An old identity revisited?

A discourse analysis of NATO's identity formation during the crises in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea

Master thesis International Relations – International Studies

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The study of NATO's discourse during the crises in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea offers a possibility to analyse the way NATO presents itself and influences its identity. By means of a discourse analysis of NATO's published texts during these two crises, this thesis will elaborate on the role discourse has played in the shaping of NATO's identity. This thesis will show that the identity presented by NATO is that of an organisation that is mainly concerned with international norms and values. However, when confronted with a perceived threat by Russia to the organisation itself, this identity also includes an emphasis on the military background of the organisation, which responds to a foreign threat. The identity of NATO is thus more nuanced than frequently described and lies in the middle of the two identities that are most often attributed to NATO by the existing literature.

Introduction

 "The crisis shows us more clearly than ever that defence matters… And that the cooperation between the two shores of the Atlantic is the best and most natural way to keep ourselves secure".[1] The Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Anders Fogh Rasmussen, responded to the crisis in Ukraine emphasising the urgency of cooperation between the members of NATO. After the Cold War, NATO has consistently worked for closer cooperation and trust with Russia. However, the current crises in Ukraine and the previous crisis in Georgia have influenced this relationship negatively. According to NATO, Russia has violated international law and breached the trust on which the cooperation between the organisation and Russia has been based. NATO has, therefore, decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between the two.[2] This leads to questions about the role of NATO in international politics. More specifically, how NATO perceives its role and wants others to see it.

Most of the research on NATO has been inspired by the endurance of the organisation after the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. NATO was thought to be in an identity crisis, because the main reason to join the organisation, the Soviet threat, had disappeared (e.g. Betts 2009, Ciută 2002, Lübkemeier 1990, Sjursen 2004 and Waterman, Zagorcheva and Reiter 2001.2002). In order to explain the endurance of NATO, many researchers turned to constructivist approaches. According to them, NATO was no longer or had never been only a military alliance. The shared norms, values and

beliefs among the member states needed to be taken into consideration. The identity of NATO was no longer based only on its military capabilities, but on its democratic and liberalist norms and values as well (e.g. Risse-Kappen 1995, Sjursen 2004, Betts 2009, Adler 2008, Davis 2010 and Flockhart). Taking these different definitions into account, the way identities are founded needs to be discussed. Literature on identity formation goes back to social psychology. Identities are mostly made in comparison to others. When identifying characteristics of someone or something else, one's own characteristics become clear as well (Hegel 1977, Neumann 1996). Following this line of thinking into international relations, the identity of a state is formed against an external threat. Therefore, fear and danger are very much a means to create a certain discourse and identity (Campbell 1998). In the case of NATO this would mean that in situations where there is an external threat, the identity of the organisation is formed opposite to this threat. The reaction of NATO to the actions of Russia in response to the crises in the Crimea, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, will be used as case studies to test these theories. In what way has Russia been portrayed as an external threat in order to internalise certain characteristics of NATO? Furthermore, in what way does this correspond to the identities that researchers have attributed to the organisation? Therefore, the research question that this thesis will discuss is: In what way has NATO presented its identity during the crises in Crimea in Ukraine and in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia? This thesis will in this way fill a gap in the literature concerning the identity formation of modern-day NATO as the organisation is faced with a Russian threat once again.

This thesis will go about this by firstly exploring the existing literature on identity formation and in particular on the identity of NATO. This will provide a basis for the research that follows. It will focus on the literature concerning the formation of identities and will provide an overview of the research on the identity of NATO. By means of a discourse analysis of press releases, speeches, transcripts of press conferences and news by NATO on the crises in the Crimea, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, this thesis will discuss the way the organisation framed the discourse to define its own identity. Therefore, the execution of this research will be set out by means of a short discussion of discourse analysis and the case studies. Furthermore, the way these texts will be analysed is discussed in detail. The analysis provides an overview of the concepts NATO finds important to emphasise. The violation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the countries in crisis appear to be the main explanations for the behaviour of NATO. This leads to NATO mainly being regarded as a community of shared norms and values. However, the identity of NATO does appear to be more balanced than that. When NATO is confronted with a perceived threat to the organisation by the actions of Russia, they refer back to the military background of the organisation. Thus, the identity of NATO is more

nuanced than often described and lies somewhere in the middle of the two identities that are attributed to NATO by the existing literature.

Literature Review

Against the backdrop Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine, in 2008 and 2014, it is worth to re-examine the descriptions that have already been made on the identity of NATO. The following exploration of the literature, results in a clear overview of the existing knowledge on identity formation, and more specifically NATO's identity formation. Furthermore, it attempts to fill the remaining gaps in the literature, concerning the reaction of current-day NATO to Russian military actions.

The formation of identities

Research on the formation of identities is originally part of social psychology. This is not strange as identity has a lot to do with the relations between people. According to Gibson and Somers, identity is created within a specific time, space and in relation to others. People and institutions form identities by means of situating themselves within a certain narrative and in relation to others (1993, p.3-5). The narrative is based on ideas of 'Self and Other'. The question of identity formation and the concepts of 'Self and Other' were specifically related to each other by Hegel. He stated that by knowing the other, the self can decide whether or not he relates to that (Hegel 1977, p.112). An accent is placed on the similarities and differences between the self and the other (Neumann 1996, p.144). According to Neumann the first to introduce this kind of analysis into the field of international relations was James Der Derian with his book 'On Diplomacy, a genealogy of western estrangement'. Instead of having people define who they are opposite to others, Der Derian's analysis focused on states and their ways of estrangement (Der Derian 1987, p.1-29). A second theorist that can be identified as one of the first to use the self/other dichotomy in international relations was Michael J. Shapiro. Shapiro mainly focussed on the way the dichotomy was useful for questions of war and peace. Wartime is the moment where the other is obvious, which makes one's own identity also distinct. Thus, war emerges as a way to produce, maintain, and reproduce identity (Shapiro 1992, p.109-110).

The formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with the existence of another. Therefore, foreign policy should not be seen as a bridge between pre-existing states with secure identities. State identities are not stable; they cannot exist on their own. Rather, international relations is concerned with the establishment of boundaries, by means of making some events and actors foreign. Only when what is foreign is identified, it becomes clear what is domestic (Campbell 1998, p.61-62). Therefore, dilemmas in international politics are often threats to the identity of the state. The threats are considered to be foreign, because it is the domestic that is under attack. By placing these treats outside of the domestic, they can be understood as serving a particular interpretive and political function. It is easier to believe that threats come from a foreign and anarchical world, than that they come from the sovereign, well-ordered and rational domestic world (p.63). The dichotomies of us versus them, self versus other, domestic versus foreign and sovereignty versus anarchy, all serve the same purpose: to define one's own identity. For a norm to be a meaningful identity category the existence of a logical opposite is necessary, in this case that of anarchy and sovereignty (Rumelili 2004, p.31).

An external threat

Consequently, the identity of the state is formed in reference to an external threat. Campbell identifies state identity as: *'the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of "danger" with threats identified and located on the "outside"'* (1998, p.69). Therefore, the identity of the state is often constructed by means of discourses of fear and danger. However, even when the identity is based on a constructed narrative of the other, it cannot be wholly fictive. Ongoing events must be continually integrated in the narrative. Therefore, the discourse must be based on truth, it cannot simple be made up for the sake of identity. However, the events can be framed (Flockhart 2012, p.82). This leads to a foreign policy that is concerned with the reproduction of the unstable identity and the containment of the threats to that identity (Campbell 1998, p.71-78). In the case of collective identities such as that of NATO, certain states can see the collective as an extension of self. The collective is the domestic. The construction of difference remains integral to the production of the collective identity, as if it was a state (Rumelili 2004, p.32).

Thus, danger and fear are a way to redefine or reproduce state identity. An example of this is the United States (US) during the Cold War. The way the danger of communism and the Soviet Union was interpreted, replicated US identity when threatened. The Soviet threat provided a framework for US

politics (Nathanson 1988, p.443). In foreign policy texts not only the Soviet threat would be discussed, but it would entail references to the American culture as well. For instance, these texts would begin with a reference to the American culture, ideology or another general reflection, before discussing the Soviet threat (Campbell 1998, p.137-138). This is a clear way of juxtaposing the other and the self, the foreign and the domestic. Emphasis is placed on the goodness of one's own culture and ideology and opposite to this is the negative interpretation of the other. Therefore, otherness is very much a part of the creation of an identity. Moreover, the Cold War can be seen as a struggle related to the production and reproduction of identity (p.169). Before the Cold War, the role of the US in the world was unclear. By opposing its nature against that of the Soviet Union this identity was made clear, it was based on culture and democratic ideology (Nathanson 1988, p.444). As long as the other remains the same, the contradistinction does not change, and therefore the identity of a state is stable. Thus, during the Cold War the contradistinction was very stable. For the Soviet Union the other was the US or "the West" and for the US the anarchical other was the Soviet Union. However, when the Cold War ended this also meant the end for the stability of these identities (Campbell 1998, p.169).

The identity of NATO

As the Soviet threat disappeared, not only the stability of the US identity was brought into question, but NATO's as well. It became unclear what NATO is and what it does (Ciută 2002, p.35). It was the threat of the emerging Soviet Bloc that led five West European countries to sign the Brussels Treaty on 'Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence', on 17 March 1948. This was followed a year later by the creation of NATO. The five West European countries that signed the Brussels Treaty were joined by the United States, Canada and five more European countries. Military cooperation was seen as the only right way to deal with the Russian threat (Bailes 1999, p.305). This idea seemed to have been proven right. It is thought that by being prepared to defend its members and if necessary retaliate against the Soviet Union, NATO has prevented World War III during the Cold War. The purely defensive posture of NATO had been enough to end the war with a loss for the Soviet Union (Betts 2009, p.31-32). By being successful in its deterioration of the Soviet threat, NATO's goals had been reached and its dissolution was thought to be near (Lübkemeier 1990, p.30). It was no longer in the security interests of the members to continue their military cooperation. Furthermore, according to alliance theorists, military alliances are always founded against an enemy, never to achieve something else. This definition of the identity of a military alliance does not leave room for a military alliance to continue after the threat of the other has dissolved (Ciută 2002, p.39).

Therefore, after the Cold War there should have been no reason for the member states to maintain their obligations towards NATO. However, regardless of these assumptions and predictions NATO remained to exist. This led academics to redefine the actions of the alliance and its identity.

In order to be able to explain NATO's role and identity after the Cold War, many researchers turned to constructivist approaches. Based on these approaches they suggested it was necessary to take into account the role of principles, identity, norms and values. This led many to not see NATO as a military alliance, but as a community of liberal and democratic norms and values as well (Sjursen 2004, p.687). Betts, for example, states that NATO also had a purpose of serving as a diplomatic vehicle for transatlantic political unity (2009, p.32). Risse-Kappen goes even further, by stating that it was not even the Soviet threat that led to the creation of NATO. According to him the Soviet threat only strengthened the sense of a common purpose among the allies. The origins can be found in the wartime alliance of France, the United Kingdom and the US. This alliance led to a sense of community and common values, and more specifically the focus on democracy (1995, p.223). By seeing NATO as more than a military alliance, researchers were able to explain its endurance.

Not only was its endurance explained, but also its actions after the Cold War NATO's enlargement program is seen as an implementation of the liberal values that are a part of the organisation's identity. It made sense that new partners were inducted into a community of shared values (Adler 2008, p.213). According to Adler, NATO was able to transform itself by adopting a sense of community and joint enterprise, which was based on ideational and material resources and by partially adopting cooperative-security knowledge and practices. For these new partners it made sense to join NATO, because they faced serious economic, social and political problems. NATO could provide them with support to counter these problems. Furthermore, some of these states still faced military and economic threats from Russia. Membership of NATO might juxtapose that threat and Western organisations might help them resist the Russians (Waterman, Zagorcheva and Reiter 2001/2002, p.222). In this sense the enlargement of NATO was a positive situation for both parties.

