

Introduction

On 15 January 2004, in a big ceremony, a businessman called Syarif Abubakar Alkadrie was officially installed as the sultan of Kadriah Palace in Pontianak.¹ In an interview with an Indonesian national newspaper, he humbly explained that actually he could not be a king because he was never born as crown prince.² As he said, according to the lineage of Pontianak sultanate the crown prince was Syarif Yusuf Alkadrie (Max Nico), the son of the former king Syarif Abdul Hamid Alkadrie—better known as Sultan Hamid II.³ After the king (Sultan Hamid II) had passed away in 1978, the crown prince could not succeed him because he had already moved to the Netherlands, hence the sultanate was dissolved. To revive the sultanate, Abubakar Alkadrie, therefore, was inaugurated to put an end to a quarter century vacancy in Pontianak. Actually, the throne of the Pontianak sultanate had been practically in a vacuum even before the sultan's death because Sultan Hamid II had been put in jail in Java. In 1953, he had been sentenced to ten years imprisonment by the Indonesian court for his involvement in Westerling's coup in Bandung on 27 January 1950.⁴

Sultan Hamid II, minister without portfolio in RUSI (The Republic of the United States of Indonesia) cabinet, was a remarkable figure in Indonesian history due to his close connection with the Dutch. In Indonesian national historiography, he is negatively written about, particularly because of his anti-Unitarianist stance when he supported Van Mook's plan to set up the so-called *Negara-negara Boneka* (puppet states).⁵ Moreover, he is also viewed as the nobleman who was strongly influenced by European culture. As the prince of Pontianak sultanate, he was raised by two British nannies. He had a Dutch educational

¹ Gerry van Klinken, "Return of the Sultans: The communitarian turn in local politics." in Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley. eds, *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The deployment of adat from colonialism to indigenism*, (London: Routledge, 2007) p.157.

² *Republika*, "Jangan Panggil Saya Habib," Senin, 13 Oktober 2008. Another reason, as he said, is because he married with a Javanese woman.

³ "The first Sultan Hamid' (1802-1872) was Syarif Hamid bin Osman Alkadrie, the fourth king of Pontianak Sultanate. For genealogy of 'Alkadris' see J.J.K. Enthoven, *Bijdragen tot de Geographie van Borneo's Westerafdeeling*, (Leiden: Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap-Brill, 1903), pp.844-6.

⁴ Persadja, *Peristiwa Sultan Hamid II* (Djakarta: Fasco, 1955), p. 7. M C Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001) p.285. Marwati Djoened and Nugroho Notosusanto, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Sejarah Nasional, 1982) pp. 235-47.

⁵ Running parallel with traditional revival nowadays, there is a group called 'Lembayu' or *Lembaga Adat dan Kekerabatan Melayu* (Malay Brotherhood Customary Council) which has been attempting to rehabilitate the fame of Sultan Hamid II. See Van Klinken, "Return of the Sultans", p.157.

background, married a Dutch lady, and served the KNIL finally climbing to the rank of Major General. He is also depicted as a staunch advocate for the Dutch federalist plans during a series of Dutch-Indonesian conferences of the late 1940s. He was one of Indonesian who played an instrumental role in the side of the BFO (*Bijeenkomst voor Federaal Overleg*) during the round table conference.⁶

Taking a closer look at his family background, Sultan Hamid II was not the only sultan of Pontianak who had maintained a close relationship with the Westerners, especially the Dutch. In the eighteenth century, Pontianak as a newly established political entity in West Borneo was competing with the existing trading polities such as Landak, Sukadana, and Sambas instead of from pirates.⁷ To ensure its existence, Pontianak needed to establish relations with more powerful entities in the archipelago, such as the Westerners, Java, Djambi, and Bugis.⁸ The most significant alliance was set with the VOC. Further, with assistance from outsiders, either financial relief or a military alliance, the ruler of Pontianak was able to extend his territory and to fight against neighboring local polities; therefore Pontianak quickly emerged as an important power in this region.⁹ Interestingly, even twenty years after the VOC had departed from West Borneo, the Sultan of Pontianak still yearned for the return of the Dutch to this region.¹⁰

This briefly presented narrative from the early establishment of the sultanate up to the independence of Indonesia (Sultan Hamid II) puts into perspective the long standing special relationship between the traditional aristocracy in West Borneo and the Dutch. It also shows that the absence of the Dutch brought hardship toward the principality. During the Japanese occupation, Pontianak suffered many problems and its relationship with the Indonesian Republic at the end of the 1940s was also quite problematic. If we study the relationship between the colonial government and the traditional aristocracies, in particular the Pontianak sultanate, we may better understand the way in which the Dutch ran the colonial state, and gauge their agenda upon their return after the Japanese occupation. Thus we may also be able to delineate the attitudes, the intentions, the various tactics of the traditional West Borneo

⁶ Marwati Djoened, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, p.188.

⁷ Mary Somers Heidhues, "The First Two Kings" in *Archipel*, 56, 1998. p. 273, see also J. van Goor, "Seapower, Trade and State-formation: Pontianak and the Dutch" in J. van Goor, *Trading Companies in Asia 1600-1830*, (Utrecht: HES uitgevers, 1986), pp. 85-6.

⁸ Heidhues, "The First Two King" p. 293

⁹ Van Goor, "Seapower, Trade and State-formation", pp.97-8.

¹⁰ Heidhues, "The First Two Kings" p.73. Pontianak followed Sambas which initially asked the Dutch and to come. Interestingly, what had made Sultan of Sambas invited the Dutch—and actually also the British—was the perilous situation in his own court and the threat from Pontianak.

aristocracies to maintain a good relationship with the Dutch. By tracing back the root of the alliance from 1885 up to the 1950s, this research aims to explain the ambiguous loyalty of the Pontianak sultanate during the formation of the Indonesian Republic in the second half of the 1940s. Finally, it is hoped that this study on regional politics may not only be beneficial to understand the past but also be useful to explain today's Indonesia during the present era of decentralization.

