

# The change in Yitzhak Rabin

Researching possible changes in Rabin's Leadership Style and implications for  
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict



**Universiteit Leiden**

Bachelor Thesis: International Relations and Organisations  
Project: Political Leaders in International Relations

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Word count: 7899  
Date: 18-06-2018

## **Introduction**

On 4 November 1995 Yitzhak Rabin was shot death in Tel Aviv (Inbar, 1997). He was attending a mass rally supporting his peace policies. His funeral was attended by many heads of state, including Bill Clinton and Jacques Chirac, but also heads of state from Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Qatar and Mauritania (Inbar, 1997). This shows the impact Rabin made in and outside the Middle East. Rabin was the one that initiated the peace negotiations which resulted in the Oslo Accords and, consequently, made the first step towards peace between Israel and the Palestinians (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). However, this would have been unthinkable during his first term as prime minister of Israel since Rabin seemed to be a hardliner to whom national security seemed to be more important than peace (Shlaim, 1994). Besides that, he stated that he would never negotiate with the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), with which he eventually made an agreement after all (Shlaim, 1994). Because of these changes in attitude and policies towards Palestinians and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a question arises: what caused these changes? Could this have been a consequence of a personality change resulting in a change in leadership style? This research will try to determine Rabin's leadership style and whether or not this leadership style changed over time by using Hermann's Leadership Trait Analysis.

## **Literature review**

The conflict between Israel and Palestine is rooted in the Zionist claims to the territory that was inhabited by Palestinian Arabs (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Gelvin, 2014). In the 19th century anti-Semitic sentiments were very high and the Jewish people were divided across many different states. This gave rise to the idea of creating a Jewish state. During World War II, especially after the Holocaust, many American Jews became supporters of a Jewish state in Palestine (Gelvin, 2014; Gregory & Ferry, 2012). The United States backed the idea of creating a Jewish state. Many Jewish volunteers joined the British forces in their fight against Germany and obtained military knowledge and skills (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). Meanwhile these Jewish volunteers tried to sabotage the British control over Palestine with coordinated attacks on British personnel in Palestine. This led to the recognition that Britain had lost control over Palestine and therefore Britain referred the matter to the United Nations (UN). To solve the problem of Palestine and that of the refugees from Europe, the UN decided to divide Palestine in two parts: a Jewish state and an Arab state. The Palestinian Arabs rejected this idea, the Jewish community in Palestine supported it (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Gelvin, 2014; Gregory & Ferry, 2012). Britain decided the end of its mandate

in Palestine in 1947 and left the Palestinian Arabs without any effective leadership (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Gelvin, 2014; Gregory & Ferry, 2012). In the meantime, Jewish forces tried to secure the territory that the UN designated to them. Most of that territory was inhabited by Arabs. The Arab inhabitants tried to resist but because they were without any effective leadership, they were no match for the well-organized Jewish forces (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Gregory & Ferry, 2012). Many people were killed in these clashes, especially Arabs, which caused more than 400.000 Arabs to flee (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). On May 15th 1948 Egypt, Syria, Transjordan and Iraq invaded Israel but they were defeated by the Jewish forces (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Gelvin, 2014; Gregory & Ferry, 2012). Thus these events led to the creation of the Jewish state Israel, the flee of, eventually, hundreds of thousand Arab Palestinians and an ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine.

In the field of international politics the focus is often on structural causes. International politics is, according to many scholars, shaped by, for example, institutional dynamics, the anarchic system and domestic politics. As illustrated above, the causes and the continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are normally explained by structural factors. World War II, the support of the US for a Jewish state, the lack of unity and effective leadership among the Palestinian Arabs and the lack of British control over their mandate in Palestine are all structural factors. The role that individuals play in international politics or events is often marginalized or not even considered at all (Byman & Pollack, 2001). However individual leaders can play an important role in shaping state intentions and state intentions are a critical factor in international relations (Byman & Pollack, 2001). There are political leaders that are insensitive to information unless it might help to spread their own views. There are leaders that look at their environment to decide what to do and thus they are open to information. Other leaders are using a more strategic approach. They know what they want, but they will take incremental steps and they check whether or not the timing is right (Hermann & Hagan, 1998). Hitler is an example of a political leader that is insensitive to information. After World War I. Britain, France and Germany as well did not want to go to war, despite their differences. Thus, a new war could have been avoided. However, Hitler decided to invade Poland which marked the beginning of the Second World War (Byman & Pollack, 2001). Without Hitler the war probably would have been avoided, which illustrates the way leaders can shape state intentions and play a critical factor in international relations.

Yitzhak Rabin is a good example of the important role political leaders can play in international relations. In his second term as prime minister of Israel from 1992-1995, he played a major role in the realization of the Oslo accords and, consequently, in the first big step towards peace between Israel and Palestine. Rabin initiated the peace negotiations that have led to the Oslo I accord, which was an interim agreement created to make the real peace negotiations possible (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Shlaim, 1994). Oslo I includes the mutual recognition between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel in which Israel acknowledged the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the PLO recognizes the right of Israel to live in peace and security, promised to renounce terror and violence and removed the clauses of the PLO charter in which it called for the elimination of Israel (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). Another agreement in the accord was a five-year plan in which the Palestinian people would be gradually provided with autonomy over the occupied territories (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Shlaim, 1994). Oslo II includes the stages of the military redeployment of Israel of the West Bank and transferring power to Palestinian civil authority (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Shlaim, 1994). Oslo II was signed in 1994 (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). Thus, Yitzhak Rabin initiated and negotiated an important step towards peace between Israel and Palestine before he was murdered in 1995 (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013).

