THE INFLUENCE OF LEADERS' PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS:

A CASE STUDY OF BARACK OBAMA AND THE INTERVENTION IN LIBYA

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Introduction

From the extensive literature on international conflicts in International Relations (IR), little has been explored about the individuals behind the decisions made. In early political science literature, the role of the leader was a 'black box' that sums up inputs and produces outputs (Post & George, 2004, p. 12). When the importance of leadership was finally recognized in the shaping of events, the leader was characterized as a rational decision maker but with no attention to his or her personality (Post & George, 2004, p. 14). Although decisions are made by individuals, they represent the state as a whole and are, therefore, usually referred to using the name of the state or the state's capital when talking about decisions made there (Post & George, 2004, p. 15). Furthermore, when studying international conflicts, it is crucial to look at political leaders because of contraction of authority during a crisis – when power becomes concentrated in the hands of leaders and their closest advisers with little influence from bureaucracy or the public. This decreases the usual democratic restraints and moreover, with only limited time in a crisis, leaders are encouraged to decide quickly and act on their interpretation of the national interest (Hermann, 2001; Hermann, et al., 2001; Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Hermann & Kegley, 1995). Therefore, leaders' interpretation of the problem dominate the state's reactions as authority tends to focus on those persons that carry ultimate responsibility for maintaining government in power (Hermann, 2001; Hermann, et al., 2001; Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Hermann & Kegley, 1995).

The lack of focus on studying individual leaders can be seen in analyses of the intervention in Libya in 2011. Previous analyses of the crisis focused on the role of NATO, humanitarian interventions, IR theories, and bureaucratic politics in the American government (e.g. Kazianis, 2011; Fermor, 2012; Bellamy, 2012; Marsh, 2014; Blohmdahl, 2016). None focused on the role of the individual leaders involved. At the time, the British Prime Minister David Cameron and the French President Nicholas Sarkozy were the first to demand an intervention in Libya. Without their insistence, it seems unlikely that the United States (US) would have acted (Fermor, 2012, p. 332). Moreover, the Franco-British alliance would have been insufficient to carry out the intervention, as well as initiate the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 that would have allowed the intervention (Fermor, 2012, p. 333). Many analysts around the Obama administration assumed that the US would not intervene and the tendency of staff within the Pentagon and the White House at the beginning of the crisis was to refrain from military involvement (Fermor, 2012, p. 333). It is interesting that despite this, Obama agreed to lead the intervention. I believe this gap can be explained by looking at Obama's role in the Decision-Making Process (DMP).

Theories of political psychology can help to study leaders as they look at the individual level of analysis and not only at the system or state level as the prominent IR theories, realism and liberalism do. Whereas the former focuses on the balance of power in the anarchic international system and how states as unitary actors always try to maximize their power, the latter has a more positive worldview in which cooperation is possible and institutions matter. Both theories omit the role of individual leaders. However, neoclassical realism differs from its theoretical forerunner. In this theory, attention is paid to domestic elements such as decision-making factors and how decisions are made by leaders (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 204). It is nevertheless still part of the realist school and there is more preference for looking at the international system rather than domestic factors. In contrast, much of the literature on leadership studies using political psychology begins with the assumption that leaders' personalities, which include their beliefs, values and attitudes, have an effect on their behaviour and type of leadership and ultimately, political outcomes (McDermott, 2004, p. 219). Their personality is also determinant in how they deal with emotions and stress, which are important in a crisis situation (Winter, 2003). Foreign Policy Analysis research also shows that some leaders are able to ignore or manipulate domestic and international constraints, and their response to these pressures are even founded in their personal characteristics (Kaarbo, 2015, p. 204). Therefore, it is important to use theories of leaders' personalities in this research.

Based on the literature of political leaders, Hermann (2014) writes about five important factors regarding leaders. First, leaders use their beliefs to interpret political context and frame what is right and wrong[1] – directly impacting which policies they choose. Second, the kind of leadership style they apply determine how they work,[2] the importance of determining leadership style will be discussed further below. Third, motives largely influence what leaders will do[3]. Fourth, their reaction to and how they handle stress is also important[4]. Lastly, background factors such as first successful political roles

[1] Renshon and Renshon (2008) have written about a leader's belief system through which the leader filter incoming information – this is how the leaders come to understand the world and make their decision (p. 512).
[2] Kaarbo and Hermann (1998) also argue that leadership style affects how much a leader is involved in the decision-making process, the type of focus (s)he has and the strategy chosen to manage the process (pp. 245-246).
[3] Motives, just as leader's beliefs and style affect the leader's understanding of the world and the strategies they choose (Hermann, 1980). According to Winter (2005) motives are "the different classes of goals toward which people direct their behaviour" (p. 22). Winter has been dominant in the literature focused on individual's motives (e.g. Winter, 2003; Winter, 2005; Winter 2011).
[4] This becomes clear in another one of her articles, in which Hermann (1979) notes the importance of studying leaders during crisis situations as the quality of the leader's performance varies significantly then. Some policymakers tend to get creative in their problem-solving and show more of their ability than usual, while others are negatively influenced by it, resulting in unstable behaviour (Hermann, 1979, p. 27). Renshon and Renshon (2008) argue that leaders in political decision-making deal with conditions such as threat to important values,

and their nature matter too[5] (Hermann, 2014, pp. 5-10). The first two factors are of importance in providing information as to how leaders will urge their government to act (Hermann, 1980, p. 10). Moreover, Hermann et al. have put together eight leadership styles by looking at how leaders act to constraints, process information and their motivation to act (2001, pp. 95-96). These factors are necessary to assess whether or not the leader is sensitive to the political context. Obtaining this knowledge will help determine how much influence leaders will have in forming foreign policy and how they will form it. For example, if the leader is less sensitive to the political context, they will be more dependent on their own beliefs, attitudes, passions and principles, creating foreign policy based on their priorities (Hermann et al. 2001, p. 89). This led to the following research question:

"Did Obama's personal characteristics, and in turn his leadership style, influence the decision-making process to intervene in Libya or do IR theories have more explanatory power in this intervention?"

Theoretical framework

Leadership Trait Analysis and Leadership Style

By identifying a leader's personal characteristics and their reaction to constraints, ability to process information and motivation to act, it is possible to determine their leadership style (Hermann, 2005, p. 179). Leadership style is defined as "the ways in which leaders relate to those around them – whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders – and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions" (Hermann, 2005, p. 181). To determine leadership styles, Hermann focuses on seven personality traits in her Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) framework: "the belief that one can influence or control what happens, the need for power and influence, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others' ideas and sensitivities, general distrust or suspiciousness of others and intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias" (Hermann, 2005, p. 184). Following Hermann's LTA framework, personality is here conceptualized as the combination of

sleeplessness, anxiety, or severe time pressure – which all bring about stress – on a daily basis and, may worsen in a crisis situation contributing to poor decision-making (pp. 512-513). Factors that are also taken into account are time pressure and how external stress can decrease flexibility, resulting in overreliance on standard operating procedures or solutions decision makers learned in other situations and the centralization of authority in the decision-making process (Renshon & Renshon, 2008, p. 515).