I. The relationship between the Colonial administration and the traditional aristocracy: a historiography

An abundance of works has been devoted to West Borneo covering various topics. West Borneo's historiography shows a certain inclination to put the issues on this region in a wider perspective by framing it into the studies of globalization and transnationalism. Ethnicity has attracted anthropologists' interest since a long time, as shows a number of studies on Dayak and Chinese.¹¹ Viewing West Borneo as an international border region, some recent works also see this region as a stage of the interplay between states. Noburu Isikawa's *Between the Frontier*, for instance, problematizes the presence of the state at the frontier and shows how the state lays claims for its territorial recognition and the national space.¹² Michael Eilenberg's book *At the Edge of the State* tackles similar borderland issues to explain the process of state-formation at the margins of the Indonesian nation state.¹³ While focusing on illicit activities at the porous border, Eric Tagliacozzo also spells out West Borneo as the borderless landscape where smuggling and the like used to take place.¹⁴

For the study of Borneo in the colonial period, some classic works deserve to be mentioned. P.J. Veth's compendium titled *Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling, geografisch, statistisch, historisch voorafgegaan door eene algemeene schets des ganschen eilands*

¹¹ Many works are attempts to understand the Dayaks and their mysterious world, in which they are seen to live beyond the world according to the West paradigm. This kind of thought can be gauged from the introduction on Victor T. King, *The people of Borneo* (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993), p.7. For more recent research, scientist has included ecological approach, for example see Peter G. Sercombe and Bernard Sellato, *Beyond the Green Myth: Hunter-gatherers of Borneo in the twentieth first century* (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2007). Other instances can be searched under the authors, such as, Michael Dove and Reed L Wadley.

¹² Noburu Ishikawa, *Between Frontiers: Nation and identity in a Southeast Asian border zone* (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2009)

¹³ Michael Eilenberg, *At the Edges of States: Dynamics of state formation in the Indonesian borderlands* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012)

¹⁴ Eric Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and states along a Southeast Asian frontier, 1865-1915* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005)

supplies fruitful data about West Borneo up to the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁵ Besides compiling narratives on the various dwellers of the region, Veth also provides some informative accounts on the relationship among the various ethnicities in West Borneo, particularly on the historical background of the encounter between the Dutch and the local rulers in their early phase of their presence in this region.

Two volumes by J.J.K. Enthoven, *Bijdragen tot de geographie van Borneo's Westerafdeeling* can be seen as a continuation for Veth's work.¹⁶ Each chapter of their work focuses on a differed district.¹⁷ Enthoven's opus consists of ethnographic, history, and geography accounts but also covers political issues such as the establishment of the colonial administration, genealogies and some of the treaties concluded with local polities.

In my research, Veth's work is utilized to narrate how the Dutch adjusted to local Borneo politics since their early presence, and the second helps us understand the early colonial period. In order to explain the political relation in the region, this research owes much to *Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van Borneo's westerafdeeling*, a remarkable contribution on local history of West Borneo written by E.B. Kielstra.¹⁸ Compiling papers into a book, his work is another important supplement toward dynamic political aspect of this region. By bringing forward political relations among the powers, it demonstrates the way the colonial administration maintained the territory, and maneuvered to seal political deals with various local principalities and Chinese society. Moreover, Kielstra's book can be seen as a gate to a further quest to primary sources owing to the intensive use of government documents and reports.

Although much has been written about West Borneo, little attention has been paid to the relationship between the Dutch and traditional principalities, particularly, during the late colonial period and what happened to these aristocracies in early independence of Indonesia. As Kahin has pointed out in 1991, Indonesian historiography is marked by the study of regional politics in which local elites were prominent, but only few studies tackle the role of these local elites after Japanese occupation, especially in areas outside Java.¹⁹ Moreover, this rings particularly true of Pontianak because only a small number of studies about West

¹⁵ P J Veth, *Borneo's Westerafdeeling, Geographisch, Statistisch, Historisch voorafgegaan door eene algemeene schets des ganschen eilands*, (Zaltbommel : Noman en Zoon, 1854-56). Interestingly, this work has been widely cited not only by scientist but also colonial officers.

¹⁶ Enthoven, *Bijdragen tot de Geographie*.

¹⁷ He devoted twenty-eight pages specifically on Pontianak. Enthoven, *Bijdragen tot de Geographie*, pp.841-869

¹⁸ E B Kielstra, *Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van Borneo's westerafdeeling*. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1889-1890)

¹⁹ Audrey Kahin, "Introduction" in Burhan Magenda, *The Decline of the Traditional Aristocracy* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1991), p. V.

Borneo is devoted to Pontianak in particular. In this regard, considering the clear-cut political stance toward the Dutch, closer examination of the history of the Pontianak sultanate—throughout dramatic era of the Indonesian revolution—will enable us to reconstruct and to gauge this sensitive issue in Indonesian history.

Historical accounts tackling the early formation of the Pontianak sultanate commonly problematize how the Pontianak sultanate, as the newest kingdom with the smallest inhabitants on the west coast of Borneo, could emerge so quickly as a newly supreme political entity. According to Van Goor (1986) there were many factors to be accounted for, but at least three were very influential: namely the personal capability of the ruler and his successors, location on trade and the assistance from outsiders.²⁰ Yet, limited account has been given precisely about the personality of the rulers toward their people, except for a general acknowledgement of the charisma of a *sayid* who was believed to be a direct descendant of the prophet. Although their charisma gave high dignity to the rulers, more attention has been paid to their political capability.²¹

Mary Somers Heidhues' article *The First Two Kings* examines the enchantment of the first two kings of Pontianak. She mainly argues that they were skillful to somehow manipulate the VOC and the British for their own ends.²² As the diplomatic skill and psychological insight of Pontianak ruler had won Dutch cooperation, the sultanate was able to escape the menaces imposed by its neighboring realms and pirates. Gradually, it also fed Pontianak wishes to strengthen its foothold and expand the territory by fighting against Sukadana and Mempawa, where later the sultan's son was put on the throne. However, assistance was provided not only by the Company but also by the Bugis and Riau. Joining this discourse, Kathirithamby-Wells frames the Pontianak sultanate as a stranger king model, in which a Hadrami *sayid* successfully ascended the throne. Eventually, she concludes that also in other regions it became a common strategy of stranger kings to survive.²³

The discussion about Pontianak sultanate during the colonial era reflects to what extent the sultanate depended on its allies. As van Goor has indicated, the sultanate probably had continued maintaining a direct relationship with the Dutch in Semarang even after the

²⁰ J. van Goor, "Seapower, Trade and State-formation" p.103

²¹ For some described characteristics of the ruler see J. van Goor, "A Madman in the City of Ghosts: Nicolaas Kloek in Pontianak", in *Itinerario* (1985: II) pp. 208-9

²² Heidhues, "The First Two Kings", p. 293.