However, this scenario would have been unthinkable during his first term as Israeli prime minister in 1974-1977. Rabin has spent most of his life serving Israeli defense forces (Crichlow, 1998). When he was a teen he served the Palmach, which were the shock troops of the Haganah which served as defense forces to protect the Jewish community in Palestine before the creation of the Israeli state (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). Later he served the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as a general as well. He played a huge role in the Six Day War as general of the IDF (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013; Crichlow, 1998) and he also fought in the War of Independence (Ziv, 2011). Therefore, he personally had a deep commitment to the national security (Crichlow, 1998). This was visible in his political career with his call for more arms and the commitment to national security and strength (Crichlow, 1998; Inbar, 1997). He was seen as a hardliner. Which is illustrated by the fact that as a defense minister he had to react to the eruption of the first Intifada and applied the strategy of 'breaking bones' to young stone throwers (Sicherman, 2011). For Rabin, Israeli national security seemed more important than peace. He had stated before that he would never negotiate with the PLO and

even during the peace negotiations he deported 400 Palestinians from (mostly) Hamas for the murder on an Israeli border policeman (Shlaim, 1994).

It is clear that Rabin played a major role in the peace negotiations with the PLO in his second term as prime minister. But what caused the change Rabin made in policies regarding Palestinians and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? During his second term the international arena looked different than during his first term. The United States, which is a close ally of Israel, emerged as a superpower and the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East declined because of its collapse (Inbar, 1997). Therefore, Israel's enemies did not pose as much of a threat as they did before, since they missed the Soviet Union's military support (Inbar, 1997). The Eastern European states and Third World countries as China and India started to establish diplomatic relations with Israel (Inbar, 1997). This meant that Israel's isolation declined and its position in the international arena improved (Inbar, 1997). Consequently, the Israeli government could afford looking at other things than just strategies to defend Israel. Since the United States emerged as a superpower and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Israel's value as a strategic asset in countering the influence of the Soviet Union became an open question (Inbar 1997, Rynhold, 2007). Therefore, the United States were able to put pressure on Israel to move towards peace negotiations (Inbar, 1997; Rynhold, 2007). The public opinion in Israel started to change as well (Lieberfeld, 2007; Mor, 1997). In Rabin's first term as prime minister most Israelis did not support any peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO and Palestinians (Mor, 1997). However, in his second term half of the Israelis supported peace negotiations and the majority of the people that did not support these negotiations stated that they would support the negotiations if specified conditions were set (Mor, 1997). Thus, between Rabin's first and second term many structural circumstances changed. the balance of power within the international arena shifted and the Israeli public opinion changed. These are structural factors that might have had an influence on Rabin's change in policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Although these structural factors may have had influence on Rabin's choice to initiate the peace negotiations, his personality and leadership style probably played a role as well. In Rabin's earlier years and his first term as a prime minister he believed that 'time was on Israel's side' (Inbar, 1997). However, in the last years of his life he started to believe that Israel 'no longer had much time at its disposal' (Inbar, 1997). He started advocating for peace and he felt an urgency to use the 'window of opportunity' to reach agreements between Israel

and its enemies before the window would close (Inbar, 1997). This is in line with the ideas of Post, which state that a leader's personality might change over time (Post, 2004). During life a leader goes through different life stages and transitions in which his personality possibly changes and every stage and transition has different characteristics. For example, leaders in their middle adulthood are more likely to take major life decisions and leaders within their late adulthood will probably feel a sense of urgency because of the limited time they have left (Post's theory will be explained in more detail later on). These changes seem to have occurred regarding Rabin, which suggests a change in his leadership style and policies.

This illustrates why individual personalities should be taken into account when conducting research in the field of international relations. Although structural causes, of course, play an important role in shaping international politics, the influence of the individual should be considered as well (Byman & Pollack, 2001). Especially during an international crisis, when there is little time for decision making, authority concentrates among the people or groups that are responsible for keeping the government in power (Hermann & Hagan, 1998).

Leaders' perceptions and interpretations influence or determine, at least partly, government orientations and strategies (Hermann & Hagan, 1998). Their leadership styles determine the way leaders perceive and interpret situations and circumstances (Hermann, 2005). Who is in charge does matter. Before Rabin started his second term, Shamir was Israel's prime minister (Lieberfeld, 2007). The international community tried to move Israel, the Palestinians and other Arab countries towards peace in the Madrid Conference of 1991 (Lieberfeld, 2007). However, Shamir only participated reluctantly and admitted later on that he had not been interested in making progress within these negotiations (Lieberfeld, 2007). This shows how political leaders can affect international relations. Shamir had not been interested in making the peace negotiations work and therefore he did not put much effort into it (Lieberfeld, 2007). However, Rabin, in his second term as prime minister was determined to make progress and let the peace negotiations succeed. Thus, when a leader decides whether or not a certain issue is important and whether or not he should act on it, influences the outcome of this issue which in turn influences international relations.

