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U.S. Iraq Policy: Competing Grand Strategies?

A comparison between the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations

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Introduction

'As simple as ABC'

Anything But Clinton. That is how George W. Bush's agenda was described right after he came into office in January 2001 as the 43th president of the United States of America (Poppe I). By that time, Bush had already openly criticized his predecessor on several fronts, of which the most notable was Clinton's strategy of containment towards 'rogue' state Iraq. Saddam Hussein and his dictatorial regime had posed a challenge for several administrations already, as the leader defied multiple UN resolutions regarding weapons inspections, and ran biological and nuclear weapons programs on a large scale (Dunn 291). There is not one specific and fixed method that guarantees success when dealing with such a regime. There exists a wide range of different tools and instruments that can be deployed to confront a state that does not conform to the international norms. Different policy options have been taken by different presidents and their administrations, and in the case of Iraq, president Bush and his administration seemed very willing to take a different course of action compared to his predecessor. The decision to invade the country in 2003 showed indeed an abandonment of the strategy of containment, since the administration actively enforced regime change. But does this make Bush really as simple as ABC? Were Clinton and Bush really that different when it comes to their Iraq policy? It was Clinton who put his signature under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, that stated that it should be U.S. policy to support regime change in Iraq (Katzman 5).

This leads to the central question that will be addressed in this thesis: To what extent is there a continuity in the grand strategies of presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton with regards to their policy on Iraq? To answer this question, it is key to analyze and understand the grand strategies of both presidents. For the sake of clarity, grand strategy here is defined as a collection of plans and policies that comprise the state's deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state's national interest (Feaver). The term grand strategy and doctrine are often used interchangeably, while Dumbrell explains that this is not always correct as

doctrines do not always involve into a grand strategy (44, 45). However, the most common definition of a doctrine is "a set of prescriptions that specify how tools should be employed in the service of strategy and that serve as a guide to decision making" (Dumbrell 44). Keeping that in mind, it seems not problematic to use these terms interchangeably in this essay, as both are used here to describe foreign policy ideas and strategies. It is not always clear from the outset what an administration's intended objective is, and it is not seldom seen that strategies are still being formed during terms of office. Often, academics only figure out the doctrine after a president resigns and passes the baton to his successor. Also, grand strategies are not only influenced by merely rational variables, such as threats or resources, but also by personal ideas or beliefs. Furthermore, presidents themselves can be influenced by these ideas and beliefs of others, and it would be impossible to identify exactly whose ideas influenced who and whether or not the ideas were already present. Keep in mind here that a president never decides completely on his own, he has his administration that backs him and consults him. Key officials and foreign policy advisors in the Clinton administrations were Secretaries of State Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright and National Security Advisors Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger. For the Bush administration, key advisors and officials were National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Vice-President Dick Cheney.

By looking at speeches and official documents published and released by or on behalf of the president and his administration, one is able to get an insight in the grand strategy of a president. Many scholars have already done this, and tried to identify and interpret key components in both Clinton's and Bush's policy making that together form their foreign policy doctrine. It is therefore that this essay draws upon secondary sources. It is particularly useful to look for scholars that analyzed both administration's official National Security Strategy (NSS) documents, which are published annually. The NSS is naturally concerned with the national security issues of the United States and how to deal with them. Iraq was a major one. Thus, examining NSS documents can provide a better insight in how the grand strategies of Clinton and Bush are related to and reflected in their Iraq policies.

Gaddis wrote an article that is of specific interest to this research, as he indeed compared the NSS documents of Clinton and Bush. Note here that this has been done in 2002, so before the actual

invasion of Iraq. Now, more than a decade later, it is useful to look back at this comparison and put it into a new perspective with newly acquired knowledge. Gaddis detected several 'innovations' in the 2002 NSS of Bush. Moreover, he found that the NSS of Bush was in general more pro-active and achieved a coherence that the Clinton administration never did (Gaddis 51-54).

With regards to what scholars have written about Clinton's foreign policy approach, Donnelly and Perry et al. both typecast it as predominantly defensive. The Clinton administration seemed interested in keeping the status quo with Iraq and a strategy of containment would be the best way to achieve this. As well as Brinkley, they explain this by looking at the "roots of the Clinton doctrine", which is according to them concerned with the economy and the enlargement of it. Donnelly also points out that even after the administration acknowledged that regime change was the best option for Iraq, they were still refusing to act directly. In general, many scholars agree that Clinton favored a multilateralist approach and liked the ideals of international cooperation, sustainable development, and collective security (Donnelly 10, 14). Brinkley even argues that 'democratic enlargement' is the title of the Clinton doctrine, as he and his administration were primarily concerned with the enlargement of democracy, freedom, and free markets, which indicates his passion for the economy again (111). Even though Dumbrell acknowledges the emphasis put on this concept of 'democratic enlargement', he does not agree with Brinkley about how the Clinton doctrine is best described. He would rather see it as a warning to 'rogue states', a concept used by Clinton to define 'outlaw' states, under which among other Iraq. Rogue states posed a threat to the democratic 'family of nations', presumably led by the United States (Dumbrell 54). Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor of Clinton, elaborates in particular upon the strategy of containment, and calls Clinton's approach one of 'dual containment'. This entails maintaining a favorable balance with their regional allies in the Middle East without relying on either Iran or Iraq. Lake argues that the Clinton administration was able to do this as it had several advantages that previous administrations did not have, for instance the ending of the Cold War. His contribution to the body of literature is that his identified advantages help in understanding the strategic choice for containment, and thus why Clinton did not opt for the use of force (Lake 46-49).

