
Jean-Claude Juncker's leadership style and EU politics



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Introduction

Jean-Claude Juncker is considered one of the most powerful politicians in Europe (European Union, 17/06/2018). His position as President of the European Commission (EC) makes him one of the key representatives of the European Union (EU) and grants him a significant role in the legislative process. A leader tasked with representing the interests of a Union of 28 (soon to be 27) Member-States needs to be able to unify polarising ideas on the future of the EU into one plan. Juncker is manoeuvring himself through the minefield that is international relations (IR), handling dossiers like the financial stability of the Union and Brexit. However, he is also known for having a distinct personality. Examples are calling Viktor Orbán a dictator during a summit in Latvia while the EU is negotiating a dispute between itself and Hungary (Bloomberg, 01/06/2018) or displaying his informal way of maintaining relationships with other politicians by kissing and slapping them (Politico Europe, 01/11/2015). His public behaviour is different from the stereotypical image of a 'boring bureaucrat'. This begs the question whether his personality, due to his powerful position within the EU, has influenced EU policy during his tenure as EC President.

Juncker and his Commission have acknowledged differing views on the future of the European project. To contribute to this discussion, they drafted a report, the '*White Paper on the Future of Europe*', which was published on May 1st, 2017. In this report, the Commission proposes five scenarios to aim for in 2025. These five scenarios range from striving for an EU that entails no cooperation but a single market to a scenario in which the Union covers even more policy areas than it does at time of writing. The decision as to which scenario will be chosen lies with the Member-States (European Commission, 01/03/2017). Involving Member-States in decision making on the future of Europe is this report's objective as it gives the EC a legitimate mandate to steer the EU in a certain direction. The EU has had a problem with the legitimacy of their legislation due to declining turnouts in EP elections (European Parliament, 01/07/2014), the limited role the EP has in the legislative process (Smismans, 2016, pp.343-347) and voters voting in line with their national preferences (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, pp.551-552). Juncker states in foreword of the White Paper that he would voice his personal opinion on the future of Europe in his yearly '*State of the Union*' (European Commission, 01/03/2017). During this speech he pleaded for a more unified EU after Brexit.

The State of the Union of 2017 was not the first occasion Juncker expressed his personal views on what's best for Europe. He has taken a distinct position in the debate on the future of Europe by expressing his support for a more federalist Europe (Financial Times, 14/09/2017). During his State of the Union in 2015 for example he stated that *"There is not enough Europe in this Union. And there is not enough Union in this Union."* (European Commission, 09/09/2015).

If one wants to research personality and views of a politician, the field of political psychology is most relevant since it primarily looks at individuals in IR. However, a problem with applying this political psychology-analysis to officials running a supranational organisation is the complexity in the structure of the organisation. The amount of parties involved in the policy-making process makes the influence of particular leaders difficult to recognize in policy. Besides the difficulty of measuring individual influence in a large international organisation, a case can be made for individuals not being able to influence policy in a significant way because of the structure of the EU. Limited influence could be due to checks and balances within the system as a result of the design of the legislative system of the EU favouring groups of people making decisions instead of a president or dictator. This structure-agent debate will be investigated in the following section.

The field of political psychology argues that individuals have an important role in international relations ('t Hart, 2010, p.99-110). It is based on the importance of the 'first image', a term introduced in Kenneth Waltz's book *Man, State and War*. Waltz describes three 'images' or levels of analysis with which one can explain the behaviour of States in International Relations (IR). The first image is the individual level, about which Waltz states that the behaviour of individuals shapes the behaviour of states (Waltz, 1977, p.16; Byman & Pollack, 2001, p.111). The second image argues that domestic (political) structures shape the behaviour of nations. Waltz's third image explains states behaviour by looking at the relative position of the state in the international system. Waltz states that the third image is the most adequate tool to explain IR and rejects the first image, the individual, as an influencing actor in policymaking. He does not feel like the individual level as unit of analysis provides accurate explanations for state behaviour (Waltz, 1977, pp. 159-164; Byman & Pollack, 2001, p.111).

Byman and Pollack however, argue that state intentions are formed by individuals, making the preferences and personalities of individuals important when attempting to understand a state's intentions (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp.111-114). They rebut Waltz's objection to using the first image that human nature is constant while IR is not constant. Byman and Pollack state that there is variance between and within humans, each person possesses a different mixture of personality traits. An analysis of the distribution of these traits could provide theories concerning their impact on politics (Byman and Pollack, 2001, p.112). To support their position on the importance of the first image, Byman and Pollack use five historical events to show the reader that leaders and Waltz's first image can have an influence on IR. They do this by looking at five different historical cases of political leaders who all made an impact on IR. They discuss Hitler, who was responsible for the rise as well as the downfall of the Third Reich (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp.118-120). Byman and Pollack also make this argument for Otto von Bismarck, Napoleon Bonaparte, Saddam Hussein and others to prove that the first image plays an important role in IR and an analysis of individuals can produce testable hypotheses (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp.114-132).

Jean-Claude Juncker's powers come nowhere close to the powers of some authoritarian leaders in Byman and Pollack research. However, there is also research available proving that leaders in more liberal political system can influence decision-making and policy. An example is Hermann research on Bill Clinton during the first seven months of his first administration. She linked Bill Clinton's personality traits to the decision-making process within the White House (Hermann, 1994). The applicability of the individual as useful level of analysis is further proven by Kaarbo & Hermann (1998), as they show that individuals (more specifically prime ministers and not just presidents of the United States) can influence the policy-making process. These studies are examples from the field of political psychology, proving that the individual can be influential in policy-making. This research design will be applied to Jean-Claude Juncker, to determine whether an individual in his position can influence an institution like the EU.

