

Thesis Final Version

Recognition of Palestine by Western European States



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Introduction

Over the summer of 2014, we have witnessed a foreign policy change of some Western-European states towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Frustrated by the ongoing conflict some states like Sweden and the Vatican have recognized Palestine officially (Al Jazeera 2015). Several states like Ireland, Spain, France and the United Kingdom have recognized the Palestinian state symbolically by Parliamentary resolutions while others like Belgium and Denmark have suggested that they planned to do so in the near future (Arom 2014). This seems like a drastic change in the foreign policy of these European states, since states like the United Kingdom and France, in the past, have often openly supported Israel against the recognition of the Palestinian state. Israel, of course, opposes any official recognition of the Palestinian state. The research question that arises from these events is: why have some Western European states recognized the Palestinian state, during the period September 2014 and December 2014, while others have not? By answering this question, this thesis is hoping to open the black box of the reasons for states to recognize (new) states and at the same time to give more insights in the specific cases of recognition of Palestine.

This topic can be placed in a broader perspective of research in foreign policy analysis. Recognition of states is an emerging topic of interest. But studies of recognition focus either on the normative side of recognition or on the international law position and are mostly outdated. This paper however, focuses on the standpoint of the states that will recognize a (new) state and their motives to do so. The theoretical framework of this paper is mainly based on the approaches of Bridget Coggins (2011) and Beverly Crawford (1995). Of these approaches, Coggins adopts an international level approach, while Crawford focuses mainly on the domestic political level. By combining the approaches it is possible to get a more complete overview of the motives of western European states for recognizing the Palestinian state. An initial speculative answer is that western European states choose to recognize Palestine because of their ideological preferences, the diplomatic costs are low and then there is no strong Israeli interest group present in the recognizing state.

Since the policy of non-recognition of Palestine had been in place in most Western European states for years, this paper aims at identifying the relevant factors for the policy change. An additional contribution of this thesis is that it can identify factors which can explain future cases of recognition of Palestine by western states and perhaps other states in general.

The rest of this thesis will consist of six parts. First the literature review, discusses the relevant literature on state recognition. Then the theoretical framework will be presented, where the two theoretical approaches of Coggins (2011) and Crawford (1995) will be combined with other existing approaches. In the following section the research design in which the variables and their operationalization and methodology will be discussed. Then the results and the discussion will be presented.

Literature review

The recognition of states and more specifically of the Palestinian state has been the subject of many articles and books. Most of the work either focuses on international law or takes a normative and a state-centric approach. A problem with this literature is that scholars leave out one important category, namely the importance of recognition by the international community that, either formally or symbolically recognizes the recognition-seeking state. Moreover most of the work, such as for example Francis Boyle (1990), Roland Rich (1993) and Sanford Silverberg (1998) is quite outdated, ranging from the initial post-Soviet Union era, when several former Soviet states were seeking recognition to the beginning of the new millennium. Many of these articles coincided with the end of the cold war period and the end of the “interim phase” for Palestine, negotiated in the Oslo Accords of May 1999 (Bishara 1999, 5). The interim phase was the time period in which there was an interim government in Palestine between the first Oslo Accords, signed in 1993, and the Second Oslo Accords, signed in 1995. The period was supposed to end in May 1999, but it did not lead to the official creation of a Palestinian state (Bishara 1999, 5-9). In the next subsection some of the general scholarly work on state recognition will be discussed.

State recognition in international law

Stephen Krasner argues that statehood is given to states on a legal basis, instead of mainly political reasons (1999, 71). This argument is central to the declaratory theory. This theory argues that every entity that complies with the international legal standards of the Convention of Montevideo, will automatically become a state. This is also argued by international law scholars, such as Francis Boyle (1990). He argues that Palestine should be recognized as a state because it complies with almost all the conditions of international law on statehood (Boyle 1990, 301-302). But the fact that a state complies with the conditions does not mean they will be automatically be recognized by the international community¹.

Other scholars that adopt an international law approach in scholarly work on the recognition of states are Roland Rich (1993) and Sanford Silverberg (1998). Rich ends his article with the conclusion that recognition in the end is not determined solely on a legal base but recognition is more a matter of political discretion (Rich 1993, 63). He contends that states have to consider whether recognition will contribute to a peaceful resolution of a conflict. Furthermore, Rich argues that states also take democratic norms into account even though this leads to inconsistent use of the tool of recognition (Rich 1993, 63-65). With his article he gives an insight in the legal conditions, that recognition-seeking states have to comply with. These conditions are being modified by the international community itself. Since his article focuses primarily on international law, he does not give clear answers to this variance in the recognition of states and the change of legal conditions.

Although Silverberg's work gives good insights in ambiguous legal status of Palestine, like for example the fact that Palestine has no effective governmental control over all its territories, and how Palestine is in fact a functioning state, because it is able to establish diplomatic relations with other states. The article is not very useful to explain why some states

¹ For instance one can think about the example of Somaliland which has not been recognized. According to Alison Eggers "as Somaliland operated as an independent state for fifteen years and as it meets international legal standards for "statehood" is, in fact, a state" (2007, 222).

are recognized while others are not. The author states that the answers have to be found in political dynamics and that further research should focus on this aspect (Silverberg 1998, 47).

Furthermore, scholars like Stephen Krasner (1999), Joel Migdal² (2001) Tanisha Fazal (2008; 2014)³ and international law scholars like Boyle (1990), Rich (1993) and Silverberg (1998) focus mainly on state-centered dynamics. They mostly take the viewpoint of the state that is seeking international recognition and their dynamics with other states. By contrast this paper argues that the state-centered dynamics and international law do not fully explain why some states are being recognized by one part of the international community while others remain unrecognized. It is therefore necessary to take both international and domestic factors into account.

More recent work on state recognition has been written by Mikulas Fabry (2010). His book *Recognizing States* deals with the recognition of states since the recognition of the United States in 1776 up until the recognition of new states in the post-Cold War period. His book is an example of a normative account of the practice of recognition of new states (Fabry 2010, 4). Fabry argues through different cases that the only viable method for recognition is the *de facto* recognition practiced in the 19th century by the United Kingdom and the United States (Fabry 2010, 219). This *de facto* recognition doctrine means that states do not interfere in the internal affairs of other states, because the people of a country have the right to determine their own political destiny. The winner of the internal struggles will be recognized as the lawfully heirs of the state. Or when both states decide to divide their country into two separate states, the international community has to recognize both states (Fabry 2010, 219). Although Fabry's book is interesting and extensive, it gives no direct insights in why states choose to recognize new states. It merely advocates a particular doctrine of recognition.

² Migdal has written a very interesting chapter on why so many weak states stay intact, he argues these states stay intact because the people consider the state to be "as natural as the landscape around them". This is primarily a state-centered and society-centered approach. He discards the international factors as not sufficient to explain why states remain intact (2001, 137). He does not consider the role of the international community.

³ Fazal focuses in both her articles (2008; 2014) on the question why there has been an increase in the amount of secessionist states and not specifically on recognition. Furthermore she takes these secessionist states as her focus point.

Towards another perspective of state recognition

The issue of recognition of states has led to many political struggles and even wars over the centuries. Many wars and disputes have been fought over recognition of independence. For example Great Britain declared war on France because the French recognized the independence of the American colonies in the 18th century (Rich 1993, 55). More recently, the unilateral recognition of Croatia by Germany in 1991 caused widespread European controversy (Crawford 1995, 1-2). Also, the initiatives to recognize Palestine have put pressure on the relationships of the recognizing states with Israel. For example Israel has recalled its ambassador to Sweden for consultations, after it recognized Palestine (Calamur 2014). Therefore recognition should not only be analyzed from the point of view of a recognition-seeking state, but the perspective of the recognizing states should also be taken into account.

Research by Crawford on the unilateral recognition of Croatia by Germany shows the importance of national politics (1995). The paper suggests that national politics matter to explain the unilateral recognition of states under certain conditions. The first condition is that domestic politics shape the preferences of states when decisions have to be ratified at the domestic level. The next condition is that national politics matter in foreign policy when there is a high level of uncertainty at both the international and domestic level around the particular issue. Lastly, national politics weigh in on the decision to recognize a state when there is no real threat to national security (Crawford 1995, 27). But even though Crawford puts emphasis on national factors, she also acknowledges the fact that international factors have to be taken into account as well. The conditions Crawford brings to the table seem convincing but could also be quite case specific. This is because she only did an in-depth analysis of the German case. Furthermore the research does not take into account the actions of the rest of the international community. The study also neglects the possibility of different types of recognition. It is possible to recognize a state formally, as in the case of Germany and Croatia or symbolically by parliamentary resolution as in the case of France and the United Kingdom with Palestine in 2014. Because Germany formally acknowledged Croatia, this distinction has not been made by Crawford. In fact, it is hard to find any work on different types of recognition beyond the studies of

international law scholars who make strict distinctions between different types of formal recognition and their legal consequences, for example Hersch Lauterpach (1947), Ti-Chiang Chen (1951) and Ben Bot (1968).

So if new membership in the international community is not just decided by domestic factors of a recognition-seeking state or by international legal conditions, the answer to the question of why some western states have recognized Palestine has to be found in the collective actions of members of the international community themselves. They are the ones who eventually decide upon who gets full membership and who does not. Coggins for instance argues that membership is decided by the great powers. Because if a state does not have as she calls it “friends in high places”, it is less likely to get recognized internationally (2011, 435). Coggins comes up with an alternative model of why states choose to recognize secessionist states. Her model focusses on the international system of states which she sees as a community or a social group, in which the existing members have the final say on who becomes a new member of the high status community. Although it is not necessary to get the consent of every member state, it is necessary to have at least the consent of some of the important members (Coggins 2011, 448).

Coggins comes up with three broad categories of self-interested motives of why states choose to recognize secessionist states. The first is external security, which means that a state should take its own security into account when deciding upon recognizing a new state. The second is domestic insecurity: states should take into account secessionist groups within their own borders before deciding upon the recognition of new states. And lastly, Coggins argues that states should prefer coordination in recognition. If Great Powers disagree, it is more likely that the status quo, non-recognition, is maintained (2011, 449-450). A weakness in her argument is however that it focuses primarily on the state level. It does not take into account the societal level. It is for example possible that widespread popular support within a state for the recognition of a particular state may be the main pressure point to push a government to recognize a particular state. Furthermore Coggins, similarly to Crawford, makes no clear distinction between different forms of recognition.

Theoretical section

The theoretical framework of the thesis will mainly build on two existing theoretical approaches that in isolation have deficiencies. In order to overcome the deficiencies of the domestic politics approach of Crawford (1995) and the international sphere approach of Coggins (2011), it is best to mix both approaches in order to provide a complete answer to the research question, to derive a set of hypotheses of both approaches and to test them to the cases of recognition, partial recognition and non-recognition of Palestine by Western European states. Furthermore within these two main frameworks, other theoretical insights from the works of Trevor Rubenzer (2008) and Elizabeth Oldmixon, Beth Rosenson and Kenneth D Wald. (2005) and George Dimitriu and Beatrice De Graaf (2014) will be used to support the main argument.

National level theoretical approach

Crawford (1995) derives her theoretical framework namely from the two-level game metaphor of Robert Putnam (1988). She adjusted the theory for her own research to answer two questions. Why did Germany recognize Croatia? And why did Germany do this unilaterally? She divides the questions into two “games”, in which one game was played at the level of domestic politics, where according to her the preference for the recognition of Croatia was formed. For her other argument on why Germany acted unilaterally she uses a second game which was played at the level of the European Political Cooperation (EPC).

