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Franz Joseph utilised?

Why the concept of Kaisertreue in the Austro-Hungarian Empire should be reinterpreted from an anational and national perspective based on two Kaiserreisen to Galicia in 1880 and 1894

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By Niels J. Bakhuis

The image on the cover is of emperor Franz Joseph I. of Austria-Hungary (1830 (r. 1848) -1916) as he was presented on the front page of: *Die Neue Zeit* Nr. 197 (28-08-1880), 1. Used with permission from the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, see: HHStA Neuere Zeremonialakten (NZA) Karton 367.

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Abstract

Ever since Oscar Jászi's thesis on opposing centripetal versus centrifugal forces within the Austro-Hungarian empire, historians have perceived developments within the Dual Monarchy through a dichotomous lens without questioning this assumed mutual exclusivity. This has led to singular interpretations of imperial loyalty, *Kaisertreue*, as a purely centripetal, read imperial, force. While new studies have shown that the opposition between nationalism and imperial identity is much more complex and that in some cases they could be compatible and even mutually supportive, this has not led to a new interpretation of *Kaisertreue*. Through an analysis of the promotion of *Kaisertreue* during two imperial visits to Galicia in 1880 and 1894, this thesis argues that the ruling Polish conservatives nationalised dynastic loyalty in order to support their nationalist visions and policies for Galicia, while at the same time the Habsburg Court continued to promote an anational *Kaisertreue* based on the equality of all nations, languages, and cultures. This reinterpretation helps historians to better understand the complexities of imperial-nationalist dynamics and therefore offer better explanations of developments within Austria-Hungary.

Introduction

“Stets hat der Monarch unsere Aufgabe leichter gemacht, den Er gestattete es in fester und glänzender Weise, dem in uns gelegten Vertrauen zu entsprechen, ohne dass wir es nöthig hätten, den natürlichen Rechten und angeboren Gefühlen untreu zu werden und Er brachte das Alles in Einklang mit dem Wohle der Monarchie. Auf diese Art ermöglicht Er uns die Anknüpfung inniger, ja freundschaftlicher Verbindungen mit den andern Völkern Oesterreichs.”¹

This quote comes from a German edition of *CZAS*, a Polish conservative newspaper from west Galicia. Within this article, Anton Klobukowski, the chief editor, described why the Galician Poles were loyal to emperor-king Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary, also known as *Kaisertreue* in German.² In this specific part, the monarch is described as the protector of the rights of national cultures and languages, while simultaneously making it possible for them to feel connected with the other peoples of the Dual Monarchy. In other words, nationalism and dynastic loyalty were considered to be compatible and linked.

This is interesting, because ever since Oscar Jászi, a former Hungarian Minister of National Minorities and historian who emigrated to the United States, first wrote about how Austria-Hungary’s “centripetal forces of a supranational consciousness were more and more disintegrated by the centrifugal forces of national particularisms”³, historians have continued to characterise the Dual Monarchy’s history by these supposedly mutually exclusive forces and failed to question whether the assumption of this “inherent opposition between national consciousness and imperial loyalty” is correct.⁴

Perhaps the reason is that conceptual history, or *Begriffsgeschichte*, is not popular with historians, as they tend to consider historical research as studying that which is individual and specific, while leaving theory and concepts to social and natural scientists. However, studying concepts and defining them is important as they help to “experience and to interpret history, to represent or to recount it.”⁵ In the words of Reinhart Koselleck, one of the founders of conceptual history: “There can

¹ In: *CZAS* nr. 200. *Auszüge in deutscher Uebersetzung* (31-08-1880), 1. Found in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA) Vienna, Neuere Zeremonial Akten (NZA), Karton 367.

² Crone, C.L., *Casus Imperii: Enige Aspecten van de Ondergang der Dubbelmonarchie 1867-1918* (Universiteit van Amsterdam 2017), 118, 125.

³ Jászi, O, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, (Chicago 1929), 4.

⁴ Cole, L. and D.L. Unowsky, ‘Introduction. Imperial Loyalty and Popular Allegiances in the Late Habsburg Monarchy’, in: in: L. Cole and D.L. Unowsky (eds.), *The Limits of Loyalty. Imperial symbolism, popular allegiances, and state patriotism in the late Habsburg Monarchy* (New York 2007), 1-10, 2.

⁵ Koselleck, R., *The Practise of Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford 2002), 22-23.

be no history, no historical experience or interpretation, no representation or narrative without social formations and concepts by means of which [...] they define their challenges and seek to meet them.”⁶ How can one explain developments or events if one does not understand the concepts by which people, in the period under analysis, used to define the world around them? Conceptual history is about questioning the current interpretation of concepts, because “despite continual use of the same word, the political and social language has changed” over time.⁷ Moreover, based on the principle of ‘semasiology’, concepts can have different meanings at the same time.⁸ Begriffsgeschichte aims to “identify the social scope of concepts” and look at their influence on political and social groups.⁹ Therefore, conceptual history prescribes that in order to create a better interpretation of history, historians should “theoretically formulate in advance the temporal specifics”¹⁰ of political and social concepts in order to better interpret historical sources and to explain history.

As stated, within the historiography on nineteenth and twentieth century Austro-Hungarian history, scholar’s main assumption has been the opposing centripetal and centrifugal forces. Their focus has therefore mainly been on the increasing radicalisation of nationalism and the assumption of “a parallel diminishing of popular imperial loyalties”, such as Kaisertreue.¹¹ Nevertheless, new studies have shown that there was often an overlap in loyalties and identities within the empire, i.e. imperial and national loyalty are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Daniel Unowsky, for instance, shows that nationalist movements and dynastic loyalty could actually reinforce each other and in some cases even depended on each other for survival. According to him, the Galician elites used imperial loyalty and the monarchs personal popularity to legitimise their rule, while the Habsburg dynasty and their imperial state relied on elite loyalty and participation within the imperial institutions.¹² Moreover, another study by Peter Hának on Hungarian imperial and nationalist celebrations, concluded that there was a complex relationship between identities and loyalties. He argued that there was a national identity, in which the primary bonds were language and ethnicity, and a supranational identity, defined by loyalty to the dynasty and positive acceptance of the multinational empire. Markian Prokopovych defined this

⁶ Koselleck, R., ‘Social History and Begriffsgeschichte’, in: I. Hampsher-Monk, K. Tilmans, and F. van Vree (eds.), *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives* (Amsterdam 1998), 23-36, 25.

⁷ Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, 5.

⁸ Hampsher-Monk, I., K. Tilmans, and F. van Vree, ‘A Comparative Perspective on Conceptual History – An Introduction’, in: I. Hampsher-Monk, K. Tilmans, and F. van Vree (eds.), *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives* (Amsterdam 1998), 1-10, 2.

⁹ Bödecker, H.E., ‘Concept - Meaning – Discourse. Begriffsgeschichte reconsidered’, in: I. Hampsher-Monk, K. Tilmans, and F. van Vree (eds.), *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives* (Amsterdam 1998), 51-64, 51

¹⁰ Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, 4-5.

¹¹ Unowsky, D.L., ‘Celebrating Two Emperors and a Revolution. The Public Contest to Represent the Polish and Ruthenian Nations in 1880’, in: L. Cole and D.L. Unowsky (eds.), *The Limits of Loyalty. Imperial symbolism, popular allegiances, and state patriotism in the late Habsburg Monarchy* (New York 2007), 113-137, 113.

¹² Unowsky, D., ‘Dynastic Symbolism and Popular Patriotism. Monarchy and Dynasty in Late Imperial Austria’, in: J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen, *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen 2011), 237-165, 238.

relationship as people having one nationality, but multiple loyalties.¹³ With this in mind one can better explain the fact that during late Habsburg rule, nationalist confrontation coexisted with an unprecedented increase in official and popular manifestations of imperial loyalty.¹⁴

Consequently, historians' assumptions on the mutual exclusivity of imperial and national loyalties are false, or at least it is much more complex. As they have consistently identified *Kaisertreue* with the empire's centripetal forces, historians have only defined this concept from that perspective. Based on the semasiologic ideas of conceptual history in which concepts can have different meanings at the same time and the new studies that show that people could have different loyalties at the same time and that sometimes nationalism and imperial loyalty can be made compatible, this thesis argues that the concept of *Kaisertreue* should be revisited and be reinterpreted from an anational and national perspective. Based on the work of Ellen Comisso, this thesis will argue that in the case that national identity was compatible with imperial loyalty, *Kaisertreue* could be claimed by the nationalists to legitimise their 'national goals' by utilising it in a national narrative. Moreover, this nationalist interpretation did not necessarily oppose the 'classic' promotion of dynastic loyalty by the Habsburg Court. It could be mutually beneficial as long as elites and dynasty could cooperate and the nationalists had an interest in participating within the imperial framework.

In order to make this argument, this thesis shall focus on how the Habsburgs and nationalists exploited *Kaisertreue* for their own goals by analysing two *Kaiserreisen* to Galicia in 1880 and 1894. Galicia serves as an excellent case for this analysis, because it was one of the more recent additions to the Habsburg Monarchy and even though the political elite was initially considerably antagonistic towards Habsburg rule, by the end of the nineteenth century they were considered to be one of the pillars of the Cisleithanian half of the Dual Monarchy and among the most *Kaisertreu* of the emperor's subjects. On the other hand, the Poles were fiercely nationalistic and propagated the Polish language, heritage, and symbolism. The public celebrations could therefore be 'hijacked' with different agendas to the official promotion of the dynasty as the living embodiment of state unity.¹⁵

By describing the political motives and interests that were at stake both from the side of the Habsburg Court, the Cisleithanian government, and the Galicians, how these interests were made compatible within the *Kaiserreisen*, how the ceremonies were staged, and how the *Kaiserreisen* were politically interpreted, this thesis will point out that the participating parties had different interpretations of *Kaisertreue* and that historians should therefore revisit the concept in order to

¹³ Prokopovych, M., *Habsburg Lemberg. Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital, 1772-1914* (West Lafayette 2009), 39.

¹⁴ Cole, L., 'Differentiation of Indifference? Changing Perspectives on National Identification in the Austrian Half of the Habsburg Monarchy', in: M. van Ginderachter and M. Beyen (eds.), *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Basingstoke 2012), 96-119, 110.

¹⁵ Unowsky, 'Dynastic Symbolism and Popular Patriotism', 242.

better understand the dynamics between the imperial centre and the Crownlands in the Austro-Hungarian empire. The question of this research therefore is: *To what extent was there a different interpretation of Kaisertreue between the Habsburg Court, the Cisleithanian government, and the Galician ruling elites and how did this manifested itself during the two Kaiserreisen made by emperor Franz Joseph to Galicia in 1880 and 1894?*

The political interpretations of Kaisertreue by political factions in Vienna and Galicia can be analysed with the help of Viennese daily newspapers of different political leanings (the liberal *Neue Wiener Zeitung*, *Neue Freie Presse*, and *Neues Wiener Journal*, the conservative *Das Vaterland*, and the governmental *Wiener Zeitung* and *Fremden-Blatt* for instance), documents and telegrams from court- and (local) governmental officials found in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, the Kriegsarchiv and the Allgemeine Verwaltungsarchiv in Vienna, Unowsky's analysis of the Polish and Ruthene news coverage of the two Galician Kaiserreisen (Polish: *CZAS*, *Gazeta Narodowa*, and *Dziennik Polski*, and Ruthene: *Slovo* and *Dilo*) - which were published in languages not mastered by this author - and secondary literature on the historical and political context of late nineteenth century Austria-Hungary, Cisleithania, and Galicia as well as specific events, like the 1894 Galician Exhibition.

A special note must be made about the Unowsky's impressive work on Habsburg imperial celebrations in Cisleithania. Even though his analysis of the local political and nationalist reception of the Kaiserreisen by the emperor to Galicia leads him to conclude that the Galician Polish elites tried to legitimise their nationalist vision and policies for Galicia by linking it to Kaisertreue, he does not discuss the implications this has for the historical understanding and interpretation of this concept. Nevertheless, his analysis of Galician Polish and Ruthene newspapers and of other sources from the archives of Cracow and L'viv (Lemberg), will be very useful and will be utilised throughout this thesis.

Before analysing the two Kaiserreisen however, this thesis will first deal with the historiography on Kaisertreue and the evolution of the debate on Austro-Hungarian history in chapter 1. Then, in chapter 2, based on conceptual history's strategy to formulate the concepts in advance of analysing them, the differences between nationalism and anationalism will be discussed, as well as their interpretation, and the promotion of Kaisertreue will be detailed. Chapter 3, will follow with an overview of the 1867 *Ausgleich*, and the political context in Cisleithania, and Galicia after 1867. Finally, chapter 4 and 5 will analyse the two Kaiserreisen to Galicia in 1880 and 1894 based on the political motives of the Court, the Cisleithanian government, the ruling Polish conservatives, the liberal opposition in the Reichsrat, and the Polish and Ruthenian opposition; how their interests were made compatible; what happened during the visits themselves; and how they were politically interpreted. Finally, this thesis shall end with a conclusion discussing the implications, and the bibliography.

Note on terminology and geographic names

The use of geographic names requires a short elucidation. Cities, provinces, areas, nations, and states often had different names in different languages. For instance, Lemberg was also called Lwow or L'viv. Using a certain name implies a certain perspective. Bohemia was called Böhmen by those who spoke German and Čechy by the Czechs. Čechy thus implies to exclude the Germans and vice versa. The same goes for the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy where the term Magyar implies the Hungarian nation, not the other nationalities in Transleithania.

For practical reasons this thesis will use English terminology insofar that Anglicised versions of the names exist, otherwise the German form shall be used, because German was the bureaucratic language of Cisleithania. For example, the capital Cisleithania shall be referred to as Vienna, not Wien, and the Galician capital shall be called Lemberg, not L'viv or Lwow. In the case that a name was changed or that it is more known in another language, this shall be noted parenthetically, i.e. Preßburg (Bratislava).

Secondly, when referring to the Habsburg Empire as a whole the term 'Austria' cannot always be used since the meaning of the term changed with history. Before the 1867 *Ausgleich*, Austria referred to the entire empire, but afterwards it only referred unofficially to the Western half of the Dual Monarchy, which was officially called *Die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Länder*. In order to be as clear as possible, this thesis shall reserve the term Austria or Austrian empire to refer to the period before 1867 and refer to Austria-Hungary, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Dual Monarchy, or the Monarchy after the Ausgleich. Furthermore, the western half shall be referred to as Cisleithania or 'the Austrian half' and the eastern half as Transleithania, Hungary, or 'the Hungarian half'.

Thirdly, within Galicia the two largest nationalities were Poles and Ruthenes. 'Ruthenian' is a term that is used in Austrian newspapers and sources to refer to the Ukrainian population within the empire as opposed to those living in the Russian Empire. 'Ukraine' or 'Ukrainian' will be used when referring to the language or their national movement.

1. Historiography

Historians have traditionally focused on patterns of development and decline within Austria-Hungary. Their discussion rested on the increasing strength of nationalism, and calls for self-determination, versus the power of centripetal forces like *Kaisertreue*. Within the historiography on Austria-Hungary, there are therefore basically two schools of thought: those who argue that the monarchy's disintegration was due to international factors, i.e. World War I and that internal problems could have been overcome, and those who believe that internal national, political and structural problems would have caused the disintegration of the monarchy. The problem with this is that many scholars thus perceived the Dual Monarchy's collapse as predetermined and they assumed that decline had settled in and was inevitable.¹⁶ In this chapter, the development of these two schools within the Habsburg historiography will be discussed, as well as the main considerations on *Kaisertreue*.

1.1 The *Belle Époque* and the Great War years

The main discussions in the historiographic debate on the Habsburg Monarchy start with two men: Louis Eisenmann, a French professor at the Sorbonne,¹⁷ and Henry Wickham Steed, a British journalist. Eisenmann was an academic who wrote his doctoral-thesis on *Le compromise austro-hongrois de 1867* in 1904. His conclusion was that the empire had to reform itself, because dualism did not work well/anymore. He proposed three far-going reforms: the reestablishment of absolutism, a national reconciliation in the Cisleithanian half (mainly between Germans and Czechs), which could however lead to tensions Hungarians who would see this as a violation of the *Ausgleich*, or national autonomy within the frame of a unitary state.¹⁸ While not in the original dissertation, another writer, Fuscien Dominois, wrote in 1937 that Eisenmann had stated that: "elle [the Dual Monarchy] remplir sa mission européenne en assurant la justice à tout les peuples de la vallée moyenne du Danube, ou elle est condamnée à disparaître."¹⁹ Dominois claims that Eisenmann's conclusion that the empire would disintegrate if it could not treat all its people's equally, had been correct. However, this statement cannot be found in the original text and it was probably done so in hindsight. Nevertheless, Eisenmann was one of the first to speak of imperial decline and the possibility of the monarchy's end.

¹⁶ Barkey, K., 'Changing Modalities of Empire: A Comparative Study of Ottoman and Habsburg Decline', in: J.W. Esherick, H. Kayali, and Eric van Young eds., *Empire to Nation. Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc: Oxford 2006), 167-197, 167.

¹⁷ Mares, A., 'La vision française de l'Europe Centrale du XIX au XX siècle', in: *Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques* (1991), 7, 1-12, 5.

¹⁸ Eisenmann, L., *Le compromise Austro-Hongrois de 1867. Étude sur le dualisme* (Paris 1904), 668-669 and Mares, 'La vision française', 6.

¹⁹ Dominois, F., 'Louis Eisenmann', in: *Revue des Études Slaves* (1937), 17:3-4, 240-244: 241.

Henry Wickham Steed was not an academic like Eisenmann, but more of an activist, being employed during the Great War to create propaganda “designed indirectly to undermine and destroy the Habsburg Empire.”²⁰ As a correspondent for *The Times* in Vienna, and from 1913 as a contributing editor on foreign affairs, he wrote (often critically and with anti-Semitic accusations) about the Austro-Hungarian Empire.²¹ Nevertheless, it was he who was one of the first to describe the importance of dynastic loyalty:

“The idea of an " Austrian " nationhood, with its uniting virtue, is lacking, nor is the want supplied by what is called the "State idea". [...] *Gesamtpatrtotismus*, or patriotism embracing the whole Monarchy, is the privilege of a few. Such "soul" as "Austria" possesses is mainly dynastic; and the principal bond between the Hapsburg peoples is devotion to the person of the Monarch, who, ruling by right Divine in various constitutional guises, is the chief factor in each State separately and in both States jointly. The Dual Monarchy depends upon the Crown more fully and more truly than any other European realm. The dynasty is not only the pivot and centre but the living force of the body-politic. The Army, the Navy, the Bureaucracy and, in a sense, the Church are dynastic projections. "Austria" can only "find herself" when her aspirations run parallel to those of the dynasty, or when dynastic purpose coincides with popular necessity.”²²

With this observation Wickham Steed clearly considered dynastic loyalty to be the most important unifying factor in the monarchy. Something that would become very influential later on in the academic debate.

1.2 The *Interbellum*

In the *Interbellum* both schools within the historiography are started off by those in the post-dissolution successor states. The new states (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) focused on their own ‘national’ histories and many scholars considered the Dual Monarchy to have been a ‘prison of nations’ which ignored and suppressed the legitimate demands of the different *Völker*.²³ They presented themselves “as the natural and inevitable outcome of peoples “struggling to be free” of the empire in which they had previously been encapsulated.”²⁴ Their research therefore mainly concluded that the empire had to disintegrate because of the (rightful) rise of nationalism.

