The Scottish National Liberation Army

Marzipan Gang or Real Terrorist Threat?

10 years for extremist who made letter bombs

A case study of the Scottish National Liberation Army and the reasons why they did not become a large terrorist movement during the years 1979-1997

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Preface

In January 2011 I went to Scotland to study at the University of Edinburgh through the Erasmus Exchange Programme. During my time there I came to love the country, its nature, the City of Edinburgh, and especially its people. When I came back and finished my Bachelor's degree at Leiden University that summer, I knew that I wanted my Master's dissertation to be about Scotland. In September that year I started the Master 'Political culture and national identities' at Leiden University and the course that really interested me was 'Revolutionary Movements in Modern Western Society'. What interested me most about the subject were the mechanisms that are at work when a movement arises and especially why one movement does resort to violence while another movement tries to achieve its goals through non-violent means. When I needed to choose a topic for my dissertation, it was clear to me to me that I wanted to combine my love for Scotland with the interest I have in the creation and perseverance of violent movements. Lucky for me there was this obscure violent movement in Scotland, The Scottish National Liberation Army, which had not been researched on an academic level before. I was even more lucky when Dr. Joost Augusteijn wanted to be my supervisor. Above all I would like to thank you for your advice, your clear feedback, your excellent guidance and endless patience, but above all for the confidence that you gave me that I could finish it. I would also like to thank my family and friends, who were always there if I needed a shoulder to cry on or an ear to talk to. A special word of thanks goes out to Erik and my parents. Erik, thank you for being so patient, for giving me the time and space to develop and write, thank you for letting me vent and for still loving me, even though I can only imagine how obnoxious I sometimes may have been. Mom, thank you for supporting me, for your kind and motivating words which I did not always want, but definitely needed to hear. Dad, thank you for being my tower of strength, for being my sparring partner and for always believing in me. My student days are now finally over. I did my best to let them last as long as possible and develop myself in every way possible, with committees, theatre education and a full-time job, but I am also very glad that the end is now really in sight. So bring on the future!

Lara van Dijken

Leiden, 2016

Summary

The Scottish National Liberation Army was, and still is, a very small violent Scottish nationalist movement with the aim of establishing an independent Scottish Republic. From their inception in 1980 they knew how to make the headlines of the newspapers through an insistent campaign of letter bombs to important figures like Lady Diana, Margaret Thatcher and even the queen. They planned bomb hoaxes and were even responsible for some actual bombings. Somehow they were, however, never really (visibly) taken seriously by the media or the authorities. And that might just be one of the reasons why they did not become a large terrorist movement.

The aim of this study is to contribute to wider terrorism research by looking at the factors that kept the SNLA from becoming a large terrorist movement. By figuring out what kept the SNLA from becoming the Scottish equivalent of, for example, the IRA we might be able to recreate these conditions and policies in our societies today and reduce the number of people joining such a movement resulting in the gradual decline of terrorist movements.

Beatrice de Graaf's theory on performative power proved to be of crucial importance to answer the research question of this paper: Why did the Scottish National Liberation Army not become a large terrorist movement during the years 1979-1997? By building on a firm theoretical framework of new and proven terrorism research and investigating newspaper articles and parliamentary debates from that period for anything relating to the SNLA this study has come to the conclusion that one of the major factors that contributed to the SNLA remaining a small and obscure movement was (1) the low performative power of the British Government.

By publically ignoring the SNLA and letting the infiltration be done by local authorities and intelligence agencies thus not involving the public in the terrorism discourse, the British government minimised the performative power and thus the influence of the movement. Other factors were; (2) the way the media reported the actions of the SNLA, which was usually with disdain; (3) errors from within the SNLA itself, like failed attacks or other actions and; (4) there were other alternatives for the SNLA, movements like the trade union or political parties which were more successful at achieving the same goals as the SNLA but through legal means.

On this basis it is recommended for future counterterrorism policies to keep the performative power of the government as low as possible and to keep an open dialogue with and invest in the alienated and marginalised groups of society. Providing them with other alternatives for terrorism.

Introduction

Terrorism, like the plague in the Middle Ages, frightens both leaders and citizens. It is a disease that is spreading, a cure unknown.¹

Terrorism, a concept that strikes fear into every (wo)man's heart. Nowadays it is often associated with Muslim terrorists and their attacks in the late twentieth and the early twenty-first century. Visions of hijacked airplanes flying into the Twin Towers, the jihadist attack on- and murder of eleven people in the building of satiric weekly Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the beach shooting in Sousse, Tunisia and, even more recent the terrorist attacks at several locations in (once again) Paris and Brussels and the latest attack at Ataturk airport in Istanbul are some of the first things that come to mind when thinking of terrorism.

Terrorism, however, is not just a concern of the past couple of decades and certainly not just an extremist Islamic or even religious affair. Even in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century there were acts of terrorism and terrorist groups which sowed panic and threatened to overthrow the established political regimes. The assassinations of Empress Elizabeth of Austria (1897) and American president William McKinley (1901) are just two examples of anarchist acts of terror which had their impact on late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe.² In the second half of the twentieth century left-wing terrorist attacks of movements like the German *Rote Armee Fraktion* or the *Brigate Rosse* in Italy let Europe quiver on its feet.

The second half of the twentieth century was marked by a resurgence of terrorist groups with ethnic-separatist aspirations, like the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Spanish Basque Homeland and Liberty movement (ETA, *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*). By using violence these movements tried to disrupt society and accomplish their separatist aims. Because of their impact on national and international societies these movements and their actions are well documented, much discussed and analysed on academic level. There are, however also separatist groups which are less well documented. Movements that tried to gain publicity, tried to disrupt society and gain national and even international influence, but until now have failed even to make it to the British Home Offices 'Proscribed Terrorist Organisation' (PTO) list.³

¹ Deutch, J., Terrorism, *Foreign Policy, No. 108* (Autumn, 1997), p. 10

² Laqueur, W., 'Postmodern terrorism: New rules for an old game', *Foreign Affairs, volume 75 no. 5* (September/October 1996), pp. 24-36

³ The PTO list derived from the Terrorism Act of 2000, updated list of 27 March 2015 used, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf

The Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA) was and still is one of those movements. The SNLA is a Scottish separatist movement, aiming at the total independence of Scotland. To achieve their goal they will not shun coercive or violent action.⁴ The trigger for the founding members of the SNLA to set up the movement was the outcome of the first referendum on Scottish Home Rule in 1979. In the 1970s the nationalists of the Scottish National Party (SNP) gained a lot of constituents and gained some influence in Scottish politics. The government of the United Kingdom reacted to this growth of the nationalist party by introducing the Scotland bill in 1977. The Scotland bill had to make sure that if a majority of the Scottish people would vote in favour of a devolved Scottish legislation in a referendum, Scotland would get some form of Home Rule. The bill received Royal Assent in 1978 and so the Scotland Act of 1978 became reality and the referendum on Scottish Home Rule was to be held in 1979.⁵

During this first referendum almost 52 percent of those who voted, voted in favour of a devolved Scotland. This vote count made clear that a large part of the Scottish population did welcome a form of independence for Scotland. The outcome of the Referendum was not respected however, because of a clause in the Scotland bill, attached with the passing of the bill through parliament.⁶ This clause was the Cunningham amendment. This amendment stated that forty percent of the Scottish electorate had to support the Referendum for the Scotland Act to be honoured and because a lot of Scots did not turn up to vote, only a third of the Scottish electorate actually voted in favour of the Scotland Act.⁷ The fact that the outcome of the referendum was not respected shows that the Scottish people in favour of an independent Scotland did not achieve their goal of Home Rule and thus some form of independence for Scotland through political means.

In other countries or regions, like the Basque region in Spain and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom movements have arisen which have acted on this inability to achieve their goals by political means by resorting to violence. Approximately 600 people have died during the years 1968-1987 in ETA related violence⁸ and during 'The Troubles' the IRA tripled that number by killing nearly 1800 people.⁹ The SNLA, however, had a total of (only) 43 attacks or attempted attacks registered by the media and officially did not kill a single person.¹⁰

So even though nationalism rose in Scotland during the sixties and seventies and the tendency under the Scottish people towards separation from the United Kingdom was present in the second

⁴ Scottish man gets four years for sending hoax bomb threats, *The Irish Times*, Jul 24 2010, p. 4

⁵ Lynch, P., *The History of the Scottish National Party*, (Cardiff 2013), pp. 156-158

⁶ Ibid, pp. 156-158

 ⁷ Leith, M.S. and Soule, D.P.J., *Political discourse and national identity in Scotland*, (Edinburgh 2012), pp. 32-33
 ⁸ Douglass, W.A. and Zulaika, J., On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp. 238-257

⁹ Stevenson, J., Northern Ireland: Treating Terrorists as Statesmen, *Foreign Policy*, No. 105 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 125-140

¹⁰ Table 2.2, 3.1 and 4.1 of this paper

half of the twentieth century (even today the Scots led by the Scottish National Party (SNP) are still struggling for an independent Scotland), the Scots have mainly tried (and still try) to achieve this goal in a non-violent manner. How is it possible that in a country like Scotland, with a great constituency for separation, where this goal has not been achieved, there does not rise a large-scale separatist terrorist movement? What are the reasons that the SNLA remained relatively small compared to movements like the IRA or the ETA?

This question asks for legitimisation. Is it legitimate to hypothesise that in similar situations violent or even terrorist movements do rise? We only have to look at previously mentioned movements like the IRA and the ETA to see that they do. In both situations the movements have tried to achieve their nationalist separatist aims through the use of terrorist violence, because they felt there was no other way to achieve them. Although the situations in those areas were of course not identical to the situation in Scotland, the aim of the nationalists remained the same: separation.

Why the SNLA remained a relatively small movement is important for future terrorism research. If the reasons and circumstances in which the SNLA arose, but did not grow out to be a movement with a large constituency can be figured out, it might be possible to better understand the incentives of such a movement and the (un)willingness of the public to join it. It could maybe even help to create a better perspective on how to prevent terrorism in the future and figure out if terrorism is indeed, as stated in the quote at the beginning of this introduction, 'a disease that is spreading, a cure unknown'¹¹.

This paper intends to contribute to modern terrorism research by looking at the SNLA and the circumstances in which it arose, with the ultimate aim of finding out what circumstances and/or policies are required to keep terrorist movements small and unsustainable, like the SNLA. So the SNLA in this paper, will be used as a case study to wider terrorism research. This paper will look at the SNLA during the period 1979-1997 and will divide this broader period into three sub-periods or phases.

The first period is the start-up phase of the SNLA (chapter 2). This phase runs from 1979-1983 and was characterised by some degree of organised violence by SNLA members. It was the most active phase of the SNLA in which they sent several letter bombs to government officials. This period is distinguished as such in this paper, because it was a period of three consecutive years in which the SNLA used the same techniques and violent repertoire. At the end of this phase some of its most prominent members were caught and tried, some of them escaped to Ireland while on bail, which marked the end of this organised period.

¹¹ Deutch, J., Terrorism, *Foreign Policy, No. 108* (Autumn, 1997), p. 10

The second phase lasted from 1984-1992, and was a period of reorganisation (chapter 3). After the capture and escape of some of its members, the SNLA needed to regroup. Although this second period was one of relative rest from attacks of the SNLA, 1986 was a year of resurgence of that violence. During this year the SNLA fell back to its old repertoire by sending letter bombs and threats as they did during the first period. This second period was not that easy to distinguish though, because the SNLA went back to its old repertoire. One could thus argue that the first period lasted until 1986 after which a period of almost complete silence from the SNLA lasted until 1992. The capture and escape of some of the members of the SNLA during the end of 1983 and early 1984 and the change in strategy that came from operating from another country and thus the breach in continuity convinced me of using 1984 as the starting point of a new period for the SNLA.

The third and last phase that will be examined in this paper will be the period from 1993-1997 in which the SNLA becomes less and less active. In these years a couple of the remaining SNLA members are arrested and tried. The only member still heard of, who is not imprisoned yet, is Adam Busby. During this period, he schemes from his bedsit in Dublin, still plotting to free Scotland through violent means (chapter 4).

By first looking at modern terrorism research this paper will build its argumentation from a firm base of theories on terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies (chapter 1). The theories that will be used in this paper are the theories on relative deprivation and resource mobilisation for explaining why the movement arose in the first place (relative deprivation) and how it came to collective action (resource mobilisation). The theories on the social utility of terrorist movements and the theory of performative power by Beatrice de Graaf will be used to try and find out why the SNLA did not become a large terrorist movement. These theories, terms and their implications will be discussed in the first chapter of this paper.

After shaping this theoretical framework I will examine what the actual actions of the SNLA where during the three phases, what the counter-policies and -actions were and look at how this was all portrayed in the newspapers. Newspaper research is important because on the one hand newspapers have an impact on public opinion and they are a key source on which the people relied for their national and international information. The information given by the newspapers on the SNLA is therefore a good indicator for the knowledge people had on the SNLA and its activities.

On the other hand, it is also important because it shows what information the government did release on the SNLA. Although, unfortunately, it does not give us an overview of what the government kept to themselves it does show what (limited) information they did release on the SNLA. In combination with the theories on terrorism and counter-terrorism and the information and claims the SNLA itself gives on their actions this paper will examine why the SNLA did not grow out to be a large-scale terrorist movement. By doing so this paper aims to get a clear picture of what

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contributed to the fact that the SNLA did not gain a foothold in Scottish society and has almost no place in modern terrorism discourse unlike, for example, its Spanish and Irish counterparts.

The information on the attacks by the SNLA discussed in the following chapters derives mainly from newspaper articles. The newspapers used in this paper are *The Irish Times, The Guardian, The Observer* and *The Glasgow Herald* (*The Glasgow Herald* changed its name to *The Herald Scotland* on 3 February 1992¹²). These newspapers are respectively an Irish newspaper, a British daily and a Sunday British newspaper and a Scottish newspaper. Newspapers from these three countries are used because of the different views that could be expected from the different backgrounds and relationships towards Scottish nationalism and the United Kingdom. The Sunday newspaper is used because of its coverage on the Sundays, so that no attack is missed, even though it was executed on a Saturday for example.

The Glasgow Herald/Herald Scotland is, unlike some other newspapers carrying the name Scottish, or Scotland¹³, an actual Scottish newspaper based in Glasgow, also the base of the first attacks by the SNLA. It is the oldest national newspaper in the world and is considered a real Scottish newspaper with a Scottish and even slightly Glaswegian identity. It is definitely not a Scottish version of a British newspaper. In 1995 *The Herald* was even considered to be the most Scottish newspaper in Scotland.¹⁴ *The Herald* was the Scottish daily newspaper with the fifth largest circulation in 1981 and also in 1992¹⁵ and was considered to be Scotland's leading quality newspaper.¹⁶

The Guardian has the reputation of being one of the most sensible daily newspapers in the United Kingdom practising distinguished journalism.¹⁷ It was considered to be a newspaper read by 'the more alert and intelligent members of the population'.¹⁸ The other British newspaper used in this research is the Sunday newspaper *The Observer*. *The Observer* is the oldest Sunday newspaper in the world, founded in 1791.¹⁹. According to the BBC, *The Observer* has claimed to be 'unbiased by prejudice, uninfluenced by party', for more than two hundred years.²⁰ And according to former Times Editor Sir Howard Evans: 'The literary and political tradition of *The Observer* is absolutely

¹² Douglas, F., Scottish newspapers, language and identity, (Edinburgh, 2009), p. 55

¹³ Like for example: *The Scottish Sun, The Scottish Daily Mail* and the *Scottish Express*

¹⁴ Douglas, F., *Scottish newspapers, language and identity*, p. 55 & pp. 103-106

¹⁵ Hassan, G., *Independence of the Scottish mind, Elite narratives, public spaces and the making of a modern nation* (2014 Hampshire), p. 75-76

¹⁶ Griffiths, D., *The encyclopedia of the British press*, 1422-1992, (Basingstoke, 1992), p. 305

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 280-281

¹⁸ Taylor, G., *Changing faces, a history of The Guardian* 1956-1988, (London 1993), pp. 75-76

¹⁹ Griffiths, D., The encyclopedia of the British press, p. 444

²⁰ *The Observer* under review, Aug 4, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/8184667.stm

paramount.²¹ Both newspapers are, *The Observer* since 1993, part of The Guardian Media Group and the Scott Trust, which advocates and ensures unbiased, uninfluenced and independent journalism.²²

The Irish newspaper used in this research of the SNLA is *The Irish Times*. *The Irish Times* is, like the Scottish and British newspapers used, a quality newspaper. The independence of *The Irish Times* is also ensured in the form of a Trust. In 1974 this Trust is formed 'with the objective of securing and maintaining *The Irish Times* as 'an independent newspaper primarily concerned with serious issues for the benefit of the community throughout the whole of Ireland, free from any form of personal or party political, commercial, religious or other sectional control'.²³

All newspapers used in this paper are intellectual and quality newspapers, which pursue unbiased news. Because there are dangers involved in newspaper research, especially problems with bias, influence and dependence, these newspapers are used because of their reputation of unbiased, and independent reporting and referencing. The reason why the information on the Scottish National Liberation Army is mainly based on newspaper research, and not on elaborate academic research, is because little to no academic literature has been written on the SNLA. A lot of books have been written on the SNP and on the sociology of Scotland, Scottish nationalism, national identity and other Scottish matters, but no books that answer the question on why the emergence of a large-scale terrorist movement in Scotland did not take place.

There are two books, however, written on the SNLA of which one is purely on the SNLA, and the other only spends one chapter on the Scottish National Liberation Army. There are a couple of reasons, however, why these books will be used with caution as sources or references in this paper.

The first book is an unpublished book from 2005 by former *News of the World* journalist David Leslie, *Inside A Terrorist Group - The Story of the SNLA*. Although the book is (still) unpublished it does circulate on the internet. It can be found mainly on Scottish nationalist websites like *electricscotland.com*²⁴ and a Scottish nationalist blog called *Celtic Phoenix*, subtitled *A blog with a distinctly Scottish theme covering my interests in matters Scottish and Republican Socialism*.²⁵ The book was allegedly written with cooperation from SNLA members, who wanted to remain anonymous, and it is very difficult to tell whether the events have (partially) happened or are exaggerated or in some cases are maybe even completely made up to be used as a tale of propaganda.

²¹ Observer has 'important and viable role', Aug 5, 2009,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/8185145.stm

²² Taylor, G., Changing faces, pp. 299-305

²³ From the website of *The Irish Times*, http://www.irishtimes.com/about-us/the-irish-times-trust#irishtimes

²⁴ http://www.electricscotland.com/books/snla.htm

²⁵ http://dawnofliberation.blogspot.nl/2008/09/interview-with-ex-member-ssgsnla.html

The second book is *Britain's Secret War, subtitled 'Tartan Terrorism and the Anglo American State'*. It is written by Andrew Murray Scott and Iain Macleay. This book is on violent Scottish movements²⁶ in Scotland from 1968-1986. Such as can be derived from this book the SNLA was not the only violent group in Scotland during the second half of the twentieth century. They were, however, the largest, most persistent and well-known violent group Scotland had known since then. Other groups like the Army of the Provisional Government (which disbanded after their first failed operation), the Army for freeing Scotland, the Scottish Citizens' Army of the Republic, the Scottish Civilian Army and the Army of the Scottish People, were active from 1968 to 1975, but never carried out any (successful) attacks.

The Workers Party of Scotland was also one of these very short-lived, albeit quite violent groups. They carried out six raids during the year 1971. All of these raids were aimed at gathering enough funds to set up their own political party. But within the year the Workers Party of Scotland was infiltrated by the police and it was only a matter of time before all of its members were arrested and convicted.

The group that survived more than one year and successfully carried out some of its violent actions during the period 1968-1975 was the 'Tartan Army'. They were responsible for the bombing of three electricity poles in Scotland and England and the bombing of an oil pipeline during the years 1972-1976. Although they gathered some publicity during those years they too were infiltrated by Special Branch agents. Eventually fourteen people were charged, but because of a judicial error only one man was jailed for five years, another one for one year, the third was only put on probation for two years and the remaining members were freed of all charges. Whether these violent nationalistic movements of the seventies failed due to internal struggles or due to Special Branch plants and successful police action cannot be said for certain. But it could well be that politics and Special Forces worked together well to keep the performative power of the movements to a minimum.

One chapter of the book is dedicated to the SNLA and its actions. At first I was thrilled to finally have found a book available on the violent movements in Scotland with even a chapter on the SNLA. And although the book does not have the nationalist or even propagandist air of the book by David Leslie, there were still some aspects of the book that made me doubt its impartiality. First, when I could finally open the book (it took me six months to actually obtain the book second hand), there was something on the first page that immediately caught my attention. There was a line of text

²⁶ Or as Andrew Murray Scott and Iain Macleay claim 'terrorist movements'. This paper only examines the terrorist level of the SNLA and so I cannot claim whether the other movements in this book are actually terrorist movements. Further research on that topic would be advisable.

handwritten by one of the authors of the book stating: 'To a fellow figh[t]er for Scottish freedom. From Iain Macleay Sutherland. 4-11-90.'²⁷

Second, that same lain Macleay Sutherland is founder, treasurer and main spokesman of Scottish Watch.²⁸²⁹ Scottish Watch was an anti-English settler group that arose in the early nineties. Although Scottish Watch publically condemned violence, there was an increase in violence done to Englishmen by Scots in Dumfriesshire (base of Scottish Watch and home to Sutherland) after the group was formed.³⁰ Iain Macleay Sutherland denies the allegations and states: Obviously we would condemn absolutely any form of intimidation of English people in Scotland, particularly incidents of that nature. [...] All we have done is raise the awareness of the social issues caused by English inward migration, particularly on housing and jobs in rural areas. I don't think we have heightened any anti-English feeling in the area.³¹

Although Sutherland claimed to condemn violence, the bias of the book 'Britain's Secret War' is ambiguous to say the least. Because there is so little written on the SNLA, however, the insights in these books could be useful. The events as described in David Leslie's book, even though the book lacks notes or even a bibliography, could be a representation of the SNLA's side of the story, just like the newspaper articles are in a way the representation of the editors' and maybe even authorities side of the story. Ian Macleay Sutherland was, apart from being the founder of Scottish Watch, also a lecturer at Dumfries and Galloway College of Technology. So even though his bias can be doubted, he was familiar with some form of academic writing and his book is based on newspaper articles and some academic and non-academic sources (the book lacks footnotes, or end notes, but it does contain a bibliography).

Illustration 1. Handwritten text by Iain Macleay Sutherland in Britain's Secret War³²

Fair Madean 4-11-90

²⁷ Murray Scott, A., Macleay, I., *Britains secret war, Tartan terrorism and the Anglo-American state*, (Edinburgh, 1990), introduction page, unnumbered

²⁸ Groups 'spark attacks on English', *The Herald Scotland*, Nov 1, 1993

²⁹ Scottish Watch disowns anti-English slogans, *The Herald Scotland*, Sept 26, 1994

³⁰ Groups 'spark attacks on English', *The Herald Scotland*, Nov 1, 1993

³¹ Ibid.

³² Murray Scott, A., Macleay, I., *Britains secret war*, introduction page, unnumbered

To understand terrorism, it is first important to establish a definition of terrorism, because we first have to establish if the actions of the SNLA even fall under the definition of terrorism. Second, it is important to understand how and why terrorism arises. What breeding grounds are there within society and what explains the successes or failures of a terrorist organisation? Third, it is important to see what can be done to prevent terrorism. What are the various repertoires of authorities in fighting terrorism and which repertoires are considered to be most effective? When the theoretical base is established this paper will look at the actions of the SNLA and how they relate to these theories. This will be done per chapter by looking at Scottish society during the previously mentioned periods. After that it will look at and list the actions of the SNLA. Then it will look at whether the SNLA was a terrorist movement during that period and at the degree of relative deprivation within Scottish society, resource mobilisation within the SNLA and at the performative power of both the government, the media and the SNLA. Finally each chapter will give some thoughts on why the SNLA remained small and did not gain a constituency during that period. Using the previously mentioned sources and theories this paper will try to find out why the SNLA did not become a large scale terrorist movement and by doing so try to establish why a large scale terrorist movement did not arise in Scotland during the period 1979-1997. While having access to limited information and sources it is hard or even impossible to establish an unequivocal answer, but by analysing the sources that were available and trying to look at them from every angle this paper tries to establish why the SNLA did not become a large scale terrorist movement during the years 1979-1997.

1. Theories on terrorism and counterterrorism strategies

When is a terrorist not a terrorist? When his gang uses marzipan instead of Semtex in its letter bombs.³³

1.1. What is Terrorism?

But what if, as mentioned in the quote above, this bomb made of marzipan is meant to instil terror into the minds of the people? If it disrupts a society, and interferes with day to day life? Is it then still not terrorism? Coming up with a definition of terrorism is easier said than done. Since the 2001 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York the academic interest in terrorism has increased. Multiple definitions of terrorism have emerged and it seems like there is no clear unified definition of terrorism in academic literature and even the authorities of different countries have different definitions.

The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD, *Algemene Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdienst*) gives the following definition of terrorism:

Terrorisme is het dreigen met, voorbereiden of plegen van geweld dat gericht is op mensen of op het aanrichten van maatschappij-ontwrichtende schade. Doel hiervan is maatschappelijke veranderingen te bewerkstelligen, de bevolking bang te maken of politieke besluitvorming te beïnvloeden.³⁴

In this definition the terms 'religious', 'racial' or 'ideological' are not mentioned. Instead it gives a somewhat broader definition by stating that the aim of terrorism is to bring about social change, to scare the public and/or to influence political decision-making.

In the United States the FBI and the CIA do not even share the same definition of terrorism. The FBI defines terrorism as 'the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.' And the CIA states: 'The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.' In this definition terrorism is denoted as merely politically motivated violence and the social factors, which you find in the other above stated definitions (to greater or lesser extent), are disregarded. If even law enforcement agencies in the same country cannot agree on one

³³ Sweeney, J., Bittersweet jokes of marzipan gang, *The Observer*, Oct 15, 1995, p. 14

³⁴ Source: <u>https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/terrorisme/</u>

Translation: Terrorism is the threat or preparation of violence or committing acts violence aimed at people or at doing damage which causes social disruption. The aim is to bring about social change, influencing political decision-making or frightening people.

definition, how are historians, sociologists and other researchers on the subject supposed to come to one definition?