Rabin is seen as a hawk (Shlaim, 1994; Ziv, 2011), a hardliner (Shlaim, 1994) and a pragmatist (Ziv, 2011). Rabin's operational code has been examined (Crichlow, 1998) but his leadership style and traits have not been determined before. Hermann created a research method with which it is possible to determine the leadership style of political leaders even

without their cooperation. She created an 'at-a-distance' research method by analyzing content of what political leaders say in interviews (Hermann, 2005). Interviews are used (and not speeches) because interviews are more spontaneous. Leaders have to respond quickly and use their own words. By analyzing these interviews it is possible to determine seven personality traits which answer the three questions to determine the leadership style of a political leader (Hermann, 2005). These questions are: "how do political leaders respond to political constraints in their environment? How open are leaders to incoming information? And what are leaders' reason for seeking their positions (Hermann, 2005, pp.181-182)?" By answering these questions it is possible to construct a profile and determine what kind of leadership style a political leader has. This profile can then be placed into context (Hermann, 2005). Although Hermann's LTA can determine which leadership style a leader has, it does not examine whether or not a leader's leadership style might change over time. Within the LTA a leadership style is mostly considered as stable and something that doesn't change (Hermann, 2005; Hogan et al, 1997), which will be explained in more detail later. However, Rabin's change from hardliner to initiating peace negotiations implies that there might have been a change in his leadership style. To research whether or not Rabin's leadership style has changed, it is necessary to determine his leadership style during his first term as a prime minister and use this as a baseline which, then, makes it possible to determine whether or not his leadership style had changed when he became prime minister for the second time. This leads to the following research question:

*Which leadership style does Yitzhak Rabin have and to what extent did his leadership style change over time?*

### **Theoretical framework**

As mentioned before, Hermann created an 'at-a-distance' method to determine leadership styles of leaders without needing their cooperation. She analyzes content, preferably interviews, to determine their leadership style. Leadership style, as defined by Hermann, "means the ways in which leaders relate to those around them - whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders - and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules and principles they use to guide such interactions." To determine a leadership style three questions have to be answered. First, how do leaders react to political constraints in their environment - do they respect or challenge such constraints? Second, how open are leaders to incoming information - do they selectively use information or are they open to information directing

their response? Third, what are leaders' reason for seeking their positions - are they driven by an internal focus of attention within themselves or by the relationships that can be formed with salient constituents? When the answers to these questions are combined a particular leadership style can be determined. Hermann has found seven traits that provide information which make it possible to determine the leadership style of a leader. The first two traits are the belief that one can influence or control what happens and the need for power. These traits say something about whether or not a leader will respect or challenge constraints they perceive. The following to traits, conceptual complexity and self-confidence are helpful to determine how open a leader is to information. The last traits, the tendency to prefer problem-solving functions to those involving group maintenance, in-group bias and distrust of others, are relevant to establish leaders' motives.

Johnson states that personality traits are stable (Hogan et al, 1997). Differences in behavior of people can be explained by their traits. For example, if behavioral changes occur this can be explained by how responsive a person is to situations. A change in behavior is, thus, a consequence of their personality. Therefore, changes of behavior don't mean that there are changes in in a person's personality traits (Hogan et al, 1997). Hermann suggests the same in her explanation of the LTA. For example, she mentions that "changes or differences in scores across contextual categories usually suggest that a leader is highly sensitive to the situation (Hermann, 2005, p.208)." These leaders might change their behavior, but these changes occur because sensitivity to situations is part of leader's personality and leadership style. Not because of a change in personality (Hermann, 2005). Other literature on the LTA implies stability of leadership traits and leadership styles as well. Most literature is focused on a comparison between different leaders and their traits or on the implications of a leaders' personality on policy. Görener & Ucal did research on the personality and leadership style of Erdogan and its implications on Turkish Foreign policy in which they used data of a 5-year period to determine his traits and leadership style but they did not look at changes of these traits that might have occurred during this period (Görener & Ucal, 2011). The same goes for the research of Hermann on the leadership style of Clinton and the implications on advisory systems and policy making and Keller's research on the implications of leaders' personalities within different regime types on peace (Hermann, 1994; Keller, 2005). Therefore, the first expectation of this research is that Rabin's traits and leadership style did not change and that his change in behavior and the change in policy towards the Palestinians and the Palestinian-



Israeli conflict can be possibly explained by his (unchanged) leadership style, which would mean he possesses traits that make him sensitive to (changing) structural factors and context.