A different group of authors, to which Bacevich belongs, do see Clinton as more assertive than how others have described him. Bacevich even argues that U.S. foreign policy militarized under

Clinton. He agrees with other academics that the president seemed to disdain the use of force in his early days. However, he states that force has become the preferred instrument of American statecraft, especially after the in 1998 resumed hostilities with Iraq. Even though Clinton might not have been eager to use the military, he was a successful commander-in-chief according to Bacevich (5-7). While most authors do not clearly express their opinion on the strategy, Rouleau is very skeptical and critical about Clinton's strategy. The international sanctions posed on the regime harm the innocent Iraqis more than the regime itself, he argues (62, 63). Obviously, it is also of great importance to know what already has been written on the 'Bush Doctrine'. Note that scholars have looked at it with the intention of explaining the Iraq invasion, while at the same time the invasion itself can be seen as a key component and determiner of Bush's grand strategy. It is intertwined and thus works both ways. There is a vast group of scholars who detect a shift in U.S. grand strategy after Bush came into office. They see, among other, a president who is willing to act unilateral, and who does not see containing and deterring Saddam as sufficient. Differences within this group exist as to what they view as the main cause for this shift. Many scholars, like Miller, put an emphasis on the importance of 9/11, where others such as Flibbert regard personal ideas and beliefs as the main drivers for choosing a specific course of action. Specifically the ideas of neoconservatives have played a key role in influencing both administrations. This is especially true for the Bush administration, as many of its key officials were leading neoconservatives. This has been acknowledged and reflected upon by many scholars, including Miller, Monten, Flibbert, and Schmidt and Williams.

The Iraq invasion was highly controversial and there are several scholars who are skeptical towards the sincerity of the Bush administration. Everest and Kellner both accuse the administration of having a hidden agenda that pursued oil interests and even imperialism. However, most scholars disagree and believe that it was genuine in its beliefs.

In order to answer the central question of this thesis, it is necessary to understand the grand foreign policy visions or doctrines of both presidents and subsequently how this relates to and is reflected in their Iraq policy. Chapter I and II will discuss this for the Clinton and Bush administration respectively. In chapter III, a comparison will be made between the two administrations and their Iraq policy to find discontinuities and/or continuities. It is also in this chapter that the importance of 9/11

will be discussed with regards to whether that day was a 'game changer' or rather a 'window of opportunity' for the Bush administration in terms of overall strategy towards Iraq. In the academic world, different opinions exist on this matter and even though the main research question of this thesis does not directly address this debate, it helps to provide a new insight. This is because the found continuities in Clinton and Bush's Iraq policy give reason to argue that 9/11 proved to be a window of opportunity. It also works the other way around. If a continuity or discontinuity is found, it is important to understand what role 9/11 played in this and whether or not it contributed to this continuity or discontinuity. Thus, even though it might not seem like it at first glance, the central question of this thesis and the discussion on whether or not 9/11 changed everything are closely related to each other in this case. Furthermore, the Iraq policy of Bush is an ever returning aspect when reading through the literature that has been written on him and his strategy. This is not the case for Clinton. Therefore, this thesis aims to fill that gap to a significant extent as it not only combines and compares the grand strategies of Clinton and Bush, but also compares them in relation to the policy on Iraq. The comparison contributes to a deeper understanding of why Iraq was invaded, as it becomes clear that the Bush administration built on ideas that were also existing in the Clinton administration.

Chapter I: Clinton and Democratic Enlargement

Each president has to deal with many issues, both domestic and international ones. It is in the interest of this thesis to focus on how both presidents have managed the international (security) problems by means of a foreign policy strategy. Obviously, Iraq was such a concern. This chapter will discuss how the Clinton administration attempted to deal with Saddam by looking at its adopted strategy towards Iraq. This will be done after the broader vision of the Clinton administration's foreign policy doctrine has been analyzed, as this contributes to a deeper understanding of why a specific course of action was taken.

For a long time, it has not been clear what the foreign policy doctrine of Clinton entailed exactly. In the beginning of his presidency in 1993, Clinton even expressed a firm disinterest in international relations and foreign policy. Instead, he wanted to 'focus like a laser beam on the economy' and made it absolutely clear that U.S. economic interests would attain a high priority as long as he was in power (Donnelly 10; Brinkley 113). Clinton's initial disinterest and difficulty to formulate a coherent foreign policy strategy should be put in a broader context. The Cold War had just ended, and the U.S. had never experienced so much power before. It had become a superpower economically, politically, military, and even culturally. As Walt explains, this led to a paradoxical implication for the conduct of foreign policy; 'the paradox of unipolarity'. There is less to gain on the international stage if one is already at the top. Moreover, there were no significant enemies anymore. Hence, the U.S. simply did not face an imminent geopolitical challenge anymore, like it did during the Cold War. The paradox here is thus that the U.S. has an unprecedented level of power, but was not sure what to do with it. In addition, this decrease in international stakes worked against any clear articulation of a new grand strategy (Walt 64, 65; Dumbrell 46).

Eventually, Clinton understood that the international community did demand global leadership from the United States, and great foreign policy meant forming a clear grand strategy. In September 1993, Lake brought up the term 'democratic enlargement' and started working on a foreign policy blueprint for the years to come. The administration announced early on in its first term that democracy

promotion would be a key integrating principle of his foreign policy, next to economic development and national security. The concept of democratic enlargement had a strong identification between democracy and markets, and Lake stated that the world's free community of market democracies should be enlarged. It becomes evident that democratization, free market expansion, and economic prosperity lay at the roots of the Clinton administration's foreign policy ideas, as all four points of the blueprint focus on these concepts and the promotion of them (Brinkley 114, 116). Democracy promotion continued to be a central aspect of Clinton's doctrine, as he identified the pursuit of human rights, democracy, and 'freedom' as key to U.S. internationalism several years later, in 1999 (Brinkley 114, 116; Dumbrell 46, 49; Rieffer and Mercer 390,391).

The expansion of democracy and its accompanying vast and free markets was to be achieved multilaterally. As Donnelly describes, "the Clinton administration was animated by the lofty ideals of international cooperation, sustainable development, and collective security" (10). With regards to international security and stability, speeches given by president Clinton during the first eight months of his term on his administration's foreign policy also made clear that he was a proponent of multilateralism. He declared to be willing to calm the international landscape, but only if the United Nations or NATO stood on his side (Bacevich 9; Brinkley 112, 113).

Given his enthusiasm for the economy and multilateralism, Clinton proved to be a real liberal Democrat. This also meant that any enthusiasm for the military and the use of force was hard to find. Peace is in the best interest of everyone, Clinton believed, and the preferred strategy of keeping it would be containment (Walt 67). Bacevich identified, in terms of views on the use of force, some key components of what he sees as the 'Clinton doctrine'; a priority assigned to avoiding casualties, the emphasis of holding collateral damage to a minimum, and the expectation that the very prospect of the use of American military force will deter or persuade enemies (6). Thus, a distaste for the expansion of the military, and the actual direct use of it, is clear. As Clinton himself said: "We have learned that the world works better when differences are resolved by force of argument rather than force of arms" (qtd. in Donnelly 10).