[5] Based on Barber's (1977) argument on how the leader's first political role, how (s)he obtained that role and how it made them feel emotionally (pp. 3-14), influences his or her behaviour. Moreover, Post and Walker (2005) assess that besides the individual's core personality, formative experiences in a person's life also matter and they help shape his or her personality (p. 271).

these seven traits.

The trait *belief in one's own ability to control events* is defined as the "view of the world in which leaders perceive some degree of control over the situations in which they find themselves" (Hermann, 2005, pp. 188-189). Leaders who score high in this trait will try to control everything in policy making and its implementation, and because of their certainty of the impact they can have in the situation, they are less likely to make compromises. Those who score low usually do not take charge, wait to see how the situation evolves before taking any action, and have no problem delegating tasks or blaming others (Hermann, 2005, pp. 189-190). The *need for power* is "the desire to control, influence, or have an impact on other persons or groups" (Hermann, 2005, p. 190). If a leader scores high in this trait, they will try and manipulate their surroundings to have control over other people, bargain and negotiate to test their boundaries and see how far they can come when they keep pushing toward their goals (Hermann, 2005, pp. 191-192). Leaders with a low score in *need for power,* on the other hand, focus on empowering others around them, are willing to sacrifice and stimulate high morale in their followers – in the process creating a bond between them and making the leader the representative of the group (Hermann, 2005, pp. 191-192). If the leader scores high on both traits, they will be focused on getting what they want and will be in charge, however, if the leader scores low, they will adjust themselves to the situation and work within the boundaries. If the leader is moderate on both traits, the actions they will take depend on their other characteristics (Hermann, 2005, p. 187). However, if the score of *belief in one's own ability to control events* is high and the score of the *need for power* low, the leader will still take charge of the situation but will not be very successful in manipulating people and situations as they are not very discreet. If it is the other way around, these leaders are more comfortable with pulling the strings from behind the scenes to avoid being accountable for the outcome (Hermann, 2005, pp. 187-188).

Self-confidence is "an individual's image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the environment" (Hermann, 2005, p. 194) and a trait used as a standard for judging one's own position in a certain context. Leaders with a high score in this trait are more closed to incoming information from their surroundings and they are less likely to adapt to a situation because of their satisfaction with who they are. Leaders with low *self-confidence* are not so sure with whom they are and are, therefore, easily influenced by the situation and others – this makes them appear inconsistent in their actions (Hermann, 2005, p. 195). *Conceptual complexity* indicates whether individuals are able to differentiate situations. Whether they view the world only in black and white, categorizes situations as good or bad, or whether they are able to put everything into perspective and see that things can be

ambiguous (Hermann, 2005, pp. 195-196). Leaders scoring high on this trait are flexible, do not tend to categorize the world in simple groups, ideas are not black and white and they always want more information from different views to understand certain situations instead of interpreting them solely from their own point of view (Hermann, 2005, p. 196). The ones with a low score in *conceptual complexity* are ready to jump into actions instead of taking their time to assess the situation because their view of the world is simply ordered and structured into specific categories. Hence, it is easier for them to make a decision (Hermann, 2005, pp. 196-197). This trait interrelates with *self-confidence* in a way that when the former score is higher than the latter, the leaders are generally more sensitive to context, interests and input from others and they look at one situation at a time (Hermann, 2005, p. 192). However, if it is the other way around*,* the leaders are usually ideologues and goal-driven, so they are closed to their surroundings and are willing to do anything to make sure that their plans get carried out (Hermann, 2005, p. 192). If both scores are high, the leaders will be strategic and manage to combine the two traits in a way that enables them to be sure of what they want to achieve and to adjust their surroundings to make it work (Hermann, 2005, p. 193). However, if both scores are low, the leaders are closed and choose a position that will have at least limited success, they can be manipulated into certain situations for a bit of influence and authority (Hermann, 2005, p. 193).

Leaders can be driven by different reasons in their motivation to assume office (Hermann, 2005, p. 197). This can be a certain cause or ideology, or about obtaining power and support from those around them. Leaders also seem to have a need to protect their own kind. Their motivation for assuming office is measured by the trait *task-focus*, which assesses whether they are motivated by problems or relationships. Motivation towards the world is measured by the scores of *in-group bias* and *distrust of others*, which determine how high their need is to preserve and secure the group they are leading (Hermann, 2005, p. 197). High scores on *task-focus* mean that the leader focuses on getting the job done instead of concentrating on his or her relationship with important constituencies. A leader who manages to balance both, falls under the group of charismatic leaders (Hermann, 2005, p. 198). The *task-focused* leader will do anything to solve a problem – even use their relationships. On the other end of the spectrum, the leader will adjust their behaviour to fit the spirit of the group. They try to keep spirits high as well as make the group feel empowered, heard and included in decision-making (Hermann, 2005, p. 199). Furthermore, *in-group bias* is "a view of the world in which one's own group (social, political, ethnic, etc.) holds centre stage" (Hermann, 2005, p. 201). A high score indicates that the leader has a very 'us-against-them' mentality because of their zero-sum worldview; they will always make decisions based on what is important for the group and tend to only see the good features

(Hermann, 2005, pp. 201-202). If the leader scores low in this trait, they will still favour their own group and sees the world as '*us* or *them*'. In this case, the context remains important which means they do not see the world in strictly black or white, and when dealing with discontent in the domestic area, the leader will be more inclined to use positive diplomatic gestures instead of scapegoating (Hermann, 2005, p. 202). *Distrust of others* shows whether or not the leader can rely on others. Even though distrust may be part of being a political leader, a leader with a low score for this trait can put this into perspective, contrary to a leader with a high score who is suspicious of others' motives and actions (Hermann, 2005, p. 203).

Hence, these traits provide information about the three dimensions; 1) a leaders' *belief that they can control events* and their *need for power* determine how they will react to constraints; 2) *conceptual complexity* and *self-confidence* suggest their openness to information; 3) measuring their *task-focus, distrust towards others* and *in-group bias* will show the leader's motivation to act (Hermann, 2005, p. 186). When these three dimensions are combined, they will result in eight leadership styles, as shown in table 1, namely: expansionistic, evangelistic, incremental, charismatic, directive, consultative, reactive or accommodative (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 96). When the leadership style is established, it gives some clues about the influence the leader has in the DMP.

Table 1

Leadership style as a function of responsiveness to constraints, openness to information and motivation

Responsiveness to constraints	Openness to information	Motivation	
		Problem focus	Relationship focus
Challenges constraints (The leader becomes a crusader)	Closed to information (The leader becomes a crusader)	*Expansionistic* (Focus is on expanding one's power and influence)	*Evangelistic* (Focus is on persuading others to accept one's message and join one's cause)
Challenges constraints (The leader is generally strategic)	Open to information (The leader is generally strategic)	*Incremental* (Focus is on maintaining one's manoeuvrability and flexibility while avoiding the obstacles that continually try to limit both)	*Charismatic* (Focus is on achieving one's agenda by engaging others in the process and persuading them to act)
Respects constraints (The leader is inclined toward pragmatism)	Closed to information (The leader is inclined toward pragmatism)	*Directive* (Focus is on personally guiding policy along paths consistent with one's own views while still working within the norms and rules of one's current position)	*Consultative* (Focus is on monitoring that important others will support or not actively oppose, what one wants to do in a particular situation)
Respects constraints (The leader is usually opportunistic)	Open to information (The leader is usually opportunistic)	*Reactive* (Focus is on assessing what is possible in the current situation given the nature of the problem and considering what important constituencies will allow)	*Accommodative* (Focus is on reconciling differences and building consensus, empowering others and sharing accountability in the process)

Note. Adapted from "Who leads matters: The effects of powerful individuals", by Hermann et al., 2001, *International Studies Review, 3*(2), p. 95.