According to Winter, personalities do operate in a certain context or situation which influences their behavior but does not affect their traits (Winter, 2005). This is in line with the ideas of the researchers mentioned above. However, Winter also argues that context shapes a person's personality and traits. Personalities are formed by their environment and experiences. Things as religion, race, nationality, wealth and gender shape a person's personality and personality traits (Winter, 2005). Once these personalities or personality traits are formed they are more or less stable (Winter, 2005). This is in line with Post (2004) and his theory on the effect age and aging on a leader's personality. According to Post, there are four life stages which are: childhood and adolescence, young adulthood, middle adulthood and late adulthood (Post, 2004). Further, there are three transition phases in which a person transitions from one phase in his or her life to another. Within the first transition, young adult transition, a person obtains its identity. This identity is influenced by the political circumstances at that time and the psychological development (Post, 2004). Political events occurring at the time of personality development can determine a person's key attitudes and perceptions which are then fixed within their personality structure (Post, 2004). Within the transition from young adulthood to middle adulthood a person gets an intensified need of self-actualization and restlessness which leads to major life decisions and actions (Post, 2004). Within the late adult transition a person obtains a sense of urgency because of the limited time they might have left. This leads to the intensification of "long-standing personality patterns and preexisting attitudes (Post, 2004)". Thus, personalities are not stable and they change over time. This leads to the second expectation of this research: Rabin's traits and leadership style did change. Therefore his change in behavior and change in policy towards Palestinians and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can, at least partly, be explained by the change in traits and leadership style of Rabin.

Post's ideas provide a framework which make it possible to determine whether or not a leader's leadership style change and why changes occur. When Rabin became prime minister for the first time he was 52 years old and when he became prime minister for the second time he was 70, which means he was in a different life stages during these two different periods. The first period he was prime minister, from 1974-1977, he was in his middle adulthood, which is between 40 to 65 years old (Post, 2004). The second time he was prime minister,

from 1992-1995, he was in his late adulthood, which starts at 65 (Post, 2004). As noted before persons in their middle adulthood are more likely to take major life decisions and actions because of their need of self-actualization (Post, 2004). Persons that are in their late adulthood obtain a 'sense of urgency' (Post, 2004). They become aware of potential losses, health risks and dangers of every-day life, which results in reduced perceived control (Kandler et al, 2015). They also become more selective regarding social relationships and activities and their openness to experiences reduce (Kandler et al, 2015). Thus, age or ageing can play a role in changes in personalities and traits.

### **Research design**

The research question " *Which leadership style does Yitzhak Rabin have and to what extent did his leadership style change over time?*" will be answered by a quantitative content analysis that is based on Hermann's Leadership Trait Analysis. As argued before, political leaders can play a major role in international relations. Rabin is chosen as a case because his policies regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have changed dramatically. In his first term as a prime minister committed himself to Israel's national security in which military deterrence played a major role (Inbar, 1997). He seemed more interested in national security than peace and he stated that he would never negotiate with the PLO. However, in his second term as a prime minister he was the one that initiated the peace negotiations. By doing research on the possible change in leadership style of Rabin, it is possible to determine whether or not this change has led to a change in policy. Consequently, if there is a change in leadership style this will illustrate the importance of political leaders in international relations.

By using an independent samples T-test it will be possible to determine if any changes occurred between Rabin's traits between different periods and whether or not these changes are statistically significant. To determine Rabin's scores on the different traits ProfilerPlus will be used, which is a program that with computerized coding systems. ProfilerPlus can be used for different kinds of content analysis, including the LTA, which is used for this research. The advantage of a computerized content analysis is that it is completely impartial (Bligh et al, 2004). For every interview of every leader the same coding scheme is used (Bligh et al, 2004). Therefore, by using ProfilerPlus to analyze Rabin's interviews and to determine his leadership style, a researcher-bias is avoided (Bligh et al, 2004). The operationalization of the different traits can be found in table 1

To assess whether or not changes in Rabin's leadership style occurred Rabin's verbal output in interviews will be analyzed. Interviews are preferred over speeches because interviews are more spontaneous (Görener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2005). Interviews consist of questions that are asked on the spot and the person answering the questions has to respond quickly (Dyson, 2006; Görener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2005). Although leaders might be prepared for the kind of questions they might get, they are on their own during an interview and without any aid. Therefore interviews are relatively spontaneous (Görener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2005). Speeches on the other hand are often written by speech-writers or staff members and well-prepared (Görener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2005). Since the aim of this research is to determine Rabin's leadership style, the material used here are interviews to avoid the possibility of determining traits of speech-writers or staff members when using speeches (Dyson, 2006; Görener & Ucal, 2011; Hermann, 2005).

Interviews from two different phases will be used. These phases are chosen because in both phases Rabin served as the Israeli prime minister, which makes sure that other factors such as role change did not have influence on Rabin's change in policies regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. By comparing phase 1 to phase 2 it is possible to determine whether or not changes have occurred regarding Rabin's traits and leadership style during a period of twenty-one years. For both periods Rabin's traits will be determined.

### **Phase 1 (n = 30): 1974-1977**

Within this period Rabin served as the Israeli prime minister for the first time

### **Phase 2 (n = 25): 1992-1995**

In this period Rabin served as the Israeli prime minister for the second time.