A strategy of containment was thus regarded as the best option for ensuring peace in general, according to the Clinton administration's foreign policy vision. The confidence in the effectiveness of deterrence was prominent. This is clearly reflected in Clinton's Iraq policy. Shortly after coming into power, the administration announced a policy of 'dual containment' towards 'rogue state' Iraq. The logic of 'dual containment', as explained by Clinton's National Security Advisor Lake, was to maintain a favorable balance with regional allies, those being Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, without depending on either Iran or Iraq. Both states needed to be contained. Lake elaborates on why this approach seemed suitable in an article published in 'Foreign Affairs' in 1994. He explains that the Clinton administration had several advantages that its predecessors did not have. The end of the Cold War meant that the strategic importance of Iran and Iraq had decreased massively, which made them unable to play the United States and the Soviet Union off against each other. Secondly, Iraq's defeat in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 reduced its military capabilities and brought its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) under tight control. Hence, the country experienced more difficulties in challenging the United States as a superpower. Furthermore, the Gulf Cooperation Council states were more willing to enter into security arrangements with Washington after Iraq invaded Kuwait. And finally, in line with the third advantage, ties with regional allies have been strengthened (Lake 48, 49; Perry et al. 23).

But what did this strategy of containment entail practically? One aspect was imposing sanctions, which were predominantly economic, on the Iraqi regime in a multilateral way. Throughout the Clinton administration's time in power, the U.N. Security Council continued imposing sanctions that were already inflicted during the Bush senior administration. Its initial purpose was to compel Iraq to withdraw out of Kuwait, which it had invaded in 1990, and later to eliminate the development of WMD. In addition, no-fly zones were enforced and an internationally approved resolution put an arms embargo on Iraq in place. The Clinton administration was keen on maintaining these sanctions, as it concluded halfway through its term that this was the best strategy to contain Saddam. Even though the sanctions have been criticized for having disastrous implications for the Iraqi population, they have been successful in terms of diminishing revenue for Saddam and thus indirectly blocking the import of vital materials and technologies for producing WMD. Also, the arms embargo eroded much

of Iraq's military capabilities. An additional positive effect of these sanctions was that Saddam felt compelled to accept weapon inspections of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which started its first inspections already in 1991 (Brown 79, 80; Lopez and Cortright 91; Perry et al. 20, 21, 23).

During Clinton's time in office, there occurred some specific incidents concerning Iraq that demanded the administration's immediate attention. Already in 1993, a plot to assassinate former U.S. president Bush senior was uncovered by the Kuwaiti government. Washington reacted by firing Tomahawk missiles at an Iraqi intelligence agency. In 1994, Saddam deployed Iraqi troops near the Kuwaiti border. Clinton's answer to this provocation was purely defensive, as he increased troop strength in the Persian Gulf with the aim of deterring Saddam. This reinforcement operation was called 'Operation Vigilant Warrior'. Then, in 1998, Saddam defied the U.N. resolution when UNSCOM inspectors were forced out of Iraq. This led to another round of missiles ordered by the Clinton administration in the form of 'Operation Desert Fox', the largest one of all (Donnelly 10-12; Perry et al. 22-24). Although these actions could be interpreted symbolically, it showed first and foremost that the Clinton administration was reluctant to move directly against Saddam. By sending missiles instead of soldiers, the administration looked passive in the face of terrorism rather than determined (Donnelly 11, 12; Boot 2). Clinton's aforementioned distaste of the direct use of military force is clearly visible in his Iraq policy, as well as his belief in deterrence given operation 'Vigilant Warrior'.

Even though containment is the most fitting concept to describe Clinton's foreign policy on Iraq and also in general, it is possible to identify a slight change throughout the years. During both terms in office, Saddam defied and disappointed the international community time and time again. He flaunted their will by ignoring and not complying to several U.N. resolutions. Moreover, in 1994, it turned out that the UNSCOM had been misled by the Iraqi regime, meaning that Iraq had manufactured nerve agent and that its biological warfare program was much more comprehensive and advanced than the inspectors had imagined. Also, the UNSCOM's final report in January 1999 stated that they could not guarantee that Iraq did no longer possess WMD, or capabilities to develop them. Thus, several facts became clear during Clinton's second term, which could not be ignored: Saddam's

unwillingness to comply with U.N. resolutions, Saddam's provocations by repeatedly moving to the brink of war, Saddam's ongoing pursuit in acquiring WMD, and Saddam's mistreatment of his own people (Donnelly 12; Perry et al. 20, 22). These observations led the administration to think about whether or not it would be better to have Saddam gone.

The accumulation of these incidents, and especially Saddam's obstruction of weapon inspections, were reason for the Clinton administration to eventually declare the need for regime change in Iraq. It now seemed the best practical solution to the problem. Clinton put his signature under the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) in 1998, which stated that it should be the formal policy of the U.S. to support regime change. It was a clear indication of Congressional support for a more robust effort to overthrow Saddam (Donnelly 14, 31; Katzman 5). Practically, it encompassed a reinforcement of support for Iraqi groups opposing Saddam's regime. The ILA gave Clinton the authority to spend $97 million on training and 'non-lethal' defense equipment. By supporting opposition groups, the administration hoped to set off an insurgency in Iraq itself. It had also supported the opposition earlier, but abandoned that policy after serious setbacks in 1996. The Iraqi National Congress (INC), which was formed as an umbrella opposition group in Iraq, became the main vehicle for U.S. support. The INC appeared the most viable, as it represented multiple Iraqi ethnicities and political ideologies (Perry et al. 25; Katzman 4, 5).

Although the signing of the ILA demonstrated the administration's realization that the situation with Iraq was no longer sustainable, the act did not mention the use of direct force. Again, the administration showed an unwillingness to act military. There were other distractions such as the war in Kosovo, and Clinton's presidential legacy would not be another messy invasion (Donnelly 14, 15).