This strand of literature argues that the main incentives for NATO's enlargement were the shared liberal democratic values and norms. This common identity of the alliance members led to a focus on democracy promotion. The new identity of the organisation was one that grants membership on the basis of political assessments and democratic principles, instead of the capability to contribute militarily to the security of its members (Sjursen 2004,p.689-690). Furthermore, NATO even stated in the preamble of the founding treaty that the parties are 'determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law'.[3] Its actions following the end of the Cold War show a focus on these

principles. According to Sjursen, one cannot claim that NATO is an organisation with the sole purpose of protecting its member states from an identified external threat. Furthermore, there is evidence that the identity of the organisation is somehow linked to the idea of democratic governance. However, one must wonder if this means that democracy is the core identifier for the identity of NATO (Sjursen 2004, p.693). Furthermore, the current strategic concept of NATO takes other threats into account as well. It is the spread of unconventional challenges, such as mass migration and organised crime, which are now on the agenda as well. This leads to new actions by the organisation; its purely defensive attitude has made room for a more proactive posture (Davis 2010, p.36). NATO has been involved in demanding missions such as Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Gulf of Aden. Such missions were not on the agenda during the Cold War (Flockhart 2012, p.79). By examining the attitude of NATO in response to the crises in Georgia and the Ukraine this thesis will question the conclusion that the identity of NATO is mainly based on the concept of liberal democratic values and norms.

This literature review has discussed the existing literature concerning the way state identities are shaped. It has set out how an opposite is needed to create the identity of the 'self'. More specifically, the literature on NATO's identity has gone through a great change. Firstly it described NATO as a military organisation, however, this changed into a description of NATO as a community of states with common norms and values. However, the literature does not discuss the identity of NATO during its involvement in other international crises. The crises in Georgia and Ukraine provide an interesting case study to challenge NATO's perceived identity as a community of common norms and values. The involvement of Russia in these conflicts is proving to become one of the biggest and most recent international disagreements between Russia and NATO. When confronted with Russia as the opposition again, what type of identity will NATO want to present of itself and Russia? This is where this thesis will contribute to the existing literature.

Methodology and Analysis

The literature review has made clear that identity is formed by juxtaposing oneself against the other. Furthermore, states do not have an ontological status apart from their acts; these constitute their reality. Thus, the status of an international organisation as a sovereign actor is produced by a discourse of a principal and stable identity. The identity of an international organisation is created by

means of a repetition of acts through time (Campbell 1998, p.10). Therefore, this thesis focuses on the importance of acts in the formation of the identity of NATO. By means of a discourse analysis, the way NATO has juxtaposed itself against Russia's recent actions in Georgia and Ukraine will be set out. Therefore, this section will firstly discuss discourse analysis as a method. Furthermore, this chapter will provide a justification for the case studies chosen and the sources used. Finally, the actual analysis of these sources will be discussed.

Discourse analysis

The perception of an object, a person, a state or an international organisation is socially reproduced. Putting these perceptions forward time after time, leads them to become a set of statements and practices. Moreover, certain language becomes institutionalised and normalised over time. This institutionalised discourse is at the centre of discourse analysis. Discourse constrains how the world is viewed by people and thus how the world is ordered. By influencing the discourse, people, states and international organisations are able to influence how they are viewed (Neumann 2008, p.61-62). For states, identity is of great importance. National states or international organisations do not possess pre-discursive and stable identities. However, their legitimacy is based on such an identity. Thus, to contain the challenges to the state's representation, the state attempts to fixate its identity (Campbell 1998, p.12). Discourse analysis focuses on the way discourse is used to create a certain form of reality, in this case a certain identity.

Discourse analysis is most associated with the works of the French philosopher and sociologist Michel Foucault. Foucault initiated the concept that truth is created by the ideas that society creates and formulates about the world (Schneider 2008, p.1-2). Through time, discourse analysis has evolved and become a method that focuses on communication practices that systematically form the subjects and objects of which they speak (Jäger 2004, p.116). Discourse is not only influenced by society, it also shapes or constitutes society itself (Schneider 2008, p.3). Discourse studies are organised through a set of theoretical commitments. Among the most important of these are the following three analytically distinguishable groups of theoretical claims. The first commitment is to a concept of discourse as systems of signification. That is, people construct the meaning and reality of things, by means of, for instance, linguistics. The second commitment is that discourses are seen as productive of things defined by the discourse. Discourses make the ways of being in, and acting towards the world clear. Furthermore, it shows the operationalisation of a 'regime of truth', while excluding other possible modes of identity. For instance, it shows who is authorised to speak and act

and who is not. Thus, discourses define and enable certain knowledge; they endorse a common sense. The third commitment of discourse analysis is the play of practice. As identity and knowledge are not fixed, this requires them to be emphasised and reemphasised. Discourses are changeable and contingent upon history. Thus, identities are only partially fixed and discourse therefore adapts to the context (Milliken 1999, p.229-230). In this case, the discourse of NATO will adapt to the two crises and its identity will be formed.

Case studies – Abkhazia, South-Ossetia, and Crimea

The crises this thesis focuses on are those in Abkhazia, South-Ossetia and Crimea. As Rasmussen himself said, these crises challenge the organisation. More specifically, these crises challenge the identity of NATO. Once again NATO is confronted with a Russian military threat as it is militarily involved in neighbouring areas. This refers back to the first identity attributed to NATO: that of a military organisation. Furthermore, these crises also concern liberal democratic values of NATO, as Russia incorporates sovereign territory of other states. The two case studies will be used to analyse if there is a pattern in the way NATO responds to situations in which it is confronted with a Russian threat. The comparison between the case studies will result in a description of the possible causes of differences in the response of NATO concerning its identity when it is confronted with a Russian threat. The response of NATO to the crises might lead to conclude that the response of NATO is different when it concerns a Russian threat. Furthermore, it might lead to conclude that other factors influence NATO's presented identity more than the Russian involvement in the conflicts. The two analysed cases will be described hereafter to provide the background information needed for the analysis of the results.