²³ Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells, "Stranger-kinsmen as Stranger-kings in Eighteenth and Nineteenth-century, Perak, Siak and Pontianak", paper of conference *Stranger-Kings in Southeast Asia and elsewhere*, KITLV-ARI (Jakarta, 2006).

Company had left West Borneo in the late nineteenth century.²⁴ Therefore, competing with neighboring realms for receiving Dutch colonial protection, Pontianak successfully surpassed Sambas. This then leads to the interesting question why the traditional aristocracies were so keen on asking protection from the Dutch.

Research on Sambas done by Muhammad Gade Ismail proves that during the first half of the nineteenth century, this traditional realm was involved in a power struggle with the Chinese kongsi in the hinterland which had grown very powerful.²⁵ He argues the establishment of Chinese *kongsi* hindered the *hulu-hilir* system, consequently the traditional authorities could not extract taxes and goods from the Dayaks in the interior. At the same time the sultanate was not able to levy taxes upon those Chinese *kongsi*. The similar condition probably also affected Pontianak which was also included in the *hulu-hilir* system. As E.B. Kielstra notes that the condition in Pontianak was not better than the neighbor, it almost lost all wealth due to the impediment of the Chinese.²⁶ Jeopardized by the emerging of Chinese *kongsi*, the Malay rulers therefore embraced the Dutch in order to regain their prosperity. *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders in the "Chinese District" of West Kalimantan Indonesia*²⁷—another contribution from Mary Somers Heidhues—highlights the ongoing, mutual conflicts among the traditional realms as another factor that led to their decline. As she argues, Pontianak had expansionistic interest to extend its territory so that it could gain direct access to the resources in the hinterland and strengthen control over the Dayaks.

A more extensive period has been dealt with in the study about the relationship between the Dutch and traditional aristocracy in Indonesia by Burhan Magenda, *East Kalimantan: The decline of a commercial aristocracy*.²⁸ Focusing on the neighboring region, Magenda's works proves that the absence of the Dutch contributed to the declining of traditional aristocracy economically. Since the turn of the century, the sultanate however enjoyed royalties from the oil exploitation monopolized by the Dutch. But when East Kalimantan was incorporated into Indonesian Republic, this revenue was also centralized to Jakarta, but the Indonesian government subsidized the sultanates in compensation.²⁹ Whereas their prosperity collapsed, politically the East Kalimantan traditional aristocracies were able

²⁴ Van Goor, "Seapower, Trade and State-formation" pp.85-8.

²⁵ Muhammad Gade Ismail, *Politik Perdagangan Melayu di Kesultanan Sambas, Kalimantan Barat: Masa akhir kesultanan 1808-1818*, Master Thesis, Jakarta: Fakultas Pascasarjana, Universitas Indonesia 1985, p. 60.

²⁶ E.B. Kielstra, "West-Borneo," *Onze Eeuwe* (April: 1916) p. 42

²⁷ Mary Somers Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders in the "Chinese District" of West Kalimantan Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University SEAP, 2003), pp.73-4

²⁸ Burhan Magenda, *East Kalimantan*.

²⁹ Burhan Magenda, *East Kalimantan*, p. 44.

to adjust themselves to the new political system by joining political parties on the brink of the first Indonesian election in 1950s. This means that the regime change did not politically affect them too much although economically it did. Regardless Magenda's explanations however are not wholly applicable to West Borneo. Unlike West Borneo, the intensive contact between sultanates in East Kalimantan and the Dutch was quite recent, in fact only after the discovery of oil in 1902. Previously, these sultanates had not been depended on protection from the Dutch because they were relatively safe from inroads by pirates, and because they preferred to employ Bugis mercenaries or European adventurers whenever necessarily. Although the *Walinegara* (state head) of East Kalimantan, called Sultan Parikesit, was politically of the same stature as Sultan Hamid II from Pontianak, his political stature was different. Sultan Hamid II strongly supported federalism, on the other hand, Sultan Parikesit assumed the role of a representative of republican rule owing to his half-brother's prominent role in the republican circles.

Two contributions from local historians also deserve to be mentioned here: *Pontianak 1771-1900: Tinjauan Sejarah Sosial Ekonomi*,³⁰ and *Sejarah Perlawanan Terhadap Imperialisme dan Kolonialisme di Kalimantan Barat*.³¹ Emphasizing the dynamic changes in the social organization and economy of Pontianak city, the first book argues that some sort of alliances was made between the Pontianak sultanate and outsiders because of economics interest and feudalism.³² The second book is part of the state's project during the *Orde Baru* (New Order) period on writing about local history or local national heroes in order to foster nationalism through a uniformed historical narrative. It frames the encounter between local principalities with the Westerners in the context of war against colonial powers. As emphasized, the book spells out a series of struggles during the colonial time conducted by all of the prominent sultanates in West Borneo, but it excludes Pontianak. Whereas Indonesian national history proudly highlights the revolution era as dramatic years of *perjuangan fisik* (physical struggle) against the return of the Dutch, interestingly, this book does not touch upon this period, but turns on the issue of malay-Chinese antagonism.³³

To sum up, with regard to Indonesian historiography, there is still little research about the relationship between the traditional aristocracy and the Dutch in West Borneo. Particular

³⁰ Hasanuddin, et.al., *Pontianak 1771-1900: Tinjauan Sejarah Sosial Ekonomi* (Romeo Grafika: Pontianak, 2000)

³¹ Ja' Achmad., et.al., *Sejarah Perlawanan Terhadap Imperialisme dan Kolonialisme di Kalimantan Barat* (Jakarta: Depdibud, 1984)

³² Hasanuddin, et.al. *Pontianak: 1771-1900*, p.5

³³ Ya' Achmad, et.al., *Sejarah Perlawanan*, chapter six.

issues, for instance inter-ethnic relationships or conflicts—which facilitated the Dutch control to prevail—revolution, and particularly citizenship have been successfully presented in the previous researches. Nevertheless, these earlier works limit their periodization up to the late colonial state and rarely do they continue the narrative during the Japanese occupation or the dramatic years during the revolution when the majority aristocracies in the archipelago were declining. In order to have clearer view about regional politics, this research will focus on one particular principality, Pontianak, and deal with two successive periods: post kongsi war and the period after the colonial state collapsed.