When researching the potential influence of Juncker's leadership style, a method of quantitative content analysis will be used. The next section will elaborate on this method. The theoretical expectation (hypothesis) of this research is a limited influence of Juncker's leadership style. Because of the way the legislative procedure of the EU is structured there are multiple parties involved in the policy-making process, possibly making it hard to measure

the influence of Juncker as an individual instead of the influence of the Commission in general. However, Juncker has a leading role in the Commission and is capable through his office to make some decisions without the involvement of others (like the Selmayr appointment, the second part of this thesis will elaborate on this situation). It looks to be hard to detect the influence of Juncker as an individual but due to his leading role not impossible.

This thesis looks to explore the hypothesis of leaders of international organisations having a significant impact in the policy it produces. In sum, the research question of this thesis is as follows:

“What has been the influence of Jean-Claude Juncker’s leadership style on the evolution of the European Union?”

Literature Review

How does one determine the leadership style of a leader? How does the EC function? Does its structure allow Jean-Claude Juncker to influence policy? This next section elaborates on the analytical model used to determine leadership traits and leadership style, as well as expand on the structure of the organisation Juncker manoeuvres in as a politician.

The Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA)

What is Leadership Trait Analysis?

The Leadership Trait Analysis is a model of quantitative content analysis developed by Margaret Hermann that defines the personality traits of a political leader. By comparing the scores on these traits to the means of other politicians it can be determined whether the leader that is subject of analysis scores high or low on the traits in comparison to others. Through combining the high, average and low scores the leadership style of the leader in question can be defined (Hermann, 2005, p.184). Hermann defines leadership style as: “(...) *the ways in which leaders relate to those around them—whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders—and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions.*” (Hermann, 2005, p.181).

The seven traits Hermann measures with her Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) are:

“(1) the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power and influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and people in one’s environment), (4) self-confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and dealing with others’ ideas and sensitivities, (6) general distrust or suspiciousness of others, and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias.” (Hermann, 2005, p.184).

These seven leadership traits will be used to answer three questions to define the leadership style of a leader. These three questions are ‘*How do leaders react to political constraints in their environment?*’, ‘*How open are leaders to incoming information?*’ and ‘*What are the leaders’ reasons for seeking their positions?*’ (Hermann, 2005, pp.181-182). Looking at the leader’s reaction to political constraints there are two possibilities: respecting constraints or challenging them. The leader can try to meet the obstacle head-on and try and overcome it, or he or she can be more flexible and responsive to the environment and adapt to the new situation with the constraint in place. Openness to incoming information studies the degree to

which leaders are susceptible to information coming from their surroundings and if they change their course of action if they are influenced by conflicting information. Leaders either are open to information or closed to information. The third question researches the motivation of politicians to seek office, whether they are problem-focused or relationship-focused (Hermann, 2005, pp.181-182).

Based on the personality trait scores answers to the three questions can be formulated. For example, a leader with a high belief in controlling events and a high need for power challenges constraints rather than respect them. Low scores on these two traits mark a leader with respect for the constraints around him. A higher score on 'conceptual complexity' than on the trait 'self-confidence' means that a leader is more open to information. By looking at the scores in this fashion the three initial questions can be answered. The answers to these questions form the leadership style, of which Margaret Hermann has defined eight: '*expansionistic*', '*evangelistic*', '*actively independent*', '*directive*', '*incremental*', '*influential*', '*opportunistic*' and '*collegial*' (Hermann, 2005, p.185).

Table 1. 8 types of Leadership Style (Hermann, 2005, p.185).

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TABLE 8.1. LEADERSHIP STYLE AS A FUNCTION OF RESPONSIVENESS TO CONSTRAINTS, OPENNESS TO INFORMATION, AND MOTIVATION			
Responsiveness to Constraints	Openness to Information	Motivation	
		Problem Focus	Relationship Focus
Challenges constraints	Closed to information	<i>Expansionistic</i> (Focus of attention is on expanding leader's, government's, and state's span of control)	<i>Evangelistic</i> (Focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message)
Challenges constraints	Open to information	<i>Actively Independent</i> (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both)	<i>Directive</i> (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others by engaging in actions on the world stage that enhance the state's reputation)
Respects constraints	Closed to information	<i>Incremental</i> (Focus of attention is on improving state's economy and/or security in incremental steps while avoiding the obstacles that will inevitably arise along the way)	<i>Influential</i> (Focus of attention is on building cooperative relationships with other governments and states in order to play a leadership role; by working with others, one can gain more than is possible on one's own)
Respects constraints	Open to information	<i>Opportunistic</i> (Focus of attention is on assessing what is possible in the current situation and context given what one wants to achieve and considering what important constituencies will allow)	<i>Collegial</i> (Focus of attention is on reconciling differences and building consensus—on gaining prestige and status through empowering others and sharing accountability)

How can we study leadership traits?

How are the leadership traits, needed to determine the leadership style of Juncker, derived from public appearances of a political leader? To conduct the LTA a coding scheme and web-application of the company Social Science Automaton is used (Social Science Automation, 2013). The online coding scheme analyses written materials (in English), which are transcripts of interviews and speeches conducted by the subject at hand and uses a word-analysis technique to determine the leadership style of the subject. These written materials are transcripts derived from oral sources. To specify the analysis the program conducts, ProfilerPlus is counting frequency of certain words and analyses linguistic features like the use of synonyms or lack thereof (Hermann, 2005, p.196).

