

# Unified or national policy-making? An analysis of EU decision-making processes of the Energy Union and the EU sanctions on Russia

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Unified or national policy-making? An analysis of the EU decision-making  
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## **Abstract**

During the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the EU faced multiple threats of Russia to their interests. Russia threatened the energy security of the EU, as well as EU norms of democracy, freedom and security. In order to protect these interests, two policies have been proposed to deal with these Russian threats. These are the creation of an Energy Union (EnU) to protect the EU's energy security, and a policy of sanctions to protect EU norms. However, the EU was not able to unanimously agree on the creation of the EnU, but did adopt a unified policy of economic sanctions on Russia. The thesis aims to provide an answer to this puzzle by researching the question: Why do EU member states generally prefer privileging national foreign policy in the EnU case, but agree on a common EU policy during the Ukraine crisis in 2014? The thesis will approach this question by applying three dimensions; the national, external and EU dimension to explain the variance in the outcome of the two decision-making processes. It argues that the different interests that have to be protected play a crucial role for the outcome of a decision-making process. Interests that are important for everybody will increase trust among these countries and will result in a unified policy.

*Keywords: Ukraine crisis, energy, EU sanctions, Energy Union, energy security, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Germany, Poland, decision-making process, Russia, energy situation, trust.*

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## Introduction

For the last 30 years, Russia and the EU have had a stable gas relationship which has been based on high mutual interdependence (Bilgin 2011, 119). Until 2006, Russia had not posed a direct threat to the EU's energy security, but this changed when relations between Ukraine and Russia worsened from the early 2000s onward. As 80% of Russia's gas supply to Europe is transported via Ukraine, the gas disruptions to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 have affected the energy supply security of many EU countries (Bilgin 2011, 126). The threat to the energy security of the EU increased again following the third Ukraine crisis in 2014. The third Ukraine crisis has led to the proposal of an EU Energy Union (EnU) by Poland (Mišík 2016, 68), which is a long-term permanent measurement to strengthen the EU's energy security and to deal with energy threats from Russia in the future. The second reaction of the EU to the crisis is the discussion to impose sanctions on Russia because of its aggressive behaviour in Ukraine.

These two cases form an empirical puzzle as these cases have different outcomes in terms of unified or fragmented policy-making at the EU level, even though they occurred at the same time and with the same political leaders. The EnU proposal to strengthen the EU energy security is not welcomed by every EU member state. Some countries have different views over the content of a common EU energy policy and prefer a national foreign energy policy over a common EU foreign energy policy (Mišík 2016, 68). The Ukraine crisis in 2014, on the other hand, shows a different side of EU cooperation, namely a common EU policy to impose economic sanctions on Russia (Natorski and Pomorska 2017). The discrepancy in policy actions of EU member states in these two cases creates a theoretical and empirical puzzle which this thesis will address by answering the research question: *Why do EU member states generally prefer privileging national foreign policy in the EnU case, but agree on a common EU policy during the Ukraine crisis in 2014?* In order to analyse the

differences in foreign policy decision-making, the thesis will start with a literature review of existing scholarships that are related to the research question. The literature review will be followed by a discussion of the theoretical framework used to answer the research question and the operationalization of the identified hypotheses which will be tested in this research project. The operationalization will be followed by the empirical section and the conclusion.

### **Literature review**

The existing literature can be divided in two scholarships which have produced valuable insights that are related to the national and European foreign policy-making, and energy security. The first scholarship is the national and EU foreign policy scholarship. In this scholarship, national foreign policy is defined as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (Hill 2003, 3). EU foreign policy is defined as the interaction of “(a) national foreign policies of the Member States; (b) European Commission external trade relations and development policy; and (c) the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU” (Wong and Hill 2011, 3). The concept of Europeanization takes a central position in this scholarship (Gross 2011; Wong and Hill 2011; Larsen 2009) and is defined as “a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making” (Tonra 2000, 229). The Europeanization approach is often used to analyse the influence of the EU on national foreign policies (Gross 2011, 168). Even though the concept of Europeanization seems valuable to the research question, the previous literature has used it in a very abstract and general manner and has not considered foreign policy in relation to energy issues. Moreover, most research has been done to evaluate whether some EU countries were Europeanized, but did not pay attention to why EU member-

states prefer a concerted EU foreign policy approach or a national foreign policy approach to deal with energy related issues.

Larsen (2009) has developed a framework to analyse national foreign policies in an EU context. He provides analytical tools to understand a member-state's position towards unified or national foreign policy decision-making. In this framework, Larsen makes the distinction between two extremes, autonomous national decision-making and unified decision-making at the EU level (Larsen 2009, 544). However, Larsen does not explain why and how there are differences in the extent to which an EU member states conducts foreign policy within the EU, nor does he relate it to the foreign policy decision-making process related to energy issues.

The energy security scholarship has provided multiple works that emphasises the importance of a common energy policy and the difficulties the EU faces to adopt such a common policy (Bressand 2011; Aalto and Temel 2014; Mišik 2016; Austvik 2016). Energy security implies the “availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability” of energy (Mišik 2016, 70). Other scholars have focused on national policies that are adopted in the case of energy policies (Umbach 2010; Barysch 2007). Such a policy is the ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policy, which refers to the preference of member states to secure their own energy security at the expense of other EU member states instead of adopting a common policy that is beneficial for all. However, most of these works are often very general and not case related. On the other hand, some authors analysed one specific case, such as the Energy Union or the Ukraine crisis, but these cases are not then related to each other, nor are they related to the EU foreign policy scholarship (Mišik 2016; Austvik 2016; Naturski and Pomorska 2017).

A valuable contribution though is that this scholarship has produced two important approaches that are useful to analyse the energy preferences (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011; Correljé and van der Linde 2006). These two approaches, Regions & Empires (R&E) and

Markets & Institutions (M&I), focus on the geopolitical and the market side of energy relations. Each approach identifies an important aspect of the energy relationship of EU countries with Russia, but these approaches also explain national energy preferences. However, these two approaches are not used to explain the variance in member states' preference for national or unified decision-makings between two cases, such as the EnU and the EU sanctions on Russia.

The uniqueness of the thesis is that it will combine both scholarships. In isolation, these are not able to explain why EU countries adopted a unified sanctions policy following the Ukraine crisis of 2014, but cannot agree on a common EU energy policy. Therefore, the use of both scholarships will make a significant theoretical contribution, because the framework of Larsen and the two approaches of the energy security scholarship will be combined for the first time. Moreover, the thesis also has important empirically implications, because the findings of the research will be useful for both academics and politicians as it will be clearer as to why and when EU member-states will prefer unified decision-making over national decision-making. The next section will elaborate on the theoretical approach of the thesis and will provide the hypotheses that will be tested.