For this framework however, it is sufficient to only use the implications and variables identified in the first game of the domestic arena. Because that is “where the preference for recognition was formed” (Coggins 1995, 2). Since that is the focus of my research, it is useful to use the hypotheses derived from those factors in domestic politics. Crawford recognizes three main societal pressures that shaped the choice of Germany to recognize Croatia. Although Crawford herself does not mention these hypotheses explicitly herself, it is possible to derive them from the argument and evidence she presented.

The first pressure is that of public opinion, from which the hypothesis H1) can be derived stating that the more public opinion is in favor of recognition the more the political elites, at the

head of a government, will be in favor of the recognition of a recognition-seeking state. Crawford measures this through looking at the position of the German public opinion on this issue by analyzing opinion surveys (Crawford 1995, 7-8).

The second pressure is that of interest groups in the case of Germany recognizing Croatia. Crawford talks about the political pressures from Croatians living in Germany, especially focusing on one important figure: the emissary of Croatia who had direct contact with the foreign policy advisors of the German government (Crawford 1995, 8-9). The hypothesis H2a) that can be derived from this factor is the more pressure of interest groups is present at the domestic level, the more political elites at the head of a government will be in favor of the recognition of a recognition-seeking state. According to Rubenzer (2008), it is necessary to look at the organizational strength and the level of political activity of interest groups, when analyzing successful influence (Rubenzer 2008, 182-184). These two were the only necessary conditions that came forward after studying and analyzing six of the most widely cited criteria in the literature on interest groups and their influence (Rubenzer 2008, 169). Organizational strength refers to resources and the professional lobbying capabilities but also the ability to mobilize people. Political activity refers the perceived propensity to vote based on foreign policy that favors the political means and interests of the interest group (Rubenzer 2008, 172).

Another hypothesis that can be derived from the interest group literature: H2b) The more pressure from interest groups opposing recognition is present, the more political elites, at the head of a government, will be against recognition of a recognition seeking state. The conditions of Rubenzer (2008) are also applicable for this hypothesis. The home state is the state of origin of members of the interest group that opposes the recognition of the recognition-seeking state, in this research this is the state of Israel. A problem with these interest groups is that Israeli and Jewish interest groups are often intertwined while they are not necessarily the same. Therefore only interest groups that openly support Israel in either their actions or statements were taken into account.

The third societal pressure is the media. This pressure was analyzed by looking at the most influential newspapers in Germany of that time (Crawford 1995, 9-10). The hypothesis H3)

that can be derived from this pressure is the more media coverage will be in favor of recognition the more likely elite support will be for recognition of a recognition-seeking state. Dimitriu and de Graaf (2014) argue that, public opinion and the role the media play are closely linked. They argue that public opinion is shaped by the way opinion polls and especially the media coverage frame a certain issue (Dimitriu and De Graaf 2014, 7).

A final national level factor to take into account is the ideological dimension. This factor comes from an article about support for Israel in the US House of Representatives by Oldmixon et al. (2005). Oldmixon et al. found that in the US House of representatives a shift was taking place in support for Israel. A new cleavage was found on this particular issue. Left-wing liberals and African Americans started to identify themselves with the Palestinian cause, instead of an unquestionable support for Israel. By contrast, religious and ideological conservatives and right wing Republicans on the other hand identified themselves with Israel. In fact, Oldmixon et al. found that religious beliefs have become more important in explaining member's positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Oldmixon et al. 2005, 420). From this analysis it becomes clear that ideology and or religion matters in explaining support for Israel or Palestine. This thesis assumes that the findings of the American case can also be applied to the Western European cases. Ideology also matters in explaining why some European states recognize Palestine while others do not. A hypothesis H4 that can be derived from this factor is: The more party ideology of the parties in government, support recognition of recognition-seeking states the more likely a state will be in favor of recognition of a particular recognition-seeking state.

International community level theoretical approach

Coggins' article takes another approach to explain why states recognize new member states into the international community. She argues that a new state's acceptance in the international community, and therefore its legitimacy, is mainly based on the acceptance from its peers (Coggins 2011, 433). But the international community does not act as one unitary actor. Coggins makes the assumption that it is crucial in high status groups to be recognized by its members instead of mainly identifying oneself with the group. She takes the international community as one of these high status groups and treats the states as its members who decide

upon the recognition of new members. She compares it to the Greek fraternities in US colleges. Furthermore she assumes the Great Powers are the ones who have the most influence in the recognition process. Coggins mainly focuses on the Great Powers (which are according to her the UK, US, Russia, China, France, Germany, Italy and Japan), but she also argues that not all members have to recognize the newcomer before it can join the community (Coggins 2011, 448-449). A hypothesis based on the aspect of legitimacy is H5) the more Palestine is integrated in international institutions and or organizations, the higher the likelihood that western European states will recognize Palestine. The logic behind this hypothesis is that more states will see Palestine as a legitimate state as it is increasingly recognized by international institutions. Furthermore it also reduces diplomatic costs, because states are able to argue that the recognition of Palestine is legitimate because Palestine is already a member of many international institutions. This is a fact that cannot be denied even by states like the United States and Germany that oppose unilateral Palestinian membership in the international community or organizations such as the World Zionist Organization (WZO) that lobby for the non-recognition of Palestine.

External interests can be a reason for states to recognize new member states. The logic behind this reason is that states first look at their own external security and interests when considering the recognition of, a new state. They can use recognition as a strategic policy to weaken their enemies and to strengthen their own position in the international community. It is also argued by Coggins that states are less likely to recognize a state that seeks independence from a friendly state, especially when the state and the home state have shared interests, but also when they have a shared ideology or shared (un)democratic values (Coggins 2011, 449-450). This is because the diplomatic costs of recognizing Palestine can be too high when there are good economic, military and political bilateral ties with Israel at stake. A hypothesis that can be derived from this logic is: H6) the nature of bilateral ties with Israel will determine the willingness of Western European States to recognize Palestine.

Operationalization section

Case selection

This paper takes the most similar system design approach to guide the case-selection. Therefore it is necessary to take cases that are similar in many aspects (Hague and Harrop 2010, 50-51). This method is useful when the cases are similar but only differ in their outcome and certain independent variables. The selected cases for this paper are France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. All states are western European states. All states are member of the European Union. Furthermore all these states have a parliamentary system in which accountability to the parliament by the government is essential. However the cases differ on the dependent variable (the recognition of Palestine). Sweden has officially recognized Palestine. France and the United Kingdom have symbolically recognized Palestine by parliamentary resolution. By contrast Germany has not made any official moves towards the recognition of Palestine. By analyzing these four states that have or have not recognized Palestine, it is possible to look at the specific reasons for recognition or non-recognition.

Variables

The dependent variable, present in all the hypotheses is, the type of recognition of the recognition seeking state. It is a nominal variable divided, into three categories. Recognition of a state can be 1) formal recognition, 2) symbolic by parliamentary resolution, or 3) non-recognition. The evidence for this variable was found in the cases of France and the United Kingdom in the respective parliamentary resolutions (Assemblée Nationale 2014; Parliament.uk 2014). The evidence in the case of Sweden and was found in official governmental statements (Wallström 2014).

The independent variables that can be derived from hypotheses H1 to H6 are respectively public opinion, presence of Palestinian interest groups, presence of Israeli interest groups, media coverage, party ideology of the incumbent government, integration into international organizations and institutions of the recognition-seeking state, and lastly the nature of bilateral ties. The variables will be explained and operationalized in the next paragraphs.

This variable is analyzed by looking at opinion polls held in each of the cases. This paper focuses on the support for Israel or Palestine. And on the specific question of support for

recognition or opposing recognition. This is a continuous variable. Data was gathered from various sources. The cases are marked as 1) in favor of recognition when more than 50 percent of the respondents were in favor. 2) against recognition when more than 50% were against recognition and 3) not available when there was a lack of data. A problem with the different polls in the different cases is that they were not all conducted at the same time with the same questions. Questions may vary from whether or not Palestine should be recognized within the UN, as a formal state and on what side people were during the Israeli-Palestinian Gaza war of the summer of 2014. The oldest polls were conducted in the Swedish case. Therefore these opinion polls might not be completely accurate they also did not specifically cover the question of recognition of Palestine.

The presence of pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli interest groups of influence in each of the western European cases can be seen as an independent variable. This is a nominal variable. The two factors that should be taken into account when identifying interest groups are according to Rubenzer, organizational strength and the level of political activity (2008, 169). The organization was coded as 1) organized, when the organization has an office in the capital and a regional office in each of the cases. If the organization does not comply with this condition they were coded as 2) unorganized. According to Rubenzer the literature on interest groups is clear that “well-organized groups have both offices at the national level as well as regional outreach capability” (2008, 177). Therefore these groups will be able to influence policy whereas unorganized groups are less likely to have an influence. The other necessary condition is the level of political activity. Are the organizations able to mobilize their members around issues relating to either Palestine or Israel? A group was coded as 1) active when it is able to mobilize their members in for example mass-demonstrations, urge them to sign petitions or make public statements in the media. They were coded as 2) not active, when they do not meet these conditions. Both conditions are necessary according to Rubenzer. Therefore, only interest groups that comply with both conditions were taken into account. When interest groups do not meet these conditions or just one condition, they were not regarded as influential. Finally the cases will be put on an ordinal scale, on which they will be evaluated per case of the existence, number, and political activity of these interest groups. The scale has three categories 1) likely to

have influenced policy, 2) somewhat likely to have influenced policy, 3) not likely to have influenced policy. When there are more than two organizations well organized and politically active on the matter of recognition of Palestine they will be put in category 1, when there are two or less organizations well organized and politically active they will be put in category 2. Finally a case will be put in category 3 when there are no organizations present that were well organized and politically active.

The data sources for the media coverage variable were articles from two national newspapers in each of the cases, except for Sweden. Newspapers were selected by criteria as being of opposing political sides, broadsheet newspapers and daily circulation, and for the Swedish case a Swedish news website in English was used. For the United Kingdom, the Daily Telegraph and the Independent were chosen. Both newspapers are in the top ten of most read newspapers in the United Kingdom (Greenslade 2014). The Daily Telegraph is traditionally supportive of the Conservative Party while the Independent is supportive of the Liberal Democratic party⁴. For France Le Figaro and Le Monde were chosen. Both newspapers rank 1 and 2 in the figures of the OJD for circulation (OJD 2014). Le Monde can be seen as a left-wing newspaper (L'OBS 2007). While Le Figaro can be seen as a right wing paper (Peralva and Macé 2002, 36). For the German case the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung were selected. The Süddeutsche Zeitung is described as a center-left newspaper, while the Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung is described as a center-right newspaper (Spiegel Online Staff 2011). Both newspapers are the second and third biggest paper after the tabloid newspaper Bild Deutschland (Schröder 2014). Finally for the Swedish case an online news website, thelocal.se was selected (because of linguistic limitations).

Articles were selected through the websites of each newspaper, by searching their online archives using the search words "Palestine recognition". The indicator that was used is the newspaper coverage of the recognition of Palestine. This is a nominal variable, newspaper articles were divided into three categories: 1) a Pro-Palestinian/critical of Israel standpoint, 2)

⁴ Originally the newspaper that is supportive of the Labour party, the Guardian was selected, but this newspaper's articles were hard to access online, instead the Independent was chosen.

neutral standpoint of view and 3) Pro-Israel/critical of Palestine standpoint⁵. The level of analysis are the articles. Of each article each sentence was analyzed and categorized in one of the three categories. Then each article was given a final code: Pro Recognition/Palestinian, Against recognition/Pro Israel or Neutral. The time period of the articles was between September 2014 and December 2014 because the first case of recognition took place on 13 October 2014 in Great Britain and the last by France on 11 December 2014. To measure if the media might have shaped public opinion and the opinion of political elites, it is therefore necessary to take newspaper articles that pre-date the first recognition until the last recognition.