How does it relate to decision-making?

How can a link be made between the leadership style of Juncker and the policy made by the EU? In what way is the influence of Juncker's personality on policy measurable? Previous research on the subject of the Leadership Trait Analysis focuses on defining the leadership style before looking at the foreign policy a country generates and analysing this to establish any influence of the leader in question. By defining the type of leadership style that is applicable, certain characteristics can be linked to having this style. For example, a leader can be polarising in his or her views and refuse to cooperate with other people. This would translate in policy of the same kind.

From 1980 until now Hermann has researched lots of leadership traits and styles in political leaders. However, a causal link between personality and policy outcomes has not yet been made. An example of this is Hermann's research on Bill Clinton's first administration. During this research she was able to gather information about the policy-making process and dynamics between Clinton and his staff during this process, granting her room to look at authority patterns and the links between his charisma and group-dynamics, instead of just analysing the policy as an outcome (Hermann, 1994). In the case of research on Juncker however, the only available information is at the back end of the policy-making process. Distinguishing the influence of his leadership style on policy is more difficult if there is little to no insight available with regards to the process within the EC.

One author who researches the outcome of the policy-making process is Dyson (2006). Dyson compares Tony Blair's scores on the LTA to policy towards Iraq. Unfortunately, a problem of

comparing Dyson's research to this thesis is the position Tony Blair has within the decision unit on war policy. Juncker has a much less authority on any of the policy areas the EU is responsible for when compared to Blair's power in military policy areas, where Blair takes a leading role in the decision-making as prime minister. Research on the impact of the personality of Margaret Thatcher by Dyson in 2009 has the same limitations for this research as she almost dictated Britain's Foreign Policy on her own (Dyson, 2009).

To research the potential link between EU policy and Juncker's personality, Juncker's leadership style will be determined and a comparison between his personality traits and EU policy that resembles these traits will be made. The policy used in this analysis will stem from the same period of time as the materials used in ProfilerPlus. However, when drawing conclusions, it must be noted that Juncker takes a less central role in the policy-making process compared to other political leaders previously researched in political psychology. This makes it harder to establish a *direct* link between his personality and EU policy.

The European Commission


The EC is the executive power of the EU. Its main goal is promoting the general interest of the EU (European Commission, 11/10/2017; Egeberg, 2016, pp.126-128). Commissioners represent the interests of the EU and in no way are allowed to forward their country's interests in their function (Egeberg, 2016, p.129). Different policies and policy areas are distributed within the portfolios of 28 Commissioners, one for each Member-State, the President included. The 28 Commissioners are called the 'College of Commissioners' or the 'College'. The EC as an institution also entails several administrative branches and Directorates General each headed by a Commissioner. The influence of the EC in the legislative process is significant since the most frequently used legislative process can only be initiated by a proposal from the EC (Article 294(2) TEU in Foster, 2017, p.96).

The Commission also has the power to oversee the implementation and enforcement of EU policies, but due to the limited amount of words allowed in this thesis the scope of this section on the EC will be narrowed down to the Commission's power to initiate legislation.

The European legislative process

The EU knows two general legislative procedures to produce legislative acts: the ordinary legislative procedure and the special legislative procedure. The former procedure is more frequently used than the latter (European Council, 28/02/2018). In EU law it is categorised in the Treaties per policy area which legislative procedure is to be used. For instance, if the Commission wants to implement policy on humanitarian aid it needs to follow the ordinary legislative procedure (Art. 209 TFEU in Foster, 2017, p.77). The ordinary legislative procedure consists of a co-decision mechanism between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the EU (The Council). The Commission submits a proposal to both organs at the same time. The EP and the Council will from that point forward negotiate a joint position on the proposal in two phases (readings) of negotiation and exchange positions. The proposal is adopted successfully if both the EP and the Council accept it. If there is no agreement from either party on the proposal, the legislative act will not be adopted. According to the Treaties the Commission has a monopoly on initiatives (Article 294 TFEU in Foster, 2017, p.96; Barnard & Peers, 2017, p.46). In practice however, the EP can request the EC to submit a proposal (European Parliament, 24/07/2012), but the EC maintains the right to accept or decline this request (Egeberg, 2016, p.126). The course of the *special legislative procedure* is determined ad hoc. A common feature between the procedures of the ordinary and special legislative procedure is that the Commission also initiates the special legislative procedure (European Council, 09/11/2017).

Figure 1. The ordinary legislative procedure (European Commission, 31/01/2012).



The election of the President

Since the president is no ordinary Commissioner, the way he is elected into office is different. This process is called the '*Spitzenkandidaten process*'. The Spitzenkandidaten process is an interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which states that the European Council shall nominate a candidate for the function of Commission President for the EP to approve. The precise procedure is not mentioned in the treaty but was agreed upon between all involved parties (the Council, EP, EC, Member-States etc.) (European Parliament, 07/02/2014). The European Council and the EP agreed upon letting each party in the EP choose a candidate from their own ranks (the Spitzenkandidat) to nominate for the function of Commission President. After the elections of the EP the nominee of the biggest party in the EP will become Commission President (European Parliament, 07/02/2014). This process of appointment is a more politicized process than ever (Peterson, 2017, p.353), since the President is chosen from the EP. The European Council has become increasingly hesitant concerning the procedure. Opponents of the process state that the Spitzenkandidaten process favours the EP over the European Council (Dinan, 2015, p.96).