The sociological approach of Austin T. Turk gives an insight in why it is so hard to formulate one definition of terrorism. According to him terrorism is not a fixed entity in the world, even though it is often depicted as such by media reports and in incidence counts. Terrorism is, according to him, 'an interpretation of events and their presumed causes.' These interpretations are not unprejudiced efforts to represent the truth of a situation, but rather 'conscious efforts to manipulate perceptions to promote certain interests at the expense of others.' ³⁵ He even goes as far as to say:

When people and events come to be regularly described in public as terrorists and terrorism, some governmental or other entity is succeeding in a war of words in which the opponent is promoting alternative designations such as 'martyr' and 'liberation struggle'.³⁶

This statement is partly true. Even though terrorism has a very negative ring to it, and the Western World mostly uses it for violence used against them but never for violence used by them, we have to try and treat the definition without bias so that we can ultimately use it for any kind of violence, by whichever (governmental/political/ideological/religious) organisation that meets the prerequisites. Although we will never be able to entirely grasp the way the 'others' see themselves or how the 'other' sees 'us', whether called freedom fighter, martyr, or terrorist, we are able to address the directly observable features of a group and its actions.³⁷ For example: is the target of the violence a particular organisation, government or social/ethnic/religious group? Are the targets non-combatants (civilians excluding governmental figures and armed forces)? Is the violent behaviour of the group organised and what tactics does it use? If the organisation states its conditions and goals we are even able to observe these goals and conditions and place them in the spectrum of terrorism.

If we look at ETA in this light we can observe the abovementioned without resorting to biased opinions on whether the actions of ETA are condemnable or not. The aim of ETA is, in short, a separate Basque state. The target of ETA's frustrations is the Spanish government which will not grant the Basque region that authority. They targeted the Spanish government, members of the Armed Forces and Police Force, civilians, but also buildings and institutions like banks and stations.

 ³⁵ Turk, A., Sociology of Terrorism, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 30 (2004), pp. 271-286
 ³⁶ Ibid, pp. 271-286

³⁷ Senechal de la Roche, R., Toward a Scientific Theory of Terrorism, *Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium Vol. 22*, No. 1 (Mar., 2004), pp. 1-4

Their violent repertoire³⁸ consisted of bombings, threats, assassinations, kidnappings etc. and the attacks were well planned and organised.³⁹ In the attacks that were carried out during the years 1968-2010, 829 people have died.⁴⁰ So without condemning ETA's actions, it is possible to name this type of violence and come up with a definition of terrorism. A definition which focuses on the perceivable features and motives of a group and its actions.

The definition of terrorism therefore has to encompass the previously mentioned conditions of impartiality, stating the type of aim of the movement and its repertoire. In 'The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research' by Alex P. Schmid a definition of terrorism can be found which nearly encompasses all the above mentioned theories and reflections. In his work Schmid gives the 'revised academic consensus definition of terrorism (Rev.ACDT 2011)'. This definition states that:

Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated demonstrative direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants⁴¹, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.⁴²

In this statement on terrorism, the doctrine and the practice of terrorism are separated. Both the doctrine and the practice are important when looking at terrorism. The person or group which follows the doctrine usually proceeds to using the practice as a result of following and believing in the doctrine of terrorism. This definition does not state, however, what kind of practice or violent action this can be.

 ³⁸ A repertoire of violence is a range of means and resources of violence which are at the service of the various actors. Van Dijken, L.F., Moderates and Terrorists, *A comparative study on the turn to violence by the Red Youth in the Netherlands 1968-1972*, (2012), p.10, from C. Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge 2003)
 ³⁹ Douglass, W.A., Zulaika, J., On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process, *Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 32, No. 2* (Apr., 1990), pp. 238-257

⁴⁰ The Guardian, Eta and Basque separatism: data over the years, SOURCE: El Ministerio del Interior, <u>http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/jan/10/eta-basque-sepratists-ceasefire-victims-over-</u>time#data

⁴¹ Civilians being civilians including governmental figures and non-combatants being civilians excluding the governmental figures, for the government is a 'legitimate' target during war-time according to the Geneva convention.

 ⁴² Schmid, A.P., *The Routledge handbook of terrorism research*, (New York, 2013), p. 86
 For a complete overview of 'The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism' see Appendix I

The definition given by the British secret service MI5 adds to the definition by Schmid by stating that terrorist action involves or causes:

- serious violence against a person;
- serious damage to a property;
- a threat to a person's life;
- a serious risk to the health and safety of the public; or
- serious interference with or disruption to an electronic system⁴³

Although the definition by Schmid completed by the description of MI5 almost encompasses the previously mentioned conditions, there are still some things that need to be addressed.

First, the term *organised* needs to be added to the definition. Terrorism is premeditated and well organised. Terrorism needs to be well-planned for the attack to succeed. The actions itself need organisation as well, especially because they are in need of a multitude of (mostly illegal) resources and manpower.

Second, is the definition of terrorism inseparable from a *group*? Or can one *individual*, a so called 'lone wolf', commit an act of terror as well? For an individual to be taken seriously, and not to be dismissed as a lunatic, rather than terrorist, is harder than for a group. If a whole group shares the same ideas and goals and tries to achieve these goals through violent action, we are more inclined to think they are 'sane people who commit horrible crimes' to achieve their goals than one or two individuals killing off a bunch of people. We have just stated though, that we cannot judge the 'other' and how sane or insane, how wrong or right that someone and his goals are. If the actions of an individual or a so called 'lone wolf' therefore meet the requirements for terrorism, these lone wolves are most definitely terrorists. So even if there was, for example, just one individual behind the SNLA attacks they would still be terrorist actions.

The definition by Schmid, the kinds of violent action of MI5 and the fact that terrorism is organised action and that it can be perpetrated by either a group or an individual (lone wolf) will be used throughout this paper as a reference to what terrorism is. So in summary, terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of feargenerating, coercive political violence. On the other hand it refers to a conspiratorial practice of organised, calculated demonstrative direct violent action without legal or moral restraints. It targets

⁴³ For the complete MI5 definition visit: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism.html

mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. It can either be perpetrated by a group or a lone wolf.⁴⁴

1.2. The emergence of terrorism

Now that we have established a definition of terrorism, the next step in the process is to determine where and how terrorism originates. It has long been thought that terrorists come from the lower classes of society, that they are people who felt deprived of social and/or economic resources. A recent study indicates that this appears to be, at least partially, untrue. It shows that a 'typical terrorist' comes from the relatively better-off parts of the world, is middle- to upper-class and appears to be motivated by political-ideological resentments rather than economic distress.⁴⁵ They are usually people who do not fit in, who are socially isolated and, in their own eyes, do not fit in to their surroundings or have the feeling they are not accepted by the society they live in.

One form of terrorism motivated by political-ideological resentments is nationalist terrorism. Wherever there is a deeply felt sense of oppression and resentment against alien rule on the part of a large section of the population, the nationalist rallying cry is a grave danger signal for the incumbent regime.⁴⁶ As mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter terrorists may see themselves as freedom fighters and with nationalist movements there is a great chance that they gather a large constituency, for they appeal to the nationalist sentiments within their 'own' ethnic group. 'The misguided actions of a few hotheads will be condemned but at the same time extenuating circumstances will be found to explain, if not altogether to excuse, their behaviour.⁴⁷

It is also one of their aims to gather a large constituency. They know that the more powerful they are, the more people they attract, the more support they have, the more pressure they can put on the authorities. Violence is then considered a means to coerce people into joining the movement, or at least to support the movement. This mobilisation also sends a signal to the population: the fragility of the State and the power of the opposing movement.⁴⁸ In the end the main objective of the nationalist terrorist movement is the use of violence to coerce the authority (the occupying forces or the State) to withdraw from the 'occupied' territory or at least to establish some form of autonomy in that territory.⁴⁹ Which falls in line with the definition given on terrorism earlier on in this chapter.

⁴⁴ Schmid, A.P., *The Routledge handbook of terrorism research*, p. 86

⁴⁵ Turk, A., Sociology of Terrorism, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 30 (2004), pp. 271-286 and Piazza, J.A., Poverty, minority economic discrimination, and domestic terrorism, Journal of Peace Research Vol. 48 no 3, special issues, new frontiers of terrorism research (may 2011), pp. 339-353 ⁴⁶ Wilkinson, P., *Terrorism versus democracy, the liberal state response*, (2006), pp. 21-22

⁴⁷ Laqueur, W., *Terrorism* (1977 Boston), pp. 110

⁴⁸ Sànchez-Cuenca, I. The Dynamics Of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Volume 19, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 290-291

⁴⁹ Ibid.

In the 1960s and 1970s even the media sometimes depicted this kind of terrorism as a necessary means to an end. In those years a terrorist might even be depicted as 'the only one who really cares; he is a totally committed fighter for freedom and justice, a gentle human being forced by cruel circumstances and an indifferent majority to play heroic yet tragic roles: the good Samaritan distributing poison, St. Francis with the bomb.'⁵⁰ The violence used by the movement as 'propaganda by the deed' or 'armed propaganda'⁵¹ in this case works for the terrorist movement.

Without condoning or condemning the motives and/or actions of terrorists or terrorist movements, or describing the circumstances in which they arose with value judgements like 'cruel', it is still possible to give some explanation as to why these movements arose. This paragraph will focus on three theories in terrorism studies and the linkages between them:

- 1. (Relative) deprivation
- 2. Resource mobilisation
- 3. The political opportunity structure

One of the popular approaches in recent studies is the (1) deprivation approach. ⁵² According to this approach (perceived) economic-, ethno-cultural- and/or political deprivation can lead to great unrest in societies or even to terrorism. It does not explain however, why there are a lot of people and populations who are deprived but do not (feel the need to) resort to violence.⁵³ This is where the theory on relative deprivation steps in. How deprived a population is or how deprived the people of that population feel and how frustrated they feel about this deprivation are separate things. The potential for collective violence - and, if you take it one step further, for terrorism - within a society depends partially on the discontent of the people within that society. This discontent rises when people perceive 'an intolerable gap between what they want and what they get.'⁵⁴ Between what they have and what they think they should have (or maybe even had in the recent past). This gap is called relative deprivation. Through the 'frustration aggression'⁵⁵ mechanism which is sparked by relative deprivation they are provided with a motive for (violent) action.⁵⁶

Relative deprivation does not only include deprivation of economic resources, but also deprivation in socio-political resources (ethno-cultural- and/or political or religious deprivation etc.). If we look at what was previously mentioned in this chapter this makes sense. As terrorists appear to

⁵⁰ Laqueur, W., *Terrorism*, pp. 4-5

⁵¹ Sànchez-Cuenca, I. *The Dynamics Of Nationalist Terrorism*, p. 291

⁵² Zimmerman, E., Research on Political Terrorism: Promises and Pitfalls (2014), pp. 5-7

⁵³ Ibid.

 ⁵⁴ Davies, J.C., Toward a theory of revolution, *American Sociological Reviews, Vol. 27, no 1* (Feb., 1962) p. 6
 ⁵⁵ Viktoroff, J., The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches, *the journal of conflict resolution, vol. 49*, no.1 (Feb., 2005), pp.3-42

⁵⁶ Brush, S.G., Dynamics of Theory Change in the Social Sciences Relative Deprivation and Collective Violence, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 4* (Dec., 1996), pp. 523-545

be not only from the lower classes of society, but also from the more privileged classes of societies. This was especially true for leftist terrorists during the 1970s.⁵⁷ Relative deprivation, whether sociopolitical or economic, is not the only mechanism contributing to collective violence or terrorism. Linked to relative deprivation is the theory of resource mobilisation. 'Deprivations are filtered and enlarged through processes of (2) resource mobilization'.⁵⁸

According to Charles Tilly 'the word "mobilization" conveniently identifies the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active group of participants in public life.'⁵⁹ He states that resource mobilisation is:

The process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action. Those resources may be labour power, goods, weapons, votes and any number of other things, just so long as they are usable in acting on shared interests. Sometimes a group such as a community has a complex internal structure, but few pooled resources. Sometimes it is rich in resources, but the resources are all under individual control. The analysis of mobilization deals with the ways that groups acquire resources and make them available for collective action.⁶⁰

So without mobilising resources such as information, material, networks, weapons or even people and using them for the good of the community or movement collective action is made almost impossible and the sense of deprivation will persist. The theory on resource mobilisation derives from other principles than the theory on relative deprivation though. The deprivation theory mainly points to grievances and shortcomings and with it addresses a field of (perceived) social problems.

The theory on resource mobilization strongly draws on organizational hypotheses, on the profiling and rent seeking of new elites, on cost/benefit calculations in terms of whether and how to mobilize and to act. It concentrates on the very same cost-benefit arguments and strategic skills that function similarly in economics and politics, both in running a company or a political party.⁶¹

Where the deprivation theory mainly focuses on deprivation within a society from which a social movement rises, resource mobilisation focuses more on the actual mobilisation of the resources within the political and organisational context. It focuses on whether the movement achieves its goals with the resources available, or if the movement needs other resources to achieve them. The

⁵⁷ Viktoroff, J., The Mind of the Terrorist, p. 20

⁵⁸ Zimmerman, E., *Research on Political Terrorism*, p. 7

⁵⁹ Tilly, C., From mobilization to revolution (Michigan, 1977), pp. 1.10-1.11

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 3.26-3.27

⁶¹ Zimmerman, E., *Research on Political Terrorism*, p. 6

movement mobilises resources to achieve its goals and the government tries to mobilise its resources in a way the terrorist organisation cannot profit from.

Deprivation and resource mobilisation are intertwined. When there are feelings of deprivation within a certain community some of its members might want to engage in collective action. This movement will need resource mobilisation to actually be able to engage in this collective action. Uniting the deprivation- and resource mobilisation theories therefore seems like a good starting point in explaining how collective violence or terrorism rises, but it is not yet enough. Occurrence of these two principles does not guarantee outbursts of collective violence or terrorism. A lot depends on the opportunities that arise.

Changes in, for instance, leadership, repression, economy, migration, demography, or political economy can create a climate in which movements can organise their collective action.⁶² Even natural catastrophes can create an opening or closing for a movement to capture or hold on to power. Changes in this (3) 'political opportunity structure' can create situations in which feelings of deprivation and resource mobilisation are augmented and/or enabled, hence augmenting the level of frustration.

According to Ekkart Zimmerman, Emeritus of Macrosociology at Dresden University of Technology, these three factors therefore, deprivation, resource mobilisation and political opportunities are three essential conditions for successful mobilisation of frustration and dissent. These are, however, not factors which, if combined, always result in collective violence or terrorism. As Zimmerman puts it:

Whether protest becomes enacted, in particular in terrorist violence, is a matter of strategy and tactics. Such strategies and tactics can take real opportunities successfully into account, but may also easily misjudge them. The well-known asymmetries in terrorist activities - they command over knowledge where, when, and how to strike, with how many resources - make for the sufficient element of explanation that is missing up to this point. It is the terrorists who strike and the state authorities and society to react to the attacks. Pre-emptive measures seem to blur this distinction but logically they do not. The terrorists set the agenda, the state authorities try to react or affect it.⁶³

The processes of (1) relative deprivation, (2) resource mobilisation and (3) political opportunities do, however, contribute to the probability for social and/or terrorist movements to arise.

⁶² David S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff, Conceptualizing Political Opportunity, Social Forces, Vol. 82, No. 4 (Jun., 2004), pp. 1457-1492, p. 1459

⁶³ Zimmerman, E., *Research on Political Terrorism*, p. 8

1.3. Counter-terrorism and performative power

How do these state authorities then try to react or affect terrorism? The most common counterterrorism strategies intend to decrease the political utility of terrorism, thus rendering it redundant. The predominant strategy is the deterrence strategy. According to most contemporary governments, for example the governments of the United States of America and France, showing the terrorists that their political goals will not be gained or even helped by using terrorism and that their acts will only hurt their cause is the most effective way to decrease terrorism. Another strategy is based on the believe that governments should reason and or compromise with terrorists to appease them and with it decrease terrorism. Advocates of this idea urge their governments towards negotiations and peace processes. The third most frequently upheld counter-terrorism strategy is the promotion of democracy. Proponents of this strategy believe that by granting the people a voice to express and address their problems in a democratic system the (presumed) need for terrorist actions is diminished.

These strategies are all based on the idea that terrorist are political utility maximizers. They are based on the idea that 'people use terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest'. ⁶⁴ This idea implicates that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy, which relies and acts on a cost-benefit basis. This model paints a pessimistic picture. 'If target countries are routinely coerced into making important strategic and ideological concessions to terrorists, their victories will reinforce the strategic logic for groups to attack civilians, spawning even more terrorist attacks.'⁶⁵ In this case only no-negotiation and zero tolerance (deterrence) tactics might work on terrorist movements. Deterrence policy raises the costs for terrorist initiatives by increasing the probability of detention and by strengthening the punishments for caught terrorists. If terrorism is indeed based on a cost benefit model it becomes less attractive for terrorists to use terrorist means when the targeted government uses deterrence measures.

According to Max Abrahms, however, the idea of terrorists as political utility maximizers is incomplete and not sufficient in explaining terrorism and conducting counter-terrorism strategies. Max Abrahms, assistant professor of political science at Northeastern University, is a frequent terrorism analyst in the American media, and his research is mainly focused on the consequences of terrorism, its motives, and the implications for counterterrorism strategy.⁶⁶ According to him terrorism is not solely based on an economic cost-benefit model. His research indicates that

⁶⁴ Abrahms, M., What terrorists really want: Terrorist motives and counterterrorism strategy, *International Security*, vol. 32, no.4 (spring 2008) p. 78

⁶⁵ Abrahms, M., Why Terrorism Does Not Work, *International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2* (Fall, 2006), pp.42-78 ⁶⁶ http://www.northeastern.edu/cssh/faculty/max-abrahms

terrorism does not pay. It points out that only seven percent of terrorist attacks is actually (partially) lucrative and even points out that terrorist organisations accomplish their political goals zero percent of the time by attacking civilians.⁶⁷ He states that 'terrorist organizations often resist disbanding in the face of consistent political failure, in spite of the ending of their immediate political grievances, and even when presented with peaceful alternatives for political gain.'⁶⁸ Instead of being based on an economic cost-benefit model terrorism is, according to Abrahms, based on a social cost-benefit model. Instead of being 'political utility maximizers' terrorist tend to think and act more like 'social solidarity maximizers'.⁶⁹ Which means that most terrorists attach much greater importance to the social benefits rather than to any political gains the organisation might achieve and respond largely to the social solidarity they enjoy while being part of the group.⁷⁰

In terrorism studies and political psychology the empirical evidence, proving that individuals join a terrorist movement rather because of the want for affective ties with fellow terrorists than for achieving their political goals, is growing. Studies on movements like the RAF, the IRA, but also Hezbollah, The Weather Underground and al-Qaida show that most of the terrorists in these movements participated in the violent actions to reduce their sense of alienation from society.⁷¹ Either in nationality, money or work-related terms, or in the case of dislocation from homeland, family and friends. Not fitting in to their host societies, which they tried to join also accumulates to the feeling of alienation (social deprivation).⁷² Terrorist movements focus their recruitment on these socially isolated people.⁷³

Research based on eleven hundred interviews with terrorists also indicates that terrorists join a terrorist movement rather because 'their friends were members' then because of the 'ideology' of the movement. Members from various terrorist groups, like the RAF, IRA and ETA, also stated that they joined in these terrorist actions to 'maintain or develop social relations with other terrorist members.⁷⁴ Not because of their political or ideological cause. Recent studies have also found that a very important condition for joining a terrorist movement is having a friend or family member already residing in the movement.

A paradox rises. While terrorist movements are organisations which arise out of political, ideological and/or resource deprivation, the individuals joining these organisations and the reason

 ⁶⁷ Abrahms, M., Why Terrorism Does Not Work, pp.42-78
 ⁶⁸ Abrahms, M., What terrorists really want, p. 103

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 78-105

⁷⁰ Gross Stein, J., Deterring terrorism, not terrorists in: Wanger, A., and Wilner, A., Deterring terrorism, theory and practice, (Stanford 2012), p. 49

⁷¹ Abrahms, M., What terrorists really want, p. 98

⁷² Alex P. Schmid, 'Why Terrorism? Root Causes, Some Empirical Findings, and the Case of 9/11,' presentation to the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, April 2007, in Abrahms, M., What terrorists really want, pp.98-99 ⁷³ Pedahzur, A., Suicide Terrorism, (2005) pp. 137-138, 168, in Abrahms, M., What terrorists really want, p. 100

⁷⁴ Abrahms, M., What terrorists really want, p. 97

for these movements to keep existing are based on different social mechanisms. So what does this mean then for counter-terrorism measures? For counter-terrorism to succeed it needs to take all these factors into account. The supply-side as well as the demand-side of counter-terrorism strategies must acknowledge all these incentives in order to be effective.

By exploiting the knowledge that people tend to join terrorist movements to develop strong ties with other terrorists, the supply-side can more easily identify risk individuals or groups. Law-enforcement agencies must pay more attention to the socially deprived and marginalised people within society than to the politically suppressed. Socially isolated and dislocated people, like diaspora communities and prison populations. Although this is a very large group of people to monitor all at once, it helps if they consider the fact that terrorist groups are made up of social networks of friends and family members and knowing one of them is the key scope condition for entering the group.⁷⁵

Demand-side counter-terrorism strategies should target terrorism's social utility in two ways. First it is essential to drive a wedge between the terrorist groups' members by infiltrating the group and with that creating mistrust and resentment among the members. By attacking the social bonds within the group, you attack one of the main reasons for a group to exist and with it you dismantle the movement from the inside out. One of the tactics to accomplish this was by using agent provocateurs. An agent provocateur is a person used by intelligence agencies or the police to infiltrate in a group and provoke the members into practising illegal actions. These agents were also used to discredit certain groups or members of these groups.

Second, governments should invest in the alienated and marginalised groups of society. They 'must reduce the demand for at-risk populations to turn to terrorist organizations in the first place.'⁷⁶ Hateful regimes or parties which are founded on the discrimination of one group (like the Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV in the Netherlands), are harmful not just for the discriminated party, but also for counter-terrorism. It is important to create a platform for these marginalised groups, and to incorporate them into societies. To allow them their different houses of prayer or clubhouses, union houses or parties where they can meet other moderates. We only have to look at the riots in the Veldhuizen district of Ede (Netherlands), where Moroccan youth were rioting for days because of the closure of one of their favourite teahouses where they used to come together,⁷⁷ to see the immediate impact of such deprivation. Social and incorporative measures help reduce the incentives for terrorism by minimising its social benefits. With it governments also minimise the feelings of social and ideological deprivation, diminishing the chance of terrorist movements arising in the first place.

⁷⁵ Abrahms, M., What terrorists really want, pp. 103-104

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 104

⁷⁷ Dekker, M., 'Lekker kloten op straat' in Ede, *NRC Handelsblad*, May 5, 2016 retrieved from: *http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/2016/05/1618586*

In 'Theater van de angst'⁷⁸ Beatrice de Graaf also explains the role of communication, imaging and persuasiveness of government policy in the deradicalisation of terrorist movements. According to her terrorists want 'theatre', they want provocations. Their effect, therefore, stands or falls with our reaction. Although this reaction is partly determined by public opinion, the media and their shocking images of terrorist attacks, the reaction and imaging are also determined by the government and government policy. She calls this the *performative power* of terrorism and counterterrorism. Performative power or the performativity of the national government is the extent to which that government succeeds in mobilising public and political support and influencing national discourse and imaging of terrorism and counterterrorism policies.⁷⁹

Indicators of performative position according to De Graaf are:

- 1. Priority of the topic
- 2. Degree of politicisation
- 3. Definition of the threat
- 4. Description of threat and presentation of policy
- 5. Link to the current discourse of enemy images
- 6. Mobilisation of the population
- 7. The creation and deployment of new special units responsible for detection, suppression or arrests of terrorists
- 8. Introduction of special terrorism laws and other anti-terrorism measures
- 9. Reviewing and strengthening of existing legislation
- 10. Organising publicity campaigns around major terrorism trials
- 11. Emphasizing tough approach, refusing compromise
- 12. Mental distance
- 13. Perception of risk to oneself
- 14. The degree of unique attention and interest⁸⁰

If these parameters were low in anti-terrorism strategy than the performative power of the policy was low and vice versa. Because most of the reports on police and intelligence matters have not been released yet, these reports will not be part of this research. This paper will look at the performative power of terrorist acts and of government policy as described in the media.

In her book De Graaf describes the anti-terrorism policies of four different countries: The Netherlands, Italy, Germany and America. Each country has a different approach to terrorism and

⁷⁸ Translation: Theatre of fear

⁷⁹ De Graaf, B., *Theater van de angst, de strijd tegen terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, Italië en Amerika* (Amsterdam 2010), p. 139 and pp. 265-266

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 142-144

each policy has its own effectivity. According to De Graaf an approach with a low performative power was the most effective.⁸¹

In Italy the performative power of terrorism and terrorism policies was quite high. There was a high degree of politicisation of terror and a high level of mobilisation of the people which lead to great polarisation within Italian society. This made that a wide spectrum of social disturbances and (violent) actions were described by the government and the media as (potential) terrorist violence, but the government did not respond accordingly.⁸²

There was no clear counter-terrorism policy in Germany during the seventies. In those years propaganda, media hysteria and incident politics determined German terrorism discourse. Structural economic and political crises and announcements of future ecological disasters lead to reactive crisis management. The nervousness in counter-terrorism policies from the government, the repetitive call for tougher measures and the strong reactions to terrorism and counter-terrorism policies from the German media and the German people made for a polarised society in which the performative power of terrorism and terrorism policies was high.⁸³

American counter-terrorism policy during the seventies was characterised by an unprecedented deployment of intelligence agencies and sabotage of terrorist groups even suspending certain privacy privileges of the American people. President Nixon even declared his war on terrorism (which was repeated by President Bush Jr. in the zeros). But his paranoid approach to all groups and governments which were not in line with his own views, made that his anti-terrorism policies were unsustainable. The exaggeration of the threat of youth organisations and foreign governments, without any founded arguments on foreign espionage and sabotage, and the Watergate scandal of the early seventies, which undermined his credibility, made that Nixon's anti-terrorism policy with high performative power was doomed for failure.⁸⁴

As an example of a policy with low performative power De Graaf uses the Dutch approach of the seventies. In The Netherlands the terrorism policy during the seventies of the twentieth century was a policy with a low performative power. The administrative and legislative landscape in the Netherlands was highly compartmentalised. Anti-terrorism policy was divided amongst various bodies like the Departments of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Culture, Recreation and Social Work, but also amongst police departments, city councils, mayors and social workers. This division of labour amongst the different bodies made sure that there was no unified anti-terrorist discourse.

The Dutch government also did not want too much influence from the Dutch population in the shaping of their anti-terrorism policy, for their input could be dangerous and ill-advised. They also

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 289-291

⁸² De Graaf, B., *Theater van de angst*, pp. 131-133

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 170-173

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 98-100

had little use for public violence and so their policy was, in the first place, one without violence using intelligence agencies, arrests and negotiations.

If there was no other way, they did not shun violent interventions, however, but always made sure that the public was informed as little as possible. The media was intentionally kept away from the scenes of terrorism. It was perceived by the Dutch government that security policy could best be designed and implemented in the political sidelines, without media attention. This reluctance by the government to involve the media in the anti-terrorism discourse was accepted by the media, and so the 'theatre' that terrorists need and crave for according to De Graaf was kept to a minimum.

