprise and diplomacy as its instruments. And this course is the best in the long run, for all concerned and for the world...” Huntington Wilson, ‘The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68, (1916), pp. 306.

<sup>128</sup> Wilson, ‘The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment’, (1916), pp. 307

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 300

In the same volume published in 1916, New York Port Authority Head, Fedrick C Howe, provides an alternative perspective on Dollar Diplomacy by offering a strong critique of the relationship between New York financial capital and Washington policymakers as economic imperialism.

Dollar diplomacy or financial imperialism is not to be confused with international trade or international banking. For trade is a function of the commercial rather than the banking classes... The new movement, which began in this country in a small way twenty years ago, is an activity of finance rather than of trade. It is carried on by great banking houses, chiefly those in New York. It consists in the loaning of money to weak nations or to revolutionary governments; in the building of railroads, canals and public-utility enterprises; and in the development of mines, plantations and other resources. Only incidentally does trade or commerce enter into the program of imperialistic finance. Closely allied with the lending of money and the securing of concessions is the sale of munitions, which in all the great powers has been carried on under the joint protection of the government and the great banking and exploiting houses.<sup>130</sup>

It is important to note that these authors and articles are not homogenous and singular in their ideas, arguments, and discourses. Wilson and Howe reflect this tension in the debates, and overall standing of American economic and political domestic and abroad. As in the period of Early-Modern colonial overseas expansion, it was the *conquistador*, the merchant, or the missionary accompanied by cannons and muskets that opened up new territories, creating new markets and access to resources and raw materials. In the age of imperialism, it was the industrialist, the banker, and the diplomat followed by the flag that opened the doors for new sources of profit, new markets, and new forms of territorial jurisdiction.

Throughout US national development, economics, in particular, a market based political economy and private property was used as a means to an end, it was believed to provided order,

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<sup>130</sup> Howe, F., 'Dollar Diplomacy and Imperialism', *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York*, 7-3 (1917), pp. 74.

stability, and civilization. In this period, the policy of dollar diplomacy encapsulated relationship economic development, American expansion, and civilizing mission.<sup>131</sup> With many forms of imperialism and empire, there is a sense of morality and ethics at the heart of outward expansion. Dollar Diplomacy was no different. There was the belief that foreign trade through the support of the US government was not only good for the American capital interests but for the nation as a whole. But the benefits were not only limited to the American nation and the American taxpayer, Dollar Diplomacy was portrayed as a service to humanity. For the architects of the policy, American dollars were to be a transmission of American business practices, American governance, American law, and American morality. As Taft said during a speech on American economic activity in China expresses that, “our activities...none the less express a logical, worthy, and beneficent programme altogether consistent with the principles and ideals of our government, because of the fact that American dollars are made to perform a high moral duty”.<sup>132</sup> Through the open door of American foreign trade, the receiving countries were not only to receive American goods and capital but the development of their ‘agrarian’ countries, republican and representative government and laws of contract. American foreign trade was viewed as a civilizing process. Commerce and enterprise was believed to bring and provide stability and peace. For these American theorists, diplomats and businessmen “merchants were the ‘rank and file of the army of peace.’” For them, capitalist enterprise and trade was “moral

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<sup>131</sup>Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, (1999).

<sup>132</sup> Martin J. Sklar, ‘Dollar Diplomacy According to Dollar Diplomats: American Development and World Development’, *The United States as a Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1992), pp. 99.

equivalent of war”.<sup>133</sup> The dollar diplomats were the believers of their own gospel, they believed “corporate capitalism was the natural, inevitable product of evolutionary development; that which was natural and necessary could only be right and beneficent”.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Martin J. Sklar, ‘Dollar Diplomacy According to Dollar Diplomats: American Development and World Development’, (1992), pp. 99.

<sup>134</sup> Martin J. Sklar, ‘Dollar Diplomacy According to Dollar Diplomats: American Development and World Development’, (1992), pp. 101.

## Chapter 4- 'A Sovereign among Sovereigns'<sup>135</sup>

“Happily the head of the American nation is really attempting to bring peace, not merely to Europe but to the world, and he is appearing in no such spectacular and hypocritical attitude. We want to adopt some sort of an organization in this present moment to preserve the peace of the world. The whole world is ripe for it. The philosophers of the world, and its poets for the last fifty years have been writing about it. There is a public spirit abroad that demands it.”<sup>136</sup>

July 4, 1821 John Quincy Adams- “America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy... she might become the dictatress of the world; she would no longer be the ruler of her spirit.”<sup>137</sup>

“The only peace that we can now consider is a general peace that makes the world safe for democracy. For better or for worse, Woodrow Wilson has given the United States a new world policy.”<sup>138</sup>

“The peace of the world must primarily be founded upon that which is infinitely higher than peace, viz., justice in the world. There never can be a real peace without justice, and unless we first maintain justice in civilization, there will never be any durable peace. Unfortunately, temporarily or permanently, justice must often, both in the lives of individuals and in the lives of nations, be maintained by force.”<sup>139</sup>

In this chapter, I focus on the debates and ideas concerning America as an emerging global power. In particular, trying to answer the question whether the United States was

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<sup>135</sup> Roland G. Usher, “The International Right America Must Champion.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 57.

<sup>136</sup> Samuel W. McCall, ‘Peace and Democracy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84 (1919), pp. 216-17.

<sup>137</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1980), pp. 750.

<sup>138</sup> George W. Kirchwey, ‘Pax Americana’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), 42.

<sup>139</sup> James M. Beck, ‘A Yearning for World Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 212.

organizing a global order in response to the context of post-World War I?” Much of the discourse found throughout the primary and secondary sources present this new global order as a continuation of expansion of the North American continent in the post overseas expansion, as a result of the Cuban War of 1898, together with a foreign policy based on the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. As Appleman Williams describes the period, “...the dramatic acceleration and intensification of the imperial outreach made it necessary to develop an appropriate ideology, to coordinate and institutionalize the continental and overseas parts of the imperial political economy, and to devise a military strategy that would preserve and extend the empire without wasting its psychic or cultural or economic substance”.<sup>140</sup>

The writings on American foreign policy and America as a global power were diverse and ranging in perspective. The first form can be framed as ‘Caesar’, a true imperial power based on force as many authors called for more American influence in shaping the global economy, world politics, and organization of humanity to provide order and security first, and for all, for the benefit of the United States.<sup>141</sup> The second form which can be framed as ‘Christ’, a savior of humanity, a benevolent shepherd leading the world to the righteous path out of chaos and violence, represented by other authors who argued for the use of US power to benefit the world based on American principles of democracy, liberty, and capitalist political-economy, while at the same time, remained reluctant, skeptical, and critical of America’s growing power on the global level.<sup>142</sup> Regardless of the two, American global power was thought of and conceptualized as an intervening force in reshaping the world in political, economic, and social terms.

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<sup>140</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1980), pp. 1143.

<sup>141</sup> Henry A. Wise Wood, ‘Planning the Future America’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 19–23. Thomas P Gore, ‘The True Basis for America's World Influence’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66 (1916), pp. 130–135. Walter L. Fisher, ‘A League to Enforce Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 185–199. Joseph I. France, ‘American Idealism in the War’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (1918), pp. 32–33. James M. Beck, ‘A Yearning for World Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 208–216. Morris Jastrow, ‘The Turks and the Future of the near East’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84, (1919), pp. 30-40. George W. Kirchwey, ‘How America May Contribute to the Permanent Peace of the World’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 61 (1915), pp. 230–234.

<sup>142</sup> Algernon S. Crapsey, ‘Militarism and the Church’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66 (1916), pp. 247–249. Charles E. Jefferson, ‘Military Preparedness a Peril to Democracy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66 (1916), pp. 228–236.



A few key elements that shape the foreign policy of the United States during the period is the Monroe Doctrine and a mutating form of exercising sovereignty through the interstate system, military interventions and the theorizing of a global alliance of the world powers in the form of a “League of Nations” to provide global peace and stability in global affairs.<sup>143</sup> The United States implemented its influence through trade and financial capital, promotion of American civilization, social and religious values, democracy, and increasing military power. With America’s economic development becoming ever more interconnected and dominant in the global economy, U.S. policymakers were put in a position of looking abroad in order to defend American interests and growth. This economic development forced administrations to intervene abroad in an effort to protect American life and property and to encourage further growth and expansion. As Appleman Williams argues the U.S. was in the positioning of having to manage both the wealthy nations and the poor masses of the world. It is through their formulation of American global order that the authors of *The Annals* attempted to provided an answer to the chaos in the old world order.