The powers of the President

What is the influence of Juncker's position within the Commission and within the EU? Firstly, the President can choose from candidates forwarded by Member-States. He is also able to reject nominations of candidates by Member-States (Egeberg, 2016, p.129). Juncker cannot hand pick his College, but by using this veto he can force the Member-State into proposing someone else. Secondly, he has the power of dismissal. If the Commission does not function properly according to the EP, the EP's has the power to dismiss the College as a whole. However, this is a difficult tool to apply as it requires a hard to reach qualified majority vote in the EP (Barnard & Peers, 2017, p.45). Secondly, when a Commissioner does not function according to the wishes of the President he can dismiss Commissioners individually, a power that is much greater than the dismissive power the EP possesses (Barnard & Peers, 2017, p.42). Thirdly, Juncker can reshuffle the College and (re-)divide portfolios (Barnard & Peers, 2017, p.42). A fourth power of the EC President is an agenda setting power. Juncker decides what policy proposals the College discusses and votes on (Müller, 2017)

Egeberg argues that a process of '*presidentialization*' is taking place, where the president of the Commission may end up above other Commissioners when hierarchy is concerned

(Egeberg, 2016, p.129). An example is the way consensus is reached within the Commission. Even though the President does not have a vote with more weight than other Commissioners, he or she mediates the process of seeking consensus in the Commission's decision-making process (Egeberg, 2016 p.129). Kurpas argues that this process is already completed because the President has the power to allocate portfolios and the power to demand the resignation of individual Commissioners, possessing far more and different powers than other Commissioners (Kurpas et al., 2008, p.32). The European Parliamentary Research Service states that the President even has the power to instruct individual Commissioners within their portfolios (EPRS, 2014, p.3). This means that Juncker ultimately has the last say with regards to all policy areas the Commission has competence over and is able to apply his view on the policy subject even when it concerns the portfolio of one of his Commissioners.

After being approved by the European Council, Juncker revised the system of Vice-Presidents in the Commission to control the other Commissioners (besides the vice presidents) in his College (Hodson, 2015, p.158). Each Vice-President leads a project group with a specific goal (for example '*Jobs, Growth and Investment*'), managing a group of Commissioners to attain this goal (European Commission, 10/09/2014). Each project team has a clear task (European Commission, 10th September 2014), which Juncker expects them to complete. This more concrete way of goal-setting makes the progress more measurable at the end of his term. Through this system, Juncker also concentrates power around him and his trusted Vice-Presidents. A disadvantage of this reform is the Vice-Presidential veto, which could prove to make it more difficult for Juncker to pass his personal vision (Hodson, 2015, p.158).

Structural limitations

What are the structural limits of Jean-Claude Juncker's influence as Commission President? Firstly, because of the way the voting procedure within the Commission is laid out, Juncker as an individual cannot make decision on his own on behalf of the Commission. When voting, the vote of the Commission President carries the same weight as the votes of the other Commissioners (Egeberg, 2016, p.129). The President has no veto in Commission proposals (Barnard & Peers, 2017, p.42). These voting guidelines mean that Juncker needs the backing of his College to initiate the procedure. Secondly, as we can derive from the process of the ordinary legislative procedure, the Commission as a whole can propose legislation but it does not have the final say as to whether this legislation is passed. As explained above, this competence lies with the EP and the Council (Drachenberg & Brianson, 2016, p.204). This

means that the Commission can propose legislation it favours, but when the proposal lacks support among other institutions this legislation will not pass.

Summarising, not only does Juncker's function have considerable power in the legislative process of the EU, Jean-Claude Juncker has also been vocal about his ambitions as Commission President. He expressed his views on his function, stating that he would not merely be a secretary general for the EU but a prominent agenda-setter (Dinan, 2015, p.98; Hodson, 2015, p.157). These statements lead us to believe he is aware of and using the degree to which he is involved in EU policy-making. Taking this assertive attitude into account, as well as his influence as Commission President concerning the legislative procedure, the appointment of Commissioners, in decision-making all portfolios within the Commission, Juncker seems like a powerful politician within the European legislative framework.

Evolution of the EU

What is defined as the 'Evolution of the European Union' in this research? The policy used to compare Juncker's leadership traits to is policy that impacts the functioning and the future of the EU. Policy shaping a new institution or agency is an example of a type that impacts the functioning of the EU. A democratic process initiated to determine if the Union gets more responsibilities or has to take a step back from some policy areas in the future, like the White Paper on the Future of Europe, is an example of impact on the future of the EU. A comparison between these types of impactful materials and Juncker's leadership style will decide whether he influenced the future of Europe.

Methods: Conducting the LTA

Two types of materials can be used in an LTA: spontaneous (private) and non-spontaneous (public) materials. Spontaneous materials consist of interviews and Q&As at press conferences because the individual has to formulate answers on the spot. Non-spontaneous materials are speeches and reports as the leader has time to carefully formulate an answer. The difference between these two types of materials lies in determining the traits of the leader that is the subject of analysis. In the case of high-ranked politicians and government officials it is expected that a team of speechwriters provides these leaders with consistent policy statements on the subject. These speechwriters dictate what the leader in question is going to say in his speeches. This makes the coding scheme measure the leadership traits of the speechwriter instead of the political leader (Hermann, 1980, p.14-15). Interviews offer a more unexpected line of questioning, putting the leader more on the spot in its answering of the questions. This leaves less space for calculated answers and more space for the opinion of the leader itself on the matter (instead of the opinions of his or her speechwriters). Hermann states that leaders being put on the spot in interviews makes their behaviour and statements quite spontaneous (Hermann, 2005, p.179) and argues that it is preferable to minimize the effects of this phenomenon called 'ghost writing' by using more spontaneous materials (Hermann, 1980, p.14-15). She also states that the relationship between the materials and the leadership traits is stronger (Hermann, 1980, p.15).

