

The Politics of Power Balancing Vs. Enmeshment Theory

An Analysis of Indonesia's Response to Regional Power Competition in the Asia-Pacific Region

MA Thesis International Studies; International Relations

January 2017



**Universiteit
Leiden**

Student: Meena Messelaar 1259253
Thesis Supervisor: Lindsay O. Black

Abstract

This thesis places Indonesia's strategic regional policy for dealing with power competition within Asia in the context of its relationship with ASEAN, China and the US. The main question this thesis addresses is whether Indonesia, as a secondary state in the Southeast Asian region, is more likely to deal with the politics of the regional order through power balancing or institutional enmeshment. It will compare the arguments of Robert R. Ross, who argues that the balance of power in Asia-Pacific politics is affected by military power, and Evelyn Goh, who argues that the regional order is more complex and that regional frameworks such as ASEAN will also help influence larger regional counterweights such as China. In focusing on the power balancing actions that secondary states take, Ross argues that Indonesia uses military power, with the US by its side, to balance against China. Goh does not believe Indonesia can simply power balance against China, but that it will also try to enmesh China in regional entities. Both Ross's and Goh's arguments will be tested through a case study on Indonesia's behaviour in the regional dispute in the South China Sea to determine which of the two arguments is more relevant to Indonesia's strategic regional policy. This study is relevant because it provides a more detailed analysis of Indonesia's capabilities to deal with power competition in the region. This thesis concludes that Indonesia is more likely to deal with power competition in the Asia-Pacific through the enmeshment theory of Evelyn Goh.

Abbreviations

AIV	Advisory Council on International Affairs
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ACFTA	ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement
CARAT	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
COC	Code of Conduct
DOC	Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
EAS	East Asia Summit
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union

G20	Group of Twenty
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration
SBY	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Table of Content

Abstract.....	02
List of Abbreviations.....	02
1.Introduction.....	03
2.Theoretical Framework.....	04
2.1 Literature Review.....	04
2.2 Methodology.....	10
2.3 Robert R. Ross – Power Balancing Politics.....	11
2.4 Evelyn Goh – Omni-enmeshment.....	14
3.Case Study: Indonesia’s Behaviour in the South China Sea Dispute.....	15
3.1 Indonesia’s Relationships Through the Frameworks of Ross and Goh.....	20
Conclusion.....	23
Bibliography.....	25

1. Introduction

Indonesia is becoming more important to the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) as a regional partner and *primus inter pares* within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is due in part to its large territory, population of over 240 million, vast domestic market and historical role as one of the founding members of ASEAN, in addition to its strategic location on the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. Jakarta’s ambition to exert regional leadership and become a driver of regional integration processes in ASEAN is yet another reason why it is an important partner for institutions such as the EU. However, regardless of Indonesia’s favourable location and size, the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region

is overshadowed by the economic and military abilities of large states such as China (AIV 2013).

This thesis places Indonesia's strategic regional policy for dealing with power competition within Asia in the context of its relationship with ASEAN, China and the US. The main question this thesis addresses is whether Indonesia, as a secondary state in the Southeast Asian region, is more likely to deal with the politics of the regional order through power balancing or institutional enmeshment. It will compare the arguments of Robert R. Ross, who argues that the balance of power in Asia-Pacific politics is affected by military power, and Evelyn Goh, who argues that the regional order is more complex and that regional frameworks such as ASEAN will also help influence larger regional counterweights such as China. In focusing on the power balancing actions that secondary states take, Ross argues that Indonesia uses military power, with the US by its side, to balance against China. Goh does not believe Indonesia can simply power balance against China, but that it will also try to enmesh China in regional entities. Both Ross's and Goh's arguments will be tested through a case study on Indonesia's behaviour in the regional dispute in the South China Sea to determine which of the two arguments is more relevant to Indonesia's strategic regional policy. This study is relevant because it provides a more detailed analysis of Indonesia's capabilities to deal with power competition in the region.

This thesis will start with a review of relevant literature that has been written on the subject. It will then turn to a section dedicated to the methodology this thesis uses. After the methodology section, the thesis will go into the case study to test Ross's and Goh's arguments, followed by the conclusion.

2.1 Literature Review

To analyse whether Indonesia, as a secondary state in the Southeast Asian region, is more likely to deal with the complexity of the regional order through power balancing or institutional enmeshment, we need to turn to the basic theory of order and regionalism.

The key concept of regionalism within international relations (IR) theory entails dynamic regional cooperation that is defined as the increase of economic and social interaction and the growth of regional identity and awareness. With the decline of US hegemony following the end of the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific region has risen in its stead. This has resulted in a more decentralised international system, leading to shifts in autonomy and different dominant actors, such as the rise of China. The rise of regionalism is partly due to deepening integration processes and growing economic interdependence, but it has also led to questions of whether it has promoted a more polarised world or a more globalised one. Either way, it has also led to great power competition, in which regional states must deal with the politics of balancing power (Griffiths et al 2002).

The literature on power balancing is quite extensive. Most traditional realists believe that the balance of power system is always connected to international politics. IR theorist Kenneth Waltz believes that great powers will always respond to the rise of other great powers by trying to increase their own power (Paul et al 2004). Great powers are defined as states that have the ability to take part in wars and conflicts with other states. In contrast, secondary states, like Indonesia, are not able to provide for their own security and therefore must rely on 'great powers' to do so; these secondary states are, in other terms, 'bandwagoning' with great powers. For instance, according to this theory Indonesia would be bandwagoning with the US (Paul et al 2004). According to Robert A. Pape, secondary powers have a few security concerns in a balance of power system. First, there is the possibility of a direct attack by one of the great powers. Another threat is not the direct threat to the state itself, but rather indirect harm from attacks on alliance states through military actions that undermine the security of these other secondary states. A third threat scenario is when another great power becomes a global hegemon; in this case, many things may change, such as international rules of conduct, exploitation of economic resources, domination of the other second-ranked powers or even conquering some of these states (Pape 2005).