²⁰ Cornwall, M., *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (London 2000), 176..

²¹ Ibidem.

²² Wickham Steed, H., *The Hapsburg Monarchy* (London 1913), xiv.

²³ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 13.

²⁴ Comisso, ‘Empires as Prisons of Nations’, 138.

Then there were also scholars living within the Austrian rump-state. They often felt more closely linked with Germany and rather focused on a *Großdeutsche Geschichte* than on Habsburg history. This 'Germanised' version of history made them look exclusively through a Viennese and Austro-German perspective and therefore ignored the 'nationality problem'. Instead they ascribed the disintegration of the Dual monarchy to losing the Great War and/or (depending on their political opinions) blamed the Hungarians, nationalists, socialists, and freemasons.²⁵ Hungarian historians, meanwhile, differed between both camps, depending on their political opinions.

Both schools of thought originated from these first politically motivated historic works from Europe. Nevertheless, it were *émigrés* like the earlier mentioned Oscar Jászi and Josef Redlich, the last Austro-Hungarian finance minister, who went to the United States, who published the first academic works about the Dual Monarchy, albeit quite critically. Jászi had been a liberal Hungarian politician who disapproved of both conservative and nationalist politics in Hungary after the *Ausgleich*. After the Great War he emigrated to the U.S. and became a professor. In his influential book *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (1929) he opposed those who argued that the "collapse was purely a mechanical process"²⁶ by stating that the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy "grew out of the inevitable logic of a long series of social causes" and that the medieval-like collection of countries was without any common ideal or feeling that could have been the foundation for solidarity.²⁷ With this book, Jászi has continued to influence historians' assumptions of 'centrifugal' and 'centripetal' forces.

Redlich, who also emigrated to the U.S. to become a professor, focused less on both forces, but blamed the continued influence of the Habsburg dynasty for the disintegration of the empire. In his political diary, *Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem*, he argued that they saw the realm as their personal property and that this collided with democratic government.²⁸ In another book he wrote: "So stellt sich der Kaiser as Regieren vor: Ernennen und Entlassen von Ministern nach seinem Gutdünken!"²⁹ Despite his criticism, his work did emphasize the important role of the dynasty.

The rise of fascism and autocracy in 1930's Europe did spark a more positive interest from U.S. scholars for Austria-Hungary. The *Anschluss* of Austria by Nazi Germany caused American historian and former Habsburg subject, Hans Kohn, to argue that the Monarchy had been "an important and necessary factor for the stability of Europe" and that its disintegration "opened the way for the domination of central and central-eastern Europe by Berlin and gave Germany a chance for expansion

²⁵ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 13.

²⁶ Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 7.

²⁷ Idem, 7, 33, 129.

²⁸ Redlich, J., *Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. A Biography* (New York 1929), 352

²⁹ Fellner, F. (ed.), *Schicksaljahre Österreichs 1908-1919. Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs. II Band 1915-1919* (Graz 1954), 201.

along the Danube unhoped for by even Bismarck.”³⁰ Thus, while many European historians either ignored the Dual Monarchy, perceived it as a prison of nations, or saw it through a ‘Germanised lens’, émigré historians in the United States seriously began studying it, leading to many new publications.

1.3 The post-war debate

Carel Crone argues in his PhD dissertation that post-war historiography on the Habsburg Empire was determined by five (chronological) factors.³¹ The first is that the post-Habsburg successor states created a power-vacuum in central-eastern Europe which was filled by Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union. This changed the overall historical perspective on the Dual Monarchy from highly critical to a somewhat more positive view.³² Secondly, nationalism was blamed for the two world wars while scholars wrote more positively about the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire which had lasted for centuries. Even the much criticised *Ausgleich* of 1867, though caused by nationalism, had accommodated the nationalist Hungarians for fifty years. After 1945 and the academic backlash against nationalism, the Dual Monarchy was therefore viewed more positively.

The third factor was the cultural, economic, monetary, social, and political integration of western Europe. This prompted some historians to have a new look at historic European empires which included many nations, cultures, faiths, and/or lands. The Dual Monarchy gained renewed interest and, unlike in earlier works, it was not perceived as an obstacle to modernisation and the legitimate rise of the nation, but as a framework wherein peoples had lived together for centuries. Some historians like Istvan Deák and Alan Sked even argued that the European Union might even learn some lessons from the Dual Monarchy, despite the massive differences.

The fourth factor that renewed interest and influenced the debate on Austria-Hungary, was the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. This led to a new focus on the causes for disintegration of empires. Historians started to focus more on the final years of the Dual Monarchy, the causes for disintegration, and the relationship between empires and (pseudo-)national states. And finally, the fifth, factor was the development in economic historical research, which concluded that the Dual Monarchy’s economy was growing fastest amongst European powers and that its economy, financial, and banking services were much more internally integrated than thought before.³³

³⁰ Kohn, H., ‘AEIOU: Some Reflections on the Meaning and Mission of Austria’, in: *The Journal of Modern History* (1939), 11:4, 513-527, 517.

³¹ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 17.

³² Rumpler, H., *Österreichische Geschichte 1804-1914. Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa. Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Habsburgermonarchie* (Vienna 1997), 11.

³³ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 18. See for more information: Good, D., *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire 1750-1914* (Berkeley 1984); Komlos, J., *The Habsburg Empire as a Customs Union: Economic Development in*

1.3.1. Austro-American school versus Anglo-French school

After 1945, the Habsburg empire was largely ignored by European historians, who focused instead in the Interbellum and the causes of the Second World War and its atrocities. In the post-war years, research on Austro-Hungarian history therefore continued to be done by American historians. It was only during the 1950's that Austrian scholars renewed their interest in these "lost years" of imperial history as a means to distance themselves from Germany.³⁴ The interaction with their American colleagues developed into, what Helmut Rumpler calls, an Austro-American Historical School.³⁵ This group mainly focused on elite rule and the political, social, economic, cultural and national developments in the Monarchy that was quite different from pre-war studies in that it perceived the multinational empire more positively. Furthermore, the Austro-German perspective was exchanged for a more multinational perspective.

Not long thereafter, French and British scholars also started analysing the Habsburg Empire. Their historical school differed from the Austro-American one in that it focused mainly on the external relations of Austria-Hungary with the rest of Europe and its influence on internal policy-making. According to Crone, this was mainly based on the British historical perspective to see European history as a balance of power. The Anglo-French school was less dominated by émigrés from the Habsburg lands than the Austro-American one and therefore they might have been less inclined to research the internal developments as opposed to the external. Their studies often highlighted the more 'positive' developments and the strength of the centripetal forces, which enabled Austria-Hungary to continue being a great power.³⁶ As the post-war academic debate mostly focused on the causes of the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy, two opposing explanations came to be: those who argued that there was a turning point from 'flourishing empire' to decline³⁷ and those that argued that the empire fell because of external factors.

One of the most important historians from the Austro-American school was Robert Kann. He did not consider Austria-Hungary as an anachronistic, autocratic relict, but argued that despite its problems, the centripetal forces often came out stronger than the centrifugal ones. Nevertheless, Kann argued that nationalism would have *certus an, incertus quando*³⁸, sometime but surely, caused the end of the empire, but only when the people lost their trust in the imperial institutions, such as the dynasty,

Austria-Hungary in the nineteenth Century (Princeton 1983); and Rudolph, R., *Banking and Industrialization in Austria-Hungary* (Cambridge 1976).

³⁴ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 9.

³⁵ Rumpler, H., *Österreichische Geschichte 1804-1914. Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa. Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Habsburgermonarchie* (Vienna 1997), 13.

³⁶ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 20.

³⁷ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 19-42.

³⁸ Kann, R.A., *The Habsburg Empire: A Study in Integration and Dis-Integration* (New York 1957), 126.

the bureaucracy, and the army.³⁹ Kann thus reframed Wickham Steed's conclusion of people's having to follow the interests of the dynasty into the Habsburgs being dependent on their people's trust and loyalty. This was a new definition, which implied a more active role by the dynasty to win over their subjects' hearts and minds.

Alan Taylor, an influential historian from the Anglo-French school, countered Kann's conclusion. Considering Wickham Steed's observation, he was of the same opinion that Austria-Hungary was in the first place a tool for the Habsburg dynasty to have a place at the European diplomatic table. The peoples served the dynasty, not the other way around. In his book he wrote this down as "In other countries dynasties are episodes in the history of the people; in the Habsburg Empire peoples are a complication in the history of the dynasty."⁴⁰ He claimed that the Habsburgs actively pursued a policy of 'divide and rule' between its peoples so that only the dynasty would unite them. No supranational state which could compete for the peoples' loyalty, should ever exist or develop. Only the monarchy and the dynasty should unite them. Or, in Taylor's words: "Only 'the August House' was permanent."⁴¹

Taylor's perspective is indirectly countered by Alan Sked, who is interestingly also from the Anglo-French school. He argued that the Dual Monarchy was a successful example of a multinational state, and that most nationality problems were solved by 1914. According to him most nationalities did not consider separating from the empire and that the Habsburgs were not in the business of *divide et impera*. Moreover, Sked argued that the empire's population was still very loyal to the dynasty and that they only argued for a better position for themselves within the imperial state.⁴²

American scholar, Arthur May, build on this by describing the widespread popularity of the monarch with the different nations. He stated that "not only was this person the focal objective of political loyalties, for Austro-Germans and Magyar, for Slav and Latin, but he embodied the common concern for law and order. Symbol of unity and dynastic patriotism, Francis Joseph had lent a special inspiration to the realm of many tongues, and to speak critically of him in the open was akin to sacrilege."⁴³ May argued that Franz Joseph was considered to be the guarantor of national rights, of equality before the law, and that this was what made him very popular with the different nations in his realm. This implies that the monarch had to actively portray himself in this manner to the population.

³⁹ Kann, *The Habsburg Empire*, 134-153.

⁴⁰ Taylor, A.J.P., *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* (London 1957), 10.

⁴¹ Ibidem.

⁴² Sked, A., *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire* (London 1989), 263-264.

⁴³ May, A.J., *The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy 1914-1918 Volume I* (Philadelphia 1966), 426..

Other historians also took a closer look at Franz Joseph and the Habsburg dynasty, with many blaming them for the empire's problems, like Helmut Rumpler who argues that the emperor was reluctant to let go of power and appointed statesmen with weak personalities who were unfit to reform the empire⁴⁴, or Carlile Macartney, who argued that the 'dynastic plan' of an anational empire had failed, with only the court, the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, high ranking clerics, the officer corps, and a part of the aristocracy upholding the Habsburg identity.⁴⁵ Solomon Wank, an American historian, also writes on this lacking supranational identity, which could "have coordinated particular national loyalties with loyalty to a supranational political identity."⁴⁶ Loyalty to the emperor meant, according to Wank, nothing more than loyalty to Franz Joseph personally, not the Habsburg dynasty or the empire as a whole. His conclusion was that the Habsburgs only barely acknowledged the force of nationalism to such an extent that they could preserve their control over the territories and its status as a great power. This acknowledgement amounted to limited decentralisation leading to the formation of nationalist constituencies which vied with the imperial centre in Vienna for power and influence over the population, "thus accelerating imperial decay".⁴⁷

This lack of a supranational identity or the relative weakness of the centripetal forces compared to those of nationalism, is often recognised by historians. Nevertheless, their opinion differs on the power of *Kaisertreue*. Peter Sugar, also an American historian, for instance considered dynastic loyalty one of the more successful Habsburg policies, saying that it did preserve the state "for much longer than one would have had a right to expect" and that it made "most national groups seek, almost to the last days of the monarchy, a solution for the grievances within the state rather than in secession."⁴⁸ Dutch scholar Carel Crone also recognises this, but does point out the decreasing relevance of traditional unifying forces, like *Kaisertreue*, in the modern, industrialised, and urban Dual Monarchy after 1880. He concludes that the state kept promoting dynastic loyalty, while its unifying force was dwindling.⁴⁹

Even though these scholars belong to the Austro-American or Anglo-French schools, their conclusions were quite different. There were those who saw the inner strength of the empire, but also those who recognised its structural problems. Then there were also those who were divided on the stability of the Dual Monarchy within the international system. Nevertheless, they seem to agree on *Kaisertreue* as a strictly imperial and unifying force, even though its strength and relevance is the

⁴⁴ Rumpler, H., *Österreichische Geschichte 1804-1914. Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa. Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Habsburgermonarchie* (Vienna 1997).

⁴⁵ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 28.

⁴⁶ Wank, S., 'Some Reflections on the Habsburg Empire and Its Legacy in the Nationalities Question', in: *Austrian History Yearbook* (1997), 28, 131-146, 139.

⁴⁷ *Idem*, 140.

⁴⁸ Sugar, P.F., 'The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule', in: *Slavic Review* (1963), 22:1, 1-30, 3.

⁴⁹ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 292.

subject of intense debate, especially when combined with discussions on the power of nationalism, the accommodation of nationalities' demands, dynastic interests versus state interests, continuing political dominance of the nobility, identities and loyalties of the population, and modernisation.⁵⁰

1.4 The historiographic gap

These two historiographic schools were heavily criticised in more recent literature. In a commentary by Phillip Ther, historians are denounced for focusing too much on the supposed anachronism of empires, like Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*, which even speaks of "Ruritania" when talking about empires, implying their backwardness.⁵¹ Ther criticises these historians who are ignorant or at least lack attention for 'the imperial' in nationalism studies.⁵² This all added to an academic atmosphere that accepted that empires had to fall in favour of nation-states. He therefore comes up with 'imperial nationalism'. His argument is that "there were national movements who struck a coalition with the empire and its dynasty" and anti-imperial movements that either tried to break away or agreed with a compromise.⁵³ Ther bases this on the fact that even when imperial nations were in clear opposition to imperial rule or imperial policies, "the emperor and the dynasty, the military or the imperial high culture could still serve as objects of identification."⁵⁴

The implication of Ther's argument is not only the compatibility of *Kaisertreue* and nationalism, and therefore the end of the dichotomous assumption, but also that they could strengthen each other. Unowsky's analyses of the official representation of emperor Franz Joseph in imperial celebrations in Cisleithania, seems to support Ther's argument. Unowsky discusses the Galician Polish nationalist coalition with the empire and the dynasty, while other national forces within Galicia, like the Ruthenes, also sought to identify with the Habsburgs and the monarch.

Based on this, it can be argued that historians have too often assumed imperial decline through nationalism due to a focus on macrohistorical developments like state modernisation or world systemic changes. Karen Barkey calls this a broad, macro-perspective, where large-scale state actions are considered without attention to the more micro-interactive dynamics between state and society actors.⁵⁵ Moreover, these interactions are not just political, they're also based on the complexity of different overlapping loyalties and identities within the imperial context. Nationalism and imperial loyalty did not need to be mutually exclusive. Nationalism was not always directed against the empire

⁵⁰ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 40, 41, and Barkey, 'Changing Modalities of Empire', 169, 170.

⁵¹ Gellner, E. (2006), *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford 2006), 67-68.

⁵² Ther, P., "Imperial Nationalism" as a Challenge for the Study of Nationalism', in: S. Berger and A. Miller (eds.), *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest 2015), 573-592, 575.

⁵³ Ther, "Imperial Nationalism" as a Challenge for the Study of Nationalism', 577-578.

⁵⁴ Ther, "Imperial Nationalism" as a Challenge for the Study of Nationalism', 578.

⁵⁵ Barkey, 'Changing Modalities of Empire', 171.

and discourse against the imperial state did not necessarily represent the views of most within the national groups. Neither did the Cisleithanian half try to create an encompassing collective identity forcing their peoples to choose between their loyalties. The truth is much more complex. Crone describes the Dual Monarchy as a *Vielvölkerstaat*, a multi-ethnic, multicultural state that encompasses several Völker, with each striving towards their own cultural identity as a nation, but without a supranational state identity.⁵⁶

These criticisms, studies, and ideas on identity lead to the question is whether the concept of Kaisertreue has not also been singularly perceived through a macro-perspective, without attention for the dynamics and bonds between centre and periphery. As seen in the quotation from CZAS, nationalist interests and dynastic loyalty could be compatible. It is therefore necessary to take a new look at the concept and see whether it should be reinterpreted as heaving different meanings.

⁵⁶ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 2.

2. Nationalism, anationalism, and Kaisertreue

2.1 Nationalism

One cannot deny that nationalism became a major force in the formation of politics and loyalties in late nineteenth century Austria-Hungary. According to Ellen Comisso, a professor in political science, nationalists and the imperial government both influenced the loyalties and identities of the empire's peoples. She identified five options for individuals to cope with the complexity of imperial-nationalist loyalties and identities: 1) Insurrectionism/nationalism, 2) pragmatism/accommodation, 3) collaboration/assimilation, 4) parochialism, and 5) anationalism.⁵⁷

The first category refers to those who actively strove towards secession from the Habsburg Monarchy and form an independent sovereign state, like the Italian irredentists who actively sought to unite themselves with their 'nation-state'.⁵⁸ However, "not every triumphant nationalist had as his primary goal the establishment of a nation-state."⁵⁹ The second group therefore, consist of nationalists that considered insurrection to be too costly and extreme to find popular support. They advocated a policy of accommodation or pragmatism, which meant to maximise the benefits of being within the empire while working to consolidate (and strengthen) their cultural and linguistic heritage. They perceived the Monarchy as the appropriate area in which to fulfil their national aims and therefore rejected separatism. Through participation in imperial institutions, they were rewarded with having their own language in local politics, administration, and schooling, gaining subsidies for cultural institutions, and sometimes even autonomy.⁶⁰ Then there was also a third option in which individuals gave up their nationality and assimilated into the culture and language of the ruling classes of the empire.

The last two categories refer mostly to the masses, whose attitudes were mostly not politicised and more often relied on parochialism, i.e. the relationship between lord and village rather than nation and state, or on 'anationalism', defining themselves based on class, occupation, or confession. Social democratic parties for instance were open for all nationalities and their programs were based on class, not nationality, while Christian Socials were to some extent also open to all nationalities with the condition of faith. The success of these parties rested in part on the willingness of imperial authorities to tolerate them though, something that was often problematic because of the elite fear of uprisings against their authority, which, according to Comisso, often caused them to collaborate with the

⁵⁷ Comisso, 'Empires as Prisons of Nations', 144-152.

⁵⁸ Ther, "Imperial Nationalism" as a Challenge for the Study of Nationalism', 577.

⁵⁹ Prokopovych, M., *Habsburg Lemberg. Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital, 1772-1914* (West Lafayette 2009), 4.

⁶⁰ Comisso, 'Empires as Prisons of Nations', 145.

imperial state, despite their nationalist interests, to secure their local control. Moreover, it might even have influenced elite assimilation to some extent.⁶¹

Comisso's different options are interesting in that she has identified a grey area between separatism/nationalism and assimilation: pragmatism and accommodation, while parochialism and anationalism shows either the indifference towards or the unwillingness to be defined by nationality. This is supported by scholars such like Tara Zahra or Pieter Judson, who questioned the effectiveness of nationalism, arguing that it lacked the social and cultural resonance often attributed to it.⁶² Comisso's pragmatism/accommodation is however to be understood as an elite movement, as in a "specific political programme or ideology, usually involving some form of claim to autonomy."⁶³ Nationalist loyalty, in this context, was not just based on idealism, but on a calculation.⁶⁴ It therefore recognises Prokopovych's earlier mentioned assumption that people could have different loyalties, despite having one nationality.