For the Leadership Trait Analysis conducted on Juncker in this thesis, 50 entries are used in the ProfilerPlus coding scheme of Margaret Hermann's LTA. Due to the increased accuracy of LTA scores spontaneous materials were preferred. However, due to the limited availability of spontaneous materials during the designated time (01/11/2014 to 01/03/2017), to attain the minimum amount of entries for an accurate score (50 entries) non-spontaneous materials were also used. Of the 50 entries, 35 entries were non-spontaneous materials (70% of total amount of materials) and 15 entries spontaneous materials (30% of total amount of materials). All spontaneous materials that could be found were used. The remainder of the entries, the non-spontaneous materials, were randomly selected from the European Commission Press Release Database.

What effect does this distribution between types of materials have on the outcomes of the LTA? Jonathan Renshon conducted research in 2009 on the subject of difference between

public and private materials in an analysis of the Operational Code (OC) of a leader. OC analysis falls within the field of political psychology and is, like LTA, a content analysis to determine the belief systems of political figures. It uses a similar method to LTA when analysing texts, like looking for frequency of certain words, negative or positive wordings and the use of synonyms (Renshon, 2008, pp.832-833). Renshon states that even public materials contain information that show a leader's true beliefs (Renshon, 2009, p.652). He concludes his research, comparing the outcomes of public materials and private materials in content analysis, by stating that the outcomes of both analyses were very comparable (Renshon, 2009, p.657-658).

Research by Suedfeld & Bluck (1988) supports Renshon's notion concerning public materials. Suedfeld and Bluck state that an actor unknowingly reveals certain beliefs in public materials it tries to keep secret (Suedfeld & Bluck, 1988). This research supports Renshon's statements concerning the use of public or non-spontaneous materials. Even when speeches are written by speech writers, they still contain clues that content analysis can derive from these texts.

The research of Suedfeld & Bluck, as well as Renshon's research suggest that the difference between using spontaneous and non-spontaneous materials in content analysis is not significant. This leads us to believe that the fact that most of the entries in ProfilerPlus are from non-spontaneous materials does not corrupt the LTA of Juncker.

A second decision to make on the subject of choice of materials is the period these materials emanate from. What periods seem most relevant for defining his leadership style? The materials that will be used in ProfilerPlus will stem from the time period of 01/11/2014 (Juncker assumes office) until the 28/02/2017 (because 01/03/2017 marks the publication of the White Paper). Because of the substance of the White Paper it is expected that Juncker knowingly took a step back to leave the decision on the future to European citizens. This move would mean that his influence has been limited after the date of publication and maybe not the genuine influence a Commission President would possess.

It is also important to note on what subjects the speeches were given and interviews were conducted. A politician's attitude on different subjects can vary. For example, Juncker's opinion on Brexit is much more outspoken and negative than his position on the increasing

tensions between the EU and Hungary. Contrasting political stances can lead to different analyses by ProfilerPlus. To prevent inconsistency in the outcomes from occurring the entries in ProfilerPlus will consist of materials on multiple policy areas.

All non-spontaneous materials were classified in three main policy areas: 'Europe's Foreign Policy', 'the Future of Europe' and 'Economics, Finance and Monetary Policy'. Of the 35 non-spontaneous entries, 13 were on the subject of EU Foreign Policy. Of the 35 entries, 8 entries were on the Future of Europe, meaning that Juncker discussed a more general outlook on the upcoming years. 11 of the 35 entries were on the subject of Economics, Finance and Monetary Policy. The 3 remaining entries of the 35 total entries were the State of the Unions of the years 2015 through 2017. These State of the Unions cover a wide array of policy subjects.

The spontaneous materials, consisting of interviews and Q&As during press conferences, have less of a problem with differentiation in policy areas. The interviews covered multiple policy areas at once, mostly actualities (for example Brexit, migration). Considering the fact that almost all but one interview (the interview with the Financial Times which only covered economics) fitted in multiple categories at once, no interviews had to be left out due to oversaturation of a certain policy subject.

Juncker's scores on Hermann's LTA cannot be analysed on their own but must be compared to the scores of other leaders to determine whether Jean-Claude Juncker scores above, below or according to the average on these traits. The results of 122 leaders are available in Hermann's research (Hermann, 2005, p.204) and will serve as material for comparison when analysing the outcome of Juncker's LTA.

Results: Juncker's Leadership Style

The LTA by ProfilerPlus points out that Juncker has respect for constraints, is open to information and is problem-focused or relationship-focused (depending on the situation). In situations where he tends to be more problem-focused, Juncker is an *opportunistic leader*. In those cases, he is solution-oriented and thus adapting to the situation to see what is possible and what is not. During these times he tries to find a balance between the goals of his administration and what Member-States will allow him to do (Hermann, 2005, p.185). In situations where he tends to be more relationship-oriented, Juncker is a *collegial leader*. During these times he is seeking consensus in decision-making and is focused on gaining prestige by letting others participate in this process. He shares accountability for his actions with the Member-States by doing these things (Hermann, 2005, p.185). The next section discusses the three questions resulting in determining this leadership style and how these three questions result in this leadership style.

Table 2. Juncker's scores on the Leadership Trait Analysis compared with Hermann's analysis of 122 political leaders (2005, p.204).