### **Theoretical framework**

The thesis will build on the framework developed by Larsen, as introduced in the literature review, to analyse why countries choose for different decision-making processes in the case of the EnU and the EU sanctions on Russia. Larsen argues that the crucial elements that explain variance in the extent to which foreign policy is conducted at the EU level can be found both at the EU level and the national level (2009, 548). Therefore, the national and EU levels of analysis will be used for this research. The thesis will conduct its analysis in three dimensions, related to these two levels of analysis. These three dimensions are: the national



dimension, the external dimension, and the EU dimension. It is important that one recognises that these three dimensions are somehow interconnected, and cannot entirely be isolated for this research.

The national dimension aims to relate the different domestic energy situations of the four countries of analysis (see operationalization in the following section), to a country's preference for a national or unified EU foreign policy. In this dimension, the two approaches provided by the scholarship of energy security will guide the analysis, because they explain the energy relationship between EU countries. The first approach, Markets and Institutions (M&I), is based on economic liberalism and cooperation, and focuses on market principles and relations based on institutions. As multilateral cooperation in energy issues is perceived as a valuable manner to improve energy relationships, the main priority of this approach is the creation of a single EU energy market (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011, 575). The second approach, Regions and Empires (R&E) is based on economic nationalistic principles and views energy relations between the EU and Russia as a geopolitical struggle between two power blocks that compete over the control over energy resources (Correljé and van der Linde 2006, 533). Countries which perceive energy issues in accordance to the R&E approach value energy security as the highest priority (Austvik 2016, 373). The focus on energy security is often related to a country's energy dependency on, and bargaining position with a third country, which is Russia in this thesis.

The bargaining position determines a country's negotiation position towards Russia and its capability to deal with Russian threats. Countries that have a high dependency on Russian gas and no alternative supplier have a weak bargaining position against Russia as they do not have any power to deter Russia. However, when the EU countries act together as a united body, the bargaining position of all EU countries will increase because the EU is able to threaten the Russian revenues of gas because of the high interdependency between the EU

and Russia (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011, 579). Hence, based on these theoretical assumptions, the first two hypotheses can be derived:

**H1:** The greater the dependency on Russian gas, the higher is the willingness of a country to conduct energy foreign policy at the EU level, as it strengthens its bargaining position.

**H2:** If domestic energy situations of EU countries differ a lot, then national decision-making is preferred over unified decision-making.

The external dimension focuses on the reactions of EU countries to Russia's actions. As discussions about the EnU and the EU sanctions against Russia occurred in the same period, it is important to examine which effect Russian actions had on the decision-making process. As part of the definition of Europeanization introduced in the literature review, it is argued that the internalisation of norms and expectations due to EU membership can contribute to unified decision-making at the EU level (Tonra 2000, 229; Warntjen 2010, 670). As in both cases, there are different interests at stake. Socialization with EU interests due to EU membership then can become a higher priority than national interests (Warntjen 2010, 670). Hence, when actions of an external country threaten these interests, this can change EU country's perceptions on how to deal with this external actor. However, it also shows that countries may have conflicting demands and have to choose between what the EU expects them to do and what they personally want to do (Warntjen 2010, 670). This section therefore aims to provide an answer to the question if Russia's aggressive behaviour in Ukraine can account for unified decision-making among EU member-states. It therefore can be assumed that:

**H3:** When Russia continuously threatens EU interests, EU countries will prefer unified decision-making at the EU.

The last EU dimension will explore the relationship between the EU countries and its impact on a unified policy-making at the EU level. Trust is an important element that can explain the variance in the extent that EU countries conduct a unified policy at the EU. The definition of trust is that actors in a trust relationship are confident that the other will not commit actions that will harm the mutual interests and norms (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 230). Trust is related to uncertainty as uncertainty can prevent the existence of a trust relationship between countries. Therefore, the acceptance of the dependency and vulnerability of another country is important for the creation of a trust relationship (Natorski and Pomorska 2017, 55). Trust contributes to the strength of the EU, because these actors are more willing to transfer sovereignty to the EU. EU strength is important, as a strong EU constrains the national ability to implement national policies that differ from EU policies (Larsen 2009, 549). The 'we-feeling' between EU countries is another important indicator of trust (Natorski and Pomorska 2017, 56; Larsen 2009, 552). Who is meant by and what is expected from the 'we' is essential to know, as the formulation of the 'we' is related to the extent a country prefers to conduct a unified foreign policy at the EU level (Larsen 2009, 551, 552). EU countries which only refer to the EU in combination with a strong EU policy characterize a strong preference for unified policy at the EU level (Larsen 2009, 555). As a result, the EU is more able to implement policies that are effective and successful (Natorski and Pomorska 2017, 57). Based on these assumptions, the following hypothesis and its counter-hypothesis can be derived:

**H4a:** If a member-state trusts the EU, then it is more likely to prefer unified decision-making at the EU level.

**H4b:** If a member-state does not trust the EU, then national decision-making is preferred over unified decision-making at the EU level.

The dependent variable (DV) that will be tested in these hypotheses is the extent of foreign policy decision-making conducted at the EU level, as opposed to national decision-making. These two extremes are introduced by Larsen (2009) and will be applied to the energy realm of foreign policy. Variations on this DV can be: unified EU foreign policy-making and fragmented national foreign policy-making (Larsen 2009, 544). In this thesis, unified decision-making means unanimous agreement of EU countries to a given foreign policy. National decision-making, on the other hand, means that national preferences are promoted at the international level, but a country does not agree to adopt policies that are promoted at the EU level (Larsen 2009, 544). The given hypotheses will be tested in order to examine which hypotheses and dimension can explain the variety of the DV in both cases. The next section will provide the justification for the selected case studies, elaborate on how the hypotheses will be tested, which variables are involved and which data will be used.

## **Operationalization**

### *Case selection*

As has become clear in the introduction, the cases that will be analysed are the national decision-making process of the Energy Union, and the unified decision-making process regarding the economic sanctions against Russia during the Ukraine crisis in 2014. These two cases are chosen because they show clear differences on the DV, which provides the opportunity to analyse why there is such variation on the DV. The second reason is that these cases occurred roughly in the same time period with the same national leaders, which makes them suitable for comparison.

