ECONOMIC SELF-RESTRAINT

An interpretation of Ischomachus' use of sophrosyne in Xenophon's Oeconomicus

MA Thesis Classics and Ancient Civilizations

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Introduction

> Ἀπεκρίνατο δέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ γυνή, Τί δ᾽ ἂν ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, δυναίμην συμπρᾶξαι; τίς δὲ ἡ ἐμὴ δύναμις; ἀλλ᾽ ἐν σοὶ πάντα ἐστίν. ἐμὸν δ᾽ ἔφησεν ἡ μήτηρ ἔργον εἶναι σωφρονεῖν.
>
> Ναὶ μὰ Δί᾽, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ γύναι, καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ὁ πατήρ. ἀλλὰ σωφρόνων τοί ἐστι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς οὕτως ποιεῖν, ὅπως τά τε ὄντα ὡς βέλτιστα ἔξει καὶ ἄλλα ὅτι πλεῖστα ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ δικαίου προσγενήσεται.[1]
>
> *And to this, Socrates, my wife answered me: 'How could I help you? What is my power? But everything is in your hands. My mother said that it is my job to have self-restraint.'*
>
> *'Yes, by Zeus, wife,' I said, 'and so did my father to me. But it is natural to both a self-controlled man and a woman to act in such a way, that their possessions are as good as possible and that very many other things are added to them from the good and the just.'*[2]

It is not at all surprising that we find the term σωφρονεῖν in this passage of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus,* for Ischomachus is here telling Socrates about a conversation he once had with his wife about how to manage an estate. Like Carlson says, σωφρονεῖν 'is typically associated with good decision making, soundness of mind, and a capacity of restraint, particularly with regard to women.'[3] The fact that Ischomachus' wife sees this as her primary task is therefore only natural. What is surprising though, is the answer of Ischomachus. As Pomeroy notes, (Xenophon's) Ischomachus 'is the first to connect the σωφροσύνη of both men and women with good administration of the household.'[4] So apparently *sophrosyne* has in his opinion nothing to do with the chastity of his wife. Rather, it is interpreted as a state of mind that benefits an *oikonomia*, i.e. 'household' or in this case 'real estate'. This is an unexpected interpretation, for it is not found in similar contexts in works written by other authors. Therefore, we are bound to wonder whether Xenophon really means this 'economic' interpretation of female *sophrosyne*.

There is a group of commentators who would happily answer this question with a no: the 'ironic' interpretators, best represented by Strauss.[5] According to their interpretation, Xenophon's Socrates (and therefore Xenophon) does not actually believe that Ischomachus' way of life is truly worth imitating. Instead, Socrates would be contrasting Ischomachus' only seemingly good life to his own actually good life.[6] This means that anything Ischomachus says should not be taken seriously, including the interpretation of female *sophrosyne* presented above. However, not all commentators follow these

[1] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus,* 7.14-15.
[2] All translations are my own.
[3] Carlson (2015): 133.
[4] Pomeroy (1994): 275.
[5] Strauss (1970).
[6] Cf. Stevens (1994): 211-213.

Straussian ideas. Dorion, for example, shows many parallels between the ideas of Socrates and Ischomachus and proves that their ways of life are in fact not in opposition, 'but instead, a profound complementarity.'[7] Therefore, he would not question Ischomachus' interpretation of *sophrosyne* here.

However, this passage is not usually the focus of either interpretation. The first commentator I have come across who looks into the concept of *sophrosyne* as an actual argument for the interpretation of the *Oeconomicus* as a whole, is Carlson: she claims that the fact that Ischomachus interprets female *sophrosyne* in an unexpected way proves that he has not correctly understood what this concept means. By focusing only on the *oikonomia* instead of female qualities like chastity, he makes his wife more masculine. This way he forgets her actual importance: bearing children. In other words, Ischomachus' life is based on a distorted view of *sophrosyne* and therefore not actually worth living or imitating.[8]

Though I believe Carlson is on the right track by looking into the way *sophrosyne* is used and interpreted by Ischomachus, I do not agree with her conclusion. My hypothesis is that an analysis of Ischomachus' *sophrosyne* will rather give us an argument for the non-'ironic' interpretation: Ischomachus and Socrates live very different ways of life, and it is not surprising if this results in a focus on different aspects of *sophrosyne*. After all, Rademaker[9] has shown that the term *sophrosyne* has many uses in different contexts. Therefore, I want to use his finds and ideas to come to a new interpretation of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*. By showing that Ischomachus is not so devious in his uses of *sophrosyne* an 'ironic' interpretation will no longer be necessary.

In order to prove this hypothesis, I will closely read three different texts by Xenophon. Naturally, one of these will be the *Oeconomicus.* However, I do not believe a study of this work alone will suffice for my research, and therefore I have chosen to also look into the *Memorabilia,* because this work can give a clear idea of Socratic *sophrosyne,* and thirdly, into the *Cyropaedia*. This last work may seem to have little to do with my research question, but it is in fact essential for it, since this work is about Cyrus who, according to Xenophon, was an extraordinary example of *sophrosyne,* while living an entirely different life than Socrates. By showing that Cyrus is a σώφρων person, even though he does not live a philosophical life, it will seem more likely that Ischomachus' life can also be in accordance with *sophrosyne*.

My thesis will be divided into four chapters. The first chapter will be a short introducing chapter with a more detailed description of the various uses the term *sophrosyne* can have in Xenophon's time, mainly on the basis of Rademaker. In the second chapter there will be an analysis of passages of the *Memorabilia*. Through this analysis I will try to define what Socratic *sophrosyne* compasses. In the third chapter the same will be done with the *Cyropaedia,* and in the fourth with the *Oeconomicus*. In this last chapter I will then also combine the results of the three analyses. Finally, I will draw a conclusion based on my findings.

[7] Dorion (2018): 540.
[8] Carlson (2015): 134-143.
[9] Rademaker (2005).

Chapter 1: a semantic study of *sophrosyne*

In this first chapter I will mainly focus on a summary of the relevant conclusions of Rademaker's semantic study.[10] However, even though this work is a quite recent and elaborate, I still think it is necessary to also look at a few other works. This is because Rademaker does not mention a problem that I think deserves attention: the relationship between *sophrosyne* and *enkrateia*. Therefore, in order to give a complete relevant semantic study of *sophrosyne*,[11] as I will need for my research, it seems best to also include their studies into this chapter.

1.1. General uses

Let us start by looking at the meanings of *sophrosyne*, as they are given in the *LSJ*:[12]

A. 'soundness of mind', 'prudence', 'discretion', 'sanity'

B. 'moderation in sensual desires', 'self-control', 'temperance'

C. (in a political sense) 'a moderate form of government'

This already shows that *sophrosyne* has a variety of contexts in which it can be used. About this, Rademaker states as follows: 'Are we to suppose (…) that the considerable differences between [various] examples (…) are the result of the application of this general term to [quite] different individuals in quite different settings? Or are we to take it that [there] are [separate], and in principle quite unrelated 'meanings' of the word? It would seem that the truth is somewhere in between."[13] What does he mean by this 'somewhere in between'? Rademaker's claim is that there 'is a number of quite distinct uses of the word that are connected by what is called, after Wittgenstein, family resemblance.'[14] So, there are indeed separate, quite unrelated 'meanings', but at the same time these 'meanings' are not entirely unconnected. This idea is based on a structuralist[15] and a cognitive[16] view on language. The so-called family resemblance Rademaker explains as follows: 'some uses share some attributes with some other uses, and others with others. There may be uses of the term which have little or nothing in common at all.'[17]

What does this 'family resemblance' mean for our aim at a semantic study? It means that we should view the 'meaning' of *sophrosyne* not as one, abstract concept, but as a field of different semantic

[10] Rademaker (2005).
[11] It should be noted that in talking about *sophrosyne*, I also take into account the cognates σώφρων and σωφρονέω, cf. Rademaker (2005): 252, '[There is] no reason to reject the assumption, implied by all existing description of the terms, that the adjective σώφρων, the noun σωφροσύνη and the verb σωφρονεῖν etc. can be regarded as belonging to a single lexeme, by which I mean that each of these terms basically expresses one and the same concept, and exhibits essentially the same, very full, range of senses.'
[12] *LSJ*, s.v. σωφροσύνη.
[13] Rademaker (2005): 18.
[14] Idem: 6.
[15] Idem: 16.
[16] Idem: 19.
[17] Idem: 25.

uses, similar to a family tree. Instead of 'family members', we have different categories and sub-categories of uses of the term. These categories are as specific as possible, because generalizations often 'give a distorted view of the actual use of the word.'[18] Also, the categories have no clear boundaries, because there should always be a possibility for so-called *borderline cases*[19]: specific uses which cannot be placed in a certain category, but which are at the same time not entirely unrelated to this category either. This means that we have 'gradations of membership'[20]: some uses are better examples of a certain category than others. When a certain attestation of *sophrosyne* is used in a specific category in a way we would expect, we call this *prototypical use*: 'central cases that form 'normal' good examples of its category.'[21] Rademaker has made a list of 18 such categories/'uses' in total, put into five broader categories, as summed up below:[22]

A. Good sense

1. Soundness of mind.
    - Antonym: μανία/μαίνεσθαι/χαλιφρονεῖν/παραφρονεῖν.

B. Good sense to avoid harming oneself

2. Avoiding behavior that is harmful (to oneself).
    - Typical, but not uniquely, for men.
    - Focus on the *behavior*, instead of the state of mind of a person.
    - Not a purely 'intellectual' use of the term: prudential.
3. Observing what is good for the city.
    - Typical for citizens.
    - Focus on the interest of the city as a whole.
    - Often used in speeches to persuade listeners.
4. Good caution in international affairs.
    - Typical for the city.
    - Often with military connotations.

C. Good sense to avoid indecency

5. Control of pleasures and desires.
    - Typical for men.
    - Has no longer to do with self-interest, rather with behavior towards other people.
    - Antonym: ἀναιδής/μιαρός/πανουργός/θρασύς/κακαπύγων/ὑβριστής.
6. Moderation.
    - Sub-category of (5).

[18] Rademaker (2005): 22.
[19] Idem: 23.
[20] Idem: 29.
[21] Idem: 24.
[22] Idem: 252-269.

- Specifically to do with money and serving the interests of the city.
- Closely linked to the ‘prudential use’ described above.

7. Marital fidelity.
    - Typical for women.
8. Chastity.
    - Typical for girls.
9. Decency in dealing with ἐρασταί.
    - Typical for boys.

D. Good sense to avoid disorder

10. Quiet life.
    - Typical for men.
    - Avoiding πράγματα and law suits.
    - No *sophrosyne* means in this case that you harm your fellow citizens.
11. Keep quiet.
    - Typical for women.
    - Avoiding contradicting husbands.
    - Suppressing strong emotions.
12. Obey.
    - Typical for girls.
    - Modesty, silence, obedience.
13. Quietness and ‘shame’.
    - Typical for boys.
    - Modesty, silence, obedience.
14. Do not resist.
    - Typical for subordinates.
    - Obedience.

E. Good sense to avoid harming others

15. Avoiding injustice.
    - Typical for men.
    - Avoiding acts that violate the rights of others.
    - Antonym: ὑβρίζειν.
16. Avoiding violence.
    - Sub-category of (15).
    - Avoiding physical violence.
17. Do not offend the gods.
    - Typical for men.
    - Avoiding violating human rights under protection of the gods.