Responsiveness to constraints shows how the leader reacts to constraints posed by the environment. The leader can either challenge them or respect them. Leaders who belong to the former group are usually goal-driven, their own beliefs are seen in the decisions made, they want to be able to control the situation and constraints are only seen as obstacles to overcome (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 90-91). The latter group, on the other hand, sees constraints as their boundaries; the leader is sensitive to his or her surroundings, needs support from relevant constituencies, deals with situations on a case-by-case basis and is, therefore, flexible (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 91).

Openness to information determines how leaders process and gather information. On the one hand, there are goal-driven leaders with an agenda, they are less sensitive to the context, tend to seek information which affirm their own views and beliefs and look for advisers who share the same ideas (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 92). These leaders make choices relying on methods they are used to and search for information to strengthen the argument they had from the beginning (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 92). On the other hand, there are leaders who are more sensitive to the political context and are open to new information even though it may be different from their own point of view. These leaders take their time before making a decision and instead of gathering data top-down, they process data bottom-up, allowing evidence from their surroundings to guide them (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 92-93).

Motivation for action indicates whether the leader is motivated by certain issues they would like to solve or by people they would like to please. Leaders who are motivated by problems are concerned with their own ideas and beliefs, making them less sensitive to the situation and focused on certain tasks. Leaders motivated by relationships, such as endorsement from important constituencies, make them more sensitive to the political context (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 93).

If the leader is a constraints challenger, not open to information and either motivated by problem solving or by relationships, the style of the former is expansionistic, the latter is evangelistic. Both can be called crusaders as they are the least sensitive to political contexts, take charge and try to control what happens in the DMP. In contrast are the opportunists, the leaders who are most sensitive to political context and who would not take any chances if they risk losing support. Both reactive and accommodative styles respect constraints and are open to information, however, the former is motivated by problem solving and the latter by relationships (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 95-96). The last group consists of leaders who display signs of being both high and low in their sensitivity to contexts. These strategic and pragmatic leaders are able to use the situation for their benefit, coming across as unpredictable because the strategists with incremental and charismatic leadership styles will carefully try to reach their goal without making any mistakes or failures, whilst the pragmatists, with directive and consultative leadership styles will try to reach their goal and work within the system (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 95-97).

Based on Hermann's Leadership Trait Analysis theoretical framework and previous research on 122 leaders, including 87 heads of state from all over the world (2005, p. 188), I would expect that certain personality traits found in leaders that form their leadership style would determine the level of influence the leader will have in the DMP. Specifically, the characteristics of goal-driven leaders who

believe they can control events and have a high need for power will influence the DMP as their behaviour and choices depend on their own beliefs, attitudes, passions and principles. In contrast, the personality and preferences of leaders from the other end of the spectrum who are more pragmatic and more sensitive to the political context do not matter as much as the situation, the foreign policy problem, the media, the public or the people surrounding the leaders (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 89).

R2P and Realism

Other theories I would like to test and contrast to the LTA and leadership style framework are based on IR theories. Firstly, the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P). Stemming from the 'Liberal peace' (Glover, 2011), R2P has become an important principle in the international community as the way to respond to crises that involve genocide and mass atrocities (Bellamy, 2012, p. 12). The R2P doctrine is the result of two fundamental principles in international politics; state sovereignty and human security (Cooper & Kohler, 2009, p. 3) and was unanimously adopted by world leaders at the United Nations World Summit in 2005 (Bellamy, 2012, p. 14). The three pillars supporting the concept are:

(1) responsibility of the State to protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement;
(2) commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting those obligations;
(3) responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection[6].

The creation of R2P is based on the idea of states having a guideline based on international law to prevent genocides and mass atrocities such as the Cambodian genocide in the 1970s, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 (Evans, 2009, p. 15). According to the narrative of the states involved, the intervention was necessary due to R2P as there had been so many lives lost under the Gaddafi regime (Fermor, 2012, p. 335). The expectation based on this theory is that leaders make decisions because there is an international norm based on international law to which governments adhere to.

Secondly, if realism was taken into account, with the assumptions that a state is a unitary actor and behaving based on self-interest as they strive to maximize power, then the expectation according to

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[6] These are the main points from the documented three pillars, outlined by the UN Secretary General at the time, Ban Ki-Moon. From the *UN document A/63/677* "Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General"*,* http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf

defensive realism would be that leaders make decisions because there is a national interest that can be obtained or protected by this particular action (Marsh, 2014, p. 122). The possible threats to US interests in Libya are lack of oil supply, terrorism or the flow of refugees caused by the crisis (Davidson, 2013, p. 312).

This brings us to the main hypothesis of the research. I expect that the personal characteristics of a goal-driven leader, which falls under "crusaders" as they take charge of the DMP to make sure that they control what happens (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 96), will also have a big influence in the decision-making process during an international crisis besides the liberal's explanation of states following international norm or the realist's reasoning of protecting national interest.

Methodology

As Winter (2003) argues, the most effective way to study leaders from a distance is to use a content analysis of speeches and interviews as they provide a reflection of their psychological characteristics or personalities (p. 114). Hermann (2005) chose the same method in analysing leadership style using only interviews instead of speeches, as she believes the former is a more spontaneous setting and the leader's personality will then be more evident (p. 179). A similar method of data collection will be used here as in Hermann's trait analysis, by assessing more than 50 interviews with the leader's responses in 100 words or more and they will be chosen from different periods of the leader's time in office, in different settings and different types of interviews to ensure that the traits composing leadership style being studied are stable over time (2005, pp. 180-181). This stability shows how sensitive the leader can be to the context (Hermann, 2005, p. 180). The assumption while using content analysis is that the more frequent the leader uses particular words, the more important these concepts are to them (Hermann, 2005, p. 186).

For these reasons, I employed the same method for the first half of my case study to determine Obama's leadership style. I used the programme, Profiler Plus, and full transcripts of 32 interviews and 33 press conferences (data available in the appendix). The interviews with Obama were done by different interviewers from several news agencies and television networks, and most of them were conducted in the White House. They were chosen from different years and different sources to prevent bias of certain news agencies. I have chosen four press conferences from each year of Obama's time in office, in which he speaks alone (if he does not, then the parts in which other leaders speak are left out of the content analysis), and as spread out throughout the year as possible by using one conference

every quarter of the year to try and determine the consistency of his leadership style. To be able to do the latter, most of the conferences chosen are held in the White House, but at times materials are used when Obama was holding a conference outside the US.