To investigate why variation on the DV exists, the thesis will focus on four EU member-states to analyse their preferences for unified or national decision-making. This will be done because an evaluation of all EU member-states would go beyond the scope of the thesis. Therefore, these four countries are chosen based on the expectation that these will compose a representative sample of the wider EU membership. These four countries are: the Netherlands, Germany, Poland and Slovakia. This is a representative sample because they are all EU member-states, differ in country size, geographical position, domestic energy situation and in their relations with Russia. Hereby, most characteristics of EU countries are represented in these four countries. The main distinction that is made is in the geographical location of the countries. The Netherlands is chosen as a unit of analysis because it is a small western country and has the capability to produce parts of its gas demands for its own consumption. Germany is chosen because it is a large Western country, a powerful country in the EU, and a large importer of Russian gas. Poland is chosen because it has a relatively high gas dependency on Russia and was the country who proposed the creation of the Energy Union. The last case is Slovakia, another Eastern country, but with a 100% gas dependency on Russia, which represents many Eastern EU countries along the Russian border (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011, 577).

#### *Testing hypotheses and data*

In order to explain the variation in the dependent variable in the case of the EnU and the sanctions on Russia, the thesis will approach this question from three different dimensions. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on different independent variables (IVs) that come from the national dimension. These IVs are the gas dependency on Russia and the diversity of the domestic energy situations of the four countries which are expected to influence the DV. The gas dependency will be measured in the percentage a country depends on Russian gas, which can be between 0-100%. The domestic energy situations will be evaluated by different

indicators (Table 1) which can be compared among the four countries of analysis. This data will be collected from the International Energy Agency (IEA) 2014's energy supply security report. This data will be compared to the countries' perspectives on the EnU and sanctions on Russia. At this point, we can relate a country's energy situation to its policy preferences. Moreover, it can be determined if a country acts in line with the M&I or R&E approach. Country's which act in line with the M&I prefer the completion of the energy market, country's which act in line with the R&E approach have a strong priority for the improvement of the energy security. The data concerning the preferences of the countries for the EnU and the sanctions will be collected from government documents and statements of the country's leaders. These sources will be complemented by secondary literature.

The third hypothesis represents the external dimension. In this hypothesis, the threat of Russia to EU interests in both cases is the IV. The interest of energy security has to be protected in the EnU case and EU norms, such as democracy, security and freedom have to be protected in the sanctions case. The theoretical assumption that a threat to EU interests contributes to the preference to protect these interests by a unified policy will be tested. This will be done by analysing EU countries' reactions to these threats. These reactions will be compared to a country's preference for national or unified decision-making, in order to analyse if a correlation exists. National documents, newspapers which include prime ministers' views and secondary literature that has examined national statements and documents will be used to test the hypothesis. The analysis of these sources can provide insights about a country's position towards Russian actions and the influence Russia had on EU countries' preferences towards unified decision-making.

Hypotheses 4a and 4b are derived from the theoretical assumptions of the EU dimension. In these hypotheses, trust is the IV that affects the DV. In these case studies, EU countries trust each other, or they do not trust each other. This will be analysed by using the

EU strength and the 'we-feeling' of EU countries as indicators. The willingness of countries to transfer sovereignty to the EU, which increases its strength, indicates if trust exists among the EU countries (Natorski and Pomorska 2017). The 'we-feeling' and expressions of the 'we' will be analysed, because it illustrates how a country evaluates its relationship with the EU. In order to determine whether there trust, 'we-feeling' and willingness to transfer sovereignty to the EU exist, a language analysis will be done. This analysis is based on Larsen's assumptions of national agency articulation that indicates a country's preference for national or unified decision-making (2009, 552). The most prominent articulations refer to the country, solely the EU, or a combination of the country with the EU. The articulation of a country indicates how a country identifies with the EU and the aims of a policy (Larsen 2009, 552). The language analysis will be done by analysing national and relevant EU documents, Prime Ministers' statements and complemented with secondary literature that has analysed these statements.

#### *Research method*

To conduct this research, the thesis will use a mix of the research methods of a structured, focused comparison and process-tracing. The method of structured, focused comparison applies to the research by systematically testing all the hypotheses to each country in each case. The thesis only focuses on the decision-making process of the four cases in two events and uses a clear theoretical focus by applying the three dimensions, with the same theoretical assumptions, to each case (George and Bennett 2004, 67, 70). The findings of the analysis are then suitable for comparison, as the findings are collected by the same research approach. By doing this, the thesis tries to understand the decision-making processes that have led to two different values of the DV in the two cases. This is consistent with the process-tracing method (George and Bennett 2004, 206). By applying the three dimensions to the cases studies, the method of process-tracing helps to identify which IVs causes differences in

the outcome of the DV. The aim of the thesis is to understand why EU member-states chose to privilege unified decision-making in the case of EU sanctions on Russia and fragmented decision-making in case of the EnU. The next section will provide the analysis and results that these research methods provide.



## Chapter 1: The Energy Union

After Russia annexed Crimea, the EU questioned the safety of its energy relationship with Russia. Therefore, Poland presented the proposal of the EnU that should improve the energy situation of the EU (Lada et al. 2015, 18)<sup>1</sup>. Initially, all EU countries supported the idea of an EnU because of the EU's high dependency on Russian gas. However, when negotiations started it seemed to be more difficult to achieve agreement on the EnU than initially expected. Member-states have different energy situations (see table 1) and thereby different expectations of the EnU (see table 2), which hinders them from acting as a united body at the EU (Lada et al. 2015, 11).

In Germany's energy situation, gas has an important position in its domestic energy mix (IEA 2014, 200), but its domestic production is very low. It is expected that the German gas demand will decline in the future. More importantly, Germany has a diversified and flexible infrastructure that provides the gas supply (IEA 2014, 201). The geographical position of Germany contributes to Germany's ability to diversify its gas supplies and ensure its gas security by importing gas from the Netherlands, Norway and Russia; since 2011 directly via the Nordstream pipeline (IEA 2014, 211). Due to Germany's variety of suppliers and supply routes, it does not have energy security concerns, as alternatives exist. Moreover, the chance of a Russian threat to Germany's energy security is low because Germany is directly connected to Russia via the Nordstream pipeline and has never stopped the gas supply in the past (Lada et al. 2015, 63; Schmidt-Felzmann 2011, 584). Additionally, Germany is Russia's largest gas importer which led to a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011, 579). It is unlikely that Russia will stop supplying gas to Germany

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<sup>1</sup> The report written by Lada et al. (2015) is used for this research as it has conducted an in-depth survey on behalf of the Polish Institute of Public Affairs. Interviews have been taken with important stakeholders, such as heads of states and ministries of Germany, Poland, France and the United Kingdom. The report is thus a reflection of national perspectives on the Energy Union, which contributes to the understanding of nation's preferences to the decision-making process.

as “dependency works both ways”, meaning that when Russia harms Germany, Russia will be harmed too (Lada et al. 2015, 64).