### ***The Monroe Doctrine***

The Monroe Doctrine greatly shaped American foreign policy. America as a nation was, in many ways, shaped by the European colonial struggles of the seventeenth and the eighteenth

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<sup>143</sup> As Schmitt describes Cuba, May 22, 1903 and Panama, November 18, 1903 “are typical of the modern form of control, whose first characteristic is renunciation of open territorial annexation of the controlled state. The territorial status of the controlled state is not changed if its territory is transformed by the controlling state. However, the controlled state’s territory is absorbed into the spatial there of the controlling state and its special interests i.e. into its spatial sovereignty. The external, emptied space of the controlled state’s territorial sovereignty remains inviolate, but the material content of this sovereignty is changed by the guarantees of the controlling power’s economic Grobraun.” Carl Schmitt, and G. L. Ulmen, *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*, New York: Telos Press, 2003, pg. 252.

centuries. As the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and British colonial powers fought over and negotiated commerce, resources, and territory in the ‘New World,’ the American colonies as a polity were still trying to develop and solidify within this environment of colonial empire building. Out of this geopolitical game of empire building bore the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, an unofficial international policy of no further European expansion and territorial acquisition, leaving as a ‘de facto’ leader/protector of the Western Hemisphere, the United States. American empire and the Monroe Doctrine has long been rooted on the need for defense and security, or in the words of some intellectuals “self-preservation”. US Navy Rear-Admiral Colby N. Chester articulates the relationship between self-preservation and the Monroe Doctrine, “The first principle of the Monroe Doctrine—self-preservation—is axiomatic and immutable, and all other considerations must give way to it”.<sup>144</sup> Chester further writes,

But aside from the fact that “self-protection,” the basic principle of the Monroe Doctrine, compels the United States to take cognizance of the political affairs of Mexico, the Central and South American countries bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean sea, we have assumed an obligation here in behalf of the interests of the whole world, that makes it imperative that these countries and seas shall be under the supervision of the United States, and we have also by treaty stipulated that no other country shall share in this protectorate.<sup>145</sup>

The “basic principle” is key in the analysis in terms of US global power, in how the political, social, and economic conditions of foreign nations become part of US policy and economic interest.

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<sup>144</sup> Colby N. Chester, ‘The Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 54 (1914), pp. 20-21.

<sup>145</sup> Colby N. Chester, ‘The Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 54 (1914), pp. 25.

West Virginia Governor William A. MacCorkle continues this link between conditions of foreign nations in relation to US foreign policy in his overview on the Monroe Doctrine in how it shapes American interests and foreign relations with the Caribbean and Central and South America, “While this doctrine may be a policy and not a part of the technical code of international law, it has for one hundred years held the hands of the mightiest nations on earth, who have recognized its potency equally with the recognition which they have extended to any principle of international law. The law of self preservation is the most fundamental and absolute of all the law of nations”.<sup>146</sup> The Monroe Doctrine represented key components of empire and a global power, the right to intervention and the quest for order and peace. The crucial point is the power and the ability to intervene but also to shape the order and the peace in foreign territories. Within this growing American influence in global affairs was a link between a search for global peace, order, and security. Often coated in the language of ‘making the world safe for democracy and capitalism.’ Now, with the expansion of American trade into new markets and territories, security of American ‘life and property’ become even more crucial for American foreign policy in terms of planning and implementation. MacCorkle writing on Haiti in regards to how US power should respond to the political and social instability in that country that put American interests in possible danger.

Can the peace and safety of this country be preserved unless we adopt the measures which are the inalienable right of every nation? The world, with the shortening of trade routes, the touching of nations, and their demands for sure commercial conditions, is arriving at the thought that there is no inalienable right on the part of any people to control any region to the detriment and injury of the world at large. This is not a covert statement, that under the Monroe Doctrine this nation can take control of the affairs of other states of this hemisphere, when the

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<sup>146</sup> William A. MacCorkle, ‘The Monroe Doctrine and Its Application to Haiti’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 54 (1914), pp. 31.

policy of that country does not suit our theories and ideas. It means, however, that when a country of this hemisphere persists in being an international nuisance, when it shows to the world a condition of general degeneracy by which it practically gives notice that there will be no improvement, that this government, under the Monroe Doctrine, will adopt measures for its own peace and protection and for the preservation of the trade and commerce of these seas, which are practically within its commercial life.<sup>147</sup>

MacCorkle further writes:

The doctrine of Monroe is a doctrine of help and peace. It is true that those who love our country believe that this Republic “looks hopefully to the time when by the voluntary departure of European governments from this continent and the adjacent islands, America shall be wholly American.” Still these governments and their systems are here and are part of the life of this hemisphere. They will surely demand that we preserve order and conserve the safety of the commerce within our sphere. *This means absolute order.*<sup>148</sup>

This passage is crucial in how MacCorkle demonstrates the increasing link in an evermore globalized world between American interests foreign and domestic, as much as, the American desire and need for “absolute order” in global affairs and the right to intervene in areas of global instability. In many forms of the arguments and discussions about the need for peace in the world is the extension and application of the Monroe Doctrine outside of the Western Hemisphere. The following step was to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the world in general, in a search for order and security. It is the same with the period of the early twentieth century and

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<sup>147</sup> William A. MacCorkle, ‘The Monroe Doctrine and Its Application to Haiti’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 54 (1914), pp. 48.

<sup>148</sup> my italics, “...To bring about this order this government will not hurt the self-respect work with them along the lines of mutual respect and esteem. Touched by the new life, which is making them so vital and important a part of the world affairs of the day, they will understand that the conditions of other days cannot continue, and that the responsibilities brought about by present world conditions demand that our safety and peace, as well as theirs, compel the continued existence of the Monroe Doctrine in its full virility. When this is understood there will be no distrust. There will be the co-mingling of nations with the same governmental freedom. It will be a great brotherhood, and the only one, of free people and free nations marching onward hand in hand, will not oppose the weak, and when filled with mutual esteem, confidence and regard, and touched by the wondrous vitalizing life of freedom, the nations of this hemisphere, great and little, Latin and Anglo-Saxon, will show to the world the splendor of freedom in its highest and best development.” William A. MacCorkle, ‘The Monroe Doctrine and Its Application to Haiti’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 54 (1914), pp. 56.

with the outbreak of World War I. The global political system based on the European power alliances had led to the first global war and a shock to the European world order. The ‘chaos’, to use Arrighi’s term, in the global power structures created power vacuum for a force or entity that could establish a new global order. “During the same period the entire American continent was singularly free from wars of importance or of long duration, either between American states or between American and European states. No other part of the world can show a record at all comparable to this. If, therefore, we are in search of bases for a just and durable peace, we should examine the public policies of America rather than of Europe.”<sup>149</sup>

### ***Global Order***

In the debates around the features on American as a global power, debates on new juridical concepts, institutions, and actors in the context of global instability were swiftly incorporated. Ideas such as the League of Nations, international court, international police force, economic sanctions, were put forth as possible alternatives to the changing world power structure dominated by the European imperial powers. It is during this period, with the European War changing the global power structures, that debates began on the question of the need for a global institution to foster world peace or a “concert of nations” rather than a “balance of force”, this taking the form of ‘League of Nations’ or ‘The League to Enforce Peace’.<sup>150</sup> The League of Nations, as Vice President Thomas R. Marshall describes it, “Stripped of explanatory verbiage

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<sup>149</sup> John H. Latané, ‘The Monroe Doctrine and the American Policy of Isolation in Relation to a Just and Durable Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 100.