The first case this thesis focuses on is the Russian-Georgian war. This was the first time since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that Russia sent armed military troops into foreign territory. On 7 August 2008, fighting broke out between Georgian military and the local armed forces in Tskhinvali. This led to hundreds of deaths, including 12 Russian peacekeepers (Turner 2011, p.50). According to an EU-sponsored report, it was Georgia that attacked South Ossetia first, which led to a quick response of the Russians (Karagiannis 2013, p.74). Russian troops arrived in the capital, and the fighting continued for four more days. On Monday the 11th, both houses of the Russian parliament decided to recognise the independence of South Ossetia as well as that of Abkhazia. Russia did agree to a ceasefire the next day. Therefore, this war is known as "the five day war". The war seemed to have come to an end with the ceasefire (Turner 2011, p.50-51). However, on 26 August 2008, Russia

officially recognised the independence of these two republics. Furthermore, Russia was slow to abide by the terms of the ceasefire. A second implementation agreement was needed before Russia finally withdrew its forces from Georgia on 8 October. Russia's actions in Georgia were highly condemned by the international community, including its ally China (Bowker 2011, p.198). A vast majority of the countries in the world does not recognise the independence of the two regions. Thus, they are still considered to be a part of the sovereign territory of Georgia. A side effect of the war was that it stopped further NATO enlargement towards the East. A future Georgian accession to NATO seems to be ruled out, because few members are willing to issue security guarantees to unstable and geopolitically exposed states which could lead to conflict with Russia (Larsen 2012, p.103).

The second case study, the crisis in Crimea, is part of a larger crisis in Ukraine. As this thesis is written, there is still unrest in the eastern regions of the country. This thesis will not include this aspect of the crisis as it is still ongoing at the time of writing. The crisis in Ukraine started when the cabinet of President Yanukovych abandoned a trade agreement with the EU and sought after closer cooperation with Russia. Mass demonstrations in Kiev turned into violent encounters between the protesters and government forces. On the 21 February President Yanukovych signed a compromise deal with opposition leaders, but fled the country the next day. The following days an interim government was presented. However, on 27 and 28 February pro-Russian gunmen took over key buildings in the Crimean capitol, Simferopol and the main airport of the region. On 6 March the parliament of Crimea voted to join Russia and schedules a referendum to be held on 16 March. Russia declared that it would support Crimea if the region would vote to leave Ukraine and join Russia. At the same time Western states warned Russia for new measures if it does not withdraw its forces from Ukraine. However, on the 16 March the secession referendum was won by the pro-Russians with a force majeure. As promised, Putin signed a bill to absorb the region into the Russian Federation. The EU responded by condemning the annexation and extending the list of individuals targeted for sanctions. This crisis was followed by a build-up of Russian forces on the eastern border of Ukraine and secessionist movements in this areas.[4]

The sources that will be analysed are press releases, speeches, transcripts of press conferences and news published by NATO during these two crises. This research only focuses on texts published by NATO itself, because it is concerned with the identity that NATO wants to propagate outwards. Furthermore, the analysed sources are further contained by the case studies. Only the press releases, speeches, transcripts and news published during these crises are analysed. In the case of the crises in Georgia this concerns all discourse from the 16 April to 26 august. On 16 April President Vladimir Putin of Russia signed a decree authorising direct official relations between the Russian government and the secessionist authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This date is considered to be the start

of Russia's open involvement in the secessionist regions of Georgia. On 26 August, Russia recognised the independence of these two republics. Therefore, this is seen as the end of the main confrontation between Georgian and Russian military. During this period, 18 press releases, speeches, news and transcripts of press conferences were published. These 18 texts will be analysed. In the case of the crisis in the Crimea this thesis will analyse all texts published between 27 February and 24 March. On 27 February Pro-Russian gunmen seized key buildings in Simferopol, the Crimean capital. This was followed by the sending of Russian forces to protect Russian civilian on 1 March. The end of the main confrontation is defined to be on 24 March when Ukrainian troops leave Crimea after the absorption of Crimea into Russia. In this period NATO has published 15 texts in which it responds to the crisis. These will be analysed in the next chapter of this thesis.

Discussion of analysis

For the analysis of these responses, this thesis follows the five-step framework suggested by Jäger. This method is used because it provides a clear framework. This makes this research better to reproduce and, thus, better to verify. This framework suggests to first analyse the institutional context. This step entails defining the medium, the author, the public and possible events that the discourse refers to. Thus, this first step provides the background information that might have influenced the discourse. Secondly, the text surface is analysed. This includes an analysis of the graphical configurations of the product, for instance the headlines (Jäger 2004, p.175). These first two steps have mainly been preparatory work for the next two phases. The analysis of linguistic and rhetoric tools is the core of the discourse analysis. This step will include examination of the arguments, the logical composition of the argument, conclusions, as well as rhetorical figures. The style of the discourse is analysed as well, for instance, protagonists and antagonists, vocabulary and modality (p.275-328). Thus, this phase focuses on what the different elements of the text mean and how they formulate the identity of NATO. The forth step in this discourse analysis takes a step back from the textual analysis and looks at the content and discursive positions expressed in the texts. The fifth step is the formulation of a final conclusion. The preceding four steps should have led to a coherent description and interpretation of the texts concerning the Russian involvement in Abkhazia, South-Ossetia and Crimea. Furthermore, this will lead to an analysis of the way NATO sees itself, and wants others to identify them (p.175). A second benefit of this research method is that the five steps lead to a complete analysis of the discourse. This method not only looks at the vocabulary used, but also at the arguments used, the conclusions drawn, as well as events that might have influenced the discourse . This leads to a complete overview of the discourse which is the aim of this thesis.