As a result of Germany’s strong bargaining position and diversification of gas suppliers, Germany’s focus on the EnU can be characterized by an M&I approach which strongly prioritises the completion of the EU energy market (Lada et al. 2015, 88). The completion of the internal market is a priority that will strengthen the energy security of the EU, which is positive for more vulnerable EU countries (Lada et al. 2015, 74). In addition, Germany values the improvement of climate policies as the highest priority that should be adopted in the EnU. This is caused by the successful implementation of the *Energiewende* in German national policies that reduces the national gas demand and contributes to a better environment (Lada et al. 2015, 59, 78). Germany requires that policies comparable to the *Energiewende* should be adopted in the EnU, and if climate policies do not get enough attention, Germany will not agree on a unified policy at the EU level (Lada et al. 2015, 85; Szulecki et al. 2016, 555). This causes division with other countries’ priorities, because not every country perceives climate issues to be a priority (see table 2). The threat of Germany to disagree with the EnU when climate issues are not addressed illustrates that Germany will only support the EnU when it can be used to achieve its own national energy goals (Szulecki et al. 2016, 554). The Ukraine crisis did not have a big influence on Germany’s perspective over the EnU, as Germany is not directly affected by the crisis (Lada et al. 2015, 88). Therefore, the Ukraine crisis is no reason for Germany to view the EnU from an R&E perspective (Lada et al. 2015, 65).

The Netherlands has a different gas situation than Germany as gas is the most important energy resource in the energy mix of the Netherlands (IEA 2014, 316) and it is expected that the gas demand of the Netherlands will rise in the future (IEA 2014, 319). However, as it is expected that domestic production will decline in the future, the Netherlands

is investing in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) installations and storage capacities to ensure supply diversity in the future (IEA 2014, 319). This shows that the Netherlands pays attention to the preservation of energy security in the future, because it also imports gas from other EU countries and Russia (IEA 2014, 328).

Similar to Germany, the Netherlands also has an M&I approach to energy issues and supports the EnU. It prefers an internal energy market, as the Dutch minister of Economic Affairs has said: “The creation of a European energy market is vital, and the sooner the better” (Dutch Senate and House of Representatives 2016, 12). The Dutch government has also argued that the energy market is the most crucial element for the success of the EnU and will get their full attention during their EU presidency (Koeppel and Zuidhof 2015, 3). As energy security will become more important in the future for the Netherlands, attention is also given to the improvement of energy security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015, 10 *hereafter MFA*). In contrast to Slovakia and Poland, the Netherlands wants to achieve more energy security through the creation of an EU internal energy market (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2015, 5 *hereafter MEA*). Additionally, energy security should be guaranteed by the creation of new pipelines and the diversification of gas suppliers (MEA 2015, 25). This focus on the diversification of supplies and routes is caused by the Ukraine crisis which results in concerns about energy supply security. This is another reason why the Netherlands supports the EnU (MEA 2015, 30).

Though contrasting to Germany qua focus on energy security, the Netherlands also emphasizes the importance of the improvement of the climate, as the Dutch government refers a lot to climate policies that should be implemented to improve the climate conditions in the future (MEA 2015). The Dutch focus on the internal energy market is also caused by the expectations that the market will contribute to the improvement of the climate as it will be more convenient and efficient to implement climate policies and renewable resources when

all countries implement the same climate policies (MEA 2015, 25). Though the Dutch and German government act according the M&I approach, differences between their energy situations lead to differences in priorities for the EnU (Table 2).

The Polish energy situation differs a lot from the other 3 countries, because natural gas only has a small role in the country's energy mix as coal is the dominant energy resource (IEA 2014, 360). However, the gas demand is expected to rise which makes the country more gas dependent in the future. As Russia is the main gas supplier to Poland, the country has a high dependency rate on Russian gas. This affects their bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia and makes them vulnerable to gas disruptions. Therefore, Poland's gas security policy focuses on the improvement of the infrastructure, storage capacities and the diversification of suppliers (IEA 2014, 363). The Polish energy approach is based on an R&E approach, which marks a clear difference from Germany and the Netherlands. Similar to the Netherlands, though, is that LNG investments can also reduce Poland's gas dependency from Russia, as there is a lot of shale gas under the Polish territory (IEA 2014, 370). This provides opportunities for improving Poland's energy security.

This prospect of lower dependency on Russian gas, however, is a long-term project and has no effect on Poland's current energy situation. This explains why the Ukraine crisis led to a strong reaction of the Polish government. As the Ukraine crisis could threaten the energy security of many EU countries, Poland recognised that a unified energy policy at the EU level would strengthen its bargaining position (Lada et al. 2015, 99). The Polish government stresses the importance of solidarity, strengthening of bargaining power and the diversification of suppliers as crucial factors to cope with a Russian threat (Lada et al. 2015, 99). Poland has also argued that the EU should act as a united body against Russia, as "excessive dependence on Russian energy makes Europe weak" (Tusk 2014). Therefore, strengthening of the bargaining position is important to Poland and other countries that have a

high dependency rate on Russian gas (Lada et al. 2015, 100). Transparency of bilateral contracts with third parties such as Russia is also important to improve the bargaining position of the EU. The transparency of contracts will prevent EU countries from being divided by Russia, which makes the EU a stronger negotiation partner with Russia (Szulecki et al. 2016, 558; Lada et al. 2015, 106). The change of content of the EnU proposal by the EU has been a great disappointment for the Polish government as it is expected that it will not achieve the improvement of energy supply security as many more issues have been added to the proposal of the EnU (Szulecki et al. 2016, 558; Lada et al. 2015, 98).

Slovakia is the most extreme case of these four countries as it has the smallest gas demand, is almost 100% dependent on gas import from Russia. Though Slovakia's gas demand is small compared to the other countries, it has a central role in the energy supply of the EU as it is an important transit country of Russian gas (IEA 2014, 392). As Slovakia is vulnerable to Russian gas disruptions, it is investing in reverse pipelines to Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary to create the ability that these countries can transfer gas to Slovakia (IEA 2014, 400). The 100% dependency on Russian gas leads Slovakia to also be vulnerable in terms of economic and political blackmail to Russia (Lada et al. 2015).