<sup>150</sup> George C. Herring, “‘A New Age’ Wilson, the Great War, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1913–1921’, In *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, New York: Oxford University Press, (2008), pp. 7040.

and clarified as to non-legal shares, the objects of the proposed league are to prevent war, promote peace, reduce armaments, control the sale of munitions, abrogate secret treaties, preserve territorial integrity from external aggression, and to help weak and struggling peoples toward the maintenance of democracies".<sup>151</sup> Leading these debates on establishing a new order based on universal principles was President Woodrow Wilson.<sup>152</sup>

As Appleman Williams frames it, these debates theorizing possible forms of alliances during this period, was due to the US having entered the business of managing the poor and rich of the world. "The substance of it was that he (Woodrow Wilson) had to control the disgruntled poor (symbolized by the ongoing revolutions in China, Mexico, and Russia) while simultaneously policing the greed of the rich who competed with the United States for the wealth of the world. That awesome undertaking was the inevitable result of defining American freedom and welfare and security in global terms".<sup>153</sup> Appleman Williams goes on to explain the options at the time confronting Washington D.C. policymakers,

There were four primary strategies for attaining the objective. The United States could organize and deploy its resources to police the world—or at any rate those parts of it that refused to accept the American conception of benevolent progress. It could treat the poor as equals and support them to control the rich in the short run, confident that American power would prevail in the medium or long run. It could step aside and let the other rich deal with the poor on the assumption that

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<sup>151</sup> Thomas R. Marshall, 'America, the Nations and the League', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84, (1919), pp. 196.

<sup>152</sup> In a President Wilson speech on January 22, 1917, "The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace." Walter L. Fisher, 'A League to Enforce Peace', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp.187.

<sup>153</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 1370.

both groups would eventually be forced to accept American leadership. Or it could use its power in alliance with the other rich to control the poor in return for the rich accepting the American rules for the international marketplace.<sup>154</sup>

Appleman Williams concludes that Woodrow Wilson and the US would choose the fourth option, an international system and juridical structure with other rich nations to manage and control the poor nations with US trade, finance, and the nation-state system creating a blueprint for the “architecture of the post-modern world”.<sup>155</sup>

It is during this period that America began to see itself with the responsibility and desire to shape the world. Fisher writes on the need for US participation in a League to Enforce Peace,

We have been given a convincing demonstration that we cannot keep out of the war by avoiding international alliances. No matter how beneficent our purposes, how pacific our policies, peaceful isolation has become impossible in a world at war. If we would maintain our own peace we must do our part to maintain the peace of the world. And what is true of us is true of every other great nations. For weal or for woe the restless energy and inventive genius of man knit the nations of the earth together; and the inexorable laws of industrial and social evolution have made out of many peoples one people for all the deep and vital issues that affect the future of mankind. We cannot avoid our share of world responsibility if we would, and we should not if we could.<sup>156</sup>

Within this context of the European imperial powers waging war on the European continent forced the Americans to examine their ‘share of world responsibility’. This leads to Hardt and Negri’s juridical, political, and philosophical analysis of empire, describing what they call the ‘ancient notion’ of past imperial logic, they write,

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<sup>154</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1980), pp. 1372-1374

<sup>155</sup> Patricia Clavin, Defining Transnationalism, *Contemporary European History* 14- 4 (2005), pp. 421–39.

<sup>156</sup> Walter L. Fisher, ‘A League to Enforce Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 185–199.

Empire is formed not on the basis of force itself but on the basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace. All interventions of the imperial armies are solicited by one or more of the parties involved in an already existing conflict. Empire is not born of its own will but rather it is called into being and constituted on the basis of its capacity to resolve conflicts. Empire is formed and its intervention becomes juridically legitimate only when it is already inserted into the chain of international consensuses aimed at resolving existing conflicts.<sup>157</sup>

This is the beginning stages of the US expanding its influence in shaping global space. It is the “call into being” and the ability to resolve conflicts that many authors in *The Annals* reference.

The chaotic period of the 1910s represented a call for intervention, a moment where an imperial power was “called into being”. Beck expresses this “call into being”, “No human being can tell what the outcome will be. All we know now is that we are in it. It does not matter whether the traditions of that past have hitherto forbidden it. We are past that. No one statesman, no one party, not even the instinct of the people, involved us. The logic of world events drove us in, for better or for worse, and we are in it for generations and centuries to come”.<sup>158</sup> But this call is not the only component of the juridical and moral foundations of an empire, but one that is “constituted on the basis of its capacity to resolve conflicts.”

This “capacity to resolve conflicts” is crucial for many writers because of the belief that the United States was the only Great Power able to resolve the existing instability and chaos of the crumbling old international order. Wise Wood writes precisely on this capacity, “We must be respected not only because of our intellectual and material usefulness to our neighbor nations but also because of our ability, our readiness, and our determination, everywhere and upon every

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<sup>157</sup> Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2000), pp. 15.

<sup>158</sup> James M. Beck, ‘A Yearning for World Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 214.



occasion, to support with force if need be the rights even of the humblest of our people, be those rights assailed by a nation little or big".<sup>159</sup> Usher also writes regarding a new order and the ability to resolve existing conflicts due American economic and military power.

There is again a general feeling that the defense of weak and small nations must be led by the United States at all costs, because we are better situated to defend the integrity of international law than are the nations of Europe. Of our power to achieve something of moment if we choose, the popular mind has not the slightest doubt. It thinks of the United States today apparently as the world's money power and, therefore, indispensable and all important, as the world's chief industrial nation, as the world's richest nation. Our invulnerability, our military prowess, our naval power the public accepts as beyond dispute.<sup>160</sup>

He continues, "But the only effective guarantee of a new order will be the prompt, efficient, decisive participation of the United States in the world conflict. We are now to demonstrate our equality, to prove our title to consideration as a sovereign among sovereigns".<sup>161</sup> As Usher shows, it was through American trade that America was able to shape European affairs and global space. It is through the economic organizing of space that the US exercised its politics and influence. This ability of a non-European power to shape European affairs was crucial in

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<sup>159</sup> "The aegis of America must protect the American, as did that of Rome, the Roman. Upon no other terms can a nation with either the respect or the trade of the world. We must have both." Henry A. Wise Wood, 'Planning the Future America', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 23.

<sup>160</sup> Roland G. Usher, 'The International Right America Must Champion', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 53.

<sup>161</sup> "...International status, as the great powers have observed it, has depended primarily on the ability of a nation to cast a decisive influence into the international". Roland G. Usher, 'The International Right America Must Champion', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 57.

defining this period.<sup>162</sup> The New World was for the first time reshaping and determining the Old World in its ability to dictate and determine European territory and politics, and even more so international law.<sup>163</sup>

The U.S. now was needed to fill the gap created by the breakdown in the world power structure. It was the America's turn to create new structures and forces to maintain peace and global order. In many of the primary source articles discuss the ways and means, the form and content, and the structures in an attempt to provide order and peace. Talcott Williams provides his interpretation how the US should go about achieving this and it involved an international court with an international sheriff made of up of allied powers, much in the line of Hardt and Negri with the imperial forces intervening in the name of peace and order. Talcott Williams writes,

Unless America, led by the United States, in due times secures and organizes a force behind courts of arbitration able and willing to insist on all issues likely to lead to war being adjudicated, out of the furrows of this great war no harvest of the peace of humanity can come. Either we must create an international force strong enough to keep the world's peace or we must arm to defend ourselves to keep our peace in a world of war... The one indispensable service constructive and perpetual peace demands is an international court with an international sheriff behind it, made up of allied powers strong enough to compel attendance at court, to enforce its judgements and to execute an international receivership of a land like Mexico unable to keep its own peace. By force, stronger than the unruly, law,

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<sup>162</sup> "...Upon our decisive influence, upon the war itself depends our international status in the immediate future; upon the demonstration of our equality of status depends the creation of a new international order truly international and non-European, for the new state must contain at least one non-European power whose efficiency and power is beyond dispute equal to that of any of the older powers—the United States must achieve that the new internationalism may be realized" Roland G. Usher,, 'The International Right America Must Champion', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 57.