In order to be able to generalise the conclusions of this analysis, more case studies should be included in future analysis. Furthermore, discourse analysis is inherently biased, as it is the researchers' interpretation of the discourse. In this thesis the bias is attempted to be kept at minimum, by looking as objectively as possible to the analysed discourse. In order to exclude the possibility of a bias, this research should be repeated by several other researchers. The used framework should make it possible to be reproduced. However, one should take these weaknesses inherent to the approach into consideration when drawing conclusions.

Results

The previous sections have outlined the basis for this research. The literature review has made clear that identity can be formed through juxtaposing oneself against another. Furthermore, the repetition of certain acts or views creates the identity of an international organisation. As outlined in the last section, the five-step plan of Jäger is used for the analysis of the way NATO formed its identity during the crises in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea. Subsequently, an overview of the results of this analysis will now be given. It will do so by describing the results for the case of Abkhazia, followed by a description of the results for Crimea. For each case, the arguments and vocabulary used, and the conclusions drawn will be set out. In the fourth step of the plan of Jäger the content and the discursive positions are analysed. These results will be presented as well as the use of certain concepts in the texts. Moreover, this analysis will take the changing circumstances during the crises into account. The rhetoric of NATO might have changed as events took place. Finally the conclusion will state that NATO has used similar arguments and conclusions in both cases. These mainly focus on the illegitimate nature of the Russian acts. However, there remain some differences. The main difference concerns the way NATO perceives Russia's actions to be a threat to the organisation in Crimea, but not in Georgia. These identities will be compared to the identities attributed to NATO in the existing literature.

NATO on Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Firstly, the arguments that were used in the press releases, speeches, press conferences and news items will be discussed. Within these texts a number of arguments were regularly used. Furthermore,

the arguments changed tone, as the conflict endured and intensified. From the beginning of the conflict the Secretary General of the NATO had amplified the importance of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty for NATO. In his statement of 16 April 2008, the Secretary General states that the Russian steps undermine that sovereignty. He finds that the Russian Federation should reverse the measures they have taken, the establishment of legal links with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[5] The three concepts of territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Georgia remain the most important arguments for NATO to condemn the Russian actions. On the 12th of August, Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said in a press point following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the situation in Georgia:

> *It is also clear that allies reiterated in very strong terms the full respect necessary for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. And it is more than a phrase in a period of time where that territorial integrity is not respected by Russia.*[6]

Thus NATO places emphasis on the importance of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of Georgia throughout the entire conflict.

A second argument that is recurrent throughout the analysed texts is the illegality of the Russian actions in Georgia. Not only does NATO focus on the breach of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, it also mentions the illegality of the specific acts of Russia. The Secretary General for instance responded to the deployment of Russian Railway troops: '*This deployment of Russian Railroad Forces does not appear to have any legal basis; it is not taking place in the context of the CIS peacekeeping mission, and it is against the express wishes of the Georgian Government*'.[7] He again mentions this in a press point on the 12th of august. He then states:

> *I do not think, quite honestly, that the bombardments we have seen, the naval blockade we have seen, the massive use of force by the Russians we have seen, is in conformity with the CIS peacekeeping mandate. I do not think that that has much to do with peacekeeping, quite honestly.*[8]

Again he mentions that the military actions by the Russians do not match with the CIS peacekeeping mandate. When the Russians recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia at the end of the conflict, the Secretary General responds by arguing that this recognition is a direct violation of numerous UN

Security council resolutions regarding Georgia's territorial integrity. Furthermore, it is mentioned multiple times that Russia itself endorsed these resolutions. These arguments are used to call on Russia to respect the Georgian sovereignty and to stop its military actions in the country.

A third argument that is made throughout the texts concerns NATO's support for Georgia. Georgia is often mentioned as a friend or a partner of NATO. During the press conference of 12 August a question was raised concerning the involvement of NATO in the conflict. De Hoop Scheffer answered that:

> *It does matter to NATO, first of all, because Georgia is a highly respected Partner of NATO, is a friend of NATO, has Intensified Dialogue with NATO. Georgia has applied for the Membership Action Plan. That decision has not been taken, but the Allies have said that one day Georgia will join NATO. In that regard, such a massive conflict with another nation coming into territory of Georgia proper, not only the disputed areas of Abkhazia and Ossetia, but also coming into Georgia proper, and using excessive force, is of direct relevance to NATO. We owe that to our PfP partners.*[9]

This quote clearly shows the standpoint of NATO regarding its relationship with Georgia. Even though the country is not a member state of the Alliance, it is considered an important ally and, therefore, NATO will support Georgia in this crisis.

These arguments have led NATO to draw several conclusions concerning the crisis in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The main conclusion that NATO has drawn from the beginning of the crisis until the end is that it supports the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and independence of Georgia. NATO has urged the Russians to do the same throughout the crisis. For instance at the weekly press briefing by the NATO spokesman on 30 April he said:

> *I want to state very clearly and very firmly that the allies are unanimous in supporting, endorsing, Georgia's territorial integrity and will not recognize or support steps that undermine that sovereignty, be they explicit recognition or other steps which, if not, de jure, de facto undermine that sovereignty.*[10]

NATO has reiterated its support for Georgia's territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. At the end of the conflict the foreign ministers met in a special session of the North Atlantic Council to re-affirm their support for these principles.[11]

Secondly, NATO has made clear in its discourse that the actions of Russia have consequences. In the earlier responses to the crisis, NATO calls on Russia to reverse the measures they have taken. This is followed by a call to de-escalate tensions and open dialogue on a high level. However, towards the end of the crisis, NATO's tone changes. NATO concludes that it cannot continue with business as usual. The Secretary General stated on 19 august:

> *I think there can be no business as usual with Russia under present circumstances. And the future of our relations will depend on the concrete actions Russia will take to honour the words of President Medvedev… But I should add that we do certainly not have the intention to close all doors in our communication with Russia.*[12]