18. Εὐνομία.
    - Quiet obedience of citizens.
    - Avoiding civil strife.

These different categories are put into the following figure (figure 1) by Rademaker. Here we see a kind of 'network' of the different uses mentioned above. According to Rademaker, there are two important questions in regard to the semantic description of *sophrosyne*: '(i) *Who* is called σώφρων? (…) and (ii) *Which kind of behaviour* is the manifestation of this σωφροσύνη and who is affected by it, and benefits from it?'[23] Therefore, from the top to the bottom we find the various types of behavior in which we can find *sophrosyne* and from the left to the right, we find the different social groups who can possess *sophrosyne.*



Figure 1.

[23] Rademaker (2005): 271.

1.2. Plato's philosophical uses

In the overview of the previous paragraph, we have seen that *sophrosyne* has many different uses. This semantic variety is a phenomenon which is called *polysemy*. In the second part of his study, Rademaker describes the way Plato uses *sophrosyne*.[24] Plato is someone who deliberately intervenes in the different uses a certain concept can have. Rademaker distinguishes two tendencies here: on the one hand, 'Plato fully exploits the polysemy of our terms',[25] in order to 'establish links with several other virtues.'[26] On the other, he 'greatly reduces the vast range of conventional uses' by focusing on the 'prototypical examples of the σωφροσύνη of men, both as individuals and in the πόλις.'[27]

As to the polysemy, Rademaker shows how Plato's Socrates argues in several dialogues for the unity of all virtues. *Sophrosyne* is linked to σοφία, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη. In order to do so, Plato uses specific uses of *sophrosyne* to find overlap with the other virtues.[28] Then, it is assumed that because there is an overlap 'in one of their manifestations, it should follow that the qualities overlap throughout their manifestations.'[29] So Plato does not limit himself to one specific use in a specific context, but rather combines different uses at the same time: in *Protagoras,* for instance, he re-interprets the 'prudential' use of *sophrosyne* to find a link with δικαιοσύνη,[30] combining the uses 'avoiding behavior that is harmful to oneself' and 'avoiding injustice' in one and the same passage.

However, there are also dialogues in which Plato reduces the polysemy of *sophrosyne*. The best example of such a dialogue is *Charmides*. In this work, Plato focuses on 'its prototypical use of 'control of desires'.'[31] Plato does discuss 'a number of notions conventionally associated with traditional uses of σώφρων and cognates, [but] only to reject them all as *definitions* of the concepts.'[32] So here, Plato does not seek to combine different uses, but to explicitly choose one. This is not coincidentally the specific use we would expect on the basis of the context, i.e. the prototypical use.

Rademaker ascribes the fact that Plato sometimes exploits and at other times reduces the polysemy of *sophrosyne* to different purposes of the dialogues.[33] The dialogues that attempt at proving the unity of the virtues need *sophrosyne* to be polysemous, while the dialogues that attempt at a definition naturally are looking for a single, prototypical 'meaning'.

However, I believe there is something more to be said on this. If we take a look at the context of the dialogues, there is something remarkable going on there. In *Charmides*, Socrates is talking with Critias and Charmides, two persons who are associated with Socrates, but have lived rather dubious

[24] Rademaker (2005): 293ff.
[25] Idem: 291.
[26] Idem: 322.
[27] Idem: 292.
[28] Idem: 296-297, 307-308.
[29] Idem: 297.
[30] Idem: 303, 322.
[31] Idem: 350.
[32] Idem: 339.
[33] Idem: 350.

lives.[34] If we keep in mind that Socrates was charged with the crime of 'corrupting the youth', we might see some apologetic tendencies of Plato here.[35] After all, as Rademaker correctly notes, both men are in this dialogue 'exposed as 'false experts' on political virtue,' while Socrates is shown to be the one 'who, ultimately, offers the greatest benefits to his city and constitutes the best example of the σώφρων πολίτης.'[36] This is also shown by the contrast between the *philosophical definitions* which Socrates' collocutors attempt, and the actual σώρφων *behavior* that Socrates displays, e.g. 'in his self-control at the sight of young Charmides.'[37] So maybe, the difference is not due to the different purposes of the dialogue, but rather that of Plato: is he defending Socrates *post mortem* against the charges that were made against him, or is he extending his own philosophical theories? In the first case, Plato has to prove that Socrates met the general notions that people had in mind when they thought of *sophrosyne* and therefore focus more on its prototypical uses, while in the latter case, he could simply make use of the borderline cases and combine different uses for philosophical purposes. As we will see in the next chapter, a similar distinction can be made in the way Xenophon uses *sophrosyne*.

1.3. Relation to *enkrateia*

Finally, I should say something on the relationship between *sophrosyne* and *enkrateia*. These terms are often used together in the same contexts and closely related to each other. The difficulty is that they both have 'uses' in a similar semantic field.[38] North believes that even though the two terms are quite alike, there is a difference: *sophrosyne* has 'a wider scope than *enkrateia*, which is usually restricted to the control of the appetites and passions.'[39] Hence, *enkrateia* can often be seen as a form of *sophrosyne*, while *sophrosyne* is always broader in meaning than the restricted 'control of appetites and passions' which *enkrateia* encompasses.

Even though Humble says that she disagrees with North on this point, in fact she argues something similar: 'the meaning of *enkrateia* does not stretch beyond physical self-control whereas *sōphrosynē* encompasses a much wider range of meanings.'[40] Chernyakhovskaya, however, makes a different distinction: '[ἐγκράτεια] selbst hat aber (…) keine rationale Basis, während die σωφροσύνη die rationale Selbstbeherrschung ist, d.h. die auf dem Wissen begründete Enthaltsamkeit.'[41] In other words, *sophrosyne* and *enkrateia* differ because *sophrosyne* is based on knowledge, while *enkrateia* is not.

[34] Cf. Danzig (2013), 486, "Critias, the infamous leader of the Thirty (…), Charmides, who also served in a subordinate role in that infamous government."
[35] Cf. Danzig (2013).
[36] Rademaker: 340.
[37] Ibidem.
[38] Cf. Humble (1999): 340.
[39] North (1966): 130.
[40] Ibidem.
[41] Chernyakhovskaya (2014): 93.

Johnson, finally, goes even further than Chernyakhovskaya by arguing that *sophrosyne* for Xenophon is not only based on *sophia*, but even (almost) an equivalent of it.[42] Johnson tries to prove that for Xenophon's Socrates, just as for Plato's, *sophia* is a central notion.[43] *Sophrosyne* is the word through which *enkrateia* and *sophia* can be connected: by using the word σωφρονέστερον in the oracle-speech of the *Apologia*,[44] Xenophon would be drawing attention to the fact that *sophia* is also essential for his Socrates. After all, *sophrosyne* is not an equivalent for him to *enkrateia*, but Xenophon rather says that Socrates did not distinguish between this and *sophia*.[45] So, in Johnson's opinion, *sophrosyne* is apparently a quality that is somewhere between *enkrateia* and *sophia*, although it is much closer to *sophia*.

In conclusion, we can say that *enkrateia* and *sophrosyne*, even though they are closely related to each other, are not equivalent terms. This can either be because *sophrosyne* has a broader scope than *enkrateia*, as North and Humble believe, or because *sophrosyne* has also a close connection to *sophia*, as opined by Chernyakhovskaya and Johnson.

[42] Johnson (2018): 93.
[43] Idem: 94.
[44] Xenophon, *Apologia*, 14.
[45] Johnson (2018): 93.

Chapter 2: Socrates' *sophrosyne*

In the previous chapter we have seen the conclusions of existing semantic studies on *sophrosyne*. In this chapter, I will take a closer look at Socrates' *sophrosyne* through an analysis of the *Memorabilia*. In this work, there is an important difference between the way Xenophon characterizes Socrates as a σώφρων person and the way Socrates philosophizes about the concept of *sophrosyne*: just like Plato, whenever Xenophon has apologetic tendencies in the *Memorabilia*, we will see he uses more prototypical interpretations of *sophrosyne*, whereas when Socrates is speaking, we will encounter more borderline cases and combinations of different uses. Therefore, I have chosen to make clear distinction between those types of passages in this chapter.

In addition, this chapter will be divided into two in-between headers that are based on Rademaker's categories. The most important uses of Socrates' *sophrosyne* fall in the categories of 'good sense to avoid harming oneself' and 'good sense to avoid harming others'. Therefore, I have chosen these two categories as starting points for my analysis. I want to emphasize that I am not trying to give another semantic description of *sophrosyne*, but rather to show the specific *interpretation* of this virtue Socrates and Xenophon have: with what kind of behavior or descriptions do they express/fulfill *sophrosyne*? Still, I believe that they, too, start from the semantic values of *sophrosyne*, which is why the semantic theory of Rademaker is a necessary scholarly framework.

2.1. Good sense to avoid harming others

2.1.1. Xenophon's apologetic definition

Many attestations of (a cognate of) *sophrosyne* we find in the first book of the *Memorabilia*, where Xenophon addresses the charges against Socrates, on the basis of which he was sentenced to death. One of them concerns the charge of ἀσέβεια, which Xenophon describes as μὴ σώφρονεὶν.[46] Rademaker uses exactly this passage to explain the way *sophrosyne* can be used in the juridical context of the πόλις.[47] This means that the way Xenophon describes it in this specific context, is what any Greek would expect. Socrates is shown to make sacrifices to the gods, follow the customs of the state, pray to the gods, and so on,[48] which are all prototypical things one should do to avoid the charge of ἀσέβεια. Xenophon has therefore obviously interpreted *sophrosyne* as the generally approved behavior one should show towards the gods.

Another charge against Socrates was that he corrupted the youth. About this, Xenophon writes as follows:

[46] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.1.20.
[47] Cf. Rademaker (2005): 269.
[48] Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.1.2, 1.1.10, 1.3.1, 1.3.2.

Ἴσως οὖν εἴποι τις ἂν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐχρῆν τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικὰ διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας ἢ **σωφρονεῖν**. ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀντιλέγω· πάντας δὲ τοὺς διδάσκοντας ὁρῶ αὐτοὺς δεικνύντας τε τοῖς μανθάνουσιν, ᾗπερ αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἃ διδάσκουσι, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ προσβιβάζοντας. οἶδα δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην δεικνύντα τοῖς συνοῦσιν ἑαυτὸν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα καὶ διαλεγόμενον κάλλιστα περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρωπίνων.[49]

Maybe one could say about these things, that Socrates should not teach politics to his companions before (he taught them) how to be σώφρων,[50] and I do not disagree with that; but I see that all teachers explain to their students as regards themselves, how they themselves practice what they teach, and that they persuade (them) by arguments. I know that Socrates also showed himself to his companions to be a gentleman and that he spoke most excellently about virtue and the other human affairs.

In this passage too, Xenophon is obviously defending Socrates. Here, we are in the context of his σώφρων behavior within the πόλις:[51] εὐνομία. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Socrates was associated with various people who have lived rather dubious political lives, like Critias and Alcibiades (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.15-28). Xenophon therefore needs to prove that Socrates is not to be blamed for their misbehavior. For this, he interprets *sophrosyne* again in a prototypical way. Rademaker describes that *sophrosyne* as εὐνομία is 'the quiet obedience of the law-abiding citizen, who wisely refrains from the 'injustice' of civil strife.'[52] This is exactly what Socrates is doing according to Xenophon: he is behaving like a καλὸς κἀγαθός, i.e. someone who is good and excellent, and therefore someone who is by definition law-abiding. It is even possible that καλὸς κἀγαθός is specifically referring to being a member of 'a group of moderate conservatives who intended to keep its distance from the crimes committed by the Thirty under the leadership of Critias.'[53] This means that Xenophon would be explicitly distancing Socrates from the crimes of the Thirty and thereby from the 'injustice of civil strife'.