The interviews come from a variety of news sources and cover a variety of topics. Interviews from Israeli, American, English, German, Lebanese and even Palestinian news sources are used. The interviews cover different topics, although most interviews are focused on foreign policy which might cause a bias (Hermann, 2005). However, the interviews that are used are all interviews that were digitally available in English with a full transcript. Thus there are no other interviews available that cover a broader range of topics. By including all digitally available interviews in English with a full transcript, a sampling-bias is avoided. To make sure all interviews were included Google and Factiva were used to search for these

interviews. Factiva is a global news database of nearly 33,000 sources that are not available on the free web. To determine the leadership style of a political leader a minimum of 5000 words and 50 interviews responses are needed to develop an adequate assessment of a leadership style (Hermann, 2005). However, using more words and interview responses results in an increasing confidence in a leader's leadership style profile (Hermann, 2005). In this research 82874 words are used and 55 interviews, which much more than the minimum that is needed. To determine Rabin's leadership style in the first period, 30 interviews are used and 49818 words. To determine his leadership style in the second period, 25 interviews and 33057 words are used. Some of these interview transcripts are translated to English. However, the distortion effect that might occur while using translated material is found to minimal (Görener & Ucal, 2011).

**Table 1**

<b>Trait</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Operationalization</b>
<b>Belief ability to control events</b>	Degree of control the author perceives over the situation he is in, the perception he can influence what happens	Verbs that indicate people taking responsibility for planning or initiating actions. Actions proposed or taken by the author indicates belief in control over events
<b>Need for power</b>	Degree of the author's concern for establishing, maintaining or restoring one's power. The desire to control, influence or have an impact.	Verbs where the author (1) engages in a strong, forceful action, (2) gives unasked advice, (3) attempts to regulate someone else's behavior, (4) tries to persuade, bribe, argue, (5) endeavors to impress or gain fame with an action, (6) is concerned with his reputation or position.
<b>Self-confidence</b>	The author's sense of self-importance or image of his ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the environment	The pronouns my, myself, I, me and mine. When the pronoun reflects the speaker is instigating an activity, should be viewed as an authority figure or is the recipient of a positive response, self-confidence is indicated.
<b>Conceptual complexity</b>	Degree of differentiation which the author shows in describing or discussing other people, places, ideas, policies or things	Words that suggest the author can see different dimensions in the environment and words that indicate the author sees only a few categories along which to classify objects and ideas. High score: approximately, possibility, trend and for example. Low score: absolutely, without a doubt, certainly and irreversible.
<b>Task focus</b>	The author's relative emphasis on interactions with others when dealing with problems as opposed to focusing on the feelings and needs of relevant and important constituents.	Words that indicate work on a task, as well as words that center around concern for another's feelings. Task-oriented: achievement, plan, position, recommendation. Group-maintenance: appreciation, amnesty, collaboration, disappointment.
<b>In-group bias</b>	View of the world in which one's own group holds center stage, is perceived as the best and there is a strong emotional attachment to this in-group	references to the author's own group that are favorable (great, prosperous, successful), suggest strength (powerful, capable) or indicate the need to maintain the group honor and identity (decide our own policies).
<b>Distrust of others</b>	Wariness about others or the degree of the author's inclination to suspect the motives and actions of others.	References to persons other than the leader and to groups other than those with which the leader identifies, that convey distrust, doubts, misgivings or concern.

*Note: Operationalization based on Hermann's LTA, done by ProfilerPlus. Source: [www.profilerplus.org](http://www.profilerplus.org)*

## Rabin's leadership style

To determine Rabin's leadership style, trait scores from the first period will be used as a baseline. These scores are obtained through ProfilerPlus and they are based on interviews given in the period 1974-1977. Hermann provided a reference group with traits scores of 122 political leaders which makes it possible to determine if Rabin's trait scores are low, average or high. By examining these trait scores it is possible to determine Rabin's responsiveness to constraints, openness to information and motivation to seek office (Hermann, 2005). First all Rabin's trait scores will be discussed and the trait combinations will be determined. Further his leadership will be determined. Next, Rabin's possible change in leadership style will be discussed.

**Table 2: Rabin's trait scores**

Trait	Phase 1: 1974-1977		Phase 2: 1992-1995		
<b>Belief ability to control events</b>	0.27	Low	<b>0.32</b> <b>(-2,19**)</b>	Low	Mean = 0.45 Low < 0.33 High > 0.57
<b>Need for power</b>	0.26	Low	0.29 (-1,28)	Low	Mean = 0.50 Low < 0.38 High > 0.62
<b>Self-confidence</b>	0.62	Average	<b>0.48</b> <b>(3,04**)</b>	Average	Mean = 0.57 Low < 0.34 High > 0.80
<b>Conceptual complexity</b>	0.59	High	0.59 (0,07)	High	Mean = 0.45 Low < 0.32 High > 0.58
<b>Task focus</b>	0.68	Average	0.63 (1,53)	Average	Mean = 0.62 Low < 0.48 High > 0.76
<b>In-group bias</b>	0.14	Low	0.22 (-1,78)	Low	Mean = 0.43 Low < 0.34 High > 0.53
<b>Distrust of others</b>	0.15	Low	0.13 (0,49)	Low	Mean = 0.38 Low < 0.20 High > 0.56

*Note: the bold data indicates significant results. Values in parantheses are t-statistics for change from previous phase. \* $p \leq 0,10$  \*\* $p \leq 0,05$ . Source: Hermann (2005), in Post, J. (2005). Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, chapter 8, p. 204*