	Average Overall (n=50)	122 Political Leaders (Hermann. 2005)
Distrust of Others	0.063 <i>Low</i>	Mean = 0.38 Low < 0.20 High > 0.56
Task Focus	0.710 <i>Average</i>	Mean = 0.62 Low < 0.48 High > 0.76
Belief in One's Own Ability to Control Events	0.335 <i>Low-Average</i>	Mean = 0.45 Low < 0.33 High > 0.57
In-Group Bias	0.121 <i>Low</i>	Mean = 0.43 Low < 0.34 High > 0.53
Self-Confidence	0.358 <i>Low-Average</i>	Mean = 0.57 Low < 0.34 High > 0.80
Conceptual Complexity	0.607 <i>High</i>	Mean = 0.45 Low < 0.32 High > 0.58
Need for Power	0.264 <i>Low</i>	Mean = 0.50 Low < 0.38 High > 0.62

Dealing with constraints

How leaders deal with constraints, either respecting them or challenging them, can be determined by looking at the scores of the analysis in two traits, 'belief in one's own ability to control events' and 'need for power' (Hermann, 2005, p.187). Juncker scores on the low end of the spectrum on 'belief in ability to control events', with a score of 0.335 (low belief is a score *below* 0.33, the mean of the sample is 0.45). On the 'need for power' trait Juncker scores a 0.264, which is a very low score (Hermann, 2005, p.204). Since Juncker's score on belief in ability to control events is on the boundary of low scores and nowhere near the mean for this trait, we will interpret his score as a moderately low score. This is due to the possible standard deviation from Juncker's scores, meaning that the true score of Juncker could be slightly below or above his current score when more entries are used. How does a leader like Juncker with low scores in these areas deal with constraints? Leaders with low scores in both traits tend to adapt to their constraints and respect them. They aim for consensus on policy subjects and challenges (Hermann, 2005, p.187).

Openness to incoming information

How open a leader is to contextual information is determined by their scores on the 'self-confidence' and 'conceptual complexity' traits. Juncker scores a 0.358 on self-confidence and 0.67 on conceptual complexity. His score on self-confidence is moderately low, with scores below 0.34 being low scores and 0.57 being the mean of the 122 political leaders Hermann researched. On conceptual complexity Juncker's score is high, with the mean being 0.45 and high scores on the trait every score above 0.58 (Hermann, 2005, p.204). Leaders like Juncker with higher conceptual complexity scores than self-confidence scores are more open to input from others. They seem concerned with the opinions of others and helping people around them and gather as much information as possible through a structure in which all input is recognized (Hermann, 2005, p.192).

Motivation for seeking office

Three traits can be used to analyse these reasons and determine why a leader wants to assume this position in public administration, 'task focus', 'in-group bias' and 'distrust of others'. On 'task focus' Juncker scores a 0.710, which is a moderate to high score considering the mean being 0.62 and high scores ranging 0.76 and over.

The 'task focus' score is moderate, suggesting that Juncker's motivation for seeking office lies in both problems (an internal motivation) as well as in relationships (an external motivation). Whether Juncker is problem- or relationship-focused depends on the context of the situation (Hermann, 2005, p.198).

On the 'in-group bias' trait Juncker scores a 0.121, which is very low considering the range for low scores starting at everything below 0.34 (Hermann, 2005, p.204). This is to be expected however, considering the position of Juncker as a representative of the EU, not his own Member-State. On the 'distrust of others' trait Juncker scores very low with a 0.063, with everything below 0.20 being a low score.

The scores on 'distrust of others' and 'in-group bias' can be combined to determine one's motivation towards the world. Hermann defines this as "*whether the leader is driven by the threats or problems he or she perceives in the world or by the opportunities to form cooperative relationships.*" (Hermann, 2005, p.199). Because the scores on both traits were low in Juncker's case it can be concluded that he does not view the world as threatening, adapts to its constraints and seeks to cooperate with others. He focuses on building relationships and taking advantage of opportunities (Hermann, 2005, p.200).

Linking LTA results to policy

Policy cases

In the following section the leadership style of Juncker will be read in conjunction with certain policy events. These events are the publication of the White Paper on the Future of Europe, the appointment of Martin Selmayr as secretary general of the EC and the signing of two legislative agreements between the Council, EC and EP.

The White Paper on the Future of Europe

The aim of the White Paper on the Future of Europe is to reach consensus concerning the future of the EU and letting national governments and citizens choose a future. The EU has a problem with the legitimacy of their legislation because of low turnouts in EP elections and a limited role of the EP in the legislative process (Smismans, 2016, pp.343-347). Involving Member-States in decision making on the future of Europe is Juncker's objective as it gives him a legitimate mandate to steer the EU in a certain chosen direction. The EC proposed a timeline of open discussion, concluding with the 2019 EP elections (European Commission, 01/03/2017, p.28). The Commission made clear through the White Paper that these opinions are appreciated, stating that "every voice should be heard" (European Commission, 01/03/2017, p.26). This marks the involvement of others in decision-making, as well as sharing responsibility (for the future of Europe). These developments fit very well into Juncker's personality profile since he is open to incoming information in the policy process and seeks to cooperate with others because of his low distrust of others and low in-group bias.

Juncker adapting to constraints is most noticeable when looking at future integration in Europe, meaning an increase in cooperation in more policy areas. Increasing distrust towards the EU is developing in Europe (European Commission, 01/03/2017, p.12). Juncker and other EU officials believe in more EU. To unite these opinions, the Commission has proposed a scenario in the White Paper ('Scenario 3: Those who want to do more') in which a 'coalition of the willing' can cooperate even more while sceptic Member-States don't have the obligation to participate (European Commission, 01/03/2017, p.20). In some way this approach is already the case and nothing new within the Union, with different compositions of the Schengen Area, the European Customs Union, and the Eurozone (European Commission, 01/03/2017, p.7; Economist, 2007).