In addition, Socrates teaches other people about virtue,[54] so he is not only refraining from civil strife himself, but even encouraging other people to do the same. This is typical for Xenophon's Socrates. As Dorion notes, Xenophon's Socrates 'openly acknowledges that he is a teacher and an

[49] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.2.17-18.
[50] Since the purpose of this study is to interpret what is meant by *sophrosyne* (and its cognates), I have chosen to keep those words untranslated.
[51] Cf. Bevilacqua (2018): 461-464, for a more elaborate analysis of the political context.
[52] Rademaker (2005): 269.
[53] Bevilacqua (2018): 475.
[54] Cf. for this point Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.6.1-15, where Socrates has three conversations with Antiphon about (teaching) virtue. In the last paragraph, he explains to him that he did not engage in politics himself, because he felt more useful to the πόλις by preparing others. Cf. also Pangle (2016) for a more elaborate analysis of this point.

educational expert'.[55] This is a great difference with Plato's Socrates, 'who denies being anyone's teacher, [and] often represents himself as his interlocutor's student.'[56]

Hence, we see that Xenophon gives prototypical interpretations of σώφρων behavior towards others. *Sophrosyne* towards the gods, on the one hand, is interpreted as generally approved behavior towards the gods and therefore behavior that avoids the charge of ἀσέβεια. *Sophrosyne* within the πόλις, on the other hand, is interpreted as behaving as the perfect, law-abiding citizen, i.e. according to εὐνομία. In short, we see that within the specific contexts we have here, Xenophon uses *sophrosyne* exactly as we would expect him to.

2.1.2. Socrates' philosophical definition

Let us now have a look at the passages in which Socrates is speaking. The passage that is relevant here is the following, in which Socrates is speaking to one of his students, Euthydemus:

> **Σωφροσύνης** δέ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τίνι ἂν φαίημεν ἧττον ἢ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ προσήκειν; αὐτὰ γὰρ δήπου τὰ ἐναντία **σωφροσύνης** καὶ ἀκρασίας ἔργα ἐστίν. Ὁμολογῶ καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὧν προσήκει οἴει τι κωλυτικώτερον εἶναι ἀκρασίας; Οὔκουν ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Τοῦ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ὠφελούντων τὰ βλάπτοντα προαιρεῖσθαι ποιοῦντος καὶ τούτων μὲν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἐκείνων δὲ ἀμελεῖν πείθοντος καὶ τοῖς **σωφρονοῦσι** τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν ἀναγκάζοντος οἴει τι ἀνθρώπῳ κάκιον εἶναι; Οὐδέν, ἔφη.[57]
>
> *'Whom, Euthydemus, could we say that* sophrosyne *concerns less than the uncontrolled one? For surely the acts belonging to* sophrosyne *and those belonging to incontinence are the exact opposite.' 'I agree with that too,' he said. 'And for the taking care of the things that are right, do you think there is anything more hindering than incontinence?' 'I do not,' he said. 'And if that (incontinence) urges (one) to choose the harmful instead of the useful and persuades (one) to take care of the former, but to neglect the latter, and forces (one) to do the things opposite to the σώφρων things, do you think that anything is worse for a human?' 'Nothing,' he said.*

In this passage, Socrates emphasizes the importance of *sophrosyne*. There are two things that become clear about σώφρων behavior here: firstly, the opposite of *sophrosyne* is apparently 'to be uncontrolled' (ἀκρασία) and, secondly, for Socrates *sophrosyne* has something to do with the things ὧν προσήκει, here translated as 'the things that are right'.[58] It is not immediately obvious how we should concretely understand these things, but the part that follows gives some better explanation: in order to be σώφρων, one should do useful things (ὠφελούντων), not harmful things (βλάπτοντα).

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[55] Dorion (2006): 95.
[56] Ibidem.
[57] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.5.7.
[58] This translation is based on the translation of the *LCL* 168 (2013). The *LSJ* gives 'to be befitting, proper' as a possible meaning for προσήκω.

Still, it remains unclear what is meant by this 'useful' and 'harmful'. First of all, for whom is it useful/harmful to (not) be σώφρων? If we take a look at the context of this passage, it seems that Socrates meant both for other people and for oneself. Near the end of the passage, Socrates gives some examples of useful behavior. On the one hand, it is about useful things for oneself: you should be able to endure hunger, thirst, lack of sleep, etc. because it will make eating, drinking etc. so much more pleasant for you.[59] On the other hand, it is about useful things for other people: you should manage your household well, be beneficial to your friends and to the city, etc.[60]

Here, we see that Socrates is stretching the general uses of *sophrosyne* here. By explicitly calling ἀκρασία the opposite of *sophrosyne*, it becomes clear that the starting point of Socrates' interpretation was 'control of desires'. However, for Xenophon's Socrates, self-mastery is the most central notion of his philosophical ideas. Therefore, it should be no surprise that if we look at the specific completion Socrates gives to this use of *sophrosyne,* we see that it goes further than the general notions of the previous chapter. Being self-controlled is about more than enduring hunger, thirst, etc. (the useful things to oneself); it is also about helping your friends and the city (the useful things to others).[61]

'Being useful to other people' is a typical Socratic trait: after all, in Socrates' eyes, friendships and other social relations are 'based almost completely on utility.'[62] Danzig shows that in different passages of *Memorabilia* book 2[63] 'Socrates shows himself a good friend by teaching others how to create mutually beneficial bonds of friendship,'[64] for example 2.7, where a man named Aristarchus has problems with the excess of mouths to feed, because the women of his family have all come to him for help. If we keep this in mind, then the word ὠφελούντων in this passage will become much easier to understand. For Socrates, σώφρων behavior apparently is being mutually ὠφελιμός. In order to fulfill his *sophrosyne* he therefore tries to be as useful as possible for his friends, which essentially means he gives his friends all sorts of practical advice.

Furthermore, not only Xenophon's Socrates links *sophrosyne* to 'doing good/useful things'. If we take a look at Plato's *Protagoras*, we see that Plato suggests that σωφρονεῖν has something to do with εὖ πράττειν, which is then re-interpreted as ἀγαθὰ/ὠφελιμὰ πραττείν.[65] This means that there are even verbal agreements between those two passages (ὠφελιμά vs. ὠφελούντων). Probably, Xenophon is either responding to Plato here or Plato to Xenophon. It is striking, however, that they both seem to associate the concept of being beneficial to others with Socratic *sophrosyne*.

[59] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.5.9.
[60] Idem, 4.5.10.
[61] Cf. Dorion (2006): 102-103.
[62] Danzig (2018): 462.
[63] Idem: 460-478.
[64] Idem: 478.
[65] Plato, *Protagoras*, 333D. See Rademaker (2005): 303, for a more elaborate analysis of this passage.

2.2. Good sense to avoid harming oneself

2.2.1. Xenophon's apologetic definition

The next passage that we will analyze is one that is closely related to the previous ones. Again it is clearly a defense of Socrates against his charges:

> Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται **σωφρονήσαντας** πρόσθεν αὖθις μὴ **σωφρονεῖν** καὶ δίκαια δυνηθέντας πράττειν αὖθις ἀδυνατεῖν; πάντα μὲν οὖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τἀγαθὰ ἀσκητὰ εἶναι, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ **σωφροσύνη**. ἐν γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι συμπεφυτευμέναι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἡδοναὶ πείθουσιν αὐτὴν μὴ **σωφρονεῖν**, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταχίστην ἑαυταῖς τε καὶ τῷ σώματι χαρίζεσθαι.
>
> Καὶ Κριτίας δὴ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἕως μὲν Σωκράτει συνήστην, ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένῳ συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν· ἐκείνου δ᾽ ἀπαλλαγέντε Κριτίας μὲν φυγὼν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένοις, Ἀλκιβιάδης δ᾽ αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν θηρώμενος, διὰ δύναμιν δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δυνατῶν [κολακεύειν] ἀνθρώπων διαθρυπτόμενος, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ δήμου τιμώμενος καὶ ῥᾳδίως πρωτεύων, ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν γυμνικῶν ἀγώνων ἀθληταὶ ῥᾳδίως πρωτεύοντες ἀμελοῦσι τῆς ἀσκήσεως, οὕτω κἀκεῖνος ἠμέλησεν αὑτοῦ.[66]
>
> *How then is it not possible that those, who have behaved σώφρων before, behave (now) not σώφρων again, and that those, who have been able to act just, become unable (to do that) again? To me it seems that all the excellent and good things are to be trained,* sophrosyne *not in the least. For the pleasures, planted in the same body together with the soul, urge her (i.e. the soul) not to behave σώφρων, but to gratify themselves and the body most quickly.*
>
> *Indeed, both Critias and Alcibiades, as long as they were together with Socrates, were able to be in charge of their foul desires by using him as their ally; but when they pulled away from him, Critias was, after fleeing to Thessaly, in the company of people who used lawlessness rather than justice, and Alcibiades, on the other hand, being hunted on by many respectable women because of his beauty, being pampered by many powerful men because of his power in the city and with the allies, being honored by the people and easily holding the first position, neglected himself, just as the athletes of gymnastic competitions neglect their training when they win easily.*

Like the passage of paragraph 2.1.1, we are here in the context of the charge about 'corrupting the youth'. Xenophon uses the most central use of *sophrosyne*: 'control of desires'.[67] In contrast to Socrates'

[66] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.2.23-24.

[67] In Rademaker's figure 1, this specific use of *sophrosyne* fell in the category of 'good sense to avoid indecency', but the last two words of this passage ἠμέλησεν αὑτοῦ, point me to believe that in this specific passage it is more about 'good sense to avoid harming oneself'.

use in the previous passage, this use does not exceed our expectations. Σώφρων behavior is described as τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν: being in control of your foul desires. This is almost literally the same as Rademaker's description. Specifically, it means that you should abstain from ἡδοναί, such as losing yourself in the attention of beautiful women or the indulgence of powerful people.[68]

In order to do this, you should train yourself (ἀσκητά), to enable yourself to cultivate the right kind of desires. This means, for example, that you should not indulge in expensive food at any moment of the day, but rather eat something when you are actually hungry. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, this is, after all, what makes it pleasant to eat.[69] The emphasis on this training or *askêsis* is meaningful, for it is one of the most important differences between Plato's Socrates and Xenophon's: in Xenophon's view 'control of desires' is not, as in Plato's, a consequence of *sophia*, but rather a condition for it. This means that you cannot learn self-mastery by being wise, but that it is something that should be trained.[70]

This also means that if you fail to do this, the bad kind of desires will urge your soul again to indulge in them too much. Therefore, Critias and Alcibiades were able to behave σώφρων as long as they were with Socrates, since he forced them to train themselves, but, as soon as they left his side, they stopped training and therefore became unable to behave σώφρων again.