A system in which only one great power is in charge is called a unipolar system. In this case no other state is able to balance against this great power. Pape argues that secondary states have just as many reasons to balance against a unipolar power that

threatens their security as they would have to balance against great powers in a multipolar system. The issue is whether they can actually do this. Normally states might deal with a growing great power through external or internal balancing. External balancing involves using an organization of counterbalancing alliances, while internal balancing makes use of remilitarization or quick economic growth to support eventual remilitarization (Pape 2005).

Within IR theory the fundamental schools of thought are realism, constructivism and liberalism, and the politics of power balancing rely heavily on realism. Classical realism can be traced back to Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. However, throughout time realism has evolved into many different variations. The ideas of classical realist Hans Morgenthau rely on the notion that a longing for power is an unchangeable part of human nature and that political leaders will always think in terms of interests defined by power. (Toledo 2005). In Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, the structure of the international system forces states to compete with each other for power when they are concerned about their own security. The ultimate goal for all states that want to be a great power is to maximize their power on a global level and, in the end, dominate the international system. They do so by first establishing hegemony in their own region and then moving towards becoming a global hegemon (Snyder 2002).

Robert R. Ross challenges the perspective of neorealists and traditional realists, because the behaviour of secondary states in response to rising powers has not been analysed in a coherent way. According to Ross, neorealists and traditional realists believe that secondary states and their preferences are driven by their geographical placement. However, other scholars argue that the concept of anarchy will push secondary states to adhere to a state that is a status-quo power, instead of power balancing with rising powers (Ross 2006). In his article Ross examines what effects economic power and military power have on the state alignment of secondary states, what this means for the development of the balance of power in Asia and what kinds of response secondary states have to rising powers. Ross argues that, as a rising power, being economically dominant in the region is not enough to push secondary states to align with the rising power. In addition to economic dominance, a rising state also needs military power to

convince secondary states to align with it. This way of thinking builds on the traditional realist and neorealist arguments that secondary states will respond to the capabilities of great powers (Ross 2006).

Evelyn Goh argues in her work that multilateral institutions like ASEAN play a more crucial role in affecting regional politics than many may think. Indonesia is one of the founding members of ASEAN and has been active in including great powers like China and the US in regional frameworks such as the East Asia Summit (EAS). Indonesia still relies heavily on the US commitment to the region when it comes to security matters, but the question is whether it does so as an act of power balancing or because engaging great powers in regional frameworks leans more towards enmeshment (Goh 2007).

To test Ross's theory against Goh's theory of enmeshment, this thesis presents a case study on Indonesia's behaviour in the South China Sea. Most of the literature written on regional tensions in the South China Sea has several recurring themes. First, most researchers, academics and journalists write about the strategic importance of the region and the global dependence on maritime traffic to sustain international trade. Many academic articles point out the importance of the international trade factor, with a focus on the Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes (Kang 2009). The 2013 Report of the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) of the Netherlands described the recent Asia-Pacific developments as one of the most important topics in international relations in the twenty-first century. The region is home to a large part of the world's population, and the life expectancy rate is growing faster than in any other region (AIV 2013). A side effect of this positive economic (and social) development is the fact that the ocean has also become an area of conflict for establishing territorial boundaries. There is a possibility that these disputes could lead to regional wars, which would have consequences not just for the region but for nations around the world. Conflicts of sovereignty over shared waters and other territories have led to growing rivalry between neighbouring countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Yee 2012).

Because this thesis uses a case study on the South China Sea dispute to analyse Indonesia's behaviour, the involvement of intergovernmental organizations such as the

UN is another recurring theme. There are many different opinions on the effects of interventions through treaties such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Most scholars argue that the UN has both improved and aggravated tensions in the South China Sea (Kang 2009). The UNCLOS treaty, which was introduced in 1982 and ratified in 1994, embodies international maritime law and lays down protocol on nation-states' behaviour in their quest for oceanic expansion (Kang 2009). Nevertheless, the UNCLOS is violated on a frequent basis, which is why in 2012 ASEAN drafted the Code of Conduct. The motivation for this draft comes from 1995 when China occupied Mischief Reef, a large reef located in the Spratly island group 250 kilometres west of the Palawan island of the Philippines, which also claims the area (Thyer 2012). In an attempt to constrain China, the Philippines strongly urged ASEAN to adopt this code of conduct, and in 1999 the ASEAN members agreed on a set of rules. China and all ASEAN members signed a declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea in 2002. However, in the exchange of drafts of the Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN there were still some topics that caused conflict, such as the issue of the amount of military activity allowed in neighbouring waters and whether fishermen could be detained and arrested when found in disputed waters (Thyer 2012). In 2012 the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) was signed by the ASEAN members and China to promote peace and stability in the region which has now been reaffirmed on the 25th of July 2016 in a joint statement on the full effective implementation of the DOC (ASEAN 2016).

Indonesia and China have a long history of both conflict and cooperation in their bilateral relations. Nevertheless, their trade relationship seems to be a top priority in both the countries' foreign policy. It is therefore important to first analyse China's ambition to extend its regional territory, influence, and maritime power through claims that rely on historic and territorial rights. After World War II, to justify its territorial claim over the South China Sea, China came up with the 11-dash line calculation, which was later scaled back to nine. The nine-dash line was used to claim all reefs, atolls and islands that were situated in the South China Sea, which ultimately would mean that 90% of the South China Sea would belong to China (Langel 2012). However, in response to the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling against it in 2016, China stated that it did not in fact claim historic rights over the whole area of the nine-dash line. China pointed

out that there was a difference between its territorial claims and its sovereignty over the islands. The nine-dash line map shows the alleged Chinese territorial sovereignty over the islands, but it is separate from the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), continental shelf and historic rights. The Tribunal's major findings against China were based on the link between the claim of historic right and the claim of sovereignty over the islands, which now appear never to have existed in the first place (East Asia Forum 2016).

