

In the Name of War

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In The Name of War
Framing Decisions in Decolonization Conflicts

Thesis

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*La fonction d'un écrivain
est d'appeler un chat un chat.
Si les mots sont malades,
c'est à nous de les guérir.
Au lieu de cela,
beaucoup vivent de cette maladie.*

- Jean-Paul Sartre, *Qu'est-ce que la littérature*, 1948

*The function of a writer
is to call a spade a spade.
When the words are sick,
it is up to us to cure them.
Sadly,
many suffer from this disease.*

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Introduction

Just after the Second World War, many colonies saw an opportunity for independence. However, not all decolonization processes went peacefully. In the first decade after 1945, armed conflicts such as the Indonesian National Revolution, the Algerian War, the First Indochina War and the Malayan Emergency created challenges for the colonial powers. The military operations in the Dutch Indies were framed as "police actions" or *Politionele Akties* by the Dutch government. The British government framed the war in Malaya as the Malayan Emergency. By contrast, the Algerian War and the First Indochina War were framed as wars by the French government.

This thesis aims to clarify the variation in the framing of these conflicts as acts of war or police actions. What explains the decision by state leaders to frame these colonial conflicts following World War II as either "war" or "police actions"?

The decisions by the Dutch and British governments to frame the military operations in words other than war seem to indicate that the conflicts were considered to be a domestic problem. These domestic problems existed within the boundaries of the state. The Dutch Indies were a colony of the Netherlands just as Malaya was a British colony. However, this does not explain the contrasting decision of the French government to frame the First Indochina War and the Algerian War, since Indochina and Algeria were also colonies.

The Dutch frame of *Politionele Akties* has been the subject of many debates throughout the years. Unsubstantiated interpretations range from explanations of masking war crimes to a clever attempt to avoid condemnation by the war-averse international community (Van Liempt 2012, 2014; Limpach 2016). The public's

reaction to military operations is also mentioned as a reason to refrain from using a "war" frame (Daalder 2004).

At first glance it seems evident that the public opinions in France, the Netherlands and Great Britain were shaped by being tired of war after the Second World War. To not antagonize the public, the operations were framed as police actions. However, it is not uncommon to think that war could also be initiated to gather public support. State leaders have been known to operate against an external threat to increase public support within the state (Levy 1989). When going to war, the public at home would 'rally around the flag' in support of the leadership (Mueller 1970).

The idea that going to war can help state leaders bolster public support comes from diversionary theory. It is only a small step to extend the argument and link diversionary war to the framing decision. In this sense, state leaders can use a "war" frame to increase public support and deal with domestic problems. Thus, the unique contribution of this project is to build on and extend the logic of diversionary theory to the framing of conflicts.

In the next section, this thesis will provide a short overview of the diversionary theory scholarship. It will show that the literature on diversionary theory is fragmented. Different factors have been identified as causing an increased or decreased likelihood of the use of diversionary war. The different causal logics that underlie these factors are then discussed in the theoretical section. Both domestic factors and international pressures are presented and translated into testable hypotheses. The method section elucidates the testing of the hypotheses before the analysis of the results brings the reader to the discussion and conclusion of this thesis.

Diversionsary theory

War has been the focus of many written works within the discipline of political science. The attentive reader might have noticed that those scholars who do not cite Clausewitz in their studies of war tend to refer to Machiavelli's *Il Principe* (1532 [2013]). Machiavelli is the first to be credited with discussing the idea that leaders can increase support of their constituencies by engaging in a conflict with an external enemy. The sociologist Simmel (1898) however, is seen as the first who systematically studied the subject. Later, Coser (1956) introduced the argument to political science. The so-called in-group/out-group hypothesis that Simmel and Coser brought forward holds that an external threat will increase cohesion within a group: Facing an external threat will pull the members of a group tightly together (Simmel 1898; Coser 1956).

Diversionsary theory builds on the in-group/out-group argument and extends it to the level of states. The main premise of the diversionsary theory of war is that state leaders can engage in conflict abroad to garner public support at home (Levy 1989; Gelpi 1997). Leaders use diversionsary tactics such as war to deal with domestic problems. The notion that the public will stand behind its leader in case of a foreign war is known as the "rally around the flag" effect (Mueller 1970). "[T]he president enjoys a boost in popularity following the use of force internationally" says Gelpi in perhaps the most parsimonious description of the effect (Gelpi 1997, 257). In his work on American presidents, Mueller (1970) found that engaging in overseas conflict increases public support for the president. Other scholars were also able to find considerable support for the "rally around the flag" effect (Levy 1989; Miller 1999; Gelpi 1997).

Early work in diversionary theory finds support in anecdotal evidence and historical cases (Levy 1989; Gelpi 1997). According to Levy (Levy 1989), scholars have diagnosed nearly all instances of international conflict since 1800 as diversionary war. Such widespread support has led scholars to believe that state leaders can and do take advantage of the "rally around the flag" effect and actively increase public support by fighting abroad (Ostrom & Job 1986; James & Oneal 1991; Morgan & Bickers 1992; Richards et al. 1993; Downs & Rocke 1994; Morgan & Anderson 1999; Sprecher & DeRouen 2002; Keller & Foster 2016). State leaders are said to go on "foreign adventures" such as war to deal with domestic problems (Morgan & Anderson 1999, 800).

Two main problems have plagued research on diversionary theory. First, research has long focussed solely on the United States. Levy's 1989 call for research on the theory outside of the United States has not been sufficiently adhered to, with Sprecher and DeRouen echoing this in 2002 and more recently Sobek (Levy 1989; Sprecher & DeRouen 2002; Sobek 2007). Still, scholars ask for a scope that extends beyond the United States and the inclusion of more cases in studies on diversionary war (Keller & Foster 2016).