Austrian historian, Peter Haslinger, came up with the concept of territoriality to understand these different loyalties. According to him one must look at the imperial, national, and regional levels, in order to study of changing patterns of allegiance and senses of belonging, without privileging the concept of nation.⁶⁵ The concept of loyalties enables scholars to address the issues of how the state fitted into the matrix of identities at the individual or group level. Contrary to the assumption on the inherent opposition between national consciousness and imperial loyalty, which was unquestioned by most historians using Jászi's thesis of centrifugal and centripetal forces⁶⁶, the emerging nationalist movements did have an overlapping, but complex and ambiguous relationship with Habsburg state-building. Nationalism was often utilised by the Habsburg state to bolster imperial allegiance, while nationalists used the imperial framework for their own purposes. Some scholars criticise this by arguing that all was well if the interests were compatible, but that when nationalist leaders found conflicts between national and dynastic interests, they gave preference to the former.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, there was little demand for independence among the various ethnic groups and political groupings that actively called for separatism and national freedom were very marginal. Instead, nationalist goals were primarily focused on achieving more autonomy

⁶¹ Comisso, 'Empires as Prisons of Nations', 148-149.

⁶² Cole, 'Differentiation or Indifference?', 105.

⁶³ Idem, 99.

⁶⁴ Barkey, 'Changing Modalities of Empire', 178.

⁶⁵ Cole, 'Differentiation or Indifference?', 107.

⁶⁶ Idem, 110.

⁶⁷ Varga, B., 'Writing imperial history in the age of high nationalism: imperial historians on the fringes of the Habsburg monarchy', in: *European Review of History* (2017), 24:1, 80-95, 82.

within the framework of the imperial state⁶⁸ or the right to participate in the imperial state institutions.⁶⁹ Sked support this assertion, by writing that:

“The national leaderships had to concentrate on the immediate questions of the day. Most of these concerned practical questions such as the franchise and the language of administration and education. Thus, despite the fact that in some cases there was indeed much dissatisfaction with Habsburg rule, the nationalities directed their attention primarily to the issues that directly affected their daily lives [or that of their constituents]. No major leader or party called for the destruction of the monarchy.”⁷⁰

It is hardly surprising that nationalists’ demands for more autonomy had a linguistic side to them. If politics goes on in a foreign tongue, possibilities for participation in public life are limited. Local diets that claimed to represent a specific nationality wished to have an administration in that nation’s language. Not only would this allow for more control, but also – to their minds- it would create a more legitimate government because the population understood the rules they had to follow.⁷¹ The battle between nation- and empire-building was therefore mainly one of control.

2.2 Anational imperialism

The Habsburg Monarchy has been described “as a monarchic union of estates-dominated Crownlands⁷² with its structure remaining “multi-cultural or poly-ethnic” rather than becoming a multi-national state.⁷³ Its cohesive bonds remained dependent on premodern concepts, such as dynastic loyalty and religious identities.⁷⁴ Historians argue that in most states the importance of these ‘anational’ cohesive forces declined in favour of more modern ones, like economic growth, nationalism, or democracy.⁷⁵ Anationality means here refers to the antithesis of nationalism, i.e. ‘non-national’ loyalties, like religion or dynastic loyalty. In other words, anational cohesive forces were not in competition with national values and interests.

⁶⁸ Baidins, V., *Franz Joseph, Kaisertreue and Loyalty in the Late Habsburg Empire* (UMI 1999), 7.

⁶⁹ Comisso, ‘Empires as Prisons of Nations’, 141.

⁷⁰ Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 231.

⁷¹ Comisso, ‘Empires as Prisons of Nations’, 143.

⁷² Urbanitsch, P., ‘Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities: The Dynastic Myth of the Habsburg Monarchy – a Futile Exercise in the Creation of Identity’, in: *Austrian History Yearbook* (2004), 35, 101-141, 102-103.

⁷³ Hinsley, F.H., *Nationalism and the International System* (New York 1973), 56.

⁷⁴ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 4 and Baidins, *Franz Joseph, Kaisertreue and Loyalty*, 6.

⁷⁵ Baidins, *Franz Joseph, Kaisertreue and Loyalty*, 4, 6. And Mann, M., *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge 2009), 3.

Furio Cerutti, an Italian professor of political philosophy, defined four elements of an anational supranational identity: interdependence, normative universalism, global challenges, and institutionalisation, and he excluded national elements like a community of language and the homogeneity of communities.⁷⁶ According to him, a network of interrelations, constraints, and feedback mechanisms bound the empire together through ‘neutral forces’, such as technology and communication, but also due to a functional imperative, e.g. an idea or an ideology. This is linked with normative universalism, which are basic rights that are considered collective goods, like civil, political and social rights.⁷⁷ These are not just enjoyed by one imperial nation, but by all.

Lastly, the external factor of global challenges or threats, was a strong incentive for the empire’s nations to bond together. The fact that all are affected by the same challenges and threats enhances the will to cooperate under some kind of central authority a necessity.⁷⁸ The peoples Austria-Hungary had an interest in the external safety, internal wealth, and influence which they enjoyed while staying together as His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty’s subjects, but not as individual states.⁷⁹ This element provides, according to Cerutti, the unquestionable force for people to act in accordance with one another.

These three elements were institutionalised within Austria-Hungary’s *Übernational*, or supranational, common institutions.⁸⁰ The imperial bureaucracy and the *Gemeinsame Armee* were not only symbols of unity, but also powerful forces that kept the empire together. As Crone states, the bureaucracy did not serve the state, it was the state. In Cisleithania, German was, for a long time, the *lingua franca*, and while other nationalities were not blocked from entering the bureaucracy, the Austro-German upper classes and assimilated aristocracies dominated the higher echelons.⁸¹

The *Kaiserlich und königliche Gemeinsame Armee* was likewise an imperial institution which, as its name suggests, operated in both halves of the Dual Monarchy. It bore no responsibility to either parliament or government, but solely to the emperor-king as *Oberste Kriegsherr*. While many nationalists perceived the army to be partial (it was used against them in 1848, it was dominated by an Austro-German officer corps, and its *Kommandosprache* was German), it did function as a ‘school of the empire’ and as a way to bring people from all over the empire together through the Conscription law of 1868. Conscripts and recruits from all over the empire therefore had to learn some German to

⁷⁶ Cerutti, F., ‘Can there be a supranational identity?’, in: *Philosophy and Social Criticism* (1992), 18:2, 147-162, 152.

⁷⁷ Idem, 153.

⁷⁸ Idem, 155.

⁷⁹ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 112.

⁸⁰ Kann, A., ‘Die Habsburgermonarchie und das Problem des Übernationalen Staates’, in A. Wandruszka and P. Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. Band II Verwaltung und Rechtswesen* (Wien 1975), 1-56, 2.

⁸¹ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 112.

understand commands and to speak with their superiors. Furthermore, they also came in contact with other nationalities, as of the 102 infantry regiments, only 22 were of a nationally homogenous nature.

During their training they were also instilled with *Kaisertreue*, imperial values, and their responsibility at maintaining the dynasty and their lands.⁸² It is questionable that this school of the empire idea worked for every individual, but it is certainly true that while with the army, the majority of people were imbued with a strong patriotic feelings based on a dynastic, patriarchal society, respect for the traditional order and traditional dynastic leadership.⁸³ This importance of this dynastic-military alliance was noted by archduke Albrecht, who was a cousin of the emperor's father. As Inspector General of the Habsburg forces he stated that in "no country is uniformity and the dynastic soldiery spirit as vital [...] because only the dynasty and the army hold this divided monarchy together."⁸⁴

These common interests and institutions found their way in the anational *Österreichische Staatsidee*, the idea of Austrianness, i.e. a *Gesamtstaat* or *Gesamtmonarchie* with *Gesamtstaatsbewusstsein*. In other words, an empire in which the differences between peoples were recognised, but with a form of centralised government and army headed by the common Habsburg sovereign.⁸⁵ It did not politicise language, culture, or ethnicity, but rested on the idea a community of interests between dynasty and local elites/aristocracy, which linked them to the imperial state. It was again archduke Albrecht who emphasized this by stating that: "in a polyglot Empire inhabited by so many races and peoples the dynasty must not allow itself to be assigned exclusively to one of these. Just as a good mother, it must show equal love for all its children and remain foreign to none. In this lies the justification for its existence."⁸⁶

Austrianness was an anational idea that allowed the 'Austrian political nation' to be united around the common popular sovereign and legacy of Habsburg rule, while enjoying the benefits of a common defence, imperial support for diversity, participation in imperial state institutions, and the growing economy.⁸⁷ This anationalism made sure that Austrianness would not be a rival for nationalism. Very few therefore felt their imperial loyalty to be superseded by their nationalist interests as long as both interests were compatible.⁸⁸ As Arthur May implied, the imperial centre actively promoted this anational interpretation of *Kaisertreue* and in the late nineteenth century the imperial centre could and did inspire loyalty. Leaders of national communities characterised by Comisso's pragmatism and accommodation stance, did incorporate Franz Joseph into their own

⁸² Crone, *Casus Imperij*, 114.

⁸³ Urbanitsch, 'Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities', 135.

⁸⁴ Rothenberg, G.E., *The Army of Francis Joseph* (West Lafayette 1976), 74.

⁸⁵ Komlosy, A., 'Imperial Cohesion, Nation-Building, and Regional Integration in the Habsburg Monarchy', in: S. Berger and A. Miller (eds.), *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest 2012), 369-428, 380.

⁸⁶ Barkey, 'Changing Modalities of Empire', 186.

⁸⁷ Komlosy, 'Imperial Cohesion', 381, 383. And Barkey, 'Changing Modalities of Empire', 174-175.

⁸⁸ Prokopovych, M., *Habsburg Lemberg. Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital, 1772-1914* (West Lafayette 2009), 45.

national stories.⁸⁹ Like Prokopovych claimed, they may have had one national identity, but the nationalist leaders mastered different roles, different loyalties, “that they played at different occasions.”⁹⁰

2.3 Promoting Kaisertreue

In a time when national movements came up, this was “accompanied by an expansion in forms of monarchical self-representation and dynastic political rituals.”⁹¹ The closest thing Austria-Hungary had like a common patriotism, was dynastic loyalism, which meant allegiance to the current occupant of the Habsburg throne.⁹² Kaisertreue was one of the few forces unifying the various territories and lands under the Habsburg crown.⁹³ The Habsburgs considered only their dynasty, with its traditions and history as something that was common to all their peoples and that could demand loyalty from its subjects.⁹⁴ Therefore, the legacy and heritage of the House of Habsburg and Franz Joseph himself were utilised by the Court and the Viennese government.⁹⁵

2.3.1 Religion

One way, the dynasty utilised itself was through their *Pietas Austracia*, the piety of the House of Austria.⁹⁶ As the Habsburgs could not base their dynastic support on the idea of a core ethnicity or core land, they had to rely on the legitimacy of their God-given rule over the Christian peoples of eastern-central Europe. As a consequence, empire and religion were dependent on each other to a much greater extent than other states.⁹⁷ When Franz Joseph came to power on December 2nd 1848,

⁸⁹ Unowsky, D.L., ‘Celebrating Two Emperors and a Revolution. The Public Contest to Represent the Polish and Ruthenian Nations in 1880’, in: L. Cole and D.L. Unowsky (eds.), *The Limits of Loyalty. Imperial symbolism, popular allegiances, and state patriotism in the late Habsburg Monarchy* (New York 2007), 113-137, 114.

⁹⁰ Baskar, B., ‘Small National Ethnologies and Supranational Empires: The Case of the Habsburg Monarchy’, in: Nic Craith, M., U. Kockel, and R. Jöhler (eds.), *Everyday Culture in Europe. Approaches and Methodologies* (Hampshire 2008), 65-80, 68.

⁹¹ Cole, L., ‘Differentiation of Indifference? Changing Perspectives on National Identification in the Austrian Half of the Habsburg Monarchy’, in: M. van Ginderachter and M. Beyen (eds.), *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Basingstoke 2012), 96-119, 110. And Baskar, ‘Small National Ethnologies and Supranational Empires’, 69.

⁹² Baidins, *Franz Joseph, Kaisertreue and Loyalty*, 3.

⁹³ Sugar, P.F., ‘The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule’, in: *Slavic Review* (1963), 22:1, 1-30, 2.

⁹⁴ Urbanitsch, P., ‘Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities: The Dynastic Myth of the Habsburg Monarchy – a Futile Exercise in the Creation of Identity’, in: *Austrian History Yearbook* (2004), 35, 101-141, 105.

⁹⁵ Varga, ‘Writing imperial history’, 81.

⁹⁶ Schulze Wessel, M., ‘Religion, Politics and the Limits of Imperial Integration. Comparing the Habsburg Monarchy and the Russian Empire’, in: J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen, *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen 2011), 337-358, 347.

⁹⁷ Idem, 344.

he therefore styled himself ‘*von Gottes Gnaden Kaiser von Oesterreich*’.⁹⁸ While his uncle, emperor Ferdinand, had stopped using the ‘by the Grace of God’, Franz Joseph reinstated it to emphasise the divine monarchical principle, that power came from God and not the people; and to state that tradition was to be a pillar for his reign.⁹⁹ The Catholic faith had in premodern times been a strong pillar of Habsburg rule. Through the counterreformation and the baroque, the Habsburgs had strengthened the bonds between dynasty and church and succeeded in converting a large part of the population (back) to the Catholic faith. In the Concordat of 1855, the church had gained oversight of primary education and it was agreed that marriage would be based on canonical law. Moreover, the bishops and cardinals sat in the *Herrenhaus*, the Cisleithanian House of Lords, and many of the lower clergy took seats in the *Reichsrat*, the house of representatives.¹⁰⁰

In exchange, the church made sure that the faithful were made aware of the divine blessing of Franz Joseph’s reign and the Habsburg dynasty’s piousness. Legends about Rudolf I and the priest carrying the Eucharist and the rescue of Maximilian I from the mountains by the angel Gabriel in the guise of a peasant, supported the claim that the Habsburgs ruled by the Grace of God.¹⁰¹ Throughout the year the emperor performed two rituals to strengthen the claim of catholic kingship, be it the annual foot washing on Maundy Thursday or the grand Corpus Christi procession. The latter, held every year on the first Thursday following Trinity Sunday, was an important opportunity for the emperor to show himself in public and to showcase the relationship between church and dynasty.¹⁰²

The importance of this relationship is illustrated in Joseph Roth’s *Radetzky* *marsch*:

“The monarchy, our monarchy, is based on piety, on the faith that God has chosen the Habsburgers to reign over so and so many Christian peoples. Our emperor is a worldly brother to the pope, it is his imperial and royal apostolic majesty, none other is like he is: apostolic, no other majesty in Europe is so dependent on the Grace of God as on the faith of the peoples in the Grace of God. The German emperor rules, even when God abandons him, possibly by the Grace of the Nation. The emperor of Austria-Hungary cannot be abandoned by God.”¹⁰³

⁹⁸ ‘Kaiserliches Patent vom 2. December 1848, womit Se. k. k. Majestät, Kaiser Franz Joseph I., allen Völkern der Monarchie Allerhöchstihre Thronbesteigung verkünden’, in: *Allgemeines Reichs- Gesetz- und Regierungsblatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich* (1849), 1, 1-4, 1.

⁹⁹ Urbanitsch, ‘Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities’, 106.

¹⁰⁰ Johnston, W.M., *The Austrian Mind. An intellectual and social history 1848-1938* (Berkeley 1983), 56.

¹⁰¹ Urbanitsch, P., ‘Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities: The Dynastic Myth of the Habsburg Monarchy – a Futile Exercise in the Creation of Identity’, in: *Austrian History Yearbook* (2004), 35, 101-141, 106.

¹⁰² Baidins, *Franz Joseph, Kaisertreue and Loyalty*, 21.

¹⁰³ Translated from Roth, J., *Radetzky* *marsch* (translated by J. Winkler and A. Winkler-Vonk: Amsterdam 1946), 207.

The problem with this state-religion relationship was however that 1) not all Franz Joseph's subjects were catholic, and 2) anti-clerical liberals, socialists, and some nationalists opposed this close relationship between church and state. Moreover, the representation of the sacred ruler and the God-given right to rule directly competed with the claim of national movements to rule their nations.¹⁰⁴

2.3.2 Education

The Cisleithanian education system did not have the goal to assimilate the youth into an 'Austrian identity', but it did try to instil them with dynastic loyalty. Primary education was exclusively in the local (officially recognised) language, though schools with both German and the local language continued to exist until the late 19th century. History was taught through myths and legends and was meant to connect the student of the crownland to the dynasty and the monarchy as a whole. Because the Habsburgs did no longer emphasized their German origins by the second half of the 19th century, the supranational character of the ruling house was emphasized by teaching the local national culture when it did not counter Habsburg myths.¹⁰⁵

In secondary schools the Habsburg state itself was emphasized and the curriculum on history focused on moments "that were important for the gradual development of the Austrian state idea."¹⁰⁶ In schoolbooks, the term *Vaterland* was used to refer to the entire monarchy, Transleithania included. Cole argues that the effect of this policy is hard to determine. On the one hand, gymnasia and universities were breeding stocks for nationalists, despite teaching Habsburg patriotism. On the other hand, a large part of the *intelligentsia* did participate within the imperial institutions, or were loyal subjects to the crown. Schools were therefore special agents for the propagation of dynastic loyalty, as stated in a teachers' manual:

"A rapturous feeling of love and esteem attaches primarily to the leader of the state, whose picture is already known to the child from his earliest infancy by the money in circulation and by its presence in a dignified place both in the home and the school. He should learn to venerate him as the father of the fatherland and extend this reverence to all the members of the majestic family."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Schulze Wessel, M., 'Religion, Politics and the Limits of Imperial Integration, 344, 347, 349.

¹⁰⁵ Baidins, *Franz Joseph, Kaisertræue and Loyalty*, 13.

¹⁰⁶ Urbanitsch, P., 'Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities: The Dynastic Myth of the Habsburg Monarchy – a Futile Exercise in the Creation of Identity', in: *Austrian History Yearbook* (2004), 35, 101-141. And Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 117.

¹⁰⁷ Originally: Hannak, E., *Methodik des Unterrichtes in der Geschichte* (Vienna, 1891,1907), 14-15; cited in Urbanitsch, 'Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities, 132.

Furthermore, schools should not pay attention to national sensitivities and the influence of political and national partisanship should by all means be excluded from what was taught. This, however, meant relying on the ‘anationality’ of the teachers and many of them actually propagated nationalist ideas.¹⁰⁸ So schools might not have been able to create the *homo austriacus* after all. Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that people had multiple loyalties and that nationalism did not mean one could not be loyal to the monarch. Generations of people were thus instructed by their teachers in Habsburg and national mythology.