According to Nien Chung and Chang Liao, China's new foreign policy under Xi Jinping is to ensure the country's great power status through a coordinated grand strategy. Great power diplomacy is central to this strategy, which includes promoting the moral and political visions of Beijing and strengthening its regional leadership abilities. It also entails the idea of providing a multilateral alternative for partner countries. According to Chung and Liao this is not a surprising move, because although China has experienced great economic growth the market has slowed down, which means it must rely on a more proactive diplomatic strategy. Chung and Liao predict that China's new power diplomacy will not necessarily cause more tension or conflict, as evidenced by its use of economic sanctions instead of violence to enforce its claims. This reveals a China that is resorting to a less coercive style of foreign policy, one that is more focused on diplomacy (Chung et al 2016).

Indonesia's behaviour in the South China Sea is defined by its self-proclaimed role as the 'honest broker': it attempts to maintain a respectable position outside the battlefield of the South China Sea dispute, taking on the role of a standoff mediator (Mietzner 2015). The most likely reason why Indonesian policy makers have attempted to stay at a distance is that economic diplomacy is the top priority in Indonesia's foreign policy, which the Joko Widodo administration has emphasized since it came to power in 2014. The priority of attracting foreign investment and commercial interests is the primary motivation for Indonesia to hold back from playing an assertive role in territorial claims. Indonesia does not underestimate China's economic influence in the whole Southeast Asian region, and because China also acknowledges Indonesia's growing importance in international economic forums like the G20, Indonesia continues its passive role in the South China Sea dispute (Marthinus 2016). However, Indonesia was previously and involuntarily involved in the dispute when in 1993 China claimed a portion of

Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone of the Natuna Islands, which includes an island group located approximately 150 miles northwest of Borneo and the southern tip of Vietnam. The Natuna Islands consist of about 270 islands and are part of Indonesia's Riau Islands province (Johnson 1997). After over a decade, on 12 November 2015, China released a public statement in which it finally – and very surprisingly – recognized Indonesia's sovereignty over the islands, to avoid further isolation in the region (Yu 2015). The bilateral relationship between China and Indonesia has been very prosperous ever since, as evidenced by the Jakarta-Bandung Railway Project, which costs \$5.5 billion, financed almost entirely with China Development Bank loans. Nevertheless, Chinese-Indonesian relations are still complicated, as evidenced by a standoff between Chinese coast guards and Indonesian officials on 21 March 2016: there was illegal fishing activity by a Chinese fishing boat 4.34 kilometres off Indonesia's Natuna Islands, which means it occurred within Indonesia's EEZ. Indonesia captured the Chinese fishers, but China claimed it was well within traditional Chinese fishing grounds (Prasetyo 2016).

The literature on the South China Sea does not include significant discussions of Indonesia's involvement, causing a gap. This is, however, understandable, as Indonesia is not a direct claimant in the dispute. Much literature is dedicated to the Philippines versus China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and there is also a large amount of literature on US relations with the South China Sea and the balance of power. This gap in the literature can be filled through a closer analysis of Indonesia's response to the power balancing politics in the region. Studying Indonesia is interesting because it provides an opportunity to analyse the behaviour of developing secondary states in response to rising great powers. It allows us to evaluate whether regional frameworks and strategic partnerships can play a role in balancing out power structures to avoid violent conflict, or whether the realist idea of anarchy will always be the norm in power struggles between states.

2.2 Methodology

In order to answer the main question of this thesis – whether Indonesia, as a secondary state in the Southeast Asian region, is more likely to deal with the politics of the regional order through power balancing or institutional enmeshment – the works of Robert R.

Ross and Evelyn Goh will be analysed and compared. Ross's argument about the balance of power politics through military power will be analysed through his article "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia". His arguments will be compared with those of Evelyn Goh in her article "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies". In this article, Goh argues that the regional order is more complex than just a case of power balancing politics. Goh believes that regional frameworks like ASEAN will also help to influence larger regional counterweights such as China, which will prevent conflicts from spiralling out of control. Goh argues that a combination of regional frameworks, the politics of power balancing and international production networks (IPNs) will add to regional security and cooperation (Goh 2007).

Both Ross's and Goh's arguments will be tested through a case study on Indonesia's behaviour in the South China Sea dispute. To gather information on this behaviour, this thesis makes use of news articles, journals, books and online publications by various academics and journalists. Unfortunately, most information from the government such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands on the Asia-Pacific is confidential and not allowed to be used publicly. The South China Sea issue is an ongoing dispute that is in the news very often, which makes it difficult to keep track of all the new developments. However, this thesis focuses only on Indonesia's behavioural trends in order to determine what strategies it uses to deal with regional power competition. This study is useful because it analyses the behaviour of a developing secondary state in response to a rising great power. It provides an opportunity to see whether regional frameworks and strategic partnerships can play a role in balancing out power structures to avoid violent conflict, or whether the realist idea of anarchy will always be the norm in power struggles between states. The next sections will analyse Ross's and Goh's arguments on secondary state behaviour more closely.

2.3 Robert R. Ross – Power Balancing Politics

A key feature of Ross's argument is that he believes that there are only two kinds of states: "...great powers, those states that can contend in a war with any other state in the system...and secondary states, which cannot independently provide for their security

against any other state, including great powers...”(Ross 2007 p.357). In his article “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia”, Robert R. Ross examines what effects economic power and military power have on the state alignment of secondary states, what this means for the development of the balance of power in Asia and what kind of response secondary states have to rising powers. Ross argues that, as a rising power, being economically dominant in the region is not enough to push secondary states to align with it. In addition to economic dominance, a rising power state also needs military power to convince secondary states to align with it (Ross 2007). This way of thinking builds on the traditional realist and neorealist arguments that secondary states will respond to the capabilities of great powers, and Ross’s arguments rely heavily on the traditional realist and neorealist schools of thought of theorists such as Kenneth Waltz (Snyder 2002). In his analysis of China’s rise in Asia and the impact of this rise on secondary states such as Indonesia, Ross states that traditional balancing is taking place in the region. “The East Asian response to the rise of China also establishes that realism and traditional balance of power theory are as appropriate for understanding alignment policies in East Asia as they are for understanding alignment policies in any other region of international politics” (Ross 2007).