### **Respect or challenge constraints?**

#### *Belief in one's own ability to control events*

Rabin's score in phase 1 is 0.27, which is low when compared to the reference group. Thus, Rabin does not believe that he is able to have a lot of control over events. Leaders who score low on this trait tend to be more reactive to situations (Hermann, 2005). Since they don't believe they have a lot of influence on events they wait for events to happen and then act on it

(Hermann, 2005). They are less likely to take initiatives and are willing to delegate authority. They prefer others to take responsibility (Hermann, 2005). Consequently, when something does not go as planned they are able to blame others and don't take responsibility (Hermann, 2005). Political leaders who score low on this trait are often afraid to fail (Hermann, 2005). In phase 2 his score is 0.32, which is statistically significant. However, this is still a low score on this trait. Thus, Rabin scores low on the belief in one's own ability to control events in both phases, which means this trait did not change.

### *Need for power*

Rabin scores low on the need for power as well. His trait score is 0.26, which is low compared to the reference group. The need for power indicates a desire to have an impact on other persons or groups (Hermann, 2005). Leaders that score low on this trait are ok with sharing power with others. They don't have to be in charge and they accept credits for what happens given to others (Hermann, 2005). They have the group interests in mind, what is in the interest of the group is in their interest as well (Hermann, 2005). They tend to have a positive effect on the group morale, which creates a sense of team spirit. They treat everybody the same and judge on basis of the group norms rather than on the basis of which person it is (Hermann, 2005). These leaders have a sense of justice. They aim to build a relationship of trust and shared responsibility with their followers (Hermann, 2005). Thus, leaders with a low need for power become an agent for the group and represent their interests (Hermann, 2005). Rabin's score in phase 2 does not significantly change, which means that this trait remains stable. Thus, in both phases his need for power is low.

Rabin scores low on the belief of one's own ability to control events and the need for power, in both phases. Leaders who score low on both traits tend to respect constraints and try to work within the space they do have to reach their goals (Hermann, 2005). They are able to build consensus and reach compromises (Hermann, 2005).

### *Openness to contextual information*

#### *Self-confidence*

Leaders whose self-confidence is high are less affected by incoming information from their environment than leaders with low self-confidence (Hermann, 2005). They are generally sure of themselves and are not looking for ways to evaluate themselves and their behavior. Consequently, new information will be ignored or 'filtered and reinterpreted based on their

high self-worth' (Hermann, 2005). However, leaders with low self-confidence are likely to adapt to the situation. They tend to look at the context and seek information from the environment in order to know what decisions to make. Outside information is crucial for these leaders to determine what to do or how to act (Hermann, 2005). Rabin's score on self-confidence in phase 1 is 0.62, which is an average score compared to other political leaders. This means that Rabin probably has a mix of these characteristics. In Phase 2 Rabin scores 0.48, which is a statistically significant change. However, 0.48 is an average score as well. Therefore, his score on self-confidence remains average.

### *Conceptual Complexity*

Conceptual Complexity is the degree of differentiation a leader shows in describing the environment (Hermann, 2005). Rabin scores high on this trait. He scored 0.59 in both phases which is high compared to other political leaders. Leaders with a high conceptual complexity do not see situations and their environment as black and white but tend to see issues as gray (Hermann, 2005). They are able to see a variety of perspectives to a single situation. Therefore, it is necessary for these leaders to gather a lot of information and different perspectives in order to decide what to do (Hermann, 2005). They take their time to come to a decision as well and tend to involve many actors in the decision-making process (Hermann, 2005).

When a leader's complexity is higher than his self-confidence this means that this leader is likely to be open to contextual information (Hermann, 2005). These types of leaders are often pragmatic and seem to be responsive to the interests and ideas of others. They try to obtain as much contextual information as possible and involve others in the decision-making process (Hermann, 2005). They tend to look at issues and events case by case and decide what to do based on the available information (Hermann, 2005).

### ***Motivation by problems or by relationships?***

#### *Task focus*

Rabin scores 0.68 on task focus in phase 1, which is average compared to other political leaders. Task focus is about whether a leader is focused on completing tasks and solving the problem or is he focused on building relationships (Hermann, 2005). When a leader scores high on task focus it means that he is focused on problem solving. This means that his goal is to move the group towards a goal or solution (Hermann, 2005). When a leader scores low on



task focus, his focus is on the maintaining and establishing relationships, keeping the loyalty of constituents and high morale (Hermann, 2005). However, Rabin's score on task focus is average which means that he is focused on both, problem solving and building relationships, depending on the context (Hermann, 2005). Rabin's score did not significantly change in phase 2, which means that his trait remains stable during both phases.

### *In-group bias*

Rabin scores 0.14 in phase 1 on in-group bias, which is low compared to the reference group of political leaders. His score in phase 2 does not significantly change. Leaders that score low on in-group bias are 'patriots interested in the maintenance of their group as separate entity' as well as leaders who score high on in-group bias (Hermann, 2005). However, they are less likely to see the world in categories as 'we' and 'them'. They don't see the world as black and white. They tend to deal with domestic opposition through interaction and positive gestures instead of using scapegoats (Hermann, 2005).