2.2.2. Socrates' philosophical definition

The final passage we will have a look at in this chapter, is the following about the relationship between *sophrosyne* and wisdom:

> Σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὰ καλά τε κἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι σοφόν τε καὶ σῶφρον ἔκρινε. προσερωτώμενος δέ, εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ποιοῦντας δὲ τἀναντία σοφούς τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζοι, Οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἢ ἀσόφους τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς· πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἃ οἴονται συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν. νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι.[71]
>
> *He did not distinguish*[72] *between wisdom and* sophrosyne, *but he judged it to be wise and σώφρων to do fine and good things, while understanding them, and to knowingly beware of shameful things. And when he was asked further, whether he would consider the ones who knew*

[68] Cf. also Xenophon, *Memorabilia,* 1.1.22, 1.3.8-9.
[69] Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.6.1-10, in which there is a conversation between Socrates and Antiphon about precisely this point.
[70] Cf. Dorion (2006): 103. It should be noted that Dorion is speaking about *enkrateia* here, but the specific use of *sophrosyne* here is close to this concept and Dorion does not distinguish between the two, cf. 101.
[71] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 3.9.4.
[72] Dorion (2012): 466-467, argues that the translation should be 'he did not separate'. According to Dorion, *sophia* is not so important for Xenophon, and especially not a virtue like or even equivalent to *sophrosyne*. I believe, however, that Xenophon here really wanted to closely relate *sophrosyne* to wisdom, as I argue in the rest of this paragraph. Therefore, I have chosen to keep this translation.

> *what they should do, but (still) did the opposite, to be wise and uncontrolled (at the same time), he said: '(I would consider them to be) nothing rather than unwise and uncontrolled; for I believe that all people, after choosing out of the possibilities what they believe to be most beneficial for them, do that. And so I consider those who do not do (this) right to be neither wise nor σώφρων.*

North argues that here, *sophrosyne* has a focus on the 'intellectual' use, since *sophrosyne* is here equated with σοφία.[73] If we follow this interpretation, the starting point of Socrates' interpretation of *sophrosyne* must have been the 'soundness of mind'. However, as Rademaker notes, the antonym of this use would be something like 'μαίνεσθαι' ('μανία'), 'χαλιφρονεῖν' or 'παραφρονεῖν'.[74] Here, we encounter ἀκρατεῖς, which would rather be an antonym to 'control of desires'. This interpretation agrees with the description that Socrates judged it to be wise and σώφρων to do τὰ καλά τε κἀγαθά. After all, we saw in the previous paragraph that 'control of desires' for Socrates has a strong connection with 'doing ἀγαθά/ὠφελιμά'.[75]

This analysis in itself already shows that Socrates is again interpreting *sophrosyne* in a different way than we would expect. He combines different uses of different contexts into one. Johnson seems to agree with this line of interpretation. As I explained in the previous chapter, he uses this passage to prove that for Xenophon's Socrates, *sophia* also plays an important role. In the *Apologia* there is a cognate of *sophrosyne* used. Johnson believes that in combination with this passage, a connection is created between the two central notions of Socrates' philosophy: *enkrateia* and *sophia*.[76] So, for him, too, *sophrosyne* has in this context a combined use of 'control of desires' and 'soundness of mind'. Chernyakhovskaya argues something along the same line. *Enkrateia* is according to her the "Eigenschaft der menschlichen Seele" to resist your desires. If this *enkrateia* gets a rational ground (i.e. *sophia*), you are σώφρων.[77]

Now that we have established that *sophrosyne* in this passage is used as a combination of *enkrateia* and *sophia*, we should take a look at the implications of this combination. Even though Dorion believes that *enkrateia* alone is 'the foundation of virtue',[78] I agree with Johnson and Chernyakhovskaya that this passage shows that 'die ἐγκράτεια ist notwendig, aber nicht hinreichend für die Tugend.'[79] As Johnson says, 'Xenophon leaves plenty of important work to be done by *sophia*.'[80] This becomes clear from the close combination of σώφρων and σοφός in this passage. I believe that they are not

[73] North (1966): 128.
[74] Rademaker (2005): 253.
[75] Both 'control of desires' and 'soundness of mind' do not fall in Rademaker's category of 'good sense to avoid harming oneself', but I believe this passage belongs there because of the emphasis on doing things that are beneficial *to yourself* (συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς).
[76] Johnson (2018): 93-94.
[77] Chernyakhovskaya (2014): 72.
[78] Dorion (2006): 103.
[79] Chernyakhovskaya: 76.
[80] Johnson (2018): 94.

distinguished (οὐ διώριζεν), not because they are the same concept, but because you cannot have the one without the other. After all, *enkrateia* is for Xenophon's Socrates the precondition of *sophia*,[81] which means that if you have *sophia,* you automatically also have *enkrateia*. This combination means that you have *sophrosyne*. Thus, when Socrates says a person is σοφός, he implies this person is also σώφρων.

This, then, is the reason why you can lose your *sophrosyne* if you stop training yourself (cf. above). The capacity to not become ἀκρατής is attributed by Xenophon's Socrates 'above all to the presence of *enkrateia*.'[82] This self-mastery is something that should be trained in order to preserve it. If you neglect your training, you will lose it, and this means that you have lost the precondition of *sophia* and therefore *sophia* itself. In other words, by losing your *enkrateia,* you will lose the combination of 'control of desires' and 'soundness of mind', i.e. *sophrosyne*. This means you no longer possess the knowledge of how to do τὰ καλά τε κἀγαθά, i.e. virtuous things.

Consequently, *sophrosyne* has a strong connection to virtue. The person who has a combination of wisdom and self-control both has the capacity to behave virtuously and the knowledge of what virtue is. However, Xenophon did not, like Plato, believe in the unity of all virtues. As Dorion shows, there is according to him not one indivisible form of wisdom, but rather multiple *sophiai*, each specific for one virtue.[83] So you could be virtuous in one aspect, but not in another. Still, in the end every type of virtuous behavior is based on a combination of *enkrateia* and a form of *sophia*, and thus on a form of *sophrosyne*. In other words, σώφρων behavior is essentially the same as (a variant of) virtuous behavior.

2.3. Preliminary conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that the description of Socrates' *sophrosyne* in the *Memorabilia* has two tendencies. On the one hand, it is interpreted in traditional/prototypical ways, because Xenophon tries to prove that Socrates' conviction was unjustified. Socrates was, for example, most pious towards the gods and a perfectly law-abiding citizen.

On the other hand, we have an interpretation of *sophrosyne* that goes further. Socrates, for example, expresses his σώφρων behavior by doing ὠφελιμά not only for himself (like resisting desires), but also for his friends. This utility principle in social relationships is typically Socratic and is not only by Xenophon's description linked to Socrates' *sophrosyne*. Also, *sophrosyne* is seen as something that should be trained in order to acquire and preserve it. Finally it is sometimes interpreted as a broader quality than one would expect: instead of choosing one specific use in a specific context, Xenophon's Socrates exploits the polysemy of *sophrosyne*, like Plato's Socrates does, in order to prove that σώφρων behavior is the same as virtuous behavior. In short, the philosophical completion of *sophrosyne* is much broader than the apologetic description of Xenophon.

[81] Dorion (2006): 103.
[82] Ibidem.
[83] Dorion (2012): 466-467.

Chapter 3: Cyrus' *sophrosyne*

In the previous chapter, we have given an analysis of Socrates' *sophrosyne* in the *Memorabilia*. In this chapter, we are going to analyze Cyrus' *sophrosyne* in the *Cyropaedia*. In order to do this, we will again start from Rademaker's categories. Since we are in a different context here, it should not be surprising that we have different categories that are prominent.

Again, as in the previous chapter, there will be a clear distinction between the passages in which Cyrus is speaking and the passages in which Xenophon is describing him. In this case, there will be differences due to the fact that, as Tamiolaki shows, the *Cyropaedia* is a more or less historiographical work,[84] which means that Xenophon has used actual Persian sources for his portrayal of Cyrus.[85] However, Xenophon was not trying to write an accurate history of Persia, but to reflect on politics with his Greek audience through an existing historical figure.[86] Because a Persian king might not be the most relatable person for the ordinary Greek, Xenophon needed to find a way to make his work more accessible. In order to do this, he hints 'at Greek figures or realities.'[87]

It is my believe that this duality is also visible in the way he treats *sophrosyne*. In describing Cyrus to his audience, he uses the more prototypical uses of *sophrosyne*, because these are the uses his audience will be familiar with. This will make Cyrus more accessible. However, when Cyrus is speaking himself, Xenophon can let the more specific ways that Cyrus expresses and completes his *sophrosyne* shine through.

Of course, it must be noted that the Cyrus I am analyzing here is not identical to the historic figure. Each instance of Cyrus' name in this chapter therefore refers to Xenophon's characterization of Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia*. This also means that the 'Persian' *sophrosyne* I will be analyzing is, in the end, still a Xenophontic reflection hereof.

3.1. Good sense to avoid disorder

3.1.1. Xenophon's Greek-oriented definition

In this first passage that we are analyzing, Xenophon describes the Persian education of the ephebes. This passage may not be directly about Cyrus, but Xenophon is only describing it because he wants to describe Cyrus' education in order to explain his success as a ruler. Therefore, I think this passage is appropriate for showing Xenophon's description of Cyrus' *sophrosyne*.[88]

[84] Tamiolaki (2017): 178-179, 182ff.
[85] Gera (1993): 15.
[86] Tamiolaki (2017): 177.
[87] Idem: 180.
[88] Cf. Humble (2018): 587, 'none would deny that Xenophon thought Cyrus' educational experiences were fundamental to the way he ruled his empire.'

> Οὗτοι δ᾽ αὖ οἱ ἔφηβοι διάγουσιν ὧδε. δέκα ἔτη ἀφ᾽ οὗ ἂν ἐκ παίδων ἐξέλθωσι κοιμῶνται μὲν περὶ τὰ ἀρχεῖα, ὥσπερ προειρήκαμεν, καὶ φυλακῆς ἕνεκα τῆς πόλεως καὶ **σωφροσύνης**· δοκεῖ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἡλικία μάλιστα ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι· παρέχουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς ἄρχουσι χρῆσθαι ἤν τι δέωνται ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ. καὶ ὅταν μὲν δέῃ, πάντες μένουσι περὶ τὰ ἀρχεῖα· ὅταν δὲ ἐξίῃ βασιλεὺς ἐπὶ θήραν, ἐξάγει τὴν ἡμίσειαν τῆς φυλακῆς· ποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο πολλάκις τοῦ μηνός.[89]
>
> *Those ephebes in their turn live in the following way. Ten years long from the moment they leave childhood, they spend their nights around government buildings, as we have said before, both for the sake of the guarding of the city and for the sake of* sophrosyne*; for that age seems to need care the most; and also during the day they offer themselves to their leaders to be used, if they are needed for anything regarding the state. And whenever they must, they stay all around the government buildings; and when the king goes out hunting, he brings along half the guards; and he does this many times a month.*

It may not be immediately obvious what is meant by *sophrosyne* here. Apparently, one becomes σωφρών by being περὶ τὰ ἀρχεῖα ('around the government buildings'): if we read the preceding passage (*Cyr*. 1.2.4), it becomes clear what is meant by this: the youth was supposed to be guarding those buildings like soldiers at night (cf. φυλακῆς ἕνεκα τῆς πόλεως). If we take a look at Rademaker's figure 1 in the first chapter, we see which use of *sophrosyne* we would expect in this specific context: orderliness/obedience. After all, we are talking about boys (young men) here. With this in mind, it is not surprising that both here and in the paragraph immediately preceding, *sophrosyne* is placed in a context of obeying authorities. The ephebes are around the ἀρχεῖα day and night, and Xenophon emphasizes that they are also in service of the ἄρχοντες by day. Whether they have to stay around the government buildings, or whether they are supposed to go hunting with the king, they do what they are told.