As Ross argues, US dominance in the South China Sea has not diminished despite China’s rise. Additionally, the US’s ability to determine the security situation of the surrounding states has not declined either. This means that China’s successful rise relies on other Asian states’ economic dependence on it. Secondary states therefore still strategically seek out security cooperation with the US (Ross 2007). According to Leszek Buszynski, regional conflicts such as the South China Sea dispute have gone beyond territorial claims of access to energy resources because the area has become a place of rivalry between great powers such as the US and China. As China’s economic power has increased, and simultaneously its maritime ambitions and expansion, US interest in the Asia-Pacific region has grown as well, leading to a growing conflict between the two powers (Buszynski 2012).

In the case of Indonesia, Ross argues that Indonesia will try to balance against China together with the US military wise. According to Ross, Indonesia has acknowledged the

US power and influence for many years, which became especially visible in 1999 when it accepted the secession of East Timor under US pressure, after occupying the island for years after the Portuguese decolonisation. Many human rights were violated during that time by the Indonesian government and pro-Indonesian militia groups that were often backed by the Indonesian army. The United Nations Security Council urged for direct withdrawal, and under US pressure, Indonesia finally did so. They had to cooperate with the US or otherwise Indonesia would be cut off from economic aid provided by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Human Rights Watch 2005). The US sent a substantial number of military forces out to the South China Sea to support the secession of East Timor. Because there was no other compensating great power, Indonesia had no viable alternative but to cooperate with the US in this matter. Despite the military embargo imposed on them by the US and the 'free and active' foreign policy Indonesia has upheld ever since independence, Indonesia continues to participate in US military exercises such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT).

Ross poses the question of whether the Southeast Asian region is becoming more dependent on China economically than on the US. From the realist point of view, the intentions of great powers are not that important to secondary state decisions about alignment, as demonstrated by the post-Cold War situation in the Asian region. The way states perceive Chinese influence in the region varies. States such as Vietnam and Japan keep a distrustful stance towards China, while other states such as Brunei and Singapore have positive views on China's influence in the region. Through strategic alliances with the US some states have balanced against Chinese power (Ross 2007).

Ross concludes that dominant economic power is not enough to push secondary states into accommodating a great power, because military power always trumps economic power when it comes to secondary state alignment. The responses of East Asian secondary states to China's rise are driven by their military capabilities. East Asia is undergoing not Chinese dominance but the intensification of regional bipolarity, because some secondary states are aligning more and more with China while others are choosing the US (Ross 2007). In the case study on Indonesia and its method of power balancing against China, this thesis will further analyse whether Ross's argument is valid

for Indonesia's response to China's rise. By considering Indonesia and its behaviour in the South China Sea dispute from Ross's point of view, this thesis will hopefully be able to conclude whether Indonesia is participating in the politics of power balancing.

2.4 Evelyn Goh – Omni-enmeshment

In her article "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies", Evelyn Goh argues that the post-Cold War peaceful stability in East Asia is due to great power dynamics. One of the reasons for this stability is that the US has remained closely involved on an economic and strategic level. The building of multilateral institutions such as ASEAN has also added to the relatively peaceful transition. Another factor is that many Southeast Asian nations make use of the US security commitment to the region to counter potential Chinese power. This has often raised the question among IR scholars whether Southeast Asia is actually balancing against China or whether it is accommodating, aligning or bandwagoning with China. Another question is whether ASEAN-led regional institutions have actually facilitated the building of a regional security community or whether it is another way of playing into the hands of great power interests (Goh 2007).

Goh also poses the question of whether small states are actually able to influence the regional order, and to what extent. Goh argues that the fear among Southeast Asian states of a potential shift towards a multipolar regional system, in which large powers engage in competition against each other, does exist. One way they can deal with this threat is neither to exclude any specific great power, nor to choose sides. The best thing to do is to strive for the inclusion of all great powers in the strategic affairs of the region. Therefore, Goh suggests the omni-enmeshment strategy, arguing that the main method of Southeast Asian states' strategies for regional order is that of the omni-enmeshment of great powers. Goh uses the term 'enmeshment' to refer to the act of engaging with states to increase their involvement in the regional or even international order. By doing so, states create a network of sustainable relationships and exchanges that last on a long-term basis of integration. These efforts lead to deeper economic ties and create more dialogue on security and political matters (Goh 2007).

In his article on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), Leszek Buszynski argues that in a situation in which a dominant great power has a clear advantage over smaller secondary states, there must be an agreement of norms and behaviour to keep the balance of power in check. Without that balance, there would be no reason for great powers to accept constraints on their behaviour and norms. In this case the US would have to deliver this balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region (Buszynski 2003). However, in addition to the extended deterrence of the US, regional security for Indonesia and the other ASEAN countries is mostly regulated through regional frameworks such as the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Kosandi 2013).

Goh argues that this is a case of complex balancing that is different from the conventional power-balancing acts of secondary states against great powers. Goh argues that the small states in Southeast Asia cope with strategic changes regarding China's rising power and the US rivalry in the region by diversifying strategies of dependence instead of conventional power balancing against great powers. Being part of a framework such as ASEAN helps them to create more space in which to manoeuvre and decreases their dependence on great powers. With institutionalization, regional competition is settled through regional frameworks. These frameworks are able to set rules for norms and constraints, and these regional strategies are a non-military way of dealing with regional competition (Goh 2007). Goh's argument will be tested through the case study on Indonesia's behaviour in the South China Sea dispute. The outcome of the case study on whether Goh or Ross's argument is more valid in the case of Indonesia will provide more insight into small state behaviour in the politics of regional security and power issues.

3. Case Study: Indonesia's Behaviour in the South China Sea Dispute

In 1991 Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas warned that the Spratly Island dispute would become 'the next potential conflict area' for the Southeast Asian region. This would turn out to be an accurate prediction. Now referred to as the 'South China Sea dispute', it is a heated debate over territorial sovereignty that concerns a variety of countries, including China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam and Indonesia.