II. Problem, Approach and Sources

During colonial period it was common practice that the sultans of Pontianak and other traditional realms in West Borneo concluded an alliance with foreigners. Sambas, a contender of Pontianak, also worked on the same path with the Dutch. It really was the same pattern as could be seen on Java. As Kuntowijoyo has been noted, the degree to which this relationship between the native ruler and the Dutch was cemented could be simply indicated by the way the king addressed the Dutch colonial government.³⁴ For example, Pakubuwana X called the resident of Surakarta as *bapa* (*vader*, father) and hailed the Governor General as *eyang* (*groot vader*, grandfather), on the other hand the government granted the title of Major General to the king. Since Surakarta was closely connected with the colonial government, the same held true for its neighboring principality, Kasultanan Yogyakarta. In this regard, however, the sultanate of Pontianak presents a particular case considering that the political power of the sultanate somehow vanished and the king himself was jailed during the era of Indonesian independence.

This research aims to chronicle the nature and the extent of the long-endured alliance between the Dutch and the local aristocracy in Pontianak, the ethnic tensions, the patron client relations and eventually the absence of the Indonesian revolution in this region. The starting point of this research revolves around the question on why the revolutionary republican failed to emerge. Why were the post war political developments strongly marked by the prevailing of “re-clientelism”? To answer this question we have to go back nearly a hundred years and deal with the years after the end of the kongsi wars in 1885³⁵ up to the era of independence Indonesia in the 1950s. By starting out with the aftermath of the kongsi war, we may revisit

³⁴ Kuntowijoyo, *Raja, Piyayi dan Kawula: Surakarta, 1900-1915*, (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2004), p. 16

³⁵ There were series of Kongsi war. The year of 1885 is assumed as the last stage of the *kongsi* war when the Chinese had been already subjugated resulting the peace and tranquility in western coast of Borneo.

the previous discourses about the relationship between traditional ruler and colonial ruler, and the reasons why the principalities were keen on befriending the Dutch. As is generally agreed, the threat from Chinese Kongsis was a major concern for the sultanate which led to setting up an alliance with the Dutch. By taking 1950s when the Pontianak sultanate became politically insignificant, as an end, this research tries to fill a historiographical gap. Three chapters which tackle the following issues:

Chapter one focuses on the geopolitics to provide a general context of the political relations among the authorities in the West Borneo in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Of course, some important events from the previous years will also be chronicled in this chapter. It includes the political landscape of the region, the inhabitants and the emergence of Pontianak as a prominent local sultanate. This chapter, eventually, explains why the alliance between a traditional realm and the Western colonial power became politically pivotal. And, how could the ethnic sentiment determine political situation in this region?

Chapter two gauges the characteristics of the alliance, and in particular explains how the relationship enabled the Dutch, who were very limited in number, to control the marginal territories of the colonial state. Eventually, these questions correspond with issue dealing with the indirect rule system. Like other outer-regions in the Netherlands Indies, the colonial government ruled West Borneo indirectly, so that Batavia needed local cooperation in order to exercise its authority. To get closer to the subject the following questions are addressed: How did the Dutch maneuver and conclude deals with the local authorities after the *kongsi* war? What was the political impact? How did the colonial government assess the cooperation with the local realms? Because this alliance endured for a very longtime—since the newly formation of the sultanate during the VOC's era until the Indonesian independence—this leads us to more questions such as: how was the nature of this relationship? Why could the relationship be preserved for a long time?

Chapter three touches upon the period after the colonial state collapsed and it attempts to gauge the reason behind the political stance of Pontianak sultanate. In this chapter, inevitably, the spotlight will be on Sultan Hamid II who sided with the Dutch in their attempt to form federal states. During the Japanese occupation, the Pontianak sultanate gradually declined: the sultan was murdered and his successor was jailed.³⁶ But just after Jakarta had proclaimed Indonesian independence, the Pontianak sultanate was welcoming the Netherlands Indies

³⁶ Jamie S. Davidson, *From Rebellion to Riots: collective violence on Indonesian Borneo* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), pp. 36-41. Prasadja, *Peristiwa Sultan Hamid II*, pp.5-6.

Civil Administration (NICA) followed up by the Dutch civil administration. How did the regime changes determine the post-war political development of West Borneo? Why did the pre-war political system revive quickly during the period of the Indonesian revolution? Why was the sultan keen to support federalism in the following era? In what extent did both the Dutch and the Sultan utilize the relationship during this period?

How should one try to explain this problem? Supposedly, the alliance is framed as a mutual relationship which would prevail because both sides need it. To understand the nature and extent of the alliance, I shall study the negotiation between the Dutch and the sultan on basis of their contracts. Concerning the Pontianak's *suppletoire* contract, the assistant resident O. Horst noted in 1934 that the government gave a special treatment to the Pontianak sultanate distinguishing it from other principalities in West Borneo.³⁷ The government had postponed signing a renewed political negotiation with the new sultan of Pontianak for one month because the king urged for *bedenktijd* (reflection time) to examine the deal.³⁸ Furthermore, as Mary Somers Heidhues has pinpointed, Pontianak received about f42.000 in 1822, and increased to f45.000 in the following year from the sharing revenue exerted from taxes on trade. These amounts were definitely higher than those other principalities received, more precisely, almost four times higher in comparison with revenue received by Sambas, and six times than Mempawa.³⁹ This illustration displays the extent of the negotiation process among both political powers, and to some extent, also show that within the negotiation process the sultanate had power to bargain. As the alliance endured for very long time, one may be curious to know how both parties were able to accommodate each others interests.

This study is based on primary and secondary sources. Primary sources, mainly kept in the Netherlands, used here include *Politiek Verslag* (PV)⁴⁰, *Koloniaal Verslag* (KV) and *Memories van Overgave* (MvO) of the resident of West Borneo⁴¹ and MvO from the assistant resident of Pontianak.⁴² Besides reporting on the general situation and highlighting the social-political development—of course with a number of repetitions, these archives demonstrate political relations between two powers, and provide us a series of important decisions made by the government. The use of archival documents will be supplemented with data from *tijdschriften* (periodicals-journals), magazines and newspapers both in Dutch or Bahasa

³⁷ O. Horst, 5 October 1934, NL-HaNA, Koloniën / MvO, 2.10.39, inv nr. 985, (p. 7).

³⁸ NL-HaNA, Politieke verslagen buitengewesten, 2.10.52.01, inv.nr. 29.

³⁹ Mary Somers Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, p.75.

⁴⁰ NL-HaNA, Politieke verslagen buitengewesten, 2.10.52.01, inv.nr. 28-31.