The independent variable of the party ideology of the incumbent government helps to understand why a western European state chooses to recognize the Palestinian state or not. Left-wing parties are traditionally more likely to support Palestine while the right-wing conservatives and religious parties are more likely to support Israel. Evidence for this has been found in the American case where left-wing democrats and liberals were more likely to support Palestine than religious and conservative Republicans. This variable is a nominal variable. Each party in the governments of the cases is placed into three categories 1) parties that have traditionally supported Palestinian nationalism 2) parties that have traditionally opposed unilateral recognition of Palestine without peace negotiations and 3) parties that traditionally have been neutral when it comes to Palestinian nationalism. The data for this variable will be derived from the party websites, platforms and manifestoes of each party.

The variable of Palestinian integration into international organizations and institutions is expected to serve as a control variable. Arguing that the recognition of Palestine is legitimate because it has already been recognized by a variety of international organizations and institutions reduces the diplomatic costs for all western European states that choose to recognize Palestine. Indicators that will be used are Palestine's admission of a member of UNESCO, the Arab League, the Geneva Convention, the ICC, IBAN. Data sources are the different treaties that

⁵ The coding scheme that was used for analyzing the newspaper articles can be found in the annex.

Palestine intended to join and the member states lists of different institutions that Palestine has become a member state of over the past few years.

The independent variable of the nature of bilateral ties with Israel is an important background factor, because it takes into account the costs for western European states to formally recognize Palestine. Israel and western European states are known to have close bilateral ties. Indicators that can measure these relationships are bilateral weapon trades with Israel⁶, the economic ties between Israel and these European states⁷ and political ties measured by the amount of bilateral visits of heads of states and other members of government to Israel and vice versa. These indicators can be measured as an ordinal variable. Category 1 includes states with close bilateral ties with Israel on all three indicators, scoring highest on all indicators. Category 2 is composed of states that have somewhat close bilateral ties with Israel, scoring high on 1 or 2 indicators. Lastly category 3 comprises states that have less close bilateral ties with Israel, scoring lowest on all indicators. The expectation is that the states that fall into category 1 are the least likely to recognize Palestine as an independent state, whereas states that fall into category 2 will be more likely to recognize Palestine symbolically and states that fall into category 3 are most likely to recognize Palestine officially.

Research Method

For this paper the controlled comparison method will be used, more specifically the method of most similar system design. This method is useful when the cases are similar but only differ in the outcome and certain independent variables. This method however has some limitations. It is for example not possible to have cases that resemble each other perfectly in every respect (George and Bennett 2005, 151-153). But the cases in this thesis do resemble each other in different important aspects as for example all being western European states, all are member of the European Union and having a parliamentary system. It can be seen as a controlled comparison because the cases resemble each other have different outcomes. With this method it is possible to eliminate causes that are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for recognition of Palestine (George and Bennett 2005, 157). Using this method it is possible to

⁶ For this indicator, the weapon trade figures on the SIPRI websites will be used.

⁷ See for Israel's main European trade partners: http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/presentations/maz_nis_2013.pdf

answer the question of why some western European states choose to recognize Palestine while others do not, because it takes the logic that these states seem similar but differ in one aspect, namely the recognition of Palestine. Furthermore this specific research method can help building a theory of recognition of states.

Results

Hypothesis 1 Public opinion

France and the United Kingdom

In 2011 the international polling bureau Globescan carried out a worldwide survey, at the request of the BBC, asking citizens of 19 countries worldwide whether or not they were in support of recognition of Palestine. In France, 54 percent were in favor of recognizing Palestine while 20 percent opposed recognition and 26 percent were indifferent. In the United Kingdom, 53 percent were in favor while 26 percent opposed recognition and 21 percent were indifferent⁸. Since in both countries more than 50 percent was in favor of recognition both countries will be marked as 1), in favor of recognition.

Germany

The German polling bureau Forsa carried out opinion polls, at the request of the newspaper Stern, in both 2012 and 2015, on the question whether or not Germany should recognize Palestine officially. In 2012, 65 percent of the German public answered yes to this question, while 18 percent said no and 17 percent was not sure (Weber 2012). The same opinion poll was held in March 2015 among 1001 German citizens. In 2015, 71 percent of the German public was in favor of official recognition of Palestine, 15 percent was against, official recognition, and 14 percent answered do not know (Mathes 2015). Due to the fact that an overwhelming majority, of Germans, was in favor of the recognition of Palestine. Germany will be marked as 1) in favor of recognition of Palestine.

⁸ In France 509 people were questioned and in the United Kingdom 1000 people were questioned (Mountford 2011).

Sweden

In Sweden there have been no recent opinion polls on this particular matter. The most recent opinion poll dates from 2004. This poll asked whether the Swedish approved the behavior of the Israeli and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Swedish people disapproved the behavior of both parties. 83 percent disapproved Israel's behavior and 83 percent also disapproved the behavior of the PLO (Bjereld 2005, 242). Because the questions asked in the opinion poll do not specifically cover the question of recognition of Palestine, Swedish public opinion will be marked as 3) not available. Although it acknowledges that more recent figures might show completely different results.

Table 1.1

Standpoint	France	Germany	Sweden	United Kingdom
1) In favor of Recognition	X	X		X
2) Opposing recognition of Palestine				
3) Not Available			x	

Table 1.1 shows the final conclusions with regard to the results of the different Public opinion polls held in the different countries. It shows that in three out of four cases the public opinion was in favor of recognition of Palestine. The public of France, Germany and the United Kingdom were largely in favor of recognition. Surprisingly, the Germans were most in favor of recognition in 2015 (71 percent). It is surprising because Germany did not recognize Palestine. One limitation is that the opinion poll held in Sweden might not be representative for the contemporary opinion of the Swedish public. The other cases clearly show that public opinion was in favor of recognition some years before the Gaza war of 2014. This supports the idea that the initiatives to recognize Palestine were pressured by the public opinion, and confirms hypothesis 1 in at least three out of the four cases.

Hypothesis 2a: pro-Palestinian interest groups in France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom

For each case, two tables were made, one with the level of organization of the interest group and another table with the political activity of each interest group. In the first table the level of organization is described and whether or not the particular organizations are interest groups or non-. The second table shows the level of political activity of each of the interest groups. From each organization, if available, the kind of activities are described. The second and last column reflects the political activity of each organization.⁹ The organizations coded as 1) can be seen as politically active, the organizations coded as 2) can be seen as not politically active and 3) is marked as non-available, since the organization does not have an available agenda or has no website at all. Finally the cases will be put on an ordinal scale, on which they will be evaluated per case of the existence, number, and political activity of these interest groups. The scale has three categories 1) likely to have influenced policy, 2) somewhat likely to have influenced policy, 3) not likely to have influenced policy.

Pro-Palestinian interest groups

Table 2.1 shows the level of organization of pro-Palestinian interest groups in France. Six organizations can be marked as organized. The *Association France Palestine Solidarité*, *CAPJPO – Europalentine*, *Plateforme des ONG Françaises pour la Palestine*, *CBSP*, *UJFP* and *Les Amis d’ Al Rowwad*. These organizations both have an office in the capital of France and have several regional offices.

Table 2.1 France Pro-Palestinian interest groups’ level of organization

Name	Office in capital	Regional offices	Level of Organization 1) organized, 2) un-organized
Association France Palestine	Yes	Yes	1

⁹ All the sources and websites for all organizations are categorized by case and in alphabetical order can be found in Annex 1.

Solidarité			
CCIPPP (protection Palestine)	No	No	2
CAPJPO - Europalestin e	Yes	Yes	1
Plateforme des ONG Françaises Pour La Palestine	Yes	Yes	1
AURDIP	Yes	No	2
Génération Palestine	Yes	No	2
CICUP	Yes	No	2
CBSP	Yes	Yes	1
CVPR-PO	Yes	No	2
Amani	No	No	2
Union Juive Française pour la Paix (UJFP)	Yes	Yes	1
Les Amis d'Al Rowwad	Yes	Yes	1

The table below shows the degree of political activity of each pro-Palestinian interest group. Four organizations can be seen as politically active. They organized debates, wrote open letters to lawmakers, petitions and other mobilizing activities during the parliamentary debates. The *Association France Palestine Solidarité*, *CAPJPO-Europalestine*, *Plateforme des ONG Françaises pour la Palestine* and the *Union Juive Françaises Pour la Paix* are therefore marked as politically active. While some others have no available information about their activities in the period between September 2014 and December 2014. These organizations were therefore marked as 3) not available.

Table 2.2 France Pro-Palestinian interest groups' level of political activity

Name	Organized manifestations and or protests or any political activity related to the recognition of Palestine in the period september – December 2014	Politically active 1) yes, 2) no or 3) Not Available
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Association France Palestine Solidarité	Yes (many activities, including debates)	1
CCIPPP (protection Palestine)	No (only articles placed on the website, directly copied from other sites)	2
CAPJPO - Europalestine	Yes (many activities, debates, demonstrations and manifestations)	1
Plateforme des ONG Françaises Pour La Palestine	Yes (some open letters to the president and several petitions to (European) lawmakers)	1
AURDIP	Yes (an open letter to the president but no real manifestations)	2
Génération Palestine	N/A	3
CICUP	N/A	3
C BSP	No (some articles on recognition placed on the website directly copied from other sites)	2
CVPR-PO	N/A	3
Amani	No	2
Union Juive Française pour la Paix (UJFP)	Yes (many activities)	1
Les Amis d'Al Rowwad	No	2

Only four pro-Palestinian organizations qualify for both the condition of political activity and organized group. One organization can be seen as a Palestinian ethnic organization: the *Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (CBSP)*. This organization however is not politically active. The CBSP is mainly focused on helping people in Gaza and the Westbank. The four organizations that did meet the requirements are the *Association France Palestine Solidarité*, *CAPJPO- EuroPalestine*, *Plateforme des ONG Françaises Pour La Palestine* and the *Union Juive Française pour la Paix (UJFP)*. This last organization is in fact a Jewish organization that is in favor of peace in the Middle-East and for an open dialogue with the Palestinians. These four organizations have possibly influenced lawmakers in Paris to vote in favor of the resolution. Since there are more than two organizations both well organized and politically active the organizations in France fall into category 1), of more likely to have influenced policy makers. Therefore hypothesis 2a has to be confirmed for the case of France.

Pro-Palestinian interest groups in Germany

Table 2.3 gives an overview of the pro-Palestinian interests groups that are active in Germany. There are less organizations active in Germany than in France. Only one active organization can be marked as organized. Most websites of these interest groups are outdated and do not give any indication of sustained political activity. The organization that was organized is the *Deutsch-Palästinensische Gesellschaft*. Even though most of the organizations do not have an office in Berlin they often do have regional offices in Germany.

Table 2.3 Germany Pro-Palestinian interest groups' level of organization

Name	Office in capital	Regional offices	Level of Organization 1) organized, 2) un-organized
DINO	No	Yes (one in Münster)	2
Palästina Portal	No	Yes (in Dortmund)	2
Palästinensische Gemeinde Deutschland Falastin	No	No	2
Deutscher Koordinationskreis Palästina Israel	Yes	No	2
Deutsch-Palästinensische Gesellschaft	Yes	Yes	1
Genfer Initiative	No	Yes (one in Munich)	2
Uri Avnery	No	Yes (one in Osnabrück)	2

Table 2.4 shows the political activity of the different pro-Palestinian interest groups in Germany. Only one out of seven interest groups can be seen as politically active, the *Genfer Initiative*. This organization has put some statements on recognition and some interviews on their website on recognition in the other European cases. However all the other organizations do not have statements on the recognition of Palestine by the other states. Some do have general news

articles but most organizations do not even mention the recognition at all, let alone that they are politically active on the subject.