Of course there would be commotion within the media and within society right after the terrorist attacks occurred, but in the long term and even medium term of a couple of months the attacks were not linked in public perception. Even after groups like 'De Rode Jeugd' (Red Youth) and Palestinian commandos had wreaked havoc with multiple bombings in 1972 one of the headlines in daily newspaper De Telegraaf in June 1973 was still 'Man met bommen op NS Station gepakt'.⁸⁵⁸⁶ Even though that man was a member of the well-known Red Youth packed with material for five pipebombs, the reactions in the media were extremely lukewarm, if not indifferent. The media did not even use the word terrorist for this incident. Terrorism was newsworthy, but apart from the reports on loose incidents a permanent 'terrorism' discourse, or discourse of threat did not arise.⁸⁷

The performative power of the Dutch anti-terrorism policy was low. Politicians only spoke to the media or the public about terrorism around the actual terrorist attacks. Striking was that when they spoke out, they spoke out very brief and to the point. No long-winded rhetoric or background stories, no mentioning of ethnic backgrounds, ideology or incentives, just the facts on what happened and who was responsible.

So for counter-terrorism policy to be successful a couple of things need to be taken into account. First, the social utility of a terrorist movement should be minimised. Infiltration into terrorist groups is necessary to create a wedge between the individuals and thus minimise the social aspects and social utility of the group. The social utility should also be minimised by making sure society is open to minorities and marginalised groups within that society, making sure polarisation is kept to a minimum decreasing feelings of social and ideological deprivation making terrorist organisations redundant. Second, the performative power of counter-terrorism strategies needs to be kept low. Terrorists need their 'Theatre of Fear' and by keeping the performative power of counter-terrorism strategies low you keep away the audience from the terrorists' show. Because the number of actions of the SNLA and its effects do not compare with actions like those of, for example, the Rote Armee

⁸⁵ Translation: Man with bomb caught on NS Railway Station.

⁸⁶ De Graaf, B., *Theater van de angst*, pp. 35-52

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 44

Fraktion, the IRA or the ETA, the only thing that can be said of the performativity of the SNLA and the counter-terrorism measures regarding the SNLA is whether the indicators of performative power were present to a greater or lesser extent.

For this research the social utility of terrorist movements and performative power of counterterrorism policy are important, because they can help us find out why the SNLA never grew out to be a large scale terrorist organisation. Could it be that the reason why most people have never heard of the Scottish National Liberation Army be that their social utility was minimised? And what was the performative power of counterterrorism policy of the British government during the years between the two Referendums on Scottish independence? This paper will shed light on these two things in order to try and figure out why the SNLA never grew out to be a large-scale terrorist organisation.

Scotland and Scottish nationalism 1979-1983: Prelude to Referendum, outcome of the Referendum and the first years of SNLA

No one in the mid-1970s can doubt that Scottish [nationalism has] established a firm foothold in the political life of the United Kingdom. Indeed, with the present Labour administration's commitment to establish [a Scottish Assembly], the impact of the nationalists has already been sufficient to produce drastic alterations to the British constitutional structure.⁸⁸

2.1. Scotland 1979-1983: Referendum and Tories elected

Apparently that firm foothold of the nationalists' and Labour's commitment, as described in the quote from a year prior to the referendum, were not enough to actually realise a Scottish Assembly though. In February 1977 the Scotland and Wales Bill was introduced as a reaction of Labour to successes of the Scottish National Party during that period.⁸⁹ This bill intended to establish a directly elected Scottish and Welsh Assembly and a Scottish and Welsh Executive as a devolved legislature for those countries.⁹⁰ Devolution or home rule is the transfer of power from the central government of a sovereign state to an underlying sub-national level of government. The bill did not make it through Parliament at that time, so they introduced two separate bills for the countries in November of that year which did make it through Parliament by conceding a referendum. In 1978, however, the Cunningham Amendment was attached to the Scottish electorate had to support the Referendum for the Scotland Act to be honoured.⁹¹

On 1 March 1979 the first Referendum on Home Rule was held in Scotland. In 1978 in which 51.6 percent of the people who turned up to vote, voted in favour of a devolved Scotland.⁹²Although the nationalists technically won with a majority of the votes, the Scotland Act was still repealed. Only two-third of the Scottish electorate had turned up for the election and thus the proportion of the registered YES voters was only a third of the Scottish electorate and therefore not enough for the Scotland Act to be implemented.⁹³ As reporters of *The Glasgow Herald* put it: 'In Scotland a photo-

⁸⁸ Rawkins, P.M., Outsiders as Insiders: The Implications of Minority Nationalism in Scotland and Wales, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Jul., 1978), pp. 519-534, p. 519

 ⁸⁹ Leith, M.S. and Soule, D.P.J., *Political discourse and national identity in Scotland*, (Edinburgh 2012), pp. 32-33
 ⁹⁰ Lynch, P., *The History of the Scottish National Party*, (Cardiff 2013), pp. 145-160

⁹¹ Leith, M.S. and Soule, D.P.J., *Political discourse and national identity in Scotland*, pp. 32-33

⁹² Parkhouse, G. and Trotter, S., (1979), Split vote teaches Callaghan a lesson, *The Glasgow Herald*, 3 March, p.1

⁹³ Leith, M.S. and Soule, D.P.J., *Political discourse and national identity in Scotland*, pp. 32-33

finish result split the country three ways - a third voting Yes: a third voting No; and a third not bothering to vote at all.⁹⁴

		REN		\mid	X	
REGION	YES	NO	DID NOT VOTE	ELECTORATE AFTER DISCOUNT	TURNOUT	"YES" PROPORTION OF ELECTORATE
Strathclyde	596,519	508,599	37%	1,750,299	63%	34%
Lothian	187,221	186,421	33%	561,234	67%	33%
Grampian	94,944	101,485	42%	339,881	58%	28%
Tayside	91,482	93,325	36%	290,076	64%	32%
Fife	86,252	74,436	· 35%	243,485	65%	35%
Central	71,296	59,105	34%	195,673	66%	36%
Highland	44,973	43,2/4	35%	134,997	65%	33%
Dumfries and Galloway	27,162	40,239	36%	104,085	64%	26%
Borders ·	20,746	30,780	33%	76,742	67%	27%
Western Isles	6,218	4,933	50%	22,127	· 50%	28%
Shetland	2,020	5,466	50%	• 14,724	50%	14%
Orkney	2,104	. 5,439	45%	13,789	55%	15%
SCOTLAND	1,230,937	1,153,502	36%	3,747,112	64%	32.8%

Table 2.1. Votes and percentages of the 1979 Referendum on Scottish Home Rule⁹⁵

Some Scots felt betrayed by the outcome of the Devolution Referendum and especially by the consequences of the Cunningham Amendment. In the 'Letters' section of *The Glasgow Herald* of 2 April 1979, a month after the Referendum, Robert Grubb writes: 'Sir, - "One is enough. One is a majority," the Prime Minister said in his ministerial broadcast. Except it would seem when the Scottish people were asked to vote for a small measure of self-government.'⁹⁶ In his letter Grubb refers to a comment made by Prime Minister James Callaghan on Margaret Thatcher's motion of no confidence which passed through the House of Commons with a majority of 311 to 310. Even in 1987 John Bonner still remembered the 'unforgivable betrayal' of the 'Scot who betrayed Scotland'.⁹⁷ The Scot he was referring to in his letter to *The Glasgow Herald* was London Based Member of Parliament (MP), George Cunningham, who imposed the 40 percent rule in 1978, therefore the clause was named the Cunningham Amendment.

Even politicians of parties like the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Labour felt deprived of a Scottish Assembly by the Amendment.⁹⁸ In spite of the outcome of the Referendum, Labours 'Yes' campaigners and the SNP still pressed the Government to go ahead with setting up an Assembly in

 ⁹⁴ Parkhouse, G. and Trotter, S., (1979), Split vote teaches Callaghan a lesson, *The Glasgow Herald*, 3 March, p.1
 ⁹⁵ Ibid., p.1

⁹⁶ Grubb, R., The memory lingers on, *The Glasgow Herald*, Apr 2, 1979 p.6

⁹⁷ Bonner, J., Scot who betrayed Scotland, *The Glasgow Herald*, Mar 26, 1987, p.10

⁹⁸ Hetherington, Peter, Nats and Labour press for assembly, *The Guardian (1959-2003)*; Mar 3, 1979, p.1;

Edinburgh.⁹⁹ Eleven Scottish Nationalist MPs even threatened to 'bring down the Government and force a General Election'¹⁰⁰ if the plans for a Scottish Assembly were not put into action. They shared MP Martin Flannery's opinion that: 'A simple majority prevails throughout Democracy and the 40% (required under the Scotland Act) was an utter nonsense. We should take steps to set up the Assembly as soon as we get back to Parliament.'¹⁰¹ Labour and the SNP never lived up to these notions, however, and the outcome of the British general election two months after the referendum definitely did not bode well for any further action by the central government to pursue a devolved Scotland.

One of the main reasons the pro-devolution parties thought that a devolved Scottish Government could rise and survive was the North Sea oil found in Scottish waters in the late 1960s. The economic boost the oil could have given to the Scottish economy was big enough for parties like the SNP to believe that a devolved Scotland could survive.¹⁰² So with the loss of the referendum, the realisation came that the profits of the new found oil would not fall into the hands of a devolved Scottish Government and thus not in the hands of the Scots, but in the hands of Westminster. This sense of deprivation within Scottish society only increased when two months after the Referendum the Conservatives won the General Election on 3 May 1979.

During the sixties of the twentieth century, a series of regional policy initiatives had been pioneered in Scotland by successive Conservative and Labour governments. During the 1960's Scotland was a large beneficiary of the system of regional industrial development and by 1975 the whole of Scotland was eligible for support. 'A series of growth poles was designated and major industrial developments lured to Scotland, including the steel plant at Ravenscraig, the vehicle plants at Lindwood and Bathgate, the aluminium smelter at Invergordon and the pulp mill at Corpach.

The Scottish Office, a department of the United Kingdom Government initially created by the British state in 1885 to oversee local Scottish affairs like health care, education and poor relief, gradually gained more powers in industrial planning and sponsorship and in 1975 the Scottish Development Agency was set up as a central government agency, with a remit to develop industry, improve the environment and regenerate urban areas. North Sea oil production, starting in the 1970s, was transforming north-east Scotland and government policy, in the face of nationalist pressure, sought to tap the benefits for other parts of Scotland by establishing a state-owned oil company headquartered in Glasgow.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Our Correspondent, It's an Assembly or else--SNP, The Observer (1901- 2003); Mar 4, 1979, p.2;

¹⁰⁰ 40 Labour MPs threaten to defy whip on devolution, *The Irish Times (1921-Current File)*; Mar 5, 1979, p.7 ¹⁰¹ Ibid.

 ¹⁰² McCrone, D., Understanding Scotland, the sociology of a stateless nation, (1992, London), pp. 31-32, 164
 ¹⁰³ Keating, M., Nations against the state, the new politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland,

⁽Basingstoke, 2001), p. 245

When the Conservatives under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to power in the early eighties, all of this state-sponsored reindustrialisation came to an end. The Conservative government of Thatcher even reversed most of the benefits closing plants and mines, like Ravenscraig Steelworks and Cardowan Colliery. Scotland was hit particularly hard by a severe recession, which was being aggravated by government policy. Unemployment rose rapidly, regional development grants were cut back and the government shifted its attention to measures facilitating private sector growth and set up a programme of privatisation.¹⁰⁴

In Scotland, the reversal of Scottish benefits and the privatisation of Scottish industries and revision of state institutions like the nationalised industries, the education system, local governments and even the church, was seen as an attack on Scotland and Scottish identity.¹⁰⁵ Together with the failure of the Referendum of 1979 these measures by the Conservative government formed the basis for the formation and actions of the SNLA.

2.2. The SNLA from 1979-1983: Start-up and organisation

According to the anonymous SNLA source, whose information is the key to David Leslie's unpublished book, *Inside A Terrorist Group: The Story Of The SNLA, the Scottish National Liberation Army* came into existence in December 1980. 'Its formation followed a series of strictly confidential meetings at the SNP Club in Edinburgh attended by people who felt that the outcome of the Devolution referendum demanded a definite response, and a complete change of strategy in Scotland.'¹⁰⁶ According to the source, the SNLA had five founding members of which Adam Busby was one and Douglas Ross, the publican of the Swiss Cottage pub in Edinburgh, was another. He does not give the names of the other three founding members as they were allegedly still active in the SNLA at the time of the interview for the book. According to the source, founder Douglas Ross died under mysterious circumstances not long after the operations of the 'Dark Harvest Commando'. The source also claims that lawyer Willie McRae, who also died under mysterious circumstances in 1985, had not been one of the founding members of the SNLA, but that he had been a very early associate of the movement.¹⁰⁷

In 1981 the SNLA, or rather a proto-SNLA group going by the name of 'Dark Harvest Commando', made its first move. In October 1981 they dumped a package of soil containing anthrax spores outside Porton Down (a United Kingdom government military science park) and near the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool. The group claimed it would drop more anthrax at

¹⁰⁴ Keating, M., Nations against the state, p. 244-247

¹⁰⁵ McCrone, D., Understanding Scotland, the sociology of a stateless nation, pp.169-273

¹⁰⁶ Leslie. D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 11

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 13

'appropriate points' in the twelve following months. They claimed to have taken three hundred pounds of contaminated soil from the Scottish island of Gruinard to 'send the seeds of death back where they came from'¹⁰⁸.

Initially the media were informed that the contaminated soil came from the island of Gruinard, but after the British government confirmed that the earth indeed did contain anthrax Dark Harvest Commando revealed that they had not taken the soil from the island. Instead they claimed they had taken the contaminated soil from the mainland across from the island. A couple of members from this proto-SNLA group had gone to the island to make sure it looked as if they had dug up the soil from there, but in fact they had taken two large sacks of contaminated earth from the mainland. As a result the government had to admit that the situation on and surrounding the island was not as safe as they had claimed it was and started a decontamination operation of Gruinard island. During World War II the British government had tested anthrax as a potential biological weapon on the uninhabited island of Gruinard which lies just off the North West Coast of Scotland. The British authorities had always denied that any Anthrax had spread from the testing area, Gruinard Island, to the Scottish mainland, but with this 'proof' from the SNLA they could no longer deny this and had to start the decontamination process.¹⁰⁹

After the success of the Dark Harvest Operation the members of the group decided to use the name Scottish National Liberation Army 'because it signifies total Independence and a National Revolution which rejects all things British - and to begin the SNLA campaign as soon as possible on an appropriate and significant date.¹¹⁰ The campaign of the SNLA officially began in the spring of 1982. On the symbolic date of 1 March 1982, three years after the nationalists defeat at the Referendum, the SNLA made its first move under the name Scottish National Liberation Army. They planted hoax bombs in Edinburgh which created a great disruption in the city's centre. On 17 March 1982 the SNLA sent a letter bomb to Defence Secretary John Nott. The SNLA telephoned a Scottish newspaper saying they sent the device because of the Governments agreement on the Trident nuclear missiles. But these actions went virtually unreported in the newspapers until a couple of years later.¹¹¹ On 19 March the SNLA sent two letter bombs to the Social Democratic Party offices in Edinburgh and Glasgow. The Social Democratic Party, a centrist and 'moderate' party which had been founded in 1981, got a lot of media attention during their first years and was therefore a good 'prestige target' for the SNLA.¹¹² In terms of propaganda this was a well-placed attack by the SNLA. They got the

¹⁰⁸ A Staff Reporter, *The Guardian*, Oct 14, 1981, p. 1

¹⁰⁹ Leslie. D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 12

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 13

¹¹¹ Murray Scott, A., Macleay, I., Britains secret war, Tartan terrorism and the Anglo-American state,

⁽Edinburgh, 1990), pp.134-135

¹¹² Leslie. D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 15

media attention they longed for and while achieving that goal they hurt 'just another British political party, and this made them a legitimate target. So fuck them.'¹¹³ A fortnight before the letter bombs were sent, the SNLA sent a note to the SDP office in Edinburgh saying: 'The safest place for an English middle-class party is in England, and you will soon find out.'¹¹⁴

The Edinburgh bomb was demolished in the streets by a bomb squad. This bombing got a lot of media coverage and brought the SNLA their wanted recognition. Although on 18 March the newspapers mentioned the bombings as being conducted by 'a Scottish Nationalist organisation'¹¹⁵, the name of the Scottish National Liberation Army was first used in several newspapers during the days that followed the letter bombs of 19 March.¹¹⁶

In November 1982 another letter bomb was sent by the SNLA. This time it was addressed to Mr. Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of Industry. The letter bomb was delivered at the Norman Shaw building near the House of Commons and was discovered by a secretary who found the package suspicious. The secretary called the police and a bomb disposal expert from Scotland Yard handled and diffused the bomb. According to a spokesman 'there was no doubt this could have killed someone. It was similar to others sent to politicians in the past.'¹¹⁷

The SNLA probably targeted Jenkin because as Secretary of Industry he was 'responsible for the future of the steel industry and therefore the future of Ravenscraig'.¹¹⁸ Ravenscraig steelworks in Motherwell, Lankashire, was a symbol of hope to Scotland for Scottish industrial renewal.¹¹⁹ According to Jenkin, the closure of Ravenscraig and four other plants was 'the only way to restore the British Steel Corporation and give it any hope of viability in the medium term'.¹²⁰ Even though *The Glasgow Herald* of 23 November 1982 immediately reported the letter bomb to have been made and sent by the SNLA, *The Guardian* quoted a secretary spokesperson stating that it was 'probably sent by someone with a personal grudge'.¹²¹

On 23 November 1982 the SNLA officially claimed the attack on Jenkin along with a couple of other 'bombings' in a letter sent to the Glasgow office of the Press Association. An article in *The Irish Times* of 24 November 1982 stated the following:

¹¹³ Leslie. D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 15

¹¹⁴ Letter bombs sent to SDP offices, *The Irish Times*, Mar 20, 1982, p. 6

¹¹⁵ Brown, P., Letter bomb sent to John Nott, *The Guardian*, Mar 18, 1982, p.1

¹¹⁶ I.a. *The Irish Times, The Guardian, The Glasgow Herald*.

¹¹⁷ Russel, W., Bomb sent in post to Jenkin, *The Glasgow Herald*, Nov 23, 1982, p.1

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Stewart, D., Fighting for survival, the 1980s campaign to save Ravenscraig steelworks, *The Journal of Scottish Historical Studies*, Volume 25, Issue 1, Page 40-57

¹²⁰ Jenkin in steel clash, *The Guardian*, Nov 23, 1982, p.4

¹²¹ Ibid.

As British police investigated a letter bomb sent to the Industry Secretary, Mr Patrick Jenkin, a group calling itself the Scottish National Liberation Army yesterday claimed responsibility for 10 bomb incidents over the last eight months. The list included a claim to have sent a bomb to Queen Elizabeth at Buckingham Palace on July 19th which went "totally unreported". In their letter, received at the Glasgow office of PA, the SNLA claimed responsibility for what it described as "bomb scares" in Edinburg on March 1st, three letter bombs sent to the Defence Secretary, Mr John Nott, and two to SDP offices on March 17th and 19th. It also claimed that incendiary bombs placed at the Scottish Assembly during the sitting of the Scottish Grand Committee on May 24th and the Conservative Party's London HQ on August 10th went "virtually unreported". It stated the British army blew up a device outside the Tory Party's Edinburgh HQ on June 19th. --(PA)¹²²

On that same day The Guardian came with a similar article on the ten bomb claims made by the SNLA.¹²³ It could be said that these articles raised the level of performativity surrounding the SNLA and its actions, by listing the various attacks and bundling them into one article and even listing attacks which had not been in the newspapers before. The Glasgow Herald on the other hand, placed quite a different article on the claims made by the SNLA on 24 November 1982. The title of the article was: 'A one-man 'Tartan Army' or real terrorist threat?' In this article the author, James Freeman, discussed whether there was cause to fear the SNLA. He wondered whether the SNLA was not just a one-man organisation, whether the ten bomb claims are not just an indication of 'the mind of a deranged crank'. He then compared the SNLA with the 'Tartan Army'¹²⁴ of the seventies which was responsible for a couple of bombings of pipelines and concludes with: 'The evidence so far in the case of the self-styled Scottish National Liberation Army appears insufficient to suggest cause for such alarm in this case or to suggest that the cancer is once again active.¹²⁵ So *The Guardian* and *The* Irish Times took the claims made by the SNLA regarding the bombs placed under the Scottish Grand Committee on May 24th and the Conservative Party's London HQ on the 10th of August of 1982 quite serious. They even linked the SNLA to the Tartan Army and listed the claims and attacks of the SNLA which would only increase its performativity, Glasgow Herald reporter Freeman was not yet convinced of the threat of the SNLA though.

In a letter to the Glasgow office of the Press Association the SNLA complained about the lack of attention they got on the alleged bombings of Buckingham Palace and the Conservative Party's London Headquarters that summer. Although there is no available evidence that these attacks ever

¹²² Scottish bombing claim, *The Irish Times*, Nov 24, 1982;

¹²³ Keel, P., Police in check on 10 bombs claim, *The Guardian*, Nov 24, 1982, p.3

¹²⁴ A collective noun for a couple of Scottish terrorist cells active in the 1970s. I.a. the Army of the Provisional Government, the Jacobites, the Scottish Legion, the Border Clan.

¹²⁵ Freeman, J. Home Affairs Reporter, A one-man 'Tartan Army' or real terrorist threat?', *The Glasgow Herald*, Nov 24, 1982, p.9

really took place, it says something about the attention, or lack thereof, the SNLA was getting in their own opinion. It is possible that the British government and the police forces or even Special Branches had been working together on keeping it from the public eye and were indeed keeping the performative power of the SNLA to a minimum. If the events claimed by the SNLA had indeed taken place like they claimed, the various agencies had been successful in keeping the attacks out of the media and thus out of the public eye.

The next year the SNLA made sure they would be taken seriously. The first action by the SNLA in 1983 was sending a letter bomb to Glasgow's Lord Provost, Michael Kelly, which was delivered on 17 February 1983. Although the letter bomb was addressed to Kelly, he was not the actual target. Lady Diana (then Princess of Wales) would visit the Lord Provost that same day. Earlier the SNLA had sent messages to the Glasgow BBC and Press Association stating that: 'A letter bomb has been sent as a protest at Lady Di's visit. More attacks will follow'.¹²⁶ Eric Hamilton, the Lord Provost's secretary, opened the padded envelope in which the letter bomb was sealed and it burst into flames. While Hamilton tried to stamp out the flames, a member of the curator staff came into the office with a fire extinguisher and put out the fire.¹²⁷ In the end nobody got hurt except for the carpet.

On 15 March 1983 the SNLA claimed they sent a letter bomb to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at 10 Downing Street. On the 16th of March Scotland Yard treated the attack as coming from a Ukrainian anarchist group called the Mahknos Anarchist Army. The newspapers reported accordingly that

Earlier yesterday the so-called Scottish National Liberation Army claimed responsibility for unspecified attacks yesterday and today in protest at steel closures in Scotland. [...] However, Scotland Yard is linking yesterday's bombs with those sent recently to the US and Soviet embassies in London [...] police appeared to be treating the SNLA claim as coincidence, while not ruling out the possibility that the group could also be sending letter bombs.¹²⁸

The action of the SNLA had been coincided with similar actions by the previously mentioned Ukrainian anarchist attacks on Soviet and US targets. The SNLA itself said that:

On one memorable occasion in 1983 three letter bombs were sent to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on three consecutive days. Only one of them was ours, and we think it was the second one.

¹²⁶ Hetherington, P., Bomb protest at princess's Scottish visit, *The Guardian*, Feb 18, 1983, p.3

¹²⁷ MacCalman, J., Letter bomb sent to Lord Provost, *The Glasgow Herald*, Feb 18, 1983, p.1

¹²⁸ Ukrainian anarchist link in No. 10 bomb, *The Glasgow Herald*, Mar 16, 1983, p.1

We don't know who sent the others. We targeted Thatcher on numerous occasions, usually getting quite close, and on one occasion a letter bomb ignited in a room only a few yards away from her.¹²⁹

The letter bomb had been prepared and posted in Glasgow on 12 May 1983 by David Dinsmore, a Falkirk youth of eighteen who had been a member of the SNLA for a year then. While posting the letter bomb, Dinsmore had been followed by detectives. He had been kept under strict surveillance since the police had identified him as a member of the SNLA. He was caught after posting the incendiary device in a post-box in North Hanover Street in Glasgow and delivering a letter to the Press Association there which said: 'The SNLA (Scottish National Liberation Army) claim the attacks on 13 and 14 May.'¹³⁰ The next morning he was arrested in Falkirk at his parents' home.¹³¹

On 17 March Scotland Yard acknowledged the claim made by the SNLA. A Scotland Yard spokesman said they treated the claim made on the 15th of March by the SNLA that, 'it would take action "within 24 hours" as a protest at the closure of steel works in Scotland'¹³² seriously, because the manufacturing of the bomb seemed very similar to that of the bomb sent to the Lord Provost office to protest Lady Di's visit a month earlier. A large scale police operation was under way the whole night in London as well as in Scotland to track down the SNLA members responsible for the attack on PM Thatcher. The bomb was believed to be a viable device. "It could have taken off a hand, or if close enough could have blown off half of a face."¹³³

This was not the only attack the SNLA had planned for Thatcher. Exactly one month later on 15 April, the SNLA sent a letter bomb to the hotel where the Prime Minister met with two hundred prospective Tory candidates for a private seminar and diner.¹³⁴ The SNLA sent the letter, claiming responsibility for the incendiary device to the Press Association's London offices. The letter said that the attacks were "in retaliation for cuts in Scots industry".¹³⁵ In addition to the attack on 15 April the SNLA claimed in that same letter that they were responsible for a bomb sent to the Army careers office in Penge, South London, on 5 April. At the time the actual bomb was planted and defused, there had not been any claim and the bomb was defused without anyone getting hurt, so the event passed without much media coverage.¹³⁶ Again it seems as if the authorities had been able to keep the identity of the perpetrator(s) of the bombing to themselves, or the SNLA was claiming a bomb which had not been of their making. The fact that Scotland Yard was paying attention to the SNLA

¹²⁹ Leslie. D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 15

¹³⁰ Caven, B., Time runs out for tartan terrorist, *The Herald Scotland*, Feb 9, 1994

¹³¹ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 19

¹³² Parry, G., Another letter bomb for Thatcher, *The Guardian*, Mar 17, 1983, p28

¹³³ McKillop, J., Second No. 10 bomb blamed on SNLA, *The Glasgow Herald*, Mar 17, 1983, p.1

¹³⁴ Early election unlikely after Thatcher speech, *The Irish Times*, 16 Apr 1983, p.5

¹³⁵ Bomb sent to Premier's hotel, *The Glasgow Herald*, Apr 16, 1983, p.1

¹³⁶ In the papers included in this research only a very small piece in *The Guardian* could be found on the matter on 6 April 1983. Bomb' defused, *The Guardian*, Apr 6, 1983, p.22

and that after these attacks they were even putting their anti-terrorism unit on the cases of the SNLA¹³⁷, however, leads us to believe that the authorities were indeed trying to keep the actions of the SNLA under the radar.