However, due to numerous security alliances and economic interests, the US and the EU are just as interested in the outcome in the Asia-Pacific region. If the dispute were to escalate, the consequences would not be confined to the region (Buszynski 2013). This case study addresses Indonesia's act of power balancing against China within the context of the South China Sea. It draws from the work of Robert R. Ross, who argues that secondary states such as Indonesia will rely on another great power, in this case the US, to balance against China through, for instance, military power. It will also draw from Evelyn Goh's theory of omni-enmeshment, in which secondary states benefit from including great powers, such as China, in regional frameworks through the institution of ASEAN. The point of this case study is to determine whether Indonesia's behaviour in the South China Sea with regards to regional power competition can be identified more with Ross's or Goh's argument.

To analyse Indonesia's response to China's rise and whether Indonesia is balancing against China, this case study will first look at Indonesia's separate relationships with the US and with China. Indonesia has signed comprehensive partnerships with both the US and China but does not seek to form an alliance with either one. In Indonesia's case, the policy of 'alignment', as Ross discusses it, is unlikely, because Indonesia's 'free and active' foreign policy ideal leans towards a non-alignment strategy. This non-alignment strategy likely gives Indonesia the confidence to think it can influence both China and the US, rather than align with either of them. Nevertheless, relationships between the US and Indonesia and China and Indonesia have been intense and unstable over time (McRae 2013).

Indonesia – US relations

The United States and Indonesia have maintained a diplomatic and supportive relationship ever since the Netherlands acknowledged Indonesia's independence in 1949. However, it remains a relationship of ups and downs, with fluctuating trust in one another. According to several polls, more than 60 percent of Indonesians did not trust the US to act responsibly in global affairs during the George W. Bush administration. Additionally, more than 60 percent of respondents in a world public opinion poll thought the US was abusing its power in pushing Indonesia to do things in the US's advantage (Quayle 2013). However, when Barack Obama took office, Indonesians'

opinions shifted tremendously in favour of the US. A big factor contributing to this sentiment was the fact that Obama himself had a close bond to Indonesia due to the several years he lived there during his childhood (Wike 2010).

There have been some darker periods in the history of US-Indonesian relations. In particular, under Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, non-alignment became a key feature of Indonesia's foreign policy outlook. The accommodation of communism under Sukarno's presidency was seen as a threat by the US. When Sukarno was overthrown by Suharto's military coup, the term 'non-alignment' became less significant. Of course, other issues came to the fore during the authoritarian rule of Suharto's 'New Order' regime, such as countless human rights violations, which resulted in restricted security cooperation in the 1990s (McRae 2013). However, throughout the Cold War period, Indonesia was aligned with the US even though Indonesia strove for a 'free and active' foreign policy that avoided formal alliances. The American 'War on Terror', however, was not popular with Indonesians because it seemed like the US was waging a war against Muslims; because Indonesia is home to the largest Muslim population in the world, this was not received well (Hamilton-Hart et al 2015).

During Obama's visit to Indonesia in 2010, the comprehensive partnership between Indonesia and the US was made official. To avoid Chinese dominance in regional institutions such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), Indonesia has been including both China and the US in multiple frameworks of ASEAN. In order to participate in the EAS, the US had to sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and ASEAN also worked closely with the US on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. In 2013, the partnership was extended and it rebalanced the American presence in the region: by 2020 the US would station 60 percent of its naval force in the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to keeping four vessels rotating through Singapore and rotating US marines through an Australian Defence Force base on a yearly basis (Hamilton-Hart et al 2015). The US has been a very useful partner on an economic level, and its ability to provide military goods and a force to ensure regional stability has been useful because Indonesia's military capabilities have been and still are very limited. Funding is one problem, which has resulted in very minimal force readiness and modernisation within Indonesia's military. During the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, defence spending was targeted at

1.5 percent of GDP, but expenditure stayed under 1 percent during the whole length of his presidency. Under the Joko Widodo administration defence spending has not increased, so overall military spending has stayed quite low and therefore there is little room for improvement (Sebastian et al 2013).

The military and security cooperation between Indonesia and the US has intensified since the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. Indonesia has been involved in regional defence counterterrorism fellowship programs and yearly meetings on security and defence strategies ever since then, and the US has provided funding for a special counterterrorism unit in the Indonesian National Police Force since the Bali Bombing in Indonesia. In 2011 the American FBI and Indonesia's National Police cooperated in the fight against terrorism, as well as an anti-narcotics cooperation. In 2012 there were more than 170 bilateral military-to-military engagements with large-scale exercises, which have substantially strengthened the bonds between the two militaries. In 2013 a regional counterterrorism initiative including 1,800 Special Forces was co-chaired by Indonesia and the US. However, even though the partnership between Indonesia and the US on security matters is much larger and more substantial than the security relationship Indonesia has with China, Indonesia remains cautious: tensions between the US and China are leading to provocations of one another, which brings the risk of instability to the region. Nevertheless, Indonesia welcomes the US's rebalance to Asia and its military cooperation, while keeping all options open (Hamilton-Hart et al 2015).

To conclude this section on US-Indonesia relations, Indonesia's military capabilities are far from sufficient to ensure its security on its own, which means it must still rely on great powers such as the US for security reasons. It therefore cooperates with the US on many security issues. However, this does not necessarily mean Indonesia uses this relationship to power balance against any other great power. The 'free and active' foreign policy ideal remains the most important factor for Indonesia.

Indonesia – China relations

Indonesia's worries are much more directed towards the unpredictable actions of China as its power grows, especially within the South China Sea dispute. One of those concerns, related to the dispute, includes the presence of Chinese fishermen in Indonesian

territorial waters. China acknowledged Indonesian sovereignty over the Natuna territory, situated in the South China Sea area, in 2012, but nevertheless continues to trespass in Indonesian waters, which periodically leads to confrontation (McRae 2013). Despite this, the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and China is somewhat stable at the moment.