2.3.3 Personal popularity and Kaiserreisen

The promotion and success of *Kaisertreue* was dependent on two elements: the cooperation of political elites and the penetration of ideas into broader segments of society by means of the creation of a communication network, symbols, institutions, and practises conducive to the formation of a group identity (or self-images of such groups).¹⁰⁹ Elites could hinder the promotion of *Kaisertreue* by converting imperial symbols into national messages or acts of resistance or by claiming the personae of the monarch for their ‘own nationality’.¹¹⁰ Imperial representation therefore had to be negotiated, but was asymmetric at the same time because it implied acceptance by the local/nationalist elites of at least a symbolic, primacy of the imperial centre over all regions of the empire.¹¹¹

The personal popularity of Franz Joseph with the elites was an important factor in elite willingness to cooperate. The emperor was much less popular in the first two decades of his reign than he later became. Martial rule and neo-absolutist centralism alienated many among the local and political elites, whether liberals, nationalists, or conservative nobles. The style and content of the courts dynastic self-representation and public propaganda was therefore received with a coolness. Only after the *Ausgleich* of 1867 did suspicions diminish. Constitutionalism made the Franz Joseph the guarantor of the rule of law, and hence protector of the rights of all peoples of the monarchy. Not just the strict father-figure, but the wise and caring patron of all imperial subjects.¹¹²

Furthermore, an assassination attempt in 1853, the imperial wedding of Franz Joseph and Elisabeth in 1854, the twenty-fifth accession jubilee in 1873, and the silver wedding anniversary in 1879 had changed the reputation of the emperor, while the memories of 1848 had faded and imperial subjects had been educated for decades in dynastic patriotism by reading poems, stories, and histories

¹⁰⁸ Urbanitsch, ‘Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities’, 133.

¹⁰⁹ Idem, 102.

¹¹⁰ Haslinger, P., ‘Commentary. Failing Empires? Strategies and Impacts of Imperial Representation during the Nineteenth Century’, in: J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen, *Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Göttingen 2011), 302-307, 304.

¹¹¹ Haslinger, ‘Commentary’, 306.

¹¹² Unowsky, D.L., *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848-1916* (Columbia 2000), 109.

of the Habsburgs, praying for Franz Joseph's health, and participating in annual celebrations reminding them that they owed loyalty to the ruler.¹¹³ This resulted in great personal popularity of the monarch.

Aside from banknotes, stamps, coins, and in public offices, the visage of the emperor became quite prominent in newspapers, books, pictures, photographs paintings, and other forms of mass consumption. Franz Joseph's reputation as a fair and impartial monarch was often a major feature in the media and his qualities, both myth and true, like his strong sense of duty, his personal modesty, and his family-mindedness, were emphasized. The omnipresence of the emperor's face served two different but overlapping purposes: representation and propaganda. The emperor was for instance often depicted in a private way, i.e. working at his desk or being with his close family, in other words "values that counted much with bourgeois society."¹¹⁴ He could also be portrayed as the mighty ruler who lived in incredible splendour in Vienna in images which "dazzled the uneducated but imaginative peasantry."¹¹⁵

Moreover, Franz Joseph was very recognisable with his sideburns and moustache and especially when he got older, the portraits showed an elderly monarch with a "friendly face ... familiar and well-known, snow-white bearded under the general's hat, the clear blue eyes and the benevolent face, its features glowing with a mellowed, distinguished calm and mild understanding."¹¹⁶ This led to the myth of the hard-working good old emperor.¹¹⁷

The most important method however remained personal visibility. Franz Joseph had visited all the Crownlands during his reign, some quite frequently. During these carefully planned visits he inspected military institutions, participated in manoeuvres, opened exhibitions, bridges, hospitals, held receptions for local dignitaries, visited the *Landtage*, the regional diets, and held speeches. These Kaiserreisen were used to further the imperial myth and to create and sustain patriotic feelings amongst the populations.¹¹⁸

The locations and occasions for a visit were therefore not simply made at the whim of the ruler, but they were discussed with the emperor's closest advisors and often reflected the political necessities of the moment and whether it would result in a surge of *Kaisertreue* in the province or a reduction in national tensions. Hence they were meticulously organised and thoroughly thought out beforehand so that the emperor would come in contact only with carefully selected people while giving the impression that all could participate in the event. This was because of the risk of events that might

¹¹³ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 108. And Baidins, V., *Franz Joseph, Kaisertreue and Loyalty* (UMI 1999), abstract.

¹¹⁴ Urbanitsch, 'Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities', 122.

¹¹⁵ Sugar, P.F., 'The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule', in: *Slavic Review* (1963), 22:1, 1-30, 4.

¹¹⁶ Urbanitsch, 'Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities', 122-123.

¹¹⁷ *Idem*, 130.

¹¹⁸ *Idem*, 123.

disturb the occasion, such as animosities between nationalities, or possible open expressions of disloyalty. Nevertheless, probably only a small minority ever saw the emperor in person.

Though, by 1880, the Cisleithanian government no longer strictly censored the press, it continued to wield significant influence on the coverage of imperial events and matters concerning the imperial family.¹¹⁹ “The risk of confiscation to any publication showing Franz Joseph in a bad light was very high.”¹²⁰ Newspapers were therefore quite positive about imperial events and the government tried to persuade the press to give the widest possible publicity to these occasions, which was made easier because of the growing frequency of publications, the number of newspapers, and literacy rates.¹²¹ Newspaper issues still had to be presented to the censor before publication, but short of publishing insults to and attacks on the imperial family, ethnic slurs, and open calls for violence, the press was free to present widely varying accounts of events to the reading public.¹²²

Galicia was one of the lesser visited Crownlands. Prior to the Kaiserreise of 1880, Franz Joseph had visited Galicia only twice, a Kaiserreise in 1851 and imperial manoeuvres in 1855, during the neo-absolutist regime. The imperial visit was planned just a few years after the revolutions of 1848 so the young emperor could present himself to the population of Galicia during an official inspection tour. The Galician administration had to execute the orders of the Habsburg court and Viennese government, which had arranged a spectacular display of imperial pomp, ceremony, and dynastic power in order to show off the success of the neo-absolutist centralised regime. Franz Joseph reviewed military parades, visited fortifications, and rode through Galician cities and towns in colourful processions. It was written that the masses hailed their ‘emperor-liberator’ who had ended serfdom.¹²³

There was no significant role for the Polish nobility during this tour. They were only to participate in the emperor’s entourage. Their political role was limited during the neo-absolutist era and their appeals for more autonomy were ignored. Unowsky quotes an west Galician aristocrat who stated the hostility of the nobility towards the new regime.¹²⁴ The visit was therefore a strictly choreographed military and bureaucratic affair.¹²⁵

¹¹⁹ Siadkowski, M., ‘The Land Exhibition in Lemberg (Lwów, L’viv) in 1894, Galicia and Schlachzizen in the German political discourse in Vienna’, in: *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* (2009), 58:1,2, 197-222, 209.

¹²⁰ Siadkowski, ‘The Land Exhibition in Lemberg’, 209.

¹²¹ Baidins, *Franz Joseph, Kaisertreue and Loyalty*, 55.

¹²² Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 125.

¹²³ Unowsky, ‘Celebrating Two Emperors and a Revolution’, 114.

¹²⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁵ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 168.

3. Conservative rule, Polish loyalty, and Szlachta dominance

3.1 The *Ausgleich* and Cisleithania

3.1.1 The Habsburg Monarchy

The Habsburg empire grew by incorporating various crown lands through key marriage alliances. Making deals with each set of regional elites separately, the Habsburgs provided concessions and granted privileges in return for allegiance.¹²⁶ Habsburg monarchs relied heavily on the local aristocracy to ensure the collection of taxes, control of the peasantry, the administration of justice, and to maintain traditional order. In return, the crown contributed to the maintenance of seigniorial wealth, inheritance, power, and prestige, maintaining serfdom, and stifling urban and bourgeois development in favour of the nobility.¹²⁷ This feudal compact between the monarchy and the regional landed elite secured resources and was beneficial to maintaining stability.

Charles Tilly also notes the importance of imperial-elite relationships. In his definition of empire, he states that there is:

“1) retention or establishment of particular, distinct compacts for the government of each segment; [and] 2) exercise of power through intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy within their own domains in return for the delivery of compliance, tribute, and military collaboration with the center.”¹²⁸

Nevertheless, the Habsburgs often touched upon this relationship by striving towards a more coherent and integrated state structure. The two most notable were Joseph II, whose decade of reforms (1780-1790) politicised regional elites and affected state-elite relationships, and Franz Joseph’s neo-absolutist regime, which alienated the liberals and the Hungarian elites. After the defeat of the Hungarian revolt of 1848-49 and the subsequent military occupation of Hungary, the emperor tried to incorporate Hungary into an imperial centralised framework which would be governed in a neo-absolutist fashion from Vienna.

Problematic for Franz Joseph’s neo-absolutist regime, was that the Hungarians (and other regional elites) opposed and boycotted the centralised state. The Magyar nobles claimed their rights based on the Golden Bull of 1222, which placed constitutional limits on the powers of the monarch by

¹²⁶ Barkey, K., ‘Changing Modalities of Empire: A Comparative Study of Ottoman and Habsburg Decline’ in: J.W. Esherick, H. Kayali, and Eric van Young eds., *Empire to Nation. Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc: Oxford 2006), 167-197, 178.

¹²⁷ Ibidem.

¹²⁸ Idem, 173.

establishing the Hungarian Diet, and the rights of the aristocracy to disobey the king when he acted against the law.¹²⁹ The opposition by the Hungarian elites meant that the army had to continue to occupy large parts of the empire and could therefore not be used in wars. Moreover, Hungarian units deserted, and the finances of the regime worsened drastically. This resulted in an Austrian defeat in the Italian war of 1859 and the loss of Lombardy.¹³⁰

Another force, that opposed neo-absolutism, was liberalism. The liberals, mostly Austro-Germans, did support the centralised state, but not its absolutist character. Like other liberal movements in nineteenth-century Europe, they were against clericalism, militarism, absolutism, high taxes, and big government. They mostly came from the bureaucracy and bourgeois entrepreneurs, who were essential for the imperial government to function and to finance its policies.¹³¹

With such strong liberal and noble opposition, Franz Joseph was not able to continue his neo-absolutist regime. In order to keep his administration centralised and to finance his government, he made concessions to both which to some extent resulted in restoring Tilly's two basics of imperial-elite relationships. The *Reichsrat* was recalled, its number of deputies was enlarged, and it was granted parliamentary oversight on state expenditures. The emperor had these reforms codified by his Minister of the Interior, the Polish Conservative Count Agenor Goluchowski, who made sure that the Landtage, which were dominated by the conservative aristocracy, retained the right to vote for the Reichsrat deputies. The result was that this October Diploma of 1860 was opposed by the liberals as a feudal, anti-liberal, and decentralising document. The Hungarian elites also contested the October Diploma in that they refused to acknowledge the authority and legitimacy of a central parliament and continued to boycott the imperial institutions.¹³²

Franz Joseph therefore compromised with the liberals, in order to get his financial problems solved. The resulting February Patent of 1861 was formulated by the liberal Anton von Schmerling. It took the new powers away from the Landtage and recentralised the empire. Furthermore, the Reichsrat was turned into a bicameral system with a new voting mechanism as to ensure more power for the bourgeoisie and gained more power over legislation and the budget.¹³³

The Hungarians naturally also opposed the February Patent, as they refused to acknowledge a central parliament which could decide over Hungarian matters. The conservative aristocracy remained against centralisation, was anti-liberal, and was in favour of returning to the *status quo ante* 1848. Hungarian liberals swayed between wishing independence and a constitutional monarchy in a personal union with Austria. In between these factions was the moderate party headed by Ferenc Deák. They

¹²⁹ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 74.

¹³⁰ *Ibidem*, 75

¹³¹ *Ibidem*.

¹³² *Ibidem*, 75-76.

¹³³ *Ibidem*, 76.

argued that Hungary should be a sovereign state, but they recognised the agreed shared prerogatives of the monarch as detailed in the Pragmatic Sanction of 1723 (which prescribed the indivisibility of the Habsburg possessions), such as defence.¹³⁴

The Reichsrat was further undermined in 1863, when the Polish deputies also boycotted the Reichsrat as they were opposed to the declaration of a State of Emergency in Galicia because of the February Uprising of 1863-64 in neighbouring Russian Poland.¹³⁵ The Reichsrat also lost the confidence of the monarch as they voted against increased military spending. The liberals argued that they had no power over the armed forces and they remembered that the military, as a *Kaisertreu* institution, helped the monarch to quell the liberal movements of 1848. Franz Joseph now had to choose between liberal centralisation, but with a lack of finance, or Hungarian support, but with a resulting divided empire. He chose the latter and fired von Schmerling, dissolved the Reichsrat, suspended the February Patent, and started to negotiate with Deák.¹³⁶ The defeat in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 increased the pressure for a quick solution.

The *Ausgleich* of 1867 was based on the Pragmatic Sanction and transformed the empire into a dualist system of two halves: Cisleithania, officially *Die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Länder*, with the adjective k.k., and the Transleithania, officially the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, with the adjective k.u.. Institutions common to both halves of the Dual Monarchy would be referred to as *kaiserlich und königlich*, and were limited to the *Gemeinsame Armee*, the *Ministerium des kaiserlichen und königlichen Hauses und des Äußern*, the *Reichskriegsministerium*, the *Reichsfinanzministerium*, and the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The constitution of December 21st 1867, known as the *Dezemberverfassung*, amended the February Patent. As the Hungarians refused to recognise a central parliament, the Reichsrat was transformed into the parliament of Cisleithania, with a lower house, the *Haus der Abgeordneten*, and an upper house, the *Herrenhaus*. The lower house consisted of 203 seats and the election of representatives remained in the hands of the Landtage with each Crownland having a fixed number of allocated seats: 54 for Bohemia, 38 for Galicia, 5 for Dalmatia, 2 for Trieste etc.¹³⁷ In 1873, the amount of seats was increased to 353 and the allocation of seats was changed accordingly, with Galicia now having 63.¹³⁸ The voting system was also changed. Representatives were now chosen by four groups: the great landowners (85 seats), urban centres (118 seats), chambers of commerce (21 seats), and rural areas (129 seats). The franchise in the urban centres and rural areas was limited to those who

¹³⁴ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 76.

¹³⁵ *Idem*, 77.

¹³⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹³⁷ 'Gesetz vom 21. December 1867 wodurch das Grundgesetz über die Reichsvertretung vom 26. Februar 1861 abgändert wird', in: *Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich* (Vienna 1867), 389-394, 390.

¹³⁸ Binder, H., *Galizien in Wien. Parteien, Wahlen, Fraktionen und Abgeordnete im Übergang zur Massenpolitik* (Vienna 2005), 321.

paid at least 10 gulden in taxes, which was subsequently lowered to 5 In 1882.¹³⁹ The Herrenhaus, on the other hand, remained a centralised institute with a combination of automatic membership for archdukes from the ruling dynasty, the high aristocracy, and high ranking members of the church, and those who were appointed a member for life by the emperor.¹⁴⁰

The new constitution also created a more decentralised state with more power for the Landtage. While article 11 prescribed over which topics the Haus der Abgeordneten held authority and could adopt legislation, article 12 stated that any topic not mentioned in the constitution, would be subject to the authority of the Landtage. If the government wanted to change any of these topics, they had to come to an accord with the regional diets.¹⁴¹ Linked to these new rights for the different lands, were the new rights of citizenship for all inhabitants of Cisleithania, accompanied with a guarantee of equality before the law, freedom of religion, and the equality of all nationalities and their languages.¹⁴²

Finally, the constitution also made provision for the possibility that the Reichsrat could not come to an agreement or was unable to meet, so that the government could govern by imperial decree as long as it did not relate to constitutional changes.¹⁴³ According to Crone, this was a power Franz Joseph did not possess as king of Hungary, and he would use it several times during his reign.¹⁴⁴

3.1.3 The Iron Ring and its successor

While some assessments of late nineteenth-century Cisleithanian political life described it as “a situation of terminal crisis”, more recent studies are less “condemnatory.”¹⁴⁵ Scholars still accept that there were national difficulties, but also have a more complex and nuanced understanding of the constitutional frameworks, the rise of political parties and civil society, and social and economic developments. This was the era of Eduard Graf von Taaffe, who was minister-president between 1879-1893. An era, American historian Gary Cohen, considered to be characterised by “neither absolutism nor anarchy.”¹⁴⁶

After the Ausgleich, the Austro-Germans in the Reichsrat were divided between two main camps: the liberals and the conservatives/clericals. The liberals favoured centralisation and German

¹³⁹ Jenks, W.A., *Austria Under the Iron Ring 1879-1893* (Charlottesville 1965), 18.

¹⁴⁰ ‘Gesetz vom 21. December 1867’, 389-390.

¹⁴¹ Idem, 392.

¹⁴² ‘Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. December 1867 über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder’, in: *Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich* (Vienna 1867), 394-396, 394-396.

¹⁴³ ‘Gesetz vom 21. December 1867’, 392-393.

¹⁴⁴ Crone, *Casus Imperii*, 79.

¹⁴⁵ Cole, L. and D.L. Unowsky, ‘Introduction. Imperial Loyalty and Popular Allegiances in the Late Habsburg Monarchy’, in: L. Cole and D.L. Unowsky (eds.), *The Limits of Loyalty. Imperial symbolism, popular allegiances, and state patriotism in the late Habsburg Monarchy* (New York 2007), 1-10, 1.

¹⁴⁶ Cohen, G.B., ‘Neither Absolutism, nor Anarchy. New Narratives on Society and Government in Late Imperial Austria’, in: *Austrian History yearbook* (1998), 29:1, 37-61, 38-39.

dominance and were against raising taxes to spend on the military, while the clericals had more federalist tendencies, favouring devolving power to the Landtage.¹⁴⁷ This division within the Austro-German ranks made the Cisleithanian government dependent on minority deputies to support their policies. Since the 54 Czech deputies initially boycotted the Reichsrat sessions because they insisted they would get the same status as the Hungarians, the liberals gained a majority in the Reichsrat between 1867 and 1879.¹⁴⁸

However, the liberals in the Haus der Abgeordneten continued to challenge the emperor on his foreign policy dominance and in January 1879 112 liberals voted defiantly against (their own) prince Adolph von Auersperg's liberal government intent to ratify of the Berlin treaty which would legalise the military occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. With this vote they damaged their prestige with the emperor enormously and by contrast, the conservatives looked increasingly responsible, constitutionalist, and Kaisertreu.¹⁴⁹ This made the emperor abandon Auersperg and led him to appoint Taaffe in February 1879 as new Minister of the Interior in a transition government of Karl Ritter von Stremayr to organise elections.¹⁵⁰ The 1879 elections cost the liberals 49 seats and their majority. Taaffe, as a non-aligned politician, got the assignment to create a new cabinet which loyalty was to be "above the parties".¹⁵¹ Nevertheless he had much difficulty in forming a majority government. As the Austro-German vote was split and since a short coalition with the liberals did not work out, he had to work with minority deputies.

First, Taaffe managed to end the Czech boycott by making German and Czech equal *Landessprache* in external administration in Bohemia and Moravia in 1880.¹⁵² Then he formed a coalition with them (54 seats), the tight-knit *Polenklub* or the *Kolo Polskie* (57 seats) and a combination of German clericals, Slovenes, Croats, and Rumanians (57 seats). However, since this coalition had only 168 of the 353 seats in the Reichsrat, with 174 representatives in opposition, Taaffe had to turn to the 11 independents for each vote.¹⁵³

This reliance by the government on Crownland delegations and Taaffe's policy of granting some autonomy to "historic-political entities", made participation in the Reichsrat more attractive to the provincial and nationalist elites.¹⁵⁴ Not only did their support ensure an increase in their Kaisertreu

¹⁴⁷ Jenks, *Austria Under the Iron Ring*, 11-13.

¹⁴⁸ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 109.

¹⁴⁹ Judson, P.M., *Exclusive Revolutionaries. Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848-1914* (Michigan 1996), 186-187.

¹⁵⁰ Frank, M., *Vergleich der Regierungen Cisleithaniens und Ungarns hinsichtlich ihrer Stellung zwischen Volksvertretung und Monarch in Verfassung und Realität von 1867 bis 1918* (Vienna 2013), 54

¹⁵¹ Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries*, 187.