### *Distrust of others*

Distrust of others is about 'a general feeling of doubt, uneasiness, misgiving and wariness about others' (Hermann, 2005). Leaders who score high on this trait question the motives and actions of other, especially when the other person is seen as a rival (Hermann, 2005).

However, Rabin's score on distrust of others is low. He scored 0.15 in phase 1, which is low compared to other political leaders. Leaders that score low on this trait might be wary of others in certain situations but they are able to put it into perspective. For these leaders (dis)trust of others is based on past experiences and current situations (Hermann, 2005). In phase 2 his trait remains stable because there is no significant change in his trait scores.

Regarding motivation, two types of motivation can be distinguished. First, the reason for seeking office, which can be determined by looking at task focus or interpersonal focus. Second, motivation towards the world: is a leader driven by threats and problems or by opportunities and cooperative relationships (Hermann, 2005). Motivation towards the world can be determined by combining distrust of others and in-group bias (Hermann, 2005). Rabin scored average on task focus which means that his reason for seeking office is problem solving and building relationships depending in the context (Hermann, 2005). He scored low on distrust of others and in-group bias, which means that his focus is on taking advantage of opportunities and relationships. Problems and conflicts are seen as context-specific (Hermann,

2005). Leaders that score low on both traits see problems as constraints which every state has and has to deal with (Hermann, 2005).

### **Leadership style**

Now that Rabin's traits and their implications are determined, it is possible to determine which leadership style Rabin has. The trait combination of belief in one own's capability to control events and the need for power suggests that Rabin respects constraints (Hermann, 2005). The trait combination of self-confidence and conceptual complexity implies that Rabin open is to contextual information (Hermann, 2005). Rabin's scores on task focus, in-group bias and distrust of others show that he is focused on both, problems and relationships (Hermann, 2005). Consequently, Rabin has a mixed leadership style, as can be seen in table 3 (Hermann, 2005). His leadership style is a mix of an opportunistic leader and a collegial leader. Thus, Rabin's focus of attention is on assessing what is possible within the context and current situation and look at which goals are possible to achieve considering the constraints. Further he focuses on creating consensus and gaining prestige by empowering others and sharing responsibility. Because there were hardly any changes regarding Rabin's leadership traits, his leadership style remained unchanged. Thus, during his first term as a prime minister and his second term, Rabin had a mixed leadership style.

**Table 3**

**Motivation**

<b>Responsiveness to Constraints</b>	<b>Openness to Information</b>	<b>Problem Focus</b>	<b>Relationship Focus</b>
Challenges constraints	Closed to information	<i>Expansionistic</i> (Focus of attention is on expanding leader's, government's and state's span of control)	<i>Evangelistic</i> (Focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one's mission, in mobilizing others around one's message)
Challenges constraints	Open to information	<i>Actively Independent</i> (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's maneuverability and independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both)	<i>Directive</i> (Focus of attention is on maintaining one's own and the government's status and acceptance by others by engaging in actions on the world stage that enhance the state's reputation)
Respects constraints	Closed to information	<i>Incremental</i> (Focus of attention is on improving state's economy and/or security in incremental steps while avoiding the obstacles that will inevitably arise along the way)	<i>Influential</i> (Focus of attention is on building cooperative relationships with other governments and states in order to play a leadership role; by working with others, one can gain more than is possible on one's own)
Respects constraints	Open to information	<i>Opportunistic</i> (Focus of attention is on assessing what is possible in the current situation and context given what one wants to achieve and considering what important constituencies will allow)	<i>Collegial.</i> (Focus of attention is on reconciling differences and building consensus— on gaining prestige and status through empowering others and sharing accountability)

Source: Hermann (2005), in Post, J. (2005). *Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton*, chapter 8, p. 185

### **Implications of Rabin's leadership style**

Although the leadership style of Rabin did not change over time, his leadership style did seem to have had influence on the change in policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as well as the structural factors mentioned before. Hermann argues that changes can occur because of a leader's sensitivity to context and events, which is part of a leader's leadership style (Hermann, 2005). This is visible when looking at Rabin's leadership style and traits. His openness to contextual information probably made him sensitive to pressure from the United States to move towards peace and the changing public opinion. Israel's position in the international arena improved and there was less of a threat during Rabin's second term as prime minister. Rabin is a leader that respects constraints. However these constraints declined which Rabin probably saw as a window of opportunity that he needed to use. The mix of leadership styles Rabin possesses ensures that he is focused on solving problems and building and maintaining relationships. By initiating peace negotiations and reaching an agreement he did both at the same time. Establishing peace with the Palestinians and other Arab countries decreases the threats posed on Israel. Further these negotiations are a way of maintaining the relationship with the United States who pushed Israel to move towards peace, improve the relationship with the Israeli citizens and to build a relationship with the Palestinians and other Arab countries.