Second, the quantitative research that followed early studies on diversionary war has failed to find evidence of a causal relation between problems on the domestic side and leader's decision to go to war (Levy 1989; Morgan & Anderson 1999). For example, Rummel (1966) finds no evidence for any causal relation supporting diversionary theory. In his statistical study, he finds "relationships that have an orthogonal structure -that is, dimensions which are *independent* of one another" (1966, 66). Other scholars replicated Rummel's findings (for a review of these works, see Levy 1989; Gelpi 1997; Morgan & Anderson 1999).

This discrepancy between theory and evidence was already put forward by Levy (1989), who argued that the diverse findings were due to the lack of proper theory at the basis of diversionary research. Going back to the sociological grounds of the diversionary idea, Levy remarked that the linear relationship that quantitative works have looked for is incongruent with the in-group/out-group hypothesis that is fundamental to diversionary theory. Re-reading Coser, Levy pointed out the relationship between increased public support and international conflict ought to be seen as curvilinear, since there has to be a certain level of cohesion within the group for the effects to occur (Coser 1956; in Levy 1989, 272). This has led scholars to use different methods to try and close the gap between the quantitative and qualitative findings, ranging from game-theoretical models (Richards et al. 1993; Downs & Roche 1994) to modern statistical approaches (Morgan & Bickers 1992; Dassel & Reinhardt 1999; Morgan & Anderson 1999; Sprecher & DeRouen 2002). Findings from this new wave of diversionary theory scholarship point at different and diverse conditions for state leaders to engage in diversionary conflict. If framing military operations as "war" is used to deal with domestic problems, as it is according to the diversionary logic, these factors can explain the framing decision by state leaders.

Regime type has been extensively studied in relation to war. Democratic regimes are seen as more likely to engage in diversionary war than autocratic regimes, albeit mostly against non-democratic regimes (Miller 1995; Gelpi 1997; Miller 1999). The logic is that autocratic leaders are able to repress their population in case of domestic problems and choose repression above the alternative of diversionary war (Gelpi 1997).

Within democracies, a factor that has enjoyed considerable attention from scholars is the need to bolster public support in the context of **approaching elections**.

When elections are near, leaders are more likely to resort to diversionary war (James & Oneal 1991; DeRouen 1995; Hess & Orphanides 1995). This is due to the fact that leaders need more public support when they battle for re-election.

By looking at different types of democracies, scholars further differentiated between factors that might predict diversionary use of force in democracies. Kisangani and Pickering (2009) find that leaders of "mature democracies" more often engage in diversionary war. Koch (2016) distinguishes candidate-centred and party-centred systems to explain how party constraints limit leaders in their ability to use diversionary measures. In democracies where party politics are less important, diversionary war is more common. When a single party can govern the country, without the need for a coalition government, party politics are more important. Brulé and Williams find that governing parties in **coalition governments** are less likely to go on an international, diversionary adventure than leaders of single party government with strong party cohesion.

A different take on diversionary theory can be seen in the work of Dassel and Reinhardt, who view the military as an important actor in regards to war (Dassel & Reinhardt 1999). The reason seems simple: without the cooperation of the military leaders cannot go to war, diversionary or otherwise. Diversionary war, according to this logic, will occur more often in instances of **contested institutions**, where the role of the military in the state is contested.

Economic downturn is also seen as an influential factor in diversionary theory. State leaders can deal with a worsening economy by means of diversionary war (James 1988; Russett 1990; Hess & Orphanides 1995). They do so to avoid the electoral cost of economic downturn under their leadership. Diversionary war would

therefore be more likely to occur in states that experience economic problems than in states with blossoming economies.

In their attempts to resolve Levy's problems with the literature on diversionary war, subsequent work has dispersed into different directions and explanations. Each of these scholarships attributes weight to different factors that may play a role in the decision of leaders to engage in diversionary war. This makes it clear that a test of just one of these factors cannot suffice. The extended argument holds that state leaders use the "war" frame as a diversionary tactic. In order to demonstrate the influence of the abovementioned factors on the framing decisions in the decolonization conflicts, this research will test for multiple factors. The next section shows how the arguments from diversionary theory are translated to possible explanations for the decision to frame military operations as "war" or "police actions".

Theoretical Framework

The act of framing, frames and framing effects have been subject to many different conceptualizations in the political science literature. While some scholars focus on the receiving end, on the individual that receives information in a particular way, this study will focus on the frame as the sender uses it.¹ The sender, in this case, is the state leader that uses the frame. Leaders intentionally use frames to gather support for their interests (Edelman 1993).

Even with the distinction between sending and receiving made, the different definitions are still plentiful. Edelman, for example, points at "a kaleidoscope of potential realities, any of which can be readily evoked by altering the ways in which observations are framed" (Edelman 1993, 232). Iyengar wrote that "[t]he concept of

¹ For an overview of studies looking into the perception of frames, see Entman 1993; Scheufele 1999; Druckman 2001.

framing refers to the subtle alterations in the statement or presentation of judgement and choice problems" (Iyengar 1994; in Druckman 2001, 227).

Framing is often defined in even broader terms, referring to "the words, images, phrases and presentation styles that a speaker uses when relaying information to another" (Gitlin 1980; Iyengar 1994; Cappella & Jamieson 1997; in Druckman 2001, 227). Garrison and Modigliani add framing effects to their definition by describing a frame as "[a] central organizing idea or storyline that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue" (Garrison & Modigliani 1994, 376). Entman also points at possible effects and specifies that "[t]o frame is to select some aspect of a perceived reality and make it more salient" than other aspects (Entman 1993, 52).

Among many possible definitions, a frame in political science literature can at least be considered as "an attempt by leaders and other influential actors to insert into the policy debate (or into a group deliberation), organizing themes that will affect how the targets themselves as well as the public and other actors (e.g. media) perceive an issue" (Mintz & Geva 1997; in Mintz & Redd 2003, 194). To use this very broad definition allows us to treat "war", "police measures" and "emergency" labelling of the conflicts under scrutiny as frames.