¹⁵² Jenks, W.A., *Austria Under the Iron Ring 1879-1893* (Charlottesville 1965), 59.

¹⁵³ Idem, 35-36.

¹⁵⁴ Wendland, A.V., *Die Russophilen in Galizien. Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland, 1848-1915* (Vienna 2001), 171.

and imperial reputation, but it also increased their chances of lobbying for a decentralisation of power.¹⁵⁵ Especially since they got important ministerial positions: the Polish conservative Julian Ritter von Dunajewski became Minister of Finance in June 1880, and Florian Ritter von Ziemialkowski, a member of the Polish liberals, remained Minister for Galicia, which he had been since 1873.¹⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Taaffe never had to dance to the wishes of the Poles and Czechs as he could threaten to give in to the liberals instead.¹⁵⁷ For thirteen years, Taaffe's 'Iron Ring' government thus managed to govern, create some political stability, and ensure financial resources to buttress Austria-Hungary's diplomatic position.¹⁵⁸

In October 1893, after fourteen years the Iron Ring fell. The Czech deputies had been replaced with younger, more nationalist ones, and they took on a more opposition-like role. This forced Taaffe to turn more often to the Austro-German liberals for support. Subsequently, liberal 'antislavism' caused the Czechs to completely leave the coalition. Also the Poles were unhappy, as a planned reform of the franchise would jeopardise their dominant position in Galicia.¹⁵⁹ Taaffe's dismissal of Dunajewski in 1891, who opposed cooperation with the liberal opposition, did not help.¹⁶⁰ The liberals, clericals, the conservatives, and the Polish Club demanded the end of the Taaffe administration, but decided to continue cooperating in a Grand Coalition under Alfred Graf zu Windisch-Grätz, who became minister-president on November 11th 1893.¹⁶¹ The importance of Polish support was reflected in that they got two ministers: Stanislaw Ritter von Madeyski on Education and Apollinar Ritter von Jaworsky as minister for Galicia.¹⁶²

3.2 Galicia

3.2.1 The Poles

The *Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien*, as the Crownland was officially called, occupied a region that is currently divided between Poland and Ukraine. The conglomerate territory of Polish west Galicia and Ruthenian east Galicia was acquired by the Habsburg Monarchy in the first partition of Poland in 1772 and the subsequent 1793 and 1795 partitions. The name of this new Crownland was given to legitimise Habsburg rule by basing it on a medieval Hungarian claim to Ruthenian Galicia.

¹⁵⁵ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 110.

¹⁵⁶ *Idem*, 112.

¹⁵⁷ Jenks, *Austria Under the Iron Ring*, 53.

¹⁵⁸ Unowsky, D.L., *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848-1916* (2005), 76.

¹⁵⁹ Frank, *Vergleich der Regierungen Cisleithaniens und Ungarns*, 83.

¹⁶⁰ *Idem*, 79-80.

¹⁶¹ *Idem*, 88-89.

¹⁶² In: *Neue Freie Presse Morgenblatt* nr. 10498 (12-11-1893), 2-3.

The Crownland was ruled centrally from Vienna, but after the *Ausgleich* autonomy was granted. Although, technically the October Diploma already allowed for Galician autonomy by changing the empire's organisation from neo-absolutist centralism to aristocratic federalism and increasing the power of local elites.¹⁶³ The Polish elites expressed their delight in the imperial pledge for Galician autonomy in exchange for Polish loyalty and in their 1866 address to Franz Joseph they said: "With you, Our most Gracious Monarch, we stay and wish to stay."¹⁶⁴ However, the October Diploma and the subsequent February Patent failed due to political opposition and it was only after the *Ausgleich* of 1867 that the Crownland gained autonomy.¹⁶⁵ This post *Ausgleich* period is often referred to as the Galician Autonomy era (1867-1918).

The Autonomy era was mainly achieved through the work of Goluchowski, who was also thrice *Statthalter*, governor, of Galicia (1849-1859, 1866-1868, and 1871-1875), and a group of conservative west-Galician *Szlachta* or *Slachzizen*, Polish nobles, who dubbed themselves the *Stanczycy* or *Stanczyks*, after a famous Polish court jester who was a symbol of Polish patriotism.¹⁶⁶ The Poles actively supported the 1863 January Uprising in Russian (Congress) Poland and the Austrian government had declared a state of siege in the Crownland. The subsequent defeat of the uprising by Russian forces and the distrust of the Austrian government of Polish sedition convinced them and a new generation of *Szlachta* to reject revolution as a political tool and instead turned towards a pragmatic/accommodative program of imperial loyalism and focusing on the encouragement of Polish culture and economic growth.¹⁶⁷

In 1867, Józef Szujski, Stanisław Tarnowski, Stanisław Kozmian, and Ludwik Wodzicki published the *Teka Stanczyka*, the Stanczyk Portfolio, in the *Przegląd Polski* newspaper. This portfolio, which turned the Stanczyks effectively in a political faction and argued against glorifying revolution and the encouragement of demonstrations against the *Ausgleich*. The Stanczyks argued that reform would help Polish interests. Any call for protest or revolution was only a diversion of the population from realistic goals such as strengthening the Poles' cultural and economic status, i.e. so-called 'organic work'.¹⁶⁸ In the words of Aleksander Świętochowski, a writer from Russian Poland, "What does every one of us, taken individually, demand? Is it soldiers, battles, victories, conquests, parliaments, representatives, in a word a political apparatus? No, everyone dreams only of being able to live happily, in conformity with the laws of his personal and collective nature."¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ Prokopovych, M., *Habsburg Lemberg. Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital, 1772-1914* (West Lafayette 2009), 76-77.

¹⁶⁴ Trencsényi, B., M. Janowski, M. Baár, M. Falina, & M. Kopeček, *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe. Volume I: Negotiating Modernity in the 'Long Nineteenth Century'* (Oxford 2016), 305

¹⁶⁵ Jenks, *Austria Under the Iron Ring*, 5.

¹⁶⁶ Trencsényi et al., *A History of Modern Political thought in East Central Europe*, 298.

¹⁶⁷ Idem, 278.

¹⁶⁸ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 111.

¹⁶⁹ Idem, 292.

The Stanczyks considered it possible to achieve this without necessarily establishing a Polish sovereign state.¹⁷⁰ Goluchowski and the Stanczyks' idea was to reduce (or even take away) the distrust of the Poles from the mind of the Austrian government through a policy of accommodation with the imperial state which would secure a leading and dominant position for the Polish elites in Galicia and secure nationalist policies. Therefore, Goluchowski and the Stanczyks set to build a conservative coalition comprised of the Stanczyk Szlachta, Cracow and Lemberg bureaucrats, and the *Podolacy* (East-Galician magnates). Based on the agreement of Kaiserstreue and Polish nationalist gains, this coalition had by 1880 managed to solidify their control of political and cultural institutions of Galicia.¹⁷¹ Moreover, Stanczyk members gained significant influence in Galicia, for instance over leading west-Galician newspapers such as *CZAS* (Time) and *Przegląd Polski*, or through important posts like Józef Szujski, who was rector of Cracow's Jagiellonian University, Józef Majer, who became president of the Academy of Sciences, and count Alfred Potocki, who had been the prime minister of Cisleithania between 1870-1871 and became the Statthalter of Galicia between 1875-1883.¹⁷²

Furthermore, due to the restrictive voting franchise and election manipulation, Polish and Ruthenian peasant representation in the Galician Landtag, the *Sejm*, was minimalised, thereby ensuring conservative control of the Galician parliament. This combination of parliamentary majority and having officials in high executive offices, "accelerated the Polonization of the administrative" that had begun under Goluchowski (Polish had been made the internal administrative language in the Galician judiciary and administration in the early 1870's).¹⁷³ In 1877 the Sejm therefore established the *Wydział Krajowy*, a committee of six parliamentarians that oversaw an apparatus of administration parallel to the *Statthaltereij*.¹⁷⁴

The conservative coalition, however, also faced opposition from other Poles. Like in Cisleithania, the Galician political landscape was divided between conservatism and liberalism. The main opposition against Stanczyk policies therefore came from the liberal *Towarzystwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne*, the Polish Democratic Party, under the leadership of Franciszek Smolka.¹⁷⁵ The liberals emphasised the history and traditions of the Polish nation, anticlericalism and democracy, which stood for community, collective values, the end of aristocratic rule, and the end of the Austrian enforced institutional structure, that would benefit the nations development.¹⁷⁶ In other words, the liberal

¹⁷⁰ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 292.

¹⁷¹ Unowsky, 'Celebrating Two Emperors and a Revolution', 115.

¹⁷² Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 112.

¹⁷³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷⁵ Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien*, 152.

¹⁷⁶ Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 35.

programme was one of democratic national patriotism, and much less pragmatic/accommodative than that of the conservative Stanczyks.¹⁷⁷

Lemberg, which was a stronghold of the Polish Democratic Party, while Cracow was that of the Stanczyks. During the autonomy era, Lemberg, the capital of the Galician Crownland and home to the Galician parliament, the *Sejm*, transformed from a city of German-speaking bureaucrats to a Polish speaking city. However, Lemberg was also home to large groups of Jews, Ruthenes, and German-speakers. According to Markian Prokopovych, this resulted in the Galician capital becoming an arena for contests of representation, especially between the Poles and Ruthenes.¹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, despite the nationalist conflicts, the city remained “one of the most *Kaisertreu* in the monarchy.”¹⁷⁹

The Poles’ strongest trump card was the Polish Club in the Reichsrat, in which the Polish conservatives and liberals were united under the strong leadership of Kazimierz Ritter von Grocholski.¹⁸⁰ They managed to overcome their different perspectives on opposition against Viennese control and imperial loyalty for the common Polish interest of Galicia. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, both the conservative coalition and the Polish Democrats agreed to work together in the Reichsrat and to support the Taaffe administration in exchange for incremental gains for Polish interests in Galicia and important government positions. As Alan Sked states “the year 1868 therefore brought an effusive declaration of loyalty to the Monarchy and to dualism, with which the Poles proved themselves the staunchest pillar of the new political system.”¹⁸¹

Stanczyk hegemony, and their political vision, came under attack however in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. New generations and upcoming urban elites increasingly perceived the Democrats as the party of the future. The liberals emphasized industrialising Galicia, a message that was favoured by the middle classes, and opposition against aristocratic rule, while the conservative coalition continued to serve aristocratic interests by favouring agrarian policies.¹⁸² They even founded a new newspaper, *Nowa Reforma*, in Stanczyk dominated Cracow, to express the re-energised liberal vision. The elections for the Sejm of 1889 therefore resulted in a larger liberal representation. There was now a more clear division than ever before between the conservative coalition between Stanczyks and the aristocracy, the *Unia koserwatywna*, and the democratic left, the *Lewica*.¹⁸³ The conservatives were slowly losing their dominant position within Galicia.

¹⁷⁷ Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 40.

¹⁷⁸ Prokopovych, *Habsburg Lemberg*, 5.

¹⁷⁹ Idem, 9.

¹⁸⁰ Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 321. And Frank, *Vergleich der Regierungen Cisleithaniens und Ungarns*, 73.

¹⁸¹ Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 224.

¹⁸² Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 42.

¹⁸³ Idem, 42, 56.

3.2.2 The Ruthenes

While the western part of Galicia was home to the majority of Poles, while the Ruthenes dwelled mostly in the east. Before 1848, the Ruthenes had been divided into the Greek Catholic clergy and the peasantry, with very few intellectuals living in the cities.¹⁸⁴ Its nobility had by then largely assimilated into the *Szlachta* and urban dwellers were mostly Poles. In the nineteenth century, however, the Ruthenes started to focus more on their national-cultural identity within Polish Galicia and its links with their Ukrainian brethren in Russia. In 1848 their leaders declared clearly that “Wir sind anders” and “Wir sind nicht Polen”, but “galizische Ruthenen”, a people with its own language, religion and history.¹⁸⁵

These leaders, the *starorusyny* (Old Ruthenes), also known as St. George’s Circle, dominated Ruthenian intellectual life before the 1860’s. Made up mostly by Greek Catholic clerics, they had a “vague sense of cultural unity with other Rus’ people”, but they remained loyal to the imperial state.¹⁸⁶ As the first leaders of the ‘Ruthenian nation’, they dominated Ruthenian cultural institutions, like the National Home and their newspaper *Slovo* (The Word).¹⁸⁷

Within this group there were those whose convictions gradually changed and became increasingly more pro-Russian, after what they considered to be the ‘Austrian betrayal of Ruthenian Kaiserstreue by letting the ‘seditious’ Polish nobility rule them after 1848.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, initiatives by Statthalter Goluchowski to Latinise the Ruthene Cyrillic alphabet religious reforms to make the Greek Catholics less orthodox further aggravated them and some of them started to call themselves *Moloda Rus*, the Young Russians, but they were also known as the Young Ruthenes.¹⁸⁹ These ‘Russophiles’ desired a strengthening of Ukrainian national identity, autonomy for the Ruthenes, or a cultural and political unification with Ukraine, in some cases even with Russia.¹⁹⁰

Besides the Old Ruthenes and the Young Russians, another group developed, the ‘Ukrainophiles’, also known as the national populists. They were unsatisfied with the *status quo* and wanted to cultivate Ukrainian culture and language within the imperial framework. They also founded their own newspaper in 1880, *Dilo* (The Deed) in opposition to the Old Ruthene/Russophile one¹⁹¹ and held their first public manifestation in Lemberg in 1880.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁴ Isaievych, I., ‘Galicia and Problems of National Identity’, in: R. Robertson and E. Timms (eds.), *The Habsburg Legacy. National Identity in Historical Perspective* (Edinburgh 1994), 37-45, 38.

¹⁸⁵ Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 44.

¹⁸⁶ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 146.

¹⁸⁷ Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 45.

¹⁸⁸ Isaievych, ‘Galicia and Problems of National Identity’, 39.

¹⁸⁹ Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 45.

¹⁹⁰ Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien*, 150.

¹⁹¹ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 148.

¹⁹² Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 49.

The Ruthenes were represented by Old Ruthenes in the Reichsrat and had been allies of the liberal government of Auersperg despite liberal anticlericalism and the fact that two-thirds of the Ruthenian deputation were clerics.¹⁹³ The Ruthenes did support the liberals because of the enlightened heritage of Joseph II who's reforms had targeted inequality between peoples and religions. The Auersperg administration did however rest on a solid parliamentary majority and the vision of a centralised Cisleithania. The Ruthene representatives could therefore not utilise their support as successfully as the Poles later did with Taaffe.¹⁹⁴ After the 1879 elections, the Ruthenes lost many seats and ended with only three representatives. The liberal opposition therefore did no longer consider them to be useful allies and the Ruthenes, though often still voting with the liberals, also posed themselves as a government-friendly opposition. They also cooperated somewhat with the Polish representative, but after the death of Grocholski in 1888, the four remaining Ruthenian representatives left the Polish Club and joined the opposition against Taaffe and later Windisch-Grätz.¹⁹⁵

Within the Galician diet, the Poles were dominant and only 8,6-14,2% of the seats in the Sejm were occupied by Ruthenes between 1877-1908.¹⁹⁶ They could therefore not form an effective political opposition within the Crownland and soon the official language in the province and the two universities (Cracow and Lvov) was Polish and only Polish schools and cultural institutions received official support while Ruthenian ones did not. Needless to say, this fed the sense of grievance of the Ruthenes and led to nationalist tensions. Nevertheless, compared to the views of the Polish Democrats on Polishness, the Ruthenes considered the "Krakauer", the Stancyks, as more open and tolerant than the "Lemberger."¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 344.

¹⁹⁴ Idem, 345.

¹⁹⁵ Frank, *Vergleich der Regierungen Cisleithaniens und Ungarns*, 73.

¹⁹⁶ Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 224.

¹⁹⁷ Binder, *Galizien in Wien*, 42.

4. Nationalist *Kaisertreue* in Galicia 1880

4.1 The different ambitions of 1880

It was not until 1880, twenty-five years after the last visit, that the emperor returned to Galicia. The Kaiserreise of 1851 had been a spectacular display of imperial pomp, ceremony, and dynastic power. Post-Ausgleich constitutionalism and the Autonomy era in Galicia meant that these celebrations were no longer needed to strengthen the militaristic neo-absolutist state. Constitutionalism had changed the role, or at least the perception, of Franz Joseph and, as Galicia had become more autonomous, the success of promoting *Kaisertreue* now more than ever rested on the cooperation of political elites and their help in penetrating this idea into the broader segments of society through the media, Habsburg symbolism, institutions, and the formation of an imperial group identity.

Besides the old characterisation of the emperor as the personification of the state and the representative of the history, honour, and prestige of the Monarchy, constitutionalism had made Franz Joseph the guarantor of the rule of law and the protector of all peoples of the Dual Monarchy, their equality, their language, and their heritage.¹⁹⁸ No longer the strict father-figure who ruled over his children, now he was the wise and caring patron of the social, economic, and political development of all imperial subjects. The programme and the goals of the Kaiserreise adjusted accordingly and less attention was given to the military during the visits, though it remained an important aspect of every imperial inspection tour, and more to events that would bolster the link between dynasty/imperial state and the local elites, and between monarch and his peoples.

The imperial visit was also an important stage in the conflict between the Austro-German liberals and the conservative Iron Ring government of Cisleithania. Taaffe's administration rested on the support of the Polish Club to maintain its majority over the liberal opposition and the Kaiserreise therefore had to support their allies, the Polish conservatives. Moreover, it was also to remind the Poles of the benefits of belonging to the Dual Monarchy, by promoting dynastic loyalty and to remind the Poles that under Habsburg rule they enjoyed a national autonomy experienced by the Poles of no other land.

As Franz Joseph's popularity had risen enormously since 1851, the Polish elites, both pro-autonomy aristocrats, anti-absolutist liberals, and critical nationalists, were much more willing to cooperate with the Court to spread *Kaisertreue* and to use it for their own benefit. They utilised the popular Franz Joseph in order to influence public opinion into supporting their vision for Galicia and the Polish nation.¹⁹⁹ Unlike 1851, when the Galician administration had to bow to the wishes of Vienna,

¹⁹⁸ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 128.

¹⁹⁹ *Idem*, 114.

the Polish conservatives now took the initiative in organising the celebrations. The Cisleithanian government and the court therefore generally deferred to the Crownland's administration on the content of speeches and planned ceremonial occasions.

Nevertheless, Franz Joseph retained the right to approve every detail and change in the programme, and he did so, even last-minute.²⁰⁰ Moreover, Statthalter Potocki often corresponded with the Court official in charge of the Kaiserreise, the emperor's General adjutant, field Marshall Friedrich Freiherr von Mondel, as to coordinate the events and to make sure both sides agreed with the programme, the travel schedule, and which cities the emperor should visit.²⁰¹ Furthermore, the Hofquartiermeister, Michael von Branko, travelled to Cracow and Lemberg to arrange all local imperial receptions and banquets, as well as lodgings for the emperor and his staff.²⁰² Together, the Court and the Polish conservatives agreed on a programme that would promote Kaisertreue based "on the mutual understanding of rights and duties between the emperor, as the symbol of the state, and the Polish conservatives, as the acknowledged legitimate and natural leadership of Galicia."²⁰³ The Stanczyk vision of a Polish Galicia under Habsburg rule would be presented to the masses and the reading public of Austria-Hungary.