After applying this quantitative approach to identify Obama's leadership style throughout his tenure, the outcome is used for a qualitative analysis using speeches and press conferences regarding Libya as proxy to the DMP, as I could not be there in person. This is to assess whether Obama's personal characteristic, and in turn, his leadership style established with the LTA can be found in the DMP of the Libyan crisis and to see if it was the reason he made his choice to intervene. If this is the case, then I can ascertain that his personality influenced the process. Furthermore, articles and books on Obama, the White House and the time of the decision-making during the Libyan crisis were used to support the findings.

Results and analysis

Obama's LTA and Leadership Style

Table 2

Obama's personality in comparison with the average of 87 heads of state

Individual characteristics	87 Heads of state	Obama
Belief can control events	0.44	0.39 (average)
Need for power	0.5	0.26 (low)
Conceptual complexity	0.44	0.64 (high)
Self-confidence	0.62	0.49 (average)
Task-focus	0.59	0.61 (average)
In-group bias	0.71	0.11 (low)
Distrust of others	0.41	0.14 (low)

Note. Data on 87 heads of state retrieved from Hermann (2005).

Obama's score for *belief in one's own ability to control events (0.39)* is just under the mean in comparison to 87 other heads of state, but not more than one standard deviation below the mean. He is, therefore, moderate in this trait and is like the average leader in the comparison group. As established in the LTA framework, this indicates that Obama will not try to control everything in the decision-making process, but would not delegate everything either. He will also be open to compromise. Obama's low score in *need for power (0.26)* points to the fact that it is important for him to empower

others around him instead of focusing on his own power. This creates a bond between them, based on trust and the feeling of shared responsibility. Obama has a sense of justice and treats everyone equally and does not play favourites. He represents the needs and interest of his followers in policy-making. The combination of these two traits shows that Obama can either challenge or respect constraints, depending on the context and according to Hermann this means that the leader will then be driven by the other traits (2005, p. 187).

Obama's moderate score in *self-confidence (0.49)* shows that he is not immune to incoming information from his surroundings, but he is not easily "buffeted by the 'contextual winds'" either as Hermann describes leaders with moderate level of *self-confidence* (2005, p. 195). This is because Obama knows who he is without being too satisfied with himself. His high score in *conceptual complexity (0.64)* means that he sees that there are grey areas and having different perspectives are important in understanding the full picture. He does not rely on his intuition and he prefers thinking, planning and collecting more information over taking actions right away. Obama's higher score on the conceptual complexity compared to his self-confidence implies that he is more sensitive to the political context and is open to ideas and demands of others. He will try to obtain as much information as possible from those around him to fully understand the situation and will act accordingly. He deals with situations on a case-by-case basis.

Obama has a moderate score on *task-focus (0.61)*, which means that he is motivated by both problem and relationship, depending on the context of the situation. This description fits that of a charismatic leader (Hermann, 2005, p. 198). He knows when to focus on the problem and he knows when to focus on building relationships. For the second type of motivation, Obama scores low in both *in-group bias (0.11)* and in *distrust of others (0.14)*. His low score for *in-group bias* points to the fact that Obama does not see the world in black-and-white terms and when identifying people as either '*us* or *them'* he looks at the context so the terms are fluid and change according to the situation. His low score of *distrust in others* means that he is likely to rely on others and does not have a zero-sum view of the world. The combination of the score of these two traits suggests that Obama's focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and relationships. This shows again that he takes on problems and views them in their context, he knows that there are constraints and that is why he is flexible when dealing with an issue. Because he does not view the world as zero-sum, cooperation may be possible in certain international arenas.

When everything is taken into account, there is a mixed expectation about what type of leadership style

Barack Obama has because of his moderate score on some of the traits. He is certainly open to information and is relatively sensitive to the political context, and according to the leadership style framework this means that his beliefs, attitudes, and passions are not highly predictive of his reaction to situations, however, he does need certain feedback from his surrounding when making a decision. Furthermore, Obama does not impose his ideas top-down but gathers information bottom-up and allows the evidence to guide him in making his decisions. He is moderate in whether he challenges or respects constraints. He is also moderate in his task-focus; depending on the situation he may focus on the problem or he may focus on his relations with the people around him. Thus, Obama falls under the style of the non-crusaders who are open to information. If he challenges constraints, then he is strategic and can either have the incremental or charismatic leadership style. And if he respects constraints then he is opportunistic and can have either the reactive leadership style or the accommodative one.

If he is strategic, he falls under the more interesting leaders because "they can at the same time benefit from and use the situation in which they find themselves" (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 96). He then looks for information that will help him attain his goals but he does this with such caution as to minimize his risks. If he is incremental, then he wants to maintain control in foreign policy decision-making so that he would have the space to do what is necessary to achieve his goal. It does not matter if it takes him awhile before reaching that goal, as long as he is moving closer to it little by little. If he is charismatic, his focus is on relationships with important constituencies, also when making foreign policy decisions, as he needs their support because he knows that power and authority are given to him by those around him. In both strategic styles, the leader knows what he wants, but he also knows that it depends on the situation whether or not he can reach his goal. However, if he has an opportunistic style because his motivation towards the world leads to a focus on taking advantage of opportunities and relationships, then "politics is the art of the possible in the current setting and time" (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 96). If he has a reactive style, he lives in the moment and finds planning difficult as you cannot predict what will happen. He will do his best and use everything he has right then and there when dealing with problems, while staying rational and trying to reduce his risk as much as possible. The accommodative leader focuses on relationships, which causes consensus-building and results in compromises being important to them. The leader needs to know where the important constituencies stand on issues before he himself can make any decisions on those same issues (Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 99-100).

As Obama has multiple traits in which his score was moderate, he does not fit exactly one ideal type of the leadership style and according to Hermann et al. this type of leader can move between styles (2001,

p. 100). Through analysing the DMP during his tenure, I will make an attempt to match one style that is closest to him and if this is not possible due to him being moderate in a couple of traits, I will assess the characteristics that are visible in the decision-making process. Based on LTA, I expect to see his openness to information, so when making a decision he is not too controlling and is open to compromise. He has good relations with those around him, he knows who he is and what he wants but he will take his time thinking and planning his next move, gathering as much information as possible along the process. His sensitivity to political context will be visible as he knows when to focus on the problem or the relationships; he does not see the world in black-and-white or in zero-sum terms. So, based on leadership style framework, his own views and beliefs would not be highly predictive of the choices he makes.