<sup>163</sup> Carl Schmitt, and G. L. Ulmen. *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. New York: Telos Press (2003), pp. 242-258

courts and peace have in the past been established in each civilized land. So will come the peace of humanity and by no other path.<sup>164</sup>

For Talcott Williams, the construction of perpetual peace and order had to be established based on force or the international organization backed with the capacity to present force in territories and polities deemed incapable of providing its own internal stability. This conceptualizing of international force is very much similar to Schmitt's framing of the sovereign, as the one that decides on the exception.<sup>165</sup>

In regards to setting up an international commission in the oversight of the former Ottoman Empire and the Middle East after World War I Jastrow provides an analysis on how the allied powers, France and Great Britain, along with the United States viewed the situation in former Ottoman territory and how these spatial powers should go about addressing this area of the globe, which was viewed as vital to economic interests and potential for global instability. "The peace of the world would again be in danger if we allowed the Turks in Asia Minor to fall under the influence of crafty and scheming leaders. For self-protection as well as for the betterment of the Turk, we must place Asia Minor under western tutelage."<sup>166</sup> Jastrow writing on the need for a mandate power to coordinate efforts in Western Asia to 'resuscitate the old civilizations' and the US can no longer remain isolated so it must take its responsibility in 'world politics'.

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<sup>164</sup> Talcott Williams, "An International Court, an International Sheriff and World Peace", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 61 (1915), pp. 275.

<sup>165</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 1985. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2000), pp. 15.

<sup>166</sup> Morris Jastrow, 'The Turks and the Future of the near East', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84 (1919), pp. 37.

We were drawn into the war after it had been going on for over two years and a half. In case of another international conflict it is almost a certainty that we will again be involved. We must, therefore, from motives of self-protection, participate in the present deliberations to solve international problems, with which was a nation have no direct concern, both because of our part in the war that has come to an end and because in the event of another conflict we certainly will want to have something to say at the time of its *breaking out* (authors's italics). We must, therefore, be willing to take a share of responsibility for conditions in the Near East, because the East has been and will continue to be one of the danger zones.<sup>167</sup>

This passage by Jastrow provides insight into the shift in American foreign policy in terms of isolation and intervention, new areas of the planet for American intervention, and how foreign intervention was framed as self-protection, the foreign now became national. No longer confined to the Western Hemisphere as its region for self-protection, this included all global space and all directions: north, south, east, and west.

In the period between 1898-1920, the US was long intervening in foreign territories throughout the world spanning multiple continents and regions. The list of military foreign interventions excluding declared wars, starts in: 1898 and 1899 in Nicaragua (and yet again in 1910, 1912-1925) followed by China (1898-99, 1900, 1911, 1912-1942), Samoa (1899); Philippines (1899-1901), Colombia (1901,1902), Honduras and the Dominic Republic (1903 and 1904 and 1914 and 1916-1924), Syria (1903), Panama (1903-1914), Korea (1904-5), Morocco (mostly Tangier, 1904), Cuba (1906-1909), Honduras again in 1907, 1911, 1912 and

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<sup>167</sup> Morris Jastrow, 'The Turks and the Future of the near East', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84 (1919), pp. 39.

1919, Turkey (1912), Mexico (1913 and 1914-1917), Haiti (1914 and 1915-1934), Soviet Russia (1918-1920).<sup>168</sup>

### *The Heretics*

Much of the debate surrounding the new role for America centered around the form and content, the overall mission, to what extent should America intervene into global and human affairs. These debates at the time surrounding America's new role as emerging global power were by no means homogenous and uniform in its support or propagation of such a global power. Patten asks questions pertaining to new global power but also, his questions reflect a perspective of a portion of American and its view of the world and mass of people beyond the borders.

Is it any wonder that the American people should hesitate to enter a league of enforced peace if the mass of the people beyond their borders have the natural inclinations of the savage and can be kept in subjection only by the impressment of superior force? It may be a very moral task to hold a world subjection, but the history of many failures of imperialistic ventures shows that enforced peace is a waste of blood and treasure. Why is not isolation better than domination if the hearts of men are as black as has been pictured? Is it not better to be in happy oasis than to be engulfed in an eternity of strife and brutality?<sup>169</sup>

While Patten reflects a common sentiment of contempt, apathy, and mistrust of the non-American world and peoples while critiquing the use of force to establish peace. Jefferson invokes morals, principles, and a higher standard of human existence, through a historical

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<sup>168</sup> In the following period of 1920-1941 had the following interventions excluding declared wars: 1920-1922 Russia (Siberia); 1920 China; 1920 Guatemala; 1921 Panama-Costa Rica; 1922 Turkey; 1924 Honduras; 1924 China; 1925 China; 1925 Honduras; 1925 Panama; 1926-33 Nicaragua; 1926 China; 1927 China; Cuba 1933; 1940 Newfoundland, Bermuda, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad and British Guiana; 1941 Greenland; Netherlands (Dutch Guiana); 1941 Iceland; 1941 Germany. William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life : an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford University Press (1980), pp. 1647-1670.

<sup>169</sup> S. N. Patten, 'Peace without Force', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 33.

reflection of human evolution from the caveman to the ancients, as a form of questioning American power.

How can we so order the world's life that a recurrence of this tragedy shall never be, there are thousands of Americans thinking of nothing else, talking of nothing else, suggesting nothing else but the old stupid experiment which has again and again soaked our planet with blood. How are we ever going to get out of the heart-breaking predicament in which humanity finds itself unless men who think, dare to break away from the military traditions which have cursed and destroyed so many generations? Cannot we get beyond the ideas of Tiglath Pileser and Ramses II?<sup>170</sup>

But even these doubts reflect the situation and the magnitude which confronted the writers, the American populace, American policy makers, and the world at large.

The truth is that the United States is the only high-minded Power left in the world. It is the only strong nation that has not entered on a career of imperial conquest, and does not want to enter on it. If the nations of Europe had entertained purposes as disinterested as those of the United States they would not now be engaged in this butchery. There is in American little of that spirit of selfish aggression which lies at the heart of militarism. Here alone exists a broad basis for "a new passionate sense of brotherhood, and a new scale of human values." We have a deep abhorrence of war for war's sake; we are not enamored of glamour or glory. We have a strong faith in the principle of self-government. We do not care to dominate alien peoples, white or colored; we do not aspire to be the Romans of tomorrow or the 'masters of the world.' The idealism of Americans centers in the future of America, wherein we hope to work out those principles of liberty and democracy to which we are committed.... This political idealism, this strain of pacifism, this abstinence from aggression and desire to be left alone to work out our own destiny, has been manifest from the birth of the

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<sup>170</sup> "...Can not we rise above the ideal of the cave man? He always armed for defense. He thought only of his own skin. He was a low-down undeveloped creature, and is to be excused, because he lived in the morning of the world. But what shall we say of men who, living two thousand years after the death of Jesus Christ, cannot advance an inch in their conception of international life beyond that which was regnant in the ancient barbaric world?" Charles E. Jefferson, 'Military Preparedness a Peril to Democracy', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66 (1916), pp. 230-231.

republic. We have not always followed our light, but we have been utterly faithless to it.<sup>171</sup>

These passages reflect the two faces of American power, lying between “Christ and Caesar.” “Christ” representing how American civilization is viewed as the savior of humanity, spreading the gospel, showing the world the righteous path, and framing a singular worldview as the only way to construct human life. While “Caesar” represents the conqueror, the imperial force dominating land and peoples for the benefit of only America itself, the metropole based on military force and economic power.

This metaphor attempts to break the perception of American isolation and intervention, since the two representing multiple forms of intervention under the name of American power, two faces of the same coin. This often blinds American politicians, American corporations, and Americans, in general, to see themselves other than heroes and saviors in the eyes of “others” or those of the receiving countries, whether this be a military intervention, foreign investment or trade, and humanitarian work.<sup>172</sup> The two poles also represent the political trends during this period in regards to how the US should develop its interaction with the rest of the world ranging from conservative internationalism and progressive internationalism to self-conscious

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<sup>171</sup> George W. Kirchwey, “Pax Americana”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 47.

<sup>172</sup> This is one of Bender’s main arguments, America’s inability to itself through the eyes of the “other”. In the American perspective it always righteous and justice. Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America's Place in World History*. New York: Hill and Wang, (2006).

isolationism.<sup>173</sup> The tension between the two also helps analyze the often contradictory foreign policy of the United States throughout its history, in particular regarding this period, when the US failed entering to enter the League of Nations in 1921, an international organization theorized and formatted very significantly by the US, but the country remained unwilling to join.