Compared to the aforementioned definition that Garrison and Modigliani use, the Mintz and Geva definition stands higher on Sartori's ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970, 64). Scilicet, it is more abstract. The definition of Mintz and Geva can be seen as having a medium level of abstraction (Sartori 1970, 66). It is not too specific to allow generalization, but neither is it too abstract to be precise. Following Sartori's

warning to aim for medium level concepts, the Mintz and Geva definition is the most useful for the purpose of this study.

I aim to evaluate whether both domestic and international factors have influenced the decision to frame a colonial conflict as "war" or "police actions". International pressure on a government can come in many forms. A distinction between two types is useful for this project, with international pressure either enabling or inhibiting the colonial powers in their attempt to keep their colonial territories. Inhibiting international pressures are present when the international community forces the fighting parties to stop hostilities. By contrast, the international community can also under some conditions enable the aggressor to solve its colonial difficulty by the use of force. When it is in the interest of at least some states, these states will let the operations be carried out. The following paragraphs will attempt to flesh out these dynamics.

For inhibiting international pressure to operate, it is necessary to see how international institutions, such as the United Nations, are able to constrain states in their behaviour. In this sense, inhibiting international pressure can be seen as following from the neoliberal institutionalist tradition. "Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity" state Keohane and Martin (1995, 42). According to their arguments, the benefits of international institutions can be high enough to persuade governments to create institutions, and even constrain their own behaviour. Reciprocity in international relations refers to the non-myopic view of state leaders that future cooperation is beneficial to such an extent, that it makes it worthwhile to cooperate even in instances where it is not in the direct interest of the state (Keohane 1986).

Taking into account the war-averse international community of the late 1940s, it is not difficult to argue that states did not want to be seen as aggressors. One of the underlying principles on which the United Nations was built is the prospect of a world devoid of war. To avoid condemnation by the international community and to enhance their chances to benefit from future cooperation, states are expected not to engage in war. Thus, states are expected to frame their operations as police actions rather than war when experiencing inhibiting international pressure. This can be hypothesized as:

H1: Inhibiting international pressure led states to frame their military operations as "police actions" instead of "war".

However, when great powers have stakes in the conflict, these will try to pursue their interests through international institutions and through other means. This logic is supported by the offensive realist argument. For offensive realists, states actively try to increase their power and become the most powerful state: the hegemon (Mearsheimer 2001). With this comes the assumption that international institutions reflect the balance of power in the international realm and thus function as tools for the most powerful states (Mearsheimer 1994). Hence, when it is in the interest of powerful states for the colonial power to maintain control of its colony, they will use international institutions to enable military operations.

Therefore, great power dynamics in fact help the countries to frame their operations as "war". The great powers that emerged out of the ashes that World War II left were the United States and the Soviet Union. For enabling international pressure to come into effect, powerful states must be concerned with a specific outcome of the conflict. In other words, when it is in the interest of a powerful state for the conflict to be fought out and won (or lost) by the colonial power, the powerful

state will enable the colonial power to go to war. This serves as a competing hypothesis to H1 and can be expressed as:

H2: States are likely to frame their military operations as "war" under enabling international pressure (i.e. when powerful states have stakes in the conflict).

Diversionsary theory argues that state leaders can use war to deal with domestic issues. Extending this logic brings forward the possibility that military operations can be framed as "war" for domestic purposes. As such, factors that have been shown to influence leader's decisions to engage in diversionsary warfare can influence the decision maker's choice between a "war" frame and a "police actions" frame in the same manner. This thesis will proceed by emphasizing these factors coming from diversionsary theory and by deriving hypotheses.

Approaching elections increase the chances of diversionsary war. This is based on the increased need for leaders to gain public support and be re-elected. Therefore, state leaders are expected to use a "war" frame to gain public support when elections are near.

H3: In the face of forthcoming elections, states are more likely to frame their military operations as "war" rather than "police actions".

Building on the argument by Brulé and Williams (2009), the governmental arrangement can be of influence on the framing decision. Leaders in coalition governments are less likely to engage in diversionsary war than leaders of single party governments (Brulé & Williams 2009). This translates to:

H4: States with coalition governments are more likely than states with single party governments to frame their military operations as "police actions" instead of "war".

When it comes to fighting wars, states cannot act without their military. Dassel and Reinhardt argue that contested institutions -more specifically the contested role of the military- increase the chances of diversionary war (Dassel & Reinhardt 1999).

Translating this to the framing decision implies that politics that jeopardize the interests of the military increase the likelihood that a "war" frame is chosen. "Armed external threats are the military organization's *raison d'être*." (Dassel & Reinhardt 1999, 63). The military will seek an external threat when its role is contested, to prove there is a reason for its existence (Dassel & Reinhardt 1999). A "war" frame posits an external threat, whereas "police actions" do not. Therefore, I derive the following hypothesis:

H5: If the role of the military in a state is contested, states are more likely to frame their military operations as "war" instead of "police actions".

Leaders dealing with economic downturn are shown to use diversionary war to nullify the negative effect of the worsening economy on their popularity. In line with this argument, states can be expected to use a "war" frame in cases of economic downturn.

H6: States that experience economic downturn are more likely than states with stable or improving economies to frame their military operations as "war" instead of "police actions".

The last two sections have suggested that arguments from diversionary theory and international systemic approaches can be used to explain state leaders' decisions in framing their colonial conflicts as "police actions" or "war". The next section will discuss the methodology that will be used to test these arguments. To this purpose, it will provide the rationale behind the selection of cases, the operationalization of the variables and the justification of the research method.