Decision-making process in the Obama administration

Since the Reagan administration, much of the policy development is centralized in to the White House. According to Robert Gates, Secretary of Defence under Obama, the Obama administration was the most centralized and controlling since Nixon and Kissinger were in office (Blohmdahl, 2016, p. 150). The policy making was generally done by White House staff as presidents cannot depend too much on cabinet secretaries having objective views on certain issues (Pfiffner, 2011, p. 245). The latter group tend to advocate for their own departments, while the president needs to consider different views and options before coming to important decisions (Pfiffner, 2011, p. 244). This was very important for Obama at the time.[7] He took his time when major decisions were to be made and encouraged his staff to present as many opposing arguments as possible so that he would be able to see every option available (Pfiffner, 2011; Hybel, 2014), just as predicted by the LTA outcome of his high *conceptual complexity*. Foley (2013) categorizes Obama as an introvert leader who values his space and privacy while considering his decisions (p. 349). After closely studying the working style of Obama and his inner circle in the White House, James Mann (2012) confirms in his book that the president would spend hours alone in the evening in the White House residence to ponder and come to a decision on his own without any interference from the outside world. If there were occasions where some of his staff were reluctant about presenting certain information, he would urge them to show him different options and even insist on them confronting their disagreements and sometimes each other, in front of him (Pfiffner, 2011, p. 247), showing his openness to information.

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[7] It becomes apparent in Pfiffner's (2011) description of three different cases in which Obama showed his thoroughness in making decisions regarding detainee policy, economic policy and the Afghan war.

Obama did not have "honest brokers", whose job is to make sure that every angle from the relevant staff is heard, like some presidents do, but he did choose to control the details of policy development himself, resulting in his comprehensive knowledge of the policy issues (Pfiffner, 2011, p. 244-248). He would not only focus on formulating the problem, he would sometimes even control the implementation of the foreign policy personally, making him more directly responsible for his choices than most previous presidents (Indyk, Lieberthal & O'Hanlon, 2012, p. 29). Mann (2012) also confirmed that Obama had a dominant influence in developing foreign policy and that he was the strategic mind behind the choices made in his administration. This is surprising as this action contradicts his low *belief that he can control events* and low *need for power.* Controlling foreign policy decision-making is, according to the framework, a trait of the incremental leadership style. His aides, the 'Obamians', whom he also relied heavily upon – which corresponds with his low distrust in others – were chosen because they share the same way of thinking, in a way forming an extension of the president (Mann, 2012). This contrasts with his openness to information, resembling more the trait of the goal-driven leaders*,* the ones with an agenda and who are less sensitive to the context, who surround themselves with advisers that think the same way. In Bob Woodward's book 'Obama's Wars'[8], there are concrete examples of how Obama kept control of his foreign policy. For example, General David Petraeus from the US Army was quoted pointing out how thorough Obama was when dealing with an important policy decision regarding Afghanistan, "there's not a president in history that's dictated five single-spaced pages in his life. That's what the staff gets paid to do" (Woodward, 2010, p. 327), referring to the terms sheet to clarify the mission the army is supposed to carry out. Once Obama is done with considering every aspect there is, and evaluating dissenting views from his staff, he wanted consensus among his inner circle once he decided which option to take, "I welcome debate among my team, but I won't tolerate division" (Woodward, 2010, p. 374).

It is safe to say that Obama's decision-making style is cautious and deliberative, always taking his time and trying to evaluate every possible angle because he considered the problems his personal responsibility as president (Foley, 2013, p. 349). This again correlates with his high *conceptual complexity* as he sees the importance of having different perspectives and thinking everything through before coming to a decision. He did almost the opposite of George W. Bush, and focused on a foreign policy agenda that showed restraint by slowly pulling out of Afghanistan and being more respectful

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[8] Woodward also closely examined the activities in the White House, by using in-depth interviews with the White House aides and written record from National Security Council meeting notes, emails, reports, personal notes and many more documents that was not easily accessed by public.

towards the role of international institutions such as the United Nations and NATO (Onea, 2013, pp. 149-151). Obama avoided taking risks, often assessed and reassessed his decisions and demanded much of his cognitive resources (Hybel, 2014, p. 173), showing a trait that is opposite of that of a goal-driven leader and again confirming his openness to information. Even though his closest advisers were chosen because they think alike, he always encouraged them to come up with different, opposing views for him to evaluate, and his thoroughness and carefulness were also visible, making his leadership style more likely to be that of an opportunist because of his sensitivity to context and his openness to information, as shown in Table 1.

Decision-making process of the Libyan intervention

When analysing Obama's speeches, remarks and news conferences regarding Libya[9], a couple of things become apparent. At the beginning of the crisis, he already used many terms that are linked to R2P and building up to the justification of an intervention, however, his traits were still visible. He would talk about the importance of having a full range of options on the table and examining them before making his decision[10], showing his high trait of *conceptual complexity* and his openness to information. "I do take very seriously making sure that any decisions I make that involve U.S. military power are well thought through and are done in close consultation with … all relevant personnel. Any time I send the United States forces into a potentially hostile situation, there are risks involved and there are consequences. And it is my job as President to make sure that we have considered all those risks"[11], showing his typical cautious and thorough decision-making style like a strategic leader with either an incremental or a charismatic leadership style. Obama also spoke about "the interest of the United States"[12] when referring to imposing sanctions on Qadhafi and making him step down, but linked it with the interest of the Libyan people as well. A possible US interest based on realism is oil, however, Obama mentioned it only once in all ten sources when he talked about how unrest in the Middle East could result in a low supply of world oil, but that the US would be able to fill that gap.[13] Another interest

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[9] Words that could be categorized under his traits, R2P and US interests were counted in five news conferences and four different addresses to the public and one letter to Congress. There were 28 words that point to his personality, 82 times terms were used that are linked to R2P and only ten times that US interests were indicated. Data available in the appendix.

[10] The President's News Conference with President Felipe de Jesus Calderon Hinojosa of Mexico on March 3, 2011 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=89712

[11] The President's News Conference on March 11, 2011 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90137

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

according to defensive realism is the flow of refugees, which came up once, "America has an important strategic interest in preventing Qadhafi from overrunning those who oppose him. A massacre would have driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya's borders"[14].

A week later, in his remarks informing the American people about the situation in Libya, he would only use terms that are linked to R2P and almost none pointing to his own characteristic. Obama talked about Qadhafi who was "launching a military campaign against his own people"[15] and that there is a "humanitarian crisis"[16], he would repeat sentences such as "protecting innocent civilians"[17] and talking explicitly about R2P, "we are acting as part of a coalition … prepared to meet their responsibility to protect the people of Libya and uphold the mandate of the international community"[18]. In the same two addresses, the only things that can be identified as his personal characteristics are where he mentions the use of force not being his first choice and a difficult one for him to make, but that he still made it with confidence[19], combining traits such as his moderate *self-confidence* with high *conceptual complexity.* Even though he had made up his mind in the beginning to not intervene, as soon as the evidence guided him to make a different choice he did not ignore it but instead examined all the options and with confidence chose a new policy. This is supported by the so-called Obama watchers (e.g. Mann, 2012; Klein, 2013), as they could fill in the gap in the week of Obama's changing his stance.