On the 3rd and 4th of June that same year, the SNLA hit again. This time by sending a letter bomb to Cecil Parkinson, chairman of the Conservative Party at the time, at the Tory Headquarters in London. The police later said that the bomb could have caused serious injuries had the main inflammable material caught fire. The London police also warned that the Conservatives should be careful, because more of these bombs could be sent during their election campaign. The SNLA claimed the attack again by sending a letter to the Press Association stating: 'Scottish National Liberation Army claims the London letter bomb attacks of 3-4 June.'¹³⁸

Firm and simple, that was how the SNLA announced its next move. "SNLA attacks on 28th and 29th."¹³⁹ The letter to the Fleet Street offices of the Press Association was posted in Glasgow. It announced a letter bomb addressed to the new Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, which was intercepted and defused at the House of Commons on 28 June.¹⁴⁰ At this time it seemed as if the police were taking the SNLA serious. They issued a stern warning to everyone handling the mail that day, for they feared a second attack. The incendiary device sent to Brittan was a protest by the SNLA to the visit of the royal family to Scotland. Even Scotland Yard seemed to take the attacks seriously now. The head of Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist squad, Commander William Hucklesby, and the Strathclyde police told the public to be on their guard for suspicious packages, because they might be made by the SNLA. The device was 'defused by police explosive officers, and taken away for examination by members of Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist branch, C13.'¹⁴¹ The police and anti-terrorist squad's warning was printed in *The Glasgow Herald* on 29 June 1983. In this article the first signs of actual fear for the SNLA and its growing activity can be seen. On *The Herald*'s front page the headline read: 'SNLA letter bomb starts fears of new campaign'. The article continued with the following:

The latest attack is bound to increase concern that Scottish extremists may be considering a more serious form of assault against important figures. Last winter a device exploded inside No. 10 Downing Street sparking off an immediate review of security arrangements. The Prime Minister was the target again in March, and the SNLA were blamed, but police refused to say where the letter was posted.

¹³⁷ Petrie, G., SNLA letter bomb starts fears of new campaign, *The Glasgow Herald*, Jun 29, 1983, p.1

¹³⁸ Staff Reporter, Tory HQ post bomb, *The Guardian*, Jun 4, 1983, p.1

¹³⁹ Bomb sent to Brittan, *The Irish Times*, Jun 29, 1983, p.5

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Petrie, G., SNLA letter bomb starts fears of new campaign, The Glasgow Herald

Following an attack on the Tory Party offices earlier this month, the SNLA claimed to have put a bomb under the platform of the City Halls in Perth aimed at killing Mrs. Thatcher. They maintained it had lain undetected for 25 days and was discovered 48 hours before the Prime Minister was due to launch her General Election campaign at the Scottish Tory Party conference.

An anonymous caller told the agency: "on April 16 an SNLA unit planted a six-pound plastic explosive device and sealed it in a veterinary medical chest under the City Hall stage during a Siamese cat show." It was claimed the bomb would have been detonated by remote control.

Tayside police refused to confirm or deny the incident and said: "We cannot comment on this, it is a security matter." However, the news agency reporter who received the call was later questioned closely. Police anti-terrorist officers believe the SNLA is modelled on its Irish counterpart, the INLA.¹⁴²

For police anti-terrorist officers to state that the SNLA might have been modelled on the INLA and even come out to a reporter to voice these suspicions shows that they were taking the threat seriously. And with that they were increasing the performative power of the SNLA. Before this article the SNLA had been mentioned in the newspapers, sometimes even in a belittling tone, but never before had it been written down as a power to be reckoned with.¹⁴³

So now the SNLA was getting some media coverage and were actually being taken seriously in the newspapers. Although the SNLA's announcement of the attack on the Home Secretary had not contained a message on why they planned the attack, one of the recurring topics in the announcements and protests by the SNLA was the decline of the Scottish industry. In 1982 the SNLA protested against the closure of Ravenscraig steel works and in August 1983 they protested against the closure of Cardowan Colliery coal mine.

The mining industry in Scotland did not fare very well during the eighties and the National Coal Board wanted to close the Cardowan Colliery at Stepps, near Glasgow.¹⁴⁴ The coal mine suffered heavy losses and over a thousand miners would lose their job if it were up to the National Coal Board. "NO MORE CUTS" was what the SNLA had to say to the ruling of the board. In a letter to the Press Association in Glasgow the SNLA announced their attack with the words "SNLA Attack on 19-20. NO MORE CUTS."¹⁴⁵ The SNLA lived up to their threat and sent a letter bomb to the manager of the coal mine on the 19th of August. Following this attack *The Glasgow Herald* wrote an article on the letter bomb to the manager and also listed the attacks by the SNLA by date. Starting with their first attack under the name Scottish National Liberation Army in March 1982.

¹⁴² Petrie, G., SNLA letter bomb starts fears of new campaign, *The Glasgow Herald*

¹⁴³ Not in the newspapers examined for this paper.

¹⁴⁴ Bomb sent to Scottish mine manager, *The Guardian*, Aug 20, 1983, p.3

¹⁴⁵ Gray, I., 'Attack' warning as letter bomb sent to threatened pit, *The Glasgow Herald*, Aug 20, 1983

1983 was a very, if not the most, active year for the SNLA. Two weeks after the letter bomb at Cardowan Colliery they sent another two letter bombs. One to the British Employment Secretary, Norman Tebbit, and one to George Younger, Secretary of State for Scotland.¹⁴⁶ The discovery of the two letter bombs would, according to an article in *The Guardian* on September 8, lead to a crossborder police investigation on the SNLA. On 27 October another letter bomb, addressed to Employment Secretary Tom King, was intercepted in Glasgow. Again the SNLA claimed the attack with a very short but clear note: "SNLA attacks take place now. More will follow."¹⁴⁷

The last attack claimed by the SNLA in 1983 was the first with real casualties. A bomb, believed to be about 15lb. of commercial explosive, ripped through the perimeter wall of the Royal Artillery barracks at Woolwich, injuring five people.¹⁴⁸ This attack, however, was also the attack of which authorities were not sure whether it was an actual SNLA attack or whether the IRA or the Irish National Liberation Army was behind it. 'A man with a strong Scottish accent telephoned the Press Association, gave a code word and warned: "more will follow." But police and military experts last night held the view that the blast could herald an IRA Christmas offensive.'¹⁴⁹ On 12 December *The Guardian* also came with an article in which they announced that senior officers still believed that the attacks were carried out by the IRA rather than by the SNLA.¹⁵⁰

Three days later, however, *The Guardian* came with another article on the matter in which they wrote that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner Kenneth Newman issued an appeal to Londoners 'to be his eyes and ears in the search for terrorist bombers'.¹⁵¹ In that same article reporter David Pallister wrote that: 'Without a claim of responsibility for recent attacks from Ireland, the police face the daunting prospect that the Scottish National Liberation Army has acquired the expertise to mount a serious and sustained campaign in the capital.' Although anti-terrorist experts established similarities in design with earlier IRA bombs, they did not rule out the possibility that the SLNA 'have moved on from incendiary letters with some help from Belfast. [...] If the Provisionals or the Irish National Liberation Army have an active service unit in England it would be uncharacteristic of them not to make a claim within a few days.'¹⁵²

Later that December David Dinsmore, the eighteen year old member of the SNLA who had been involved in and arrested for his preparation and posting of the letter bomb on 12 May, fled to Dublin after he failed to appear for trial in Glasgow on the 5th of December. ¹⁵³ Adam Busby (1948)¹⁵⁴, one of

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Letter bombs sent to two Ministers, *The Irish Times*, Sep 8, 1983, p.5

¹⁴⁷ 'Bomb' sent to minister, *The Guardian*, Oct 27, 1983

¹⁴⁸ Freeman, J., Why police doubt SNLA claim over Woolwich blast, *The Glasgow Herald*, Dec 12, 1983, p.7

¹⁴⁹ A Staff Reporter, IRA bomb fear, *The Observer*, Dec 11, 1983, p.1

¹⁵⁰ Parry, G., Army blames IRA for attack despite Scottish group's claim, *The Guardian*, Dec 12, 1983, p.30

¹⁵¹ Pallister, D., Newman urges public bomb watch, *The Guardian*, Dec 15, 1983, p.2

¹⁵³ Letter-bomb charge, *The Irish Times*, Dec 6, 1983, p.4

the founders of the SNLA, also escaped to Ireland around that time. He was arrested for painting anti-British slogans on a Royal Navy lorry before in Scotland, but skipped bail and moved to Ireland where he continued his work with the SNLA.¹⁵⁵ When the two were arrested by the Dublin Police for shoplifting, they were recognised as the wanted men they were and faced extradition to Scotland. Busby fought the case and beat the order on appeal. Dinsmore, however, faced serious bombing charges and extradition, and went into hiding in 1984.¹⁵⁶

Another SNLA member Thomas Kelly, a 28-year-old shipyard worker who made only eighty pounds a week as a plater, was also tried and even convicted a month later.¹⁵⁷ The Scottish letter bomber was arrested on 1 October 1983 and gaoled for ten years at the Glasgow High Court on 25 January 1984. Kelly, like Dinsmore and Busby, had been involved in the Scottish Republican Party. The Scottish Republican Socialist Party (SRSP) was founded by SNLA founder Adam Busby in late 1982 as a movement to promote non-constitutional and anti-constitutional activities such as non-violent direct action. The group proved a great disappointment to Adam Busby, however, for it had been inundated by pro-SNP elements and people, some of whom were informers who later testified against SNLA suspects in court, like Dinsmore, Busby and Kelly. Adam Busby had already abandoned the group in early 1983, because of the 'soft character' it developed under the pro-SNP elements Dinsmore and Kelly followed^{.158}

Thomas Kelly was arrested for making two bombs addressed to Norman Tebbit. Bernard Goodwin, an ex-police cadet and voluntary Special Branch plant, infiltrated the SNLA and prevented the bombs from being sent. He tipped off the police at Kelly's every move and Goodwin's house was bugged so the police could listen in on his conversations with Kelly. Goodwin, also a member of the Scottish Republican Socialist Party, became alarmed when signs of violence were emerging at republican meetings. Because of the arrest of two other members of the SRSP, Busby and Dinsmore, he went to the police and acted as their spy for three months.

In these three months he had been able to infiltrate and gain high office in both the SRSP and the SNLA, while keeping in close contact with the Special branch.¹⁵⁹ After his involvement in the arrest and trial of Kelly, the life of Goodwin had been threatened and during the trial Goodwin was under police protection. In *The Glasgow Herald* of 26 January it even says that 'Scottish newspapers have

¹⁵⁴ Derived from newspaper articles which mention his age during the years.

¹⁵⁵ Accused jumps bail, *The Guardian*, Oct 17, 1984, p. 2

¹⁵⁶ MacRea, C., Murky world of tartan terror, *The Observer*, Jul 23, 1989, p.A7

¹⁵⁷ Freeman, J,. Threat to 'supergrass', The Glasgow Herald, Jan 26, 1984, p. 9

¹⁵⁸ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group*, pp. 19-22

¹⁵⁹ Freeman, J., 10 years for extremist who made letter bombs, *The Glasgow Herald*, Jan 26, 1984, p. 1

agreed to co-operate with a request from Strathclyde Police's Assistant Chief Constable, Crime, Mr John Boyd, not to publish photographs of Mr Goodwin.¹⁶⁰

Goodwin described his life with Kelly as a 'life of stress".¹⁶¹ He told the court that he was invited by Kelly to join a three-man cell in the SNLA and that Kelly proclaimed that David Dinsmore and Adam Busby had been the "most successful letter bombers in Scottish history", but that "both were on the run from trials in Scotland and England". Kelly also proclaimed to Goodwin that there was "an escape route to Dublin" for Scottish bombers and that they were looked after by the Irish National Liberation Army, with whom they had close links. He also alleged Kelly had said that he was in touch with Dinsmore in Dublin and that Dinsmore was going to send him "powerful stuff," which he took to mean gelignite.¹⁶²

Although Kelly first tried to deny his involvement in the attacks, on the 25th he confessed his deeds and his cause: 'to publicise the Scottish independence' and achieve 'an independent socialist republic of Scotland'.¹⁶³ On this third day of the trial, Kelly had changed his plea to guilty and admitted making an explosive package intended to send to Trade Secretary Norman Tebbit with the intent to cause injury, terror and alarm. That package exploded inside the house where Kelly was staying at that moment though, the house of Goodwin (who still lived at his mother's) in Glasgow. During the trial it was also said that Kelly had been politically motivated and had indeed been associated with the SNLA. Although this was the first time an SNLA member was convicted for crimes linked to the SNLA, it would not be the last time.¹⁶⁴

Looking at the actions of the SNLA in the years 1982-1983 there are a few characteristics that stand out during this period. First, the SNLA seemed rather organised (hence the term 'Organised Period'). Well-planned attacks and clear warnings on when and where they would strike. They knew of the whereabouts of their targets and when and how they could best hurt them. The SNLA also used code words for their claims, so they would be taken seriously. Second, the SNLA had clear goals during this period, besides of course their main goal of an independent Scotland. The actions against the closure of Ravenscraig Steelworks and Cardowan Colliery are examples of their organised and idealistic protest. Third, the SNLA clearly consisted of more than one person, as this period contains the arrest of three of its members and was thus not, like James Freeman suggested, a 'One man 'Tartan Army'.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ Freeman, J,. Threat to 'supergrass', *The Glasgow Herald*

¹⁶¹ Informer quizzed on Special Branch, *The Glasgow Herald*, Jan 25, 1984, p.1 & p.5

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Scottish letter bomber gaoled for 10 years, *The Guardian*, Jan 26, 1984, p.2

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Freeman, J., Home Affairs Reporter, A one-man 'Tartan Army' or real terrorist threat?', *The Glasgow Herald*, Nov 24, 1982, p.9




Table 2.2. Dates and deeds of the SNLA 1980-1983*

*Table shows all claimed and unclaimed actions ascribed to the SNLA

2.3. Terrorism, Relative Deprivation and Resource Mobilisation

In the previous paragraph the actions of the SNLA have been listed and described. This paragraph will first look at whether these actions were terrorist actions. Second, it will look at the examples of relative deprivation that can be seen within Scottish society from which the SNLA arose and third it will look at whether the members of the SNLA used resource mobilisation to further the growth of the SNLA.

As has been said in the previous chapter of this paper, terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence. On the other hand it refers to a conspiratorial practice of organised, calculated demonstrative direct violent action without legal or moral restraints. It targets mainly civilians and

non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. It can either be perpetrated by a group or a lone wolf.¹⁶⁶

One thing that is clear is that the SNLA existed of more than one person during the period from 1981 to 1983. Busby, Dinsmore and Kelly were at least three of its members who have been reported in the newspapers during that time. But to which extend were the actions of the SNLA terrorist actions? During these years the SNLA carried out twenty-two actions, almost all of which were aimed at royal, political or industrial officials. The only attack not aimed directly at one of these types of officials was their first action after Operation Dark Harvest, the bomb hoaxes in the city centre of Edinburgh. Although they were not real bombs, they were aimed at disrupting society and spreading fear within Scottish society. Striking is though, that this is the only attack in those years that was not directed at one of the abovementioned types of officials.

The attacks aimed at these officials were all attacks in retaliation for government policy or industrial decision-making. This diminished the fear-generating aspect of the SNLA. One can imagine that the level of fear for a movement increases when everyone is a possible target. If the SNLA were to target people with no direct link to these policies, like at an airport of subway station during the 2016 Brussels Bombings, the fear-generating aspect would have been greater. So it seems as if the SNLA does show some moral restraint as to which people they target.

Legal restraint, however is not shown, for the actions of the SNLA are all illegal actions. During this period the SNLA also showed some level of organisation in the design and execution of their plans. During the trial of Thomas Kelly, special branch agent Goodwin was even invited by Kelly to join his three-man cell. The SNLA also knew about the whereabouts of their targets and when and how to strike them. The SNLA was thus a terrorist movement during this period to the extent of it being a movement which used organised, calculated demonstrative direct violent action without legal restraints. The SNLA targeted mainly civilians and non-combatants, with the purpose of propaganda and urging the UK government to do something about the independence of Scotland and the perceived wrong they did to Scotland and the Scottish people by eroding Scottish heavy industries.

Which brings us to why the SNLA arose and perpetrated its actions in the first place. According to the relative deprivation theory feelings of relative deprivation arise when desires become legitimate expectations and those desires are blocked by society, the government, or other institutions.¹⁶⁷ The emergence of the SNLA was due to the outcome of the referendum on Home Rule in 1979. In the case of the 1979 referendum a clear case of relative deprivation can be seen. The Scotland Act had,

¹⁶⁶ Schmid, A.P., *The Routledge handbook of terrorism research*, (New York, 2013), p. 86

For a complete overview of 'The revised academic consensus definition of terrorism' see Appendix I ¹⁶⁷ Flynn, S., Relative Deprivation Theory, In: *Sociology reference guide. Theories of social movements.*, (Pasadena 2011), p. 100

at first, meant a devolved legislation for Scotland if there would have been a majority of the votes in favour of the Scotland Act. It was only for the Cunningham Amendment, added at the last-minute to get the bill through congress, that the outcome in which a majority of the votes indeed voted YES was not honoured because of the forty percent rule stipulated in this amendment.

The gap between what the SNLA wanted, for the Scotland Act to be honoured, and what they got, the Scotland act being repealed had become intolerable to some. Because the SNLA itself so clearly states that this was the reason for them to come together for the first time and conduct their (violent) plans it can be argued that the opportunity that arose, the failure of the referendum, has greatly contributed to the emergence of the SNLA. The period from the Referendum to the appointment of Thatcher as Prime Minister can be seen as the first period of relative deprivation. In this period the feelings of deprivation surrounding the outcome of the referendum were the reason for the members of the SNLA to found the SNLA.

When Thatcher came to power the feelings of deprivation only increased .The actions of the SNLA kept coming forth from relative deprivation and were often a direct reaction to governmental decisions. Like the letter bomb to Secretary of State Patrick Jenkin, which was sent to him in retaliation of the closure of Ravenscraig steelworks. Or the multitude of bombs sent to members of the Conservatives because of the deprivation felt by the SNLA surrounding Conservative policy which hit Scotland, its industries and people harder than their English counterparts. The coming to power of the Conservatives with Thatcher as their Prime Minister was also a political opportunity which only intensified the relative deprivation felt by members of the SNLA. This sense of deprivation was felt by more Scots than just the members of the SNLA however. Anti-Thatcherism was visible within the whole of Scottish society.

Resource mobilisation proved to be a lot harder to determine in relation to the SNLA than the relative deprivation from which the SNLA arose. Resource mobilisation is the deployment of resources by the members of the movement in service of that movement. The SNLA was a small movement with only a few members and even fewer members of whom the identity was actually known and it was thus pretty difficult to determine whether resources were being mobilised.

The members of the SNLA which were active during the period from 1980 to 1983, and whose names are known, were: David Dinsmore, Adam Busby, Douglas Ross, Willie McRae and Thomas Kelly. David Dinsmore, an unemployed young man who became involved in nationalist politics and fell in with older people in the SRSL and the SNLA¹⁶⁸; Adam Busby, the middle-class, politically active founder of the Scottish Republican Socialist League (which he left, because it was not militant

¹⁶⁸ Caven, B., Time runs out for tartan terrorist, *The Herald Scotland*, Feb 9, 1994

enough) and founder of the SNLA¹⁶⁹; Douglas Ross, the publican of the Swiss Cottage pub in Edinburgh;¹⁷⁰ Willie McRae, a lawyer in his late fifties and 'elder statesman' of the SNP¹⁷¹, and; Thomas Kelly, a 28-year-old shipyard worker and also formerly politically active in the SRSL together with Busby¹⁷². During the Kelly trial a three-man SNLA cell was also mentioned, from which could be derived that there may have been more active members of the SNLA during that period.

These short descriptions of the members of the SNLA do resemble the description given on terrorists in the previous chapter, terrorists being usually middle- to upper-class (Busby, Ross, McRae) and appear to be motivated by political-ideological resentments rather than economic distress(Busby, Ross, McRae, Kelly). They are people who do not fit in, who are socially isolated and, in their own eyes, do not fit in to their surroundings or have the feeling they are not accepted by the society they live in (Dinsmore was a young man, who had left school and had been unemployed for two years before joining the SNLA in which he found like-minded people).

During its foundation the members of the SNLA ran into the problem of what to do, and how to do it. 'At the very beginning there wasn't even a formal name for the group, and no clear ideas of how to proceed had yet been developed. But there was an absolute determination to see the thing through, and to win Scottish Independence by any means necessary.'¹⁷³ The members did not know yet what to do, but they did agree that they were willing to use everything they got for furthering the aims of that group, thus mobilising their individual resources in favour of the group.

Each of the founding members also agreed to recruit at least one new member and they agreed to create some sort of think-tank to research ideas for more or less immediate action. Lawyer Willie McRae, for example, had come up with the idea for Operation Dark Harvest. He had close connections with the area and had used that knowledge (resource) for the planning of Operation Dark Harvest.¹⁷⁴ At least the founding members, McRae, Dinsmore and Kelly had been mobilising their resources like labour, time and knowledge in favour of the SNLA. Whether there were more people who mobilised their resources for the SNLA cannot be said with certainty, but the fact that they carried out that many attacks and operations during the years 1980-1983 and the fact that Dinsmore and Busby were able to flee to Ireland could lead one to believe they did.

¹⁶⁹ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group,* pp. 8-11

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 11

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p.25

¹⁷² Freeman, J., 10 years for extremist who made letter bombs, *The Glasgow Herald,* Jan 26, 1984, p. 1

¹⁷³ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 11

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 11-12

2.4. Counterterrorism: Minimising social utility and Performative Power

How did the authorities then react to this new group of nationalists, with their demands and organised actions and how did they try to counter and prevent the actions of the SNLA? By infiltration of the movement and using an agent provocateur like Bernard Goodwin and other members of the SRSL against the SNLA, the authorities were infiltrating the group and with that creating mistrust and resentment among the members of the SNLA. Which eventually led to the arrest and conviction of Thomas Kelly and the flight to Ireland of Busby and Dinsmore. By also allowing the SRSL to still convene, even though some of its previous members were now walking the path of violence, the authorities were also keeping platforms alive for these marginalised groups, and were still incorporating them into societies. Targeting the social utility of the SNLA in the two ways that are needed in counter-terrorism strategies.

What about performative power then? Were the British authorities doing as good of a job on that? On 1 March 1982 the first bomb-scares disrupted Edinburgh's city centre and caused major traffic disruptions. This first action of the SNLA went virtually unreported (there was not even a mentioning in the Scottish newspaper *The Herald* on the subject). According to the SNLA the attack would have had more impact if one of the members would have done his job and the action would not have just been a scare, but an actual detonation.

Quite simply, too many people were involved and there was too much division of responsibility. The guy who was to make the incendiary devices got cold feet at the very last minute and didn't turn up, leaving us minus the devices. When it became clear that he wasn't going to turn up, we took the statement we had prepared and delivered it to the media anyway.¹⁷⁵

Although the police was on the spot and the city centre was blocked during the scares, the media did not pick up on the story in the way the SNLA had hoped. *The Herald* did not even mention the commotion and the only media that picked up on the story at the time was a local radio station, Radio Forth.¹⁷⁶

This was not the only attack that passed by the media's attention unnoticed. The next attack was the letter bomb sent to John Nott MP, the British Defence Secretary, which was first thought to be an attack by the IRA because of the date of the attack 17 March (St. Patricks day). This attack was thus not ascribed to the SNLA either, not until a couple of months later when the SNLA sent a new claim to different media in November 1982. That month, the media caught up with the actions of the SNLA as well. Apart from the few reports of loose incidents in the previous months, multiple newspapers

¹⁷⁵ Leslie. D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 14

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 15

now wrote overview articles on the actions of the SNLA. *The Glasgow Herald* even published a piece which doubted the whole existence of the Scottish National Liberation Army as an organisation and emphasised that there was no real threat coming from this 'one man army'.

Looking at the SNLA during their first years, a couple of things stand out. The first couple of actions did not directly make it to (most of) the media. The degree of unique attention and interest in the SNLA was quite low. James Morgan did mention the Tartan Army in his article, referring to another violent movement while talking about the SNLA, thus entering the SNLA into the terrorism discourse of the seventies. He immediately stated though that the SNLA had nothing to do with these type of attacks and stated that the SNLA's actions were nothing but actions carried out by a lone deranged crank.

In 1983 the media as well as Scotland Yard and the Police Departments took the SNLA a bit more seriously. Even though some of the attacks by the SNLA coincided with attacks from other terrorist organisations, the attacks were claimed by and recognised as being carried out by the SNLA. In an article by *The Herald* from 17 March the attacks of the SNLA were all linked together and the incentives for the attacks were even mentioned in the newspapers. The bomb sent to Margaret Thatcher, the bomb sent to the Lord Provost intended for Princess Diana and the threat posed by these attacks were taken seriously by the police departments and Scotland Yard as well and large scale operations were under way the whole night in London as well as in Scotland to track down the SNLA members responsible for the attack. ¹⁷⁷

When during the summer of that year the SNLA sent a letter bomb to the Tory Headquarters, the London police even warned the Conservatives to be careful, because they expected more of these bombs during the election campaign.¹⁷⁸ These warnings proved not to be superfluous. For only a couple of weeks later the letter bomb intended for the new Home Secretary was intercepted by the police which was already on its way to the House of Commons. The police had issued a stern warning to everyone handling the mail that day, and Scotland Yard even issued the "Be on Your Guard" advice, as did the Strathclyde police department.¹⁷⁹

The media also picked up on the threats and started to print things like 'SNLA letter bomb starts fears of new campaign'. Fearing the SNLA would start another campaign like their campaign of 1982. They also printed articles like 'Last winter a device exploded inside No. 10 Downing Street sparking off an immediate review of security arrangements' and 'Following an attack on the Tory Party offices earlier this month, the SNLA claimed to have put a bomb under the platform of the City Halls in Perth

¹⁷⁷ McKillop, J., Second No. 10 bomb blamed on SNLA, *The Glasgow Herald*, Mar 17, 1983, p.1

¹⁷⁸ Staff Reporter, Tory HQ post bomb, *The Guardian*, Jun 4, 1983, p.1

¹⁷⁹ Petrie, G., SNLA letter bomb starts fears of new campaign, *The Glasgow Herald*

aimed at killing Mrs. Thatcher. ¹⁸⁰ After that the SNLA claimed it had lain undetected for almost a month and was discovered only 48 hours before Thatcher was due to launch her campaign for the General Election at the Scottish Tory Party Conference. So an anti-terrorist policy and an attack that had not been reported before were now being brought to light. The police would not comment on the question if the abovementioned was true. Which could be an attempt to calm the situation and maintain control over what would be and what would not be picked up by the media and the public.