Table 2.4 Germany Pro-Palestinian interest groups' level of political activity

Name	Organized manifestations and or protests or any political activity related to the recognition of Palestine in the period september – December 2014	Politically active for the recognition of Palestine 1) yes, 2) no or 3) Not Available
DINO	No	2
Palästina Portal	No	2
Palästinensische Gemeinde Deutschland Falastin	No	2
Deutscher Koordinationskreis Palästina Israel	No	2
Deutsch-Palästinensische Gesellschaft	No	2
Genfer Initiative	Yes, some interviews and declarations on the recognition of Palestine	1
Uri Avnery	No	2

In Germany no interest group meets both the condition of the level of organization and the condition of political activity. Only one organization, the *Deutsch-Palästinensische Gesellschaft*, meets the condition of a well-organized, and one organization, the *Genfer Initiative*, can be seen as politically active on the matter of recognition of Palestine. Since no organization meets both conditions the pro-Palestinian organizations in Germany will be put in category 3) of not likely to have influenced policymakers. Therefore it cannot be argued that one of these organizations has tried and has been able to influence the German policy on the recognition of Palestine. Hypothesis 2a has to be rejected for the case of Germany.

Pro-Palestinian Interest groups in Sweden

Table 2.5 gives an overview of the Swedish Pro-Palestinian interest groups. In Sweden there are less pro-Palestinian interest groups, but they are far more organized. For example, they have up to date websites. A lot of smaller interest groups have united themselves in

Palestinagrupperna I Sverige. In Sweden two out of three organizations can be seen as well-organized. They both have an office in Stockholm and different regional offices.

Table 2.5 Sweden Pro-Palestinian interest groups' level of organization

Name	Office in capital	Regional offices	Level of Organization 1) organized, 2) un-organized
Palestinagrupperna I Sverige	Yes	Yes	1
Isolera Israel	Yes	Yes	1
Ship to Gaza Sverige	Yes	Yes	1

Table 2.6 shows that two out of three interest groups are politically active. The organizations have sent letters to parties and candidates before the elections asking them to speak out for the official recognition of Palestine. The *Palestinagrupperna I Sverige* is a very politically active interest group. It is the most well-known pro-Palestinian organization of Sweden.

Table 2.6 Sweden Pro-Palestinian interest groups' level of political activity

Name	Organized manifestations and or protests or any political activity related to the recognition of Palestine in the period september – December 2014	Politically active 1) yes, 2) no or 3) Not Available
Palestinagrupperna i Sverige	Yes, the organization sent letters to parties and candidates before the elections, organized demonstrations and placed articles on the recognition by Sweden	1
Isolera Israel	No, one article on the recognition by the Swedish government	2
Ship to Gaza Sverige	Yes, several articles on their website stating they tried to move parties in the new government to recognize Palestine	1

In Sweden two interest groups meet both of the conditions of well-organized and the political activity, the *Ship to Gaza Sverige* interest group and the *Palestinagrupperna I Sverige*. This last organization can be seen as an umbrella-organization, in which other smaller organizations are united, and the organization has at least 14 regional groups. This organization has tried to influence politicians directly, by sending them letters. The organization has also published the

answers of these parties and candidates on their websites and tried to hold them accountable for their answers. Sweden falls into category 2 of cases where interest groups have probably been somewhat able to influence policy on recognition of Palestine. Therefore hypothesis 2a has to be confirmed for the case of Sweden.

Pro-Palestinian Interest groups in the United Kingdom

Table 2.7 gives an overview of the interest groups in the United Kingdom. Two out of six organizations can be qualified as organized. The Palestine Solidarity campaign and the Friends of Al Aqsa. Both organizations have offices in London and several regional offices. The Palestine Solidarity Campaign is an UK-based interest group with active branches in other countries as well. Friends of Al-Aqsa states on their website that they try to put pressure on British lawmakers to make Israel respect international laws and regulations vis-à-vis the Palestinians. The Friends of Al-Aqsa is an ethnic organization, it focuses primarily on Islamic grass-root support.

Table 2.7 UK Pro-Palestinian interest groups' level of organization

Name	Office in capital	Regional offices	Level of Organization 1) organized, 2) un-organized
Palestine Solidarity Campaign	yes	Yes	1
Palestine Forum in Britain	Yes	No	2
Advancing Arab-British Relations	Yes	No	2
Friends of Al Aqsa	Yes	Yes	1
Friends of Sabeel UK	No	Yes (one in Oxford)	2
Jews for Justice for	Yes	No	2

Palestinians			
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Table 2.8 shows the level of political activity of the pro-Palestinian interest groups in the United Kingdom between September 2014 and December 2014. It appears that the majority of the interest groups in the United Kingdom have been politically active on the subject of recognition of Palestine. Most interest groups urged their members to ask their MPs to vote in favor of the resolution for recognition of Palestine. Some organizations have also organized a lobby event at Westminster, to influence politicians directly. Out of the six organizations, four can be characterized as politically active, the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Palestine Forum in Britain, Advancing Arab-British Relations and Friends of Al-Aqsa.

Table 2.8 UK Pro-Palestinian interest groups' level of political activity

Name	Organized manifestations and or protests or any political activity related to the recognition of Palestine in the period september – December 2014	Politically active 1) yes, 2) no or 3) Not Available
Palestine Solidarity Campaign	Yes, this organization has urged its members to ask their MPs to vote in favor of recognition, organized a lobby event at Westminster and placed several pro-Palestinian articles and placed a list of MPs that voted in favor of the resolution	1
Palestine Forum in Britain	Yes, this organization participated in the lobby event at Westminster	1
Advancing Arab-British Relations	Yes, this organization asked its members to ask their MPs to vote in favor of the resolution for recognition of Palestine	1
Friends of Al Aqsa	Yes, this organization has urged its members to ask their MPs to vote in favor of recognition, and placed several pro-Palestinian articles	1
Friends of Sabeel UK	No	2
Jews for Justice for Palestinians	No	2

In the United Kingdom there are two interest groups that comply with both conditions. The first is the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign and the second is the Friends of Al Aqsa, which is an interest group. The United Kingdom, therefore falls into the second category of cases where interest groups probably have somewhat been able to influence policymakers. Hypothesis 2a has to be confirmed for the case of the United Kingdom.

Hypothesis 2 b pro-Israeli interest groups in France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom

Pro-Israeli interest groups in France

To give an overview of the pro-Israeli interest groups tables 2.9 to 2.16 were made. Each case has both a table for the level of organization of the interest groups and a table for their level of political activity. The cases are listed in alphabetical order. The tables have the same lay-out as the tables for pro-Palestinian interest group. In the level of organization, the groups were evaluated on the basis of having an office in the capital and for having regional offices. Furthermore they were evaluated for whether or not they are openly in support of Israel. The last column gives the conclusion of each interest groups' level of organization. The political activity tables give an overview of each interest groups' political activities during the period of the parliamentary debates and the decision to officially recognize Palestine by Sweden between September 2014 and December 2014. In the last column each organization was marked for being political active on the recognition of Palestine.

Table 2.9 shows the pro-Israeli interest groups' level of organization in France. Five organizations were marked as well-organized. The *CRIF*, *Union des Étudiants Juifs de France*, *L'Agence Juive pour Israël*, *Association France-Israël* and the *KKL France* all have offices in Paris and one or more regional offices. Furthermore all but one organization are openly in support of Israel.

Table 2.9 France pro-Israel interest groups' level of organization

Name	Office in capital	Regional offices	Openly in support of Israel	Level of organization 1) organized , 2) un-organized
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CRIF	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Bureau Nationale de Vigilance Contre l'Antisemitisme	No	Yes (one in Drancy)	Not clear	2
Union des Étudiants Juifs de France	Yes	Yes	yes	1
L'Agence Juive pour Israël	Yes	Yes (one in Marseille)	yes	1
Association France-Israël	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Alliance Israélite Universelle	Yes	No	yes	2
KKL de France	Yes	Yes	Yes	1

Table 2.10 shows the level of political activity of the pro-Israeli organizations, and the kind of activities the organizations led. Three organizations can be marked as politically active. These organizations are the *CRIF*, *Bureau Nationale de Vigilance Contre l'Antisemitisme* and the *Association France-Israël*. Representatives from the *CRIF* have regularly appeared on national television, given some other media statements. They also placed several articles on the recognition of Palestine on their website. The *Bureau Nationale de Vigilance Contre l'Antisemitisme* asked their members to show up at a manifestation that was being organized in front of the National Assembly in Paris. The *Association France-Israël* sent letters to senators and other politicians to ask them to vote against the recognition resolution, they also places several articles on their website.

Table 2.10 France pro-Israel interest groups' level of political activity

Name	Organized manifestations and or protests or any political activity related to the recognition of Palestine in the period september – December 2014	Politically active 1) yes, 2) no or 3) Not Available
CRIF	Yes, several TV appearances, media statements and articles on their website	1
Bureau Nationale de Vigilance Contre l'Antisemitisme	Yes, this organization has asked its followers to show up at the manifestation in front of the National Assembly in Paris	1

Union des Étudiants Juifs de France	No	2
L'Agence Juive pour Israël	No	2
Association France-Israël	Yes, the organization sent letters to the Senate, and placed several articles on its website	1
Alliance Israélite Universelle	No	2
KKL de France	No	2

In France, the interest groups mostly appear to be well-organized, but only *CRIF* and *Association France-Israël* meet both the requirements of the level of organization and the level of political activity. The pro-Israel groups in France therefore fall into the second category of somewhat influential. It is possible that in France the lawmakers in parliament have been influenced by the activities of these two interest groups. Therefore hypothesis 2b has to be confirmed for the case of France.

Pro-Israeli interest groups in Germany

Table 2.11 gives an overview of German pro-Israeli interest groups. In Germany four organizations out of six can be marked as well-organized. These organizations have both an office in Berlin and one or more in other regions of the country. All six organizations are openly in support of the state of Israel.

Table 2.11 Germany pro-Israel interest groups' level of organization

Name	Office in capital	Regional offices	Openly in support of Israel	Level of organization 1) organized , 2) un-organized
Keren Hayesod	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
WIZO Deutschland	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Jüdische Nationalfonds E.V. KKL	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Jewish Agency for Israel	No	Yes (one in Köln)	Yes	2

Germany				
DKR	No	Yes (one in Bad Nauheim)	Yes	2
Deutsche-Israelische Gesellschaft E.V.	Yes	Yes	Yes	1

Table 2.12 shows the level of activity of pro-Israel interest groups in Germany. No pro-Israeli organization active in Germany has organized any political activities in the period between September 2014 and December 2014. Therefore none of the organizations has been marked as politically active on the matter of the recognition of Palestine.

Table 2.12 Germany pro-Israel interest groups' level of political activity

Name	Organized manifestations and or protests or any political activity related to the recognition of Palestine in the period september – December 2014	Politically active against the recognition of Palestine 1) yes, 2) no or 3) Not Available
Keren Hayesod	No	2
WIZO Deutschland	No	2
Jüdische Nationalfonds E.V. KKL	No	2
Jewish Agency for Israel Germany	No	2
DKR	No	2
Deutsche-Israelische Gesellschaft E.V.	No	2

In Germany no interest group complies with both conditions. Although most German pro-Israeli interest groups are well organized, none of them have been politically active on the matter of recognition of Palestine (or non-recognition). Therefore Germany's pro-Israel groups fall into the third category of not influential. Hypothesis 2b needs to be rejected for the case of Germany.