Furthermore, the metaphor represents the various ways in which writers and theorists have conceptualized American global power. In Schmittian terms, ‘Caesar’ signifies universalism or a monopoly of global power determining the spatial order of the earth, whereas ‘Christ’ represents pluralism or polypoly of global space and power.<sup>174</sup> Hardt and Negri, frame theories of new world orders during this period in politico-philosophical terms between Hobbes and Locke.<sup>175</sup> Appleman Williams frames American empire in terms of degrees, hard and soft, the imperial force or the benevolent police force.<sup>176</sup> I continue this concept of “Christ and Caesar” further in the final chapter, where I look at American global power in terms of biopolitics and biopower. It is through biopower that human life is dominated by networks of power but also administered and taken care of. The concepts of biopower and biopolitics connect back to my framing of American global order as “savior and conqueror” .

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<sup>173</sup> Conservative internationalism- Howard Taft and Elihu Root, mostly republicans, upper class, supported a League to Enforce Peace, military build up, international law and arbitration in creating a new world order. Progressive internationalism- peace was key for domestic social reforms, better working conditions, women’s rights, social justice legislation, ending WWI by negotiation, ending the arms race and economic reasons for the outbreak of the war, sanctions to punish aggression, and a league of nations to form a ‘concert of nations’. Self-conscious isolationism (isolationism)- maintaining the American tradition of non-involvement in European politics. George C. Herring, “‘A New Age’ Wilson, the Great War, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1913–1921’ In *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, New York: Oxford University Press, (2008), pp. 7040.

<sup>174</sup> Carl Schmitt, and G. L. Ulmen. *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. New York: Telos Press (2003), pg. 243.

<sup>175</sup> Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, (2000), chapter 1.

<sup>176</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life*, Oxford University Press, (1980), pp. 370



## Chapter 5 - Conclusion: Life, Empire of Liberty, and the Pursuit of Global Order

“Read all its glorious past, and answer me—not as partisan, not alone as patriot, geographically speaking, but as a lover of humanity—do you doubt that if our aims continue to be as they have been that the American flag will drape the throne of the nations? That we shall rule the world with a rod of love and in our right hand carry gentle peace to silence envious tongues?”<sup>177</sup>

“It is absolutely imperative that we shall now, in the very midst of this war, while we are preparing for it and fighting in it, discuss the policies and formulate the plans which, in the words of President Wilson, are to result in “a world organize for justice and democracy.” The plans may not be executed now, but their essential features must be devised and formulated now or they will never come into existence when peace is declared.”<sup>178</sup>

“Empire as a way of life involves taking wealth and freedom away from others to provide for your own welfare, pleasure, and power.”<sup>179</sup>

In this final chapter, I analyze the conceptualization of US global power in regards to the social component of a global order, to humanity and human life itself. I argue that the US empire was founded as an economic, political, and social polity as a form of governance shaped of an British colonial territory and a mixed population of European migration and African forced migration. The means by which the governance was applied on the population was through economy, racial and gender inequalities, and restricted forms of democracy and liberty. As result

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<sup>177</sup> Thomas R. Marshall, ‘America, the Nations and the League’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84 (1919), pp. 200.

<sup>178</sup> Walter L. Fisher, ‘A League to Enforce Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 188.

<sup>179</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1980), pp. 325.

of implementing a political economy based on private property, market society, and endless capital accumulation, territorial expansion and material wealth was indispensable as a remedy to the social tensions and inherent ills of this social composition. As consequence of a consolidated continental empire, a globalized market, interconnectedness of transportation and communication, and the inherent contradictions of capital in its search for endless accumulation, the foreign became national, and interests abroad became of national importance. The world needed to be secured and ordered for the continuation of the 'Empire of Liberty'. But the world at the time was not cooperating. It was a period of revolution, war, intercontinental and transoceanic migration, and a breakdown in the old international state system dominated by European overseas empires that created a time of chaos, which was perceived by US writers and policy makers as needing an intervening force to implement peace and order. But furthermore, it was an opportunity, in which America, could be an example to the world and the re-shaper of the world.

***Michel Foucault in Washington D.C.***<sup>180</sup>

As many authors acknowledge, the new positioning of the US, at the center of the global economy with its increasing wealth and military power, it was becoming a global power. This period, with the war in Europe and the revolutions in China, Russia, and Mexico, was one defined by breakdown in the global power centers. "Even before the outbreak of the First World War powerful social protest movements had begun to mobilize throughout the world. These movements were rooted in, and aimed at subverting, the double exclusion, of non-Western

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<sup>180</sup> This is a reference to Arrighi's book title, and usage of Adam Smith in analyzing the historical economic development in China, based on Tronti's article "Karl Marx in Detroit", Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing : Lineages of the Twenty-first Century*. London: Verso, (2007).

peoples on the one hand, and the propertyless masses of the West on the other, on which free-trade imperialism was based".<sup>181</sup> It is the non-Western peoples and the propertyless masses that *The Annals* authors were referring to in their writings for the US to take its responsibility in the 'welfare of mankind', the 'security of humanity'. It is here that this global order was based on the concept of biopolitics, in which human life becomes subject and object of politics and state rationality, "(...) a society's 'threshold of modernity' has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question".<sup>182</sup> The rationality of American global power was grounded in the ordering of the global population, humanity itself. This took on multiple forms and ways, through race, governance, military power, and economic development.

This new position of the US 'as managers' of the rich and poor, the disenfranchised, and the masses of the world, reformulated the relationship between sovereignty, government, and human life. In the quest for prosperity and order, life becomes the focal point of power and policy. New political and juridical structures were needed to provide order and stability, an alternative form of government rationality. As Foucault theorizes on the development of sovereignty and the state, these two were transformed into new forms of governance in relation to territory and population. Sovereignty and state rationality was no longer based on ordering

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<sup>181</sup> Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*. London: Verso, (2010), pp. 64.

<sup>182</sup> Michel Foucault, and Robert Hurley, *The History of Sexuality. Vol. 1: An Introduction*, Vintage Books, (1990), pp 143.

territorial space but “things” within a territory. These “things” included cities, markets, commodities, and human populations. The new form of sovereignty and state intervention Foucault calls, governmentality. “If the governmentality of the state is interested, for the first time, in the fine materiality of human existence and coexistence, of exchange and circulation, if this being and well-being is taken into account for the first time by the governmentality of the state, through the town and through problems like health, roads, markets, grains, and highways, it is because at that time commerce is thought of as the main instrument of the state’s power and thus as the privileged object of a police whose objective is the growth of the state’s forces”.<sup>183</sup> As this form of governance developed, it directed its focus on “man as species” or the biological itself, “the acquisition of power over man insofar as man is a living being, that the biological came under State control, that there was at least a certain tendency that leads to what might be termed State control of the biological”.<sup>184</sup> During the World War I, the conceptualization of American global power was an extension of this governmentality of the state on a global scale in structuring an ‘organization of humanity.’

In this period of global unrest was viewed by many American intellectuals and policymakers as America’s responsibility to provide order, security, and peace. This ‘new responsibility’ of the US has been often framed by contemporaries and *The Annals* authors as the

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<sup>183</sup> Michel Foucault, Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. *Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*. New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan, (2009), pp. 339.

<sup>184</sup> Michel Foucault, Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana, François Ewald, and David Macey. *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76*. London: Penguin, (2004), pp. 239.

world's police force, a constabulary, a sheriff, an international executive.<sup>185</sup> For Foucault the basic object of police activity, “generally speaking, what police has to govern, its fundamental object, is all the forms of, let's say, men's coexistence with each other”.<sup>186</sup> *The Annals* reflect the debates and ideas that were put forth and circulating in regards to the structuring and theorizing of the foreign policy of the United States as a global power in the form of alliances to manage the rich and poor nations. Lippman writes about the need for Wilson to promote this new responsibility, “...the President insisted again and again that the time had come when America must assume its share of responsibility for a better organization of mankind”.<sup>187</sup> Talcott Williams writes on the ‘organization of humanity’ and America being the only power to lead the way. He argues for America to be prepared for this responsibility, “...No nation is strong enough to fight all the world, even if it may be ready to risk war with half the world. Humanity is still stronger than any one nation and as the peace of the people can only be protected by all the people so the peace of humanity can only be protected by all humanity.” For Williams, it was only the United States of America that could construct and implement this “organization of humanity”. “No

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<sup>185</sup> “There is good hope that an international executive may be developed and there must of course be a constabulary, or police force large enough to keep order and to represent the power and majesty of the united nations of the earth. And there will be no more suggestion of war in this than there is in the existence of municipal or state police. The United States will perform one of her greatest services to the world in helping to work out this beneficent plan. She may well take the lead in establishing a league of nations based upon justice and conciliation”. Samuel T. Dutton, ‘The United States and the War’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, 1917, pp. 18. See also Talcott Williams, ‘An International Court an International Sheriff and World Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 61, (1915), 274-75.