Method Section

In this study, the dependent variable is the decision taken by state leaders to frame their military operations in their colonial territories as "war" or "police actions". The variable is dichotomous; state leaders can either frame their operations in terms of "war" or in other terms. More specifically, the frame of "police actions" includes labels of the conflict in terms other than "war". The British frame of "the Malayan Emergency" in Malaya and the Dutch frame of the *Politieele Acties* or "police actions" in the Dutch Indies are therefore both considered as "police actions". In the same logic, the First Indochina War and the Algerian War are seen as French decisions to frame these conflicts as "wars".

This research uses the method of controlled comparison, by testing hypotheses deduced from theories on comparative observations (Van Evera 1997, 63). In this way, the testing of a hypothesis is viewed as assessing the congruence between variation on the independent variable and variation on the dependent variable. For example, if there are indeed impending elections in the state at the moment the decision-maker decides to use the "war" frame (H3), the test is passed. The variation on the independent variable (approaching elections) is then congruent with the variation on the dependent variable (framing as "war"). A variation on the independent variable between cases should coincide with a variation on the dependent variable in the direction predicted by the hypothesis.

This study tests six different hypotheses against its cases, with six different independent variables. Following the theories mentioned earlier, most plausible explanations are tested. To minimize the possible impact of a third variable or intervening variable, the considered cases are similar to each other. In this sense, I control for certain factors and isolate the factors that are of interest for this project.

The Dutch decision to frame its military operations in the Dutch Indies as *Politieele Akties* or "police actions" makes this case particularly interesting for studying such framing decisions. A counter-case can be found in the First Indochina War, which the French government framed as "war". To increase the internal validity of this project and increase the generalizability of its results, two additional cases are added. The inclusion of the Malayan Emergency excludes the possibility of the Dutch case being a case *sui generis*, or the only case of such a frame being used. This British case is similar to the case of the *Politieele Akties* on the dependent variable: both are framed in terms other than "war". The Algerian War provides an extra case of colonial conflict termed as "war". The selection of these four cases follows John Stuart Mill's method of difference (Mill 1843, 455), as they occurred within the same international context and time period with the colonial powers all being European states just emerging from World War II.

The method of difference, referred to in political science as most similar systems design (MSSD), is a "common strategy" (Hague & Harrop 2013, 51), that looks at very similar cases. If these cases "differ in some other trait, we can eliminate the shared characteristics as explanations for the variation" (Babb et al. 2012, 219). In other words: "the more similar the units being compared, the more possible it should be to isolate the factors responsible for the differences between them" (Lipset 1990, xiii). This is the method this thesis uses. The four cases are all similar instances of decolonization conflicts shortly after the Second World War and were all fought by European colonial powers in their colonies.

It could be argued that the cases differ in the rules of decision-making when it comes to war. While the Dutch and the French constitutions stipulate requirements for

making a declaration of war at the time of the conflicts, the United Kingdom did not and does not have such a codified constitution.

The constitution of the French Fourth Republic states that both chambers of the bicameral parliament (l'Assemblée nationale and le Conseil de la République) have to be in accord before war can be declared: "War cannot be declared without a vote of the Assemblée nationale and before taking into account the opinion of the Conseil de la République" (Constitution de 1946, IVème République, Titre II, Article 7).

The constitution of the Netherlands had been amended in 1948, during the conflict in the Dutch Indies. However, the provisions on war declaration remained the same as in the constitution of 1938: "[The king] will not declare war without the prior consent of the Staten-Generaal" (Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1938, Zesde Afdeling, Tweede Hoofdstuk, Artikel 59). The "Staten-Generaal" in the Netherlands were the parliament in the Netherlands. Both the lower and upper chamber thus have to agree for war to be declared.

The British case is different in the fact that war declaration is part of the royal prerogative. The crown, or the government in name of the crown, can declare war without consent of the parliament. However, in practice, parliament is often consulted prior to a declaration of war. Furthermore, the absence of mandatory parliamentary influence on the decision would make it more likely that the British government used a "war" frame, where it used the "police actions" frame in the Malayan Emergency.

Therefore, the cases can be seen as most similar. The next paragraphs show how the independent variables are operationalized.

Inhibiting international pressure is reflected in the condemnation of the colonial conflict by the international community. Since the United Nations (UN) was

the key international institution operating during the time period in question, condemnation of the military operation by the international community will be visible through United Nations institutions. Since France and the United Kingdom in effect have a veto power at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), explicit condemnation will not be visible through the UNSC resolutions. However, by careful examination of all mentions of the conflicts not only in UNSC resolutions but also in the documents of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), reports of debates, memo's and vetoed resolutions, the involvement of the United Nations in the cases can be judged. These documents are available via UNDocs. Inhibiting international pressure is present when the United Nations were involved in the conflict and absent when the United Nations were not involved.

The bipolarity that characterizes the Cold War indicates that great power interests (namely of the United States, the Soviet Union, or both) shape international politics. *Enabling international pressure* on a state thus means that if the United States or the Soviet Union had an interest in the conflicts, then parties to that conflict need to take this into account. Since the Soviet Union is commonly seen as spreading communism during the Cold War and the American policy was to contain this spread, great power interests can be observed through the involvement of communist actors in the conflict. Enabling international pressure can thus be measured through the proxy of communist activity. If there is a communist group fighting in the conflict as one of the main actors, I would expect to observe an enabling international pressure, notably because of the reaction by the United States and their support to the anti-communist operation. The existence of such communist actors fighting in the conflict can be seen in the data of the Correlates of War (COW) database, a comprehensive project that has gathered conflict data including data on the fighting parties. The UPCD/PRIO

database has more data on the actors involved in conflicts since World War II (Gleditsch et al. 2002). If communist groups participated in the conflicts as main actors, they will be identified in these two databases. Enabling international pressure is present in the case when communist actors are present as well and vice versa.