Deterring, sanctioning, and a mild use of non-direct force were the components that together formed the Clinton administration's foreign policy strategy of containment. Over the years, a shift from idealism to realpolitik within the Clinton administration is notable with regards to Iraq, caused by the continuous disregards of U.N. resolutions and provocations of Saddam (Walt 78). The ILA gave the administration the opportunity to financially support opposition groups, of which the most prominent

was the INC, with the purpose of promoting a rebellion in Iraq itself. The choice for containment is explainable in the light of Clinton's general foreign policy doctrine, and the post- Cold War times in which he was president. Being a liberal Democrat, his personal beliefs made him focus on the economy and internationally on the expansion of free markets and democracy. Multilateralism was the way to go about international affairs, and the use of direct military force did not fit into his doctrine.

Chapter II: Bush, 9/11, and Neoconservatism

Now that Clinton's policy towards Iraq has been identified and explained, it is time to do the same for Bush and his administration. Each president has its own challenges to overcome, its own crises to deal with, and therefore each presidency is different. In the case of Bush, this crisis was without a doubt 9/11. The importance of the events that happened on this day cannot be ignored, nor can the consequences. There is a general consensus among scholars that 9/11 had a significant influence on Bush's strategy towards Iraq. It is of great importance to realize and keep in mind that his Iraq policy is simultaneously seen as a key manifestation of the 'Bush Doctrine', as well as an element standing on its own that contributed to shaping the doctrine itself (Jervis 365). This is because 9/11 already happened after president Bush's first eight months in office. Policy formation and the creation of a grand strategy or doctrine were then still in progress.

The 'Bush Doctrine' has been discussed thoroughly by many scholars. It is widely acknowledged that strong neoconservative ideas were held within the Bush administration and that these ideas have influenced the administration's foreign policy strategy in general, and also towards Iraq. Neoconservatism as a concept constantly recurs in the literature to describe the administration's political ideas and values. The neoconservative vision underpinned the policy content of the Bush doctrine that eventually led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (McGlinchey 12; Miller 54; Schmidt and Williams 194).

But what exactly were these neoconservative ideas and values? Firstly, the Bush administration had a more traditional view on international relations compared to the Clinton administration. According to this view, foreign policy serves as the management of threats to U.S. national security (Dunn 283). In efforts of doing so, it relied heavily on hard power instruments, as Bush and his key officials had a great confidence in the efficiency of military force. There was a firm willingness to fight. Instead of seeing the use of force as a last resort or even defeat as Clinton had done, it was seen as a useful means to an end by the Bush administration. The U.S. had often used

coercive diplomacy before and successful military interventions, such as in Kosovo, led to an increase in America's estimation of the utility of force (Dunn 286; Flibbert 343; McGlinchey 22).

It is of great importance to understand that this confidence in military force is closely related to another tenet of neoconservatism. The Bush administration embraced the new status of the U.S. as a global hegemon, which it had become after the Cold War. This also meant that its military capabilities were superior in comparison to other countries. Neoconservative views hold that a unipolar international system and the global imbalance that comes from it, do not pose a threat to the international order. Rather, American hegemony and leadership is necessary and will contribute to peace and stability (Schmidt and Williams 195). The use of power, including military force, gets in this sense a social function. The Bush administration deemed itself a benevolent hegemon with unequaled power, and with that power came responsibilities, obligations, and opportunities (Flibbert 331). This perception of being necessary and taking up leadership is also detected by Gaddis, who examined Bush's rhetoric in the 2002 NSS document. The administration believed that as long as the superpower is a benign one, other states will prefer the management of the international system by one single hegemon. On top of that comes the belief that U.S. hegemony is acceptable because it has norms and values that are universal, and accepted by all other states (Gaddis 52). Thus, a strong sense of morality prevailed within the Bush administration. McGlinchey also sees this as an important characteristic of neoconservatism, as it "holds the domestic and international sphere to a clear moral and ideological standard and champions the use of militarism to further that standard globally" (22).

An extremely important example of this moral standard is the notion of democracy promotion. Jervis, Miller, and Flibbert all identify democracy promotion as a key pillar of the Bush Doctrine. The NSS of 2002 starts by stating that the twentieth century's struggles ended in the victory of freedom and that therefore a model of freedom, democracy, and free enterprise guarantees national success. Gaddis even states that Bush's ultimate goal was to spread democracy everywhere (Jervis 366; 53).

The final essential characteristic of the Bush administration is its willingness to act unilaterally if necessary. The administration was convinced that pursuing its interests could best be done via unilateral strategies and as Dunn describes: "Unilateralism, (…), was the unifying theme across many of the foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the new [Bush] administration" (283). The Bush

administration was determined not to let multilateral coalitions constrain its freedom of action. The disastrous events that took place on 9/11 showed that security dangers were real and acute, and the U.S. should not be hindered by international organizations and their approval; it should be ready to act unilaterally in the face of (in)direct threats. It was able to do so because of the opportunities that came with its status as superpower (Dunn 283; Miller 46).

When it comes to analyzing the Bush administration's Iraq policy, it is of great important to reflect upon the significance of 9/11. The sudden attacks showed that even the U.S. was vulnerable to outside threats. Not only did it transform the way Americans thought about foreign policy, it also transformed president Bush and his closest advisors' thinking. It suddenly became necessary to address potential threats and the administration realized that a strategy of containment and deterrence was no longer sufficient; it does not work against terrorists, proved by 9/11 itself. (O'Hanlon et al. 1; Wirtz and Russell 113, 116).

A change in policy was thus necessary, and the administration came up with a strategy of preemption and 'preventive attack'. The 2002 NSS focused on this concept and showed that the Bush administration had broadened it. It was no longer "limited to the traditional definition of preemption – striking an enemy as it prepares an attack – but also includes prevention – striking an enemy even in the absence of a specific evidence of a coming attack (O'Hanlon et al. 3).

In March 2003, Bush gave the order to invade Iraq, resulting in the successful overthrow of Saddam and his regime. The invasion was a perfect execution of the administration's strategy of preemption as the main justifications for it were the suspicions that Saddam was in possession of WMD, and that he had ties with terrorist organization Al Qaeda, who had been responsible for the attacks on 9/11 (Flibbert 316). There was no reason to assume that Saddam was actually planning an attack against the U.S., but the fact that Iraq was threatening in general seemed to provide enough grounds for pursuing regime change by the use of force. Obviously, the expansion of the concept of preemption to one of preventive war served to legitimate this idea.