### **Conclusion**

Rabin seemed to have changed from a hardliner, who committed himself to the national security of Israel, which seemed more important to him than peace, and who states to never negotiate with the PLO to the one that initiated the peace negotiations between Israel, the Palestinians and other Arab states and reached an agreement with the PLO and the other parties involved. This change suggested that, over time, there might have been a change in the leadership style of Rabin. A possible explanation of this expected change is the effect of age on the personality of a leader. Post argues that personalities change over time and that different life stages have different characteristics which shape those personalities. On the other hand, there are researchers that claim that personality traits remain stable over time. This research aimed to determine the possible change in leadership style of Rabin and look at its implications.

To determine Rabin's leadership style and whether or not any changes occurred, the Leadership Trait Analysis of Hermann is used. His leadership style during his first term as an

Israeli prime minister (1974-1977) was determined first and is used as a baseline. After that the leadership style of Rabin during his second term as prime minister was determined. These results show that Rabin's leadership traits did not change between those two phases and, consequently, his leadership style remained the same during his two terms as Israel's prime minister. Further, the results show that Rabin has a mixed leadership style that focuses on both, problem solving and building and maintaining relationships

This suggests that structural factors played a major role regarding the change in policy made by Rabin. The improved position in the international arena, the change in Israel's public opinion and the pressure of the United States on Rabin to move Israel towards peace have led Rabin to make this change. However the leadership style of Rabin has probably had a lot of influence as well. As explained before, because of Rabin's openness to contextual information he was probably sensitive to the pressure of the United States and the changed public opinion in Israel. His respect for constraints has probably prevented him from negotiating peace during his first term as prime minister, but during his second term Israel's position in the international arena had been improved, which led to a decrease in constraints. Rabin saw this as a window of opportunity that had to be used. By initiating peace negotiations and reaching an agreement, he was focusing on solving a problem, the Arab threat to Israel, while maintaining and building relationships, which matches his leadership style. If there was another leader in charge at this moment of time the outcome might have been very different. For example, before Rabin became prime minister for the second time in 1992, Shamir, his predecessor, was pressured by the United States and the international community to negotiate peace (Lieberfeld, 2007). However, he was not interested in making progress and did not really cooperate, which was a reason for the failure of the peace negotiations during the Madrid conference (Lieberfeld, 2007). This illustrates the importance of leaders in international relations and shows how much influence leaders can have. Therefore, the focus should not just be on structural factors and causes, but on individual leaders as well. Without considering the influence of leaders in international relations, not everything can be explained.

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Appendix

**Overview of interviews with Rabin that are used for his research**

Phase 1			Phase 2		
Date	Source	Word count	Date	Source	Word count
06.07.1974	Israel Television	1891	15.07.1992	Israel Television	1896
<b>26.07.1974</b>	Yediot Aharonot	3660	27.09.1992	Maariv	1353
<b>10.08.1974</b>	Israel Army Radio	1909	20.10.1992	Al-Hayat	3690
<b>16.09.1974</b>	Davar	3398	30.11.1992	Time Magazine	1532
<b>20.09.1974</b>	Israel Television	2137	14.12.1992	Israel Television	900
<b>07.10.1974</b>	Al Hamishmar	1827	07.02.1993	ABC Television	776
<b>25.10.1974</b>	Israel Television	835	19.02.1993	Die Welt	2192
<b>14.02.1975</b>	Israel Television	1433	30.03.1993	Israel Television	840
<b>20.02.1975</b>	Israel Radio	1396	31.05.1993	Defense News	935
<b>01.03.1975</b>	Washington Post	3132	10.06.1993	Al-Quds	3392
<b>01.04.1975</b>	Israel Television	1080	11.08.1993	Israel Television	885
<b>02.04.1975</b>	Israel Army Radio	1997	30.08.1993	Maariv	265
<b>01.05.1975</b>	Foreign Press Association Israel	450	25.10.1993	Israel Radio	736
<b>03.06.1975</b>	Israel Television	1447	15.11.1993	ABC Television	340
<b>14.06.1975</b>	News and World Report	775	15.11.1993	Macneil-Lehrer 'newshour'	1044
<b>16.06.1975</b>	CBS Television	612	09.06.1994	Israel Radio	853
<b>25.07.1975</b>	Israel Television	875	06.07.1994	Haaretz	1795
<b>22.08.1975</b>	Israel Television	1265	19.07.1994	IDF Radio	1125
<b>06.09.1975</b>	Israel Radio	3100	01.08.1994	Israel Radio	814
<b>07.09.1975</b>	ABC Television	1854	20.08.1994	Al Hayat	975
<b>09.09.1975</b>	BBC Television	1208	05.09.1994	Jerusalem Post	2374
<b>07.12.1975</b>		1559	22.11.1994	CNN	594
<b>12.01.1976</b>	CBS Television	747	25.05.1995	IDF Radio	832
<b>01.02.1976</b>	NBC Television	1868	25.05.1995	Israel Radio	699
<b>11.07.1976</b>	CBS Television	1825	01.11.1995	Yediot Aharonot	2219
<b>29.08.1976</b>	Israel Television	1587			
<b>30.08.1976</b>	News and World Report	2135			
<b>03.01.1977</b>	NBC Television	563			
<b>13.03.1977</b>	ABC Television	2157			
<b>20.03.1977</b>	Israel Radio	1096			