Indeed, when the Arab Spring started, his first instinct was not to interfere, because the movement was something that belonged to the region and the US already had a lot on its plate with two wars going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, Obama did not want to start another war in another Islamic nation, especially not to topple a dictatorship as Bush did in Iraq (Mann, 2012; Klein, 2013). He handled the Libyan crisis the same way he handled most decision-making processes as described above. He was highly involved, led most meetings himself asking sharp questions, urging different voices to come up with arguments, but never in those occasions letting anybody know his decision (Mann, 2012; Blohmdahl, 2016). At that point, the Obama administration was divided (Klein, 2013, p. 216). One side held the realist view that there are no national interests in Libya (Fitzgerald & Ryan, 2014, p. 98) and so

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[14] Address to the Nation on the Situation in Libya, March 28, 2011
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90195&st=&st1=
[15] Remarks on the situation in Libya, March 18, 2011
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90162&st=&st1=
[16] Ibid.
[17] Remarks on the situation in Libya from Brasilia, March 19, 2011
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90164&st=&st1=
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.

agreed with the president's initial idea to not intervene. The other side consisted of proponents of humanitarian interventions. Both sides could not seem to prevail outright in convincing the president during the DMP, creating a stalemate and leaving the task for the president to make the final decision, which he did (Blohmdahl, 2016, p. 153).

In the first half of March 2011, most of Obama's responses were cautious but it gradually evolved into urging Qadhafi to step down and warning him that the option of using force was not excluded (Mann, 2012). A couple of developments then took place that would change his mind (Mann, 2012; Klein, 2013). The British and the French were insisting that the US participate, reminding Obama of their NATO assistance in Afghanistan. There were more people in the senate who favoured a no-fly zone over Libya to tear down Gaddafi's air defences, even the Arab League was on board and asked the UN Security Council for help. Finally, when Qadhafi's forces were closing in on Benghazi, a city with more than half a million-people living in it without any defence, seemed to push Obama to finally act. On March 15th, he authorized not only a no-fly zone, but the air forces were allowed to hit targets on the ground (Mann, 2012), starting his first war. With this decision, Obama turned from his characteristic realist stance in his foreign policy and embraced liberal interventionism (Fitzgerald & Ryan, 2012, p. 102). He used both as reasoning towards the public. Additionally, in his letter to congress, the only reasoning visible were R2P, "Qadhafi has forfeited his responsibility to protect his own citizens and created a serious need for immediate humanitarian assistance and protection, with any delay only putting more civilians at risk"[20] and US interest when explaining his choice for attacking Qadhafi's military capabilities, "I have directed these actions, which are in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States". From then on, the only terms that show his traits are related to the choice he already made to intervene, how he had directed the plan in great detail[21] and kept evaluating the situation on the ground.[22] Only a reactive leadership style could be detected then as he still mentioned his carefulness due to the risks involved and his rational reasoning, "I absolutely believe that the costs are outweighed by the benefits, and that is what drove my decision. And that's why I think that we need to make sure that we see this through effectively".[23] Until his last address to the American people, R2P had been dominant in his justification for the intervention.

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[20] Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Commencement of Military Operations Against Libya, March 21, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90174&st=&st1=
[21] The President's News Conference With President Sebastian Pinera Echenique of Chile in Santiago, Chile March 21, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90190
[22] Ibid.
[23] The President's News Conference With President Carlos Mauricio Funes Cartagena of El Salvador in San Salvador, El Salvador, March 22, 2011. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90188

Looking back in a 2016 interview with the Atlantic magazine[24], Obama admits that Benghazi was indeed the reason why he changed his mind and joined the side of the interventionists. Even though he may have been influenced by his advisors and finally chose one of the two sides, it was evident that he was the "supreme player" and not just one of the actors involved in the governmental bureaucracy but he was the one that created his own surrounding (Blohmdahl, 2016, p. 156). Also, Obama explains that if the situation were different, maybe if there had not been three ongoing wars for his administration, or if there would have been more international pressure and readiness, he would have taken similar measures for Syria as he did Libya.[25] However, "a president does not make decisions in a vacuum. He does not have a blank slate. Any president who was thoughtful, I believe, would recognize that after over a decade of war, with obligations that are still to this day requiring great amounts of resources and attention in Afghanistan, with the experience of Iraq, with the strains that it's placed on our military— any thoughtful president would hesitate about making a renewed commitment in the exact same region of the world with some of the exact same dynamics and the same probability of an unsatisfactory outcome".[26] Again, confirming his most notable trait, high sensitivity to context which was established in the trait analysis. It is apparent in the DMP throughout his tenure, but also Libya, that he was open to information and always tried to obtain more by urging his staff to show him all the options. His context sensitivity also determined the effects of his other traits, whether he focused on the problems or relationships or whether he challenged constraints or respected them. His focus on relationships, however, was less apparent in the empirical evidence. He relied on his inner circle, but not so much on important constituencies. Moreover, what is remarkable is how the LTA shows his low *need for power*, but empirically it was the exact opposite. Obama tried to control most aspects of the DMP like a crusader, sometimes even writing his own policy options and wanting to control the implementation, overseeing the whole process from the ideas in his mind until he sees them in action. For a non-goal-driven leader the leadership style matching him the most is the incremental leadership style, but his rationality and cautiousness while making decisions point to the reactive leadership style. This reduces his motivation for action to only a focus on problems and not relationships, leaving only his attitude towards constraints to depend on the context.

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[24] https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.

Conclusion

Though it is not possible to look behind the scenes, it is seen in the output, in the decisions made about Libya, that Obama acts according to the LTA outcome. He was so convinced of his position at the beginning, but when a series of developments took place, he was once again open to new information. He adjusted his mind-set and acted accordingly. Initially, the characteristics of a goal-driven leader appear to have the most influence in the DMP because they are relatively closed to outside information and they challenge constraints, so they are not flexible, do not adjust to contexts but only strive towards their goal. Their characteristics lead to decisions based on who the leaders are. If Obama had been a goal-driven leader, he might have stayed with his first decision not to intervene, or he might have gone completely the opposite direction and would have wanted to intervene in the first place, not listen to any advice and sent troops right away. Hence, different leaders' characteristics, and in turn their leadership style, influence the decision-making process differently.

Even though Obama was not a goal-driven leader according to the LTA framework because of his sensitivity to the context and the ability to adjust himself to the situation, he still controlled most of the decision-making process during his tenure as described in the analysis. In his decision of Libya, however, he did not seem as controlling; showing his traits that correspond with the LTA outcome, and it would appear that R2P influenced his choice more than his characteristic did. Nonetheless, his flexible character, how he processes and handle information can be the reason why he acknowledged and chose R2P as his final decision. This shows, even though he was not the typical goal-driven leader, his characteristic did influence the DMP.

Admittedly, it is not the goal of this thesis to prove that the characteristics and leadership style are the most important factors in the decision-making process, but it is of importance and gives a more complete explanation of why certain decisions are made in an international crisis. The explanations of R2P and realism in foreign policy might have been important for Obama's staff in developing their arguments and consequently have been important for Obama to come to a decision, but ultimately his characteristics affect how he processes information, deals with constraints and his motivation for action and thus his final decision. The question is now, if there had been another leader in power with different characteristics, had (s)he made a different decision? As this thesis is limited, the question could be a recommendation for future research.

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Appendix

List of interviews including LTA outcomes.