The difficulty of operationalizing the independent variable of *approaching elections* lies at the cut-off point. The elections in the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands in the two decades after World War II can be called irregular at best. Examples of the irregularities in the timing of elections include the British Labour party calling for elections in 1951, just one year after the last general elections. This decision had been made because of the very slight majority the Labour party had won in the 1950 general elections. The British king George IV was planning a tour through the Commonwealth and was concerned with the possibility that there may have been a change of government in his absence. In response to these concerns, the Labour party called for new elections to be held in 1951 (Judd 2012, 238).

The Dutch parliament was disbanded in 1946 to amend the constitution, thus new elections were held in 1946, two years before the regular elections were planned. The Dutch government needed to amend the constitution to be able to send conscripted men to fight in the Dutch Indies involuntarily. Changing the Dutch constitution requires a vote by the parliament, a change of parliament and then another vote by the new parliament. These examples are merely to illustrate the irregularity with which elections took place in this time period.

Because of such irregular elections, the considered elections for *approaching elections* are seen as the next planned elections at the time of the initiation of the conflict. If the government is in the second half of the period between the last elections and the next planned general elections, elections are considered to be in the

near future. As a test of robustness, it is also useful to see whether it yields better results to look at governments in the final or in the final two years before planned elections.

A state has a *coalition government* if the government consists of more than one party. Observing a government consisting only of members of one party and therefore observing other parties in the opposition indicates a single party government. When there are multiple parties governing in a coalition, a state can be seen as having a coalition government.

Dassel and Reinhardt's article shows that *contested institutions* predict diversionary war (1999). Since the argument of Dassel and Reinhardt is translated to predicting the decision to frame military operations as "war" in cases of contested institutions, the dataset they use can be used to predict the framing decision as well. Dassel and Reinhardt assembled data on contested institutions and compiled them into a dataset that lists instances of contested institutions (Reinhardt & Dassel 2007). For the purpose of this thesis, their data can be used to observe whether the cases are instances of contested institutions.

The influence of *economic downturn* is made visible by looking at the growth of the economies in the studied states. Measuring increases and decreases in economic growth at the state level is commonly done by studying Gross Domestic Product (GDP). To assess the effect of economic downturn on the framing decision, this study will look at a decrease in economic growth -based on the Real Gross Domestic Product- in the period between the moment when the leadership assumed office and the beginning of the conflict. To compare economic growth across cases and across time, it is necessary to use a purchasing power parities converter (PPP). A PPP adjusts GDP levels to diminish the problems created by price differences over time, between

countries and exchange rates for transitivity. A more detailed description of the origin of the data and the PPP that has been used is included in the analysis section.

The next pages feature this analysis section and provide descriptions of data as well as their meaning for the hypotheses.

Analysis

The empirical section of this thesis is structured per hypothesis. For each hypothesis, data on the independent variable are presented for the four cases. The data show whether the hypothesis holds for a case or if it does not. In this sense, all variables are treated as dichotomous variables. Either the expected causal relationship is present or it is not.

H1: Inhibiting international pressure led states to frame their military operations as "police actions" instead of "war".

By searching the documents of the UNSC and the UNGA, it is possible to show which cases have been discussed within the United Nations. The United Nations documents are available via <http://undocs.org>. For readability, complete references to the UN documents that are referred to in this analysis are placed in the reference section at the end of this thesis. When possible, the United Nations symbol is used.

From these documents, it becomes apparent that 'the Indonesian question' is discussed frequently by the Security Council during the Politionele Akties. Between 1947 and 1949 the UNSC adopted 14 resolutions regarding the conflict in the Dutch Indies. Of these 14 resolutions, 13 directly condemned the Dutch actions. Additionally, the UNSC had set up three subsidiary organs on the matter in this period: the Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question, the Consular Commission at Batavia and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNSC repertoire 1946-1951, Chapter V, Subsidiary Organs of the Security Council).

No record shows that the First Indochina War was discussed by the United Nations. Neither the UNSC nor the UNGA documents make any reference to the conflict. The Malayan Emergency is not directly referred to. However, it is mentioned in resolution 125 of the UNSC (S/3882). The Algerian War is also mentioned indirectly, although only in a statement on the French command of the Cameroons by Afana Osende, the representative of the *Association des étudiants camerounais* (A/C.4/350).

Therefore, it can be argued that condemnation of the military operations through the United Nations is visible in the case of the Politionele Akties and non-existent in the cases of the First Indochina War and the Algerian War. Regarding the Malayan Emergency, there is no clear condemnation. However, there is some involvement of the UNSC in the question.

The involvement of the Security Council in armed conflicts is also studied by Lowe, Roberts, Welsh and Zaum (2010). In their book, they present the results of several studies and assess the involvement of the UNSC in wars that occurred between 1945 and 2006. According to Lowe et al., in the cases of the First Indochina War and the Algerian war there was no UNSC involvement. In the case of the Politionele Akties, UNSC involvement was high and in the case of the Malayan Emergency, UNSC involvement was low (Lowe et al. 2010, Appendix 7).

Combining my own reading of UN documents with the study of Lowe et al., inhibiting international pressure seemed to be present in the cases of the Politionele Akties and of the Malayan Emergency and absent in the cases of the First Indochina War and the Algerian War. This is congruent with the hypothesis H1, where a relationship is expected between inhibiting international pressure and a "police actions" frame.

Also, inhibiting international pressure seems present in the research of the Institute for Dutch History (Huygens ING). In its research project on the decolonization of the Dutch Indies, the institute provides sources showing minister Van Kleffens urged the government to refrain from "war" terms, since that would 'set the whole world against us' (Van der Wal, Drooglever & Schouten 1978).

H2: States are likely to frame their military operations as "war" under enabling international pressure (i.e. when powerful states have stakes in the conflict).