Thus, Bush and his administration were adapting and responding to a changed threat environment by remodeling and adjusting its doctrine and military capabilities to face the new threats

that challenged the U.S. (Wirtz and Russell 116). This is completely in line with the model of scholar Miller, which explains shifts in U.S. grand strategies with respect to national security. He emphasizes the importance of the international material environment, as it functions as the 'selector' of ideas and the accompanying security strategy. The two variables are the distribution of power in the international system and the level of external threat. The four possible strategies are defensive or offensive realism, and defensive or offensive liberalism. Miller detects a shift from defensive liberalism to offensive liberalism, which has been translated into a shift from containment to preemption in terms of policy adoption. The U.S. became hegemonic after the Cold War, which caused the adoption of a liberal approach. However, 9/11 meant an increased external threat and led to offensive liberalism. Offensive liberalism puts an emphasis on regime change through the use of force. Needless to say, the invasion of Iraq is a key manifestation of this liberal approach. Both Miller and Jervis also state that this policy adoption appeared the most fit after 9/11, as other strategies did not offer a an effective response to this type of threat. The strategy of containment and deterrence was not sufficient for dealing with terrorists and 'rogue states' such as Iraq, since they are risk-acceptant and prone to accident (Miller 26, 29, 34, 49, 53; Jervis 369). Also, with regards to the distribution of power, the notion of American benevolent hegemony can be seen implicitly in the choice for extending the concept of preemption. From this standpoint, a hegemonic America "was entitled to defend its primacy from both latent threats and open acts of defiance" (Flibbert 332).

As identified earlier in this chapter, the Bush administration was characterized by assertive unilateralism. Miller argues that the shift from a multilateral to a unilateral approach became most visible in the Iraq invasion. The prewar debate showed that the administration was willing to ignore the U.N. Security Council and other major allies, as it was ready to enforce regime change with or without the endorsement of the international community (Miller 46). This is reflected in Bush's rhetoric in the period between 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. In public speeches right after 9/11, he asked the world to 'join them', indicating that the U.S. was the leader and deciding strategies on its own terms. The phrase "you are either with us or you are with the terrorists" also demonstrates that the U.S. is standing on its own in its fight against the enemy (qtd. in Dunn 283). Bush also appears to have said in private meetings that he did not want or need the consent of other nations, especially not if they

were going to set conditions for that. Washington sought its own solutions to its own security problems, in the form of a strategy of preemption (Dunn 283). Jervis elaborates on the link between unilateralism and this specific policy adoption. If approached multilaterally, it is hard to get consensus this type of strong actions – the use of direct military force. Therefore, other countries are reluctant and more than willing to let the superpower carry the burden (Jervis 373, 374).

In conclusion, we have seen that the Bush administration opted for a different strategy towards Iraq than the Clinton administration; namely one of preemption. Containment and deterrence were no longer viable options. Multiple authors such as Wirtz and Russel, and O'Hanlon et al. agree that this change is explainable by looking at 9/11. It increased the level of external threat to the U.S. and forced the administration to think about ways to remove threats to the national security. One can conclude that the impact of 9/11 on U.S. Iraq policy was important and should not be underestimated. However, neoconservative ideas have also impacted the decision making process and the administration's perspective. The ideas, pillars, or drivers on which the Bush Doctrine is based, according to Flibbert, Jervis and Dunn, also play a role in shaping the administration's vision on the conduct of foreign policy and the international system. The Bush administration had the perception that the U.S. had certain duties because of its hegemonic role in the international order. Peace and stability require the U.S. to take up active leadership. Especially when U.S. security interests are at stake, this should be done unilaterally. This is in line with the administration's traditional view on managing threats (Dunn 291; Jervis 376). Another significant characteristic of the Bush administration, was that it promoted regime change and democracy promotion by the use of military force. The great confidence in the efficacy of the military is an explanation for this. The use of force was not eschewed, which is understandable given the neoconservative character of the Bush administration. It is of great importance to understand that both changes in the external environment and the neoconservative nature of the administration led to the policy adoption of preemptive war. These factors were intertwined and influenced each other significantly.

Chapter III : Only Discontinuities?

The previous chapters have discussed and analyzed the Clinton administration and Bush administration respectively with regards to their Iraq policy. The next logical step is comparing the two. Iraq has been on the U.S.' agenda for more than a decade and had proved to be a long term challenge that concerned more than one administration. It is therefore interesting to examine how the policy towards Iraq has changed – or how it has not changed. Are there predominantly discontinuities, or can one also detect a consistency in both Clinton's and Bush's 'grand' strategy on Iraq? As has already been discussed, the events on 9/11 were extremely significant. They influenced or even shaped the Bush doctrine to a large extent. It is therefore of great importance that the pre-9/11 policy approach of the Bush administration is reflected upon when looking for possible continuities.

When comparing Clinton, Bush, their overall foreign policy ideas, and their ensuing Iraq policies, it is not difficult to see primarily differences rather than similarities. At first sight, one might wonder if there are any continuities at all. The mere fact that Clinton is a liberal Democrat and Bush a Republican, heavily influenced by neoconservative ideas, gives reason to think that the two approach matters completely different. And naturally, personal ideas and beliefs of presidents themselves and their key officials do have an impact on how policies are crafted.

A clear example of this is the difference in how the military and the use of hard power is viewed. Where Clinton expressed a certain disdain for the direct use of military force, Bush and his administration put great confidence in its efficacy. Where Clinton would only deploy ground troops as an ultimate last resort, Bush would see it as an effective means to an end, especially if U.S. interests were acutely in danger and at stake. Another point in which the Clinton and Bush administrations are different, is the way in which they approach international problems. Clinton was an advocate of multilateralism, as he valued collaboration. In contrast, Bush and his foreign policy analysts sharply criticized the Clinton administration for its mushy multilateralism and military weakness (Donnelly 15). Right from the start, and thus already before 9/11, the Bush administration rejected the Clintonian

premise that geo-economics was at that time more important than geopolitics (Dunn 283).

In general, Gaddis finds that Bush's national security strategy is more pro-active than the one crafted by Clinton and his national security team. Clinton solely attempts to 'enlarge' or 'engage' in democratic developments and the spread of market economics, as he and his administration assumed that these movements are irreversible and inherent to the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, the Bush Doctrine forms a more coherent and interconnected strategy, which is something that the Clinton administration never achieved according to both Gaddis and Dunn (53; 283). In addition, Bush criticized already from the outset the previous administration for not having formed clear priorities and a sense of what was important to U.S. interests (Dunn 283).