These conclusions are the result of the argument of NATO that the Russian actions in Georgia are illegal and in breach of Georgia's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

The vocabulary used places emphasis in these arguments and conclusions. For instance, NATO often used the word 'reiterate' when it concerned their expression of support for the Georgian sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Furthermore, Georgia is described by NATO as a valued friend, an ally or long-standing partner throughout the texts.[13] This description endorses the support of NATO for Georgia in this crisis. This is further underlined by the way NATO describes South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It has referred to these as the Georgian region of Abkhazia and the Georgian region of South Ossetia.[14] By describing the regions as part of Georgia, NATO makes clear that it sees them as an integral part of Georgia and, thus, stresses the breach of sovereignty by Russia. The vocabulary used by NATO also emphasises the opinion of NATO on the use of force by Russia. NATO describes this as disproportionate, massive, excessive and inconsistent with its role.[15] These adjectives all show a value judgement of the actions of Russia.

What does this discourse analysis say about the way NATO presents itself and creates an identity? It is interesting to see that the main arguments used and conclusions drawn by NATO are based on concepts such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, international law and the international recognised independence of Georgia. NATO finds that the actions of Russia in Georgia are illegal, because it

violates the sovereignty territorial integrity and independence of Georgia. Moreover, the specific actions of Russia are considered to be in conformity with a peacekeeping mandate. Furthermore, the use of force is described as disproportionate and excessive. The emphasis of NATO on these concepts within this crisis situation shows what NATO finds important to stress. Therefore, this also says something about the identity of NATO. The arguments and conclusions of NATO do not seem to correspond with the identity of NATO during the Cold War. NATO does not only focus on the external threat of Russia. It mentions Russia and its actions, however, not as a direct threat. The more constructive approach to the identity of NATO appears to match the discourse of NATO in this crisis better. This approach takes into account liberal and democratic norms and values. The emphasis of NATO on sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law does correspond with this description.

NATO on Crimea

That being said, to what extent does this identity also apply to NATO during the crisis in Crimea? As mentioned in the literature review, identity is created within a specific time, space and in relation to others. In this case, Russia remains the opposite to which the identity of NATO is formed. However, time has changed and the specific situation in Crimea was different from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Therefore, the same analysis as before will be executed. This will supply us with an idea of the subjects of importance to NATO, the emphasis they place on certain acts and the reasoning they use. Furthermore, the two cases will be compared. Has NATO been consistent in the identity it expresses or does this depend on the situation?

Firstly, let us begin by discussing the arguments used by NATO in their responses to the Russian acts in Crimea. Several arguments were put forward in response to the crisis in Crimea. Firstly, NATO focuses on the choices the Ukrainian people made. From the beginning of the crisis, NATO has given its support for the path of democratic and inclusive reforms taken by the Ukrainians.[16] Throughout the crisis, NATO emphasises the fact that only the Ukrainians can determine their country's future. NATO stands by their right to choose. Moreover NATO focuses on the democratic aspirations of the Ukrainians. As it is their decision to democratise, that should be respected. For instance, on 6 March the Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, states in a press point: '*We stress the importance of an inclusive political process, based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities and the rule of law, which fulfils the democratic aspirations of the entire Ukrainian people'.*[17] In this quote

the Secretary General discusses both the ambition of the Ukrainians to democratise and the importance of an inclusive political process for NATO.

The inclusive political process that Rasmussen mentions is based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities and the rule of law. These concepts are used throughout the discourse as a response to the Russian actions. NATO emphasised that contrary to repeated calls by the international community, Russia continued to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine are placed at the centre of the argumentation. The Secretary General has stated that: *'NATO stands by Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and by the fundamental principles of international law'.*[18] Furthermore, Russia is seen to violate its international commitments. Thus, the focus lies on the adherence to the rule of law. This line of argumentation was also used when a referendum was held on the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation. This referendum was argued to be illegal and illegitimate. The circumstances under which the referendum was held were considered to be deeply flawed and thus unacceptable. Moreover, the Secretary General stated: *'the so-called referendum undermined international efforts to find a peaceful and political solution to the Ukraine crisis and violated the Ukrainian constitution and international law'.*[19] Again NATO focussed on the way the referendum violated the rule of law, Ukrainian and international. Furthermore, it is emphasised throughout the discourse that the referendum undermines the international efforts for a political solution to the crisis, besides being illegal and illegitimate.

Interestingly, a final recurrent argument that is made concerns the implications of the Russian actions in Crimea. According to NATO these actions not only have implications for Ukraine, but for the entire Euro-Atlantic area. The stability and security of the whole area is threatened. According to the Secretary General: '*We clearly face the gravest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War'.*[20] The sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity are considered to be key factors to the security and stability of the entire region. Therefore, the support of NATO for Ukraine and its engagement with its political and military leadership is strengthened. The Russian acts are thus not only considered to be in violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also to endanger the stability and security of the entire region. Making them a grave threat to European security, and thus important to NATO.

These arguments have led NATO to draw several conclusions. At the beginning of the conflict NATO urged the new Ukrainian leadership to continue its efforts to establish an inclusive political process. Furthermore, all parties were urged to step back from confrontation and to refrain from provocative actions. The path of dialogue is suggested as the best means to achieve a solution to the crisis.[21]

NATO continued to support the constructive efforts for a peaceful solution to the crisis. However, as the crisis progressed, NATO shifted its conclusions from both parties to mainly urging Russia not to continue its actions. On 6 march the Secretary General concluded: '*We call on Russia to honour its international commitments and halt the military escalation in Crimea, we call on Russia to withdraw its forces to their bases, and to refrain from any interference elsewhere in Ukraine'.*[22]

When Russia moves to incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation, NATO strongly condemns this act and concludes that there is no justification to continue on this course and that this can only deepen the international isolation of Russia.[23] Eventually Russia's actions lead NATO to draw conclusions condemning the Alliance itself. On 21 March the Secretary General delivered a speech at the Brussels Forum and set out three priorities which he urged Allies to address in the wake of the crisis: '*to reaffirm Allied commitment to collective defence, strengthen support for Ukraine and the wider region, and to make clear that we can no longer do business as usual with Russia'.* Furthermore, Rasmussen considered the September NATO Summit key for allies to ensure that they have the full range of capabilities to deter and defend against any threat.[24] It is clear that the conclusions drawn by NATO have changed as the crisis endured. They have changed from urging both the Ukrainian and the Russian governments to refrain from violence and return to the path of dialogue, to condemning the Russian actions and considering these as a threat to the entire region and to NATO.