The act of stepping closer to either China or the US or pulling away seems to be an ongoing trend for Indonesia, and it is always in response to negative or positive developments in one of the two relationships. In the late 1950s, when Indonesia's relationship with the US worsened, its relationship with China took a new turn when Indonesian president Sukarno declared an anti-imperialist axis, in which China was also included (Hamilton-Hart et al 2015). Then came a shift in Indonesia-China relations during the regime change from Sukarno to Suharto, which might be the biggest shift of all. While Sukarno was more in line with China in the Cold War, Suharto leaned more towards the Western side (Kosandi 2013). After Suharto's military coup, the communist movement was associated primarily with China, and anyone with communist sentiments was imprisoned or even killed. The Indonesian government during Suharto's rule tried to expose China as a threat, which was a securitization method of the New Order regime with the goal of gaining popular support. Even today there is still a culture of bias among Indonesia's foreign policymakers against the history of Chinese interference, which is also reflected in popular resentment against the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia. These anti-Chinese sentiments have not done the bilateral relationship between China and Indonesia any good, although they are now significantly diminished (Hamilton-hart et al 2015).

An important point in the Indonesia-China relationship came in 2005, when a strategic partnership agreement was finalized between the two countries. In 2013, during President Xi Jinping's visit to Jakarta, the agreement was upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership with the idea of cooperating in many different areas, such as military activities and educational programmes. The military relations between the two countries have likewise evolved since 2000, and in 2013 the comprehensive partnership was upgraded with a focus on increased defence cooperation followed by expanded military exercises (Hamilton-Hart et al 2015). In 2016 China and Indonesia vowed to

intensify their military relationship even more. Both countries have agreed on joint efforts to construct the China-ASEAN community of a common future for the Asia-Pacific region, which must ultimately overcome disputes over sovereignty, territorial interests and rights through negotiations. The basis for mutual trust and respect found in the UN Charter, UNCLOS and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) is what should drive the relationship between both countries (Tao 2016). Additionally, the economic relationship between Indonesia and China has expanded trade and investment ties due to China's economic growth. While the US was the biggest export market for Indonesia in 2006, China took its place in 2009 due to the US financial crisis. However, there is no bilateral free trade agreement that shows an Indonesian preference for trade with China over the US (Hamilton-Hart et al 2015).

To conclude this section, Indonesia's threat perception of China's rise is not clear, and many scholars say is not consistent. On the one hand, Indonesia does have its concerns about China's assertive attitude in the region, but on the other hand, the military element of the US in its mission to rebalance towards Asia is also a lingering concern. When it comes to military capabilities, Indonesia is seriously lacking in substantial military power, even though its air force facilities have been upgraded and a new task force has been put in place. Unfortunately, Indonesia's moves to level up on armed forces in the direction of possible flashpoints in the South China Sea are attractive but too ambitious, because realistically its capacity is not great enough to become a serious force in the region (Hamilton-Hart 2015).

3.1 Indonesia's Relationships Through the Frameworks of Ross and Goh

Turning to Goh, her argument is that including China in strategic affairs keeps it engaged and involves it more deeply with regional issues, which makes it less likely to turn away from its responsibilities for regional security (Goh 2007). To test Goh's argument, this case study will look at Indonesia within ASEAN and its regional frameworks that include China, according to the enmeshment theory. Goh's argument relies on her belief that in addition to power balancing acts, the enmeshment of great powers in regional frameworks can help promote regional stability. Regional entities such as ASEAN, of which Indonesia is a founding member, can take on the role of including great powers

such as China to ensure their commitment to regional stability. Some scholars say ASEAN uses a combination of enmeshment and hedging towards China. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) helps foster deepening economic interdependence, which should ultimately lead to deeper security commitments. ARF is a forum for multilateral security dialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region (Ryu 2013). Following Goh's argument, the strategy of enmeshment can be very useful in increasing ASEAN's bargaining power and in increasing its centrality in the Asia-Pacific region. This way, regional frameworks such as ARF are able to decrease the potential for the regional domination of great powers, which can be a crucial factor in regional disputes like the South China Sea. Over time China has become more active within ARF, hosting several meetings and even proposing initiatives, which demonstrates the successful integration of China within the regional frameworks of ARF. An important aspect of ARF's work involves bringing great powers together: China, the US, the EU, Canada and many more have been brought together through the forum (Ryu 2013).

When considering the South China Sea, Indonesia has taken a leading role in keeping China engaged in the these regional frameworks, which might be the reason for the lack of escalation. As previously mentioned, the economic prospects for both countries are of great importance to Indonesia and China. After the devastating effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, Indonesia's strategic priorities were focused on economic recovery. Many called the economic growth that followed a miracle, considering the fact that Indonesia was one of the countries hit most severely by the crisis, and its strategic leadership role within ASEAN made China very interested in expanding its bilateral relationship with it. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) was signed in 2002, after China had already become a bigger trading partner for Indonesia than the US. The agreement increased overall trade tremendously, and the ACFTA is considered a very fruitful agreement. This shows that Indonesia is very pragmatic but keeping both China and the US at an equal distance (Kosandi 2013).

Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Indonesia's sixth president, Indonesia gained increased international recognition as an emerging regional power and global player. SBY promoted firm engagement with ASEAN, making Indonesia a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) and strengthening its role as a safeguard of peace and stability in the

region (Amitav 2014). Since the inauguration of president Joko Widodo in 2014, Indonesian foreign policy has become more nationalistic. The end of SBY's presidency phased out the 'A thousand friends, zero enemies' motto, which reflected the former president's strong belief in quiet diplomacy to resolve issues between leaders in face-to-face discussions (Mietzner 2015). This policy of accommodating all interests and avoiding confrontation created stability for a while but left a large amount of space for criticism that it advocated a stagnating status quo. Although SBY added substantially to Indonesia's international profile, there always remained a gap between Indonesia's self-perception and the geopolitical reality (Mietzner 2015).

With little interest in foreign policy and a focus on healthcare, schooling, transportation and jobs, the foreign policy outlook under Joko Widodo initially started off quite differently from his predecessor. However, after attending several summits for ASEAN, the G20 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the seventh president's initial disinterest seemed to turn around, and he changed his mind on foreign policy strategy. One part of his new strategy entails the 'global maritime fulcrum', which rests partly on emphasizing Indonesia's identity as a 'maritime nation' and its potential to become a 'global maritime nexus'. However, this has brought a series of other challenges with it, such as issues around naval and coast guard defence, illegal fishing, infrastructure and diplomatic relations with the surrounding coastal states. This brings us to the contested waters of the South China Sea (Harding 2014).