Enabling international pressure is measured by proxy: by looking at the actors involved in the conflicts. The Correlates of War project (COW) has produced one of the most comprehensive databases on conflict data. The COW War List dataset contains information on wars from 1816 onwards (Sarkees & Wayman 2010). In the Extra-State War Data (v4.0), only the Viet Minh and the CPM are mentioned as communist actors in the four cases. The Viet Minh or Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội was a communist group in the First Indochina War and the CPM was the Communist Party of Malaya active during the Malayan Emergency.

More detailed data is obtained from the UPCD/PRIo project. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program from Uppsala University and the Center for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo have composed a dataset on the involved actors in armed conflicts in a collaborative project (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016).

On the Politionele Akties, the UPCD/PRIo dataset contains two actors: the Government of the Netherlands and the Indonesian People's Army. The Indonesian People's Army consisted of multiple militarily organized groups, mainly the Tentara Rakjat Indonesia, the Tentara Keamanan Rakjat and the Badan Keamanan Rakjat

(Purwanto 2014, 41). None of these military groups are considered to be of communist ideology (Purwanto 2014).

Next to the Government of France, two other actors are listed in the dataset on the Algerian War: the FLN and the MNA. The FLN, or Front de libération nationale, was the larger of the two and had no links to communist (or other) ideologies. Neither had the MNA, the Mouvement national algérien.

The actor dataset shows four actors in the First Indochina War: the Government of France, the Khmer Issarak in Cambodia, the Lao Issara in Laos and the Viet Minh in Vietnam. The Khmer Issarak consisted of multiple groups, loosely organized. While some of the men fighting for the Khmer Issarak were in favour of communist ideas, the organization as a whole was not (Becker 1998). At a later point in the war, Khmer Issarak groups became more closely affiliated with and sponsored by the Viet Minh and many adopted the Marxist/Leninist ideology (Ooi 2004, 48). The Lao Issara did not. The Viet Minh is one of the most well known communist organizations, mainly due to its leader Hồ Chí Minh and its role in the Second Indochina War.

In the Malayan Emergency, the war was in large part fought between the Communist Party of Malaya or Parti Komunis Malaya and the government of the United Kingdom, as is also shown in the UPCD/PRIO Actor dataset (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016).

The involvement of a communist actor in the conflicts indicates that great powers (the United States and the Soviet Union) had stakes in the conflict, therefore indicating enabling international pressure. If hypothesis H2 holds, a "war" frame is used in cases with a communist actor and a "police actions" frame is used in cases without communist actors. In the Politionele Akties case, there is no communist actor

and a "police actions" frame. In the First Indochina War case, there are communist actors and there is a "war" frame. These two findings support H2. However, in the case of the Malayan Emergency there is a significant communist actor, while the government used a "police actions" frame. Also, in the Algerian War, there was no communist actor, but still a "war" frame. Thus, the findings on H2 are inconclusive.

H3: In the face of forthcoming elections, states are more likely to frame their military operations as "war" rather than "police actions".

The test of hypothesis H3 evaluates whether general elections are near by measuring if elections are planned within half the time between regular elections at the start of the conflict. If this is the case, elections are considered to be "near".

In the Netherlands, elections were planned to take place in 1950, with the first police action or Eerste Politieele Aktie taking place in 1947. Elections are planned to take place every four years in the Netherlands. Therefore, for the case of the Politieele Akties, elections were not "near". Since there was a "police actions" frame in this case, this case seems to support H3.

In the French Fourth Republic, general elections were planned every five years. In 1946, at the start of the First Indochina War, the next elections were planned to take place in 1951, five years later. Thus elections were not "near" in the case of the First Indochina War. This does not support H3, due to the "war" frame used for this conflict.

At the beginning of the Algerian War, in 1954, the next planned general elections were scheduled for 1956. Because the time between the start of the conflict and the next planned elections is less than two and a half years, elections are seen to be "near" in case of the Algerian War. Congruent with the causal relationship presented in H3, a "war" frame is used in the Algerian War case.

When the Malayan Emergency started in 1948, the next elections were planned for 1950. In the United Kingdom, elections are to be held every five years. Thus, elections were "near" at the start of the Malayan Emergency. Because a "police actions" frame was used, this does not support H3.

To evaluate whether a different cut-off point would yield more support for the hypothesis, elections in the next year or in the next two years are also considered as signifying elections that are "near". When the cut-off point lies at one year after the start of the conflict, findings on the Politionele Akties case and the Malayan Emergency case provide support for the hypothesis while findings on the First Indochina War and the Algerian War cases do not. When the cut-off point is moved to two years from the beginning of the conflict, the findings on the Politionele Akties case and the Algerian War case seem to support H3, while data on the other two cases do not. Hence, not all four cases seem to support hypothesis H3.

H4: States with coalition governments are more likely than states with single party governments to frame their military operations as "police actions" instead of "war".

Hypothesis H4 holds that states with a coalition government are more likely to use a "police actions" frame. In the Netherlands, the Beel-I government was concerned with the beginning of the Politionele Akties. This government consisted of 32 members of the Catholic party (KVP), 29 members of the Labour party (PvdA) and 39 partyless members of government. Beel-I was a coalition government, congruent with H4 as a "police actions" frame was used in the case of the Politionele Akties.

The Attlee ministry dealt with the onset of the Malayan Emergency. This British government consisted exclusively of members of the Labour party. Therefore, it is not considered as a coalition government, but as a single party government. This

goes against the expected causal relationship stipulated in H4. While instead of a "war" frame a "police actions" frame was used, the United Kingdom did not have a coalition government at the beginning of the Malayan Emergency.

Regarding the First Indochina war, the third Léon Blum government was in office when it began. The Blum-III government consisted of members belonging to the Communist party (PCF), the Socialist party (SFIO), the Labour party (UDSR), the Christian-Democratic party (MRP) and the Radicals (PRS) (Pétry 1992). Thus, there was more than one party in the Blum-III government. Therefore, there was a coalition government in the French Fourth Republic at the start of the First Indochina War. However, since a "war" frame was used in this case, this seems to be incongruent with hypothesis H4.