In the fall of 1983 the police infiltrated the SNLA. With Bernard Goodwin as agent provocateur the police caught one of the SNLA's key members Thomas Kelly. The trial was widely reported in the media. Some of the details of Goodwin's work came out and were described in the media as well. The alleged links with the INLA were exposed during the trial. So links to the current terrorism discourse of enemies like the INLA and the IRA were also being made by newspaper editors around that time. But this also meant that some of the attacks by the SNLA were being written off by the media as attacks from their presumed Irish counterparts. In December 1983 *The Guardian* even came with an article in which it described the bombs by the SNLA as 'incendiary letters with some help from Belfast'.¹⁸¹ In this article the Irish terrorist movements were being depicted as some sort of mentors for the SNLA.

The fact that most of the targets of the SNLA were political figures is striking and the fact that few politicians gave a reaction to the attacks by the SNLA in the papers is striking as well. There are statements by the police, Scotland Yard and even reactions from SNLA members themselves, but no politicians who took the stage. Not even after the attacks on Margaret Thatcher or Princess Diana. No politicians with statements about putting an end to this terrorism. So the government did not give much public attention to the SNLA and its actions even though they were their main target. This could have been a deliberate attempt at keeping the attention on the SNLA as low as possible, not giving them a stage on which to act out their theatre of fear. The fact that they used Special Branches, infiltrated the movement and did not openly campaign against the SNLA and its cause leads to believe that they were indeed keeping the attention away from the SNLA and were deliberately denying them their attention.

So ,not much attention was being given to the SNLA and its actions during the years 1980-1983, the first couple of actions did not directly make it to (most of) the media. The degree of unique attention and interest in the SNLA was quite low, but they did make it to the front page a couple of times. So they did have the priority on some occasions, like with the bomb to John Nott. James Morgan did mention the Tartan Army in his article, referring to another enemy while talking about the SNLA, so entering the SNLA into the terrorism discourse of the seventies. He immediately stated

¹⁸⁰ Petrie, G., SNLA letter bomb starts fears of new campaign, *The Glasgow Herald*

¹⁸¹ Pallister, D., Newman urges public bomb watch, *The Guardian*, Dec 15, 1983, p.2

that the SNLA had nothing to do with these type of attacks and stated that the SNLA's actions were nothing but actions carried out by a lonely deranged crank.

After the first couple of attacks the media started to pay more attention to the SNLA however. They started to link attacks together, link the SNLA with their Irish counterparts and even expressed their fear for more attacks. During the year 1983, the heyday of the SNLA, the anti-terrorism unit of Scotland Yard was being used to find its members and by infiltration arrest and convict them. The police was also on their guard for attacks of the movement. The government, however, still did not publicly comment on the issue of the SNLA.

In 1995 during the trial against David Dinsmore an article on his arrest was written in *The Herald*. The court heard that Dinsmore, who was 20 at the time of the offences, had been under surveillance of the Criminal Intelligence Unit, because of his political affiliations, prior to the Scottish Conservative Party conference in Perth. The then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Cabinet Ministers were staying at Scone Palace with the earl, who was a Minister at the time. Mrs Fiona Millar, prosecuting, said that the day before the conference began, Dinsmore was seen making various purchases in Glasgow city centre. He was even watched as he locked himself in a cubicle in a toilet at Queen Street railway station where officers reported he spent 15 minutes. Shortly afterwards, Dinsmore was seen posting a bulky white envelope in a postbox in North Hanover Street. A watch was kept on the postbox until the contents were examined. A police officer followed Dinsmore to another postbox nearby where he posted a similar package.¹⁸²

That he was arrested while posting the packages was already clear in 1983, but the fact that he was under surveillance of the Criminal Intelligence Unit was not. Whether this was kept from the media, or they did not print it remains uncertain, but the fact is that this was not reported at the time and the performative power was in that case kept to a minimum by the government, the police and intelligence agencies by keeping the news and facts on the SNLA within their ranks for as far as possible.

Looking at the indicators of performative power by De Graaf, we could say that during this period the following indicators were present to a lesser extent: Priority of the topic; degree of politicisation; description of threat and presentation of policy; mobilisation of the population; introduction of special terrorism laws and other anti-terrorism measures; reviewing and strengthening of existing legislation; organising publicity campaigns around major terrorism trials; emphasizing tough approach; refusing compromise; perception of risk to oneself (attacks were mainly focussed on targets like politicians or members of the royal family, not aimed at the public); the degree of unique attention and interest.

¹⁸² Caven, B., Time runs out for tartan terrorist, *The Herald* Scotland, Feb 9, 1994

The following indicators, however, were present to a greater extent: Definition of the threat (media, intelligence agencies, police department); link to the current discourse of enemy images (media); the creation and deployment of new special units responsible for detection, suppression or arrests of terrorists (the anti-terrorist unit C13 was deployed and Bernard Goodwin was used as an agent provocateur), mental distance (James Freeman calling the SNLA work of a deranged mind).

there was a lot of attention (especially during 1983) for the SNLA, it was not the main focus of the different newspapers. Around the different attacks there were peaks of reports on the SNLA, but apart from these peaks there was no ongoing terrorism discourse surrounding the SNLA. The local police departments and Scotland Yard were on their guard for attacks and warned possible targets, so the public was not entirely dragged into the terrorism discourse, but the 'On Your Guard' advice had been given, so they were warned.

2.5. Thoughts and concerns

So why did the SNLA not have a larger constituency during this period? Why did they remain so small? As can be seen in the previous paragraph, the British authorities did a good job on minimising the social utility of the movement. Another reason why the SNLA remained a small movement was the low performative power of the media, the government and the law enforcement agencies. Even though the SNLA sent multiple letter bombs and threats to various targets, the way they were portrayed in the media was often with some form of trivialisation. Not even all of their actions were reported in the newspapers at the time they were executed. If the actions were reported, they were often accompanied by the counter actions by the police or intelligence agencies. Striking is though, that there is no account of governmental reaction to these actions in this period. As if the SNLA was not important or dangerous enough to worry about on national level. This could well have been a deliberate strategy to keep the SNLA as small and insignificant as possible.

Thatcher's Conservative government thus seemed not to pay much attention to the SNLA, at least not to the public's eye. The anti-terrorism policies surrounding the SNLA were carried out by local or regional intelligence agencies and police departments. Like with the Dutch counterterrorism policies during the seventies there was no single-minded anti-terrorism discourse, especially not regarding the SNLA. The media and thus the public were also not informed by the government on the attacks. No political figure came out to speak on the attacks. Not even the people who were the targets of the attacks. The effect was that the SNLA were not taken seriously and they were not seen as an effective alternative from for instance the trade union, political parties or other legal institutions. After the capture and conviction of Thomas Kelly and the flight from Busby and Dinsmore, the SNLA needed to regroup and remobilise to try and gain the recognition they so longed for. The next chapter will look at this period of reorganisation of the SNLA, by first giving the outline of the conditions within Scottish society in the first paragraph. In the second paragraph the actions of the SNLA will be described. The third paragraph will respectively look at the terrorist status of the SNLA, relative deprivation in Scottish society, resource mobilisation and the fourth paragraph will state the counterterrorism measures of the British government. At the end of the paragraph my thoughts thus far on why the SNLA remained a small movement will be set forth.

3. Scotland and Scottish Nationalism 1984-1992: Anti-Thatcherism, the decline of the Scottish heavy industries and the restructuring period of the SNLA

Yet, there was a dimension to this process that eluded Thatcher. By disposing of British nationalised industries, Thatcher was unintentionally weakening the economic ties of post-war British unity.
 Employment in state-owned industries, particularly those in depressed areas, had helped to justify
 Scotland's allegiance to the British state, and Ravenscraig was one of the most popular examples of state intervention.¹⁸³

3.1. Scotland 1984-1992: Cuts in Scottish heavy industries and the poll-tax

So by disposing of the nationalised industries, the British state was pushing the Scots further and further away, increasing the feelings of deprivation within Scottish society. During the years 1984-1992 the British government continued with their austerity measures within Scottish industry. The steel plant at Raivenscraig, Motherwell was one of the major industrial developments that was lured to Scotland in the post-war welfare state consensus, but gradually broken down during the Thatcher years until it was officially closed down in 1992.¹⁸⁴ The world recession which followed the 1970's oil crisis, which was aggravated by British government policy, hit Scotland particularly hard and exposed underlying weaknesses of the Scottish economy.¹⁸⁵ Between 1979 and 1982 the Ravenscraig's workforce was reduced from 6,400 to 4,400 employees. Within a couple of months that number dropped with another 360. In 1989 the workforce was down to 3,200.¹⁸⁶ The neglect of Ravenscraig by the British government (the exhausted coke ovens were not granted the required 24 million of modernisation costs), and the privatisation policy of the Thatcher government (meaning the disappearance of the political leverage of the Scottish Office and Scottish Lobby to keep Ravenscraig alive) meant the derogation of the plant and eventually its official closure in 1992.¹⁸⁷ The downfall of Ravenscraig and its effects were a bitter pill for Scots and the traditional hopes and believes they had in Scottish industry and the Scottish economy, like David Stewart puts it so eloquently in his work Fighting for survival: the 1980s campaign to save Ravenscraig Steelworks.

 ¹⁸³ Stewart, D., Fighting for survival, the 1980s campaign to save Ravenscraig steelworks, *The Journal of Scottish Historical Studies*, Volume 25, Issue 1, Page 40-57, ISSN 1748-538x, Available Online May 1, 2005, pp. 54
 ¹⁸⁴ Keating, M., Nations against the state, the new politics of nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, (Basingstoke, 2001), p. 245

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., pp.72-73

¹⁸⁶ Stewart, D., Fighting for survival, pp. 48-54

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

The story of the former Ravenscraig steelworks in Motherwell, Lanarkshire, interweaves economics, politics, trade unionism and, above all, the life of a community. From its inception in the 1950s, Ravenscraig took on symbolic status in Scotland, encapsulating hopes for industrial renewal, whilst demonstrating the British state's commitment to depressed regions. During the economic restructuring and dislocation of the Thatcher years between 1979 and 1990, Ravenscraig's rundown characterised the Conservatives' abandonment of this strategy. The plants eventual closure in 1992 signalled the death of Scottish heavy industry, sparking widespread anger and bitterness, and touching a raw nerve that still precludes academic analysis of this traumatic period.¹⁸⁸

From the quote above a sense of deprivation and a case of relative deprivation within Scottish society can be derived. As has been stated in chapter one of this paper relative deprivation is a gap between what people have and what they think they should have (or maybe even had in the recent past). The government's support of the Steel industry in Scotland and the commitment of the government to depressed regions in the decades after the Second World War gave the Scottish people hope. They believed in the importance of Ravenscraig as an economic boast for current and future economical welfare and employment. Closure of the Steelworks was unimaginable. The Scottish people expected and got their industrial renewal and the nationalised, and regionalised Scottish economy got a short-term boast. The shrinkage at and eventual closure of Ravenscraig widened the gap between what people had expected of the plant and what they really got.

Another example of relative deprivation during the years 1984-1992 was the closing of the coalmines in Scotland during the eighties. Although the coal industry in Scotland was in decline since after the Second World War, the sense of deprivation was kind of linear to the expectations the Scottish coalminers had of the gradual decline of the industry.¹⁸⁹ When coal reserves were exhausted, pits closed. This usually happened in joint agreement between workforce representatives and the coal mine management. The younger miners were usually transferred to other pits, and thus they kept their jobs and prospect, only at another coal mine. If there was no place at another pit it was assumed they would still be able to find a job outside of the coal industry. The number of jobs in the coal mining industry halved in the years right after the war from around 56,000 employees to 28,000 in the 1960's. In the subsequent years until 1984 another half of that workforce was cut. The cuts before the 1980's were perceived as fair though, because restructuring and nationalisation of

¹⁸⁸ Stewart, D., Fighting for survival, pp. 48-54

¹⁸⁹ Phillips, J., Material and moral resources: the 1984–5 miners' strike in Scotland, *Economic History Review*,
65, 1 (2012), pp. 256–276, p. 269

the coal mining industry were thought to be necessary, 'and essential to the continual "retooling" of the nationalized industry. ' 190

The cuts that started in the early 1980's were not perceived that way. This was because the legitimacy of the cuts was doubted by the workforce because the cuts were not realised through mutual agreement between the management and workforce representation. Another reason for the opposition to the cuts was the growing fear, because of the recession of the 1970's, that the younger workers would not be able to get a job at another mine (because they were also closing) or in another industry (because almost all industries suffered from the recession).¹⁹¹ The key political change for this accelerated decline was, again, the coming to power of the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher. They characterised the coal industry as: 'a high cost drain of consumers' and taxpayers' money and a prisoner of trade unionism'.¹⁹² Closures in the coal industry accumulated across Scotland and alternative industrial deployment was also in decline which in its turn accentuated the difficulties within the mining industry. The number of mines that were closed on economic grounds were within the next ten years were: two in 1986, three in 1987, two more in 1988, and another four in 1989 and 1990. Deep mining in Scotland ended ten years later.¹⁹³

The deprivation in the Scottish mining industry had been going on since the 1950's, but the moment that people began to protest against the decline of the industry, was the moment they felt as if they were being robbed of their voice in the matter and when they saw no prospects for future employment. So they did not only feel deprived of being in charge of their own fate, but also deprived of future job prospects. They were thus relatively deprived of social and economic resources.

The poll-tax, also instated during the Thatcher years with its first collection in Scotland in the year 1989-1990, was a source of frustration for many Scots as well. 'From the first proposal of the change in local government finance, there was public criticism in Scotland that drew on assumptions about Scotland as a distinct national identity and that stated or implied that legitimacy arose from the consent of the Scottish people. The normal reference was not to 'the electorate' or 'the voters' but to 'the Scottish public'.'¹⁹⁴ The Scottish public was not pleased by the poll-tax, the newspapers spoke of Scottish anger towards the poll-tax because the Scots felt used like guinea pigs. The fact that the poll-tax was introduced in Scotland a year prior to England and Wales (it was never introduced in

¹⁹⁰ Phillips, J., Material and moral resources, p. 269

¹⁹¹ Phillips, J., Deindustrialization and the Moral Economy of the Scottish Coalfields, 1947 to 1991, *International Labor and Working-Class History*, Volume 84, September 2013, *pp 99-115*, pp. 104-109

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 109

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 111

¹⁹⁴ Barker, R., Legitimacy in the United Kingdom: Scotland and the Poll Tax, *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 521-533, p. 7

Northern Ireland) made the Scots feel as if they were a test-bed for the Conservative party's policies before they implemented them in England and Wales.¹⁹⁵

For Scots the poll-tax seemed really unfair and its legitimacy was being questioned. In England and Wales, the opposition to the tax mainly existed because of the implications of class legislation. The new local tax, the poll-tax, was in the eyes of some even 'Robin Hood in reverse, - a wealth transfusion from the poor to the rich'.¹⁹⁶ The 'head' tax did not take into account any differences in wealth and income and the tax registration it required of the citizens of the UK was seen as a potential threat to civil liberties. In Scotland, however, the tax did not only represent the abovementioned unfairness but there was also an air of illegitimacy surrounding the imposition of the poll-tax.

A combination of material deprivation and a sense of national identity within Scottish society meant that issues that would, in England, be polarized along lines of class or party had a further dimension in Scotland. The decline in electoral support for the Conservative party and its policies, which were perceived as following a path which was not in the best interests of the Scottish people, created a sense of political alienation. These feelings were in their turn drawing on feelings of national distinctiveness between the Scots and the English.¹⁹⁷

The implementation of the poll-tax in Scotland contributed to the Anti-Thatcherism in Scotland and the sense of deprivation within Scottish society. First, the fact that the poll-tax was introduced in Scotland a year prior to the introduction in England and Wales was perceived as unfair and Scottish people felt like the guinea pigs of the poll-tax. Second, the fact that the pol-tax, along with other policies like the privatisation of industries and the closure of steel plants and coal mines in which a relatively large section of the Scottish people was employed¹⁹⁸, was introduced while the mass of the Scottish population did not support the policy sparked a feeling that Westminster ruling was not legitimate during the years 1984-1992, not even after Margaret Thatcher's resignation in 1990.¹⁹⁹

3.2. The SNLA from 1984-1992: Reorganisation and disregard

The period between 1984 and 1992 was indeed a period in which the SNLA needed to regroup after the arrests and flight to Ireland by their members. A period in which they did not carry out many acts of violence successfully. A period in which they even told the newspapers that they were underreported and should have gotten a lot more attention than they were getting.²⁰⁰ Whether 1984

¹⁹⁵ Brown, A., McCrone, D., Paterson, L., *Politics and society in Scotland*, (Basingstoke and London, 1996), p. 93

¹⁹⁶ The Financial Times, in: Barker, R., Legitimacy in the United Kingdom, p. 524

¹⁹⁷ Barker, R., Legitimacy in the United Kingdom, p. 525

¹⁹⁸ Brown, A., McCrone, D., Paterson, L., *Politics and society in Scotland*, p. 74

¹⁹⁹ Barker, R., Legitimacy in the United Kingdom, pp. 529-531

 $^{^{200}}$ The SNLA's 'legitimate targets', *The Observer*, Jul 23, 1989, p. A7

and 1985 were indeed quiet years for the SNLA in comparison to 1982 and 1983, or their deeds stayed unreported by the newspapers, cannot be said for certain. But the lack of reports on the SNLA in the newspapers does indicate that their attacks were not of the same gravity as the attacks of the previous years. Maybe Busby's and Dinsmore's flight to Ireland and/or the conviction of Thomas Kelly were reasons for the SNLA to lay low for a while. Maybe their flight and conviction even meant that the biggest part of the SNLA was either behind bars or on the run.

Although the Scottish National Liberation Army did not perpetrate many attacks in 1984, they were on politicians minds at the beginning of that year. In February 1984 the SNLA is mentioned by Home Secretary Leon Brittain during a Parliamentary meeting of the House of Commons in which he clearly states that the actions of the SNLA are serious, but do not compare to actions by movements like the INLA or the IRA. The reason was the revision of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill. One of the things discussed in this bill was the definition of terrorism.

Groups such as the Scottish National Liberation Army and the Animal Rights Militia have mounted attacks on public figures by means of postal devices and arson. Serious though such incidents are, they do not compare in scale or effectiveness with the attacks by the IRA or the INLA or the vicious attacks that some international terrorists have carried out in London. It is not possible to specify in advance or to imagine a series of incidents that would lead one to take a different view, but it is right that we should be chary of coming to that view prematurely.²⁰¹

During that same meeting Dafydd Thomas, Member for Merioneth, asked the Home Secretary the following:

In his earlier response to my intervention, I believe that the Home Secretary—we shall see this in Hansard tomorrow—said that "so far" the power²⁰² had not been used in relation to groups that were concerned with possible political domestic violence relating to Scotland or Wales. Will the Home Secretary expand on those words and explain how far is "so far"? When do arsonists, whom all hon. Members condemn, become terrorists in his definition?²⁰³

²⁰¹ HC Deb 25 January 1984, vol. 52, cc1011-26

²⁰² The power is referring to the power given to the Home Secretary in the proposed Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill of 1984. In this bill the Secretary of State would get the power to exercise his discretion to make an order to continue operation of the anti-terrorism legislation for a period, albeit temporarily, without first obtaining an affirmative resolution of this House. There was some resistance against the bill, because of serious interferences with civil rights. Source: HC Deb 25 January 1984, vol. 52, cc1000-10
²⁰³ HC Deb 25 January 1984, vol. 52, cc1011-26

When looking at the reaction by Dafydd Thomas it stands out that the SNLA was not called an actual terrorist movement at the time. But Thomas seems to disagree on this when he asks when they would be called terrorists. One of the problems of the bill was the actual lack of a clear definition of terrorism.

According to the SNLA itself they were, however, indeed a bit disorganised in 1984, but were still going strong in terms of radical action. According to them 1984 would even have been the year of the first SNLA murder, had the group not been so disorganised. In 1983 they had plotted the murder of Roy Jenkins and the date chosen for the proposed attack was in the immediate run-up to the European Parliamentary Elections in 1984. This target was chosen because the SNLA was strongly anti-European Union while Roy Jenkins was strongly and vociferously pro-European Union.

The SNLA was disorganised in 1984, because two of its key members were held up in Ireland. According to the SNLA:

The guy who was in charge of the operation had all the details and could have carried out the attack himself and without any assistance. But he got cold feet and on the right night when he knew that Jenkins was asleep inside, he called in a person who hadn't even been properly briefed and didn't have any of the details or know the layout.²⁰⁴

The 'new guy' then screwed up the plot by trying to set the wrong house on fire. The inhabitants of that place spotted the fire, however, and notified the police. A different guy not related to the SNLA, Steve Wilson, got arrested for the attempted murder but got released because there was not enough evidence. According to the SNLA Wilson 'wasn't lucky - he just didn't do it. The lucky one was Roy Jenkins. He had a very narrow escape.'²⁰⁵

This whole event slipped under the radar, the SNLA did not even claim the attack and the press never picked up on it. Perhaps the SNLA was not wild on telling this tale to the press because in their own words 'The whole thing was a screw-up and a near-disaster. A near massacre of the innocent in fact. (...) Was it a massive fuck-up? Yes, it was undoubtedly, and it was also one of the greatest lost opportunities we ever experienced.'²⁰⁶

At the end of 1984, on the first of December the SNLA found another opportunity for an attack and *The Glasgow Herald* once again reported on the SNLA. A letter bomb was found on 30 November in a London postal sorting office. The bomb was once again meant for Margaret Thatcher. Although the SNLA claimed the attack, a senior officer said to the press:

²⁰⁴ Leslie., D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 23

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 23-24

'We know that the SNLA have claimed responsibility but we don't feel that the devise is any part of any known previous source'. [...] The newspaper continues:

The self-styled SNLA, which probably consists of only two people, has recently made specific threats against British military personnel in Scotland. It has also stated that the royal family will be regarded as legitimate targets. English and Scottish politicians will also be executed, the SNLA claims. These people would be regarded as legitimate targets because of the obvious intention of the English Government to turn Scotland into one huge military base, according to the "Army".²⁰⁷

The article also stated that the SNLA claimed to use a new code word in the future, but that they had not used that code word while claiming this attack on Thatcher. At the same time the bomb was discovered, *The Guardian* received a letter by the International Hindu Brotherhood, saying: "The International Hindu Brotherhood will kill Mrs Thatcher."²⁰⁸ According to the police the device was "amateurish" and "not particularly dangerous", so whether the SNLA or the International Hindu Brotherhood sent the bomb remains unclear. It can be derived from the actions of the police that they wanted to keep the incident as low-key as possible. Not giving the SNLA too much attention regarding the bomb and calling the device amateurish and not particularly dangerous could have been intentional to keep the spotlight away from the SNLA.

In 1985 there was only one attack claimed by the SNLA. A fire was lit in the basement at the Ministry of Defence building, Whitehall on 27 April.²⁰⁹ Although the SNLA was relatively quiet that year, the authorities were still on guard for SNLA attacks. The Scottish Tory convention, which opened on 8 May 1985, was more heavily guarded than ever before.

Unprecedented precautions are being taken against terrorist attacks at the Scottish Tory conference which opens today.' [...] There has been increasing concern over conference security, since a group calling itself the Scottish National Liberation Army claimed responsibility for a fire which broke out a few weeks ago in an empty building of the Ministry of Defence, in London.²¹⁰

While residing in Dublin, Adam Busby set up the Dublin cell of the SNLA. It was from this cell that most of the attacks during the period 1984-1992 were managed. According to the SNLA the Dublin cell consisted of four of five members (including Busby) and it acted as a permanent base, from which they continued to recruit and organise new SNLA members. The SNLA used the Dublin cell

 ²⁰⁷ Freeman, J. and Laing, A., SNLA claims it sent Thatcher letter bomb, *The Glasgow Herald*, Dec 1, 1984, p.1
 ²⁰⁸ Parry, G., Scottish terrorist group claims it sent letter bomb to PM, *The Guardian*, Dec1, 1984 p.1 & p.28
 ²⁰⁹ The Guardian and The Guardian and The State of the State

²⁰⁹ Terror blaze, *The Observer*, Apr 28, 1985, p.1

²¹⁰ Etead, J., Tight security marks Scottish Tory conference, *The Guardian*, May 8, 1985, p.4

because it took advantage of the fact that the Irish police had no legal right to investigate offences that took place in the $UK.^{211}$

In 1986 the period of relative silence surrounding the SNLA is somewhat disrupted by a year in which the SNLA actually carried out some attacks. Their reorganisation had taken place and in that year, on 18 April the SNLA sent a letter bomb to Malcolm Rifkind, the Secretary of State for Scotland.²¹² On 22 April they sent a letter bomb to British Steel's headquarters in London²¹³ and on the 24th a bomb blast damaged a British Airways office and other stores in London's busiest shopping street.²¹⁴ Although the latter was indeed claimed by the SNLA, it was questioned by the authorities whether they were the actual perpetrators.²¹⁵ This sense of doubt which was propagated by the authorities could also have been a deliberate attempt to discredit the SNLA and to keep the attention away from them. If that was the case, which could well be given the fact that they had been keeping reports on SNLA attacks to themselves during previous years, they were again keeping the performativity surrounding the SNLA low by not giving them the attention and credit which they longed for. The SNLA claimed they had planted the bomb because there was a move to privatise British Airways completely. It was feared in Scotland and by the SNLA that there would be job losses due to a withdrawal of air services to more remote areas.²¹⁶

The attack followed only hours after a warning from the Libyans that a terrorist attack in Europe would be carried out by American and Israeli intelligence agencies as an excuse for further US bombings in Libya. The attack was also claimed by an Anarchist group called the Angry Brigade 'in retaliation for Britain's involvement in the American bombing of Libya'.²¹⁷ So even though the SNLA was the first to claim the attack, it is not sure whether they were really the ones that executed it or whether this was indeed a successful attempt of the government and police forces to keep their performativity low. After this incident only one more attack by the SNLA, a 'crude and unsophisticated'²¹⁸ letter bomb to Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, was sent and reported on that year.