⁴¹ NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Memories van Overgave (MvO), 2.10.39, inv.nr. 260-5.

⁴² NL-HaNA, Koloniën / MvO, 2.10.39, inv nr. 981-5.

Indonesia. Interestingly, the political alliance with local realms was frequently announced and discussed by the Dutch *Indische Gids* (IG) and *Bijlagen der Handelingen van de Staten Generaal* (BHStG). A closer examination upon those periodicals will enable us to catch up the attitude of the Dutch perceiving the alliance. Tackling the post-colonial period, secondary sources will be included such as a general overview of Borneo under Japanese occupation by Ooi Keat Gin,⁴³ and Syafarudin Usman.⁴⁴ In addition, a bundle of archives from Paul Spies kept in Nationaal Archief Den Haag and a thesis of Frans Dingemans gives us in-depth examination of Sultan Hamid II who has a pivotal role in my narrative.⁴⁵ Those secondary sources are used in combination with other primary sources. For the Japanese era, KITLV keeps a number of newspapers and magazines such as *Borneo Sinboen* and *Cahaya Borneo*. Both publications record important events within this watershed period. Since NEFIS diligently gathered information, another archival study is becoming possible for the period of 1942-5, and particularly 1945-9. Besides continuously keeping an eye on the republican and underground activities, the Dutch intelligence service also looked at people within the Dutch circle, consequently they also compiled bundles of documents related with Pontianak, and in particular the correspondence with Sultan Hamid II. This report consists of: the massacre during the Japanese occupation;⁴⁶ political developments in West Borneo (Pontianak as well) since the Japanese capitulation;⁴⁷ weekly and monthly report from the resident;⁴⁸ the institution of *Negara Kalimantan* (Kalimantan state), political activities of the Sultan of Pontianak and resistance activities against him.⁴⁹ Finally, to give some balance, Indonesian Java-based newspapers are included such as *Terompet*, *Mandau* and *Berita Oemoem*. Those can be instrumental for this research, not only to supply fruitful data about the sultan's political activism but also to add new another view about his relationship with the Dutch during revolutionary period.

⁴³ Ooi Keat Gin, *The Japanese occupation of Borneo, 1941-1945* (Abingdon [etc.]: Routledge, 2011)

⁴⁴ Syafarudin Usman, *Peristiwa Mandor Berdarah*, (Yogyakarta: Media Pressindo, 2009)

⁴⁵ Frans Dingemans, *Hamid II Alkadrie, Sultan van Pontianak: zijn rol tijdens de Indonesische Revolutie, 1945-1950* (Utrecht: Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht. Instituut voor Geschiedenis, 1989)

⁴⁶ NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 2020.

⁴⁷ NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 1292, 1297, 1303.

⁴⁸ NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 1304.

⁴⁹ NL-HaNA Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 1300.

Chapter One

The setting: Geopolitics of West Borneo

This chapter sketches the main features of the West Borneo natural environment and its inhabitants. The natural landscape of the region contributed to a system in which the coastal rulers were able to gain hegemony over the inland people. In further examination, the political development of the heterogeneous society of West Borneo was marked by a great despotism. A chronicle of historical events may help us answer why the alliance became politically pivotal.

I. The nature and its political landscape

Today, Borneo (or Kalimantan) is partitioned into three countries: two third belong to Indonesia; and the rest divided into territories of Malaysia⁵⁰ and a small but rich country Brunei Darussalam. The partition itself is a legacy from the colonial time. In the past, this island was divided up by two Western powers: the Dutch and the British. After a series of talks to conclude a clearer border, a division was made, about 553.000 Km² went to the Dutch possession, and the rest or approximately 204.000 Km² to the British.⁵¹ The Dutch governed the island by dividing it into two administrative divisions (*afdeling*): North-east and West.

Residentie Westerafdeeling van Borneo—simply called West Borneo—is located on the lower side of the Island, laying a cross the equator, about a hundred miles from Batavia or more than six thousands miles from the Netherlands. Its climate is typical equatorial, which is marked with heavy rain.⁵² The land has an abundant of natural resources, particularly forest products and, in certain parts are deposited a wealth of minerals.⁵³ Its unknown interior consists of a dense tropical forest that was mostly covered by mangrove, nipah and sago palm swamp. Early European visitors wrongly assumed that the Borneo land was fertile, but it was unfortunately not due to the absence volcanic soil. Even more, in most parts the river basins formed peat moss (*gambut*), and only on particular places the land could be cultivated.⁵⁴ The river was an important part of the natural landscape because it connected the interior of the

⁵⁰ Commonly, it is referred as East Malaysia to distinguish with peninsular or West Malaysia.

⁵¹ The *Encyclopedia van Nederland Indie* refers it as '*niet slecht tropische, maar equatoriaal*' *Encyclopedia van Nederland Indie*, p.355

⁵² G.L. Uljee, *Handboek voor de residentie Westerafdeeling van Borneo* (Weltevreden: Viser & Co, 1925), p.32

⁵³ Thomas S. Raffles., *History of Java*, Kuala Lumpur-New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, p.236

⁵⁴ Uljee, *Handboek*, p. 108.

island to the coastal region. Many major settlements were located alongside of the river. A number of big rivers run in this region such as Kapuas, Sambas and Landak. The Kapuas basin forms swampy land in the coastal area which also frequently is subject to flooding hence the coasts were hardly inhabited and not fully suited to cultivation.

Map I



West Borneo in 1919.

Avé. Jan B (eds), *West Kalimantan: A bibliography*

At first glance it might be expected that the advantage of geographical position was enjoyed by Borneo, but unfortunately, it was not. Located in the central of a long chain of islands from the Malayan Peninsula all the way to the eastern part of Indonesia, West Borneo held pivotal position. It was, presumably, a strategic trade route connecting India and Chinese—two heavily populated regions.⁵⁵ Interestingly, the volume of trade from and to this region was beyond the expectation. Until the end of colonial era, West Borneo's ports mostly

⁵⁵ V.T. King, *The People*, p.19

only served two other ports namely Singapore and Batavia.⁵⁶ Even, the island itself was widely recognized as the neglected island which remained virtually unexplored. Eventually, while reasoning why Borneo only occupied a marginal position, scientists have argued on the poor geographical condition of the island.⁵⁷ Since the environmental circumstances of the island are used as an argument why the island became impervious to outside influence, the same holds also true for explaining the political structure in West Borneo.