Another thing that becomes clear in this passage (and in the preceding passage), is the importance of good examples. By being around government buildings, the ephebes will see how the authorities behave themselves and learn from these examples. This idea is not unique for the *Cyropaedia*: as Sandridge rightly points out, 'at *Anabasis* 1.9.3–4, too, Xenophon notes that young boys learn *sôphrosunê* by observing and hearing about how men are honored and dishonored by the king.'[90] Furthermore, Dorion has also found several passages in the *Memorabilia* and the *Oeconomicus*[91] that express the 'importance of examples in education and training in virtue'.[92] This means that the value that is attached here to good examples is typical for Xenophon and therefore relatable for his audience.

[89] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 1.2.9.
[90] Sandridge, N. (2012): http://www.cyropaedia.org/book-1/chapter-1-2-the-persian-moral-and-martial-education/, consulted online on 18-07-2019.
[91] Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 1.2.3, 1.2.17-18, 1.3.1, 1.5.6, 4.4.10-11 and *Oeconomicus*, 12.17-18.
[92] Dorion (2018): 526.

In short, as expected, we see prototypical uses of *sophrosyne* here. The fact that the context here is the education of boys directs us to the uses of obedience and orderly behavior. These are then exactly the uses that we encounter. In addition, Xenophon has emphasized the part of Persian education that he values himself the most: the importance of good examples. This is a principle that is prominent in multiple works of Xenophon, which means it is something his audience will recognize.

3.1.2. Cyrus' political definition

In the next relevant passage, Cyrus is on an expedition. He speaks to his men before a battle to arouse confidence in them:

> Ἄνδρες φίλοι, ἔστι μὲν τὰ ὄρη ταῦτα ἃ ὁρῶμεν Χαλδαίων· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα καταλάβοιμεν καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄκρου γένοιτο ἡμέτερον φρούριον, **σωφρονεῖν** ἀνάγκη ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀμφοτέροις, τοῖς τε Ἀρμενίοις καὶ τοῖς Χαλδαίοις.[93]
>
> *Dear men, those mountains, that we see, are of the Chaldaeans; if we could seize them and our fort could be placed on top, it would be necessary for both the Armenians and the Chaldaeans to behave σώφρων towards us.*

This passage does not describe the *sophrosyne* Cyrus wants to have himself, but the *sophrosyne* he expects from his subjects. He wants the enemies whom they are trying to overcome to have no other choice than to behave σώφρων towards them. What does he mean by this? Cyrus' goal is to submit the Armenians and the Chaldaeans to his power. Those people will essentially become slaves to him. The most obvious interpretation of *sophrosyne* here is therefore 'obedience'. This use makes sense: what else could Cyrus want from his enemies than that they treat him as their superior?

However, I believe Cyrus might have something broader in mind than this somewhat limited interpretation. For this, we should take a look at a preceding passage, namely the passage of the Armenian King's trial. I am specifically interested in the discussion between Cyrus and the Armenian prince Tigranes on *sophrosyne*.[94] The most relevant part of this conversation is the following:

> Δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ὦ Κῦρε, οὕτως ἔχειν, ἄνευ μὲν **σωφροσύνης** οὐδ᾽ ἄλλης ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, χρήσαιτ᾽ ἄν τις ἰσχυρῷ ἢ ἀνδρείῳ μὴ **σώφρονι** [ἢ ἱππικῷ], τί δὲ πλουσίῳ, τί δὲ δυνάστῃ ἐν πόλει; σὺν δὲ **σωφροσύνῃ** καὶ φίλος πᾶς χρήσιμος καὶ θεράπων πᾶς ἀγαθός.[95]
>
> *'For it seems to me, Cyrus, to be like this, that without* sophrosyne *there would not be any advantage of another virtue either; for how,' he said, 'could one use a strong or a brave person,*

[93] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 3.2.4.
[94] Idem, 3.1.16-27.
[95] Idem, 3.1.16.

if he was not σώφρων, and how a rich person, and how a powerful person in the state? But together with sophrosyne *both every friend is useful and every servant good.'*

Here, Tigranes may be the one who is speaking, but Cyrus is very intrigued by Tigranes and even takes him with him on the expedition mentioned in the previous passage. This in itself already makes it likely that Cyrus was influenced by Tigranes' view on *sophrosyne*, but it is also made explicit by several passages in the *Cyropaedia* that express a similar idea.[96]

We have a similar context in this passage as in the previous one. Again, the σώφρων behavior is strongly connected to obedience to superiors, in this case the obedience of Tigranes' father, the Armenian king, towards Cyrus. However, Tigranes' interpretation of *sophrosyne* goes further than that: North describes this use of *sophrosyne* as 'knowledge of one's situation' or 'adjustment to reality'.[97] The skill to judge your situation and adjust yourself to it can also be seen as a use in the category of 'good sense to avoid harming oneself', not just 'good sense to avoid disorder'. After all, it is important for your own success to understand what your limitations are.

Furthermore, Tigranes explicitly calls *sophrosyne* the basis, or even the condition, of all virtue (ἄνευ μὲν σωφροσύνης οὐδ᾽ ἄλλης ἀρετῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι). This reminds us of the final passage of the previous chapter, in which Socrates did the same: every type of virtuous behavior was, according to him, ultimately based on a form of *sophrosyne*. This means that *sophrosyne* has, in this context, a broader meaning than simple obedience. If the other virtues of people become useless without it, it is closely related to virtue and virtuous behavior in itself. In other words, σώφρων behavior conveys ἀρετή too, and in this way it causes people to become useful and good to you (φίλος πᾶς χρήσιμος καὶ θεράπων πᾶς ἀγαθός). Especially this last part is a clever argument of Tigranes, since all Cyrus' relations indeed 'have a strong utilitarian perspective and are based on considerations of profit.'[98] As Danzig shows, Cyrus used this utilitarian principle as a foundation for his political system[99] and relied on the principle of reciprocity in founding the Persian empire.[100]

This principle of mutual benefit in friendship and family relationships reminds us of (Xenophon's) Socrates. In the previous chapter, they were typically Socratic uses of *sophrosyne*. Behaving σώφρων towards other people meant being useful to them, for example by giving them advice. With this in mind it becomes more meaningful that 'Xenophon's Cyrus dies in a Socratic manner in his bed, surrounded by his friends to whom he gives his last advice.'[101] This is an explicit change Xenophon

[96] Cf. Gera (1993): 95.
[97] North (1966): 131. Cf. also Gera (1993): 95n, 'Here the word *σωφροσύνη* seems to mean a realistic appraisal of one's powers.'
[98] Tamiolaki (2017): 190. Cf. also Tamiolaki (2018) for an extensive analysis on the political dimensions of Xenophon's view on friendship.
[99] Danzig (2018): 463.
[100] Idem: 469.
[101] Tamiolaki (2017): 178.

has made to the story.[102] What else could have been the purpose of this, except that Xenophon wanted his audience to think of Socrates here?

In short, it becomes clear that Cyrus is doing something similar to Socrates when he uses the word *sophrosyne*: he may start from a certain use, but his actual interpretation encompasses more uses than this starting point. This is caused by the fact that Cyrus has the same purpose as Socrates had in both Xenophon and Plato, i.e. seeking a way to relate *sophrosyne* to other virtues and virtuous behavior in general. In order to do this, he needs to exploit the polysemy of *sophrosyne*. In addition, both Cyrus and Socrates highly value reciprocity and mutual benefit in relationships. All in all, there is a great similarity between Cyrus and Socrates.

3.2. Good sense to avoid indecency

3.2.1. Xenophon's Greek-oriented definition

The next relevant passage for our analysis is the following, in which Xenophon is describing how Cyrus was able to successfully rule over his empire:

> Καὶ **σωφροσύνην** δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐπιδεικνὺς μᾶλλον ἐποίει καὶ ταύτην πάντας ἀσκεῖν. ὅταν γὰρ ὁρῶσιν, ᾧ μάλιστα ἔξεστιν ὑβρίζειν, τοῦτον **σωφρονοῦντα**, οὕτω μᾶλλον οἵ γε ἀσθενέστεροι ἐθέλουσιν οὐδὲν ὑβριστικὸν ποιοῦντες φανεροὶ εἶναι.[103]
>
> *And showing his own* sophrosyne *he made it that all practiced this more too. For when the weaker people see that the one, to whom it is most possible to run riot, remains σωφρών, then they are so much more willing to appear to be doing nothing outrageous themselves.*

Apparently the key to a successful kingdom is (among other things) a σώφρων ruler. What does Xenophon mean by this? For the answer to this, we should pay attention to the antonym of σώφρων that we encounter in this passage: ὑβρίζειν/ὑβριστικός. According to Rademaker's theory, this means there are two possible uses: 'control of desires' and 'avoiding injustice'. The passage immediately following points us at the former: in this passage, *sophrosyne* is contrasted to αἰδώς: 'shame' and αἰσχρά: 'shameful things'. These words express behavior that makes you feel ashamed, in other words: behavior that is indecent.[104]

Moreover, Due shows that 'control of desires' is in general an important principle in the *Cyropaedia*.[105] Cyrus is shown to be especially a great example of controlling himself regarding food

[102] Tamiolaki (2017): 178, 'Herodotus and Ctesias report a death in battle.'
[103] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 8.1.30.
[104] It must be noted that this passage (*Cyr.* 8.1.31) is probably not authentic. Still, the presented arguments make it plausible that whoever did write this passage, interpreted *sophrosyne* in the analyzed passage as 'control of desires' and I do not see a reason why we should not follow this interpretation.
[105] Due (1989): 170-181. It must be noted that Due is speaking about *enkrateia* here, but as said in the first chapter, *enkrateia* can often be seen as a form of *sophrosyne* and that is exactly the way Due interprets it, cf. 170.

and drink, but he excels also in the endurance of cold, heat and toil.[106] Finally, even though this is made less explicit, the way Cyrus handles the beautiful Pantheia throughout the story of the *Cyropaedia* proves his self-control in the field of sexual temptations too.[107]

In addition, we again have the emphasis on the importance of good examples. Whereas in the first passage of this chapter, other people were examples to Cyrus in his education, he has now become a good example himself: by being σώφρων, his (weaker) subjects will try harder to practice *sophrosyne* too.[108] This concept may remind us again of Socrates. We have seen that Socrates, too, taught *sophrosyne* to his companions.

In short, we can say that there are two important things we can conclude from this passage: on the one hand, Xenophon is again describing the *sophrosyne* of Cyrus in a prototypical way; after all, as Rademaker points out, the 'control of desires' use can probably be seen as '*the* prototypical use of σώφρων'.[109] On the other hand, Xenophon is again emphasizing the importance of good examples. By controlling his desires in the fields of food, drink and sexual temptations, Cyrus encourages his subjects to behave the same way.