The conservative coalition in the Sejm voted to allocate funds for an elaborate reception and a central committee was established under the direction of Ludwik Wodzicki, original Stanczyk member and now the *Landmarschall*.²⁰⁴ One of the main decisions taken by this committee was the establishment of a citizens guard wearing national red-white or blue-white colours, to provide security during the emperor's stay in Cracow and to show the Kaisertreue of the population and its support for the monarchy.²⁰⁵ Normally, army units in the Crownland would be mobilised for the emperor's visit. Article 47 of the *Dienst-Reglement für das kaiserlich-königliche Heer* prescribed that during a Kaiserreise, the emperor should be guarded by the military, that there should be military honour guards, and that military parades were to be held.²⁰⁶ Potocki pleaded with Von Mondel to leave the security arrangements to the citizens guard in order to prevent Galician discontent in seeing the army on the streets as this would be reminiscent of military occupation. Having the emperor surrounded by

²⁰⁰ 'General Adjutant Seiner Majestaet des Kaisers, Wien am 27. August 1880' found in HHStA NZA karton 367.

²⁰¹ 'Telegram No 4536' found in HHStA NZA karton 367.

²⁰² 'K.K. Telegrafenamts Ischl Aufgegeben in Krakau am 9/8 18880 Nr 1082' found in Kriegsarchiv Generaladjutantur (GA) karton 11.

²⁰³ Unowsky, 'Celebrating Two Emperors and a Revolution', 115.

²⁰⁴ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 115.

²⁰⁵ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 57.

²⁰⁶ *Dienst-Reglement für das kaiserlich-königliche Heer. Erster Theil. Zweite Auflage des Reglements vom Jahre 1874* (Vienna 1888), 160-163..

the citizen's guard would show his trust in his Galician subjects. Therefore, an exception was made through a special Command nr. 180.²⁰⁷

The committee also used the Kaiserreise to define a series of Polish national symbols, all of which had been gained and supported due to the close relationship between the emperor and the Polish elites. Franz Joseph approved the preliminary program which was to emphasize the advantages of this close relationship.²⁰⁸ Visits would include the Galician Diet, the Krakow and Lemberg Universities, and the Krakow Academy of Sciences, all of which were dominated by Stanczyk's or other members of the conservative coalition.

The Polish liberal opposition opposed the narrative of natural Szlachta leadership and absolute loyalty to the Habsburgs and while the conservative coalition dominated Cracow and the Sejm, Lemberg remained a bastion of the Polish liberals. Events in Lemberg therefore did not always confirm to the will of the Polish conservatives.²⁰⁹ The Polish Democrats organised festivities with a Polish national message which was not limited to Galicia, for instance inviting Polish dancers from Russian Poland for a theatre production.²¹⁰

The Kaiserreise was also an opportunity for the Ruthenian elites to portray depict themselves as the other nationality in Galicia that was different from the Poles and their vision of a Polish Galicia. The refusal of the Lemberg Ruthenes to accept the low profile assigned to them in the conservative-produced presentation of Galician society placed some limits on the all-Polish flavour of the inspection tour in east Galicia.²¹¹ The Russophile Ukrainophile division within Ruthene society manifested itself in the different reactions of *Slovo* and *Dilo* to the Polish dominance. Ruthenian intellectuals of both sides criticised Polish domination of the preparations for the Kaiserreise. *Slovo* suggested that the Poles had "forgotten" to look for Ruthenes, outside of the Greek Catholic clergy, and had "forgotten" about the existence of the Ruthenes.²¹² Bishop Sembratovyc, leader of the Old Ruthenes, wrote to Potocki insisting on the addition of imperial visits to the Ruthenian National Home and to St. George's Greek Catholic Cathedral. *Dilo* newspaper argued in the meantime that Ruthenes had the right and obligation to greet the emperor, since "[w]e still live in Austria and not in Poland."²¹³

In reaction, the Russophiles wanted to create a list of grievances and present it to the emperor during the Kaiserreise, while the Ukrainophiles wanted to make the events a success in order to prove to the Poles, the emperor, and the rest of the Dual Monarchy, "that the Ruthenians existed, were loyal

²⁰⁷ 'Militär Commando Befehl 180, Krakau am 23. August 1880, Prás No. 645' found in Kriegsarchiv GA karton 11.

²⁰⁸ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 119.

²⁰⁹ Unowsky, "'Our gratitude has no limit'", 164.

²¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹¹ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 152.

²¹² Originally in *Slovo* (22-07-1880), 3. Quoted in Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 153.

²¹³ Originally in *Dilo* (7-08-1880), 1. Quoted in Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 155.

to Austria and to the Habsburgs [...], and would not allow themselves to be represented and governed by Poles.”²¹⁴ In a meeting in the *Ruska Rada*, the Ruthenian Council, the National Populists managed to win the discussion in favour of organising Ruthenian events, but they promised a large protest gathering in Lemberg against the Poles after the emperor had left.²¹⁵ The Polish conservatives had to acquiesce to this as Franz Joseph’s desire to show himself as the father and caring patron of all of his peoples led him to ask to visit institutions, churches, and temples from the other nationalities.²¹⁶

4.2 Cracow and Lemberg

The programme of the Kaiserreise was revisited several times to include new visits to institutions, receptions, or to change the amount of time reserved for those visits. Nevertheless, the travel schedule for the Kaiserreise remained mostly untouched. On September 1st, Franz Joseph would arrive in Cracow and would be received by those with high courtly titles, the clergy, the officer corps, and representatives of the authorities. After three days of audiences, receptions, dinners, balls, and visits, he would travel on for military manoeuvres and after that arrive in Lemberg on September 11th where he would stay for four days.²¹⁷

In Cracow, festivities followed the schedule authored by Potocki and the Polish conservative dominated central committee. According to the liberal *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* the imperial visit was first and foremost a display of the ‘Polishness’ of Galicia’s main institutions.²¹⁸ The emperor knelt before relics of Polish saints held aloft by Roman Catholic priests and signed his name in Polish in school guest books. When Franz Joseph arrived, some 50,000 lined the streets of Cracow, the largest city in western Galicia, the political stronghold of the Stanczyks, and, with its castles, monasteries, and churches, the symbolic capital of the defunct Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.²¹⁹

The emperor held several speeches, the content of which was coordinated between the Kabinettskanzlei and the Stanczyk dominated Statthalterei, and therefore included references to the natural and legitimate leadership of the Polish aristocracy and the emperor’s own role as the symbol of the state and the guarantor of Polish heritage and culture. In Cracow, for instance, Franz Joseph said that “Es freut Mich, bei Meinem Besuch Galiziens zuertst das Gebiet dieser altehrwürdigen Stadt betreten zu können, an welche sich so viele geschichtliche Erinnerungen des ganzen Landes

²¹⁴ Originally in *Slovo and Dilo*. Quoted in Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 155.

²¹⁵ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 156.

²¹⁶ Unowsky, “Our gratitude has no limit”, 165.

²¹⁷ ‘PROGRAMM für die Allerhöchste Reise Sr. Majestät des Kaisers nach Olmütz ferner durch Galizien und die Bukowina, endlich nach Czegléd und Fünfkirchen vom 29. August bis 23. September 1880.’ Found in HHStA SB NI Braun 22-10-2.

²¹⁸ Originally in *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* (05-09-1880), 1. Quoted in Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 133.

²¹⁹ Unowsky, ‘Celebrating Two Emperors and a Revolution’, 115.

knüpfen.²²⁰ Moreover, he praised the Polish aristocracy who, based on their “ritterliche Traditionen”, worked for the good of Galicia and the Monarchy.²²¹ The content was however not completely controlled by the Polish conservatives as Franz Joseph and Taaffe had to approve the speeches and they could make changes.²²² The Kabinettkanzlei, for instance, altered a speech for the city of Lemberg by crossing out parts that referred to it as the “Landshauptstadt” or called it the centre of Galician development.²²³

Speeches by notables and officials were also written by the Galician government, often in Polish, and always included the conservative principles of unshakable loyalty to the emperor, dynastic patriotism of the people, the relationship between the elite and the monarch, and the development of the Poles and their identity under Habsburg rule. Especially the mutually reinforcing nature of these aspects was to be emphasized.²²⁴ Cracow mayor Zyblikiewicz’s draft on his welcoming speech for instance included the lines: “under Your Majesty’s just sceptre, we have been permitted to be and to remain Poles.”²²⁵ He further praised the emperor who “recognized our national rights, and aided the development of national institutions that once again ignite the spirit of our national life.”²²⁶ Other speeches by politicians, Stancyks, and other members of the Galician administration, also made these principles the core of their message.

The Court received these Polish speeches with German translations in order to formulate the emperor’s responses. These were mostly done in German (not a language broadly understood by the masses) and often of a similar nature, stating his delight in the receptions, the organisation, and the cheering people, while he recognised their expressed loyalty to his house and emphasized his hope that they would continue to do so in the future as well as cooperate with the rest of the empire. For example, in Cracow he responded to the speech by the *Landmarschall* Wodzicki with:

“Bleiben Sie auch fernerhin fest und standhaft in der Treue und Anhänglichkeit an Mein Haus und das Reich, von dessen Blüthe auch Ihre Wohl bedingt ist, - mögen auch all diejenigen, die berufen sind, für das Beste der Bevölkerung zu sorgen, im einträchtigen Zusammenwirken und uneigennütziger Fürsorge für das Land nicht ermüden, und Sie können stets Meiner besonderen Gewogenheit versichert sein.”²²⁷

²²⁰ ‘3. Auf die Anspruchn und Krakauer [...]’ found in HHStA Kabinettskanzlei 51.

²²¹ ‘4. Für ein Deputation der galizischen Adels’ found in HHStA Kabinettskanzlei 51.

²²² Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 124.

²²³ ‘7. Für die Stadt Lemberg’ found in HHStA Kabinettskanzlei 51.

²²⁴ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 125.

²²⁵ *Idem*, 135.

²²⁶ In: CZAS nr. 201 (02-09-1880), 1.

²²⁷ ‘Auf die Ansprache der Landmarschall vom Krakauer [...]’ found in HHStA Kabinettskanzlei 51.

The Polish conservative's vision of representing a Polish Galicia was further emphasized through clothing and language during official events. Von Mondel and his official Von Loebenstein, who amongst many others accompanied the emperor during his visit, often send back reports to the *Erster Obersthofmeisteramt*, the head of the imperial court, prince Konstantin zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, detailing the exact times of arrival and departure of the emperor and noting important events. A report by Loebenstein, for instance, describes how the aristocracy and high ranking authorities welcomed the emperor in their "Nationalcostuum" at Cracow station.²²⁸ National costumes were also worn during banquets and balls²²⁹ and the invitations were often written in Polish, even those for non-Polish speakers like Von Loebenstein.²³⁰ Moreover, not only the elites wore their national costumes, the Cracow district also organised and clothed six-hundred peasant riders to accompany the emperor's carriage procession.²³¹

The most visible and important event that emphasised Polish heritage and culture was the dedication of Wawel Castle as an imperial residence. This decision had been prepared for months, with the Sejm passing a resolution in July 1880 requesting the removal of the imperial garrison and changing its designation as a fortress.²³² In a ceremony on September 2nd, Wodzicki, asked the emperor to restore the castle to its former glory as a royal residence, which the emperor conceded in a speech.²³³ This was an important symbolic gesture in that the former residence of Polish monarchs, symbolising Polish heritage and culture, became a Habsburg residence, thereby symbolising the union of Galicia and the Polish nation with the Habsburg dynasty and the Austrian monarchy.²³⁴ According to CZAS, with this act Franz Joseph symbolised that he was no foreign ruler occupying Polish lands, but an heir to the kings of Poland and one of their own.²³⁵

The speeches, costumes, and events mattered and influenced public opinion more than in 1851, as the 1880 *Kaiserreise* was a public event. Due to new communication technology, publication of (critical) newspapers, improvements in the education system, increasing literacy, and expansion of suffrage for *Reichsrat* elections, Galicia's inhabitants were more aware of the imperial centre and were called up to participate in the reception of the emperor. In the reports, Von Loebenstein mentions the many Galicians who stood beside the railway tracks to greet the emperor on his way to Cracow and he

²²⁸ 'Geheime Berichte. No.2 Krysovice, am 6. Septemb. 1880 – Loebenstein Obersthofsamt – Official' found in HHStA NZA karton 367.

²²⁹ 'Einladung zur Tafel bei Seiner Majestät dem Kaiser Am Mittwoch, den 1ten September 1880 in Krakau' found in HHStA NZA karton 367.

²³⁰ 'Presydyent Miasta Krakova' found in HHStA NZA karton 367.

²³¹ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 138.

²³² Ibidem.

²³³ 'Wawel' found in HHStA Kabinettskanzlei 51.

²³⁴ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 139

²³⁵ Originally in CZAS. Quoted in Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 62.

describes the emperor's arrival "unter dem Jübel von der bevolkerung."²³⁶ Mondel, furthermore, records that the people who "begeizsts jübeln die authentische Freude über der angefangen Besuchs Seiner Majestät."²³⁷ The goal that during this visit, nearly every Galician either saw the emperor, spoke to someone who did, read about his visit, or heard it from a town-crier or priest, was probably achieved.

In between his visits to Cracow and Lemberg, Franz Joseph did participate in military manoeuvres outside Premissel (Przemyśl) for about seven days.²³⁸ The military aspects of the visits and their coverage were limited by the conservatives to not detract from the Polish nature of the festivities.²³⁹ After Premissel, the emperor visited Lemberg, the official capital of the Galician Crownland and its largest city. Approximately one hundred thousand peoples lined the street as the emperor arrived, with many having travelled to the Galician capital. Unlike Cracow, which was the city of the Stancyks and Polishness, Lemberg was the 'Austrian city' in Galicia with its distinctive buildings and a cosmopolitan population of Poles, Ruthenes, Jews, Armenians, and Germans. Furthermore, it was in the hands of the Polish Democrats, not the conservatives and it was the centre of Ruthenian intellectual life.²⁴⁰ The conservative narrative of a natural Szlachta rule and an all-Polish presentation of Galician society was therefore much more contested. Nevertheless, another report by Von Loebenstein also noted that the authorities and aristocracy chose to receive Franz Joseph in national costume.²⁴¹

The Ruthenes formed the largest challenge for the conservative narrative. As mentioned earlier, the Russophiles and Ukrainophiles united behind the plan to host Ruthenian events for the emperor while refraining from public demonstrations against Polish oppression during the emperor's visit as a token of their Kaisertreue. They also used national costumes, blue-yellow colours, and symbolism to present their nation as different from the Poles.²⁴² The liberal *Neue Freie Presse*, which was pro-Ruthenian, noted the Ruthenian efforts and wrote that "Das ruthenische Volk wird den Kaiser von Oesterreich-Ungarn als seinen rechtmäßigen Herrscher ehrfurchtsvoll begrüßen, aber seineswegs sich zu einer Folie für die polnische Herrlichkeit und das „Versöhnungsprogramm“ des Grafen Taaffe hergeben."²⁴³

²³⁶ 'Geheime Berichte. No.2 Krysovice, am 6. Septemb. 1880 – Loebenstein Obersthofsamt – Officiel' found in HHStA NZA karton 367.

²³⁷ 'Telegram No 4335' found in HHStA NZA karton 367.

²³⁸ 'PROGRAMM für die Allerhöchste Reise Sr. Majestät des Kaisers nach Olmütz ferner durch Galizien und die Bukowina, endlich nach Czegléd und Fünfkirchen vom 29. August bis 23. September 1880.' Found in HHStA SB NI Braun 22-10-2.

²³⁹ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 125.

²⁴⁰ Idem, 145.

²⁴¹ 'Geheime Berichte. No.4 Czernowitz, am 17. Septemb. 1880 – Loebenstein' found in HHStA NZA karton 367.

²⁴² Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 68.

²⁴³ In: *Neue Freie Presse Morgenblatt* nr. 5725 (05-08-1880), 3.

The emperor's visit to St. Georges Cathedral and the National Home were important for the Ruthenes to show off their nationhood not only to the emperor, but also to the reading public of the Dual Monarchy. On September 13th, a large gathering of Ruthene priests received the emperor and a speech by bishop Sembratovyc was held in Ukrainian to emphasise their difference from the Poles and their loyalty to the Habsburg monarch.²⁴⁴ The visit to the National Home was utilised by the Ruthenes to declare their nationhood, as one of their leaders praised Franz Joseph for his imperial protection for all that was "sacred and precious for the Ruthenians, our nationality, our ecclesiastical rite, our language, our script, our customs and our ways [...] the more than one thousand year old heritage of the Ruthenian nation."²⁴⁵

Another thing the emperor did, that did not please the conservatives, was his acceptance of grievances and petitions of the common folk. The conservatives argued that presenting petitions to imperial institutions, such as the Court and the Cisleithanian government, undermined their Galician institutions and ordered the citizen's guard to deter the people from trying. However, Franz Joseph often halted his walk or his carriage ride in order to receive them and reports mention over 9,000 petitions that were presented to him during the Kaiserreise.²⁴⁶ Franz Joseph was a wealthy monarch and the people knew he often distributed funds to petitioners and charities. Moreover, a court official Joseph von Kundrat advised the emperor to be extra liberal with giving money in this case, for "the political importance, which lies in the impression left on the population, cannot be overlooked."²⁴⁷

4.3 Political and national perspectives

As mentioned earlier, the censorship of the news coverage of the 1880 Kaiserreise was quite limited. Taaffe's government, the Austro-German liberals, Ruthenian intellectuals, The Polish Conservatives and the Polish Democrats were therefore free to frame their own interpretation of the imperial visit.²⁴⁸ To control the coverage to some extent, minister-president Taaffe asked Von Mondel that Dr. Heinrich Blumenstok of the pro-government *Wiener Zeitung* would receive full access.²⁴⁹ Statthalter Potocki also requested that Von Mondel would give full access to Ladislaus Ritter von Lozinski from the *Gazeta Lwowska* during the visit, as that newspaper was an important channel of the Galician government.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁴ 'Ansprachen der [...] Lembratowicz in Lemberg [...] st. Georges kirchel' found in HHStA Kabinettskanzlei 51.

²⁴⁵ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 158.

²⁴⁶ '1880 map 11, ad. 1248 corr. 880' found in HHStA Kabinettskanzlei Direktionsakten 1880-1884 (11).

²⁴⁷ Unowsky, D., "'Our gratitude has no limit": Polish Nationalism, Dynastic Patriotism and the 1880 Imperial Inspection Tour of Galicia', in: *Austrian History Yearbook* (2003), 34, 145-171, 165.

²⁴⁸ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 125.

²⁴⁹ 'K.K. Minister-Praesident, no 259, Taaffe an Friedrich Freiherrn von Mondel' found in Kriegsarchiv GA karton 11.

²⁵⁰ 'N. 8328 von statthalterij Praesidium in Lemberg, Potocki an Von Mondel' found in Kriegsarchiv GA karton 11.