Also, differences in the external environment affect policy outcomes as well. As Miller said, it functions as the 'selector' of ideas (29). External factors change, which makes each presidency different. Clinton's environment was one in which he had to deal with the lack of a clear enemy, and accepting the role of the U.S. as an unparalleled hegemon. Bush on the contrary had an enemy, though not precisely clear. Terrorists raised the (perceived) threat level to the U.S. and Bush sought for a way to respond to it. Monten states here that "power and ideas are not mutually exclusive explanations, but interact to produce foreign policy outcomes of interest" (116).

Chapter II already showed that 9/11 had a significant impact on the decision making process of the Bush administration regarding Iraq. It contributed to the choice for invading Iraq by use of direct military force. According to the Bush administration, threats should be removed before they become imminent. Thus, 9/11 helped in adopting the strategy of 'preemptive attack', which is by many scholars seen as a key feature of the Bush Doctrine. One might say that 9/11 practically marks the beginning of the notorious Bush Doctrine. Not to say that this is not correct, but 9/11 was not the day that the Bush administration came into office, and what happened in terms of Iraq policy before 9/11 is now being ignored.

Despite the harsh criticism of Bush on Clinton, the initial steps taken by his administration continued many of the policies developed by its predecessors. It continued the sanctions already imposed on Iraq, but revised some of them. State Secretary Colin Powell called for 'smart sanctions'

that would better target Iraq's efforts to rebuild its military and WMD (Perry et al. 24; Donnelly 16). Furthermore, a change was made in the engagement rules of the no-fly zones. The new rules would allow activities that were banned previously under U.N. resolutions. For example, strikes were no longer limited to only air defense targets. Note here that this demonstrates the administration's taste for unilateralism, as Powell stated that the U.S. reserved the right to take military action if facilities or ongoing activities were found that were inconsistent with their U.N. obligations (Perry et al. 24, 25). Lastly, one can also find a continuity in the strategy of supporting the Iraqi opposition as the Bush administration expanded and enhanced ties with the INC and others. Thus, prior to 9/11, the policy of containment was continued and even strengthened (Katzman 7, 8).

However, Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense at that time and a leading neoconservative, stated that there was not yet an option to overthrow Saddam in that period. There was not yet a "plausible plan" for regime change. Immediately after the beginning of its term, the Bush administration had made clear that Saddam was a major concern, and that it had strong intentions of ousting Saddam from power, as claimed by former Secretary of Treasury O'Neill (Katzman 7; Perry et al. 26, 27). Nonetheless, there was not a clear indication that Saddam was to be removed by military force and the administration was trying to develop an overall strategy during its first months in office, exploring multiple options instead of only military ones (Perry et al. 26, 27).

That does not mean that there was no call for enforced regime change in Iraq by U.S. power. Wolfowitz and other neoconservative key officials of the Bush administration, such as Cheney and Rumsfeld, already promoted the goal of removing Saddam from power military since the 1990's (Miller 56; Brewer 242). Dunmire also describes that there was already a 'plan' written by Powell and Wolfowitz, representing Cheney's 'masterwork' with regards to a post- Cold War security strategy (206). The Plan, as Dunmire calls it, was "designed to deal with the problem of maintaining military preeminence at an acceptable cost in the post- Cold War context" (206). This context was characterized by a 'threat blank', which means the lack of any known material threat. The Plan and its authors came into power with Bush's election in 2000, and its tenets were, according to Dunmire, represented in the NSS of 2002 (206). Also important to note is that these men organized the neoconservative Project for the New American Century in 1997, to push for a larger military and

advocate a tougher line against Iraq. Furthermore, an open letter was signed by key Bush advisors and other leading Republicans and sent to Clinton in 1998. The content urged him to adopt a policy of regime change regarding Iraq. Not surprisingly, the Project for the New American Century actively lobbied Congress then to approve the ILA (Perry et al. 24; Brewer 242). Thus, there was a strong neoconservative sound for overthrowing the Iraqi regime by military force coming from prominent neoconservatives, who tried to influence the Clinton administration from the outside, and the Bush administration from the inside after they came into power. In addition, by 2001 the likelihood of a successful regime change via Iraqi opposition groups themselves seemed distant as they lacked unity and the necessary military capabilities (Perry et al 26). By then, "regime change in Iraq seemed increasingly to depend on major military action. In this respect, the ILA made future military action more, not less, likely" (Perry et al. 26).

This is interesting and useful information when assessing whether 9/11 was a so-called 'game changer' or rather a 'window of opportunity'. There has been a scholarly debate about this question. Some authors regard 9/11 as the day that changed everything. And indeed, we have seen that there was a shift in U.S. strategy after 9/11, a shift from containment to preemption. That strategy emerged out of fear for terrorists and rogue states, and led to a greater role for the military (Perry et al. 28). However, this is only one part of the equation. The other part is the desire for regime change. The call for regime change in Iraq has been heard before in both administrations. Bush officials had already discussed options for regime change in Iraq even prior to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and it had already been put into law when the Clinton administration signed the ILA in 1998, making the goal of regime change in Iraq official U.S. policy (Heisbourg 76; Rieffer and Mercer 403). As noted above, the neoconservative influence has been of great importance. Even though Miller sees 9/11 as the most important variable, as it raised the level of threat, he acknowledges that neoconservative thinkers consistently advanced similar ideas for a decade before 9/11. But, during that period, the environment was too benign, which made them unable to find enough support for their ideas (Miller 62). Thus, "it was 9/11 that provided the political context in which the thinking of the neoconservatives could be turned into operational policy" (Halper and Clarke qtd. in Miller 62). Recall here that Wolfowitz, fierce advocate of regime change, said that they did not see a plausible plan yet

(Katzman 7). As Dunmire describes it, the 'new Pearl Harbor' of 9/11 could fill the 'threat blank' (217). This leads to the conclusion that 9/11 proved to be a window of opportunity for the Bush administration, of which many key officials and advisors were neoconservatives, to alter its policy and take a more aggressive stance publically towards Iraq. The eleventh of September 2001 did thus not change the ideas held about regime change in Iraq. These plans existed long before 9/11 and as Dunn states: "while American foreign policy after 9/11 represented a new level of international engagement, it was a policy change arising from new circumstances that was entirely consistent with the previous strategic approach" (Dunn 283). Another argument here is that there was no direct link between 9/11 and Iraq. Why should an attack from a terrorist group based in Afghanistan lead to regime change in Iraq (Freedman 16)? Gershkoff and Kushner argue that 9/11 was used by the Bush administration to frame the war in Iraq to increase public support for its intended course of action (525). Bush never explicitly blamed Saddam for the events of 9/11, but "by consistently linking Iraq with terrorism and Al Qaeda he provided the context from which such a connection could be made (Gershkoff and Kushner 525). This contributes to the argument that 9/11 was a window of opportunity, as it indicates that 9/11 was used to justify a plan that was already on the minds of Bush and his officials.