Pro-Israeli interest groups in Sweden

In Sweden there are several pro-Israeli organizations, but most cannot be categorized as well-organized. Only the *Samfundet Sverige Israel* can be seen as organized. Most organizations have an office in Stockholm but do not have offices in other regions of the country. Furthermore only two organizations qualify as organizations. Some organizations did not have specific information about the location of their head office or regional offices. These organizations were therefore marked as 3) unknown. All the organizations are open in their support of the state of Israel.

Table 2.13 Sweden pro-Israel interest groups' level of organization

Name	Office in capital	Regional offices	Openly in support of Israel	Level of organization 1) organized , 2) un-organized 3) unknown
Samfundet Sverige Israel	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
Sionistika Federationen I Sverige	Yes	No	Yes	2
Stoppa Bojkott	Unknown	Unknown	Yes	3
Keren Hayesod Sverige	Yes	No	Yes	2
Fred I Mellanöstern	Unknown	Unknown	Yes	3
Swedish Israel Information Center	Yes	No	Yes	2

The level of political activity of the interest groups in Sweden is reflected in table 2.14. Almost all organizations are marked as politically active. Only the *Fred i Mellanöstern* has not been politically active. The *Sionistika Federationen i Sverige*, *Stoppa Bojkott* and *Keren Hayesod Sverige* have jointly organized pro-Israel rallies against the recognition of Palestine by the Swedish government in Stockholm. The *Samfundet Sverige Israel* and Swedish Israel Information

Centre have placed articles and media statements on their websites condemning the unilateral recognition by the Swedish government.

Table 2.14 Sweden pro-Israel interest groups' level of political activity

Name	Organized manifestations and or protests or any political activity related to the recognition of Palestine in the period september – December 2014	Politically active 1) yes, 2) no or 3) Not Available
Samfundet Sverige Israel	Yes, spokesmen of this organization have condemned the recognition by the Swedish government	1
Sionistika Federationen I Sverige	Yes this organization organized rallies in cooperation with Stoppa Bojkott and Keren Hayesod Sverige	1
Stoppa Bojkott	Yes this organization organized rallies in cooperation with Sionistike Federationen and Keren Hayesod	1
Keren Hayesod Sverige	Yes this organization organized rallies in cooperation with Sionistika Federationen and Stoppa Bojkott	1
Fred i Mellanöstern	No	2
Swedish Israel Information Center	A few critical articles on their website written by the head editor, condemning the unilateral recognition (Abramowicz 2014)	1

In Sweden only one pro-Israel interest group complies with both conditions of being well-organized and being politically active. Even though almost all organizations were politically active, and tried to influence the government only one pro-Israel interest group, in Sweden, complies with both conditions of being well-organized and being politically active. Sweden falls into the second category of somewhat influential, because the *Samfundet Sverige Israel* complied with both conditions hypothesis 2b has to be confirmed for Sweden.

Pro-Israeli interest groups in the United Kingdom

Table 2.15 shows the pro-Israel interest groups in the United Kingdom. All of the organizations are openly in support of Israel. Only two organizations are marked as well-organized, the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) both have offices in London and one or more regional offices. The Board of Deputies of British Jews states

that they speak for the majority of Jews living in Great Britain (Board of Deputies of British Jews 2015). The JNF is very open in its support of the state of Israel, their motto being “Supporting Israel for Life” (JNF 2015).

Table 2.15 United Kingdom pro-Israel interest groups’ level of organization

Name	Office in capital	Regional offices	Openly in support of Israel	Level of organization 1) organized , 2) un-organized
Board of Deputies of British Jews	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
BICOM	Yes	No	Yes	2
Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland	Yes	No	Yes	2
JNF	Yes	Yes	Yes	1
BICPAC	Yes	No	Yes	2
Jewish Leadership Council	Yes	No	Yes	2

Table 2.16 shows the political activity of the pro-Israeli interest groups in the United Kingdom. Four out of six organizations can be marked as politically active on the matter of recognition of Palestine. The Board of Deputies of British Jews publicized several statements criticizing the parliamentary resolution in the House of Commons. The Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland organized what they called an “emergency lobby” at Westminster in London in September 2014 to influence lawmakers directly. The BICPAC organized a rally at 10, Downing Street to protest against the resolution. Finally the Jewish Leadership Council asked their members and supporters to send e-mails and letters to their MPs to vote against the parliamentary resolution in the House of Commons. To help their members and supporters they placed a sample letter that their followers could send to the MP of their local constituency.

Table 2.16 United Kingdom pro-Israel interest groups’ level of political activity

Name	Organized manifestations and or protests or	Politically active 1) yes,
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	any political activity related to the recognition of Palestine in the period september – December 2014	2) no or 3) Not Available
Board of Deputies of British Jews	Yes, the organization has publicized statements criticizing the parliamentary resolution	1
BICOM	No	2
Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland	Yes, this interest group organized an “emergency lobby” in September 2014 and placed several articles on the recognition of Palestine	1
JNF	No	2
BICPAC	Yes this organization organized a rally at Downing street against the recognition of Palestine	1
Jewish Leadership Council	Yes, the organization urged its members to contact their MPs to vote against recognition of Palestine and placed a sample letter on their website	1

In the United Kingdom, the Board of Deputies of British Jews is the only organization that can be marked as both well-organized and politically active. The other organizations are either not politically active on the matter of recognition of Palestine or not well-organized. The United Kingdom falls into the second category of somewhat influential because the Board of Deputies of British Jews has possibly tried to influence lawmakers in British parliament. Therefore hypothesis 2b has to be confirmed for the case of the United Kingdom.

Acceptance of hypothesis 2a for the cases of France, Sweden and UK

In conclusion hypothesis 2a cannot be rejected for the cases of France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This means that in these cases there has been pressure of interest groups at the domestic level of political elites. These elites have possibly been influenced by different pro-Palestinian interest groups. An interesting finding is in the case of France where a Jewish organization tried to influence the political elites of France to vote in favor of recognition of France. In Sweden there was one central umbrella organization in which many smaller organizations were united with many regional offices and about thousand active members (Palestinagrupperna I Sverige 2012). Furthermore in some of the cases the political systems are

more open to lobbying than other systems. For example in Great Britain lobbying has been regulated by law, while in France, Germany and Sweden this is not the case (AALEP 2015).

Acceptance of hypothesis 2b for the cases of France, Sweden and the United Kingdom

In three out of the four cases the hypothesis has to be accepted. In France, Sweden and the United Kingdom interest groups have possibly put pressure on the governments and members of parliament to keep the status quo of non-recognition of Palestine. In Germany however there was no organization that has tried to influence lawmakers, the hypothesis has to be rejected for Germany. This can be explained by the fact that recognition of Palestine was not an issue in Germany, because no interest group had to put the national government or members of parliament under pressure to vote against recognition.

Hypothesis 3 Media Coverage

The results of the hypothesis of media coverage have been divided in four subsections, each subsection contains tables with the results of the coding of the newspaper articles on international recognition of Palestine. Each table has three categories: Pro recognition/Palestinian, Against Recognition/Pro Israel and the last is a Neutral category. In the last column the total number of analyzed articles is mentioned. Each article was first marked per sentence red when the sentence reflected a position against recognition of Palestine and in defense of Israel, green when the sentence reflected a position in support of recognition and criticizing Israel or yellow when the sentence was neutral. The specific words on which the coding was based can be found in the coding scheme in the annex¹⁰. After the article had been marked per sentence it was analyzed again and when most of the sentences were red the whole article was marked as Against Recognition, when most of the sentences were green it was marked Pro Recognition and when most sentences were yellow it was marked as Neutral.

¹⁰ A document with all the analyzed articles of all four cases can be found on:
<https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B7YA9g1rJMb6fnFuVknPzKtoQl9oZ09YS09mc012WE05ZUQxXzhhWC1YVUp4YkxSNzB5aFE&usp=sharing>.

France

As mentioned before *Le Figaro* can be seen as a French right-wing newspaper, and aligned with the UMP party. In parliament this party voted mainly against the resolution for recognition of Palestine (Leduc 2014). Most of the articles in *Le Figaro* on the recognition of Palestine can be seen as neutral. Out of a total of fifteen articles on the issue, eight articles were marked as neutral. While four were marked as having a pro-recognition standpoint, three were marked as against recognition. The articles in *Le Monde* were predominantly pro-recognition and pro-Palestinian. Eleven out of the twenty articles were coded as pro-Palestinian, eight articles were marked as neutral and one was marked as against recognition and pro-Israel.

Table 3.1 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in Le Figaro

Le Figaro	Pro-recognition/Palestinian	Neutral	Against recognition/ Pro-Israel	Total number of articles
	4	8	3	15

Table 3.2 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in Le Monde

Le Monde	Pro-recognition/Palestinian	Neutral	Against recognition/ Pro-Israel	Total number of articles
	11	8	1	20

Germany

The center-left *Süddeutsche Zeitung* had a total of eleven articles on the recognition of Palestine. Of these eleven articles, three were coded as pro-recognition, five as neutral and three against recognition. The coverage of recognition of Palestine by the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* has been predominantly neutral. The number of analyzed articles of the center-right *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* was thirteen. Four articles were coded as pro-recognition and pro-Palestinian, three as neutral and a majority of six articles were coded as against recognition and

pro-Israel. It can be argued that the coverage of the *Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung* has been predominantly against the recognition of Palestine and pro-Israel.

Table 3.3 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*

<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>	Pro-recognition/Palestinian	Neutral	Against recognition/ Pro-Israel	Total number of articles
	3	5	3	11

Table 3.4 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in the *Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung*

<i>Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung</i>	Pro-recognition/Palestinian	Neutral	Against recognition/ Pro-Israel	Total number of articles
	4	3	6	13

Sweden

For the Swedish case only one news source was selected. The news website *The Local.se* had a total of eleven articles on the recognition of Palestine. Five articles were coded as pro-recognition and pro-Palestinian while three were coded as neutral and three as against recognition and pro-Israel. It can be concluded that the majority of the articles of *The Local.se* were pro-Palestinian.

Table 3.5 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in *The Local.se*

<i>The Local.se</i>	Pro-recognition/Palestinian	Neutral	Against recognition/ Pro-Israel	Total number of articles
	5	3	3	11

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, articles on recognition of two newspapers were selected from the right-wing and Conservative Party aligned *The Daily Telegraph* and the more center-left *The Independent*. *The Daily Telegraph* had a total of eight articles on the recognition of Palestine. Six articles were coded as pro-recognition, two as neutral and none as against recognition. The majority of articles were pro-recognition and pro-Palestinian. The articles that were selected from *The Independent* were also predominantly pro-recognition. Thirteen out of a total of twenty

articles were marked as pro-recognition, one as neutral and six as against recognition and pro-Israel.

Table 3.6 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in *The Daily Telegraph*

<i>The Daily Telegraph</i>	Pro-recognition/Palestinian	Neutral	Against recognition/ Pro-Israel	Total number of articles
	6	2	0	8

Table 3.7 News coverage of the recognition of Palestine in *The Independent*

<i>The Independent</i>	Pro-recognition/Palestinian	Neutral	Against recognition/ Pro-Israel	Total number of articles
	13	1	6	20

The politically left aligned *Le Monde's* coverage of the recognition of Palestine was predominantly pro-recognition and pro-Palestinian. This can be explained by the fact that the newspaper traditionally takes the standpoint of the *Parti Socialiste*. In the case of Palestine, they were in favor of recognition. While *Le Figaro* is politically right-wing and aligns with more right-wing parties like UMP, the coverage of the recognition of Palestine by *Le Figaro* was predominantly neutral. This can possibly explained by the fact that a majority of the French public was in favor of recognition while the right-wing parties were against. By taking a more neutral point of view, the newspaper was perhaps able to appeal to both audiences.