Nearly a decade after the Blum-III government's decision, the government of Pierre Mendès France had to deal with the decolonization conflict in Algeria. At the start of the Algerian War, the French government consisted of members of the Radicals (PRS), the Conservatives (CNIP), the Labour party (UDSR), the Christian-Democrats (MRP) and Gaullists (ARS, URAS). Hence, the Mendès France government can be categorized as a coalition government; it consisted of more than one party. This does not support H4, since even though there was a coalition government, a "war" frame was used for the Algerian War.

H5: If the role of the military in a state is contested, states are more likely to frame their military operations as "war" instead of "police actions".

In the work of Dassel and Reinhardt (1999), diversionary war is seen more in states with contested institutions. Disagreement over the role of the military in a state would make the use of a "war" frame more likely. This is hypothesized in H5. Dassel and Reinhardt use large amounts of data in their quantitative study (Dassel & Reinhardt

1999). For the purpose of this thesis, it suffices to look at instances of contested institutions. The dataset of Dassel and Reinhardt, based in part on the Polity II data contains a variable "Major Abrupt Polity Change" (Gurr, Jagers & Moore 1990; Dassel & Reinhardt 1999; Reinhardt & Dassel 2007). Dassel and Reinhardt find that "every case of (...) "Major Abrupt Polity Change" is a valid observation of contested institutions" (Dassel & Reinhardt 1999, 66). Therefore, it is expected that the cases of this study where instances of contested institutions appear in the data of Dassel and Reinhardt are cases where a "war" frame is used.

During the Politionele Akties, no instances of contested institutions are measured, as the dataset shows (Reinhardt & Dassel 2007). Taken together with the "police actions" frame that has been used, this is in support of hypothesis H5.

According to the dataset, the United Kingdom has not seen occasions of contested institutions at the time of the Malayan Emergency. Thus, the data support H5 since a "police actions" frame was used in the Malayan Emergency.

For the years of the First Indochina War, France is labelled as experiencing contested institutions in 1946 and 1947. Again, these findings are congruent with the hypothesized causal relationship. A "war" frame was used and the role of the military was contested in the case of the First Indochina War.

Support for H5 is also found in the case of the Algerian War. Contested institutions are found in France in 1959 in the data of Dassel and Reinhardt. Thus, in the case of the Algerian War, both contested institutions and a "war" frame are present. These findings yield strong support for use of the indicator of contested institutions in predicting the framing decision.

H6: States that experience economic downturn are more likely than states with stable or improving economies to frame their military operations as "war" instead of "police actions".

Hypothesis H6 suggests that economic downturn can predict a decision between a "war" frame and a "police actions" frame. To compare economies, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is used. To be able to compare the performance of economies across states and across time, a purchasing power parity converter (PPP) has to be used to deal with differences in prices between countries and over time. Since this thesis concerns itself with historical cases, data on GDP levels is not readily available through the most used sources (World Bank data or Penn World Tables for example).

As a result, I build on Angus Maddison's work on (historical) economic performance (Bolt & Van Zanden 2014). The aim of the so-called Maddison Project is to invoke cooperation between different scholars from different disciplines and specializations and compose the most comprehensive and most accurate dataset of economic performance in history.

The Maddison project used the purchasing power parity converter that Kravis, Heston and Summers (1982) adopted in their International Comparisons Program: The Geary-Khamis dollar. In the simplest explanation, this method compares prices to the price in US dollars at a set point in time and thereby enables comparisons across time and space. To test H6, this study uses data from the Maddison Project (Bolt & Van Zanden 2014) and analyses whether there was an increase or decrease in GDP growth between the moment that the government assumed office and the beginning of the conflict. The growth percentages are calculated on the basis of the Maddison

Project data in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, comparing the GDP level on one year with the level one year earlier in the same state.

In the Netherlands, GDP growth was 2.36 per cent between 1944 and 1945, when the Beel-I government assumed office. Between 1946 and 1947, when the Politionele Akties commenced, GDP growth was higher, at 15.75 per cent.

In the United Kingdom, GDP growth was at -4.39 per cent when the Attlee ministry assumed office. At the start of the Malayan Emergency it had risen to 3.16 per cent. Thus, the increase in GDP growth correlates with the uses of "police action" frames in the cases of the Politionele Akties and the Malayan Emergency.

At the beginning of the First Indochina War, France experienced a growth in GDP of 8.37 per cent. When the Blum-III government came into office, the GDP growth was 52.05 per cent. However, because this indicates such a steep incline in growth and since the Blum-III government lasted only 31 days it might be useful to look at a larger time period. Even when compared to earlier governments, by looking at the GDP growth between 1944 and 1945, there is a decline in GDP growth: from 8.44 per cent to 8.37 per cent. Thus, the findings on the Algerian War also seem to support H6.

Contrastingly, the Algerian War does not provide much support. Growth in GDP rose from 4.85 per cent at the beginning of the Mendès France government's term to 5.74 per cent at the onset of the Algerian War.

In the following section, I discuss which theories I judge to have more explanatory power for the four cases. Also, I will propose possible explanations for disconfirming results and limitations of this research.

Discussion

Table 1 shows a matrix in which the six hypotheses are set against the four cases. It is a basic truth table. Each combination of hypothesis and case receives a 1 if the data from the case support the hypothesis and a 0 if it does not. In this way, it becomes clear that H1 and H5 hold the most explanatory power.