The Ukraine gas crisis in 2009 had an important impact on Slovakia's gas supply and economy, which explains why energy supply security has become a top priority for the Slovakian government. This is an important reason why Slovakia supports the idea of an EnU, especially after a new gas crisis in 2014. The main reason to why Slovakia support the idea of an EnU is that it should strengthen Slovakia's energy security, as it is vulnerable to Russian actions. This explains Slovakia's sympathy for the R&E approach. Moreover, Slovakia defines the EnU as a mechanism that should strengthen their energy security. The EnU is,

however, seen as a tool to achieve this national goal (Duleba 2015, 52, 53)<sup>2</sup>. Nevertheless, Slovakia also pays some attention to the creation of an internal energy market with the aim of strengthening the bargaining position of the EU vis-à-vis Russia in order to prevent Russia from using energy as a political tool against member-states (Duleba 2015, 52, 53; Mišík 2016, 72). However, where Poland wants to achieve a better bargaining position by joint purchasing of gas, Slovakia is reluctant to this idea. It only supports a joint purchase of gas in times of crises (Duleba 2015, 53, 57).

European energy interests, mainly the energy security, have been threatened multiple times by Russia in the last decade (Bilgin 2011). As is theoretically assumed by the process of Europeanization, EU membership will increase the preference of EU countries to protect EU interests (Warntjen 2010, 670). Initially, EU countries have supported a unified energy policy (Table 2), but when details had to be discussed they could not agree on a common policy. The different energy situations caused different energy priorities, which reduced the importance of energy security for certain countries, even though Russia is threatening the EU energy security for the third time in 10 years (Bilgin 2011). Moreover, the EU is willing to resolve energy security problems in the short-term by improving infrastructure to make use of reversed gas flows (Duleba 2015, 53). However, the EU cannot agree on binding agreements that would protect the energy security in the long-term, as the domestic energy situation causes differentiation in how important the protection of energy security is perceived.

For the success of the EnU, trust is an important element that contributes to unified decision-making at the EU level (Natorski and Pomorska 2017). When these levels are high, states are willing to transfer sovereignty to the EU, which increases the strength of the EU. However, in the case of the EnU, levels of trust and EU strength are relatively low. The EU

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<sup>2</sup> Alexander Duleba is a Slovakian political scientist and has made use of Slovakian national government documents that have only been published in the Slovak language. Therefore, this source has a significant contribution in understanding the Slovakian perspective to the Energy Union and its preference for the decision-making process.

strength is constrained by the Lisbon Treaty as it is agreed that EU countries maintain a large extent of their national sovereignty to decide on energy issues. The EU, on the other hand, is only given a small extent of strength to ensure energy supply security and a functioning internal market (Lada et al. 2015, 15).

The acceptance of vulnerabilities of the other in a trust relationship and the assurance that giving up sovereignty will not harm the country's vulnerability is absent in the context of the EnU. EU countries do not want to give up sovereignty to the EU as they are afraid that national preferences will be ignored (Szulecki et al. 2016, 563). This prevents them from achieving unified energy policy-making at the EU. Poland is sceptical about other EU countries' willingness to cooperate on energy issues. Poland argues that the western countries do not want to give up some of their sovereignty to the EU, because they will lose substantial financial advantages that are bilaterally negotiated with their energy suppliers. Moreover, they argue that the lack of identification with the complex energy situation of central and eastern European countries is another important factor for why they do not want to give up sovereignty for the sake of other EU countries (Lada et al. 2015, 101). These concerns illustrate a lack of trust in other EU countries' future behaviour that might harm the Polish energy security. Germany has expressed understanding of the Eastern European countries' desire for diversification of energy suppliers, but does not show willingness to support the improvement of this energy security. Germany only wants to transfer sovereignty to the EU for a unified EnU when their own priorities will get the highest attention (Szulecki et al. 2016, 554; Lada et al. 2015, 89). This shows Germany's lack of interest in the vulnerabilities of other countries.

Slovakia and the Netherlands also hesitate to give up national sovereignty to the EU as they both prefer national authority over their domestic energy policies. This is caused by a lack of trust that their national priorities will get attention in an EU coordinated EnU (Treffers

2015, 3; Duleba 2015, 54, 55; Mišík 2016, 74). Slovakia's hesitation to give up sovereignty is somehow contrasting as they have good experiences with the capacities of the EU to strengthen their energy security, which happened after the 2009 gas crisis (Duleba 2015, 53). Moreover, the Slovakian government recognised the importance of the EU in energy issues as it is called the "crucial playground" for energy matters (Mišík 2016, 74). However, the ability of the EU to improve energy security is only perceived in terms of developing cross-border energy infrastructure that connects isolated countries to the EU gas market (Duleba 2015, 53). They only support EU policies that will improve their own energy security, but a total EU energy integration is not preferred. Instead, they support the creation of a regional energy network with neighbour countries with a comparable energy situation (Duleba 2015, 58, 59).

The strong preference to maintain national sovereignty over energy issues in order to be able to address national interests is a sign of a low 'we-feeling' among EU countries in relation to the EnU. It is Poland which is a great exception on this assumption as Tusk has often expressed sentences that 'we', which refers to the EU as a whole, should work together to improve the energy security. In his article, Tusk points out that Europe should act as one united body to be strong in negotiations against Russia related to gas issues (Tusk 2014). To Tusk, there should be solidarity among EU countries which means openness of energy contracts with Russia, improving the energy security, and helping other member-states in times of crises (Tusk 2014). As has previously been shown, the other three countries have hardly expressed their desire to act as a united body on energy issues when their own national priorities will not get attention. In fact, the 'we' in their language refers to their national 'we'. 'We' is than, for example, used in the perspective of 'we as Germans want the EU to incorporate climate policies in the EnU'. The expectations of each other differ a lot and the national articulations of the 'we' refer to a preference of national decision-making rather than a unified EU-policy (Larsen 2009, 555).



In conclusion, the analysis of the national dimension illustrates that hypothesis 1 can be partly confirmed as countries with a high dependency on Russian gas value the EnU as an important mechanism that will strengthen the bargaining position and the energy security. However, countries with a lower dependency rate also support the creation of the EnU. The dependency rate is a condition that influences the different priorities of the countries, but cannot explain why an agreement cannot be achieved. Hypothesis 2 on the other hand, can be confirmed and is able to explain the lack of agreement on a unified policy-making. As we can see in tables 1 and 2 as well as in the analysis above, the EU countries are highly diversified in terms of energy situation and their expectations and priorities of the EnU. This makes it difficult for the EU to agree on a unified policy. The external dimension which focuses on the effects of Russian threats to EU interests has shown that a continuation of these threats has failed to unite the EU countries. The different energy situations have resulted in diversification over EU energy interests. Therefore, hypothesis 3 can be disconfirmed. The theoretical correlation between trust, the 'we-feeling' and EU strength has been visible in the case of the EnU. Low levels of we-feeling are reflected in low levels of trust, which causes limited willingness of EU countries to transfer sovereignty to the EU, which weakens the EU. Altogether, this leads to a preference for national decision-making regarding energy policies, instead of unified energy policies conducted at the EU level through the establishment of the EnU. Therefore, hypothesis 4b can be confirmed.