3.2.2. Cyrus' political definition

In the final passage of our analysis, Cyrus is giving a speech about important virtues:

> Οὐ γάρ τοι τὸ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας γενέσθαι τοῦτο ἀρκεῖ ὥστε καὶ διατελεῖν, ἢν μή τις αὐτοῦ διὰ τέλους ἐπιμέληται· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι ἀμεληθεῖσαι μείονος ἄξιαι γίγνονται καὶ τὰ σώματά γε τὰ εὖ ἔχοντα, ὁπόταν τις αὐτὰ ἀνῇ ἐπὶ ῥᾳδιουργίαν, πονήρως πάλιν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἡ **σωφροσύνη** καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀλκή, ὁπόταν τις αὐτῶν ἀνῇ τὴν ἄσκησιν, ἐκ τούτου εἰς τὴν πονηρίαν πάλιν τρέπεται.
>
> οὔκουν δεῖ ἀμελεῖν οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτίκα ἡδὺ προϊέναι αὐτούς. μέγα μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι ἔργον καὶ τὸ ἀρχὴν καταπρᾶξαι, πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μεῖζον τὸ λαβόντα διασώσασθαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν πολλάκις τῷ τόλμαν μόνον παρασχομένῳ ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ λαβόντα κατέχειν οὐκέτι τοῦτο ἄνευ **σωφροσύνης** οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ ἐγκρατείας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας γίγνεται.[110]
>
> *For to have become good men once – that does not suffice to also continue being so, if one does not take care of oneself to the end; but just as the other arts, when they have been neglected, become less worthy too, and just as the bodies that are in good state, whenever one loosens those in laziness, are in a bad state again, this way also* sophrosyne *and* enkrateia *and strength, whenever one gives up the training of those, turn from this again towards a bad state.*

[106] Due (1989): 172-175.
[107] Idem: 173. Cf. also Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 6.1.47.
[108] Cf. Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 7.5.86, where Cyrus draws this parallel himself too.
[109] Rademaker (2005): 259.
[110] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 7.5.75-76.

> *Therefore it is necessary to not neglect oneself nor send oneself into the immediate pleasures. For I believe it to be a great work also to have gained a kingdom, but even much greater to preserve what one has seized. For seizing has often happened to the one only showing courage, but the keeping what one has seized – that no longer happens without* sophrosyne *and* enkrateia *and much care.*

Apparently, *sophrosyne* is an important quality for preserving a conquered kingdom. To understand what use of *sophrosyne* we have here, we have to take a look at the context: we have political speech here, which means we are led to think of the use εὐβουλία: observing what is good for the city (or in this case kingdom). To understand what Cyrus believes is good for his kingdom, we have to take a look at the rest of his speech. Cyrus explains that in order to rule over other people, you have to show that you are better than them. This means you need to experience the same harsh circumstances as even your slaves to prove you are better at enduring those (*Cyr*. 7.5.78). In other words, you need to show you have the best *karteria* and *enkrateia*.[111] This is of course an idea that we have already seen in the previous paragraph, where Xenophon also mentioned that Cyrus was a successful ruler because of his σώφρων, i.e. self-controlled behavior.

However, this self-control and endurance do not only have to do with avoiding indecent behavior here. The explicit idea of 'taking care of yourself' (ἐπιμέληται; οὔκουν δεῖ ἀμελεῖν) clarifies that we are (also) in the category of 'good sense to avoid harming oneself'. This reminds us of *Mem.* 1.2.23-24. Here too, the use of 'control of desires' was placed in the context of taking care of oneself. This has to do with the underlying concept of both passages: there is an 'analogy between virtue and craft (technē)'.[112] In other words, the idea is that virtue (in this case *sophrosyne*) is something that, like a craft, can and should be trained, not something that you automatically have.[113] Therefore you need to take care of yourself in order to learn how to control your desires.

Furthermore, not only because training/acquiring *sophrosyne* requires 'good sense to avoid harming oneself', we could argue that *sophrosyne* is (partly) used in this category here, but also because we encounter *sophrosyne* in a similar passage, in which the relation to this category becomes even clearer, namely *Cyr*. 4.1.15. In this passage, Cyrus also claims that the only way that your successes will remain fruitful to you is when you handle them with *sophrosyne*. He explains that if you lose your *sophrosyne* and become reckless because you have won something once, this will cause you to lose all of it again. This means that controlling your desires is also necessary for your own success.

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[111] Of course *enkrateia* is also explicitly mentioned by Cyrus in this passage. I believe that here the difference between *sophrosyne* and *enkrateia* is that *sophrosyne* is placed in the context of εὐβουλία. It is not a pure 'control of desires', but a combination of self-control and endurance that is in the end based on a judgement ('good sense') about what is good for the kingdom.

[112] Atack (2015): http://www.cyropaedia.org/book-7/chapter-7-5-cyrus-takes-babylon-by-rerouting-the-euphrates-and-entering-by-night-while-the-babylonians-are-in-celebration-he-transitions-from-a-general-into-a-king-by-worrying-about-how-to-maintain/, consulted online on 18-07-2019.

[113] Ibidem. Atack also mentions Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.2.6 as an example of this.

Moreover, Cyrus also explicitly says that controlling your desires will cause – apart from successful leadership – happiness for yourself, because drinking is much more pleasant when you are thirsty, and eating when you are hungry, etc. (*Cyr.* 7.5.81). Again we are reminded of Socrates: not only Cyrus' behavior as described above is in itself similar to Socrates', but also the purpose of such behavior: the exact same examples we have here, we have also encountered in the previous chapter.

In short, we can again conclude that Cyrus exploits the polysemy of *sophrosyne*. The context points us at the use εὐβουλία, but this is then reinterpreted to both include 'avoiding behavior that is harmful to oneself' and 'control of desires'. Moreover, these two uses are then presented as closely related to each other. On the one hand, you need to take care of yourself in order to be able to practice self-control (because you need to train *sophrosyne*), and, on the other, if you practice self-control, you are essentially taking care of your own happiness (because you enjoy your food, drink and sleep more). Finally, both these points are again similar to Socrates' view on *sophrosyne*: he too believed in this relation between 'control of desires' and your own happiness, and in the importance of training in acquiring and preserving *sophrosyne*.

3.3. Preliminary conclusion

In conclusion, we can say there are three important tendencies in this work. Firstly, when Xenophon is describing Cyrus as σώφρων, he means this in the prototypical ways. In Cyrus' youth, Xenophon meant that he was obedient to his authorities. When he was older, it rather meant that he was excellent in controlling his desires. In both these descriptions, there is an emphasis on the power of good examples. This is due to Xenophon's appreciation in general for good examples in learning virtue, which we see in more of his works. This means that next to the prototypical uses, this is also a typically Greek or at least Xenophontic feature of the text and therefore familiar to a Greek audience.

Secondly, we have seen that Cyrus himself uses *sophrosyne* in a less prototypical way. Σώφρων behavior is not limited to one specific use in a specific context, but encompasses many uses at the same time. His subjects' *sophrosyne* conveys, for example, besides obedience, the capacity to know what one can and cannot do and (the foundation of) virtue. His own *sophrosyne* is the capacity to not become reckless after one victory, to be able to understand what actions are best for your kingdom, and to be better in controlling your desires and enduring harsh circumstances than those who obey you.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Cyrus reminds us in many instances of the main character of the previous paragraph. Like Socrates, he sees a link between *sophrosyne* and virtuous behavior, and, like Socrates, he interprets this virtuous behavior as being mutually beneficial. Finally, he also believes, like Socrates, that *sophrosyne* is something that should be trained. In short, the fact that Cyrus lives a different life and may have different purposes with his behavior does not stop him from interpreting *sophrosyne* in the same way Socrates did.

Chapter 4: Ischomachus' *sophrosyne*

In the previous chapters we have seen an analysis of Socrates' and Cyrus' *sophrosyne* and the similarities and differences between them. In this fourth and final chapter we will finally focus our attention on the work that is the main point of interest of this research: the *Oeconomicus*.

In order to analyze Ischomachus' *sophrosyne* as he shows in this work, we will again start from Rademaker's categories. After each analysis of a particular passage, we will take a look at the consequences this specific interpretation has for the interpretation of the *Oeconomicus* as a whole. After all, this research is meant to prove the hypothesis that Ischomachus' way of life is not based on a distorted view of *sophrosyne*. With the previous analyses in mind, we can now finally address the problems raised by Straussian commentators.

4.1. Good sense to avoid harming oneself

4.1.1. Analysis of the passage

To start this analysis, we return to the passage mentioned in the introduction:

> Ἀπεκρίνατο δέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ γυνή, Τί δ᾽ ἂν ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, δυναίμην συμπρᾶξαι; τίς δὲ ἡ ἐμὴ δύναμις; ἀλλ᾽ ἐν σοὶ πάντα ἐστίν. ἐμὸν δ᾽ ἔφησεν ἡ μήτηρ ἔργον εἶναι **σωφρονεῖν**.
>
> Ναὶ μὰ Δί᾽, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ γύναι, καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ὁ πατήρ. ἀλλὰ **σωφρόνων** τοί ἐστι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς οὕτως ποιεῖν, ὅπως τά τε ὄντα ὡς βέλτιστα ἔξει καὶ ἄλλα ὅτι πλεῖστα ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ δικαίου προσγενήσεται.[114]
>
> *And to this, Socrates, my wife answered me: 'How could I help you? What is my power? But everything is in your hands. My mother said that it is my job to behave σώφρων.'*
>
> *'Yes, by Zeus, wife,' I said, 'and so did my father to me. But it is natural to both a σώφρων man and a woman to act in such a way, that their possessions are as good as possible and that very many other things are added to them from the good and the just.'*

Ischomachus' wife clearly has a prototypical interpretation of *sophrosyne* here: 'being quiet and doing basically nothing'.[115] If we take a look at Rademaker's figure 1, we see that this is indeed what we would expect for female *sophrosyne* in the context of her household. She should obey her husband and not speak out of turn. However, Ischomachus has a different view: he 'suggests that good care of the estate is a characteristic of σώφρονες both male and female.'[116] Rademaker therefore places this passage in the category of 'avoiding behavior that is harmful to oneself'. This particular use is focused, as is in the

[114] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, 7.14-15.
[115] Rademaker (2005): 255n.
[116] Ibidem.

name, on behavior, specifically the kind that 'betrays a prudent and responsible concern for one's self-interest',[117] in this case Ischomachus' (successful) estate.

But what is this specific behavior that Ischomachus is talking about? Apparently it has to do with both taking care of the possessions you already have (τά τε ὄντα ὡς βέλτιστα ἕξει) and adding new possessions to them (ἄλλα ὅτι πλεῖστα ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ δικαίου προσγενήσεται). If it is not immediately clear to us what kind of behavior Ischomachus means by this, we are not the only ones. Ischomachus' wife is also confused by her husband's interpretation and asks what it is exactly that he expects her to do (*Oec.* 7.16). Ischomachus answers that she should (1) take care of the possessions that are brought into the household and (2) take care of the indoor tasks, such as nursing newborn children and preparation of bread from grain (*Oec.* 7.21). In short, her feminine *sophrosyne* has most importantly to do with behavior that makes the existing possessions as good as possible.

Ischomachus' own masculine *sophrosyne*, on the other hand, has to do with outdoor work, such as farming (ploughing, herding, etc.), in order to increase his estate. Therefore, Ischomachus' σώφρων behavior is linked to *karteria* (*Oec.* 7.23) and courage (θράσος), because he needs to be out in the open (i.e. in harsh circumstances like heat and cold) and he needs to defend his estate against evil outsiders (*Oec.* 7.25). In short, his masculine *sophrosyne* is important for adding new possessions to the existing ones.