<sup>186</sup> Michel Foucault, Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. *Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*. New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan (2009), pp. 236.

<sup>187</sup> Walter Lippmann,, ‘The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 1.

hemisphere can lead in this organization of humanity but the American hemisphere. No nation can lead the American hemisphere but the United States".<sup>188</sup>

What is key in these passages is the concept of 'humanity' and the need for an 'organization' and a 'welfare of humanity'. Human life becomes political on a global scale. "What is the obligation of the United States with reference to maintaining, and if possible raising the standard of the great masses of mankind, of whatever race or affiliation?"<sup>189</sup> US foreign policy had to be designed around 'men's coexistence with each other'. In a balance between the 'greed' of the rich nations and the masses, US power had to be applied to this 'security of humanity.' This 'security of humanity' or biopolitics of the state was expressed in *The Annals* articles in multiple ways including migration, race, military intervention, democracy, and government rationality.

Pratt Fairchild writes on the importance of the issue of migration and how the League of Nations will confront this matter, "one of the knottiest problems which will have to be faced in the establishment of a world state or a league of nations will be the question of the movement of people."<sup>190</sup> The future "world state" was to have the structuring of human mobility one of its basic objects of governance.

Whether the era of internationalism which is now dawning results in the formation of a world state, or in a more loosely coordinated league or federation of a world state, or in a more loosely coordinated league of federation of self-determining units, in either case, there can be only two general alternatives as

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<sup>188</sup> Talcott Williams, 'An International Court, an International Sheriff and World Peace', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 61 (1915), 274.

<sup>189</sup> Henry Pratt Fairchild, 'Immigration Standards after the War', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 81 (1919), pp. 74.

<sup>190</sup> Pratt Fairchild, 'Immigration Standards after the War', (1919), pp. 73

regards to migrations. Either there will be a free right of passages over the entire territory included in the state domain, analogous to the present right to travel within a given country, or else restrictions must be placed by the central authority, or by the federated states in accordance with a common agreement and consent, with respect to boundaries broadly similar to those which now separate existing nations.<sup>191</sup>

Pratt Fairchild expresses a key element in the construction of a true global order in which he describes the global order's ability to control the movement of peoples through continents and territories. For the US policy makers and their European allies (Great Britain and France) this was done through the ordering of territorial space by the creation of nation-states and mandates.<sup>192</sup> Furthermore, Pratt Fairchild continues with his analysis in relation to humanity and its relationship to democracy and economic development.

But of its material elements there is no better embodiment and criterion than the standard of living of the common people. Where the standard of living of the people is high, relative to the general producing power of their territory, there democracy flourishes, by whatever name the government may be called. Where the masses live on a low plane of comfort, democracy languishes and dies, however great may be the tabulated wealth of that nation. Speaking of the world at large, if a higher standard does not result for the great bulk of humanity, all this blood will have been shed largely in vain. If there should result a general lowering of the standard over the entire globe it would be an unspeakable calamity, dwarfing all the untold horrors and losses of the conflict itself.<sup>193</sup>

This passage by Pratt Fairchild exemplifies the underlining premise of American global power and the American 'way of life', that is the construction of an economic form of governance that provides property, material wealth, and economic opportunity for sections of the populace with the goal of order and stability. In other words, for those in the position of power, governance

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<sup>191</sup> Pratt Fairchild, 'Immigration Standards after the War', (1919) pp. 73.

<sup>192</sup> George C. Herring, "'A New Age': Wilson, the Great War, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1913–1921." In *From Colony to Superpower : U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, New York: Oxford University Press, (2008).

<sup>193</sup> Pratt Fairchild, 'Immigration Standards after the War', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 81 (1919), pp. 74.

and rule was to be exercised through the populace so basic human life needs were to be met in order to maintain social tranquility.

Leonard Wood, in his article published in 1915, writes on the work of the US Army with human life, in his attempt to clarify and articulate the real work of the army, which he believes is greatly misunderstood by the general public. He writes on the “life-saving work” in the tropics through “the Army, an agent which is more generally misunderstood in this country, perhaps, than any other branch of the government, an agent whose life-saving work has been of infinite value to mankind and to the nation”.<sup>194</sup> Wood continues writing in this biopolitical framework about the work of the army in the context of ‘tropical possessions’ (the Philippines, Central America, and the Caribbean).

In fact, the whole work in these tropical possessions has tended to the betterment of conditions under which people live, both from the standpoint of government and the standpoint of sanitation. The improvements in sanitation have been more generally appreciated than in any other department of our work, and they have been accomplished without any exploitation of the country and have undoubtedly resulted in building up bonds of lasting sympathy between the people who have come under our control and ourselves, for they must appreciate in their hearts the great work which has been done for them.<sup>195</sup>

L. Wood concludes by summarizing this link between human life and the role of US Army has played in American history.

So, when you think of our Army and its work, do not think it always as an aggregation of fighting people, bent only on fighting, but remember that it is one of the great constructive life-saving agencies of the Republic. Its work has been continuous from the earliest days. In addition to the great work of the Spanish war, and the subsequent colonial period, and preceding it, it was engaged for years in opening up the West, controlling the Indian situation, safeguarding the

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<sup>194</sup> Leonard Wood, ‘The Constructive Work of the American Army’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 61, (1915), 257.

<sup>195</sup> Wood, ‘The Constructive Work of the American Army’, (1915), 260-261.



mail routes, keeping roads open, aiding in surveys, conducting many of them, in fact. It was the advance guard of civilization and the protecting agent of people crossing the great unsettled section between the Pacific slope and the east frontiers.<sup>196</sup>

Combining the two frameworks of a global power, Leonard Wood, articulates what lies between Christ and Caesar, an imperial force working for the benefit of humanity in those areas in ‘need of aid’, while at the same, often producing the social inequalities, violence, economic and ecological destruction, and political instability. The passages by Leonard Wood on the ‘life saving work of the military’, demonstrates one of Foucault’s main ideas in the concept of biopolitics and governmentality, that state rationality taking human life as subject and object as a form of command and domination but it was a means of producing maximum efficiency in the economy and maintaining political order and power.<sup>197</sup>

Chadwick in his writing on Ibero-America expresses a long tradition of America social, political, and economic perspective in terms of viewing peoples and territories beyond US borders through the lens of race.<sup>198</sup> Race and racism has long been used as a means to justify power hierarchies, but furthermore as strategies of ‘divide and conquer’, a form of control, the “...first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum

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<sup>196</sup> Wood, ‘The Constructive Work of the American Army’, (1915), 261.

<sup>197</sup> Michel Foucault, Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. *Security, Territory, Population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*. New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan (2009).

<sup>198</sup> Thomas McCarthy, ‘Social Darwinism and White Supremacy’, In *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2009), 69-95. Walter LaFeber, ‘Race for Empire’, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2, (1993), pp. 45–59.

addressed by biopower”.<sup>199</sup> Chadwick applies this as he argues race needs to be taken into account in international affairs, in particular, dealing with foreign peoples and territories.

It is this lack of comprehension of what race character means that causes out trouble. We do not understand the other man, and until we recognize our ignorance in this regard, until we accept the great fundamental fact of all life,—that every race, every species has its special race or specific temperament and habit of thought and action,—we shall be unsuccessful in our relations with these our brother republics. It is a study of temperament, disposition, outlook on life, a study in a word of all that goes to make up character that we need for successful dealing with races so essentially different from our own. Until we shall see this, we are but groping darkly.<sup>200</sup>

Chadwick further expresses a sentiment of US imperialism in terms of not incorporation foreign territories by not wanting to incorporate foreign peoples within the American governmental structure and society for a fear of racial intermixing and diminishing of the ‘white’ population.<sup>201</sup>

Nor is it possible that the United States would ever desire to incorporate any of these regions. The immensely wide differences of race, temperament and character would forbid this even if principle were thrown to the winds. For this country to incorporate these great spaces with such different populations could only end in the overthrow of our system which is wholly unfitted for such a test. Rome failed; we should much more surely fail. There is, if I know anything of the American people, a strong and deep feeling against anything savoring of such

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<sup>199</sup> Michel Foucault, Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana, François Ewald, and David Macey. *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76*. London: Penguin (2004), pp. 258.