## **Chapter 2: EU sanctions on Russia**

Since the Russian aggression in Crimea, EU countries are debating if economic sanctions should be imposed on Russia to deter it from further aggression (Schult et al. 2014). Important, however, is that if the EU wants to impose economic sanctions on Russia, it requires unanimous agreement of all 28 EU member-states, which seemed impossible in the first place (Schult et al. 2014). In the beginning, the EU was divided about this policy as not every EU member-state was enthusiast about this initiative (Schult et al. 2014). A clear distinction can be seen between countries, such as Poland, which directly supported economic sanctions, and countries, such as Germany, Slovakia and the Netherlands, which are more reluctant to impose sanctions (Schult et al. 2014). So what caused this initial fragmentation and what factors resulted in the fact that the EU was able to unanimously impose economic sanctions on Russia?

Slovakia, Germany and the Netherlands have in common that they hesitated to agree on economic sanctions due to their relationship with Russia and fear of counter effects of the sanctions. The Netherlands has a long relationship with Russia and especially the trade relationship with Russia is for both parties of high importance. Therefore, the Netherlands did initially not favour the implementation of economic sanction as it feared that Russian retaliation would harm the Dutch economy and would close Dutch access to the Russian economy (van der Togt 2015). Instead of imposing economic sanctions, the Netherlands preferred dialogue with Russia in an attempt to de-escalate the conflict (MFA 2014, March 7). Like the Netherlands, Germany was also hesitant in the beginning to impose stronger economic sanctions and preferred negotiations with Russia. However, Merkel stated that if negotiations with Russia would fail to produce any positive result, she supports the EU to implement economic sanctions on Russia (Pond 2015, 173). Slovakia's reluctance was based on fear for countermeasure against their economy, but also for their energy security. Because

of its high dependence on Russian energy resources, Slovakia is one of the countries that fear Russia's use of the energy weapon as it has negative consequences for the energy security of these countries (Králiková and Gyárfásová 2015, 1; Szulecki et al. 2016, 552). Therefore, Slovakia preferred to maintain a solid relationship with Russia and tried to decrease the strength of the sanctions against Russia and opposed strong economic sanctions (Kobzova 2015).

In contrast, immediately after the annexation of Crimea, Poland took the lead to strengthen sanctions on Russia. The support of Poland for EU sanctions on Russia was mainly caused by its fragile relationship with Moscow, based on mutual suspicion, and Russia's aggression in Crimea (Fuksiewicz 2015, 1). The annexation of Crimea was deemed unacceptable for Poland and has resulted in further deterioration of the Russian-Polish relationship (Fuksiewicz 2015, 1). Another reason for why Poland directly wanted to take actions against Russia is because of their perceived military threat. Russia's aggression in Ukraine reminds the Polish government to past experiences in which Russia attacked Poland as well (Kucharczyk et al. 2015, 13). The perceived military threat posed by Russia can also be a factor that led to different preferences between EU countries, as not all states equally perceived the annexation of Crimea as a direct military threat to their country. When there is no security threat to a country, economic and energy interests influenced the reluctance of the other countries because these could be affected by Russian counter-measures (Szabo 2014, 120; Table 3).

These four countries' preferences and relationships with Russia contrast but they also have something important in common which unites them. After the annexation of Crimea, all four countries expressed their concern that Russia's actions are against the international law and European interests, which was the protection of EU norms, such as democracy, freedom and security. Poland immediately stated that Russia went too far by annexing Crimea and that

the EU should use every tool to deter Russia from further aggressive actions (Kucharczyk et al. 2015). The Dutch government criticized from the beginning of the conflict that Russia's violation of international norms and principles cannot be accepted (MFA 2014, March 2). International norms, which are also agreed on by Russia, are perceived as essential principles that should be respected (MFA 2014, March 2; van der Togt 2015). The first reaction of Germany was that Russia's military aggression in Crimea is unacceptable and is perceived as a threat to Europe's long lasting 'peace order' (Pond 2015, 173; Szabo 2014, 123). Merkel has stated that Russia's behaviour has been an attack to EU norms which cannot be ignored by the European community (Merkel 2014). This threat was an important reason for Germany to consider economic sanctions if negotiations would not work.

Slovakia has also been clear that it does not tolerate Russia's actions in Ukraine that violate international law. President Kiska argued that Russia is a factor that threatens the stability, unity and norms of the EU. Therefore, Slovakia would support EU sanctions policy to constrain Russia's power (Králiková and Gyárfásová 2015, 1). The change in Slovakia's position was also caused by the fact that Russia had cut the gas supply to Slovakia by 50%, even though Slovakia attempted to limit the strength of sanctions within the EU. This was done to maintain a good relationship with Russia (Kobzova 2015). What helped Slovakia to support EU sanctions is that Slovakia had made efforts to decrease its dependency on Russia. Diversification of its gas suppliers and routes, and the creation of the EnU would decrease Russia's political influence on the country (Králiková and Gyárfásová 2015, 1).

The European Commission has stated that the conflict in Ukraine is a violation of international norms as well as European norms. Russia has posed a threat to European norms of freedom and democracy that have not been respected in Ukraine (Durão Barroso 2014). The responsibility of the EU to ensure these norms throughout Europe is an important reason for the EU to make use of all kinds of sanctions against the Russians (EU Council 2014). For

countries which struggled with choosing between EU norms and domestic interests (Pridham 2014, 59), the downing of Malaysia Airline flight MH17 in July 2014 made the choice much easier as every EU country condemned the action. From the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, Germany has condemned Russian aggression and tried everything to get Russia out of Ukraine, and supported the EU sanctions when negotiations would not work. At that point, Merkel warned that “without a doubt, economic sanctions will be considered should the situation become more critical” (Hawley 2014). When flight MH17 crashed, Russia had crossed the line for Germany and economic should be imposed on Russia. Germany showed the other EU countries that Germany was accepting the negative consequences of economic sanctions on Russia. The fact that Germany was supporting the economic sanctions and accepting the negative consequences for the national economy persuaded the other EU countries to unanimously agree on the implementation of economic sanctions (Pond 2015, 174). It was after this incident that the EU was able to impose severe economic sanctions on Russia (Pridham 2014, 58).