Indonesia has always had the reputation of maintaining a respectable position outside the South China Sea dispute, taking on the role of a standoff mediator. It has sought to manage its issues with China over jurisdiction and sovereign rights in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) through diplomacy, while not damaging the other aspects of its relations with China; it does so because Indonesia's foreign policy under Joko Widodo has economic development as its priority (Mietzner 2015). However, in 1993 China claimed a portion of Indonesia's EEZ of the Natuna Islands, an island group located approximately 150 miles northwest of Borneo and the southern tip of Vietnam. Indonesia's attempt to reframe this EEZ problem as a bilateral issue of fishery agreements between it and China seems to ignore the real issue: China's real objectives in the region, which is a challenge for President Widodo and his foreign policy goals to

expand Indonesia's maritime prowess. ASEAN's attempts over the past three decades to make China adhere to the framework of preferred state behaviour in UNCLOS or the Code of Conduct all seem to have fostered no results (Weatherbee 2016). Indonesia never accepted China's nine-dash claim, but because of China's claim to the Natuna Islands, Indonesia was drawn into the dispute more than it would like to have been. The way Indonesia has reacted to China in the South China Sea dispute has everything to do with their longstanding but very turbulent relationship. However, most of Indonesia's decisions are made keeping in mind the main goal of strategically considering its greater bilateral relationship with China (Mietzner 2015).

Per Goh's argument, the reason why regional disputes like that in the South China Sea have not yet escalated involves the many regional frameworks in which Indonesia and ASEAN have engaged China. Through enmeshment, Indonesia and ASEAN have created a web of agreements on economic and diplomatic matters that are difficult for China to ignore. This does not mean China will always adhere to these agreements, as shown in its response to the PCA's ruling and its continued presence in Indonesia's fishing waters. However, there is also evidence of a more diplomatic Chinese foreign policy, rather than a violent one.

Per Ross's argument, Indonesia's relationships with China and the US have taken on the form of a three-way balancing act, with Indonesia in the very middle. However, using Goh's argument, this balancing act includes the firm engagement of China and the US in regional frameworks, which counters Ross's theory of secondary states seeking to balance against one great power by using another great power. Therefore, Indonesia as a secondary state is more likely to deal with great power competition in the region through the enmeshment of those great powers in regional frameworks, which leans more towards Goh's theory of enmeshment than Ross's theory of power balancing.

Conclusion

This thesis analysed Indonesia's response to the rising power of China by comparing Robert R. Ross's theory that secondary states power balance against rising great powers

with Evelyn Goh's argument that secondary states resort to enmeshment rather than power balancing. Both arguments were tested through a case study on Indonesia's behaviour in the South China Sea dispute. Both arguments make compelling cases; however, this thesis leans towards the enmeshment theory more than power balancing. Analysing the South China Sea dispute through Ross's theory of power balancing addresses only the fact that Indonesia is balancing against China through the military assistance of the US. However, the act of balancing is not only directed towards China, but also towards the US. This shows a three-way balancing act by Indonesia, which also makes use of enmeshment. In that respect, the power balancing theory of secondary states' alignment is not efficient enough to analyse Indonesia's response to the rising power of China.

As discussed in the case study, the regional security of Indonesia and other ASEAN countries is mostly regulated through regional frameworks such as ARF and EAS, but also through regional economic frameworks such as APEC. From this point of view, Indonesia is trying to find a balance between the US and China, which seems very much in line with the realist point of view of Ross's argument (Kosandi 2013). However, Indonesia is not only balancing against China but is including China in its regional frameworks from its position within ASEAN. These developments show that ASEAN is not bandwagoning with China as a rising great power but is involving China in order to make it rise in a responsible manner or become a status quo power (Kosandi 2013). The open regionalism of ASEAN has had positive effects on stability and security within the region. While there is still the ongoing dispute in the South China Sea, the China-ASEAN and Indonesia-China relationships are still on the right track when it comes to trade relations, which is the most important aspect of Indonesia's foreign policy. The positive role regional frameworks play is evidenced by the active participation of China in ARF and EAS (Kosandi 2013). Therefore, I agree with Goh's theory of omni-enmeshment. The dominance of rising powers like China in strategic landscapes is best dealt with through enmeshment, or omni-enmeshment, as Goh calls it. The competition between China and the US is a good reason for Indonesia to resort to including both powers in its regional frameworks within ASEAN, giving both more incentives to commit to the region's best interests.

Even though China does seem to be committed to a peaceful rise and stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region, the real threat seems to lie in the strategic challenge for secondary states such as Indonesia that comes with China's rise. The uncertainty of what China is going to do with its newly gained wealth and military power is what concerns countries like Indonesia the most. This is one of Indonesia's motivations for including the US in the EAS, in order to provide a counterweight that China will take seriously. If we take Ross's argument, Indonesia is balancing against China with the US through enmeshment. It could be a combination of both balancing and engaging. While the dependence of secondary states such as Indonesia on the economic power of greater powers such as China is an insufficient condition to compel secondary state alignment, this does not mean the secondary state automatically relies only on military alliances with another great power, in this case the US. Indonesia seems to keep its 'free and active' foreign policy close to its heart and keeps its options open, as long as the most important feature of its foreign policy, economic growth, is met.

To conclude, the main question – whether Indonesia, as a secondary state in the Southeast Asian region, is more likely to deal with the politics of the regional order through power balancing or institutional enmeshment – can be answered through the arguments of Goh. When comparing the arguments of Ross and Goh, the latter provides a more relevant framework for the complexity of the balancing act and the impact regional frameworks such as ASEAN have in influencing larger regional counterweights, both China and the US.

Bibliography

Amitav Acharya (2014). Chapter 1: "Why Indonesia Matters?" *Indonesia Matters; Asia's Emerging Democratic Power*.