Regardless of whether 9/11 was a game changer or rather a window of opportunity, it happened and left its mark on the Bush administration and their strategic approach towards Iraq. The strategy of preemption is what defines the Bush Doctrine to a large extent and it is clear that this is a significant discontinuity with Clinton's strategy of containment. It is now time to elaborate upon the other part of the equation: regime change. The Clinton administration has clearly been interested in removing Saddam from power, even before it became official government policy via the ILA. The U.S. had supported a variety of attempts to remove Saddam, of which the overt support of external opposition groups is the most prominent example (Perry et al. 25). Furthermore, the Bush administration had restated the U.S. policy of regime change for Iraq during its election campaign in 2000 and noted that it was a policy of the previous administration (Katzman 7; Perry et al. 27).

Regime change was thus desired by both administrations. But why? An obvious reason is that Saddam posed a threat to U.S. security interests. But there is a deeper rationale. One that is inherently

linked to the perception of the U.S.' own identity, and one that is seen as a long term solution to U.S. security interests in general. Namely democracy promotion; the 'ultimate goal of the U.S.' (Gaddis 53). Both presidents stressed the importance of it and made it a central aspect and goal of their grand strategies. Bush expressed a genuine interest in what Clinton had called the enlargement of the democratic community and Rieffer and Mercer find that Bush and Clinton were very similar with respect to the emphasis put on democracy promotion (387, 400).

Monten stresses that democracy promotion is central to U.S. political identity and sense of national purpose; it is clearly not just another foreign policy instrument (113). Both presidents had grand ideas about bringing democracy and free markets to other parts of the world, believing that U.S. values are universal and applicable everywhere as long as the 'tyrant' has been removed (Jervis 366, 367; Miller 48). This moral mission and a sense of doing good are rooted in U.S. history and the notion of 'American Exceptionalism'. It can best be explained as a kind of foreign policy nationalism, or "a belief that U.S. foreign policy should substantively reflect the liberal political values that define the United States as a national political community and meaningfully distinguish it from others" (Monten 117). This taps deep American beliefs and traditions, and was enunciated by Wilson and echoed by Clinton (Jervis 366). It is clear that president Bush believed in this exceptionalism and the U.S.' core self-image as champion of personal freedom (Rieffer and Mercer 386; 396). This appears from what he told one of his closest advisors shortly after 9/11: "We have an opportunity to restructure the world toward freedom, and we have to get it right" (qtd. in Jervis 368). Note here that 9/11 in this respect is also perceived as a window of opportunity.

Next to fulfilling their 'moral duty' by promoting democracy around the world, the concept of democracy promotion is strategically interesting as well, as it could help to eliminate threats and thus security concerns. Democracy-promotion programs are in essence national security programs as well. The explanation for this is the strong belief of both administrations in the 'Democratic Peace Theory', which assumes that liberal democratic states do not wage war against each other (Rieffer and Mercer 386, 398; Dumbrell 50). According to Flibbert, the idea that regime type is the principal determinant of a state's foreign policy is one that was key in shaping the Bush doctrine and it therefore played a crucial role in the decision to go to war (341). Clinton shared this belief. He was convinced that "the

presence of market-based democracies plausibly would render the world a safer, richer place" (Brinkley 117). Note here that Clinton's vision of democratic enlargement was more 'econocentric' than Bush's vision (Brinkley 118). Moreover, and equally important, the idea that a regime change into democracy in Iraq could spread democracy throughout the rest of the Middle East prevailed within the Clinton and Bush administrations. Clinton likened enlargement to the 'domino theory' in reverse and considered the continuation of the Middle East peace process to be important to the global economy (Brinkley 116, 117). In the Bush administration, Wolfowitz argued for example that democratizing Iraq would have a positive and contagious effect throughout the region. Iraq could serve as a beacon and example for other Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, the administration argued that strong measures for liberating Iraq were necessary (Rieffer and Mercer 404; Miller 56; Jervis 367). Miller also states that the objective of the invasion of Iraq was not only to prevent Saddam from acquiring WMD, but more fundamentally to enforce regime change so that a more democratic one could be installed, aiming to "spread democracy into the heart of the Islamic world" (49). He continues explaining that offensive liberalists, who dominated the Bush administration, assume that through 'domino' or 'bandwagoning' dynamics the process of democratization will spread (Miller 49). This is also mentioned by Jervis as he explains that there was an expectation of a benign form of domino dynamics, as democracy in Iraq is assumed to embolden the forces of freedom and prevent possible enemies from disturbing the peace (368).

For Bush, there was an additional reason. Removing Saddam and creating a peaceful, stable, and democratic Iraq would be a long term solution for the terrorism problem. Perhaps needless to say, this is linked to the belief in the Democratic Peace Theory. Democratization in Iraq and other countries in the region would eliminate the principal breeding ground for terrorism. It would undermine terrorism at its source (Miller 50; Gaddis 54; Monten 112).

Thus, the United States could combine its motivation of a national mission to do good in the world with the interest of advancing "its own expedient interests on the premise that liberal democratic states form a security community in which the probability of armed conflict is zero" by changing the Iraqi regime and promoting democracy (Rieffer and Mercer 386).

Two contending schools have developed with regards to the long-term strategy of democracy promotion: one perspective called 'exemplarism', while the other may be termed as 'vindicationism'. As has turned out, both Clinton and Bush valued democracy promotion and regarded it as a central aspect of their foreign policy. It is therefore interesting to analyze whether or not a continuity can be found in how both presidents viewed democracy promotion. First of all, it is important to understand these terms. 'Exemplarism' builds on the U.S.' self-identity as being unique and qualitatively different from other developed nations. It suggests that America's (democratic) institutions and values should be preserved, often through isolation. The United States is able to exert influence on the world by serving as an example for others. An activist foreign policy is therefore not necessary, nor desired as 'exemplarists' fear that such a policy might even corrupt liberal practices at home. 'Vindicationism' on the other hand believes that the United States should move beyond example and spread its universal political institutions and values by means of active measures (Monten 113, 119).