Stanczyk interpretation and goals of the Kaiserreise were made clear from the start. As mentioned in the introduction, on the first day of the emperor's visit to Cracow, the Stanczyk newspaper CZAS published an editorial which described the Stanczyk perception of the relationship between Galicia and Cisleithania and argued in favour of Kaisertreue to a monarch who had enabled Galicia's development and protected its freedom to be Polish. CZAS was normally published in Polish, but because the Stanczyks wanted to promote Galicia and the Polish Kaisertreu reputation to the reading public of the Dual Monarchy, this editorial was also published in German and copies were sent to other newspapers, like the *Wiener Zeitung*.²⁵¹ In the article, Klobukowski wrote on the "engste geistige und moralische Vereinigung, die ebenso den schönen polnischen Überlieferungen, als auch den grossen Traditionen des alten Habsburghauses entspricht."²⁵² And he praised Franz Joseph, stating that:

"Der Monarch, den wir soeben empfangen sollen, war der erste, der seinen polnischen Unterthanen wesentliches und volles Vertrauen entgegengebracht – und zwar vertraute er nicht bloß ihrem Edelmuthe und ihrer Treue, sondern auch ihrer politischen Klugheit, und Opferwilligkeit; er hat ihnen nicht bloß ihre angeborene Rechte zuerkannt, sondern er beruft sie auf seine Seite."²⁵³

Moreover, he claimed that because of this recognition, the Polish people would not need to be untrue to their "natürlichen Rechten und angeborenen Gefühlen [...] und Er [the emperor] brachte das Alles in Einklang mit dem Wohle der Monarchie. Aus diese Art ermöglichte Er uns die Anknüpfung inniger, ja freundschaftlicher Verbindungen mit den anderen Völkern Oesterreichs."

Franz Joseph was hailed as the monarch who had made it possible for the Poles freely use their language and culture, which in turn made them loyal to him and his realm and would allow them to be on friendly terms with the monarchy's other nationalities. The goal of the editorial was to confirm the leading role of the Polish conservatives in Galicia and their policies, which had benefited.²⁵⁴ The implication was that Stanczyk Kaisertreu policies were both pro-Polish and pro-Austrian, and that this had secured autonomy and a consolidation and strengthening of Polish culture, while at the same time strengthening dynastic loyalty and the will to remain within the Austrian monarchy. The article therefore states: "Treu stehen wir zu Dir, treu wollen wir stehen für immer dar!"²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ In: *Wiener Zeitung* nr. 202 (01-09-1880), 4-5.

²⁵² In: CZAS Nr. 200. *Auszüge in deutscher Uebersetzung* (31-08-1880), found in HHStA NZA karton 367.

²⁵³ Ibidem.

²⁵⁴ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 127.

²⁵⁵ In: *Wiener Zeitung* nr. 202 (01-09-1880), 5.

Other Stanczyk newspapers, like the *Przegląd Polski*, called the Kaiserreise as a “triumph of Stanczyk organisation and proved the success of conservative loyalism.”²⁵⁶ The crowds who cheered the emperor and the speeches of the Polish elites appeared to confirm the conservatives' vision and policies for achieving Polish interests within an autonomous Galicia.²⁵⁷ While *Przegląd Polski* spoke more broadly of the development of the Polish nation, CZAS' review of the Kaiserreise focused on more concrete results of the cooperation between the Poles and Taaffe's administration. The Cisleithanian policy of provincial autonomy had “brought toe Poles into the monarchy and its affairs and promised to lead to greater Polish control in Galicia and a strengthening of the state.”²⁵⁸ CZAS also compared the oppression of Polish culture in neighbouring Russian Poland to the relative freedom under the Habsburgs, lauded the emperor for allowing the Poles use of their own language in schools, church, and government, and as a symbol of successful Szlachta leadership of the Crownland.

The Cisleithanian government and the Habsburg Court also considered the Kaiserreise a success. Von Mondel and Von Loebenstein's reports had noted the emperor's popularity with the Galician population and the authentic enthusiasm of the crowds.²⁵⁹ The imperial visit had improved the prestige of the dynasty and loyalty to the Austrian state in Galicia.²⁶⁰ Government-friendly newspapers like the *Wiener Zeitung* and *Fremden-Blatt* and the conservative *Das Vaterland* all wrote on the Polish conservatives' victory. The *Fremden-Blatt* argued that Statthalter Potocki and the emperor were both to be congratulated for the successful “Kaiserfest”²⁶¹, which had strengthened the Austrianism of the Poles.

The Austro-German liberals opposed the Polish conservative narrative. The Austrian liberal press, the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Neue Freie Presse*, used the Kaiserreise to accuse the Poles, and other allies of Taaffe's Iron Ring, of destroying the unity of the state: “Die Verbindung derselben [the Polish] mit den Czechen und mit der conservativen deutschen Partei wird als verderblich für das Reich, für Galizien und für die polnische Nation bezeichnet.”²⁶² Furthermore, they lambasted the Polish suppression of the Ruthenes²⁶³ and manipulating the imperial visit to strengthen Polish conservative control over the Crownland.²⁶⁴ Nevertheless, they too considered the imperial visit a success as Szlachta, peasants, Poles, Ruthenes, and Jews all stood together in showing their loyalty

²⁵⁶ Originally in *Przegląd Polski*. Quoted in Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 166.

²⁵⁷ Unowsky, D., ‘Creating Patriotism. Imperial Celebrations and the Cult of Franz Joseph’, in: *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften* (1998), 2, 280-293, 284-286.

²⁵⁸ Originally in CZAS (21-09-1880), 1. Quoted in Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 167.

²⁵⁹ ‘Geheime Berichte. No.2 Krysovice, am 6. Septemb. 1880 – Loebenstein Obersthofsam – Officiel’ found in HHStA NZA karton 367. And ‘Telegram No 4335’ found in HHStA NZA karton 367.

²⁶⁰ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 168.

²⁶¹ Originally in *Fremden-Blatt Morgenblatt* (21-09-1880), 1. Quoted in Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 167.

²⁶² In: *Neue Freie Presse Morgenblatt* nr. 5752 (01-09-1880), 2.

²⁶³ Ibidem.

²⁶⁴ In: *Neue Freie Presse Morgenblatt* nr. 5740 (20-08-1880), 3.

to the imperial house.²⁶⁵ And even the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* had to conclude that the Kaiserreise, with the wonderful festivities in Cracow and Lemberg, was not disrupted and that Austrianism was triumphant in Galicia.²⁶⁶ Furthermore, despite the fact that the redesignation of Wawel Castle was a triumph for the conservatives, the liberals praised this gesture, stating that: "Bei der Ankunft des Kaisers in Krakau wird unseren Nationalen ein so kostbares Angebinde übergeben, daß dadurch die galizische Kaiserreise zu einem historischen Ereignisse nicht bloß für das Kronland Galizien, sondern auch für alle Polen sich gestaltet."²⁶⁷

There were also critics of the imperial visit. The Polish democrats rejected the conservative narrative of natural Szlachta leadership in the liberal *Gazeta Narodowa* and *Dziennik Polski*, and oriented themselves more openly towards the Poles in German and Russian partitions. The liberals also denied that popular enthusiasm for the emperor was to be interpreted as public approval of the Stanczyk domination.²⁶⁸ Despite the implication that this meant a "less enthusiastic embrace of imperial loyalty", they did not oppose the emperor's reception, as they also favoured a close relationship with the Taaffe administration, who might expand Galician autonomy.²⁶⁹ The *Gazeta Narodowa* stated clearly that "The Polish nation sees its interests in the attachment with Austria and its ruling dynasty"²⁷⁰ and on the first day of Franz Joseph's visit it opened with a large printed 'Na powitanie Monarchy' (Welcome Monarch)²⁷¹ Moreover, the newspaper compared the Poles in Galicia with those across the border in Russian Poland and concluded that the Austrian-Poles had come to "love and respect Franz Joseph because Austria alone among the partitioning powers had awarded the Poles enough freedom to develop themselves."²⁷²

The Ruthenes contested the exclusive Polish representation of Galicia in the celebrations and saw this as evidence of oppression of the Ruthenian nationality. Their ability to host the emperor twice and the expressions of loyalty from the Ruthenes for the monarch, led them to declare the 1880 Kaiserreise a success for the Ruthenian nation. They had distanced themselves from the Polish all-Galician nature of the celebrations and demonstrated that their loyalty to dynasty and state was equal to that of the Poles.²⁷³ Interestingly, while the Stanczyks and other conservative Poles continually referred to imperial support for Galician autonomy, the Ruthenes looked to earlier times, like the 1780's and 1848.. They cherished the myth of the good emperor who "defends the common peoples

²⁶⁵ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 167.

²⁶⁶ Originally in *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung Morgenblatt* (18-09-1880), 1. Quoted in Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 168.

²⁶⁷ In: *Neue Freie Presse Morgenblatt* nr. 5744 (24-08-1880), 3.

²⁶⁸ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 129.

²⁶⁹ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 59.

²⁷⁰ *Idem*, 60.

²⁷¹ In: *Gazeta Narodowa* nr. 201 (01-09-1880), 1.

²⁷² Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 130.

²⁷³ *Idem*, 161.

against their oppressors” emerged after the Joseph II’s reforms of the late 18th century which equalised the Greek Catholic church with the Roman Catholic one and moderated serfdom, and the current emperor who abolished serfdom in 1848 and donated land and money for the National Institute in 1851.²⁷⁴

4.4 Interpretation of Kaisertreue

The ability of the 1880 imperial visit to promote Kaisertreue was due to three developments: 1) the emperor’s popularity and reputation as protector of national rights, 2) the consolidation of political, social, and cultural dominance in Galicia by the Polish conservative elites, and 3) their participation in imperial institutions and loyalty to the monarch. Because of the combination of the monarch’s popularity and the search of the Polish conservatives to legitimise their vision for Galicia, they both had an interest in promoting Kaisertreue. The broad societal participation in the Kaiserreise demonstrates that the different loyalties could indeed be made compatible.²⁷⁵

However, despite the fact that the imperial visit met the goals of the Taaffe government and the Habsburg court, the reality was that the 1880 Kaiserreise was mainly a Polish affair, not a Habsburg one. The Stanczyk-conservative coalition had used the principle of Kaisertreue to gain rights, privileges, autonomy, and recognition of Polish nationhood, and they emphasised the emperor’s role in the ‘Polish National Renaissance’ throughout the imperial visit. Franz Joseph’s visit was grasped by the ruling coalition to present a nationalist version of Galician history and to celebrate the Polish achievements under their/Habsburg rule, thereby aiming to cement their position and aristocratic rule within the Crownland.

The Polish democrats had their criticisms and opposed conservative policies, but also praised the Crownland’s progress under Habsburg rule. The Ruthenes, on the other hand, more actively challenged the conservative Polish’ message in that they clearly presented themselves as a nation during the two Ruthene events in Lemberg. They tried to present themselves as being equally loyal to the monarch in order to gain recognition as a nation and to challenge the dominance of the conservative Poles. Nevertheless, they had to act within the framework set by the Polish conservatives.

Both the Polish and Ruthene nationalist politicians nationalised their imperial loyalty as they linked him to their rights, their language, their culture, and their history. Loyalty to Franz Joseph had become a tool in their eyes. So, while the Court tried to present an anational emperor as the personification of the empire and the symbol of common history, prestige, and honour, while also

²⁷⁴ Isaievych, ‘Galicia and Problems of National Identity’, 38, 43.

²⁷⁵ Prokopovych, M., *Habsburg Lemberg. Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital, 1772-1914* (West Lafayette 2009), 197.

emphasising his new role as the protector of the equality of all his peoples, the Stancyks and their conservative allies and the Ruthenes claimed Franz Joseph as an important character in their national narrative and tried to utilise his popularity to legitimate their aspirations. Kaisertreue was therefore interpreted in two different ways, which, during this Kaiserreise, were compatible and even mutually supportive.

5. *Kaiserstreue* in Galicia 1894

5.1 The different ambitions of 1894

Franz Joseph returned several times to Galicia after the *Kaiserreise* of 1880. His visits were however to attend military manoeuvres and no massive celebrations were organised like in 1880. Likewise, the emperor's five-day visit to the 1894 *Wystawa krajowa powszechna*, the Provincial Universal Exhibition, was also a smaller event than in 1880.²⁷⁶ Nevertheless, the *Kaiserreise* to Lemberg, and the subsequent military manoeuvres in Landskron, was the first visit to somewhat equal the 1880 tour and was also politically significant.²⁷⁷

Like the earlier *Kaiserreise* and the military manoeuvres, this visit was meant to emphasise the close relationship between Franz Joseph and his subjects.²⁷⁸ Viennese newspapers did publish articles stating the importance of an imperial visit in linking the empire's nationalities to the imperial state and the dynasty. The governmental *Fremden-Blatt*, for instance, wrote that:

“In the person of the emperor, the Empire itself appears in Lemberg. Can anyone doubt that this trip by the emperor will have a beneficial and lasting impact? Even the widest strata will become aware in a lively way of the inner identification with the Empire.”²⁷⁹

However, the imperial visit was also meant to confirm the leadership role of the Polish conservatives and business people in pushing forward progress within the Crownland.²⁸⁰ This was the specific intention of the new Cisleithanian government of Windisch-Grätz, which remained dependent on the Szlachta-dominated Polish Club in the Reichsrat for its majority after the Czechs had dropped their support for his predecessor, Graf Taaffe,

This continued importance of Galician support is evidenced by the large deputation of ministers that accompanied the emperor on his visit. Not only did minister-president Windisch-Grätz himself join the monarch, also minister of the interior Olivier marquis Bacquehem, finance minister, and leader of the German liberals, Ernst von Plener, agriculture minister Julius Graf von Falkenhayn, trade minister Gundacker Graf von Wurmbrand, and the earlier mentioned minister for Galicia Von

²⁷⁶ Dabrowski, P.M., *Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland* (Bloomington 2004), 118.

²⁷⁷ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 72.

²⁷⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁷⁹ Originally in *Fremden-Blatt* of 7 September 1894, but quoted from Unowsky, D.L., *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848-1916* (2005), 72.

²⁸⁰ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2000), 325-326.

Madeyski.²⁸¹ This expresses the importance of Polish support for the continuance of Cisleithanian conservative rule and the policy of provincial national autonomy. The *Fremden-Blatt* further emphasised this Cisleithanian charm offensive by stating that the “understanding of the empire with the Poles, and the Poles with the empire [was] one of the great ideas adhered to by Franz Joseph in the constitutional era.”²⁸² Moreover, it predicted that the Kaiserreise would showcase the patriotic cooperation of the Poles with other Old Austrian parties and the end of national tensions in the province. Other Viennese and Galician newspapers also printed favourable reviews of the exhibition in an effort to rouse public expressions of imperial loyalty as the Windisch-Grätz believed there would be advantages in gaining the attention of non-Galician Austrians for the exhibition. Statthalter Badeni agreed, stating that the exhibition could “strengthen and deepen the coalition idea in the consciousness of the population.”²⁸³

While the Stanczyk’s were still in control of most of Galicia’s institutions, they faced a growing opposition from the liberals who favoured industrialisation and stronger Polish-nation building policies. Badeni, who would become minister-president the following year, hoped the exhibition would provide a “much-needed distraction from the less constructive [Polish] national urge to mourn the partitions.”²⁸⁴ The Stanczyk programme was to better the economic, political, and cultural circumstances of the Galicians. They relished Polish culture, history, traditions, and heritage in order to strengthen the Polish nation and Galicia, but they opposed the liberal *weltschmerz* on the Polish partitions. The Stanczyks and their conservative allies wanted to work towards a better Polish future within the Habsburg imperial framework and to stop looking melancholically to the past in which Poland was independent. Sapieha himself said that the exhibition’s goal was to portray the Polish nation “in the prime of its life” and that it looked towards the future “with a healthy gaze”.²⁸⁵

However, by 1894 there had been political changes in Galicia. The Polish conservatives still dominated the Sejm and the Reichsrat delegation, but they became less able to unify the Galician population behind their vision of Polish progress and imperial loyalty.²⁸⁶ The conservative vision of the Szlachta as the ‘natural ruling elite’ was no longer commonly accepted by the population. Polish civil society developed with publications, associations, and celebrations which led to the mobilisation of

²⁸¹ ‘Einladungs-Entwurf für die Allerhöchste Hoftafel. Freitag, den 7ten September 1894 in Lemberg’, ‘Einladungs-Entwurf für die Allerhöchste Hoftafel. Samstag, den 8ten September 1894 in Lemberg’, ‘Einladungs-Entwurf für die Allerhöchste Hoftafel. Sonntag, den 9ten September 1894 in Lemberg’, ‘Einladungs-Entwurf für die Allerhöchste Hoftafel. Montag, den 10ten September 1894 in Lemberg’, ‘Einladungs-Entwurf für die Allerhöchste Hoftafel. Dienstag, den 11ten September 1894 in Lemberg’ found in: HHStA NZA, Karton 408.

²⁸² Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 72.

²⁸³ Originally in *Fremden-Blatt*(07-09-1894), but quoted from Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 72.

²⁸⁴ Dabrowski, *Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland*, 119.

²⁸⁵ Ibidem.

²⁸⁶ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 73.

the peasantry and urbanised masses. New newspapers were established, such as the *Wieniec* (Crown), *Pszczółka* (the Bee), *Swiazek Chlopski* (the Peasant Association), and the *Przyjaciel Ludu* (the Friend of the People). In 1893 this was followed with establishment of the *Związek Stronnictwa Chlopskiego*, the Union of the Peasant Party.

Besides the strengthened opposition of the Polish liberals and upcoming Peasant Party, the Stanczyk-conservative coalition was faced by the rising of social-democracy in the countryside which challenged the interests of the aristocrats by calling for economic, social, and political reforms²⁸⁷; and Russophiles and Ukrainophiles, who were actively seeking support amongst the Ruthenes. They too intended to use the exhibition to propagate their own visions for Galicia and called upon their constituents to visit it and to rally against conservative 'servility' to the Austrians, the abandonment of Polish national goals, or aristocratic rule.²⁸⁸

5.2 The 1894 *Provincial Universal Exhibition*

Following the World Exhibition in Vienna (1873) in which Galicia had participated as a Crownland, and the subsequent Land Exhibitions in Lemberg (1877) and Cracow (1887), a committee led by Prince Adam Sapieha, including the new Statthalter of Galicia, Kasimir Graf von Badeni, decided on June 29 1892 to organise the Galician Provincial Universal Exhibition in Lemberg.²⁸⁹ Franz Joseph gave his patronage to the exhibition and it was planned at the centennial anniversary of the Polish Kosciuszko Uprising of 1794 against the Prussians and Russians.²⁹⁰ Moreover, it was to show off Galicia's economic and cultural progress since its autonomy in thirty-four areas, ranging from fine arts to oil production, forestry to publishing.²⁹¹ The themes were designed to show the growth in Galicia's spiritual and material aspects, especially for the common folk. Besides the economy and Polish history, the exhibition also had sections demonstrating the development of Galicia's financial institutions, its public administration, and its politics.²⁹²

The costs were significant, as large as the annual budget for Cracow, as the exhibition had to cover 129 pavilions, restaurants, coffee shops, and bakeries in a fifty-hectare piece of land next to Kilinski Park. A new sewer system had to be set up, an electric tramline had to be built from Lemberg's

²⁸⁷ Cole, 'Differentiation or Indifference?', 109.

²⁸⁸ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 75.

²⁸⁹ Siadkowski, 'The Land Exhibition in Lemberg', 197.

²⁹⁰ Paduchowski, W., 'Galician mining and metallurgy in the light of the General Regional Exhibition of Lviv in 1894', in: *Folia Historica Cracoviensia* (2014), 22, 155-177, 175.

²⁹¹ Dabrowski, *Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland*, 120.