The dense jungle limited access to the interior, but on the other hand the coastal depended on the forest and agriculture products. People in the hinterland—commonly called the Dayak—extracted products from the jungle and made them available to the market. In addition, the rivers enabled the trade or goods exchange activities from the interior to the coastal. Consequently this relation formed a typical water-aligned system of tributary relations called upstream-downstream relation (*hulu hilir*) that to some extent were comparable with what happened in Sumatra and other parts of Malay Peninsula.⁵⁸ *Hulu hilir* system in West Borneo, of course, frames also the political relation among the settlers. Mostly rulers were traders who ruled port principalities were situated at the mouth of river—a bit far from the coast to prevent pirate's attack or floods—but still able to control the traffic of the river trade by exercising sovereignty toward the upstream. Furthermore, some smaller potentates were set up along side of the rivers closer to upstream, and had to pay tribute annually to guarantee either their political security or the supply of imported products.⁵⁹ Unlike the model of the Sumatran-Malay peninsula system which enabled coastal states to obtain benefit from the lively external trade,⁶⁰ West Borneo's principalities almost entirely depended on the supply of exotic forest products from the hinterland to feed market demands hence they could obtain imported product by trading with outsiders. In return to the upstream products, the coastal rulers provided the Dayaks with imported goods such as salt, iron, opium, and textiles which could not be directly accessed by the hinterland people themselves.

⁵⁶ O. Horst, 5 October 1934, NL-HaNA, Koloniën / MvO, 2.10.39, inv nr. 985

⁵⁷ King, *The People*, p.19

⁵⁸ Barbara Watson Andaya, "Cash Cropping and Upstream-Downstream Tension: The case of Jambi in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" in Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asian the Early Modern Era: trade, power, and belief* (Ithaca, N.Y. [etc.] : Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.91-3.

⁵⁹ In regard of trading activities, Veth sketches in detail the particular trades that were run by Pontianak. See P J Veth, *Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling*, vol I, p. 19. Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, p. 20.

⁶⁰ Bennet Bronson, "Exchange at the Upstream and Downstream Ends: Notes toward a Functional Model of the coastal state in South Asia", in Karl L Hutterer (ed), *Economic exchange and social interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from prehistory, history, and ethnography*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1977). pp. 39-52.

It could be assumed that this system of goods exchange could benefit each side if it was conducted equally, and the downstream ruler did not confine the upstream suppliers. But this assumption was no longer correct. Initially, people from hinterland had plenty options with whom the trade would be conducted, therefore when the coastal principalities were too demanding, they still had the possibility to sell their goods to other buyers.⁶¹ To assure that the hinterland goods went to their possession, some principalities endeavoured to extend their control forcefully throughout upstream or along the coastal belt to reach more river estuaries by all means.. Moreover, to appease their vassals they also married with ruling lineages from the hinterland, as in the case of Mempawa ruler.⁶² Another mode to enforce their power was through piracy. Although piracy was a major concern in this region, interestingly, the coastal states themselves also engaged in piracy in order to gain goods and slaves, to secure their monopoly activities toward the upstream river, or to express dissatisfaction over internal problem within vassals. Over time, this hegemonic system weakened the inland people, and issued into pure exploitation. The position of inland people even became worse when imported salt was introduced to West Borneo. The Dayaks also depended on salt supplies but, the high humidity and intense rainfall in West Borneo prevented evaporation necessary for the production of salt. This impediment forced the hinterland people to conduct an unbalanced trade with the coastal areas.

II. People and Power

The Dayak, as well as the Punan are the autochthonous people of the island.⁶³ Dayak is a term referring to a collective name for a large number of diverse ethnic groupings which share some common features but have substantial differences in language, art, social organization and other elements of culture.⁶⁴ Unlike the Punan who adhere to traditional practices of hunting and gathering, Dayak also exercised rice cultivation, the so called *ladang* or swidden cultivation.⁶⁵ The Dayak did not have political organization beyond the level of village or settlement. Therefore, it can be said that the Dayak were a stateless society. Whereas Punan were scattered hiding in the jungle, Dayaks settlements could also be found

⁶¹ Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, p. 21.

⁶² Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, p. 24.

⁶³ Categorization that divides Punan and Dayak differently is method of grouping based on the occupation. In fact, Punan and Dayak speak language with the same roots and share similar feature in the religion.

⁶⁴ J. Ave, Victor T King, *Borneo: The people of weeping forest*, p.9

⁶⁵ It is also referred as shifting cultivation or *essartage* in France. See Ave, King, *Borneo*, p.27

along the streams of small rivers.⁶⁶ Moreover, another feature which contrasted all Dayak from other inhabitants, in particular Moslem coastal principalities, was their religion.⁶⁷ The Dayaks used to be classified as non-Moslem. Nevertheless, since some Dayak converted to Moslem due to their closely interaction with Malay settlers, they would be called as “*Masuk Malay*” or “*Jatoh Malay*” meaning no longer as Dayak.⁶⁸

Having difficulties in classifying this ethnic grouping, the Dutch sources are inclined to refer to Dayak as a general name without providing details. However, in West Borneo, a number of groups and sub-groups of Dayak could be founded including *Iban* (Sea Dayak), *Kayan*, small number of *Ot Danum*, and *Land Dayak (Bidayuh)*—a collective name for diverse people grouped based on the recognisable linguistic unit to distinguish with Sea Dayak (*Iban*).⁶⁹ Some classic accounts tend to identify these people as pagan, primitive, very evil and enjoying killing (*mengayau*). An account marked ‘when they obtain a human head, they hang it above the door of their house. Those who have many of these are considered to be capable-men’.⁷⁰

Among those Dayaks, the Iban were most prominent as head hunters. According to Reed Wadley—since the first contact between colonial power and one group of Iban in 1854—the Dutch followed the Malay sultanates’ way by calling the Iban whenever they wanted to suppress their enemies.⁷¹ Although the practices of raiding and headhunting were against basic moral of European or Islamic value, paradoxically, European and local authority fitted them into the troops mainly due to the Iban’s fighting capability and contentment. For the Iban, being invited to engage in war was an opportunity to collect more heads, obtain plunder and gain glory hence Iban fighters enthusiastically accepted the proposals.⁷² Consequently, since the end of nineteenth century, both European and local powers attempted to utilize them. During series of the Kongsi Wars, the use of Dayak as mercenary was remarkable.