Advisory Council on International Affairs (2013) "Azie in Opmars; Strategische Betekenis en Gevolgen" p.86 1-70.

ASEAN (2016) "Joint Statement on the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and China on the Full and Effective Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct

of Parties in the South China Sea” < <http://asean.org/storage/2016/07/Joint-Statement-on-the-full-and-effective-implementation-of-the-DOC-FINAL.pdf> >

Beckman, Robert (2013) “UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea” *American Journal of International Law* Vol.107. p.142-163.

Buszynski, Leszek, Roberts, Christopher (2013) “The South China Sea and Australia’s Regional Security Environment” *National Security College Occasional Paper* No.5.

Buszynski, Leszek (2012). “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China strategic Rivalry” *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 35:2. pp.139-156.

Buszynski Leszek (2003) “ASEAN the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea” *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, Vol.25 No.3 pp343-343.

Tao, Zhang (26 May 2016) “China, Indonesia vow to deepen military cooperation” China Military Online <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-05/26/content_7074409.htm>

Chubb, Andrew (14 July 2016) “Did China just clarify the nine-dash line?” East Asia Forum; Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific.

Chung, Nien, Chang, Liao, Chang, (2016) “China’s New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping” *Asian Security* Vol.12 No.2 pp.82-91.

Emmers, Ralf (2014) “Indonesia’s role in ASEAN: A Case of Incomplete and Sectorial Leadership” *The Pacific Review* Vol.27 No.04. p.543-562.

Gindarsah, L., Priamarizki, A. (2014), “Indonesia’s Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns” *Policy Report*, S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Goh Evelyn (17 July 2016) "How Should Southeast Asia respond to the South China Sea Ruling?" East Asia Forum; Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific. <<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/17/how-should-southeast-asia-respond-to-the-south-china-sea-ruling>>

Goh, Evelyn (2007) "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies" *International Security*, Vol.32 No.3 pp.113-157.

Griffiths, Martin, O'Callaghan Terry (2002) "International Relations: The Key Concepts. Routledge, London.

Hamilton-Hart, N., McRae, D. (2015) "Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China Aiming for Independence" *Emerging US Security Partnerships in Southeast Asia*.

Harding, B. (2014), "Jokowi's Big Maritime Plans for Indonesia Need International Support" *World Politics Review*.

Human Rights Watch (2005) "East Timor: U.N. Security Council Must Ensure Justice; UN Commission's Report Urges International Tribunal if Indonesia Fails to Act". <<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2005/06/28/eastti11231.htm>>

Johnson, Douglas (1997) "Drawn into the Fray: Indonesia's Natuna Islands Meet China's Long Gaze South" *Asian Affairs: An American Review* Vol.24 No.3 p.153-161.

Kang, Harnit (2009), "Maritime Issues in South China Sea; a survey of literature" *IPCS special report*.

Kosandi, M. (2013), "Shifting Paradigms and Dynamics of Indonesia-China Relations: Towards the Best Use of Theoretical Eclecticism," *Asian Politics and Policy* 5 (2): pp. 183-210

Langel, Tunchimang (2012) "Natuna Islands; Introducing Indonesia to the South China Sea Issue" *Academia* pp.01-12.

Magcamit, Michael I., Tan, Alexander C. (2016) "East and South China Seas Maritime Dispute Resolution and Escalation: Two Sides of the Same Coin?" *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs* Vol.3 No.2 pp.113-134.

Marthinus, Pierre (June 17 2016)"See no China: Indonesia's South China Sea Policy" *the Jakarta Post*. < <http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2016/06/17/see-no-china-indonesias-south-china-sea-policy.html> >

McRae, Dave "More Talk than Walk: Indonesia as a Foreign Policy Actor" *Lowy Institute for international policy* < <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/more-talk-walk-indonesia-foreign-policy-actor> >

Pape, Robert A. (2005) "Soft Balancing against the United States" *International Security* Vol.30, No.1 pp.7-45.

Paul, T.V., Wirtz, James J., Fortmann, Michel (2004) "Balance of Power Theory and Practices in the 21st Century" *Chapter 6 balance of power theory and post-cold war politics*.

Prasetyo, Eko (March 21 2016) :Indonesia: Natuna Incident Not Related to South China Sea Dispute" *The Jakarta Globe* < <http://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-natuna-incident-not-related-south-china-sea-dispute/> >

Quayle, L. (2013), "Power and Paradox: Indonesia and the 'English School' Concept of Great Powers," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 13 (2): pp. 301-330

Ross, Robert S. (2006) "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia" *Security Studies* Vol.15 No.3. pp

Ryu, Yongwook (2013) "ASEAN's Middle Power Diplomacy toward China" Vol.2. pp1-9. < http://www.eai.or.kr/type/panelView.asp?bytag=p&code=eng_report&idx=12527&page=4 >

Sebastian, C. Leonard, Gindarsah, Lis (2013) "Assessing military reform in Indonesia" *East Asia Institute Issue Briefing Defense & Security Analysis*, Vol. 29, No.04, pp. 293-397.

Thyer, Carlyle A. (2012) "ASEAN'S Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building" *The Asia-Pacific Journal, Japan Focus* Vol.10 No.34.

Toledo, Peter (2005) "Classic Realism and the Balance of Power Theory" p.52-63.

Weatherbee, Donald E. (2016) "Re-assessing Indonesia's Role in the South China Sea" *ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute perspective* No.18

Wike, R. (2010), Indonesia: The Obama Effect, PewResearch Global Attitude Project, Available at<<http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/03/18/indonesia-the-obama-effect/>>

Yee, Any (2011) "Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis of the South China Sea and the East China Sea" *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* Vol.40 No.2 p.165-193.

Yosephine, Liza (25 July 2016) "ASEAN, China Reaffirm Commitment to Maintaining Peace in South China Sea" *The Jakarta Post* <<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/07/25/asean-china-reaffirm-commitment-to-maintaining-peace-in-south-china-sea.html>>

Yu, Miles (19 november 2015) "Et tu, Jakarta?" *The Washington Times* <<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/19/inside-china-china-concedes-natuna-islands-to-indo/>>