A second conclusion apparent in NATO's discourse is its support for the Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, NATO concludes that the actions of Russia breach international commitments and international law. Thus, NATO focuses again on specific norms and values. NATO's commitment to these concepts is clear in this quote from a news item published by NATO:

> *The discussions showed the convergence of views in both organisations in upholding Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, the need for a dialogue between Ukraine and Russia as well as de-escalating steps in view of a peaceful solution to the crisis in full respect of international law as laid down in bi-and multilateral commitments.*[25]

The support of NATO for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine is visible throughout the discourse of NATO. Furthermore, it is concluded that actions of Russia run counter to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the referendum held in Crimea had no legal effect or political legitimacy.[26]

The vocabulary used supports the arguments made and the conclusions that are drawn. For instance, it is interesting to see that when discussing the referendum about the Crimean secession to Russia, NATO talks of the 'so-called referendum'. This emphasises that NATO considers the referendum to be illegitimate and illegal.[27] Secondly, what is striking about the vocabulary of NATO is that it often refers to Ukraine as our friend Ukraine, our long-standing partner, an important partner or the partnership is referred to as excellent. These adjectives accentuate the support of NATO towards Ukraine. They can also be viewed as arguments for this support, because Ukraine is such a long-standing partner of NATO, support for its sovereignty and territorial integrity should be given. Finally, a reoccurrence in the discourse of NATO is a reference to the 'entire Ukrainian people'. For instance, NATO refers to the democratic aspirations of the entire country, and of the determination of the Ukrainian people.[28] This use of vocabulary supports the value of democracy that NATO endorses. The unity of the Ukrainian people is an integral part in the discourse of NATO, in the argumentation of NATO for its support of the new government.

What does this discourse analysis say about the identity of NATO? Just as in the case of Georgia, NATO focuses on concepts such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law. The acts of Russia are condemned as they violate these international norms and values. Furthermore, the Crimean referendum is considered to be illegal and illegitimate, because it is in violation of international and Ukrainian law. Thus, it appears that NATO finds these concepts important to emphasise. Therefore, this says something about the aspects NATO finds important and what it chooses to put forward. This appears to correspond to the description of NATO as a community of common liberal democratic norms and values. The norms and values put forward in this case can be described as liberal democratic. Moreover, NATO focuses on the democratic aspirations of the Ukrainian people and exerts its support for this. However, in this case NATO also emphasises the effect of the Russian acts in Ukraine on the Alliance. Rasmussen set out priorities for the Allies of which one was to reaffirm their commitment to the collective defence. Furthermore, he called on the Allies to ensure they have the full range of capabilities to deter and defend against any threat. These calls of the Secretary General correspond more with the original goal of NATO, to cooperate in order to defend against the Soviet treat. Rasmussen appears to use the same rhetoric, namely, that the Allies need to reaffirm their commitments and ensure that they have enough capabilities to deter and defend against any threat. The threat of potential instability in the Euro-Atlantic region caused by the Russian Federation is one that the alliance should be ready to defend against. This very much resembles the rhetoric used during the Cold War.

Both case studies have provided a view on the rhetoric and arguments used by NATO and the conclusions that were drawn. These can be used to describe the identity of NATO that the alliance

wants others to see. In both cases a strong emphasis was placed on the violation of sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and international law. However, in the case of Crimea, NATO also focused on the greater implications of the crisis for the entire region and thus for NATO itself. This differs from the case of Georgia where NATO remained rather on the surface on the implications for NATO. Thus, it is not simply the involvement of Russia that leads to a discourse focused on the military background of the organisation. NATO's identity appears to depend on the situation. When it finds that it is being threatened by the actions of another actor, NATO will most likely return to a discourse that is more related to its identity during the Cold War. The results lead to conclude that the identity is foremost based on specific norms and values that NATO wants to propagate outwards. However, when the threat is considered to be directed at the organisation the discourse changes to one that amplifies its defensive and military roots. This matches the descriptions of identity formation discussed earlier. Identity if formed within a specific time, space and in relation to others. Thus, NATO's identity adapts to the specific time it is in. The literature on the identity of NATO takes this into account by ascribing NATO a different identity after the end of the Cold War. However, the literature does not consider that this identity may vary depending on the specific situation. One cannot speak of *the* identity of NATO, but should rather discuss its identity on a case to case basis.

Conclusion and Discussion

This thesis opened with a quote of the Secretary General concerning the crisis in Ukraine. This specific case was the direct reason to look into the way NATO portrays itself and how it wants others to see the organisation. What NATO finds important to put forward when confronted with a Russian threat once more has been analysed by means of a discourse analysis. Therefore the research question of this thesis was: In what way has NATO presented its identity during the crises in the Crimea in Ukraine and in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia? Firstly, the focus was on the way identities are formed according to the existing literature. This literature review made clear that identities are created within a specific time, space and in relation to others. Especially the specific time and the relation with others have proven to be critical. Dichotomies are used to define what the other is, and what the self is. The other is often considered to be an external threat. In the analysed case studies, Russia was considered the other and acted opposite to the norms and values of NATO. During the Cold War the identity of NATO was dominated by a discourse that depicted the Soviet Union as an enemy. Military cooperation was the main component of the identity of the

organisation. However, when the Soviet Union fell apart, the main identity of NATO disappeared as well. Its identity is currently considered to be based upon the liberal and democratic norms and values of its members. This thesis has analysed whether these descriptions of NATO's identity still hold for present-day NATO when the organisation is confronted with Russian military acts.