During the years 1987-1988 little was written on the SNLA in the studied newspapers again. No letter bombs were reported on and no attacks were claimed. The first attack after this short period of rest that was claimed by the SNLA was a fire allegedly started by explosives at Glensanda granite plant near Oban on 13 May 1989. The SNLA claimed the attack was carried out because the plant was

²¹¹ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 52

²¹² Bomb sent to Rifkind at Commons, *The Guardian*, Apr 19, 1986, p.2

²¹³ Scottish Bomb, *The Guardian*, Apr 23, 1986, p. 1

²¹⁴ Pyle, F., Police fear Oxford Street bomb may be start of campaign, *The Irish Times*, Apr 25, 1986, p.6

²¹⁵ No evidence of Libyan link in dawn bombing, *The Glasgow Herald*, Apr 25, 1986, p. 1

²¹⁶ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group,* pp. 93-94

²¹⁷ British Airways Office Hit By Bomb Blast in London, New York Times, Apr 25, 1986, p. A1

²¹⁸ Fire bomb addressed to minister, *The Guardian*, Jul 17, 1986, p. 6

going to be used as a nuclear waste dump.²¹⁹ After thorough police investigation of the fire, the police dismissed the claim made by the SNLA. According to fire experts a small fire that accidentally started at the large crusher plant spread quickly to resins, electrical wiring and other chemicals stored at the crusher plant. ²²⁰ An article in *The Glasgow Herald* related to the attack was concluded by the following:

Even at its height in the early years of this decade, the self-styled SNLA probably never numbered more than four or five people and may have consisted of only three. The Glensanda site is totally isolated. Walking in would be arduous, making the most viable approach for terrorists by boat, possibly inflatable, across Loch Linnhe. And, once having breached security at the quarry, terrorists would then require considerable knowledge and expertise to handle the commercial explosive which allegedly uses – all of which, if true, would have pointed to a new SNLA, far more sophisticated than in the past.²²¹

This last sentence of the piece in *The Glasgow Herald* indicates that the SNLA had not been taken very seriously in the past and had not been thought of as a well organised terrorist movement. The way the SNLA was portrayed in the media leads you to believe that they were trying to claim an attack which they had not carried out themselves, or which had not even been an attack at all. It could well be though that government policy and intelligence agencies had been able to play it down and intentionally denied the SNLA their glory and kept the ins and outs of the attacks by the SNLA as far from the public eye as possible. Like the Dutch government and intelligence agencies had been able to able to able to implement security policy in the political sidelines, without media attention during the attacks by the Red Youth and the Moluccan actions of the seventies.

A few weeks later, on 23 July 1989, a reporter for *The Observer* wrote an article devoted entirely to 'The Murky World of Tartan Terror'. In this article he 'investigates a movement that many refuse to take seriously, but which involves bombings, terror threats and a mysterious death.'²²² The mysterious death he wrote about was the death of Willie McRae, a man known to have close, maybe even active, links to the SNLA. He was found dead in his car in 1985, a bullet in his head. There were rumours, started by SNLA members Adam Busby and David Dinsmore that he was shot by the Special Branch because of his terrorist ties to the SNLA. According to the anonymous source of David Leslie and Leslie himself the death of McRae was no suicide. According to them McRae was definitely linked

²¹⁹ Nuclear dump claim denied, *The Guardian*, May 15, 1989, p. 3

²²⁰ Thomson, A., Smith, K., SNLA terrorist raid dismissed as cause of blaze at quarry, *The Glasgow Herald,* May 15, 1989, p. 3

²²¹ Thomson, A., Smith, K., SNLA terrorist raid dismissed as cause of blaze at quarry, *The Glasgow Herald*

²²² McRae, C., Murky world of tartan terror, *The Observer*, Jul 23, 1989, p. A7

to the SNLA and he was under surveillance of the secret services. 'Willie McRae was shot during a confrontation with agents of the State who had him under surveillance because of his links to the SNLA, and they then left him to die without medical attention, rather than calling an ambulance or even officially reporting the incident.'²²³ This has never been proven however.

In the first few years of the 1990s the family of Willie McRae and Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, then the Lord Advocate, acknowledged that his death had probably been suicide and that the allegations made by Adam Busby and David Dinsmore were false. Whether this was indeed the case, or whether McRae was actually killed by Special Branch agencies because of his ties to the SNLA cannot be proven, but the effect that it had was again that the SNLA was being portrayed as a movement claiming conspiracies and attacks that were false or which they never really carried out. Thus making it harder and harder for the public to take the movement seriously.

On that same day in the same newspaper another article on the SNLA was printed. This article tells of a claim made by an alleged spokesperson of the SNLA stating that 'his group had been responsible for more than 70 bombings and terrorist incidents since March 1982.'²²⁴ He insisted that details of many of these had not been reported in an attempt to "discredit" his organisation.²²⁵ The Spokesperson also warned that the attacks would continue, but that all necessary precautions were taken so no innocent people would be harmed. He spoke of a 'legitimate target' as a person connected to the state or an agent of the State.

Two things stand out in this article. First, the spokesperson mentioned that he felt the SNLA was left underreported. He even states that his organisation is discredited by not getting the attention it deserves. Second, he states that the SNLA tries its best not to harm anyone who is innocent by their standards. A 'noble' pursuit comparing it to the hundreds of 'innocent' casualties that were taken as collateral damage during attacks by many different terrorist groups in the 1970s-1990s.

That they targeted people connected to the state has already been made clear through the actions by the SNLA as described above. In December 1991 the SNLA took its claims a step further. The SNLA claimed that in June 1991 on the 28th they tried to break in to Holyrood Palace, Edinburgh where the Princess Royal was staying at that time and where the Queen would arrive only the next day. According to Adam Busby the attack was a well-planned assassination involving explosives. He claimed that the attack only failed because of 'sheer bad luck'.²²⁶ According to *The Guardian*, however, the police denied the whole event ever happened.²²⁷ They confirmed that an alarm went

²²³ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 44

²²⁴ After counting the various attacks and hoaxes which appeared in the in this paper researched newspapers, I came to 30 incidents.

²²⁵ The SNLA's 'legitimate targets', *The Observer*, Jul 23, 1989, p. A7

²²⁶ Royal alarm story doubted, *The Guardian*, Dec 16, 1991, p. 3

²²⁷ Ibid.

off, but no one and no device was ever found. This could have been a conscious decision by the law enforcement agencies to cover up an actual attempted assassination of the Queen by the SNLA. If so, it was a move to keep the public as unaware of the SNLA and its powers as possible. It could also have been that Busby made it up, or exaggerated the event. In both cases Busby did not come out a winner. The performative power of the SNLA remained low. After the Holyrood Palace claim the SNLA lay low for a while, only to reappear again in the newspapers in 1993.




Table 3.1. Dates and deeds of the SNLA 1984-1992*

*Table shows all claimed and unclaimed actions ascribed to the SNLA

3.3. Terrorism, Relative Deprivation and Resource Mobilisation

During the period from 1984 to 1992 the SNLA was in dire need of reorganisation and remobilisation. Two of its prominent members had fled to Ireland of which only one remained active from Dublin, the other stayed on the run until October 1993. Was the SNLA then still a terrorist organisation during this period? Looking at the Parliamentary debates from the House of Commons, the SNLA was not perceived to be a terrorist movement by the majority of the House. Although there was a revision of the terrorism act, this act was mainly aimed at addressing Northern-Ireland related violence and the notion of acceptance of the SNLA or Welsh organisations in this act was not honoured. As can be derived from the various reactions of members of the House, opinions were divided on whether the SNLA was a terrorist movement or not. Looking at the texts it even seems like they are not sure themselves. A lack of a clear definition of terrorism at the time added to the complexity of the matter.

We could now argue that according to the definition of terrorism, as stated in the first chapter of this paper, the SNLA was indeed a terrorist organisation during this period. They tried to reach their goal through fear-generating tactics and still did this without any legal restraint, targeting politicians and maybe even threatening the lives of non-combatants with their attack on the British Airways office in central London. According to the SNLA, however, the bombing of the British Airways office had been deliberately set off in the early hours of morning, so that no civilians would get hurt.²²⁸ In that case, the Scottish National Liberation Army was more living up to its title of 'army' than being an actual terrorist movement, which as described in chapter 1, would mainly attack non-combatants and civilian targets for the effects of terror of that kind of attack. Which means that terrorist movements try to instil fear into the minds of people by letting them know that no one would be safe from terrorist attacks. The SNLA, however, made sure that they did not target random civilians, so the cause for terror was, deliberately or not, minimised.

During this period, the motivation of the SNLA was much the same as in the previous period. Because these decisions and the feelings of deprivation that derived from them have already been described in detail in the first paragraph of this chapter, they will not be described as detailed here. What that paragraph made clear though is that the sense of deprivation was still very much at present within Scottish society during the years 1984-1992, because of cuts in Scottish industries. The poll-tax and Scotland's guinea pig status in all of this only added to that sense of deprivation. The actions of the SNLA were, like in the previous period, often a direct reaction to these governmental decisions. The closure of Ravenscraig, the privatisation of British Airways, the instalment of the polltax and the gradual closing of the coalmines in Scotland were all decisions by the government which

²²⁸ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group*, pp. 93-94

were contributing to the sense of relative deprivation within society and were triggers for the actions of the SNLA.

The level of resource mobilisation within the SNLA is again a lot harder to determine. It is even harder to determine for this period than for the first one. After Busby and Dinsmore had fled Scotland and Thomas Kelly had been tried and convicted, the SNLA needed to regroup and remobilise their resources to be able to come to collective action again. During the first three years of the period from 1984-1992 they tried to continue their repertoire of hoaxes and letter bombs, but also altered their repertoire to include the actual murder of a government official. The failure of the assassination as well as the amateurish device the SNLA sent to Thatcher show that the SNLA was less organised and had lesser resources at their disposal than in the previous period. The active people of whom the names are known during this period were Adam Busby and Willie McRae (until his death in 1985).

For such a small group as the SNLA with so few members and such a small (almost non-existent) constituency, it is very hard to detect any form of resource mobilisation at all. We already know that there were, besides Busby, another three to four members in the Dublin cell who operated from the Irish city, but other than these people it is not even clear how many members the SNLA had during this period and how they mobilised their resources for the reorganisation and actions of the SNLA. For the SNLA to be able to regroup after the events of 1983 there must have been some form of resource mobilisation though, to think of the mobilisation of the members of the new Dublin cell, the mobilisation of personal resources, like time and labour to attract new members, and to be able to plan the attacks. It is not possible, however, to determine the exact extent and type of resource mobilisation during this period from the sources used to write this paper.

3.4. Counterterrorism: Minimising social utility and performative power

The British government was not visibly trying to drive a wedge between the members of the SNLA by infiltration or other tactics during this period. This does not mean that infiltration was not still used as a means to damage the SNLA. The fact that one of the members got cold feet while planning the assassination of Roy Jenkins might be due to the fact that the trust between the members of the SNLA had been hurt by the Kelly trial and the role that agent provocateur Goodwin had in the arrest and conviction of Kelly. Although the British government was not really trying to invest in the marginalised groups within Scottish society, they were still not proscribing the SNLA and were still allowing groups like the SRSL to exist even though Members of Parliament were asking questions about the Scottish nationalists. Scots still had their trade unions, (moderate) nationalist

parties and other ways to vent their frustrations about the government and were thus not driven into a corner to the violent Scottish alternative, the SNLA.

The authorities were also doing a good job at decreasing the SNLA's performativity. From 1984-1992 the news around the SNLA was a lot more quiet than it had been during the first years of their existence. In 1984 only one attack was reported and the attack was being written off as an attack claimed by, but not actually executed by the SNLA. The SNLA claimed to have sent the bomb, but the authorities claimed it was the Hindu Brotherhood who executed the attack. Another claim by the SNLA was the plot to murder Jenkins, but this incident was not picked up by the press and the whole event passed by unnoticed.

In the aftermath of the alleged attack something striking happened in an article in *The Herald*. In this article the types of targets of the SNLA were pointed out: military bases and personnel, the British Royal family, and English and Scottish politicians would be executed because they were legitimate targets according to the SNLA. So as long as you were not a member of any of those groups the threat to your life was close to nothing. It can be argued then that the perception of risk to oneself would stay quite low amongst the public, because they were not the targets of the SNLA. Looking back at the definition of terrorism given at the beginning of this paper this is striking. This definition stated that the targets of terrorism are 'mainly civilians and non-combatants, (...) for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.'²²⁹

The SNLA did not target non-combatants, but they did target state- and but the perceived threat is likely a lot less than with terrorist organisations which strike at metro stations or buildings, filled with and killing and/or wounding random civilians. With the SNLA in the years 1984-1985 it seemed that as long as you were not a politician, military, or a member of the British Royal family you had no real need of fearing them, making the SNLA less of a terrorist organisation and more a very small actual army at war with the British state. Among those people who were seen by the SNLA as legitimate targets the perceived threat was greater. The Tory Conference was heavily guarded, because of the threat of an attack from the SNLA.²³⁰

Striking is that even though these kind of security measures were being taken and the SNLA sent more than a few (hoax) letter bombs to high officials, claimed even more attacks and allegedly set part of the Ministry of Defence on fire, the newspapers still did not write of them as if they were a well-known notorious organisation. They still wrote down 'a group calling itself the Scottish National Liberation Army' and at the end of almost every piece in the researched newspapers from 1980 to 1985, they gave a resume of their actions. Might this be an indication of the fact that people are not really familiar with the name, or the actions of the SNLA? This does not happen to the IRA or the ETA

²²⁹ Schmid, A.P., *The Routledge handbook of terrorism research*, p. 86

²³⁰ Etead, J., Tight security marks Scottish Tory conference, *The Guardian*, May 8, 1985, p.4

during that same time period. The performative power of the SNLA in this period was pretty low. But because not only the loose incidents were reported in the newspapers, but they also gave a recap of all the actions by the SNLA enhancing the performativity a bit.

During 1986 the SNLA struck again with a couple of attacks. Most of the attacks were once again aimed at politicians, but there was also the bomb at the British Steel offices and on top of that the SNLA claimed an attack on the offices of British Airways in the busiest shopping street of London. The performative power of their attacks increased by not only targeting people which they named 'legitimate' targets before. If the attack on the British Airways offices was indeed an attack by the SNLA, they had adjusted their idea of 'legitimate targets' and the perception of threat against oneself could have increased with the public.

This attack on the British Airways offices even drew out a reaction from some politicians. In *The Herald* of 25 April 1986 these reactions were mentioned.

The Press Association received two claims of responsibility for the bomb. The first, just before 8am was from the Scottish National Liberation Army. [...] Home Office Minister Mr Giles Shaw referred in the Commons to the calls from the SNLA and the Angry Brigade, but added that at this stage it was not possible to attribute responsibility to any group or individual. Mr Shaw said: "Contrary to reports in the press, the police have no information which would firmly link this incident to the Libyans or any other group." Tory MP Mr Michael Latham (Rutland and Melton) asked whether the SNLA was the body which has claimed responsibility for last week's letter bomb which was sent to Scottish Secretary Mr Malcolm Rifikind, and demanded to know what the Government was doing to "arrest these thugs and get them behind bars." Mr. Shaw told him: 'the organisation that claims responsibility for this incident also claims responsibility for the device which was sent to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland. We will do everything possible to ensure that those guilty of offences of this kind are brought to the courts and, one hopes, convicted.²³¹

Latham did raise the question on the SNLA in parliament, but in the database of the Parliamentary debates of the UK the word thugs cannot be found.²³² Whether he indeed used the word thugs or persons, what is striking is that he did not use the word 'terrorist' which he could also have used. The reaction by Mr. Shaw was very short and decisive, but did not point a finger nor used the word terrorist either. Both politicians did not use any war rhetoric. Both Latham and Shaw did bring the attack in context with previous attacks claimed by the SNLA, but only the attacks that had happened during those few weeks. He did not go back years or months in the history of the SNLA to

²³¹ HC Deb 24 April 1986, vol. 96, cc453-6

²³² Ibid.

describe why it would be so important to fight them, or point out why they were dangerous. He kept it short and powerful, without amplifying the risk or threat.

In the late eighties the SNLA kept quiet. The news around the movement was also kept to a minimum. Apart from two articles the newspapers stayed completely quiet on the SNLA. In the early nineties the SNLA was heard from again. In December 1991 they claimed to have planned and executed an attack on Holyrood Palace during the summer of that year. They only made the claim in December though. The media had not picked up on the incident and there were no reports in the newspapers on police investigations into the SNLA regarding this incident.

Regarding this period it can be said that although the media and security were first still very much on their guard for the SNLA that feeling of threat ebbed away once the period evolved. Just like in the previous period politicians kept to the background regarding the SNLA and its actions. There were no statements from politicians in the articles about the SNLA and no outspoken anti-terrorism policy regarding the SNLA. Although the government was revising their anti-terrorism laws (mainly regarding the apprehension and arrest of people suspected of perpetrating IRA and other Northern Ireland related violence), the SNLA was not being included into that legislation.²³³ To great annoyance of some of the members of the House of Commons. John Enoch Powell, Member for Down, South was one of them asking the Home Secretary:

Why on earth, when terrorist acts are being committed, for example, in Wales with a view to influencing public opinion and Government policy and why, when we know that there is a link between terrorism in Wales and terrorism in Northern Ireland, we should go to this length to prevent the powers in part IV being used against persons, whether they belong to the Angry Brigade, the Scottish National Liberation Army or whoever they may be, who could present an equal threat to security in some part of the United Kingdom I must admit passes my comprehension, and evidently passed the comprehension of the Committee when it considered this clause.²³⁴

The reason for the Committee not to include the SNLA (or any Scottish or Welsh nationalist movements) into the bill was because it would make it easier for law enforcement agencies to arrest individuals who were suspected of having bonds with terrorists or carrying out terrorist practices. Suspending certain rights of the arrested individual, because there was less evidence needed for the arrest of someone from a proscribed organisation, only reasonable suspicion of being involved in such an organisation. While the violence related to Northern Ireland was considered severe enough

²³³ HC Deb 25 January 1984, vol. 52, cc979-1000

²³⁴ Ibid.

to be a part of the bill, the violence which occurred in Scotland and Wales was not considered severe enough (yet). Or as Home Secretary Leon Brittan puts it:

The Government take the view that precisely because this is a power of great gravity it would not be appropriate to extend it any further than is necessary. Although what has occurred in the name of Scottish and Welsh nationalism has on occasion been of a violent nature and certainly unlawful, the gravity of the matter has not so far been sufficient to justify the use of these powers in that context, although, as I said in Committee, if the position became worse the Government would not hesitate to extend their use in the manner suggested.²³⁵

By not perceiving and/or treating the SNLA like an actual proscribed, terrorist organisation. The government again succeeded in keeping the performativity at a low level. During this period most indicators of performative power were not even present at all. The only time that the perception of risk to oneself was higher than before was the moment that the SNLA claimed the attack on the British Airways offices. If this attack was indeed perpetrated by SNLA members their range of legitimate targets would have gotten wider, but because the attack was written off by the media as not being perpetrated by the SNLA, that perception of risk was taken away, whether the SNLA actually did it or not.

In preparation of the Scottish Tory Conference in 1985 security was tightened because of threats of attacks from the SNLA. The reason the Conference was better secured than before was because of the alleged arson in the Ministry of Defence. Extra security was thus deployed especially for the sake of an attack by the SNLA, but this was the only incident during this period which was reported on and so this indicator was still very low looking at the whole period. The other indicators of performative power are not even present, so it can be argued that the performative power of the media, government, police and intelligence agencies during this period was incredibly low.

In 1992, for the first time since 1986, the SNLA was mentioned in the parliamentary debates again. One of the members of the House, Mr. Wilson, asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he would like to give a statement on the recent activities of the SNLA. The reaction by the Secretary of State for Scotland, James Douglas Hamilton, was very reserved. 'The Government deplore any action by any subversive organisation which seeks to undermine the democratic process.'²³⁶ When after this very short, reserved and general answer, Mr. Wilson continued to ask what representations had been made to the Irish Government in connection with persons purporting to represent the Scottish National Liberation Army, Hamilton reacted by saying that there had been

²³⁵ HC Deb 25 January 1984, vol. 52, cc979-1000

²³⁶ HC Deb 13 January 1992 vol. 201, cc533-4W

made no representations to the Irish Government.²³⁷ This very short and unspecific answer of the Secretary of State for Scotland could mean one more piece of evidence that the British government was indeed keeping any information on the SNLA as short and vague as possible.

3.5. Thoughts and concerns

In the years 1984-1992 the SNLA remained a small movement which did not gather a constituency. The reasons that might have contributed to this are the disregard by the British government, the fact that there were other (non-violent) groups in which the Scots could vent their frustrations so that the social utility of the SNLA was minimised, the police forces and intelligence agencies were still operating on a local or regional level, not generating a national anti-Scottish-terrorism discourse and the way they were portrayed in the media was not very flattering during this period either. The ridicule with which the SNLA was still being portrayed, 'The self-styled SNLA, which probably consists of only two people..' probably did not add to the likelihood of people joining the movement either. Even if there were more Scots with the same ideas, the same thirst for violence and the willingness to step outside of the parameters of the law to achieve the goal of an independent Scotland, they would probably not want to be associated with a group of unsuccessful nationalists who were portrayed as a handful of cranks.

Depicted as a handful of cranks, usually portrayed as only consisting of two to five people the SNLA also did not speak to the socially isolated people in society looking for the social utility a movement can bring. Because potential terrorists are often social utility maximizers, the image the media painted of the SNLA could not have been very attractive to these people.

Maybe the SNLA also did not go far enough in their violent actions for this type of individual. The SNLA had a very clear policy of not hurting any innocents. They did not like the fact that they had almost burned down a house with innocent people in it. The fact that the only violent movement we know of in Scotland at that time was a movement who did hold up a certain moral standard of innocent and guilty people and was very cautious of not accidentally hurting any innocents, not even as collateral damage, is striking in itself. Where the IRA and the ETA did not shun to kill hundreds of people as collateral damage in their fight for freedom, the SNLA stuck to its views on legitimate and illegitimate targets. This, and the fact that the British government was playing it well by keeping its anti-terrorism policies local and under the radar has contributed to the fact that the period from 1984 to 1992 was not a very fruitful period for the SNLA.

The next period that will be discussed is the period from 1993 to 1997. This period was the time leading up to the second referendum on home rule, which became reality in 1997. Thatcher stepped

²³⁷ HC Deb 13 January 1992 vol. 201, cc533-4W

down, the Tory government softened its anti home-rule sentiment, still wanting to keep the union together, but now killing the idea of home rule by kindness, so what were the reasons for the SNLA to still pursue their violent cause? In the next chapter the period in Socttish society from 1993-1997 will be described. A period in which the Conservatives were becoming less and less popular in the UK and the SNP and Labour were working to realise a devolved Scottish legislature. It was also a time in which the number of English settlers coming to Scotland became a thorn in the eye of the SNLA and other Scottish nationalist fringe groups. The actions of the SNLA which were also focussed on these English settlers during this period which will be set forth in the second paragraph of the next chapter. After looking at Scottish society and the actions of the SNLA in this period, the chapter will look again at the extent to which the SNLA was a terrorist movement, factors of relative deprivation within society and the resource mobilisation of the SNLA. The counterterrorism strategies of the authorities and the performativity of the authorities and the media will again be examined in the fourth paragraph and finally I will give a reflection on which factors were contributing to the SNLA remaining a small movement during that period.

4. Scotland 1993-1997: Prelude to second Devolution Referendum

We have come to the inescapable conclusion that Scotland's destiny lies as an independent nation within the European Community. The political and economic union with England is now nearly 300 years old. It has served us well in the past, but as links with Europe strengthen that union has become more and more unnecessary. The time has come to break the shackles. To collect our own taxes. To run our own lives. To talk to other nations on our behalf. For too long - 300 years too long we have thought of ourselves as a second class nation, somehow not worthy or capable of being an independent state. This is nonsense. With independence, Scotland could be one of the wealthiest small nations in Europe.²³⁸

4.1. Scotland 1993-1997: The rise of pro-European sentiment and anti-English settler campaigns

Although the statement above resembles the pro-European speeches of Scottish politicians right after the Brexit-referendum, the quote is actually from the early 1990s, a decade in which pro-European sentiment in Scotland was on the rise like never before. Already from the late 1970s and 1980s, during the Thatcher years, pro-European sentiment rose in Scotland. Sectoral partisan, territorial and class oppositions moved from hostility to the Community to seeing it as a means of 'outflanking a centralising, right wing UK government.'²³⁹ The idea of Scotland as a European minded, modernised social democracy independent from the United Kingdom was associated with this means, at first mainly within Scottish politics, but this interest in new forms of political authority also seemed to correspond with the public mood.²⁴⁰ In 1989 the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) was established, consisting of representatives of civic Scotland and some of the political parties, to draw up a detailed blueprint for devolution including proposals for a directly elected Scottish Parliament with wide legislative powers.²⁴¹

Thatcherism and the decisions made by Thatcher's Conservative government on issues like Scottish industry and the poll-tax stirred quite some feelings of deprivation within Scottish society. The resignation of Thatcher in 1990 and the prelude to the General Election of 1992 sparked some hope within that society that the Thatcher years and their perceived 'anti-Scottish' policies were really finally over and with that the feeling that the European Union could be a good alternative for

 ²³⁸ The Sun, 23rd January 1992, p. 1 and p. 6 in: Lynch, P., The History of the Scottish National Party, p. 209
 ²³⁹ Keating, M., Nations against the state, p. 225

 $^{^{240}}$ Ibid.