Traits	HD	LD	DIS	HT	LT	TASK	IC	EC	BACE
Interviews transcripts									
Time interview 2008	15	51	0,2273	86	32	0,7288	61	120	0,337
BBC 2009 interview	7	67	0,0946	55	27	0,6707	38	61	0,3838
Al Arabiya 2009 interview	6	77	0,0723	41	36	0,5325	40	58	0,4082
NPR 2009 interview	9	72	0,1111	45	43	0,5114	37	59	0,3854
ABC news 2010 interview	15	64	0,1899	99	68	0,5928	109	163	0,4007
NBC news 2010 interview	14	65	0,1772	49	39	0,5568	77	132	0,3684
Univision radio program 2010 interview	9	67	0,1184	78	69	0,5306	80	132	0,3774
Politico 2010 interview	31	62	0,3333	46	54	0,46	49	76	0,392
NPR 2011 interview	5	34	0,1282	40	23	0,6349	36	52	0,4091
CBS news 2011 interview	30	185	0,1395	133	86	0,6073	155	223	0,4101
Town Hall Meeting Facebook Headquarter 2011	18	165	0,0984	187	131	0,5881	178	247	0,4188
10TV 2011 interview	1	20	0,0476	26	13	0,6667	35	45	0,4375
CFR 2012 interview	20	124	0,1389	79	57	0,5809	47	107	0,3052
Bloomberg 2012 interview	9	54	0,1429	76	43	0,6387	78	73	0,5166
NBC news/Education Nation 2012 interview	7	64	0,0986	70	37	0,6542	54	81	0,4
New York Times 2013 interview	3	81	0,0357	111	64	0,6343	74	140	0,3458
New Republic 2013 interview	8	74	0,0976	66	26	0,7174	39	82	0,3223
CNBC 2013 interview	12	100	0,1071	76	55	0,5802	42	97	0,3022
ABC news 2013 interview	14	203	0,0645	76	68	0,5278	66	114	0,3667
NBC news 2014 interview	28	132	0,175	127	68	0,6513	117	140	0,4553
The Economist 2014 interview	12	72	0,1429	84	47	0,6412	40	107	0,2721
ZDF heute 2014 interview	7	58	0,1077	47	48	0,4947	51	76	0,4016
CNN 2014 interview	8	24	0,25	41	23	0,6406	43	87	0,3308
ABC News 2015 interview	14	72	0,1628	75	46	0,6198	46	113	0,2893
Huffpost 2015 interview	18	81	0,1818	65	41	0,6132	55	112	0,3293
BBC 2015 interview	12	78	0,1333	48	28	0,6316	39	79	0,3305
The Atlantic 2015 interview	43	121	0,2622	99	86	0,5351	64	137	0,3184
CBS news 2016 interview	27	103	0,2077	69	51	0,575	85	112	0,4315
CNN interview 2016	37	72	0,3394	108	86	0,5567	127	288	0,306
NPR 2016 interview	21	120	0,1489	137	90	0,6035	98	152	0,392
Politico 2016 interview	19	129	0,1284	69	39	0,6389	47	136	0,2568
CBS news 2017 interview	28	164	0,1458	71	63	0,5299	74	181	0,2902

HB	LB	IGB	HS	LS	SC	HC	LC	CC	HP	LP	PWR
10	82	0,1087	69	66	0,5111	158	93	0,6295	53	130	0,2896
2	44	0,0435	43	28	0,6056	130	69	0,6533	21	75	0,2188
7	39	0,1522	38	31	0,5507	111	72	0,6066	22	74	0,2292
12	32	0,2727	45	24	0,6522	113	49	0,6975	24	71	0,2526
10	119	0,0775	91	78	0,5385	215	147	0,5939	83	178	0,318
16	124	0,1143	50	61	0,4505	122	110	0,5259	50	154	0,2451
11	97	0,1019	54	79	0,406	139	104	0,572	64	142	0,3107
6	73	0,0759	36	25	0,5902	90	72	0,5556	29	96	0,232
3	50	0,0566	23	23	0,5	105	82	0,5615	23	60	0,2771
20	192	0,0943	92	132	0,4107	346	222	0,6092	110	260	0,2973
46	271	0,1451	76	98	0,4368	413	283	0,5934	122	286	0,299
4	68	0,0556	11	6	0,6471	51	40	0,5604	23	55	0,2949
3	86	0,0337	55	40	0,5789	183	102	0,6421	26	122	0,1757
16	87	0,1553	44	37	0,5432	136	90	0,6018	46	98	0,3194
4	81	0,0471	25	53	0,3205	142	94	0,6017	31	100	0,2366
9	127	0,0662	48	58	0,4528	273	144	0,6547	54	155	0,2584
8	66	0,1081	41	42	0,494	179	65	0,7336	35	82	0,2991
8	83	0,0879	36	36	0,5	156	82	0,6555	25	108	0,188
5	117	0,041	52	44	0,5417	194	103	0,6532	38	135	0,2197
30	139	0,1775	59	74	0,4436	217	121	0,642	96	152	0,3871
9	80	0,1011	45	30	0,6	211	105	0,6677	28	116	0,1944
12	58	0,1714	41	43	0,4881	100	53	0,6536	28	93	0,2314
4	60	0,0625	36	41	0,4675	104	43	0,7075	35	92	0,2756
16	76	0,1739	53	38	0,5824	192	95	0,669	36	119	0,2323
10	106	0,0862	42	33	0,56	160	87	0,6478	40	121	0,2484
13	55	0,1912	28	41	0,4058	135	68	0,665	26	85	0,2342
14	77	0,1538	73	62	0,5407	297	137	0,6843	40	154	0,2062
12	110	0,0984	67	46	0,5929	227	112	0,6696	55	135	0,2895
12	104	0,1034	156	249	0,3852	348	195	0,6409	94	311	0,2321
18	111	0,1395	101	69	0,5941	381	161	0,703	63	182	0,2571
9	41	0,18	78	101	0,4358	215	163	0,5688	41	137	0,2303
6	75	0,0741	103	115	0,4725	211	130	0,6188	66	184	0,264

DIS: distrust in others, TASK: task-focus, BACE: belief can control events, IGB: in-group bias, SC: self-confidence, CC: conceptual complexity, PWR: need for power

List of conferences including LTA outcomes.