Three main conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the executed discourse analysis. In NATO's discourse, dichotomies are used to define what is good and bad. In both cases the actions of Russia are considered to be a breach of international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of the countries. Russia should abide by the norms and values that are endorsed by NATO. These norms and values are central to the arguments and dichotomies used and the conclusions drawn. The emphasis of NATO on these norms and values leads to the first conclusion that NATO finds these to be the most important to note. As these concepts are important to NATO, this tells something about the identity NATO wishes to present to the outside. Common norms and values are thus at the centre of the identity of NATO. This resembles the identity that researchers and NATO itself credited to the alliance, one that is based on an agreement on norms and values. However, it is important to note that the analysis of NATO's discourse concerning Crimea revealed a second aspect of NATO's identity. The discourse during this crisis also included references to a threat to the alliance itself. The Allies are requested to reaffirm their commitment to collective defence. The dichotomy created is one based on an external threat to the organisation. Thus, a second conclusion drawn is that NATO created an identity for the alliance during the Crimea crises that was based on a collective defence against the Russian threat. This is very much similar to the rhetoric and identity formed used during the Cold War, however, it needs to be acknowledged that the rhetoric during the Cold War was contained much stronger statements against Russia.

The answer to the research question is, thus, more balanced than only confirming the identity most researchers accredit to NATO. In these two cases the identity of NATO as a community of shared norms and values is predominantly brought to the forefront. NATO bases its arguments and conclusions on the disrespect of Russia for its shared norms and values. However, as became clear in the case of Crimea, NATO also felt that Russia's acts were a threat to the alliance. As a result, the identity of NATO as a military organisation founded against an external threat should not be disregarded. NATO still is a military defence alliance. The moment NATO is confronted with a military threat concerning the alliance, this identity appears to return in its discourse. Thus, it is the perceived threat to the organisation that influenced NATO to focus more on its military background, and not simply the involvement of Russia. Thirdly, this leads to conclude that the identity of NATO depends on the specific crisis it responds to. The existing literature on the identity of NATO has not taken this aspect enough into account. This literature had considered the organisation's identity to be quite

stable. However, these results lead to a different conclusion. Even though, the primary identity of NATO does focus on shared norms and values, the specific identity varies on a case-to-case basis. When only considering the analysed cases of Crimea, South Ossetia and Abkhazia one can conclude that the identity presented by NATO is one that mainly focuses on NATO as a community of shared norms and values. When threatened, this identity included a focus on NATO as a military defence alliance that defends its members when necessary.

Notes

1. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 'NATO Secretary General: Ukraine crisis shows defence matters more than ever', 07-05-2014, retrieved on 11-05-2014 from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_109638.htm.
2. 'NATO's relations with Russia', 04-04-2014, retrieved on 11-05-2014 on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm?
3. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, April 4 1949, retrieved from the official website of NATO: *http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm* on 09-05-2014.
4. Ukraine crisis timeline, BBC, 29-05-2014, retrieved on 04-06-2014 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275
5. 'Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Abkhazia and South Ossetia', 16-05-2008.
6. 'Press point by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the situation in Georgia', 12-08-2008.
7. 'NATO Secretary General's statement on the Deployment of Russian Railway Troops into Georgia', 03-06-2008.
8. 'Press point by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the situation in Georgia', 12-08-2008.
9. 'Press point by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the situation in Georgia', 12-08-2008.
10. 'Weekly press briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai', 30-04-2008.
11. 'NATO's foreign ministers reiterate their support for Georgia', 19-08-2008.
12. 'Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers', 19-08-2008.

13. For example, 'Press point by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the situation in Georgia', 12-08-2008, 'Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers', 19-08-2008, and 'Statement: Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 19-08-2008.

14. For example, 'NATO Secretary General's statement on the Deployment of Russian Railway Troops into Georgia', 03-06-2008 and 'Statement by the NATO Secretary General on events in South Ossetia', 08-08-2008.

15. For example, 'North Atlantic Council discusses situation in Georgia', 12-08-2008, 'Statement: Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 19-08-2008, and 'Press point by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the situation in Georgia', 12-08-2008.

16. 'Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defence Ministers' Session', 27-2-2014.

17. 'Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Arsenii Yatseniuk', 06-03-2014.

18. 'Secretary General assures Ukrainian Prime Minister that NATO stands by Ukraine', 06-03-2014.

19. 'NATO Secretary General discusses Crimea referendum, future cooperation with Ukraine's Acting Foreign Minister', 17-03-2014.

20. 'Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Arsenii Yatseniuk', 06-03-2014.

21. 'NATO-Ukraine Commission stresses continued engagement', 27-2-2014.

22. 'Secretary General assures Ukrainian Prime Minister that NATO stands by Ukraine', 06-03-2014.

23. 'NATO Secretary General condemns moves to incorporate Crimea into Russian Federation', 18-03-2014.

24. 'Ukraine crisis is a "game-changer" for Allies NATO Secretary General tells Brussels Forum', 21-03-2014.

25. 'NATO, EU Ambassadors hold joint informal talks on Ukraine', 05-03-2014.

26. 'Secretary General statement on the so-called referendum in Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea', 14-03-2014.

27. For example, 'Secretary General statement on the so-called referendum in Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea', 14-03-2014, 'Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the so-called referendum in Crimea', 17-03-2014 and 'NATO Secretary General discusses Crimea referendum, future cooperation with Ukraine's Acting Foreign Minister', 17-03-2014.

28. For example, 'Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Arsenii Yatseniuk', 06-03-2014, 'Secretary General assures Ukrainian Prime Minister that NATO stands by Ukraine', 06-03-2014, 'Press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen following the meetings of the NATO Defence Minister', 27-02-2014, 'Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Defence Ministers' Session', 27-2-2014 and 'NATO-Ukraine Commission stresses continued engagement', 27-2-2014.

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