While Juncker wants to move forward he adapts to the constraints Eurosceptic opinions put on his vision for the future. By allowing countries to choose to participate through this third scenario, he can move forward with the EU in a direction he envisions with a ‘coalition of willing’ while respecting opinions favouring less Europe.

Appointment of Martin Selmayr

A development more negatively spoken of in news outlets is the appointment of Martin Selmayr as Secretary-General (SG) of the EC, one of the most powerful jobs within the Commission that does not require election. The appointment is frowned upon because of the speed (two promotions in one meeting) and the attempted secrecy surrounding it (Politico, 22/02/2018; Financial Times, 18/04/2018). Even though the appointment was in line with relevant legal rules according to a published factsheet by the Commission itself (European Commission, 25/03/2018), it is highly frowned upon by international media and the EP (Politico, 22/02/2018; Financial Times, 18/04/2018). The light-speed rise of Selmayr through the EU ranks is technically within the rules but stretching the boundaries and possibly damaging the integrity of the Union as a whole. Juncker has been a supporter of Selmayr, proposing him as secretary general at the same moment as he informed the relevant Commissioner that the previous SG would resign (European Commission, 25/03/2018, Question 3). His loyalty to Selmayr was emphasized when he threatened to resign as President if the Selmayr-promotion would be reversed, stating “*If Martin Selmayr goes, I go*” (Politico, 22/03/2018).

This move to put a close affiliate on one of the highest positions within the EC is an example of Juncker recognizing boundaries to his influence and the rules concerning appointment of these high functions. He adapts to them by stretching the legal rules and operating just within them, in the end succeeding in appointing someone of his choice.

Seeking cooperation

By analysing Juncker’s policy plans before he assumed office and his State of the Union addresses during his tenure two distinct types of cooperation that Juncker seeks can be recognized: inter-institutional cooperation within the EU and cooperation between Member-States through the EU.

An example of inter-institutional cooperation is Juncker's ambition to streamline the legislative process. This does not only fit into his personality profile concerning his want to cooperate and build relationships, but also combines well with his average to high task focus. In the State of the Union of 2015 and his political guidelines as candidate President he frequently mentions the aim to deliver on expectations and having concrete results to show for it (European Commission, 15/07/2014; European Commission, 09/09/2015). The signing of such an agreement between the Commission, Council of the EU and the EP marks a period of more cooperation between these three institutions (par II.6, EUR-Lex, 2016; European Council, 14/03/2018). The agreement aims to prioritize certain policy areas and aim for the swift passing of legislation, aiming for results (II.7 and VII.42, EUR-Lex, 2016). Has Juncker's leadership style played a role in the signing of this agreement? The agreement fits in his leadership profile because it aims for more cooperation and shares responsibility for policy between three EU institutions.

This agreement made the attainment of policy-goals easier. An example of sped up legislation due to this agreement is the increase in cooperation on the digital market, on which more information can be found in the next paragraph. In 2017 the Council, EP and EC signed a new declaration, the *'Joint Declaration on the EU's legislative priorities for 2018-19'*. The parties to the declaration recognize the upcoming EP elections and the end of the term of this Commission. They extend their cooperation in the legislative process to show their effectiveness to EU citizens and deliver on expectations (European Commission, 14/12/2017). Both Juncker's task-oriented focus as well as his cooperative nature can be recognized in this move.

Juncker aims for more Member-State cooperation by proposing more policy areas to cooperate on. An example of a new area of cooperation is the digital single market (DSM). Through proposals on this area the Commission tries to merge national policies on subjects such as cyber-security and the free movement of data (EPRS, 2018, pp.8-10). This type of cooperation is more classical in the sense that it is a 'spillover-effect' (cooperation on one policy area leading to cooperation on another; Jensen, 2016) and is part of the EU's aim to keep the single market efficient. As a result, data roaming legislation became identical across all of Europe in June 2017. In 2016 the EU even adopted its first cybersecurity law (Bassot &

Hiller, 2017, p.9). This marked a new policy area for the EU to cooperate on, a development Juncker has pleaded for and impacting the evolution of the EU.

Concluding the analysis of policy events, we can state that the fact that an individual like Juncker was nominated as the Spitzenkandidat for one of the EP parties and after the elections accepted by the European Council as Commission President (European Parliament, 27/05/2014) makes sense according to our LTA. A leader who tries to build relationships, cooperate and is focused on getting results seems like the ideal candidate to unite the interests of Member-States and tackle problems on an EU level. Of course, there is a political aspect to choosing Juncker emanating from a power struggle between the European Council and the EP (EUobserver, 2015), but solely looking at his leadership style he seems like the right man for the job of EC President.

A problem of causality

In the abovementioned policy events the leadership style of Juncker is illustrated in practice. Juncker influences the evolution of the EU through seeking cooperation of Member-States and citizens in deciding its future, creating a legitimate mandate for the next Commission. He respects the legal boundaries of the appointment procedure of the Secretary-General of the EC and worked within these rules to appoint Martin Selmayr, who will hold an important office long after Juncker's term is over and will influence the EU's functioning for some time. Lastly, Juncker sought to cooperate with others and build relationships. He has done this with other institutions as well as aim for more cooperation between Member-States. However, drawing these connections between leadership style and EU policy reveals a problem of causality.