²⁹² Paduchowski, 'Galician mining and metallurgy in the light of the General Regional Exhibition of Lviv in 1894', 176.

centre to the exhibition, native regional peasant dwellings were erected, and the Palace of Art and the mausoleum for Jan Matejko, the Polish nationalist painter, had to be constructed.²⁹³

The exhibition's grand opening was done on June 5th by archduke Carl Ludwig, the younger brother of Franz Joseph.²⁹⁴ Committee chairman Sapieha then spoke in Polish and, in order to show that the exhibition would also represent Galicia's Ruthenes, Dr. Damyan Sawchak, a member of the committee, held a speech in Ukrainian.²⁹⁵ The Galician exhibition lasted for four months, until October 16th, and was visited by over one million people, approximately ten times the population of Lemberg²⁹⁶, including the emperor himself. Moreover, according to telegrams sent to Von Loebenstein, who was still in the employ of the Habsburg Court and now had the title *Regierungsrath*, there would also be a Russian and Rumanian governmental delegation present when the emperor visited the exhibition, indicating its international status, and maybe in the case of Russia, a political sensitiveness.²⁹⁷

Unlike during the celebrations of 1880, more attention was given to reconcile the Poles with the Ruthenes. Since becoming Statthalter in 1888, Badeni had attempted to find a compromise with the Young Ruthenes and his membership of the committee might have influenced the choice of Lemberg over Cracow since this "downplayed the exposition's Polishness."²⁹⁸ The Polish conservatives therefore did no longer exclusively emphasize the Polish heritage and nation in Galicia and made some room for the Ruthenes in presenting Galicia. A member of the committee, for instance, gave a speech in Ukrainian at the opening and closing ceremonies, and during the emperor's visit. Sawczak's speeches and presence not only made sure attention was given to the Ruthenes, it also enabled the emperor to fulfil his role as patron of all nationalities and praise the work of both Galician communities, and their "concerted cooperation."²⁹⁹

Yet the exhibition was not without its pan-Polish elements. While the vast majority of the exhibitors came from Austrian Galicia, quite a number came from other Polish lands abroad. Moreover, the grand Raclawice Panorama, a main attraction in the exhibition, was specifically created for the exhibition to emphasize Polish history and nationality. It was a panorama painting representing the Polish peasants victory in the battle of Raclawice against Russian imperial troops and it was meant to instil the over 200.000 visitors with a Polish national consciousness.³⁰⁰

As patron of the exhibition, Franz Joseph visited Lemberg and the exhibition between 7 and 11 September. Like in 1880, the programme for the Kaiserreise was designed by the conservative coalition

²⁹³ Dabrowski, *Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland*, 120.

²⁹⁴ 'Ciculaire 24 1894' and 'Telegramm No. 3457' found in HHStA NZA Karton 407.

²⁹⁵ Dabrowski, *Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland*, 121.

²⁹⁶ Siadkowski, 'The Land Exhibition in Lemberg', 198.

²⁹⁷ 'Telegramm an Regierungsrath Löbenstein den 2/9 94' and 'Telegramm an Regierungsrath von Loebenstein'. Found in HHStA NZA. KArton 408.

²⁹⁸ Dabrowski, *Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland*, 121.

²⁹⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰⁰ Idem, 123, 124.

and the Statthalterei and a citizens' guard was organised, associations and corporations were assigned roles. During his stay, Franz Joseph witnessed thousands welcoming his arrival in the Crownland's capital and as he toured the exhibition. Besides his daily visits to the exhibition he also visited schools, churches, and institutions, reviewed a parade held before him by Lemberg's citizenry, and received petitions. While in 1880 these petitions had partly been dealt with by Court officials and partly by the Galician institutions, for 1894 there were no references made within the Direktionsakten of the Kabinettskanzlei about petitions that were looked into by the Court. These were probably dealt with by the Statthalterei. Furthermore, like in 1880, Franz Joseph also made a gesture towards the Ruthenes by visiting some of 'their' institutions and receptions, like one at the Greek Catholic Seminary.³⁰¹

Nevertheless, despite the more concessional attitude of the Polish conservatives towards the Ruthenes, the Statthalterei and the Cisleithanian ministry of the interior still feared some opposition to the status quo by the liberals, nationalists and socialists, which could lead to unwanted actions that would hinder the goals of the visit. Measures were therefore taken to prevent this.³⁰² A Social Democratic mass rally on September 9th in Lemberg to pressure the present Cisleithanian ministers into accepting election reforms, was for instance banned by the police in the name of public security.³⁰³

5.3 Political and national perspectives

The German-Austrian newspaper coverage was still dominated by the liberal, conservative, and governmental press. As the conservatives, the Polish Club, and the liberals formed a grand-coalition supporting the administration of Windisch-Grätz, they were generally very positive about the exhibition, the reception of the emperor, and the success of the Polish conservatives policies.³⁰⁴ Nevertheless, they published from different perspectives. The Austro-German liberals for instance interpreted the exhibition as an Austrian, rather than Galician, success, and they welcomed the Kaiserreise as a turning point in liberal-conservative relations.³⁰⁵ The liberal *Neues Wiener Zeitung*, which normally was quite anti-Szlachta, wrote, for instance, that the exhibition was "ein glänzender Erfolg der culturellen Bestrebungen Galiziens, eine feireliche Guttheißung der polnischen Politik zugleich aber die schärfste Betonung der gesamtstaatlichen Idee, und der moderner Geist – in diese knappe Formel läßt sich die Bedeutung der Kaiserreiche nach Galizien zusammenfassen."³⁰⁶ The liberal press further emphasized the Kaiserstreue oft he Galician population. The *Neue Freie Presse*, for instance, wrote about the Galician masses' dynastic loyalty "die so großartig und zugleich so innig und

³⁰¹ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 73.

³⁰² *Ibidem*.

³⁰³ *Idem*, 74.

³⁰⁴ Siadkowski, 'The Land Exhibition in Lemberg', 198.

³⁰⁵ *Idem*, 209-210.

³⁰⁶ In: *Neues Wiener Journal* nr. 317 (11-09-1894), 1.

zum Herzen sprechend sind, daß es kaum einen andern Souverän in Europa geben dürfte.”³⁰⁷ And Die Presse wrote that:

“Wer diese lemberger Tage miterlebt hat, wer Zeuge dessen sein durfte, wie echt und warm , wie aufrichtig und wie aus dem tiefsten Herzen quellend diese Manifestationen waren, der musste sich sagen, dass dieses Land und dieses Volk kaisertreu und Schwarzgelb bis auf das Mark der Knochen ist und dass die auf mancher Seite so gern festgehaltene Fabel von dem kalten Vernunftpatriotismus der Pole nein- für allemal aufgegeben werden muss.”³⁰⁸

From their perspective, the conservative papers often published about the success of Galician autonomy and the Polish conservatives, Franz Joseph’s role in the development of the Crownland, and his ability to bridge political and national differences. Das Vaterland argued for example that, even though the feeling of unity and belonging was already significant, “durch die gemeinsame Begeisterung für den Herrscher einen über wältigenden Impuls erhielt” and that the imperial visit “zu einem Feste des Volkes in des Wortes höchster und edelster Bedeutung geworden [ist], an welchen zugleich mit dem Herrscher alle Schichten der beiden Nationen des Landes theilnahmen.”³⁰⁹ Moreover, the governmental press was especially emphasizing the loyalty of the Szlachta.³¹⁰

Interestingly, the Polish patriotic overtones of the exhibition were almost completely passed over in the German press, but a part of the Cisleithanian opposition, i.e. the socialists, the clerical Christian-Socials, and the German-nationals, was much more critical or negative of Szlachta leadership, the Poles, and the exhibition. Nevertheless, in 1894 most of these were still quite marginal forces.³¹¹

In Galicia itself, Franz Joseph’s visit to the exhibition was covered extensively by newspaper supportive of the Stanczyk vision and policies. The Galician government’s Gazeta Lwowska printed photographs and illustrations of the emperor and documented his every word and movement during his five-day stay in Lemberg, while CZAS accredited the close relationship between the Crown and the Szlachta for the Crownland’s economic and technological development, as showcased in the exhibition.³¹² They quoted the emperor as saying to the president of the exhibition Sapieha, that “we [the Habsburgs] can always count on you [the Poles].”

³⁰⁷ In: *Neue Freie Presse* Nr. 10792 (8-09-1894), 1.

³⁰⁸ In: *Die Presse* No. 251 (13-09-1894), 1.

³⁰⁹ In: *Das Vaterland Morgenblatt* no. 250 (12-09-1894), 1.

³¹⁰ Siadkowski, ‘The Land Exhibition in Lemberg’, 208-209.

³¹¹ *Idem*, 199.

³¹² Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 73.

The opposition in the Sejm and the Crownland was both positive and negative about the exhibition and the Kaiserreise, based on their stances. Polish nationalists, like Wojciech Graf von Dzieduszycki, a Polish writer and conservative politician who opposed Stanczyk policies, were quite positive, claiming that the exhibition was evidence of the maturity of the Poles and their contribution to the “well-being of the empire as a whole” and that the Poles best knew “how to reconcile the needs of the nations with the interests of the state.”³¹³ Moreover, they favourably compared Galicia under Austrian rule to that of the Poles in Russia and lauded the development of the Polish nation under Franz Joseph’s reign, just like in 1880.

However, as the political landscape was changing in 1894, imperial loyalty was no longer uniting all quarters of Galician society. Franz Joseph was still hailed by massive crowds, but this was mainly due to his personal popularity.³¹⁴ The things he represented, like the Dual Monarchy and elite Szlachta-conservative rule in Galicia, meant that Kaisertreue could no longer bridge all political and social divisions. Some Galician newspapers like the socialist *Naprzód*, the democratic *Nowa Reforma*, the liberal-leftist *Kurjer Lwowski*, and the Ruthenian nationalist *Dilo an Halyczanin* were even confiscated for *lèse majesté*.³¹⁵

5.4 Interpretation of Kaisertreue

By 1894 the convergence of factors which had resulted to the ability of the 1880 Kaiserreise to transform Kaisertreue into popular legitimacy for Stanczyk-conservative visions and policies for Galicia, had broken down. The promotion of Kaisertreue depended on the cooperation of political elites and the penetration of ideas into broader segments of society by means of communication, symbols, institutions, and the formation of a group identity. Franz Joseph’s personal popularity remained very high and large crowds continued to line the streets and cheer him during his arrival or his visits. For the Polish conservative-coalition the monarch therefore remained attractive as a means to legitimise their own vision and policies.

The Court continued to promote Kaisertreue in an anational way by portraying Franz Joseph as the patron of national equality. But while his visits to Ruthene institutions, his speech recognising the exhibition as resulting from the cooperation between the two Galician communities, and his support for the Stanczyk-conservative coalition found its way into the Viennese and Galician pro-governmental newspapers, there was an increasing critical attitude from other Galician political

³¹³ Dabrowski, *Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland*, 122.

³¹⁴ Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism* (2005), 73.

³¹⁵ *Idem*, 74.

movements which opposed aristocratic rule, wanted election reforms, or more socioeconomic equality.

The rise of these movements challenged Stanczyk-conservative ability to translate Kaiserreise into popular acceptance of their visions and policies or their claims to define Polish national interests and to speak for the Galician population. The coalition's rule over Galicia was contested by the 1890's was not just by the Polish Democrats, but also growing sections of Galician society, united in new socialist and nationalist movements, who were not/no longer content to seek fulfilment of their national or socioeconomic interests through the mediation of the conservative elites. Their opposition focused on the Stanczyk-conservative narrative of a united Polish Galician society, natural Szlachta rule, and imperial loyalty.

The Polish conservatives still dominated most Galician institutions and therefore controlled the message of the Kaiserreise through the newspapers and propagated the narrative of a Polish Galicia with conservative beneficial leadership and Kaiserreise. Its penetrating effect was however seriously limited by the publication of new, more critical, newspapers, which made controlling the communication difficult. Moreover, because Polish and imperial symbolism and Stanczyk dominated institutions were no longer accepted by some, using them to bolster legitimacy caused more division than unity in Galician society. The successful organisation of the social democrats, the Polish liberals, and Ruthene nationalists, had undermined the ability of the Polish conservatives to utilise Kaiserreise to their benefits. The fact that dynastic loyalty could no longer work for pragmatic/accommodative nationalist politicians to bridge social, political, and nationalist differences lessened its use for them to unite the population behind their policies and visions.

The Court's anationalist and the Stanczyk-conservative's nationalist promotion of Kaiserreise was thus challenged in 1894 due to a changing political landscape and the rise of new movements representing liberal and socioeconomic interests. Nevertheless, the monarchy and, in particular, Franz Joseph were still very popular and could rely on massive public approval, as evidenced by the massive crowds and press attention during the Kaiserreisen. In the 1890s an activist of the Polish Socialist Party complained about the Poles' disturbing embrace of the dynasty, by writing that: "The widespread cult of the Habsburg dynasty reached village homes, where portraits of the emperor and empress, bought for groschen at the bazaar, were hung on the walls, in bookshops and general stores. It was the fashion to have porcelain plates, mugs, pipes with busts of the imperial family, post cards of the imperial palace in Vienna and prints of the emperor and his family."³¹⁶

³¹⁶ Unowsky, 'Dynastic Symbolism and Popular Patriotism', 259.

Conclusion

Since Jászi's *the Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* was published in 1929, historians have debated on the power of centripetal forces versus centrifugal forces in the Austro-Hungarian empire in order to explain its disintegration at the end of the First World War. It has not been until recently that this assumption of the mutual exclusiveness between national consciousness and imperial loyalty has been put to the question. New studies have concluded that that people can have multiple loyalties at the same time and that nationalist interests could be made compatible within the imperial framework. Moreover, in some cases these forces could even support and strengthen each other.

Nevertheless, most historians have continued to interpret the concept of *Kaisertreue* from a centripetal macro-perspective, without attention for the dynamics and interaction between the imperial centre and the Crownland elites/peoples. Unowsky has come very close, but his research is mainly one of the compatibility between imperial loyalty and nationalism and has not led to a reinterpretation of *Kaisertreue*.

Based on the semasiologic ideas of conceptual history that words can have various interpretations at the same time and influences political and social groups differently. With this in mind and the new developments in the historiography which have changed historians' dichotomous perspectives, this thesis has therefore argued that the concept should be reinterpreted. Besides the, classic, anational perspective it should also be analysed from a national perspective. This reinterpretation of *Kaisertreue* is needed in order to create a better understanding what it meant to different political and social groups and how they tried to utilise imperial loyalty or reacted to it. Additionally, by having a better comprehension of the concept, historians can offer new insights into the nationalist-imperial dynamics within the Dual Monarchy.

The analysis of the two *Kaiserreisen* by Franz Joseph to Galicia in 1880 and 1894 has shown that a reinterpretation of *Kaisertreue* is warranted. Both were planned from the Galician *Stanczyk-conservative coalition's* perspective of strengthening Polish support for the empire and the dynasty, while at the same time utilising the populations' dynastic loyalty to legitimise their vision and policies for Galicia. This 'national hijack' of the emperor by incorporating them in their nationalist narrative and using the *Kaisertreue* of the population for their own political goals was at odds with the Viennese promotion of the anational monarch who was not exclusive to one nationality and who did not support one over the other. The anational promotion rested on Franz Joseph's reputation as the guarantor and protector of the equality of all nationalities, their languages, and their cultures. However, because the Habsburg Court coordinated the visit with the Polish conservatives and agreed with them on also visiting Ruthenian institutions, the emperor could perform his role as the wise and caring patron of all his subjects. Because of the interaction between Court and nationalist elites the *Kaiserreise* could fulfil

both groups goals: enhancing dynastic loyalty and the monarch's popularity, increasing loyalty to the imperial state, and to confirm Polish conservative leadership over Galicia. Imperial-nationalist interactions could therefore be mutually beneficial.

Franz Joseph's visits to St. Georges and the National Home did on the other hand support the Ruthene national cause. Ruthenian organisations used the imperial visit to legitimise their national vision and make themselves visible as another nationality within the empire. The visit enabled them to oppose Polish domination, while continue to appear/remain *Kaisertreu* to the monarch who had ended serfdom and who they considered to be 'the good old emperor'. Moreover, the Ruthenes considered it a national pride that the monarch visited 'their' institutions and heard speeches in 'their' national language. Franz Joseph was therefore a powerful symbol, one that could be utilised as symbol for a Polish and Ruthenian national success stories or used in the classic national (imperial) sense during both *Kaiserreisen*.

During the second visit, the Galician political landscape had changed with the rise of the Social Democrats, National Democrats, and Ruthenian nationalists. The ruling *Stanczyk*-conservative coalition now had to compete, not only with the liberals, but also with political movements with increasing constituencies. Opposition to the conservatives also meant opposing their vision of a Polish (*Szlachta* dominated) Galicia and Habsburg loyalty. The close relationship between monarch and elites and imperial support for elite rule was questioned and opposed. While the Habsburg Court continued to promote national *Kaisertreue* by having Franz Joseph again visit Ruthene institutions and organisations, and Franz Joseph's personal popularity continued to attract large numbers of Galicians for his 1894 *Kaiserreise*, he could no longer be used to validate Polish conservative leadership in all quarters of society by the *Stanczyk*-conservatives.

This analysis confirms that Prokopovych's assumption on 'one identity, multiple loyalties' has merit. The Polish conservatives, and to some extent the liberals, fit Comisso's category of pragmatist/accommodative nationalists who were willing to support the imperial framework as a means to achieve national development. While their loyalty was foremost to their own nation, heritage, language, and wellbeing, the empire was perceived as a useful framework to achieve these interests. *Kaisertreue* was therefore interpreted by them, from a nationalist perspective, as something that could be used and made compatible with nationalism to legitimise and strengthen their nationalist aspirations. The centre on the other hand interpreted *Kaisertreue* in an national sense that would not politicise nationality, language, culture, or ethnicity, but that promoted the ruler as the guarantor of a community of interests in which all could equally co-exist.

The question to what extent there was a different interpretation of *Kaisertreue* between the Habsburg Court/Cisleithanian government and the Galician elites has therefore shown to be true. The national interpretation was of less use to the Polish nationalists, so they reinterpreted the concept as

to suit their visions and policies. Through this reinterpretation of *Kaisertreue*, this thesis has tried to break through the singular perception of dynastic loyalty as a purely centripetal force. The dynamics between imperial centre and the Crownlands were much more complex than can be argued from a dynasty versus nationalist assumption. By looking at *Kaisertreue* from different angles, historians can better explain the complex developments in the Austro-Hungarian empire.

One interesting development that might warrant more research, is the possibility of a third interpretation of *Kaisertreue*, one that was neither national or anational. Some political groups and their constituents opposed the association of dynastic loyalty with loyalty to the empire as a whole, elite rule, or the nation within the empire. Their interests were much more socioeconomic in the sense that they favoured the extension of the franchise, more economic equality etc. Their constituents nevertheless still went to see and cheer Franz Joseph. One could therefore argue that Solomon Wanks interpretation of *Kaisertreue* as a strictly personal popularity to the monarch, not the dynasty or the empire as a whole, has merit to some extent. For some quarters of society *Kaisertreue* had changed into a more personal loyalty without the nationalist or anationalist connotations of the Court, the Cisleithanian government, and the Stanczyk-conservative coalition.

This change could be linked to Comisso's fifth category: the anationality of the masses, whose loyalties are not based on the empire or their nationality, but on their socioeconomic interests, class, occupation, or religion. While Franz Joseph retained significant personal popularity, some parts of society became indifferent towards *Kaisertreue*'s political messages. This would mean that there is also a third interpretation of *Kaisertreue*: the personal one. This however needs more historical research on the stances of the different political movements versus the monarch, the Dual Monarchy, and their constituents' loyalties.

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