Finally, Ischomachus also explains that these complementary abilities of men and women cause them to be more beneficial (ὠφελιμώτερον) towards each other (*Oec.* 7.28). This of course rings a bell: being mutually beneficial is something both Cyrus and Socrates also associated with *sophrosyne*. This means that Ischomachus is making a similar point here. However, he interprets this benefit as making profit for his estate.

4.1.2. Interpretation of the *Oeconomicus* as a whole

The problem with the above outlined interpretation is that this is actually a quite unique way to interpret *sophrosyne*. As North notes, 'Xenophon is the first (…) to define both masculine and feminine *sophrosyne* with reference to *oikonomia*.'[118] In the introduction, I already briefly mentioned that this is one of the arguments for the 'ironic' interpretation of the *Oeconomicus*. Carlson argues that the fact that *sophrosyne* is not normally interpreted this way is an indication that Ischomachus has misunderstood the concept.[119] This is mostly proven by the fact that Ischomachus' wife seems to get authority and leadership qualities because of this specific interpretation of *sophrosyne*, which are of course typically masculine traits.[120]

[117] Rademaker (2005): 254.
[118] North (1977): 46.
[119] Carlson (2015): 134-135, 142-143.
[120] Idem: 131-132.

However, this is not necessarily an indication that Ischomachus is misinterpreting his wife's role. As Tamiolaki shows, something similar happens in a conversation between Socrates and Theodote in *Memorabilia* 2.6: here, too, Xenophon('s Socrates) 'eliminates gender from his discussion'.[121] Their conversation shows that 'both Theodote and Socrates can potentially be good hunters/leaders of people,' even though Theodote is of course a woman.[122] This is due to Xenophon's own ideas: Tamiolaki has shown that in multiple works, Xenophon proves himself to have a political approach in his descriptions of the relationships between people.[123] This has resulted in the fact that the role of some, like Theodote, is interpreted in an unexpected way. In Ischomachus' account, we see something similar happening: he believes that the role of a leader can also be (partly) fulfilled by a woman, which is why his wife, like Theodote, is expected by him to go beyond the limits of her usual female qualities. As a 'co-captain' in their household, she now has to behave σώφρων in a way that is similar to the masculine version. Thus, even though Carlson may be right that this interpretation of *sophrosyne* is strange for a Greek audience, she is wrong in assuming that it is purely Ischomachus' interpretation. In fact, Xenophon is the one with unique ideas.

However, it should also be noted that the actual difference between Ischomachus' interpretation of *sophrosyne* and the conventional one is slightly exaggerated. Not only is North right that for pure etymological reasons, the connection between *sophrosyne* and *oikonomia* would 'come easily to the Greek mind,'[124] but it is also a fact that in all ancient descriptions of feminine virtue (which is often linked with *sophrosyne*), there is an 'explicit identification of the good woman with the good housekeeper.'[125] Moreover, Plato makes a similar link between *sophrosyne* and good management of the household in *Meno* 73a-b. In other words, Ischomachus' use of *sophrosyne* in this way is not so much of a stretch as is presented by Carlson.

Finally, even if Ischomachus is interpreting *sophrosyne* in an unexpected way, this is in the end not un-Socratic at all. In the previous chapters, we have seen that both Socrates and Cyrus often used *sophrosyne* in a way that we would not immediately expect on the basis of the context. Thus, the fact that Ischomachus is doing the same here makes him only similar to those figures.

4.2. Good sense to avoid harming others

4.2.1. Analysis of the passage

The next passage that is relevant for our research, is the following about the duties of the wife:

> Ἄλλαι δέ τοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἴδιαι ἐπιμέλειαι, ὦ γυναι, ἡδεῖαί σοι γίγνονται, ὁπόταν ἀνεπιστήμονα ταλασίας λαβοῦσα ἐπιστήμονα ποιήσῃς καὶ διπλασίου σοι ἀξία γένηται καὶ ὁπόταν

[121] Tamiolaki (2018): 448.
[122] Idem: 449.
[123] Idem: 433-456.
[124] North (1977): 45.
[125] Idem: 42.

ἀνεπιστήμονα ταμιείας καὶ διακονίας παραλαβοῦσα ἐπιστήμονα καὶ πιστὴν καὶ διακονικὴν ποιησαμένη παντὸς ἀξίαν ἔχῃς καὶ ὁπόταν τοὺς μὲν **σώφρονάς** τε καὶ ὠφελίμους τῷ σῷ οἴκῳ ἐξῇ σοι εὖ ποιῆσαι, ἐὰν δέ τις πονηρὸς φαίνηται, ἐξῇ σοι κολάσαι.[126]

But truly other duties of your own become pleasant to you, wife, (for example) when you, having received someone who is unable to spin, make them able to do it and they become twice as much worth to you, or when having taken someone who is unable to manage and serve, after making them able to do it and (making them) trustworthy and serviceable, you have someone invaluable, or when it is possible for you to reward the σώφρων and useful people in your house and (when) it is possible for you to punish, if anyone turns out (to be) bad.

In this passage, Ischomachus is talking about the *sophrosyne* of the slaves. This context obviously causes us to expect that Ischomachus means 'obedience' here. However, the σώφρων slaves are contrasted with a πονηρός ('bad') one. Even though this is not an antonym that is listed by Rademaker, we can still infer something from it. Πονηρός is a word which often has moral connotations.[127] A 'wicked' slave does not seem to be so much in opposition with an 'obedient' one. Therefore, we are inclined to think of another use of *sophrosyne* here, one that has to do with morality and justice.

To understand what this exact use is, we should take a look at the word that is closely linked to σώφρων in this passage: ὠφελίμους ('useful'). In other words, there is again much emphasis on the utility of relationships, which is also made clear by the repeatedly mentioning of a slave's worth (διπλασίου ἀξία; παντὸς ἀξία). We have seen that in the passages of the previous two chapters in which *sophrosyne* was interpreted in terms of mutual benefit, a link was established between *sophrosyne* and virtue. If we interpret σώφρων here in the same way, the above mentioned πονηρός becomes more understandable: the opposite of a virtuous slave is indeed a wicked one.

Moreover, the punishing and rewarding of slaves could be seen as a form of training. This reminds us of the principle of both Cyrus and Socrates that *sophrosyne* is something that, like a craft, should be trained in order to acquire and keep it. Ischomachus' wife is supposed to teach the slaves how to be σώφρων, which Ischomachus, like Cyrus' captain Aglaïtidas (*Cyr.* 2.2.14), seems to believe can best be taught by a severe authority who can punish you.

4.2.2. Interpretation of the *Oeconomicus* as a whole

What does this passage tell us about the interpretation of the *Oeconomicus* as a whole? If anything has become clear from the above passage, it is that 'Ischomachus benefits from his wife and bailiffs in that they (…) make his real estate more valuable. His relations with them are warm but governed by

[126] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, 7.41.
[127] *LSJ*, s.v. πονηρός.

utility.'[128] Even though I believe this is a point of agreement between Ischomachus and Socrates (and Cyrus), Stevens claims that this is one of the reasons why we should interpret the *Oeconomicus* ironically, because, according to him, this shows that Ischomachus has not understood the mutual benefit principle of Socrates. He believes that Socrates' education to make people beneficial is a moral education. Ischomachus, on the other hand, would not give his slaves and his wife any such education. The *sophrosyne* he teaches them is only meant to make them more profitable, but not to give them insight into the nature of virtue.[129]

However, I believe Stevens is either overestimating Socrates' 'education' or underestimating Ischomachus'. For this, I would like to refer to the passage in which Aristarchus appears, already mentioned in the second chapter (*Mem.* 2.7). Here, Socrates does not give Aristarchus much more moral education than Ischomachus does to his wife and slaves. His main argument is that on the one hand, Aristarchus needs people to work for him and that on the other hand, the women need to work. This is because Aristarchus will be happy with their results and they will be happy with pleasing him and no longer feeling like a burden (*Mem.* 2.7.9). So if there would be any 'morality' in this advice, it would be that the feeling of being useful to one another is a source of happiness.

Is this education so much different from Ischomachus'? It would not seem to be so. Only if Stevens means that Ischomachus does not make the 'happiness' goal *explicit*, but only focuses on the beneficial part, he may have a point. Still, even in that case, one could wonder whether it is really strange that Socrates explains this philosophical point explicitly to his *male* and *free* companion Aristarchus, while Ischomachus is leaving it out when talking to his *female* companion (his wife), or instructing her to deal with their *unfree* companions (their slaves). After all, a woman is not expected to philosophize as deeply as a man, [130] and neither are slaves. This also becomes clear from the passage of the *Memorabilia*: the 'moral' advice of Socrates seems to be purely meant for Aristarchus, not to be passed through when talking to the women of his family. Socrates just says that Aristarchus should offer them work, not that he should explain them why (*Mem.* 2.7.10).

Why does Stevens, then, still believe that Ischomachus fails in the moral education of his wife (and slaves)? This has to do with the 'pet theme of Straussian interpretations',[131] as Dorion calls it, namely the fate of Ischomachus' wife. In Andocides' *Mysteries* 124-127, there is a story about a woman, who is said to have been Ischomachus' wife, and who is portrayed as an extremely bad woman. Straussian commentators therefore believe that, 'if his wife turned out so badly (…), it is necessary to conclude not only that Ischomachus failed miserably in his attempt to educate his wife, but also that we must not take literally Xenophon's apparently positive portrayal of his numerous talents.'[132]

[128] Stevens (1994): 211.
[129] Idem: 231-232.
[130] North (1977): 48.
[131] Dorion (2018): 537.
[132] Idem: 538.

However, not only is it not at all certain that Xenophon's Ischomachus is the same man as the one in Andocides' *Mysteries*,[133] but, more importantly, even if this indeed were the case, it would still not be a problem '*from Xenophon's perspective*.'[134] After all, as we have seen, *sophrosyne* is, according to Xenophon, something that you should keep training. Ischomachus seems to believe the same, which we can infer from his long training of his wife and the idea of rewarding and punishing of the slaves (if this is not yet convincing enough, Ischomachus also makes it more explicit in the passage discussed below). This means that, as long as Ischomachus was alive and married to his wife, she was σώφρων because of his constant training, [135] but when he died and therefore stopped training her, she lost her *sophrosyne*. This is not only similar to Socrates' education of dubious figures such as Alcibiades and Critias, but also to Cyrus' education of his administrators: after Cyrus' death, Persia goes to waste because he is no longer able to train the *sophrosyne* of those who are left in charge.[136] Apparently, here too, Ischomachus is interpreting *sophrosyne* in the same way as our other two figures.