In this regard, the involvement of Dayak was not necessarily bonded by their cooperation with the Dutch but merely marked the extent of alliance between local principalities with the Dutch. In most of the cases, those Dayaks were joining to the

⁶⁶ Malcom McDonald, *Borneo People*, p. 41

⁶⁷ This variable particularly true before the practice of traditional religion cut of by Christian proselytizing.

⁶⁸ Uljee, *Handboek*, p. 47.

⁶⁹ Ave, King, *Borneo*, pp.6, 10-13

⁷⁰ Yuan Bingling, *Chinese Democracies: A study of the kongsis of West Borneo 1776-1884*, Leiden: Research School of Asian, African and Amerindian Studies-Universiteit Leiden, 2000, p.67.

⁷¹ Reeds Wadley, “Punitive”, p.613

⁷² Kielstra, “Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van Borneo’s Westerafdeeling”. *De Indische Gids* 12, pp. 1090–1112.

battlefield as auxiliary soldiers or coolies sent by their Malay overlord. For instance, to support the Dutch aggression suppressing the Chinese Kongsis in Montrado, the Sambas sultanate provided about 1,400 coolies and soldiers. A large number of them died due to the terrific conditions of the wild interior of Borneo.⁷³ Interestingly, Dayak warriors were also employed to combat raiding and head hunting done by other Dayaks. The terms ‘only Dayak can kill Dayak’ became popular at the end of nineteenth century when the colonial powers, either the Dutch or the British, attempted to civilize inland people by stopping head hunting.⁷⁴ Moreover, in order to prevent their Dayak inhabitants to migrate or to take revenge toward the other head hunting groups, both colonial powers agreed to allow raiding in the frontier. In 1886, replying Raja Brooke’s request, the Dutch authority in West Borneo permitted a British detachment which consisted of the Iban fighters to raid Dayak enclaves in northern Kapuas River.⁷⁵

Eventually, the engagement of Dayaks in the circle of violence mirrored their position within West Borneo political constellation as rather weak, although they were very significant in number. The inland tribesmen had less chance to overcome outsider oppression. The Dayaks also found themselves exploited by their Malay neighbours as well as the European and Chinese. In this regard, *hulu hilir* system enabled Malay sultans to gain their superiority toward the Dayaks who had only fragile political bonds and depended on foreign goods particularly salt. As Gade Ismail has listed, a great scale of oppression toward the Dayaks was growing worse when the Malay rulers had successfully landed the Dutch support.⁷⁶ Notwithstanding this, Heidhues argues that some Dutch officers were concerned about this exploitation, and made some attempts to elevate the Dayaks from their miserable position. For instance in 1851, the just retired Governor General Rocshussen urged to improve the standard of living of the Dayaks.⁷⁷ However, in practice the exploitation toward the Dayaks still remained, as long as the European or local authorities relied on the help of the Dayaks as proved during kongsis war. Another example was the use of Dayaks for *corvée* labor. In 1912, whereas the Malay and Chinese inhabitants were frequently complaining against compulsory works imposed by the Governor of West Borneo to build a new road, the

⁷³ Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, p.117

⁷⁴ Reeds Wadley, “Punitive”, p. 610.

⁷⁵ Reeds Wadley, “Punitive”, pp. 613, 16

⁷⁶ Gade Ismail, “Politik Perdagangan”, p.99-101

⁷⁷ Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, pp. 25-6.

government viewed the Dayaks as a substantial labour force which could be conscripted easily.⁷⁸

Another largest population group in West Borneo was the Malay, a term that is also considered as a tricky ethnic classification. Generally Malay is named for Muslim population to make a contrast categorization with the other indigenous people either Punan or Dayak who identify as non-Muslim inhabitant. However, among the researchers, Victor T King provides a clearer classification for the Malay as an ethnic grouping. While the other sources incline to put Malay into a grouping of foreigners who migrated from many different places of the Indonesian archipelago,⁷⁹ King argues that the West Borneo Malay in majority originated from the indigenes of Borneo, non-Dayak, who had already embraced to Islam religion.⁸⁰ This people were called *Bumi*, literary meaning earth. In this case, the arrival of number of new Muslim comers from Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi and western part of Borneo augmented the Malay population in West Borneo.⁸¹ Additionally, besides the religion, language and certain unique customary practice are other attributes which are applicable to identify someone as Malay. Since Malay is a heterogeneous ethnic grouping, the name of region where they come from is used as 'locational prefix' to distinguish them from other Malay, for instance, Brunei Malay, Banjar Malay or Serawak Malay, Kapuas Malays, Bulungan Malays and others.⁸²

The Malay settlers preferred predominantly to set up their clusters of villages in the river mouth or a long the costal belt. They engaged into occupations, such as small-scale trading activities, *Padi* (rice) and vegetable cultivation, sea and river fishing, and small holding of plantation especially rubber and coconut.⁸³ The Malay was also differentiated social status among themselves in a hierarchy which consisted of the sultan or ruler, several levels of nobles, many kinds of common people and slaves among whom sometimes also captured European sailors.

In comparison with other groups, the Malay were politically more influential because of their remarkable success in establishing sovereignty. Dutch account regards the presence of Malay in this region to date back to the fourteenth century as the *Maleische kolonisatie*.

⁷⁸ Henry de Vogel, 27 Mei 1915. Min. van Kolonien, *Politieke Verslagen buiten Buitengeweste Borneo West 1898-1942 (PV)*, 1915-1916, N.A. 2.10.52

⁷⁹ Uljee, *Handboek*, p. 50. Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, pp. 27-9. Keat Gin Ooi, *The Japanese Occupation of Borneo, 1941-45* (New York : Routledge, 2011) p.3

⁸⁰ V.T. King, *The People*, p. 31

⁸¹ V.T. King, *The People*, p. 32.

⁸² Keat Gin Ooi, p.3. V.T. King, *The People*, p. 32.

⁸³ V.T. King, *The People*, p. 32.


This was designated as an influential political development in West Borneo, just like elsewhere in the Indian archipelago, where there also was an early establishment of 'Malay states'.⁸⁴ The presence of the Malay sovereignty in West Borneo is also framed within the narrative of the Islamization process by current local historians,⁸⁵ as well as, classic Dutch accounts that used to define the presence of Malay authority as inherited with *godsdienst*.⁸⁶ Trade, either external or internal, was an important source of wealth for the Malay principalities which enabled them to obtain precious goods and to enforce taxes. Besides trade, the kings, who assumed titles as *kalifatullah* (caliphate on earth) or the representation of God in the world, felt entitled to the land and their people. This concept of land and people as belonging of the king depicts a patronized relationship as occurred in Javanese *vorstenlanden* (lands of principalities) in which the king reigned the whole realm and possessed everything above and below the land. This long history of Malay political existence gave them more dignity and privilege rather than their neighbors and to some extent forged some kind of superiority. However, above all, a decisive factor which assured the establishment of Malay sovereignty was military power. Possessing more advanced weaponry and better organization, the Malay could surpass the Dayaks. Gradually, their hegemony was strengthened by the increasing dependency of the Dayaks on coastal products.