<sup>200</sup> F. E. Chadwick, ‘A Study of Iberic-America’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 54 (1914), pp. 6.

<sup>201</sup> “Whatever the good qualities of the negro, I do not think that anyone will claim that his mixture with the white will improve the latter, but it is this mixture which we face as surely as the sun rises and sets. It is only a question in the long run of percentage. This I hold should not be allowed to increase by the new African immigration already in progress. If we have not courage to stop this our decadence has begun. I mention these facts of deep significance though they are not in over-close relation to our subject, for the earnest consideration of those who wish that our own shall not be a negroid people.” F. E. Chadwick, ‘A Study of Iberic-America’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 54 (1914), pp. 16.

adventure. Had it been otherwise an American army would have been in occupation of Mexico many months since.<sup>202</sup>

Chadwick concludes by again emphasizing the need for US policy makers, military leaders, diplomats, and business leaders to use race as a lens to interpret and understand overseas territories. In the context of conceptualizing a global order, for many theorists, as Chadwick demonstrates, it is through human bodies and ideas of race and culture that needed to be understood and used as means of shaping space, territories, and peoples. In other words, the construction of American global power of organizing humanity was done through a racial structuring of humanity and space.<sup>203</sup>

To conclude, in my attempt to link biopolitics to the inner mechanics of American global order, the following passages by Assistant Attorney Samuel J. Graham provide insight and depth into the biopolitical nature that confronted American policymakers. And the nature of the situation, as Graham phrases it, was the ‘human element’. The future of governance was to deal with the human, the human ‘as a living species’.

To understand government it is necessary to appreciate fully this human element in government, and its significance and vital relation to any form of government. Man must have his living. All government must rest on the consent of the governed. When that is withdrawn the form of government falls. Empires have risen and fallen upon the same spot... To retain the consent of the governed, the government must create and establish such reasonable living conditions for the average man as it was designed to secure. It must provide conditions where the average man can live with a fair degree of satisfaction, contentment and freedom,

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<sup>202</sup> Chadwick, ‘A Study of Iberic-America’, (1914), pp. 17.

<sup>203</sup> “I repeat that above all else I would place the study of the temperaments, the psychics of the South American. In such study is the crux not alone of this but of every international problem, or of any problem concerned with the conduct of men, for in the study of psychics lies the study of the problem of all human thought and action. We have certainly ignored this as far at least as the South American is concerned almost *in toto*. It is time we were taking another course and know something of the other races.” F. E. Chadwick, ‘A Study of Iberic-America’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 54, 1914, pp. 19.

otherwise he will withdraw his consent. The decay and disappearance of empires has been due to political causes—to the failure of the form of government to give to man that kind of living which he demands and must have...a kind of living in keeping with the advanced conscience and intelligence of the world.<sup>204</sup>

He continues...

The importance of this human element in government, as related to the internal affairs of the different nations rather than their external relations with each other, must be noted...The only safeguard is to have such a large measure of contentment and freedom at home as will be able to resist and throw off this poison of discontent from the outside. To have this you must provide that individual man shall be reasonably contented and satisfied, shall have an opportunity to strive and feel that he owns himself before God and his fellow-men. One of the things that man must have, if he is going to be contented, is food, a reasonable amount of food for himself and his family. If he at once loses that, social morality which makes him respect the rights of others and in doing so respect himself. If he reaches the extreme of hunger he reverts to the state of a savage and animal, and will kill his friend and eat him. This is Nature's primal law of self-preservation.<sup>205</sup>

Attorney General Graham concludes...

Above all, the government must go into the business of providing for the health of its citizens. If a man has not health he has not anything. He cannot be contented and he cannot strive. He cannot enjoy his surroundings. He has a right to look to his government to provide healthy, sanitary conditions under which he and his family can live, and to protect him and them, against contagious diseases and impure water; otherwise he becomes discontented, and a prey to the teachings that lead him from the paths of order and law. As previously stated, representative government is on trial the world over today, and the problem it must solve is how to provide contentment and freedom for the the average man. *Unless these are provided there can be no permanent organization of peace.*<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Samuel J. Graham, 'The Economic Organization of Peace', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84 (1919), pp. 149.

<sup>205</sup> Samuel J. Graham, 'The Economic Organization of Peace', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84 (1919), pp. 150.

<sup>206</sup> my italics, Samuel J. Graham, 'The Economic Organization of Peace', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84 (1919), pp. 151.

Graham's words speak to the 'Christ' side of the American global order, a force that is to provide life and well-being to humanity, a shepherd lording over the flock. A power that gives life. This brings back Foucault, in what he describes as 'politics of the belly' as a form of governance emerging with the rise of the State in the Early Modern Period. This maintaining order through the populace by the way of the 'belly' was done by the economy, the market. And the market has long defined American politics and society.<sup>207</sup> Furthermore, it was during this period of the Progressive Era, that many different groups of the US population started to mobilize for social and political reforms. These groups included women's rights advocates, workers, Christian reformers, farmers, African-Americans, etc. As result of an increase in population and economic advancement, American policymakers and business leaders began to implement Fordism and materialism (the American Dream) to provide food, health, and a standard of living to maintain social stability.<sup>208</sup>

The American polity was formed within the British empire's concept of civilization based on a market political economy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Appleman Williams calls this "empire as a way of life", writing "not only was the Constitution grounded in an imperial logic, but it created a government armed with typically mercantilist powers over the political economy".<sup>209</sup> It is this American 'way of life' that is extended throughout the globe. As Foucault analyzes, there is in governmentality a link between state governance, police activity,

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<sup>207</sup> Michel Foucault, Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. *Security, Territory, Population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*. New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan, (2009).

<sup>208</sup> Martin J. Sklar, 'Periodization and Historiography: Studying American Political Development in the Progressive Era, 1890s-1916', *Studies in American Political Development* 5-2 (1991), pp. 173-213.

<sup>209</sup> William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1980), pp. 508-520.

and a commodity marketplace. It is through the economy that the population becomes the object of government and control. Markets, resources, and land were always in constant demand and became influencing factors in shaping foreign policy, treaties, land purchases, infrastructure, and war. For intellectuals, policy makers, the political institutions, and business interests, had to address this ‘human element’ and to meet the wants, desires, and needs of the human. The economy was the place, the medium, the ‘technology’ to achieve such goal. This has long been a Western European tradition as Foucault articulates, “to govern a state will thus mean the application of economy, the establishment of an economy, at the level of the state as a whole... exercising supervision and control over its inhabitants, wealth, and the conduct of all and each, as attentive as that of a father’s over his household and goods.” The economy “will designate a level of reality and a field of intervention for government”.<sup>210</sup> He adds, “It is through the development of the science of government that the economy could be re-focused on a level of reality that we now describe as the economic; and it is again through the science of government that the specific problem of population could be identified”.<sup>211</sup> It was through a combination of the political and economic by these *Annals* authors that conceptualized ways of ordering the social on a global scale, an ordering of human life, the “human as a living being”.

### ***Prophetic Words***

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<sup>210</sup> Michel Foucault, Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. *Security, Territory, Population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*. New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan, (2009), pp. 95

<sup>211</sup> Michel Foucault, Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. *Security, Territory, Population: lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978*. New York: Picador/Palgrave Macmillan, (2009), pp. 104.

Many of the concepts and ideas put forth in these articles would later shape American foreign policy as an emerging world power to become realities throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century, ideas such as: league to enforce peace, League of Nations (later to become the United Nations), interstate system, economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure as part of international law, US militarism as a world police force, economic internationalism, economic professionalism, technocratic knowledge, and state governance through market rationality and fiscal policy. etc. It is through studying these articles and the thinking of these authors that one can come to see the beginnings of a new global order and the shaping of the “American Century”.<sup>212</sup> In analyzing these articles a common theme was Militarism and military preparedness. These articles provide strong critiques of the dangers of a military-industrial power on society and governance.