Press conference transcripts									
Obama's first primetime address February 2009	36	141	0,2034	248	97	0,7188	146	229	0,3893
CBS news June 2009 press conference	26	179	0,1268	160	129	0,5536	121	215	0,3601
News conference in Pittsburgh September 2009	8	55	0,127	94	53	0,6395	69	83	0,4539
News Conference in Copenhagen, December 200	2	74	0,0263	116	33	0,7785	69	88	0,4395
News conference February 2010	13	129	0,0915	107	94	0,5323	89	151	0,3708
White house news conference May 2010	19	151	0,1118	201	107	0,6526	140	199	0,413
White House Press briefing September 2010	43	224	0,161	180	179	0,5014	207	250	0,453
White House Press conference December 2010	14	104	0,1186	126	47	0,7283	86	146	0,3707
White house press conference February 2011	25	163	0,133	187	108	0,6339	160	245	0,3951
White House Press conference June 2011	39	204	0,1605	227	124	0,6467	207	228	0,4759
White house news conference July 2011	15	114	0,1163	135	103	0,5672	128	171	0,4281
News conference in Hawaii November 2011	14	130	0,0972	110	68	0,618	118	136	0,4646
News conference in Seoul, March 2012	4	75	0,0506	79	54	0,594	27	70	0,2784
White house press conference June 2012	9	102	0,0811	82	39	0,6777	47	60	0,4393
White house press conference August 2012	10	62	0,1389	57	45	0,5588	61	74	0,4519
White house press conference November 2012	24	162	0,129	180	114	0,6122	165	241	0,4064
White house press conference January 2013	18	187	0,0878	146	80	0,646	163	200	0,449
White house news conference April 2013	24	149	0,1387	145	106	0,5777	126	182	0,4091
White house press conference August 2013	22	139	0,1366	159	121	0,5679	135	179	0,4299
White house press conference December 2013	31	155	0,1667	179	146	0,5508	180	222	0,4478
White house news conference February 2014	17	115	0,1288	132	66	0,6667	77	127	0,3775
White house press conference April 2014	9	112	0,0744	72	66	0,5217	62	128	0,3263
White house press conference August 2014	16	176	0,0833	114	82	0,5816	136	120	0,5312
White house news conference November 2014	19	220	0,0795	264	130	0,6701	218	317	0,4075
White house news conference January 2015	57	186	0,2346	198	132	0,6	141	220	0,3906
Press conference in Panama, April 2015	17	128	0,1172	144	76	0,6545	77	141	0,3532
White house press conference July 2015	50	157	0,2415	210	114	0,6481	127	190	0,4006
White house press conference December 2015	38	148	0,2043	134	74	0,6442	120	130	0,48
News conference in California, February 2016	23	165	0,1223	120	80	0,6	61	104	0,3697
Press conference April 2016	23	78	0,2277	141	59	0,705	75	84	0,4717
Press conference in China after G20 in Sept 2016	8	81	0,0899	147	42	0,7778	81	118	0,407
White House Press conference December 2016	43	235	0,1547	200	114	0,6369	184	278	0,3983
Obama's Last News Conference 2017	25	124	0,1678	180	99	0,6452	117	219	0,3482
33			0,140581538			0,61312769			0,388901538
			Low in distrust of others			moderate			moderate
						task focus			BACE

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12	217	0,0524	96	110	0,466	369	221	0,6254	92	274	0,2514
20	165	0,1081	103	93	0,5255	298	216	0,5798	73	250	0,226
16	96	0,1429	39	31	0,5571	134	84	0,6147	41	108	0,2752
15	100	0,1304	38	26	0,5988	146	80	0,646	41	117	0,2595
14	116	0,1077	67	73	0,4786	234	131	0,6411	65	167	0,2802
23	193	0,1065	73	108	0,4083	400	256	0,6098	88	246	0,2635
23	297	0,0719	109	98	0,5266	353	249	0,5864	133	316	0,2962
12	88	0,12	71	99	0,4176	190	121	0,6109	62	164	0,2743
19	252	0,0701	93	97	0,4895	389	221	0,6377	87	308	0,2203
35	282	0,1104	110	84	0,567	408	236	0,6335	123	303	0,2887
7	185	0,0365	79	72	0,5232	288	133	0,6841	76	214	0,2621
28	158	0,1505	59	62	0,4876	235	126	0,651	83	171	0,3268
14	72	0,1628	22	42	0,3488	163	80	0,6708	16	78	0,1702
9	89	0,0918	23	22	0,5111	186	108	0,6327	33	75	0,3056
1	91	0,0109	31	33	0,4844	154	67	0,6968	30	104	0,2239
12	207	0,0548	110	141	0,4382	330	185	0,6408	95	302	0,2393
21	254	0,0764	76	115	0,3979	363	163	0,6901	87	270	0,2437
20	203	0,0897	66	70	0,4853	290	172	0,6277	81	222	0,2673
32	158	0,1684	91	101	0,474	327	167	0,6619	96	211	0,3127
25	198	0,1121	114	120	0,4872	453	235	0,6584	119	276	0,3013
33	141	0,1897	33	52	0,3882	227	126	0,6431	59	143	0,2921
10	122	0,0758	57	44	0,5644	198	109	0,645	43	146	0,2275
32	175	0,1546	47	40	0,5402	290	171	0,6291	94	151	0,3837
41	225	0,1541	156	221	0,4138	549	277	0,6646	135	389	0,2576
74	294	0,2011	53	57	0,4818	316	148	0,681	114	240	0,322
24	126	0,16	51	75	0,4048	224	103	0,685	46	168	0,215
36	215	0,1434	69	67	0,5074	388	164	0,7029	84	223	0,2736
28	149	0,1582	68	64	0,5152	292	141	0,6744	75	166	0,3112
17	79	0,1771	39	64	0,3786	236	137	0,6327	51	116	0,3054
12	119	0,0916	30	34	0,4688	148	85	0,6352	35	118	0,2288
20	131	0,1325	38	50	0,4318	232	111	0,6764	58	132	0,3053
21	243	0,0795	126	153	0,4516	456	275	0,6238	114	324	0,2603
29	134	0,1779	121	128	0,4859	367	170	0,6834	71	257	0,2165
		0,11416			0,492143077			0,64024			0,263553846
		Low in In-Group Bias			moderate			High in Conceptual Complexity			Low in need for power

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List of terms used to describe R2P

Terms and expressions	Amount of times used in speeches and remarks
Attacks/violence/assaults/murders/massacres against/of citizens/civilians/Libyan people	15
Protection of the Libyan people	18
Qadhafi's attacks/atrocities on his own people	11
assaults on innocent/defenceless men and women by own government	5
humanitarian threat/catastrophe/crisis	5
humanitarian aid/assistance/efforts/goals/interests	9
urgent humanitarian needs/needs of the Libyan people	1
illegitimate use of force	2
Qadhafi has lost his legitimacy to rule	1
potential atrocities inside of Libya	3
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe	3
to take all necessary measures to protect civilians	2
Support the aspirations of the Libyan people (for freedom, democracy and dignity)	2
Mentions of failure of the international community in their obligation/responsibility towards Rwanda and the Balkans	2

List of terms used to describe Obama's personality

Terms and expressions	Amount of times used in speeches and remarks
examine a full range of options	7
in consultation with	5
minimizing harm to innocent civilians	3
Do not take decisions lightly	1
Judgment calls	1
monitoring the situation and matching our actions	1
the plan developed in great detail extensively	1
continuation of evaluation of the situation	1
Talking about risks involved	2
costs outweighing benefits and that is what drove my decision and why we need to see it through effectively	1
patience in achieving goal	1
the use of force is not our first choice and not a choice that I make lightly	1

List of terms used to describe US interests

Terms and expressions	Amount of times used in speeches and remarks
it serves US interests well	1
in the interest of the US	3
Libya provides a type of oil that is highly valued	1
very practical/strategic interest	2
the national security and foreign policy interests of the US	1
Nobody has a bigger stake…than does the United States of America	1
Huge national interest	1