The politically center-left *Süddeutsche Zeitung* took a neutral point of view on the recognition of Palestine. This can possibly have the same explanation as for *Le Figaro*. Because in Germany the political elite was against recognition while the public was mainly in favor of recognition of a Palestinian state. The politically center-right *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung's* articles were predominantly against recognition of Palestine and pro-Israel. This can be explained by the fact that the political elites of Germany, including right wing parties were against recognition and a newspaper that is politically linked to right wing parties would be expected to reflect this in their articles.

The articles of the Swedish news website *The Local.se* were predominantly in favor of recognition of Palestine. This can be explained by the fact that media coverage can reflect the

public opinion of the Swedish people and therefore trying to influence the political elites.

In the United Kingdom it was surprising to see that both newspapers' articles were predominantly pro-recognition and pro-Palestinian, because the Conservative Party was officially against official recognition. It would be expected that as in the French case the newspaper that is politically linked to the party would reflect their point of view. But this has not been the case, perhaps because some Conservative party members were also in favor of recognition, and the conservative party members had a free vote on the resolution (BBC UK Politics 2014).

In sum the evaluation of the media coverage hypothesis holds mixed results across the cases. For the cases of France and the United Kingdom it can be partly accepted, for Sweden it has to be fully accepted and rejected for the case of Germany where public opinion and media coverage did not overlap at all.

Hypothesis 4 Party ideology

For the party ideology hypothesis, each case has its own table. The tables give a quick overview of each of the parties' standpoints regarding Palestine and Israel. While analyzing the party manifestoes, a checklist with the possible solutions the political parties could have to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was used. These possible solutions are shown in the first column of each table. In the second column the name of the incumbent parties are listed. Each row reflects the possible answers of the political party to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. The parties were marked for the answers that were given in their party manifesto.

France

The resolution on recognition of Palestine was adopted in the French Assemblée on 20 November 2014. It was initiated by the incumbent Parti Socialiste (PS) (Equy 2014). It was adopted by 339 votes in favor of the resolution and 151 against (Siraud, 2014).

Table 4.1: Parti Socialiste standpoints vis-à-vis Palestine and Israel

Possible party answers to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict	Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party)
--	------------------------------------

according to Party manifesto	
Unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state	0
Coexisting of Israel and a viable Palestinian state	X
Recognition after peace negotiations	0
Multilateral cooperation in achieving a two-state solution	0
Condemning of Israel	X
Condemning of Palestinian Authority/Hamas	0
Right of Israel to exist	X

The PS party manifesto of 2012 has a small paragraph on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The party argues that for PS it is clear that Israel has the right to exist peacefully alongside a viable Palestinian state. Israel should stop the blockade of the Gaza strip and should stop the colonization of Palestinian lands. Because these actions are in violation of international law and resolutions of both the UN and the EU. France should also encourage and facilitate peace initiatives for a sustainable peace (Parti Socialiste manifesto 2012, 18). This standpoint seems to condemn Israel more than that it calls upon Palestine, because it calls upon Israel to remove the blockade and stop colonization. While at the same time it calls upon a viable state for Palestine, but does not really condemn Palestinians. However this party manifesto does not mention their position on recognizing Palestine. But on their website the PS states that the party has been in favor of recognition of Palestine since it adopted this standpoint in 2011 (Parti Socialiste 2014).

Germany

Germany has a coalition government of three parties, the CSU (Christian Social Party), CDU (Christian Democratic party) and the SPD (Social Democratic Party). Officially there are three parties but the CSU and CDU are united in the same faction in the German parliament and they share a website and party manifesto (CDUCSU.de 2013). Because there has been no parliamentary or governmental move to recognize Palestine it is not necessary to take into account more parties than the coalition parties.

Table 4.2 CDU/CSU and SPD standpoints vis-à-vis Palestine and Israel

Possible party answers to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict according to Party manifesto	CDU/CSU (Christian democratic party)	SPD (social democratic party)
Unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state	0	0
Coexisting of Israel and a viable Palestinian state	0	0
Recognition after peace negotiations	0	0
Multilateral cooperation in achieving a two-state solution	0	X
Condemning of Israel	0	0
Condemning of Palestinian Authority/Hamas	0	0
Right of Israel to exist	X	0

According to its party manifesto, the SPD sees itself as a pro-diplomacy party. It strongly stresses that Germany's position in international politics should be in cooperation with other states. It explicitly stresses that Germany should not work on its own in foreign policy, but together with their European counterparts and in transatlantic alliances. One could argue that this statement of the SPD specifically rules out support of the SPD for the unilateral recognition of Palestine by Germany. The manifesto argues furthermore that Germany should work together with other states to solve international crises and conflicts in the Middle-East and Afghanistan (SPD manifesto 2012, 107).

The CDU-CSU manifesto has a small paragraph dedicated to "Germany's special responsibility regarding the state of Israel" (CDU/CSU manifesto 2013, 74). The party argues that Germany has a special responsibility towards Israel as a Jewish state. The right of Israel to exist and its security are of vital interest to Germany and the CDU-CSU. The party argues furthermore that both Germany and Europe have high interests in achieving peace and stability in the Middle East. CDU-CSU is in favor of a two-state solution, with a secure Israel with settled borders and a viable Palestinian state that both

coexist in peace (CDUCSU manifesto 2013, 74).

Sweden

In Sweden, the incumbent government urged to recognize Palestine officially within several weeks after its installation. In the government coalition, two parties are represented. These parties are the Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna) and the Social Democrats (Social Demokraterna).

Table 4.3 Social Demokraterna and Miljöpartiet de Gröna standpoints vis-à-vis Palestine and Israel

Possible party answers to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict according to Party manifesto	Social Democratic Party (Social Demokraterna)	Green Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna)
Unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state	0	0
Coexisting of Israel and a viable Palestinian state	0	0
Recognition after peace negotiations	0	0
Multilateral cooperation in achieving a two-state solution	0	0
Condemning of Israel	0	0
Condemning of Palestinian Authority/Hamas	0	0
Right of Israel to exist	0	0
Note:	No mentioning of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict	No mentioning of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict

The Green party manifesto does not mention the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Or the Middle-East or any region besides the EU at all. The manifesto does argue that military intervention should be avoided and that social and living conditions have to be fair and acceptable to enhance sustainable peace (Miljöpartiet de gröna manifesto 2013, 35). However the Green Party minister for International Development Cooperation did publicly defend the recognition of Palestine by her Cabinet in an official press release (government.se 2014).

The social democratic party manifesto does not mention the Israeli-Palestinian conflict either, but it does mention that Sweden should adopt an active foreign policy. Foreign policy should be

aimed at maintaining and enhancing peace and stability of the Scandinavian region and enhancing international security. Furthermore they wish to spread the norms of freedom and (nuclear) disarmament and taking a leading role in the settlement of international disputes (Social demokraterna manifesto 2013, 32). Even though the official election party manifesto does not mention their preference towards recognizing Palestine, it was adopted during the 37th party congress in 2013 (Kuttab 2014). The official congress protocol of the 37th congress states that the party needs to push forward the official recognition of Palestine to give both states an equal standpoint in negotiations for peace (Kongress protokoll 2013, 116). Kutabb argues that the close ideological ties between Fatah and the social democrats is important to take into account, both parties being part of the Socialist International (2014). These ties are also mentioned in the Kongress protokoll, sister parties from all over the world are being welcomed at the congress (2013, 4). At this party congress there also two members of the Palestinian social democratic party *Fatah* present (Kongress protokoll 2013, 17). A striking detail is that at the congress there were many representatives of social democratic parties from all over the world but no representative of an Israeli sister party, like for example the Israeli Labour Party or Meretz which are also members of the Socialist International (Socialist International 2015).

United Kingdom

In the case of the United Kingdom, there are three parties to take into account. Because in the UK the resolution has not been initiated by a coalition party but by the biggest opposition party. The incumbent coalition government, at the time of the resolution, consisted of two parties, the Conservative party that held 306 seats and the Liberal Democrats which had 57 seats. The biggest opposition party was the Labour Party with 258 seats in the House of Commons (The Electoral Commission 2010). The resolution in parliament was accepted by a majority of 274 ayes versus 12 nays. The rest of the House of Commons abstained from voting, including all members of the government.

Table 4.4 Conservative Party, Lib Dem party and Labour party standpoints vis-à-vis Palestine and Israel

Possible party answers to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict according to Party	Conservative Party	Liberal Democrats	Labour Party

manifesto			
Unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state	0	0	0
Coexisting of Israel and a viable Palestinian state	X	X	X
Recognition after peace negotiations	0	0	0
Multilateral cooperation in achieving a two-state solution	X	0	X
Condemning of Israel	0	X	0
Condemning of Palestinian Authority/Hamas	0	X	0
Right of Israel to exist	X	X	0

Reading the Labour party manifesto for the General Elections of 2010, we see that Labour has a small section on Israel and Palestine. The manifesto states: “We support the creation of a viable Palestinian state that can live alongside a secure Israel. All the countries of the region have a role to play in delivering the vision of the Arab Peace Initiative - normalized relations between Arab states and Israel in return for a Palestinian state” (Labour Party Manifesto 2010, 71). This standpoint does not reflect direct support for recognition of Palestine. The official manifesto seems to prefer peace negotiations within the region between the different states involved over unilateral recognition. This is also reflected in statements in the press (Wright 2014). This seems in contrast with what some frontbenchers of the Party stated in the weeks before the resolution. Media reported on internal disputes over the recognition vote (Wright 2014). Important Labour shadow Cabinet ministers like Ed Milliband, Ed Balls and Caroline Flynt were in favor of recognition. They urged the other members to vote in favor as well, while many of them had serious doubts and moral obligations (Wright 2014).

The conservative party stresses, in its manifesto, that they will “support a two-state solution to the Middle East Peace Process. The manifesto argues furthermore that the Conservative Party is “skeptical about grand utopian schemes to remake the world”. It also asserts that the Party prefers to deepen its alliances beyond Europe and the United States and enhance their relationships with friendly nations in the world, including in the Middle East (Conservative Party manifesto 2010, 109-110). In press statement surrounding the resolution,

David Cameron, the Conservative Prime Minister, stated that the United Kingdom would only recognize Palestine when there is a genuine two-state solution which ensures Israel's future (Silvera 2014). While the Labour party threatened to whip its MPs to vote in favor of the resolution, the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrat members were free to vote what they wanted (Silvera 2014). Most abstained from voting but some conservatives voted in favor and a small minority voted against the resolution (Goodman 2014).

The last party in the government coalition is the Liberal Democrat Party. In their party manifesto for the 2010 elections, the party argued that they would "remain committed to the search for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. A sustainable solution can be reached in the context of two separate Israeli and Palestinian states, mutually recognized and internationally accepted within borders which are secure and based on the situation before the 1967 conflict. We condemn disproportionate force used by all sides. We believe Britain and the EU must put pressure on Israel and Egypt to end the blockade of Gaza" (Liberal Democrat Party manifesto 2010, 68). Most of the Liberal Democrats MPs voted in favor of the resolution, except for the Liberal Democrat ministers. But this is, according to the BBC, regarded as a convention in British politics when a resolution has been initiated by a less prominent backbench MP (BBC 2014).