Unsurprisingly, Bush clearly has a 'vindicationist' perception of democracy promotion, as regime change has been enforced by military operations. If invading another country does not count as an 'active measure', nothing does. The case of Clinton is slightly less obvious since Saddam was still in power after Clinton's term ended. However, he did support opposition parties in Iraq in the hope that they would overthrow the regime themselves. Also, if Clinton would see democracy promotion in the light of 'exemplarism', he would not have engaged in humanitarian missions and nation-building. This is because 'exemplarists' believe that there are limits to the efficacy of democracy promotion, and they have been relatively skeptical towards the U.S. capacity to produce liberal change in the world (Walt 75; Monten 125).

So, both administrations saw democracy promotion on the long term in the 'vindicationist' perspective. However, one could argue that the Bush administration showed a much stronger dedication to it than Clinton given the fact that the Bush administration advocated regime change by the use of military force. Again, the neoconservative influence plays an important role. According to Monten, neoconservatism falls completely within the vindicationist wing of U.S. nationalism (143). He goes on arguing that "the convergence of unipolarity and key ideological dimensions of neoconservatism have produced a particularly aggressive iteration of vindicationist democracy

promotion" (Monten 141). One could argue that 9/11 also caused a more aggressive stance towards Iraq as the administration wanted to prevent another possible attack that would cost many American lives as soon as possible.

Concluding, there are more continuities between the Clinton administration and the Bush administration with regards to their Iraq policy than one might think initially. One continuity can be found in Bush's policy towards Iraq in the months prior to 9/11. Clinton's strategy of containment was continued, though altered a bit, and even strengthened. Another continuity, the most significant one, is to be found in what the administrations both hoped to achieve with their policy towards Iraq: a regime change into a peaceful, stable, and democratic Iraq by means of democracy promotion. Democracy promotion is strategically interesting as it serves as the perfect solution for combining on the one hand the U.S.' moral mission of doing good and bringing freedom and universal American values to the rest of the world, and on the other hand the additional positive effect on security interests. Building on the Democratic Peace Theory and the expectation of a 'domino' effect, democracy promotion became one of the core aspects in foreign policy strategies for both presidents. There was an extra dimension to it for Bush, as he regarded regime change and democracy promotion in the case of Iraq as a fundamental and long term solution for terrorism. We have seen that vindicationist neoconservatives have advocated regime change by the use of U.S. military force long before 9/11 happened and influenced both administrations – Clinton via the Project of the New American Century and Bush via the neoconservatives that rose together with him to power and became his key officials and advisors in the administration. Taking this fact together with the fact that the Bush administration continued Clinton's original strategy of containment, one can conclude that 9/11 was a window of opportunity rather than a real game changer. See here that the outcome of this research – the found continuities – helps to clarify the debate over how important 9/11 really was. It certainly led to a change in policy approach, which is probably the most significant discontinuity between the two presidents. However, it did not change the U.S.' long term goal of removing Saddam from power and installing a more democratic regime in Iraq. The ILA of 1998 showed Clinton's desire for regime change and, next to restating that policy in 2001 obviously, Bush showed its commitment to regime change by actually invading Iraq in

2003. Both administrations were convinced that Saddam needed to go. However, the way in which this should be achieved was viewed differently by both administrations. Clinton chose a strategy of containment for reasons already discussed before, Bush chose a strategy of preemptive attack.

Conclusion

We have seen that the decision making processes that led to the outcome of a specific strategy towards Iraq have been influenced by both internal and external factors. By internal factors, I mean the personal values and ideas about foreign policy that were held by the administrations, regardless of the international environment. Bill Clinton was a liberal Democrat, enthusiastic about focusing on the economic prosperity and the enlargement of it by means of a multilateralist approach. With respect to Iraq, he did not show a willingness to act military, as he only saw the use of direct force as a last resort and undesirable. All of this is in contrast to George W. Bush, who is known to be a neoconservative Republican and not afraid to rely on U.S. hard power. Moreover, his foreign policy doctrine is characterized by preference for assertive unilateralism. There were also external factors. Clinton had to deal with the post-Cold War environment, in which there was no clear enemy, solely 'rogue states'. It hindered him in forming a coherent grand strategy. Bush had to deal with the post-9/11 environment, which was quite different. It led to a shift from a strategy of (dual) containment to a strategy of preemptive attack, which marks the biggest discontinuity between the two administrations. However, we have seen that the Clinton and Bush administrations both pursued a dual-track policy of containment and regime change – at least initially (Perry et al. 19). This provides a strong ground for the assumption that 9/11 was a window of opportunity for the United States to finally enforce the regime change it had long been waiting for. 9/11 did not change everything; it solely, though important enough, changed only the practical side: the policy and strategic approach towards Iraq. The other side was the desire of regime change, which was already put into official U.S. policy by Clinton via the ILA and was eventually carried out by the Bush administration. There is a strong continuity to be found in the underlying purpose for developing a strategy towards Iraq in the first place. Democracy promotion has been advocated and hailed by both administrations, as it kills two birds with one stone. By promoting democracy and hopefully installing a democratic regime in Iraq, the U.S. unites its need to do good in the world with the need for ensuring national security by eliminating threats. The large amount of value attributed to this strategy comes from the belief in the Democratic

Peace Theory and a benign form of the Domino Theory. It should not be ignored that the unipolar post-Cold War environment in which the U.S. was the global hegemon contributed to placing the liberal approach of democracy promotion at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. In conclusion, the answer to the main research question of this thesis would be that there are definitely continuities in the grand strategies of Clinton and Bush with regards to their policy on Iraq. Namely in the policy approach of containment prior to 9/11, and most importantly in the desired goal behind their strategy: regime change and democracy promotion. We have seen that answering the main question of this research also indirectly answers the question on the significance of 9/11. The found continuities and the mere fact that there was not a direct link between 9/11 and Iraq show that 9/11 was a window of opportunity for the Bush administration. Turns out that after all, president George W. Bush was not 'as simple as ABC'.

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