²⁴¹ History of devolution, website of the Scottish Government, *http://www.gov.scot/About/Factfile/18060/11550*

the British Union rose.²⁴² Even the trade union movement in Scotland, which used to be closely integrated with the British movement, was now trying to raise European consciousness as an attempt to reawaken the debate for Scottish Home Rule. The Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) even played a leading role in the SCC and after the General Election of 1992 its main goal was to bring the disparate home rule and nationalist factions together to come to one clear goal for a (form of) Scottish independence.²⁴³

Still unionism remained a powerful force within the Conservative government up to the mid-1990s. As we have seen in the previous chapters, in the 1980s the territorial management of the Conservatives encompassed policies of privatisation, public sector retrenchment and deregulation. This management was based on the somewhat patronising view that the peripheral nations of the UK, like Scotland, were suffering from backwards political development because of post-war collectivist ideas. During the 1990s the Conservatives adopted a different strategy. The strategy of 'killing home rule by kindness', by instating less radical unionists on the political offices which involved Scottish legislature, toning down harsh unionist rhetoric and by failing to live up to the announced drastic cuts in Scottish spending levels. But when it came down to the movement for a proposed Scottish parliament, the Conservatives still blocked any ideas for an independent Scottish legislature.²⁴⁴

In Scotland the 1990s meant a decade without 'Thatcherism' which had hit Scotland particularly hard with the poll-tax and the closure of the various mines and break-down of other heavy industries. Although the Conservatives still ruled the country, the harshest policies were being softened or withdrawn. The level of relative deprivation on that part was therefore reduced, but in the eyes of a couple of Scottish nationalist fringe groups a new English threat arose. The coming of English settlers to Scotland. There was a growing number of political groups opposed to English migration, like Settler Watch and Scottish Watch (with its founding father Iain Macleay) during the years 1992-1993. According to the work of the Commission for Racial Equality there was even a wider reporting of discrimination against the English in Scotland during the 1990s.²⁴⁵

This growth in anti-English sentiments among the Scottish population was used by the Conservatives to discredit the parties in favour of Scottish home rule. This 'smear campaign', however, did not do the Conservative party that much good. Instead of discrediting the SNP and Labour, the Conservatives discredited themselves by appearing to be a party 'playing the ethnic card'. The SNP's reaction to the allegations by the Conservatives also contributed to this fact. 'There are now more than 450,000 English-born people in Scotland. The most recent census figures, for

²⁴² Lynch, P., *The History of the Scottish National Party*, p. 207

²⁴³ Keating, M., Nations against the state, pp. 239-245

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Lynch, P., The history of the Scottish National Party, pp. 224-228

1991, show that 41,320 English men and women moved to this country. Also, that in the same year, 24,205 people moved into Scotland from outside Great Britain. Scotland is now a multicultural country, a fact recognised by the SNP in their New Scot policy: if you live north of the Border you're a Scot - it's official!'²⁴⁶ The SNP revitalised multiple projects to include minorities into Scottish society and made sure that they could not be linked to any discriminatory policies, which made the Tories' discrediting attempts even more futile.²⁴⁷

In spite of the SNP's efforts to include all ethnicities in their nationalist campaign, the anti-English sentiment remained within Scottish society. Following Braveheart's release in the summer of 1995, which somehow struck a violent nationalist nerve in some Scots, there were thirteen attacks on English students at St Andrews University. The injuries had included cracked ribs, broken noses, a broken jaw and a concussion. In Fraserburgh an English woman, Laura Friedlander, fled the town after threats from Settler Watch neighbours and in Brunachie a family had endured multiple threats to their safety, from petty vandalism to death threats.²⁴⁸ So even though the Thatcher years were over and the Tories were engaged in softly proselytising Scots to unionism, not all Scots were susceptible to it or ready to even welcome the English into Scotland. However, the SNP's inclusive policies overshadowed the extremist nationalist sentiments of parties like Settler Watch. AS Peter Lynch puts it very well in his work *The History of the Scottish National Party:*

Such positive attitudes to ethnic minorities are common amongst social democratic parties but not ones which would be so easily identified with explicitly Nationalist parties such as the SNP. That is their overall significance as they paint a very interesting view of the 'nation' that the SNP seeks to mobilise, represent and lead to independence.²⁴⁹

That it was not the SNP leading Scotland to independence, but Labour leading Scotland to Home Rule in 1997 was an unexpected turn of events which was instigated by Labour's 'U-turn' on the idea of a devolution referendum.²⁵⁰ During the summer of 1996 Labour changed its stance on devolution and controversially promised a referendum on Scottish devolution. If Labour would win the general election the proposed referendum would take place only four months after the upcoming general election.²⁵¹ With Labour winning the general election in 1997, Scots were one step closer to devolution and (partial) home rule. Unlike during the campaign in 1979, during the referendum

²⁴⁶ McGinty, S., A little local difficulty, *The Herald Scotland*, March 2, 1996

²⁴⁷ Lynch, P., The history of the Scottish National Party, pp. 224-228

²⁴⁸ McGinty, S., A little local difficulty, *The Herald Scotland*, March 2, 1996

²⁴⁹ Lynch, P., *The history of the Scottish National Party*, p. 227

²⁵⁰ U-turn puts Robertson on the spot Labour faces split over referendum, *The Herald Scotland*, June 25, 1996

²⁵¹ Lynch, P., *The history of the Scottish National Party*, p. 220-235

campaign of the late 1990s all the major parties, except for the Conservatives, worked together to gain a majority for the Yes vote.²⁵²

In September 1997, 74.3 percent of the Scottish electorate voted 'Yes' to the establishment of a Scottish parliament. Striking is though that it is argued that the Scottish voters voted in favour of the setting up of a Scottish parliament because of their wish to 'improve welfare in the widest sense of the term, not necessarily as a result of a strong focus on being Scottish.'²⁵³ So even though during the years 1993-1997 there was a brief and small-scale resurgence of nationalist violence against English settlers, the majority of the Scottish people was not necessarily drawn to these sentiments and the violent repertoire of such movements.

4.2. The SNLA 1993-1997: Adam Busby and the decline of the SNLA

How then did the SNLA fit into all of this? With the resignation of Thatcher, the softening or even withdrawal of the harsh policies which had struck Scotland the SNLA had lost most of its incentives. That they were not ready to give up the fight, however, was demonstrated by their actions during this period. A series of letter bomb hoaxes disrupted the city centres of three Scottish cities during May 1993; Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee. Hundreds of policemen and sniffing dogs were sent out to track down the packages. Senior police officers immediately suspected the SNLA to be behind the hoaxes, but Adam Busby, who still lived an exiled life in Dublin, denied the allegations saying: 'It is not the SNLA. We have no connection with this but we thoroughly approve of it.'²⁵⁴ While in the years before the SNLA claimed many attacks and hoaxes it is striking to see that they now distanced themselves from the attacks even though the police were already suspecting them.

More striking is the fact that in October the SNLA issued a communiqué in which it suddenly did claim the attacks. In the communiqué Adam Busby said: 'The operation was a successful attempt to broaden and extend the range of SNLA operations by involving SNLA members with non-SNLA personnel in initially minor activities.'²⁵⁵ Adam Busby was now not only admitting to the hoaxes, but it also seems as if he was trying to say the SNLA was working together with other like-minded people to make the hoaxes happen. This could even have meant that the SNLA was recruiting new members.

In October 1993 Andrew McIntosh²⁵⁶, a member of the SNLA, is arrested for these hoaxes, among other actions.²⁵⁷Andrew McIntosh was arrested and sentenced to twelve years in prison on 23

 ²⁵² Leith, M.S. and Soule, D.P.J., *Political discourse and national identity in Scotland*, p. 34
 ²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Bruce, K., Caven, B., McConnel, T., Sinclair, K., Bomb hoaxes bring cities to standstill, *The Herald Scotland*, May 11, 1993

²⁵⁵ MacDonald, G., Smith, G., SNLA terrorist gets 12 years for conspiracy, *The Herald Scotland*, Dec 23, 1993 ²⁵⁶ 'McIntosh was expelled from the SNLA in 1997 for betraying the location of an arms dump to the police. He

hoped to get parole in return for his cooperation. He got parole.' In: Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist movement*, p. 5 ²⁵⁷ Scots terrorist given 12 years, *The Guardian*, Dec 23, 1993, p. 2

December 1993 for 'furthering the aims of the SNLA by criminal means with the intention of coercing the Government to set up a separate government in Scotland.'²⁵⁸ McIntosh told the officers that he was a cell commander of the SNLA and even told Detective Inspector Bob Duncan: 'I am a soldier with the SNLA. Whatever I did I did in the line of duty.'²⁵⁹ After the jury found him guilty, the SNLA released another communiqué promising to step up its armed struggle. Adam Busby, who issued the communiqué, promised that they would continue their violent actions. The letter, sent from Busby's home, contained a poster depicting a hooded gunman and the words "Free Andy McIntosh".²⁶⁰ Adam Busby also told *The Herald* after the trial that 'the operation for which Andrew McIntosh is now serving 12 years was carefully planned and involved several of the growing number of members of the SNLA in the North-east of Scotland.'²⁶¹

Shortly after the conviction of Andrew McIntosh the SNLA suffered another loss. After ten years 'tartan terrorist' David Dinsmore was taken to court on 8 February 1994. He had been on the run for over ten years, in Ireland, Europe and South America, but handed himself in to the British Consul in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in October 1993. He turned himself in because he deeply regretted getting involved in something he now knew was no longer justifiable. He told the court that: 'I was young and influenced by others, but I now believe legitimate political activities are much more worthwhile. I remain a nationalist, but I don't have the same radical views that I once had.' ²⁶² He also claimed that he missed his home and family so badly that he thought it time to clear up that aspect of his life.

Dinsmore was sentenced to 240 hours of community service for his actions. Sheriff George Evans emphasised in court the severity of the actions for which Dinsmore was on trial. He stated that for these kind of actions the only appropriate disposal would have been custody, but he added: 'After giving the matter much thought and in light of the favourable report I think I can at this stage show you a degree of mercy.' On the arrest of Dinsmore Busby, who was still in Ireland, spoke to the media in terms of bitterness and betrayal. Not because he regretted Dinsmore's captivity, but because of the loss of propaganda Dinsmore's conviction entailed for the SNLA: 'We built him up into a legendary Scarlet Pimpernel figure, which was useful for propaganda but was never a reality. He was actually an 18-year-old message boy, a courier.'²⁶³ A completely different reaction from the reaction of Busby to the conviction of McIntosh. Maybe Busby said it out of spite because Dinsmore had turned himself in and made the SNLA look silly by saying it was something from his past, when he

²⁵⁸ MacDonald, G., Smith, G., SNLA terrorist gets 12 years for conspiracy, *The Herald Scotland*

²⁵⁹ Accused 'cell commander of SNLA', *The Herald Scotland*, Dec 17, 1993

²⁶⁰ Scots terrorist given 12 years, *The Guardian*

²⁶¹ MacDonald, G., Smith, G., SNLA terrorist gets 12 years for conspiracy, *The Herald Scotland*

²⁶² Caven, B., Time runs out for tartan terrorist, *The Herald Scotland*, Feb 9, 1994

²⁶³ Dinwoodie, R., SNLA anger at loss of 'Pimpernel' propaganda, *The Herald Scotland*, Feb 9, 1994

was still young and unknowing, whereas McIntosh came out for the fact that he was a member or even alleged cell commander of the SNLA, no regret, everything 'in the line of duty'.²⁶⁴

In September 1994 Adam Busby himself faced the renewed threat of being extradited to Scotland.²⁶⁵ Because of the new climate of cooperation between Ireland and the United Kingdom²⁶⁶ the chance of success on extradition of Busby to the United Kingdom increased. The Grampian Police²⁶⁷ confirmed to *The Herald* on 14 September 1994 that they had issued a fresh warrant for Busby concerning a bomb-hoax in Aberdeen at the Aberdeen Sheriff Court the week before.²⁶⁸ Three men were already arrested for the hoax. Terence Webber, 29, Darren Brown, 24, and Kevin Paton, 26, were arrested on charges of 'conspiring to further by criminal means the Scottish National Liberation Army or some other organisation with the intention of coercing the Government into setting up a separate government in Scotland.'²⁶⁹ Busby was thought to be behind the attacks, but the trial was not held until summer 1995.

Six other letter bombs were sent through the mail on 11 March 1995, to coincide with Labour's conference in Scotland, including one that arrived at Tony Blair's constituency home. Two other bombs were sent to the conference venue in Inverness and Labour's headquarters in Walworth Road, south London.²⁷⁰ The Strathclyde Police launched a move to start extradition proceedings to bring Adam Busby back to Scotland in April 1995. He was not arrested until May 1995 and the Dublin Police were not able to hold him longer than 48 hours under anti-terrorist legislation without charge and had to let him go.²⁷¹

Even though Busby knew how to stay out of Scotland until very recently, the SNLA, or really some of its alleged members, were about to face another trial in the summer of 1995. Although Darren

²⁶⁴ Accused 'cell commander of SNLA', *The Herald Scotland*, Dec 17, 1993

²⁶⁵ Adam Busby has dodged the bullet on extradition to Scotland until February 2015. Twenty-one years after escaping to Ireland on 18 February 2015 he faced the High Court in Glasgow. In July 2015 the trial was still going. Source: *http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/feb/20/adam-busby-court-terorrism-charges*. In October 2015 he avoided prosecution for alleged terrorism offences after a court ruled he was medically unfit to stand trial. 'Busby has been on remand in prison since his extradition. Police and prosecutors are expected to monitor his behaviour to ensure he does not start reoffending, the Crown Office indicated on Thursday. "Based on unanimous expert medical opinion, Adam Busby has been assessed as unfit to stand trial at this time," a spokesman for the Crown Office said. "Should there be a change in that situation, the crown reserves the right to re-raise proceedings Source: *http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/oct/15/scottishseparatist-leader-adam-busby-not-fit-to-stand-trial-on-terror-charges*

²⁶⁶ The Extradition (Amendment) Act 1994 extended the range of offences that could not be regarded as political for extradition purposes.

http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/justice/arrests/extradition_to_and_from_ireland.html and http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1994/en/act/pub/0006/index.html

²⁶⁷ Until 2013 the Grampian Police was the name for the police in the northeast region of Scotland. In 2013 the Grampian Police was replaced by Police Scotland.

²⁶⁸ Dinwoodie, R., New bid to extradite Busby, *The Herald Scotland*, Sept 15, 1994

²⁶⁹ Three on SNLA bomb hoax charges, *The Herald Scotland*, Sept 13, 1994

²⁷⁰ Nowicka, H., Home rule group sends letter bomb to Blair, *The Guardian*, 12 Mar 1995, P. 6

²⁷¹ Simpson, C., Dublin frees SNLA man, *The Herald Scotland*, May 25, 1995 and: Group using Dublin to post threats, *The Irish Times*, Sep 27, 1995, p. 4

Brown had been on bail and disappeared shortly after his arrest in September 1994 only to join the SNLA's Dublin's cell there, Terrence Webber and Kevin Patton still faced serious charges and their trial was held in August 1995.²⁷² Webber, who had shared a prison cell with Andrew McIntosh for other criminal activities, was inspired by McIntosh to 'free Scotland from the shackles of Westminster'.²⁷³ During their trial various actions of the SNLA and a SNLA operation called 'Flame' came to light.

According to the SNLA they had launched a 'daring and secret' operation in early 1994 called 'Operation Flame'. This had been an attempt by the SNLA to establish a series of 'leaderless resistance groups' in Scotland to prevent English mass migration into Scotland. Their plan had been to anonymously distribute a series of bomb-making manuals and other literature to as many people in Scotland who were deemed 'suitable' for the armed struggle by the SNLA. The SNLA did not want to be openly associated with Flame (which was a fictitious group, only the name actually existed but it was all part of the SNLA), and wanted the manuals to be some sort of 'Beginners' Guide To Terrorism' so that potential terrorists could plan and carry out attacks and operations on their own, anonymously and independently. But with the intention of causing fear by letting people think a new group 'Flame' had arisen. In the end it was all a SNLA operation though.²⁷⁴

During 1994 the SNLA and its operation 'Flame' conducted a series of actions in which they targeted English settlers in Scotland by painting anti-English slogans on walls, threatening English people by communiqué and placing hoax bombs. Adam Busby said he had sent Kevin Paton the hoax letter bombs and threatening letters, which he then forwarded.²⁷⁵ Webber and Patton were convicted for doing serious damage to property, endangering lives, and plotting to issue threats to kill, as well as dispatching hoax explosive devices. All these actions were performed between 1 January 1994 and 9 September 1994.²⁷⁶

The day after the two Scots were convicted an article with the title 'Plot was allegedly masterminded from Dublin by Adam Busby, exiled head of the SNLA²⁷⁷ appeared in *The Herald*. Although the title suggests that Busby was behind the attacks it can be read later on in the article that:

 ²⁷² Clouston, E., Scots extremists sent hoax firebombs, court told, *The Guardian*, Aug 22, 1995, p. 4
 ²⁷³ Smith, G., Plot was allegedly masterminded from Dublin by Adam Busby, exiled head of the SNLA, *The*

Herald Scotland, Aug 26, 1995

²⁷⁴ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group, pp. 49-50*

²⁷⁵ Smith, G., Plot was allegedly masterminded from Dublin by Adam Busby, exiled head of the SNLA, *The Herald Scotland*, Aug 26, 1995

²⁷⁶ Designs for explosive device 'sent to paper'. Trial told of threat to bomb 'colonists', *The Herald Scotland*, Aug 22, 1995

²⁷⁷ Smith, G., Plot was allegedly masterminded from Dublin by Adam Busby, exiled head of the SNLA, *The Herald Scotland*, Aug 26, 1995

Busby, who lives in Dublin, would like the public to believe that the SNLA is a well organised and thriving paramilitary group. It seems more likely that Busby is skilful in persuading one of two impressionable extremists to carry out sporadic campaigns which gain a great deal of the publicity on which he thrives, and it is entirely possible that Busby himself is the entire core of the SNLA.²⁷⁸

So again the media doubt the credibility of operation Flame and Busby and with it, doubt the SNLA. However, the source of David Leslie's book tells us that in 1995 there were at least four active members in the SNLA cell in Dublin. Adam Busby himself, a New Zealand-born Gaelic speaker Tristan O' Cearnaigh, Hugh Smith McMahon (a native of Glasgow), Darin Brown of Aberdeen. This was the same Darin Brown who previously had been involved in operation Flame and had absconded to Ireland. O' Cearnaigh was of mixed Scottish and Irish extraction. Except for Busby, all men were in their twenties.²⁷⁹ During that year Operation Icarus was launched. The action was called Operation Icarus after Greek Mythology.²⁸⁰ The SNLA crafted a couple of the so called Icarus devices which were postal devices sent through the Royal Mail and designed and set to ignite while the aircraft was in flight. One of the devices was sent to the Press Association offices in London mid-May 1995, but had been deliberately de-activated and sent as a warning only, intended to demonstrate the SNLA's capability to carry out its threats.²⁸¹ After this threat the Dublin police immediately came into action though and arrested Busby, Brown and O' Cearnaigh. They were arrested on suspicion of possession of explosives by the Special Detective Unit and were arrested the day after the Icarus device had been sent. The fourth member of the Dublin cell was arrested the week after. All four of them were released after attempts to interrogate them.²⁸²

When in November that year an incendiary device addressed to Shadow Scottish Secretary Mr George Robertson was intercepted all eyes turned on Busby and the SNLA again. An article by *The Herald* on 16 November stated that:

Although no-one had yesterday claimed to have sent the latest "bomb" the spotlight will inevitably fall on the Scot Adam Busby, currently living in Dublin, who was named in the High Court as the man behind a campaign earlier this year to drive out the English which resulted in two lesser figures receiving lengthy jail sentences for sending fake bombs and threats. Busby's alleged activities in relation to the Scottish National Liberation Army have been the subject of a recent investigation by

²⁷⁸ Smith, G., Plot was allegedly masterminded from Dublin by Adam Busby, exiled head of the SNLA, *The Herald Scotland*

²⁷⁹ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 53

²⁸⁰ Icarus was the son of an inventor who made wings of wax for his son to fly away from the Island of Crete on which they were held captive by the minotaur. He warned his son not to fly to high, because the wax could melt. But in the end Icarus did fly to high, his wings melted and he crashed down into the ocean.

²⁸¹ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group,* p. 66

²⁸² Ibid., p. 67

the Scottish police, and *The Herald* has been informed that reports have been in the possession of the Crown Office in Edinburgh for some time.²⁸³

In the article the author also stated that police forces, including Strathclyde and Grampian were believed to have been involved. It also said that potential witnesses, like journalists with whom Busby was alleged to be in contact with, had been interviewed. Dublin and Edinburgh were also said to have been in contact in relation to the extradition of Busby, but that no decision had been reached on the matter.²⁸⁴

At the end of May 1996 the warrant for Busby's extradition was dropped by the Crown in Scotland, pending an arrest of Busby by the Dublin Police based on terrorist offences on 22 May. Busby appeared at Dublin's anti-terrorist court accused of possession of letter bombs addressed to then Labour leader Tony Blair and previously mentioned Shadow Scottish Secretary George Robertson. The court also charged him with 'sending messages of a menacing nature to newspapers, including *The Herald*.'²⁸⁵ Busby was remanded in custody until 8 October 1996.²⁸⁶ The court refused Busby bail after hearing the Dublin Police's warnings that they thought he would abscond were he to be released on bail. According to Detective Inspector Peter Maguire, who opposed the bail, Busby would interfere with and intimidate witnesses if he were to be given bail. According to him the core business of Busby's activities had been 'threats and intimidation to English people living in Scotland and to people in political life in the UK'.²⁸⁷ Although the trial would take place in October, it was postponed because of an 'Irish court fiasco'.²⁸⁸ After being released and rearrested on the same day in November 1996, Busby would still have to face the court. His bail was denied again and he was remanded in custody until the High Court ruling in March 1997.²⁸⁹

On 14 March 1997 Adam Busby was convicted to two years in prison by Dublin's Special Criminal Court. Busby was jailed for an act of terrorism which *The Guardian* described on 15 March as 'One of the most incompetent acts of terrorism ever perpetrated'.²⁹⁰ The act for which Busby was eventually jailed was sending a fax to Scottish media outlets referring to the SNLA and operation Flame and purported to be the "Headquarters communiqué of the Scottish National Liberation Army".²⁹¹ The fax threatened random no-warning attacks on what it called 'English colonists in Scotland' even including night-time petrol bombing of their homes and referred to `a rapid escalation in number

 ²⁸³ Freeman, J., Post Office staff intercept bomb sent to Labour MP, *The Herald Scotland*, Nov 16, 1995
 ²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Freeman, J., Warrant dropped against SNLA man, *The Herald Scotland*, 25 May 1996

²⁸⁶ Busby remanded in custody in Dublin, *The Herald Scotland*, Jun 13, 1996

²⁸⁷ Dublin court refuses bail to Scot accused of threatening acts, *The Irish Times*, Nov 28, 1996, p.4

²⁸⁸ Sharrock, D., Irish justice minister comes under fire over court fiasco, *The Guardian*, Nov 8, 1996, p.4

²⁸⁹ 12 men remanded until High Court ruling, *The Irish Times*, Jan 16, 1997, p. 6

²⁹⁰ Sharrock, D., Scottish 'freedom fighter' jailed by Dublin court, *The Guardian*, Mar 15, 1997, p. 5

²⁹¹ Starrs, C., SNLA 'leader' jailed, *The Herald Scotland*, Mar 15, 1997

and scale of our [SNLA] operations[']. The fax also contained a hit list of English targets based in Scotland, including three regional councillors and the Clydebank MP Anthony Worthington.²⁹² Busby, although convicted to two years by the Dublin's Special Criminal Court['], was released from prison in November 1997.²⁹³

Both Patton and Webber stood on trial for furthering the aims of the SNLA and operation Flame, Patton was, in the end not found guilty of any involvement with the SNLA.²⁹⁴ Busby even denied the involvement of the SNLA in the attacks Patton and Webber were accused of. Later, Busby tried to claim the attacks for the SNLA again in his communiqué, but his actual involvement in the attacks therefore remains questionable. It could be that the only reason he claimed the attacks is because of the publicity it generated. After the arrest of Busby, there were no reports on any SNLA attacks in the newspapers until a threat to poison the water supplies in England was issued, again by Busby, in 1999.²⁹⁵

With the conviction of both Dinsmore and McIntosh a it seemed as if the SNLA was down to one man: Adam Busby. Although Busby received help from the members of the Dublin cell and they tried to attract members in the form of Webber and Patton and operation Flame, they were not able to stay out of police hands for long and according to the newspapers Busby soon found himself alone, plotting in his bedsit in Dublin again.²⁹⁶ Whether this was actually the case or Busby had some more co-conspirators who were willing to help him to further the aims of the SNLA cannot be said for certain.

So how was the SNLA perceived during this period? Because the years from 1984 to 1992 had been relatively quiet after the start-up years 1982-1983 of the SNLA, the media still doubted the credibility of the SNLA and in particular Adam Busby. In an article in *The Observer* on 15 October 1995 the author, John Sweeney, even dares to state that: 'When is a terrorist not a terrorist? When his gang uses marzipan instead of Semtex in its letter bombs.'²⁹⁷ The author refers to the letter bombs of 1994 which were sent in jiffy bags containing 'a battery, wires, a clothes peg and - the killer

²⁹² Man is jailed for sending 'menacing' faxes, *The Irish Times*, Mar 15, 1997, p. 4

²⁹³ Freeman, J., Scottish National Liberation Army leader could still face arrest: Self-styled terrorist is freed from Irish jail, *The Herald Scotland*, Nov 29, 1997

²⁹⁴ Smith, G., Plot was allegedly masterminded from Dublin by Adam Busby, exiled head of the SNLA, *The Herald Scotland*, Aug 26, 1995

²⁹⁵ This action contains of a threat to poison the English water supplies and conducting mass murder by doing so. *The Irish Times* states the following on the matter: 'According to sources who know the man, he is highly eccentric and prone to sending threatening letters to government figures, but unlikely to pose a serious threat.' Cusack, J., Man held in Dublin over threat to water supplies is a fantasist, *The Irish Times*. Jul 12, 1999, p. 5 ²⁹⁶ Clouston, E., Scots jailed for 'anti-colonist' plot, *The Guardian*, Aug 26, 1995, p. 5

²⁹⁷ Sweeney, J., Bittersweet jokes of marzipan gang, *The Observer*, Oct 15, 1995, p. 14

ingredient - marzipan, wrapped in tape.²⁹⁸ In his piece Sweeney thus literally denies the SNLA the status of terrorist organisation.

Adam Busby does not help the SNLA's terrorist reputation by first denying and then claiming the attacks of May 1993. The inconsistency of his claims, the grandiloquence of Busby and the fact that there have been no casualties or serious injuries in any of the SNLA attacks during this period together make that the SNLA were not being taken seriously as a terrorist movement. And there is still another reason why the SNLA or rather Adam Busby was not taken seriously as a terrorist organisation. Because when looking at Adam Busby and his credibility as a terrorist, another question arises. Why was Adam Busby allowed to stay at large for more than ten years? He has been linked to many threats, letter bombs, hoax bombs and his fellow conspirators have all been arrested and jailed. The authorities knew of his involvement in the matters and knew where he resided. So why did he manage to retain his freedom for such a long time?