In conclusion, most parties are openly in favor of the two-state solution. However none of the party manifestoes clearly stated that they support a unilateral recognition. The Swedish party manifestos for example do not mention it at all. But in older party documents and internal resolutions, it becomes clear that the Social Demokraterna has close ties with the Palestinian Fatah party. It can be argued that in the case of Sweden party, ideology explains why Palestine has been recognized unilaterally. The French case shows similarities with the Swedish Social Democrats. However, the Parti Socialiste does mention the conflict in their party manifesto and condemns Israel for continuing the building of settlements on Palestinian territories. But in their manifesto, they do not directly open the door to unilateral recognition. However, in a statement on their website they argue that the party has been in favor of recognition since 2011. Party ideology explains why the Parti Socialiste initiated the parliamentary resolution, and why most party members voted in favor of the resolution. In the United Kingdom the resolution was

initiated by a backbench member of the Labour party, but many prominent MPs were also in favor of the resolution, including the now, former party leader Ed Milliband. As with the other cases, their party manifesto does not explicitly support recognition of Palestine. The party does not seem to be officially in favor of recognition. There were internal disputes over the resolution. It seems like some MPs, including prominent members were in favor while others were against the resolution (Lewis 2014). Therefore it cannot be concluded that it was only party ideology that can explain why the resolution had been initiated and accepted.

In the case of Germany there was no resolution or initiative to recognize Palestine. But one of the party manifestoes did have an interesting aspect. The CDU/CSU states that Germany has a special responsibility towards Israel as a Jewish state, and that their policy towards the conflict has to be seen in this light. This special responsibility comes from the atrocities committed by the German Nazis towards the Jewish people of Europe during World War Two. For Germany, party ideology does not explain why it does not recognize Palestine, but it seems their historical responsibility towards Israel does. In the cases of France and Sweden it seems that party ideology determined the incumbent parties' willingness to recognize Palestine although it is not the same type of recognition. For France and Sweden hypothesis 4 can be accepted. But for the cases of the United Kingdom and Germany the hypothesis needs to be rejected. However the hypothesis cannot explain the differences in types of recognition.

H5 Palestine's acceptance to different international organizations and treaties.

Over the years more organizations have accepted Palestine as an official member. Palestine has become an official member of a total of 16 different international organizations. The Palestinian authorities have also been able to develop diplomatic relations with other states and to become a member of and to implement different international treaties. Table 5.1 to 5.3 show the different organizations and treaties in which Palestine has become a member over the years.

International Organizations

Table 5.1 shows the international organizations in which Palestine is an official member. Palestine has become an official member of at least 16 different organizations between 1969 and 2015, first as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and later as the Palestinian Authority or Palestinian State. It seems that before 2005, Palestine was able to become an official member of primarily non-Western organizations and especially Arab organizations and the Non-Alignment Movement. While after 2005 they have been able to become an official member of different human rights institutions, the red cross and crescent federation. Palestine's official membership to UNESCO is described as a milestone in the history of the Palestinian state, because it is argued by some international law scholars, like Jure Vidmar (2014) that the membership of UNESCO has more legal implications than its observer state status within the UN General Assembly. The statute of UNESCO explicitly says that only states can become a member and that these new member states of UNESCO can join the organization by a two third majority of votes in the general assembly (Vidmar 2014, 41). The most recent international organization that Palestine has joined was the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2015.

Table 5.1 International organizations in which Palestine is an official member

International organization	Year of admission
1. Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC 2015)	1969 (OIC 2015)
2. Non-alignment Movement (NAM 2015)	1976 (Cahoon 2015)
3. League of Arab States (lasportal.org 2015)	1976 (lasportal.org 2015)
4. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (escwa.un.org 2015).	1977 (escwa.un.org 2015)
5. International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions (nhri.ohchr.org)	2005 (nhri.ohchr.org)
6. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and Movement (palestinerics.org)	2006 (Cahoon 2015)
7. Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (pam.int 2015)	2006 (Cahoon 2015)
8. Parliamentary Assembly - Union for the Mediterranean (europarl.europa.eu 2015)	2008 (europarl.europa.eu 2015)
9. Inter-Parliamentary Union (ipu.org 2015)	2008 (ipu.org 2015)

10. Asian parliamentary Assembly (asianparliament.org 2008)	2006/2008 ¹¹ (asianparliament.org 2008)
11. Group of 77 (g77.org 2015)	Unknown
12. International Trade Union Confederation (ituc-csi.org 2015)	2006 (became a member at the establishment of the organization)
13. Alliance for Financial Inclusion (afi-global.org 2015)	2010 (afi-global.org 2015)
14. Unesco (unesco 2012, 220)	2011 (unesco 2012, 220)
15. ISO IBAN registry (swift.com 2015, 10 & 62)	2012 (swift.com 2015, 10)
16. International Criminal Court (icc-cpi.int 2015)	2015 ¹² (icc-cpi.int 2015)

International treaties

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 give an overview of the 44 international treaties that Palestine has joined as a state party and the 10 regional treaties and peace treaties with Israel. The website of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the UN has published lists of all the UN treaties Palestine has joined. Most of the treaties are international law treaties and human rights conventions. Since Palestine joined the ICC, they also joined the international treaties on armed conflicts and warfare and a special declaration that states that Palestine grants the ICC jurisdiction over its territory.

Table 5.2 International treaties and conventions which Palestine has joined

Name of Treaties (in random order, retrieved from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the UN website and recent UNESCO treaties)
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
3. Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
4. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
5. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
6. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
7. Convention on the Rights of the Child
8. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of

¹¹ It is not exactly mentioned when Palestine joined this organization, but the actions of Israel were condemned in the first resolutions of the organization of 2006 and a member of the Palestinian Assembly participated in a committee on political issues in 2008.

¹² Although Palestine became a member in January 2015, Palestine officially accepted its jurisdiction since June 2014.

Children in Armed Conflict
9. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
10. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
11. United Nations Convention against Corruption
12. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
13. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
15. The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land
16. Geneva Convention (I) on Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1949 Geneva Convention (II) on the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949 Geneva Convention (III) on Prisoners of war, 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) on Civilians 1949.
17. Additional Protocol (I) relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts
18. Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
19. Protocol Additional (III) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
21. Declaration 12 (3) granting retroactive jurisdiction to the ICC (since 3 June 2014)
22. Agreements on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court
23. Convention of the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
24. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents
25. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
26. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
27. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
28. Convention on the Political Rights of Women
29. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
30. Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Convention Weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (with protocols I, II and III)
31. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I) to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
32. Convention on Cluster Munitions
33. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
34. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
35. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
36. Convention on Biological Diversity
37. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
38. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
39. UNESCO constitution (unesco 2012, 5-18 & 220)
40. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (unesco

2014)
41. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (unesco 2015)
42. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention (unesco 2012)
43. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Unesco 2015)
44. Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (Unesco 2015)

In the debate in the House of Commons, no MP used the argument that Palestine should be recognized by the British Government because they had been able to join international organizations and that it is therefore legitimate to recognize Palestine. It was not in the official text of the resolution either (parliament.uk 2014). However a few MPs did state that Palestine was, according to the international community and different international organizations ready for recognition. For example Mr. Andrew Love, a Labour MP, stated during the debate:

“The Palestinians have waited a very long time for this debate, but the developing international consensus is that Palestine is ready for recognition. 134 countries have now recognised it diplomatically, including some members of the European Union, and the new Swedish Government made Sweden the 135th at the beginning of October. UN observer status was granted in 2011 by 138 votes to nine. There were 41 abstentions, including by the United Kingdom, but France, Italy and Spain all voted yes. Contrary to what the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Union have all separately reported that the institutions in Palestine are appropriate for the formation of a state” (parliament.uk 2014).

The French proposition for the resolution on the other hand does explicitly mention the fact that Palestine joined UNESCO and that France voted in favor of Palestine’s observer membership:

“Elle s’est honorée en votant en 2011 en faveur de l’adhésion des Palestiniens comme membres à part entière de l’UNESCO, puis en disant « oui » à l’accession de la Palestine au statut d’État

non-membre de l'ONU en novembre 2012. Fidèles à cette position historique et équilibrée, les signataires manifestent, par la présente résolution, leur attachement à une reprise sans délai des négociations devant aboutir à un règlement définitif du conflit israélo-palestinien" (Assemblée Nationale 2014, 5)".

The Swedish government released an article on why they chose to recognize Palestine. The reasons for their recognition were among others, the wish to express support for the moderate Palestinian forces, the fact that Palestine met the legal requirements, to make the parties at a future negotiations table less unequal and finally to give the people of Palestine hope and optimism. But there is no mentioning of Palestine joining international organizations and treaties. (Walström 2014).

In conclusion, hypothesis 5 of Palestine's integration into international institutions was partly used as a justification for recognition of Palestine. Hypothesis 5 has to be accepted for the case of France and partly for the case of the United Kingdom. For the cases of Germany and Sweden, hypothesis 5 has to be rejected.

Hypothesis 6 nature of bilateral ties with Israel

For this hypothesis three factors were taken into account, namely the economic ties with Israel, the weapon trade with Israel and the diplomatic ties with Israel.

France

France is the twelfth biggest trading partner for Israel's imports and the tenth biggest exporting country for Israel's exports according to the official list of Israel's main trading partners (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2015, 26-28). Israel does not show up in the top ten of biggest trading partners of France (Trésor Direction Générale 2014). France imports and exports with Israel are worth about 1,15 billion Euros (France Diplomatie 2015). France has bought one Heron Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle from Israel in the period 2010-2014, the deal was worth 30,3 million euros (see annex 2). In 2014 there were five bilateral visits between France and Israel. Only one high level French minister visited both Israel and the Palestinian territories in 2014. The Israeli minister of foreign affairs visited France twice in 2014 (. By

contrast in the previous years there were more visits. For example in 2013 there have been thirteen bilateral visits and in 2012 there were nine bilateral visits (Ambassade de France à Tel Aviv 2012; 2013; 2014).

Germany

For Israel, Germany is the fourth biggest trading partner with regards to their imports, and the ninth biggest exporting country for Israel (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2015, 26-28). For Germany, Israel is within the top 50 of export and import markets, respectively at the 41st and place 49th positions (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015, 2). Furthermore, Germany is the biggest weapon trade partner of Israel compared to the other countries. Germany has sold 635 tank engines to Israel, several submarines and submarine frigates and an advanced radar system, together with 1620 anti-tank missiles and five Heron Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) (See Annex 2). The diplomatic ties between both countries are tight. According to the German embassy in Tel Aviv this is because of the special relation both countries have due to the Shoah caused by Nazi-Germany during World War Two. Since 2008 there have been annual Government consultations. In 2014 both governments have met for the fifth time. At these meetings all members of both cabinets are present to discuss matters and to strengthen the bilateral ties (Deutsche Botschaft in Tel Aviv 2015).

Sweden

For Israel, Sweden is a less important trading partner. It does not show up in the list of biggest trading partners for import nor export (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2015, 26-28). For Sweden Israel does not show up in their central bureau of statistics lists of main export and import partners either (Sveriges Officiella statistik 2015). Furthermore Sweden did not buy or sell any weapons from or to Israel. In 2014 there have been no high level bilateral meetings between Sweden and Israel. There were some lower level meetings, for example in February 2014 the First Deputy Speaker of the Swedish parliament visited Israel, Jordan and Palestine with a delegation of the Swedish parliament (Embassy of Sweden Tel Aviv 2014). In March the

Directors General for Political Affairs and International Development and Cooperation visited Israel, to discuss domestic and regional issues (Embassy of Sweden Tel Aviv 2014).