For many of the authors, the ‘Great War’ was a war between monarchy and democracy, militarism and justice. This, in many ways, represents how war and military intervention were beginning to be framed and juridically constructed, in terms of morals and international policing, good-versus-evil.<sup>213</sup> Germany, viewed as the representative of militarism represented a threat to democracy, global stability, and humanity. From the American perspective, it was a question of military preparedness, defending democracy, life and property, and the ‘American way of life’. “Obtensibly we went to war with Germany for the sinking of the Lusitania and other outrages of the sea; in reality, the soul of America had demanded that the world be made safe for

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<sup>212</sup> Henry Luce, ‘The American Century’, *Society* 31, 5, (1994), pp. 4-11.

<sup>213</sup> Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2000). *Empire*. ch 1. Carl Schmitt, and G. L. Ulmen. *The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum*. New York: Telos Press. (2003).

democracy”.<sup>214</sup> Furthermore, it was the growing economic power of the US abroad that created the necessity to provide protection to American commercial interests abroad.<sup>215</sup> Out of this context came debates on the need for increased naval and military preparation. The following passages provide an insight into these debates on militarism and military preparedness.

Jefferson, throughout his article, was highly critical of America as an emerging power in the world, in particular, the military build up. For Jefferson military preparedness was a threat in multiple forms. “Military preparedness is a peril to democracy, and a menace to the peace of the world. Piling up explosives in a world where so many persons carry matches is perilous”.<sup>216</sup> He continues his critique as a warning to the future consequences of a military build on the politics and on the American social body itself. He identifies the various actors in the process of military build-up and the militarization of society.

The military and naval expert of the Bernhard type, the covetous and unscrupulous war trader, the irresponsible and diabolical newspaper editor, the hot-head Jingo politician, and the pushing and rapacious commercial promoter—look at them! These are the five fingers of the hand which is now crushing the world. You cannot increase the size of your war machine without increasing the strength of every one of these fingers. To break the power of that infernal hand, is the first and most imperative duty of all men who love mankind... Let no one be fooled by all this talk about never using our army and navy except for defense. Create a war machine, and God only knows who will use it!<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> Thomas R. Marshall, ‘America, the Nations and the League’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 84, (1919), pp. 199.

<sup>215</sup> George C. Herring, “‘A New Age’: Wilson, the Great War, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1913–1921’ In *From Colony to Superpower : U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776*, New York: Oxford University Press, (2008).

<sup>216</sup> “...Running races in naval tonnage is exciting, but perilous. Diplomacy which relies on the pressure of guns is sometimes effective, but always perilous. Making other nations afraid of us is perilous.” Charles E. Jefferson, ‘Military Preparedness a Peril to Democracy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66, (1916), 231.

<sup>217</sup> Charles E. Jefferson, ‘Military Preparedness a Peril to Democracy’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66, (1916), pp. 234.



Jefferson is critiquing the ‘Caesar’ face of the American global order. Throughout the history of empires, in particular the American empire, there has been a long tension between the balance of principles of governance, equality, and justice in the face of the corrupting elements of military power and force in the need to maintain territory, privilege, and wealth. American history exemplifies this tension between military might and power and the high ideals it is intended to be built upon.

This passage by Patten provides a solid glimpse into the questions and issues facing the nation in regards to the social structure and hierarchy.

We think of ourselves as a democracy and yet our traditions keep the masses from an immediate control of their destinies. Should we go to war today, the decision will be made by people elected on other issues and not by popular assent. I find no fault with our President, but can we call ourselves a democracy when one man may plunge us into a war whose evils may weigh on us for a hundred years? If this be true of us, what can be said of Europe where millions of lives and billions of property have been sacrificed to the whim of the ruling class? No government asked its people if they wished to fight: nor has a single national election occurred since the outbreak of the war to test popular sentiment. Not only is the war carried on without popular approval, but the conditions of peace will be determined and the distant future fixed before the people have an opportunity to express themselves. It is this distrust of democratic decisions that creates the barriers preventing world harmony. What evil from democracy could equal the failure of each ruling class to reflect on the welfare of their own nation? We assumed an aristocracy would at least protect the interests of property but where has a mob shown itself so ruthless in its destruction? <sup>218</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> “...We have thought that the educated class would prove a barrier to passion only to find that the higher up we go the more vigorously has the flare of emotion itself. Passion today comes not from the street but from from the newspaper; its readers are not the despised mob but the arrogant rich and the reactionary bigot. If we want peace it is not human nature we must alter: nor is it mob rule we should fear. It is our tradition and antiquated class opinion that must be revised. We have changed the rule of the lawyer for the rule of the editor, the spoken word for the printed word, only to find that the passion of the reader exceeds that of the assembly. A demagogue as speaker can at most reach a few thousand hearts while an emotional editor can make a nation insane.” S. N. Patten, ‘Peace without Force’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72, (1917), pp. 35.

This passage by Patten, insightful for multiple reasons, for it expresses the debates and the sentiments of the day: peace, democracy, class society, war, and the future. Craspey writes on military build-up in relation to Christianity. He argues that use of military force as ways and means in international relations is antithetical to principles of Christianity. His words are quite prophetic in hindsight of future development of American military power throughout the twentieth and twentieth century.

All this wild cry for military preparedness has its source, very largely, in the wishes of those who desire that the American republic shall be a conquering nation, and be based upon the imperialistic and not the democratic conception of life and government. The American people will have far more to fear from a large military establishment of their own than from any military establishment outside their borders...One thing seems evident, the American people must either abandon their religion and dismantle their churches, or else they must use their religion and their churches to curb the present tendency to return frankly and openly to the conditions antecedent to the preaching of Christianity. *Our choice lies between Christ and Caesar.*<sup>219</sup>

This was how American global power and its role in shaping the world was conceptualized, lying ‘between Christ and Caesar’, between the savior and conqueror.<sup>220</sup> The ‘Christ and Caesar’ metaphor represents the inner contradictions of American global power, and the polity that is the United States of America. A nation made up of a social, economic, and political order, based on

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<sup>219</sup> My italics, Algernon S. Craspey, ‘Militarism and the Church’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66, (1916), pp. 249.

<sup>220</sup> “To dream no dream of empire, to see no alluring vision of power but the vision of a world made safe for democracy and secured against outrage by the united will of enfranchised peoples? I do not know. But this I know, that the days of our cloistered virtue are well lost and that we cannot refuse the great adventure even though we gain the whole world and lose our own soul. And this, too, I know, that the greatest disaster that could befall mankind is not the sum of human misery which such a war as this brings in its train, nor yet the shameful legacy of hate and fear and mistrust that it leaves behind it, but the loss to humanity of those ideals of democracy, justice and peace which our Republic has represented in an evil world. And this, too, I know, that rests wholly with us to keep our democracy true to the line marked out for it in Washington’s farewell address: Observe good faith and justice toward all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all...It will be worthy of a free, enlightened and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.” George W. Kirchwey, ‘Pax Americana’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 72 (1917), pp. 48.

Christian values and Enlightenment principles of equality, liberty, and justice while trying to maintain an empire of wealth and privilege through violence and force on a global scale.

### ***Conclusion***

In conclusion, I have argued that these *Annal* articles of the 1910s formulated an American global order. These articles occurred during a period of coinciding global trends, the expansion and increase of American economic activity coupled with the crumbling of the old world order established by European empires and social unrest throughout the various continents. In response, American intellectuals and policymakers saw the need, opportunity, and responsibility for the United States to intervene and implement order throughout the world. I have framed this order by using a metaphor of the two poles of American global power, “Christ and Caesar”. This framing represents the multiple interpretations by these authors on how America was to intervene and shape global life. This was constructed through a global order built on alliances of powerful nations made up of three components: the economic, the political, and the social. This global order was envisioned and exercised in the full sense of the term, global. Economic, political, and social power that was grounded in the planet itself: land, seas, and skies. Furthermore, this global order was not only limited to a spatial ordering of the Earth but one that included the control over things in space: cities, commodities, populations, human life, the environment, biological life, etc. It was through this global ordering that American power and intervention manifested themselves by two poles lying between “Christ and Caesar”, the savior and conqueror. As the American twentieth century unfolded over time and space, this

two sided power would often appear as one and the same, an imperial power of the post-modern world.

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