Table 1

	H1: Inhibiting International Pressure	H2: Enabling International Pressure	H3: Approaching Elections (half of term)	H3: Approaching elections (one year)	H4: Coalition Government	H5: Contested Institutions	H6: Economic Downturn
Politionele Akties	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
First Indochina War	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Malayan emergency	1	0	0	1	0	1	1
Algerian War	1	0	1	0	0	1	0

Data on all four cases confirm the idea that inhibiting international pressure seems to better predict the framing decision, and makes a "police actions" frame more likely to be used. Also, in instances of contested institutions, a "war" frame is used, confirming H5.

Coalition governments seem to be the least predictive in this study. Only in the case of the Politionele Akties, the evidence seems to support the hypothesis. This leads to believe that the composition of the government is not related to the framing decision, which is more in line with the idea that the decision maker's choice is an intentional and rational decision. The influence of party politics on the framing decision seems to be smaller than the influence of the international community.

The expected relationship between economic downturn and the framing decision is not found in the case of the Algerian War, where it is in the other three cases. However, since historical data are used, the calculations are based on rough estimations. The complex and accurate methods of the Maddison Project allow for the

description of well-educated guesses, but they are guesses nonetheless. Also, as can be seen in Table 2, there is an extraordinary large increase in GDP in France and the Netherlands at the end of World War II and declining levels for the United Kingdom. This seems to be due to the consequences of the Second World War, as the British war machine costs a lot of money and both France and the Netherlands survived German occupation with heavy losses.

Table 2

Year	France GDP	France GDP Growth	Netherlands GDP	Netherlands GDP Growth	United Kingdom GDP	United Kingdom GDP Growth
1944	94.207		24.306		362.983	
1945	102.154	8,44%	24.880	2,36%	347.035	-4,39%
1946	155.326	52,05%	41.999	68,81%	331.985	-4,34%
1947	168.330	8,37%	48.613	15,75%	327.044	-1,49%
1948	180.611	7,30%	53.804	10,68%	337.376	3,16%
1949	205.174	13,60%	58.546	8,81%	349.955	3,73%
1950	220.492	7,47%	60.642	3,58%	347.850	-0,60%
1951	234.074	6,16%	61.914	2,10%	358.234	2,99%
1952	240.287	2,65%	63.162	2,02%	357.585	-0,18%
1953	247.223	2,89%	68.652	8,69%	371.646	3,93%
1954	259.215	4,85%	73.319	6,80%	386.789	4,07%
1955	274.098	5,74%	78.759	7,42%	400.850	3,64%
1956	287.969	5,06%	81.654	3,68%	405.825	1,24%
1957	305.308	6,02%	83.950	2,81%	412.315	1,60%
1958	312.966	2,51%	83.701	-0,30%	411.450	-0,21%
1959	321.924	2,86%	87.793	4,89%	428.107	4,05%
1960	344.609	7,05%	95.180	8,41%	452.768	5,76%
1961	363.754	5,56%	95.455	0,29%	467.694	3,30%
1962	387.937	6,65%	101.993	6,85%	472.454	1,02%
1963	408.090	5,19%	105.686	3,62%	490.625	3,85%
1964	435.296	6,67%	114.446	8,29%	516.584	5,29%
1965	456.456	4,86%	120.435	5,23%	529.996	2,60%

GDP level data from Maddison Project Data (Bolt & Van Zanden 2014)

The incongruence between the data on the Algerian War case and the expected effect of economic downturn can also be due to the degree of economic voting in the French Fourth Republic. Because of the "diffusion of government responsibility" economic performance is less important to voters in states with coalition governments (Lewis-Beck 1986, 341). Since the governments of the French Fourth Republic consisted of many parties and succeeded each other quickly at the time of the Algerian War, "coalitional complexity" would have been high (Lewis-Beck 1990, 108). Therefore, voters would be less likely to see a government as responsible for

economic downturn, lowering the electoral cost. Thus, economic downturn would be less predictive in the case of the Algerian War.

Approaching elections predict the framing decision in two out of four cases. Even when the cut-off point is moved to include a longer or shorter time period, this number does not change. Therefore, even though the logic is appealing and seemingly simple, it cannot be argued that elections in the near future automatically prompts state leaders to use a "war" frame.

The same goes for enabling international pressure, although it could very well be the case that the proxy of communist actors itself is not accurate enough to yield good insights. Some light could be shed on the issue by studying foreign policy decision making in the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the cases. Looking into the Cold War superpowers might provide evidence of whether they had stakes in the conflicts.

More research can be useful for H1 as well. Although all cases seem to confirm the hypothesis, more evidence may be useful for the cases of the Malayan Emergency and the Algerian War. I expect that more evidence, perhaps in the form of notes and diaries from policymakers and United Nations delegates would confirm my results with a higher level of certainty.

This thesis set out to explain the decision by state leaders to frame the colonial conflicts following World War II as either "war" or "police actions". In doing so, it tests possible causal relations derived from international systemic approaches and from diversionary theory. Inhibiting international pressure and the deterring effect of a war-averse international community seem to have influenced this decision, as does a contested role of the military within a state. The effect of economic downturn is also visible.

These results indicate that it is possible to extend the diversionary theory argument to framing decisions. They also make clear that work still needs to be done in sharpening the theories to gain a better understanding of the exact causal mechanisms. Levy's 1989 call for a proper theoretical basis still stands for diversionary theory.

As virtually all the diversionary scholars I conclude with the remark that more cases need to be studied and more (and more accurate) data should be gathered and used. In the two decades after World War II over two dozen states gained independence from their former colonial powers. The 1948 Palestine War, the Malagasy Uprising, the Mau Mau Uprising (or Kenya Emergency) and the Brunei Revolt form examples of other decolonization conflicts in this time period. Just as the cases studied in this thesis, the labelling of the conflicts differ between the cases. Studying these cases could help further test and tease out the causal mechanisms at play. Political science allows for a better understanding of the world, its systems and their inhabitants by building on previous work. This makes every political science study an invitation to other scholars to further this understanding, including this thesis.

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