The crash of flight MH17 was a turning point for the Netherlands, which was the main victim of the incident. From this point on the government realised that economic sanctions could not be avoided anymore (van der Togt 2015). It has been clear, that this event changed the Dutch perspective on how to deal with the Ukraine crisis and Russia, and has changed the Dutch-Russian relationship (Wiersma 2015, 1). The MH17 incident was not only a crucial point for the Dutch government, but all EU countries have agreed that further steps have to be taken by the EU (MFA and Ministry of Safety and Justice 2014 *hereafter MSJ*). The lack of Russian efforts to de-escalate the conflict and its hindering of the investigation of the crash resulted in the implementation of economic sanctions (MFA and MSJ 2014). The continuation of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine contributed to the unified agreement among EU countries to

implement economic sanctions, as it was clear that dialogue with Russia has no fruitful results (MFA 2014, August 6).

The initial hesitation of Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia to impose economic sanctions on Russia has not been a direct result of different domestic energy situations (Table 3). As has been previously mentioned, the Netherlands' and Germany's hesitation for strong economic sanctions on Russia have been caused by a good interdependent economic relationship with Russia. What can be noticed though, is that these two countries are much less dependent on Russian gas than Poland and Slovakia, and that these countries' energy approach can be characterized by an M&I approach (Table 1). Important to note is that these countries' hesitation for economic sanctions did not mean that they were not willing to take a stance against Russia's actions in Ukraine. Both showed their willingness to cooperate within the EU to deter Russia from further actions, but they preferred diplomacy over economic sanctions when the crisis started (van der Togt 2015; Pond 2015).

Poland and Slovakia, even though both have an R&E approach and high dependence on Russian gas, have controversial preferences regarding the implementation of economic sanctions. Poland with its 80% dependency on Russian gas was one of the most important supporters for a unified EU policy that would impose economic sanctions on Russia. The relatively high dependency on Russia seemed no reason for Poland to be reluctant to impose economic sanctions, as no reference to the danger of energy countermeasure by Russia have been made by Polish politicians (Table 1; Fuksiewicz 2015). Slovakia, on the other hand, has a 100% dependency on Russian gas, and has expressed that it was afraid for Russia's countermeasures that could affect Slovakia's energy security (Králiková and Gyárfásová 2015, 1). This major difference in the foreign policy preferences (Table 3) of these two relatively comparable countries, in terms of energy situation, cannot be ignored.

Overall, the 'we-feeling' among the EU countries in the case of the Ukraine crisis is very strong. The acceleration of unified agreement of EU countries to implement the economic sanctions due to the crash of flight MH17 was meant as a clear sign to Russia that the EU as a unified body condemned its actions in Ukraine and the escalation of the conflict (MFA 2014, August 6). This continuation of Russian aggression leads to more and heavier sanctions as it was clear to the EU countries that the initial sanctions did not deter Russia. It has to be clear to Russia that its behaviour is not accepted by all EU countries. Therefore, unified economic sanctions will be implemented by the EU (Füle 2014).

Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia have expressed the importance of a unified EU policy against Russia. These expressions illustrate the 'we-feeling' of these countries with the EU. Especially the violation of the EU norms creates this 'we-feeling' as every country condemns the violation of these EU norms and has valued these norms as very important (Table 3). This 'we-feeling' is very important for the functioning of the EU as a 'we-feeling' contributes to a higher trust level among EU countries. The fact that every country values the protection of EU norms as important is a significant factor that increases trust among the EU countries. Because the EU countries know that other countries would not commit actions that would harm the EU values, a trust relationship among these countries arises.

The acknowledgement of the Merkel that the Ukraine crisis can only be de-escalated by a unified European policy against Russia is an important statement. It signals the willingness of the Germans to transfer sovereignty to the EU in order to resolve the conflict. Additionally, the Polish Prime Minister Tusk has agreed with Merkel on this statement and promised Polish support for a unified EU policy on Russia (The Federal Government of Germany 2014, March 12). The Polish support for EU sanctions since the beginning of the crisis indicates that Poland has been willing to transfer sovereignty to the EU in order to have

a strong EU policy that could deter Russia. Slovakia has also supported the sanctions policy, because it recognised that its position in the EU could be worsened if it opposed the policy. Slovakia does not want to be the reason that creates division in the EU (Foy et al. 2014). This then would harm the trust relationship between Slovakia and the EU, which would have serious consequences for Slovakia's economic and energy interests (Kobzova 2015). Furthermore, President Kiska is very pro-EU and stated that the EU should protect the smaller countries from aggression of the larger countries, such as Russia (Foy et al. 2014).

Germany's agency articulation refers to the EU as the most important body to deal with Russia's behaviour (Merkel 2014). No national articulations have been made, which is according to Larsen's framework a clear indicator of a country's willingness to conduct foreign policy at the EU level. Also the Dutch minister of foreign affairs talks about the process that resulted in economic sanctions from an EU perspective. The agency articulation of the Dutch government refers solely to the EU or EU member-states, and has no expression of national agency articulation. This shows that the Netherlands feels connected with the EU and wants to act against Russia in cooperation with the EU. Moreover, expressions are made that the Dutch government is happy with the sanctions policy that the EU is executing. The Dutch government states that it will strictly execute the sanctions policy that has been agreed on at the EU level (MFA 2014, August 6). This shows that the Dutch government is willing to transfer its sovereignty to the EU, which will make the EU's sanction policy stronger. The willingness of these four countries to transfer sovereignty to the EU to strengthen the policy is a clear indicator of trust among the EU countries.

In conclusion, gas was not the most important factor that divided or united the preferences of the EU. Gas dependency cannot be concluded to be a factor of high importance that have impacted the preferences of the EU member-states, nor are the different gas situations an explanation for the initial divided preferences and later unified decision-making,



as the division was caused by economic preferences and the unification was highly influenced by the socialization of EU norms. Therefore, Hypotheses 1 and 2 can be disconfirmed. Hypothesis 3, on the other hand, can be confirmed as the analysis has shown that EU interests were a unifying factor that fostered the preferences of the EU countries for a unified policy at the EU level. The analysis has also shown that the continuation of Russian actions was an important factor that unified the EU countries, as the downing of flight MH17 was a crucial point for many countries to support economic sanctions. The EU countries shared the opinion that EU norms should be protected against external actors that violates them. The general support to protect EU norms created a 'we-feeling' among the EU countries which strengthened the trust relationship between them. The countries acknowledged the importance of a unified EU policy to protect its norms and were willing to transfer national sovereignty to the EU, so it could execute a strong policy that would harm the Russian Federation. Therefore, hypotheses 4a can be confirmed.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, in order to explain why the EU was able to adopt a unified sanctions policy during the Ukraine crisis, but could not decide on a unified policy for the EnU, the thesis has analysed 3 dimensions that have an influence on the decision-making process. The method of a structured, focused comparison, in combination with process-tracing has been valuable to analyse the research question. It has provided comparable results on which theoretical conclusion can be build. The analysis has illustrated that the external dimension plays an important role in the decision-making process of the EU. As Russia has threatened EU interests multiple times, the different EU interests that have to be protected in each case seem to be the key to the success or failure of unified decision-making at the EU. When these interests are of high importance for every EU member-state, threats to these interests by an external actor form an important reason for EU countries to adopt a unified decision-making.