4.3. Good sense to avoid disorder

4.3.1. Analysis of the passage

The final passage that we will be analyzing is the following about the power of *sophrosyne* for a leader:

> Ἀλλ᾽ ὃν ἂν ἰδόντες κινηθῶσι καὶ μένος ἑκάστῳ ἐμπέσῃ τῶν ἐργατῶν καὶ φιλονικία πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ φιλοτιμία κρατιστεῦσαι ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτον ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν ἔχειν τι ἦθους βασιλικοῦ.
>
> καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο μέγιστον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ ὅπου τι δι᾽ ἀνθρώπων πράττεται, καὶ ἐν γεωργίᾳ δέ. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία τοῦτό γε ἔτι ἐγὼ λέγω ἰδόντα μαθεῖν εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ ἀκούσαντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ παιδείας δεῖν φημι τῷ ταῦτα μέλλοντι δυνήσεσθαι καὶ φύσεως ἀγαθῆς ὑπάρξαι, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον δὴ θεῖον γενέσθαι.
>
> Οὐ γὰρ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ὅλον τουτὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι ἀλλὰ θεῖον, τὸ ἐθελόντων ἄρχειν· <ὅ> σαφῶς δίδοται τοῖς ἀληθινῶς **σωφροσύνη** τετελεσμένοις· τὸ δὲ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν διδόασιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται ἀξίους εἶναι βιοτεύειν ὥσπερ ὁ Τάνταλος ἐν Ἅιδου λέγεται τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διατρίβειν φοβούμενος μὴ δὶς ἀποθάνῃ.[137]
>
> *But him, at whose sight they [i.e. employees/slaves] are set in motion and a passion enters each of the workers and a rivalry towards each other and an ambition in each to be the best, that man I could say possesses something of the character of a king.*

[133] Dorion (2018): 538.
[134] Ibidem.
[135] Cf. Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, 9.19. Here we see that Ischomachus' training of his wife has proven to have worked, for she is herself voicing Ischomachus' ideas now and taking good care of their possessions. So at least at the moment of this conversation Ischomachus' wife was indeed σώφρων.
[136] Dorion (2018): 539. Cf. also Tamiolaki (2017): 193.
[137] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, 21.10-12.

And that is the most important thing, as is seems to me, in every work where something is done by humans, also in farming. However, by Zeus, I do not claim that the one who has seen this, has learnt it, nor the one who has heard it once, but I believe that there is a need for education for the one who intends to be able to do these things, and (a need) to begin with a good nature, and most importantly to be divine.

For altogether it seems to me that this good as a whole is not human, but divine, this ruling over willing subjects; it is clearly given to the ones who truly fulfill sophrosyne*; to be a tyrant over unwilling subjects, they give, as it seems to me, to those, whom they consider to be worthy to live a life, just like Tantalus in the Hades is said to live, constantly fearing to die twice.*

Sophrosyne is here clearly linked to (successful) ruling: it is τι ἤθους βασιλικοῦ, something king-like. By behaving σώφρων you will rule over willing subjects. Because we are in this somewhat 'political' context, we are bound to think of the use εὐβουλία: observing what is good for the city (or in this case real estate). Ischomachus believes that *sophrosyne,* i.e. the ability to know what to do in order to preserve your successful estate, is of the utmost importance (ἔστι τοῦτο μέγιστον).

This makes us wonder what exactly Ischomachus considers to be good for his estate. For this we should take a look at the last sentence: *sophrosyne* is here contrasted with tyrants and Tantalus; greedy and wicked people. This means that we are also meant to think of the use 'control of desires'. After all, Tantalus is associated with the punishment of eternal hunger and thirst, just as 'those who lack σωφροσύνη can never quench their appetites.'[138] But the example of Tantalus and tyrants also implies a connection between *sophrosyne* and virtue. Tantalus is a legendary criminal, who served his son's flesh to the gods. By using him as a contrast to *sophrosyne,* the moral implications of this concept are evoked. This is something that should not surprise us: both Socrates and Cyrus also connected *sophrosyne* to virtue and virtuous behavior.

In addition, both the combination of the εὐβουλία use and the 'control of desires' use, and the explicit mentioning of ruling over willing subjects remind us of Cyrus, the former because this happened also in a passage of the previous chapter, the latter because this is exactly the reason why Xenophon admired Cyrus so much (*Cyr.* 1.1.3).

Finally, we again have the idea that *sophrosyne* is something that should be trained. Whereas in the previous passage, this concept remained rather implicit, here Ischomachus explicitly names it. It is interesting that in the passage of the previous chapter in which Cyrus mentioned this, the context was the same, i.e. preserving one's ruling position. Apparently, there is a close connection between Ischomachus and Cyrus here.

[138] Pomeroy (1994): 345.

4.3.2. Interpretation of the *Oeconomicus* as a whole

What do these similarities between Cyrus and Ischomachus tell us about the interpretation of the *Oeconomicus* as a whole? According to Straussian commentators, 'Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* should be viewed as a covert blame of Cyrus and a critique of empire and/or political life *tout court*.'[139] If this is the case, then any resemblance between Ischomachus and Cyrus will make Ischomachus look bad, as Stevens, following Pangle,[140] claims: 'Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* reveals what an Ischomachus might do if unfettered by the limitations of republicanism (…) [and therefore] Xenophon's indictment of the society Cyrus creates would be an indictment of Ischomachus' way of life as well.'[141]

However, this is not necessarily true. Even if we were to believe the Straussian commentators in that there are some problems with Cyrus' characterization in the *Cyropaedia*, it would still in any case go too far to see the whole work as 'a negative portrait of Cyrus.'[142] Furthermore, there is a far less complicated explanation for the similarities between Ischomachus and Cyrus, namely Xenophon's central preoccupation in all of his works: 'the search for the ideal leader.'[143] In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates is this ideal leader, in the *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus is, and here, it is Ischomachus. The fact that these three people are all presented similar to each other and possessing the same virtues is of course due to the fact that 'Xenophon the writer cherished similar ideas about the qualities of the perfect leader and found inspiration for this ideal in different characters with different backgrounds.'[144] One of the qualities that Xenophon thought to be important was *sophrosyne*. The interpretation Xenophon has of this leadership-*sophrosyne* becomes clear when we take a look at the way he presents Socrates' and Cyrus' *sophrosyne*. The fact that Ischomachus is showing the same interpretation is an indication that he too is a wonderful leader.

Finally, we should ask ourselves why Xenophon was so intrigued by the concept of ideal leadership. Perhaps it is because of Xenophon's own ambitions: it has been suggested that Ischomachus is in fact an *alter* Xenophon: 'Xenophon led the life of a wealthy landowner on his estate at Scillus and was quite competent in the various types of technical knowledge indispensable to success on a farming estate.'[145] In that case, Xenophon might be using the *Oeconomicus* to prove to himself and his audience that he is living his life in accordance with Socrates' principles, without being a philosopher, like he was. His life can be as much σώφρων as Socrates' was, even if their *sophrosyne* has different results: whereas for Socrates, *sophrosyne* meant creating a mutual beneficial relationship with his *friends* by giving them practical advice and thereby improve each other's lives, and for Cyrus, *sophrosyne* meant creating mutual beneficial relationships with his *subordinates* by causing willing obedience and thereby

[139] Tamiolaki (2017): 190.
[140] Pangle (1994).
[141] Stevens (1994): 212.
[142] Tamiolaki (2017): 190.
[143] Idem: 189.
[144] Due (1989): 206.
[145] Dorion (2018): 540.

preserve a successful kingdom, for Ischomachus, and thus for Xenophon, it means creating mutual beneficial relationships with the members of their *oikos* by preserving and increasing their possessions and thereby make profit for their estate. Thus, even though they had different goals in mind, the essential principle behind it was the same for all of them.

4.4. Preliminary conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that Ischomachus is in fact interpreting *sophrosyne* very similar to Socrates and Cyrus. Like those two, he believes *sophrosyne* is something that should be trained, which is proven implicitly by his dealing with his wife and slaves, and explicitly by his statement at the closing paragraphs of the *Oeconomicus*. Furthermore, he too places great value on utility and reciprocity in relationships and shows he believes in a connection between *sophrosyne* and virtue by the contrasts he makes between *sophrosyne* and a 'wicked' slave or Tantalus. In short, there seems to be no reason to interpret the *Oeconomicus* ironically based on the way Ischomachus uses this concept.

In addition, the Straussian problems addressed here are easily refuted. First of all, the idea that Ischomachus' view on *sophrosyne* is wrong because he relates female *sophrosyne* to the *oikonomia* and thereby gives his wife masculine qualities, is easily solved by pointing at parallels with the *Memorabilia*, and the fact that Ischomachus' interpretation and the conventional one are not so different as presented. Secondly, Stevens' idea that Ischomachus has misunderstood the mutual benefit principle of Socratic *sophrosyne* can be refuted merely on the basis of a comparison with the Aristarchus passage of *Memorabilia* 2.7. Finally, the similarity between Ischomachus and Cyrus throughout the *Oeconomicus* is not, as for example Stevens believes, an indictment against Ischomachus' way of life. Rather, it is a sign of Xenophon's own ideas about ideal leadership.

Conclusion

In the previous chapters, I have analyzed *sophrosyne*, both in a general semantic description on the basis of existing semantic studies and in a close reading of some passages of various works by Xenophon. In conclusion, we can say that Ischomachus' farming life is not, as Carlson thought, based on a distorted view of *sophrosyne.* First of all, as was discovered in the first chapter, *sophrosyne* has an enormous variety in uses and these different uses are not static or clearly separated, but connected through the concept of 'family resemblance'. Rademaker showed us how Plato gratefully made use of this polysemy in expanding his philosophy: in order to prove his idea of the unity of all virtues, he combined different uses of *sophrosyne* in one and the same passage and interpreted this concept in an unexpected way. This proved that it is not necessarily surprising that Ischomachus is also using *sophrosyne* differently than we would expect.

Furthermore, in the second chapter, we saw that Xenophon did the same thing in his characterization of Socrates in the *Memorabilia*. Whenever he presented Socrates as speaking himself, he used unexpected interpretations, by combining uses of *sophrosyne* or adding Socratic traits to its scope. The three most important things we discovered here were (1) Socrates' focus on mutual beneficial relationships (*Mem.* 4.5.7), (2) the idea that *sophrosyne* is like a craft and therefore can and should be trained (*Mem.* 1.2.23-24), and (3) the connection he made between *sophrosyne* and virtue (*Mem.* 3.9.4). So, like Plato, Xenophon exploits the polysemy of *sophrosyne* in order to prove his (philosophical) ideas about virtue.

Moreover, in the third chapter, we have seen that this also happened with Xenophon's characterization of Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia*. Even though Cyrus lived quite a different life than Socrates, he is still shown to be remarkably similar to this figure. It is striking that we essentially discovered the same important ideas here: Cyrus, too, believed in a strong connection between *sophrosyne* and virtue (*Cyr.* 3.1.16; 3.2.4) and that this virtuous/σώφρων behavior depended on reciprocity and utility (*Cyr.* 3.1.16; 3.2.4). Finally, he explicitly stated that *sophrosyne* is not something you possess when you have displayed it once, but something you should keep training till the end (*Cyr.* 7.5.75-76). From this, we can infer that for Xenophon, *sophrosyne* was not necessarily connected to the philosophical life.

That leaves us with the essential work: the *Oeconomicus*. In the fourth and final chapter, we have seen that the three principles outlined above are also found in Ischomachus' view on *sophrosyne*. He too believes, that if you are σώφρων you are essentially useful to another person (*Oec.* 7.14-15; 7.41). Also, *sophrosyne* is in Ischomachus' view something that has to be trained (7.41; 21.11). Finally, *sophrosyne* seems to be connected to virtue for Ischomachus, as we can infer from the contrasts he uses: a 'wicked' slave, tyrants, and Tantalus (7.41; 21.11). If this in itself would not be enough evidence that Ischomachus does not have an incorrect interpretation of *sophrosyne*, we have also shown several specific counterarguments against the objections that could be made to the various attestations of

sophrosyne in this work. In short, we can conclude that Ischomachus (and therefore maybe Xenophon himself) is living the life (Xenophon's) Socrates would truthfully advise to all his friends. This means that Xenophon has presented his own genuine interpretation of *sophrosyne* in the *Oeconomicus* and not, as Carlson thought, an 'ironic' one.

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