This thesis has shown multiple examples of policy proposals and agreements showing parallels between policy and Juncker's personality. However, because Juncker is not the only actor involved in the policy making process it is hard to say that the policy outcome is due to Juncker's personality. An example of this lack of causality is the White Paper as an initiative in general. Its aim to inspire participation in the European discussion by national parliaments and European citizens correlates with Juncker's openness to incoming information and willingness to involve others in decision-making. However, direct causality between the

White Paper and Juncker's personality trait is hard to prove. We do not know if Juncker is the initiator of the White Paper report because it is not possible to gain an insight into the decision-making concerning the White Paper. Since it is not possible to *directly* connect Juncker's personality trait 'open to incoming information' the conclusion of this policy analysis cannot go further than pointing out a correlation between Juncker's leadership style and EU policy.

Conclusion

Concluding this research, how has this thesis approached the question “*What has been the influence of Jean-Claude Juncker’s leadership style on the evolution of the European Union?*” and what is the answer this research provides?

In the first part of this thesis we investigated Juncker’s position within the Commission and the Commission’s integral position in the EU’s legislative process. Juncker has a very influential position as President, for example being able to set the agenda for the College, appointing portfolios and demanding the resignation of individual Commissioners.

Interpreting his influence as President in conjunction with the Commission’s influence in making legislation, Juncker possesses great influence in deciding what policy proposals are passed on to the Council and EP.

In the second section, by conducting quantitative content-analysis we have determined that Juncker’s leadership style is opportunistic or collegial, depending on the situation at hand. When the context needs him to be more problem-focused he is an *opportunistic leader*, focusing on what is possible within the boundaries of his environment. When the situation needs him to be more relationship-focused he is a *collegial leader*, focused on building consensus and solving problems together with others.

In the third section of this thesis three policy events that had impact on the evolution of the EU were analysed in conjunction with Juncker’s leadership style. Martin Selmayr’s appointment will influence the function of the EU in years to come. Juncker’s preference to cooperate with other EU institutions to accelerate the legislative process and reach policy-goals made the EU able to pass many proposals in a short period of time. These policies are now part of EU law and contribute to the development of the EU. Possibly one of the most important proposals the EC, with Juncker as its frontman, initiated is a debate on the future of the EU through his White Paper. The outcome of this process will determine what the EU will look like in 2025.

Despite abovementioned arguments pointing towards Juncker having a significant influence on the evolution of the EU, Juncker’s direct influence on policy is hard to measure. Even though the analysed legislation is in line with his leadership style, many individuals and

institutions are involved in the process making it impossible to say with absolute certainty that his leadership style impacted the development of the EU significantly. Without absolute transparency of the legislative process within the EC, parallels can be recognized between both variables, but a direct causal link cannot be proven. The problem with drawing conclusions from correlation is the danger of hidden variables. These variables cannot be recognised when solely looking at the policy outcomes. Apart from analyses looking at the policy process by using private materials of this process no framework is provided in previous literature to reach causality through analysing policy outcomes. Because we do not know what potential hidden variables are and in what proportion they influence policy, we do not know *how much* Juncker's leadership style influenced the EU.

However, in this thesis we have ascertained the importance of the EC within the legislative process and Juncker's influential position within the Commission. This notion, combined with the parallels that can be drawn between certain policy (proposals) leads us to believe that leadership style is a factor that can influence policy and thus influence the evolution of the EU. Even though the lack of conclusive causality does not allow us to deduce *how much* his leadership style influences EU policy, it seems impossible that Juncker has had no influence on the evolution of the EU. This confirms the relevance of defining leadership styles of leaders and confirms the importance of the first image in IR.

Even though the conclusion of this research is not definitive, it set out to apply the school of political psychology to a leader in an international organisation. Comparing Juncker to the mean of political leaders Hermann has researched in the past and noticing that his scores are not unusual, content analysis seems to have been able to depict an accurate analysis of his personality. Availability of materials that give insight into the policy making process, conversation logs and memoirs of Commissioners for example, could provide us with the ability to establish how much the leadership style of Jean-Claude Juncker influenced EU policy (like Hermann did in her research of Bill Clinton's administration in 1994). As was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis this research was explorative. When these kinds of materials become available (possibly after the end of Juncker's term in 2019) new research is needed to deduce a possible causal link between his leadership style and the evolution of the EU.

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Appendix

Weblinks to the materials used in ProfilerPlus

NON SPONTANEOUS MATERIALS
Speech by President Juncker at the Plenary session of the European Parliament on the presentation of the programme of activities of the Bulgarian Presidency http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-303_en.htm
Speech by President Juncker at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament on the guidelines on the framework of future EU-UK relations http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-1881_en.htm
Speech by President Juncker at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament ahead of the European Council meeting of 22 and 23 March 2018 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-1901_en.htm
Statement - Meeting of President Juncker and President Tusk with President Poroshenko europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-6356_en.pdf
Speech by President Juncker at the European Parliament Plenary session on the Economic and Monetary Union http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-6328_en.htm
Remarks by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the joint press conference with Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, and Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, following the EU-Canada Summit http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3583_en.htm
Speech by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker at the 20th anniversary of the European Policy Centre - "The road to Rome: from crisis management to governing the EU" http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3433_en.htm
Remarks by Jean-Claude JUNCKER, President of the EC, at the joint press conference with Donald TUSK, European Council President, in Beijing, China http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2523_en.htm
Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the EP Plenary Session on the review of the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the EU http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2412_en.htm
Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Annual General Meeting of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-2293_en.htm
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