A causal relationship can be observed between the external and EU dimension. When the interests are crucial to be protected and are threatened by an external actor, these interests are a unifying factor between EU countries and contributes to a trust relationship between them. As hypothesis 4a and 4b have been confirmed, imported interests created a trust relationship between EU countries which helped them to agree on a unified policy at the EU level. This was due to an increase in the 'we-feeling' among EU countries and their willingness to transfer sovereignty to the EU, to strengthen the impact of the policy. The absence of a unified agreement on the importance of energy security resulted in a lack of trust among EU countries in the EnU case. The lack of trust caused that countries preferred national decision-making about energy issues over unified decision-making at the EU. This is due to the fact that EU countries have to give up national sovereignty which makes them vulnerable. When countries do not trust each other, sovereignty will be kept at the national level in order to protect domestic interests.

When there is no unanimous support for the EU interests at stake, which is the case with energy interests that should be protected in the EnU case, the national dimension explains the difficulties for achieving a unified policy. As can be seen in tables 1 and 2, these 4 EU member-states have very divergent priorities which none of them is willing to compromise on. It is clear, that when agreements have to be made with 28 member-states, it is almost impossible to reach agreement on a unified energy policy when the interests are not of high importance to everyone. This can be explained by the Markets & Institutions approach and Regions & Empires approach, which cannot be unified because of the competing interests. Thus, to understand the variety in the DV in the case of the EnU and the sanctions on Russia, the content of the EU interests at stake play a crucial role. When the interests are of high importance to every country, these are willing to give up national priorities, which are different due to different domestic energy situations. Moreover, it is important that EU countries invest in a trust relationship when a unified decision is preferred to be made. The external dimension in combination with the EU dimension then is best able to explain the variation of national or unified decision-making at the EU level for these two cases.

This research has important theoretical implications. The thesis has contributed to the applicability of Larsen's framework to analyse the differences in the DV. Larsen's levels of analysis, the national and EU level, have been very important to explain this variance. However, the framework underestimates the importance of the external dimension and the effect of Europeanization to EU interests that have to be protected in times of crisis. The thesis illustrate that an analysis of this dimension is essential to analyse the outcome of decision-making processes at the EU. To test the importance of the external dimension to the decision-making process of the EU, further research can be recommended. It is important that the decision-making processes of other cases in which EU norms are at stake will be analysed, to test if a threat to these norms leads to unified-decision making at the EU. This can be done

by a quantitative research of cases in which EU norms are threatened, but can also be done by qualitative and comparable case studies in which different outcomes of the DV of this thesis exist.

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## Appendix

Table 1: Energy situation per country in 2012<sup>3</sup>

	Gas demand	Import dependency	Future gas demand	Import energy source	Infrastructure/suppliers	Russia dependency	Emergency measures	Dominant gas sector	Domestic production	LNG back-up
<b>Germany</b>	87000 mcm/y	85.9%	decline	Oil/ gas	diversified	36%	partly	Residential	A little	little
<b>Netherlands</b>	46000 mcm/y	-74.3%	increase	Gas/ oil	diversified	11%	yes	Residential, industry, commercial	Much, but decline in future	yes
<b>Poland</b>	18000 mcm/y	65.8%	increase	coal	limited	80%	yes	Industry, residential	A little	yes
<b>Slovakia</b>	5000 mcm/y	97.2%	increase	Gas/ nuclear	limited	100%	Yes, strict	Transformation, industry, residential	Almost nothing, decline in future	no

Data collected from: IEA. (2014). Energy supply security: Emergency response of IEA countries 2014. *International Energy Agency*. Paris.

<sup>3</sup> The decision to compare the energy data of the year 2012 instead of 2014 is made because energy data from 2014 was incomplete or sometimes not available. The analysis of the IEA has shown that the data for years after 2012 will not change drastically. The IEA has a complete dataset of 2012, which contributes to a good data comparison of these countries.

**Table 2: Perspectives per country on the Energy Union**

	Supports idea of energy union	Focus	climate	Diversification of	Joint purchasing	Transparency of contracts	Ukraine crisis threats energy security
<b>Germany</b>	Yes	Market, climate	Highest priority	resources	No	No	no
<b>Netherlands</b>	Yes	Market, climate	Important, high priority	Routes, resources, suppliers	No	No	partly
<b>Poland</b>	Yes	Energy security	Important, but no priority	Suppliers, routes	yes	Yes	yes
<b>Slovakia</b>	Yes	Energy security	Important, small priority	Suppliers, routes	no	yes	yes

Data collected from: Lada et al. (2015), Szulecki et al. (2016), Ministry of Economic Affairs (2015), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015), Tusk (2014), Duleba (2015), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014, April 8).

Table 3: Position per country to Russian acts and sanction policy

	Immediate support for economic sanctions	Support for EU action against Russia	Initial preference for EU action	Hesitation based on	Violation of EU norms by Russia	Perceived military threat of Russia
<b>Germany</b>	No	Yes	Negotiation	Economic relationship with Russia	Unacceptable	No
<b>The Netherlands</b>	No	Yes	Negotiation	Economic relationship with Russia	Unacceptable	No
<b>Poland</b>	Yes	Yes	Sanctions	-	Unacceptable	Yes
<b>Slovakia</b>	No	Yes	Negotiation	Gas relationship and economic relationship with Russia	Unacceptable	No

Data collected from: Schult et al. (2014), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014, March 7), Pond (2015), Králiková and Gyárfásová (2015), Szulecki et al. (2016), Fuksiewicz (2015), Kucharczyk et al. (2015), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014, March 2), Szabo (2014), Kobzova (2015)

# Unified or national policy-making? An analysis of EU decision-making processes of the Energy Union and the EU sanctions on Russia

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## GRADEMARK REPORT

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GENERAL COMMENTS

**Instructor**

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