After the capture and conviction of Busby in 1997 *The Herald* journalist James Freeman looks back on the exiled years of Busby and the question on 'why Busby was allowed to remain at large in Dublin for 13 years, plotting, and fomenting trouble for the British state.^{'299} According to Freeman this question has been asked over the years and has been answered by some of Busby's former associates in the Scottish Republican movement. Their answer was that Busby was deliberately left in Dublin, 'watched but unharmed, because his antics were damaging to the image of Scottish nationalism.'³⁰⁰ Another of his former associates Donald Anderson, who knew Busby from cofounding Scottish Republican Socialist Party also said that:

I cannot say if Busby was a Branch plant but he has certainly been responsible for an enormous amount of damage to the broader cause of Scottish nationalism. He has been very, very useful to the British state in their quest to keep the Union intact.³⁰¹

In his article on the 'Marzipan Gang' Sweeney also speaks of the rumours on why Busby might still have been at liberty, while all his contacts seemed to get arrested. According to his article: 'Many Scottish Nationalists are aware that the publicity given to the Marzipan Gang - 'the dark side of nationalism', according to George Robertson - has damaged their cause. The political agenda of their party conference last month was thrown by fresh media attention to Busby. One SNP member said last week: 'Busby should be in prison or in a psychiatric hospital.''³⁰² The article then continues with

²⁹⁸ Sweeney, J., Bittersweet jokes of marzipan gang, *The Observer*

²⁹⁹ Freeman, J., Real-life world of a fantasist, *The Herald Scotland*, Mar 15, 1997

 $^{^{300}}$ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Sweeney, J., Bittersweet jokes of marzipan gang, *The Observer*

the rumours that were drifting around nationalist circles that Busby may be remained at large because with Busby at liberty the British intelligence agencies can monitor contacts with other would-be violent nationalists. He also cites Patrick Fitzgerald, an intelligence expert, on the subject. 'It could make sense for the intelligence services to prefer to keep a target terrorist at liberty.'³⁰³

In an article in *The Guardian*, almost a month prior to the article of Sweeney, Alex Salmond, then head of the Scottish National Party, denounced the leaked Labour statement by Robertson as a 'cheap trick' to discredit the SNP by linking the SNP with 'tartan terrorism'.³⁰⁴ The full memo leaked by Shadow Scottish secretary George Robertson stated:

Those of us, and there have been a number, who have been recipients of letter bombs and death threats need to make people aware of the darker side of nationalism. The SNP publicly stands back from these extremists but the fact is that the fringe exists and feeds on rhetoric and prejudices of some prominent nationalists in public life.³⁰⁵

Salmond accused Robertson of a 'pretty cheap spoiling tactic'. In this article Alex Salmond even accuses George Robertson of deliberately attacking and smearing the name of the SNP by linking them to the extremist Scottish Nationalists. So could Adam Busby be a part of this smearing campaign, maybe even a British weapon in keeping the Union together?

It could be that he was being used some sort of unwilling 'agent provocateur', in which case the term terrorist or terrorist movement would not really apply to Adam Busby or the SNLA during the period 1993-1997 anymore. When *The Observer* asked the authorities to respond to the rumours on Busby and his role in anti-terrorist measures, a spokesman for the Crown Office in Edinburgh answered: 'I couldn't comment on that.' When the journalist of *The Observer* asked him: 'You can't comment, or are these rumours all nonsense?' the spokesman replied: 'I can't comment on that.'³⁰⁶ If Busby was an agent provocateur, a useful tool in a pro-Union campaigning, or a pawn in a larger anti-terrorist plot of the British authorities cannot, at the moment, be said for certain.

³⁰³ Sweeney, J., Bittersweet jokes of marzipan gang, *The Observer*

 ³⁰⁴ Clouston, E., 'Tartan terror' link angers Salmond: SNP in Perth, *The Guardian*, Sep 21, 1995, p. 8
 ³⁰⁵ Ibid

³⁰⁶ Sweeney, J., Bittersweet jokes of marzipan gang, *The Observer*




Table 4.1. Dates and deeds of the SNLA 1993-1997*

*Table shows all claimed and unclaimed actions ascribed to the SNLA

4.3. Terrorism, Relative Deprivation and Resource Mobilisation

During the years 1993-1997 the SNLA carried out various actions like sending letter bombs, planting hoaxes and vandalising property of English settlers. But were they a terrorist organisation according to the definition in the first chapter of this paper? When we look at the trial of Andrew McIntosh one thing stands out. *The Herald* reported on the conviction of McIntosh that 'he was found guilty at the High Court in Aberdeen after an eight-day trial of conspiring to furthering the aims of the SNLA by criminal means with the intention of coercing the Government to set up a separate government in Scotland'.³⁰⁷ When we look at the definition of terrorism given we can say that the SNLA did stick to the doctrine of terrorism. In the article we can see that the SNLA did use fear-generating tactics to coerce the British government into setting up a separate government in

³⁰⁷ MacDonald, G., Smith, G., SNLA terrorist gets 12 years for conspiracy, *The Herald Scotland*

Scotland. The aspect of 'without legal or moral restraints' is more visible in this period than in the other two periods. While during the previous years, the SNLA made sure they did not harm non-combatants, they did not shun from using violence against English settlers. Although the damage was mostly done to the English Settlers' properties and not against the people themselves it was used for propagandistic and psychological effects trying to coerce the English into leaving Scotland. Although the level of fear and the impact the attacks had can be argued, the actions were terrorist actions according to the definition.

The English settlers were the SNLA's biggest annoyance during the years 1993-1997. With Thatcher gone and her harsh policies being softened or even reversed, the incentives for the Scottish people to turn to social or terrorist movements seem harder to find. On the extreme national fringe, however, they found their new target. English settlers. Even though the views of the SNLA on English settlers were being shared by other nationalist fringe groups like Settlers Watch, but also by a portion of the Scottish people (it just needs looking at the thirteen beaten up English students to see it was true) the SNLA still did not manage to gather a large constituency. Although Scotland was still no independent country, the feelings of deprivation within Scottish society waned. With Scotland not being submitted to Thatcherism anymore the level of relative deprivation within Scottish society became less and less.

With operation Flame, the SNLA did try to generate a larger constituency. Although the operation did not attract that many people, they were actively trying to win people to their cause. Busby and the members of the Dublin cell, were thus putting effort and their own resources like money and time into finding new members for the SNLA. The effect of resource mobilisation can also be seen as Busby pointed out that the hoaxes of 1993 were a successful attempt at broadening and extending the range of SNLA operations by involving SNLA members with non-SNLA personnel. According to Busby non-SNLA people where thus mobilising their resources for the SNLA to use. Although it is still quite hard to point out resource mobilisation during this period, there are a few indicators that lead to us to think it did happen. With the SNLA being more active again than in the previous period resource mobilisation was needed for them to realise their actions. Or you could even turn that around and claim that, because resource mobilisation was happening more than in the previous period, the SNLA was better suited to execute their attacks.

Which one of these is true can, alas, not been said because it is not completely clear to which extent resource mobilisation was taking place. But the fact was that the SNLA became more active again and so in the next paragraph we will try to find out what kind of counterterrorism measures there were being taken to counter this rise in activity of the SNLA.

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4.4. Counterterrorism: Minimising social utility and performative power

What kind of actions were the authorities taking to counter the actions and growth of the SNLA. One of the things that needs to be discussed in that light is the role Adam Busby played in the media. Because, whether it was true or not, Busby was being depicted as an agent provocateur. Whether this was true or whether it was a deliberate action by the authorities to depict him like that, the effect was that the social utility of the SNLA was being reduced. The fact that a lot of Busby's associates were caught, but Busby remained at large could be an indication of Busby's status as an agent provocateur. The fact that he himself was convicted a couple of years later as well, contradicts that theory however. It could be that the authorities thought he was an unwilling and unintentional agent provocateur, but the authorities were fine with him doing what he did, because it made their job of catching his associates easier. The social utility of the SNLA was reduced even further, because there were more extreme nationalist fringe groups arising because of anti-English settler sentiments within Scottish society. So even though a constituency for that kind of thoughts was becoming larger, the (non-violent) groups to which these people could turn to were multiplying as well making the SNLA even more redundant and decreasing its social utility. So what about the performative power during these years?

The start of this period was marked by a resurgence of attention for the SNLA as a result of various processes and trials. But first the bomb hoaxes in the city centres of the cities Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow made sure the SNLA were heard of again. These bomb hoaxes also provided the evidence which was needed to finally get Andrew McIntosh arrested. The trial and conviction of Andrew McIntosh were widely reported on. During the trial multiple articles were in the newspapers reporting on its progression. The newspapers also stated the reasons for which he was caught and convicted: 'furthering the aims of the SNLA by criminal means with the intention of coercing the Government to set up a separate government in Scotland.'³⁰⁸ The goals of the SNLA were once again made clear to the public and there was much publicity around the trials against this member of the SNLA.

Another well reported trial was the trial of David Dinsmore who 'turned himself in' in Brazil. As we have seen in Paragraph 2.3 the media was now well informed on the fact that Dinsmore had been under surveillance and of the details of his arrest. Striking is that during the trial a picture of twenty year old Dinsmore was being painted as a rash youth who stood behind the goals of the SNLA, but never intended to cause actual harm.

³⁰⁸ MacDonald, G., Smith, G., SNLA terrorist gets 12 years for conspiracy, The Herald Scotland

Mr William McVicar, defending, said that after leaving school Dinsmore was unemployed for two years and then became involved in nationalist politics and fell in with older people. Mr McVicar said Dinsmore had intended to attract attention to "the cause" rather than inflict injury. He explained that his client was now a much more mature and wiser man who had settled in Brazil where his language skills meant he was able to get a good job as a translator. Mr McVicar added that Dinsmore felt he could not go on without resolving the trouble he had left behind and had surrendered to the consul. Dinsmore, the advocate continued, had changed his life and character completely in the past 10 years. He asked the sheriff to take into account the long time he had spent in custody, both in Ireland and Scotland. After the court case, Dinsmore spoke of his life on the run and his naivety in becoming involved in that "particular sphere of nationalism". He said: "I deeply regret getting involved in something I know is no longer justifiable. I was young and influenced by others, but I don't have the same radical views that I once had."³⁰⁹

If we look at the indicators for performative power of Beatrice de Graaf, it can be argued that the mental distance to David Dinsmore in this case was being minimalised by depicting him as a naïve young man. He was not depicted as some alien force but with this image it was still possible to understand this young man and his youthful shenanigans. During the trials of Dinsmore and McIntosh Adam Busby made sure that he was not left unheard. His opinion and the SNLA's planned reactions to the conviction were also widely reported in the media.

It is remarkable to notice, however, that the police immediately suspected the SNLA regarding the bomb hoaxes in the three Scottish cities. Because even though the SNLA had been belittled by various reporters in the past, and they had not been heard from in quite a while the police still suspected them even after such a long time of relative silence. This might imply that the police were still on the trail of the SNLA and kept an eye on them. It may even imply that, if not for police intervention, the SNLA might have made more moves. It could even mean that the SNLA had been conducting more plans and had been carrying out more actions than were reported in the media. If that was the case, then the government, the police and the intelligence agencies did a good job on keeping their performativity and that of the SNLA at a low level.

The media immediately picked up on the statements by the police that the hoaxes were of SNLA produce and distributed the news to the public even though Adam Busby, self-proclaimed leader of the SNLA, first denied the hoaxes to be the work of the SNLA. So despite the previous period of

³⁰⁹ Caven, B., Time runs out for tartan terrorist, *The Herald Scotland*, Feb 9, 1994

relative silence and Busby's denial, the police and media did not hesitate to revert to the SNLA's terrorism discourse of the early eighties.

After a while, maybe when he noticed that the attention could be good propaganda for the SNLA after such a long period of silence, Busby admitted by means of a communiqué to the bomb scares in the three Scottish cities. It appears as if after the communiqué and after the news and attention around the trial of McIntosh Busby regained some sort of bravado to pick up the armed struggle. He even established some sort of new and intentionally self-sustaining cells under the collective 'Flame'.

Operation Flame was supposed to be a 'Leaderless Resistance Movement'. According to Leslie 'The growth of such a diverse and self-sustaining organisation would be a nightmare for the police and the security services in Scotland, who would have little or no chance of dealing a blow at the heart of any such movement, but would have to deal separately with each of the independent cells.'³¹⁰ Operation Flame carried out multiple attacks in 1994. The attacks were mainly targeted at 'English settlers', English people living in Scotland and the agencies that were making it happen. But at the end of 1994 the main people responsible for the attacks were arrested and operation Flame died an untimely death.

The trial of Terrence Webber, Kevin Patton and Darren Brown in the summer of 1995, like the trial on McIntosh, attracted much media attention. This trial made sure that more actions by the SNLA and operation Flame came to light. But why did these actions come out now, and not before? Maybe the evidence had not been sufficient or maybe the police and the state tried to keep the SNLA as small as they could in terms of attention. It might be that the reason why this did not come out before was an intentional strategy by the law enforcement agencies and the government to keep the SNLA out of the media as much as possible. Striking is the way two of the men were caught. According to the newspapers is was by accident that these men could be arrested for the activities linked to the SNLA.

It was by chance that Webber's criminal activities led to his involvement in tartan terrorism and it was also by sheer chance that his criminal activities led to his arrest and imprisonment. Webber, a relatively articulate criminal, was inspired to fight to "free Scotland from the shackles of Westminster" when he shared a prison cell with convicted terrorist Andrew McIntosh. He was caught when, just seven hours after a hoax bomb had been placed outside Aberdeen Sheriff Court, police raided his flat in the city's Union Grove looking for stolen jewellery and an officer spotted materials similar to those which had been used in the construction of the device. The court was told that Webber and Darren Brown, who had been in the Aberdeen flat with him, were taken to Grampian

³¹⁰ Leslie, D., *Inside a terrorist group*, p. 50

Police headquarters in Queen Street where a picture began to emerge of how the hoax bomb had been planted.³¹¹

If we can believe *The Herald*, the capture of these SNLA members was therefore not the work of intensive police action or special units set up to counteract the Scottish terrorists. According to *The Herald* it was even by mere chance that these people were arrested for these SNLA activities. The performative power of the police and the media were low on this front. After the incendiary device addressed to Shadow Scottish Secretary Mr George Robertson was intercepted however, all eyes immediately turned to Busby and the SNLA again and in the aftermath of this incident something striking happened.

A memo coming from Mr Robertson was leaked to the press. This could have been a deliberate attempt by Robertson to discredit the nationalists cause. According to *The Herald*

The Shadow Secretary of State expressed surprise that an internal party document had been leaked at this time but he did not back away from its contents. He confirmed that he was the author of the report referring to the 'dark side of nationalism' and he was happy to link this to recent cases involving threats and intimidation by Nationalist extremists.³¹²

The SNP and Labour were both outraged over this remark from Robertson. SNP party's chief executive, Mr Michael Russell, said: 'Democracy is very precious and democratic parties should be making common cause against extremists instead of making cheap points against other political parties who have never endorsed racism.¹³¹³ The SNP even expelled people from the party if they had anything to do with extremist anti-English groups.³¹⁴ Robertson accepted that the SNP had disowned such groups but stated that they needed to make people aware of this darker side of terrorism.³¹⁵ Robertson even continued with accusing the SNP of standing back from extremists and said that the SNP feeding on the SNP's 'rhetoric and prejudice'.³¹⁶

It is striking that in the prelude to the general elections and the second devolution referendum, both held in 1997, most of the remaining SNLA members were being caught and Busby was more than ever depicted as a lone wolf or even an (unwilling) agent provocateur plotting from his bedsit in Dublin. Being portrayed as the puppeteer of a few naïve and lanky youth. It is even more striking that

³¹¹ Smith, G., Plot was allegedly masterminded from Dublin by Adam Busby, exiled head of the SNLA, *The Herald Scotland*, Aug 26, 1995

³¹² SNP and Labour in terror row, *The Herald* Scotland, Sept 20, 1995

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Lynch, P., *The History of the Scottish National Party*, (Cardiff 2013), p. 225

³¹⁵ SNP and Labour in terror row, *The Herald* Scotland, Sept 20, 1995

³¹⁶ Ibid.

Mr Robertson uses the SNLA and its actions for what seems to be a smear campaign against the SNP. The SNP were gaining numbers again in those days and it seems a bit too coincidental that a memo was leaked outfacing the SNP at a time when they were catching up.³¹⁷

That the SNLA and its actions were being used in an election campaign is an indicator of higher performative power of the government concerning the SNLA around that time period. There are a couple more indicators of performative power which were present to some extent during the period from 1993-1997. The priority of the topic was quite high as well. The papers were full of the stories on the various trials surrounding members of the SNLA. And even politicians had the subject high on their agenda, or at least they wanted the public to think they did. Although the mental distance to Dinsmore was kept small, the mental distance towards Busby and the members responsible for the actions carried out under the name Flame was kept high, especially the distance towards Busby. He was still being depicted as a loony old crank plotting from his Dublin bedsit.

4.5. Thoughts and concerns

In the previous paragraph it becomes clear that some of the indicators of performative power like described by De Graaf were visible in this period, like the use of rhetoric on SNLA actions by unionists to discredit the nationalists' cause during the time leading up to the elections and the extensive reporting on the trials of SNLA members like Andrew McIntosh, Patton and Webber. Still the SNLA did not gather a constituency and did not grow in size. Their status was still one of an obscure little movement which was not able to bring about change and they were still perceived with some form of disdain and even ridicule.

The years from 1992 to 1997 were turbulent years for the SNLA. Operations like operation Icarus and operation Flame were launched and these operations needed careful planning. But because of these operations and possible infiltration of the movement some of its members were caught, tried and convicted. Adam Busby's role in all of this may also have been crucial. Whether it was intentional or unintentional, intelligence agencies were probably watching him and through his contact with people like Patton and Webber, they had the needed evidence to arrest them. Busby's presumed status as an agent provocateur discredited the organisation as well and may have caused the fact that the more extreme nationalists were attracted to movements like Scottish Watch, or act on their own, like with the beating of thirteen English students, before they would turn to an organisation like the SNLA.

³¹⁷ Lynch, P., *The history of the Scottish National Party*, pp. 215-231

5. Conclusion

In 1980 the SNLA arose based on the idea of realising an independent Scottish state not shunning any violence in the process of achieving this goal. During the years 1979 to 1997 the actions of the SNLA varied quite a bit in intensity, in multiplicity and in level of success. While the gross of their actions consisted of sending letter bombs to government officials, not all of their attacks were letter bombs or other incendiary devices sent through the post. The alleged plot to assassinate Roy Jenkins and the bombing of the British Airways offices only being two examples of other types of attacks by the SNLA. But were these actions actual terrorist actions and can the SNLA thus be called a terrorist movement?

To be able to determine whether this was so we will first take one final look at the definition of terrorism. 'Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence. On the other hand it refers to a conspiratorial practice of organised, calculated demonstrative direct violent action without legal or moral restraints. It targets mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties. It can either be perpetrated by a group or a lone wolf.' The actions perpetrated by the SNLA during the period 1979-1997 were actions which were organised and calculated. They were demonstrative direct violent actions without legal restraint, but what about without moral restraint?

Especially during the first two periods, the years from 1980-1992, the SNLA was targeting people who were the direct cause for their anger. These targets included politicians, industry officials and members of the Royal Family. The SNLA made sure, however, not to target those who were innocent in their eyes. Hurting 'innocents' as collateral damage or targeting non-combatants purely out of the desire to cause terror and disrupt society was not part of their repertoire. Although industry officials were non-combatant targets, they were still targets which were directly involved in the struggles of the SNLA. They did not target airports, metro stations or other public places with viable incendiary or explosive devices trying to hurt as many people just for the purpose of causing wide spread fear.

During the period from 1993-1997 their incentives changed and with it part of their repertoire changed as well. Although they kept sending letter bombs to officials they were also targeting English settlers now. Because English settlers made up a larger portion of society than the targets during the first two periods and because they were non-combatants, the cause for alarm increased. This is reflected in the way politicians react to the SNLA and its actions, using terms like 'the darker side of nationalism' in their rhetoric. The 'terrorist' status of the SNLA is therefore debatable. One the one hand they were an organised movement which used demonstrative direct violent action mainly targeting civilians and non-combatants to coerce the British government into declaring Scotland independent. On the other hand they did show some form of moral restraint and their actions were never severe enough to cause actual widespread fear within Scottish or British society, which could be due to effective counterterrorism strategies by the British authorities.

What made the members of the SNLA start the movement in the first place? The SNLA arose because of the failed devolution referendum in 1979. The majority of the people who turned up for the referendum voted in favour of a devolved Scottish legislature but the majority was not honoured because of the forty percent rule stipulated in the Cunningham amendment. The gap between what the SNLA wanted, for the Scotland Act to be honoured, and what they got, the Scotland act being repealed had become intolerable. Because the SNLA itself clearly states that this was the reason for them to come together for the first time and conduct their plans and form their violent strategies it can be argued that the opportunity that arose, the failure of the referendum, has greatly contributed to the emergence of the SNLA. Had the Cunningham amendment not been attached and the Scotland Act been honoured and implemented things might have turned out differently. But things did not. The political opportunity of the referendum failure contributed to the emergence of the SNLA. The coming to power of the Conservatives with Thatcher as their Prime Minister was also a political opportunity which only intensified the relative deprivation felt by members of the SNLA.

The relative deprivation which was felt in Scottish society can be divided into three periods, which run somewhat parallel to the three periods of the SNLA. The first period being the time right after the referendum until the coming to power of the Tories led by Thatcher, in which the deprivation was mainly felt because of the outcome of the referendum and the implications of the Cunningham amendment. The second period was the time in which the Iron Lady fulfilled her terms of office during which the heavy industries in Scotland were in decline because of privatisation policies and the Scottish people were subjected to the poll-tax. The third period was the period after the resignation of Thatcher and the softening of those policies which hurt Scotland in particular. The 'killing home rule by kindness' policy of the Conservatives helped to reduce the feelings of deprivation within Scottish society.

Before the SNLA became reality mobilisation of resources, such as people and other goods was required. In the previous chapters it has already been noted that for such a small movement it is very hard, nearly impossible to really indicate resource mobilisation. Resource mobilisation may be a useful indicator of how people come to collective action with larger groups with larger constituencies, but with such a small and obscure movement like the SNLA it proved not to be the best instrument to use in indicating its coming to action. Some resource mobilisation is, however, visible. Some of the founding members of the SNLA had been active in other non-violent nationalist movements, but with their mobilising of the SNLA and mobilising their goods and contacts to the use of the SNLA they contributed to the emergence of the SNLA as a movement ready for collective action. After the first period resource mobilisation was again needed to reorganise the movement.

By mobilising resources, such as labour, knowledge, money and the materials for making the bombs and communication with for example Busby and the Dublin cell in Ireland, the SNLA was able to regroup and start another series of attacks in 1986. From 1993-1997 the SNLA started operation Flame, trying to attract more members. With their communiqué and 'Beginners' Guide To Terrorism' they were also trying to attract more people who would not necessarily be members of the SNLA, hoping they would also mobilise their resources for the SNLA.

Overall it is still very hard to really indicate resource mobility in the case of the SNLA. Members like Busby, Dinsmore and McIntosh were clearly members who put everything they got, their own resources into the SNLA, but for other members it is hard to find out and because the SNLA did not really have a constituency other than its members there is no constituency who could mobilise its resources in favour of the SNLA. For future research on smaller violent movements I would therefore like to recommend not to use resource mobilisation as an instrument. Relative deprivation, however, did turn out to be a good instrument in finding out the incentives for the SNLA to arise.

The actions of the SNLA kept coming from relative deprivation and their attacks were often a direct reaction to governmental decisions. Like the letter bomb to Secretary of State Patrick Jenkin, which was sent to him in retaliation of the closure of Ravenscraig steelworks. Or the multitude of bombs sent to Thatcher and other Conservative politicians because of the deprivation felt by the SNLA concerning her Conservative policy which hit Scotland, its industries and people particularly hard. After Thatcher's resignation the feelings of deprivation within Scottish Society became less, but the SNLA had now turned its eyes towards the English Settlers in Scotland. Although the sense of deprivation was felt by more Scots than just the members of the SNLA however. Anti-Thatcherism was visible within the whole of Scottish society. So why did the SNLA not have a larger constituency especially during the Thatcher years?

One of the main reasons was the way they were portrayed in the media. Even though they have sent multiple letter bombs and threats to various targets, the way they were portrayed was often with some form of trivialisation. Not even all of their actions were reported in the newspapers at the time they were executed. The SNLA was also often depicted as a handful of cranks, usually portrayed as only consisting of two to five people. Being portrayed like this the SNLA did not speak to the socially isolated people in society looking for the social utility a movement can bring. Because potential terrorists are often social utility maximisers, the image the media painted of the SNLA could not have been very attractive to these people.

The British government also did not seem to pay much attention to the SNLA. Especially during the Thatcher years. Like the Dutch approach of the seventies the British government had no centralised anti-terrorism discourse and left the authority and responsibility with the regional and local police departments and intelligence agencies. The media was also mainly left out of the loop.

Some of the attacks of the SNLA were only reported a couple of months and sometimes even years after the incidents took place.

The performative power of the British anti-terrorism policy was low. In the Netherlands politicians only spoke to the media or the public about terrorism around the actual terrorist attacks. In Scotland politicians nearly ever spoke to the media about the attacks. The people mentioned in the newspapers were heads of police departments or intelligence agencies, but politicians were rarely involved. Striking was that, like with the Dutch approach when politicians spoke out, they spoke out very brief and to the point. The government did not try to link the terrorist violence by the SNLA to the broader discourse of terrorism and anti-terrorism either. Even though, or maybe because, the violence in Northern Ireland was just around the corner. This policy was a deliberate move of the government to undermine the actions of the SNLA and with it control its consequences.

The effect of this ignoring and constant disparagement of the SNLA by the government and the media was firstly that the SNLA were not taken seriously and they were not seen as an effective alternative for instance for the trade union, political parties or other legal institutions. Even if there were people who could relate to the SNLA, its aims and its actions, they were less likely inclined to join the movement because, they were not being portrayed as a group, but as a couple of cranks. Second, the SNLA was being depicted as a strange group of very unsuccessful people, who did not come one step closer to their goals, because they, for instance, used marzipan in their bombs. What kind of self-respecting nationalist would want to be associated with such a bunch of losers?

To sum up the reasons why the SNLA did not turn out to be a large scale terrorist movement are:

- Government policy. By ignoring the SNLA altogether for most of the time and saying little to nothing to the media on the matter, the British government minimised the performative power and thus the influence of the movement.
- Disparaging media attention. The media did report the actions by the SNLA, although not all of them, but that might also have contributed to government policy, but the reports were either quite short or they were filled with belittling sentences regarding the SNLA.
- 3. Errors from within the movement. For example the failed assassination of Roy Jenkins.
- 4. Alternatives like the trade union or political parties which were more successful at achieving their goals through legal means than the SNLA was through illegal means.

Because of these factors the SNLA remained a small movement with no great constituency. My recommendations for future counterterrorism policies would therefore be to: First keep the performative power as low as possible. Although in this digital age it may be harder to keep the performativity low it is still very important not to provide a stage for terrorists. Try to give them as little public attention as possible, keep the anti-terrorism policies between closed walls and try to drive the terrorist movements apart from within through infiltration. Second, minimise the social utility of these movements by keeping an open dialogue and investment in the alienated and marginalised groups of society. Providing them with other alternatives.

These findings may be useful in future terrorism research for if we can copy these tactics and circumstances in which the SNLA arose, but did not grow out to be a terrorist movement with a large constituency and apply them to other (starting) terrorist movements, we might be able to better understand these movements. We might even be able to better prevent these movements from becoming large scale terrorist movements. The quote with which this paper started might then be proven wrong.

Terrorism, like the plague in the Middle Ages, frightens both leaders and citizens. It is a disease that is spreading, a cure unknown.³¹⁸

With further extensive research it might even be possible to find that 'cure' for the 'spreading disease' that is called terrorism.

³¹⁸ Deutch, J., Terrorism, Foreign Policy, No. 108 (Autumn, 1997), p. 10

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