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is the ninth biggest trading partner for Israel when it comes to countries it imports from, and the third biggest exporting country for Israel (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2015, 26-28). For the United Kingdom, Israel is within the top 50 of export and import markets, respectively at the 38th and 48th positions (Office for National Statistics 2015, 44). The United Kingdom and Israel are the second biggest weapon trading partners of all cases. The United Kingdom bought a total of 59 unmanned combat aerial vehicles, 200 Spike NLOS missiles from Israel. In 2014 there were ten different high level visits by ministers and secretaries to Israel. Only the top level ministers like the Foreign secretary and the Prime Minister visited both Israel and the Palestinian territories, the lower level ministers have only visited Israel (gov.uk 2014). Furthermore the Palestinian President visited the United Kingdom in May 2014 (Gov.uk 2014).

In sum the bilateral ties with Israel differs per case. The bilateral economic and diplomatic ties of Germany and Israel are tight because of the special relation between both countries due to the holocaust. Furthermore Israel and Germany have traded more weapon systems when compared to France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. France and the United Kingdom both have good economic relations with Israel, but have smaller defense ties. It can be argued that these two countries have somewhat economic and diplomatic costs to lose, but far less than Germany. When looking at the different cases, Germany seems to have the most economic and diplomatic costs to lose with Israel. Sweden on the other hand has far less economic and diplomatic costs to lose with Israel and did not buy or sell any weapons to or from Israel. The nature of the bilateral ties seem to overlap with the type or recognition of Palestine. The case with the least costs (Sweden) recognized Palestine officially. France and the UK, just like Germany have trade interests with Israel. But have less diplomatic and economic costs than Germany, however they have more costs than Sweden. When it comes to the

recognition of Palestine they have not officially recognized Palestine, as a state but only in a symbolic way, through their parliaments. Therefore hypothesis six has to be accepted for all cases, the nature of bilateral ties seems to have influenced the type of recognition.

Discussion

Table 7.1 Hypotheses Truth Table

Hypothesis	France	Germany	Sweden	United Kingdom
1. Public opinion	Confirmed	Confirmed	Not available	Confirmed
2a. Pro-Palestinian Interest groups	Confirmed	Rejected	Confirmed	Confirmed
2b. Pro-Israel Interest Groups	Confirmed	Rejected	Confirmed	Confirmed
3. Media coverage	Confirmed	Rejected	Confirmed	Confirmed
4. Party ideology	Confirmed	Rejected	Confirmed	Rejected
5. Acceptance of Palestine in organizations and treaties	Confirmed	Rejected	Rejected	Confirmed
6. Bilateral ties with Israel	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed

In conclusion, states consider several factors before they recognize new states. Most of these reasons are political reasons. Table 7.1 gives a truth table of all hypotheses per case.

France has recognized Palestine symbolically for several reasons. In France public opinion was in favor of recognition and could possibly be a pressure for the political elite to vote for recognition of Palestine. Pro-Palestinian interest groups tried to lobby for recognition at the National Assembly, while at the same time some Jewish and Pro-Israel interest groups were lobbying for non-recognition. The French political system is not formally open to lobbying. Therefore the factor of interest groups cannot explain why France recognized Palestine symbolically. The leftwing media were in favor of recognition and could have pressured the

incumbent *Parti Socialiste* to vote in favor of recognition. Recognition of Palestine was an official *Parti Socialiste* standpoint and was an initiative of this party in parliament. The factor of international integration of Palestine was specifically mentioned in the resolution in French parliament and was therefore one of the reasons for recognizing Palestine. The factor that explains why France did not recognize Palestine officially but in a symbolic way is the nature of bilateral ties. France did not recognize Palestine because the economic and diplomatic costs would be too high.

In Germany public opinion was largely in favor of recognition. This majority was even bigger than in the other cases. However, no pro-Palestinian or pro-Israeli interest groups were really active on the matter of recognition. The media however was not in favor of recognition. The more left-wing newspaper had a neutral point of view while the more right-wing newspaper's articles were against recognition and pro-Israel. The political elites in of the incumbent parties were against official recognition, and the CDU/CSU stressed the special relationship and responsibility of Germany towards the Jewish state of Israel. The fact that Palestine has been able to integrate different international organizations did not matter either. Furthermore Germany's economic and diplomatic ties with Israel are significant. Both countries are important trading partners and have developed defense ties. The diplomatic ties are also warm. This is again because Germany argues it has a special responsibility to the Jewish people and the state of Israel. The reason why Germany has not recognized Palestine at all is most likely because of the country's particular history and its close bilateral ties with Israel.

The reasons why Sweden has officially recognized Palestine are because pro-Palestinian interest groups have lobbied intensely on the matter of recognition, but at the same time so did pro-Israeli interest groups, the media was also in favor of recognition in Sweden. But the most important reason is because it was a preference of the incumbent government and especially the Social Demokraterna, who has close ties with its Palestinian sister party Fatah. However Palestinian integration was not a reason why Sweden chose to recognize Palestine according to the official statements of the minister of foreign affairs Margot Wallström. The bilateral ties with Israel were not as tight as in the other cases. This can explain why Sweden has officially recognized Palestine while the United Kingdom and France didn't do so officially.

In the United Kingdom a majority of the public was in favor of recognition. Interest groups of both the pro-Palestinian side and the pro-Israeli side were active in trying to influence lawmakers. The media was partly in favor of recognition. The more left-wing newspaper *The Independent's* articles were pro-recognition while the right-wing newspaper *The Daily Telegraph's* coverage of the recognition of Palestine was more neutral. Party ideology did not seem to matter that much in the British case. Because none of the parties whipped its members to vote in favor of recognition. The integration of Palestine into international institutions and organizations was not mentioned in the official text of the resolution, nor in the debates as a reason to recognize Palestine officially. It was however argued that some international organizations like the IMF had argued that Palestine's institutions were ready to become an official state. The nature of bilateral ties did explain why the United Kingdom did not officially recognize Palestine. Great Britain and Israel are have good economic ties and traded different weapon systems.

Through the different cases this thesis has tried to find an answer to the question, why have some Western European states recognized the Palestinian state, during the period September 2014 and December 2014, while others have not? The hypothesis that answers this question best is the nature of bilateral ties with Israel. It seems that the economic and diplomatic costs and loss of weapon trade explain best in every case why they recognized Palestine either officially or symbolically or why they did not recognize Palestine at all. Although in Germany these close ties are due to its particular history.

Every research has its limitations, this research is of course no exception to this. It is possible that this research did not include all variables and hypotheses for recognition. Furthermore the public opinion polls of Sweden might not be completely representative, because the polls were at least ten years old and did not ask specific question on recognition of Palestine. This can only be improved by carrying out a representative public opinion poll on the question of recognition in each of the cases.

It has to be admitted that the pressure of interest groups being successful is hard to measure. Future research could benefit from doing a more in depth analysis of interest groups trying to influence political elites in their decision to recognize states. It should also focus more

on the specific political system in which groups try to lobby.

The media coverage results might be biased due to low intercoder reliability and conclusions should be tempered because not that many articles were included. This could be solved by taking more articles into account and have more than one coder to analyze the articles.

Despite the limitations this thesis has given some insight in why some Western-European states have started to recognize Palestine as a state, either officially or symbolically. The main factor that seems to explain the differences in the type of recognition are the bilateral ties of the states with Israel. The theoretical framework and hypotheses could be further tested in other cases, such as Spain and Ireland, but also the more recent case of the official recognition of Palestine by the Vatican.

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Annex 2
Coding Scheme

Categories	Wording used in the selected newspaper articles
<p>1). A more pro-Palestinian and critical to Israel standpoint towards the issue of recognition of Palestine</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stressing the (suffering of) the Palestinian people. - stressing the (good) relations with the Palestinian authorities. - mentioning the viability of a Palestinian state. - mentioning the Gaza War. - mentioning the killing of Palestinians. - mentioning of occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. - mentioning arguments in favor of recognition - interviewing people that are in favor of recognition - mentioning MPs and parties that will vote in favor of recognition
<p>2). A more pro-Israeli and critical to Palestinian statehood standpoint towards the issue of recognition of Palestine</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - stressing the suffering of the Israeli people. - Stressing the (good) relations with Israel. - mentioning that Palestine is not capable of controlling its own territory. - mentioning the killing of Israelis. - questioning the statehood of Palestine in general. - mentioning arguments against recognition - interviewing people that are against the recognition - mentioning MPs and parties that will vote against recognition - mentioning Israel's opinions on the matter of recognition - mentioning Israel's opinions on the Palestinian Authority, Fatah and Hamas
<p>3). A more neutral standpoint towards the issue of recognition of Palestine.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - mentioning and focusing on facts - mentioning MPs and parties that will abstain from voting -Remaining the status quo

Annex 3 France

Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2010 to 2014

Note: The 'No. delivered/produced' and the 'Year(s) of deliveries' columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed separately. The 'Comments' column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Information generated: 14 April 2015

Supplier/ recipient (R) or licensor (L) Comments	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/ licence	Year(s) of deliveries	No. delivered/ produced	
Israel R: France	1	Heron	UAV	2009	2010	1	\$34 m deal (incl 1 contr ol stati on); French designatio n Harf ang; equi pped with French surv eilla nce syste m

Annex 4 Germany part 1

Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2010 to 2014

Note: The 'No. delivered/produced' and the 'Year(s) of deliveries' columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed

separately. The 'Comments' column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Information generated: 14 April 2015

Supplier/ recipient (R) or licensor (L) Comments	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/ licence	Year(s) of deliveries	No. delivered/ produced	
Israel L: Germany (FRG)	(3000)	Spike-MR/LR	Anti-tank missile	(2009)	2010-2014	(1620)	'M ELL S' prog ram me; Spik e-LR versi on; for Pum a IFV
R: Germany (FRG)	(5)	Heron	UAV	2009	2010-2011	(5)	'SA ATE G- ZwL' prog ram me; lease (origi nally 3 year s; EUR 75 m deal for 2- year exte nsio n 2012); for use

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Annex 4 Germany part 2

Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2010 to 2014

Note: The ‘No. delivered/produced’ and the ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed separately. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Information generated: 14 April 2015

Supplier/ recipient (R) or licensor (L) Comments	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/ licence	Year(s) of deliveries	No. delivered/ produced	
Germany (FRG) R: Israel	(790)	MTU-883	Diesel engine	(2000)	2002-2014	(635)	For Mer kava -4 tanks and Namer

						APC produced in Israel; assembled in USA from components produced in FRG
2	Dolphin/Type-800	Submarine	2006	2012-2013	2	EUR1 b deal (33 % financed by FRG)
1	MPQ-53	SAM system radar	2011	2011	1	Se cond - hand ; loan (while Israeli radar being modernized)
1	Dolphin/Type-800	Submarine	2012			EU R40 5 m deal (33 % financed by FRG)
(4)	MEKO-A100	Frigate	(2014)			Sel

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Annex 5 United Kingdom

Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2010 to 2014

Note: The 'No. delivered/produced' and the 'Year(s) of deliveries' columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed separately. The 'Comments' column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at URL <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available.

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Information generated: 14 April 2015

Supplier/ recipient (R) or licensor (L) Comments	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/ licence	Year(s) of deliveries	No. delivered/ produced	
Israel L: United Kingdom	54	Hermes-450	UAV	2005	2012-2014	(54)	Part of GBP 700 m- GBP 1 b (\$1.2 -1.6 b) 'Wat chke eper' prog ram me (incl

GBP
300
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ucer
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R: United Kingdom	(200)	Spike-NLOS	SSM/ASM	(2009)	2011-2012	(200)	Spike-NLOS Mk-5 version; development partly financed by UK; for use in Afghanistan; UK designation Exactor
	5	Hermes-450	UAV	2012	2012	5	Part of 'Project Lydia n'; for use in