⁸⁴ Uljee, *Handboek*, p. 114. P J Veth, *Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling*, vol I, p.31.

⁸⁵ Hasanuddin, et.al., *Pontianak 1771-1900*

⁸⁶ For instance: Uljee, *Handboek*, p. 115. Enthoven, *Bijdragen*, vol II pp.841-2.

**Map II:
Development of main states in West Borneo 15th -19th century**



Source: Historical Atlas of Indonesia

The concentration of population in West Borneo, at least until 1990's, somehow demonstrates a historical continuity with the previous political centres and economic activities.

As the Dutch noticed, exploitation of the Dayak was also carried out by the Chinese, a group of outsiders in this island. The Chinese in West Borneo mainly came from the north-eastern coastal area of Guangdong province with a few Hokkiens from Fujian.⁸⁷ Although archeological evidences prove an early presence of Chinese traders the significant influx of Chinese migration started in the eighteenth century.⁸⁸ E.A. Francis' account provides data which show that the number of Chinese inhabitants had become very substantial in certain parts of the region by the first decade of the nineteenth century.⁸⁹ In two principal towns namely Sambas and Pontianak the Chinese population even surpassed the Malay in number. Smaller than these two towns was Landak that was inhabited by about two thousand Chinese. A big number of Chinese settlers also could be found in Mempawa and Sekadouw, although not as populous as many as in the other towns.

⁸⁷ Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, p.31

⁸⁸ Yuan Bingling, *Chinese Democracies*, p.22.

⁸⁹ E.A. Francis, "Westkust van Borneo in 1832", *TNI*, 1842, pp.3-5. It is almost impossible to determine the exact number of the inhabitant considering the method and other difficulties. As Veth has notices in his book, he always tries to compare some rough accounts from different sources. However, in the regard of E.A. Francis data, it comes closer with other calculation done by Von Kessel, although those accounts are still remarked with some differences but not too significant, unlikely Tobian and Gronovius who seem exaggerate the number of Chinese population. For instance see P J Veth, *Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling*, vol I, p. 43.

Table I

Region	Chinese	Dayak	Malay
Sambas	16.284	20.601	9.403
Pontianak	11.391	-	8.408
Landak	2.820	14.796	2.610
Sekadouw	660	10.390	1.200
Mempawa	808	6.776	1.803

Sources: E.A. Francis, "Westkust van Borneo in 1832" *TNI* 1842, pp.3-5

The Chinese were invited by local rulers in order to boost the process of gold digging. According to Veth, during Sultan Umar Akhamudin (r. 1739-1779) reign in Sambas, a significant number of Chinese gold diggers entered West Borneo. The sultan of Sambas immediately followed the step of Panembahan Mempawa who had been recruiting Chinese miners just a couple years before.⁹⁰ Those Chinese miners apparently did not come directly from China but from the northern part of Borneo or Sumatra.⁹¹ As time went by, other waves of migration that brought thousands—or even more—people from the China mainland followed who all contributed to boosting the West Borneo economy. While Malay and Dayaks had operated the mining years before the arrival of Chinese, the massive involvement of Chinese gold diggers mirrors somehow their success. Jackson pinpoints that the Chinese were able to beat the competition because of the techniques used in extracting the gold and their willingness to dig even in remote places.⁹² Although since their early presence in West Borneo Chinese migrants mostly focused on gold mining, the exhaustion of gold deposits caused them to fill other slots of occupations such as trader or other commercial activities; fruit and vegetable cultivator; and planter especially coconut and pepper.⁹³

As number of the Chinese increased quickly, the terms *kongsi* (*gongsi*), literally meaning as 'common management', was emerging in West Borneo. Initially, the *Kongsi* had worked as a common undertaking which enabled its members to pool capital, manage the labors and share the profits among themselves.⁹⁴ Gradually, their presence in West Borneo became economically substantial and politically significant. According to Heidhues, Chinese *kongsi* operating in West Borneo Chinese possessed a unique character by which they would overcome the challenge of environment and hostile treatment from other settlers by

⁹⁰ W.L. Ritter, *Indische herinneringen, aantekeningen en tafereelen uit vroegeren en lateren tijd 1799-1862* (Impressum Amsterdam: Van Kesteren, 1843), p. 117.

⁹¹ P.J. Veth, *Borneo's West afdeeling*, Vol I, pp. 234, 297-8. Veth surmises that the sultan of Sambas was possibly the first ruler in West Borneo who had employed Chinese to mine his land.

⁹² Jackson, *Chinese Gold Diggers* p.22

⁹³ King *Ave Borneo* p.9

⁹⁴ Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, p. 54.

controlling and governing sizable territories.⁹⁵ Eventually, the kongsi became a source of anxiety towards the existing authorities, and contributed to fire the political tension in this region. The Chinese proliferation in West Borneo created contestation, and the emergence of secret societies usually called also as *kongsi* instigated a strained condition. Therefore, the following migration was suppressed. Since the second decades of nineteenth century, the Malay sultanates attempted to impede the growing of Chinese communities.

Other groups of foreigners who were politically influential were the Arabs and the Dutch. The Arabs mainly came into contact with this region as trader or religious teacher. In comparison with other population, the number of Arab inhabitants was quite small, and they predominantly scattered in few particular parts. According to E.A. Francis' account in 1828, Arab communities could only be founded in three districts namely Pontianak (about 900 person), Mempawa (9 person) and Kubu (28 person). Unlike the Arab group in the other parts of the archipelago which felt under status of *Vreemde Oosterlingen* (Foreign Asiatic) based on the colonial law, the Arabs in West Borneo were considered as native. They obtained 'honorary Malay' status and therefore they possessed not only privileges as foreign Asians but also could avoid restriction such as paying taxes and landholding which Chinese, Indians—the other foreign Asiatic—had.⁹⁶ This special status for the Arabs shows their prominent political role in West Borneo. As Muslims, Arab commonly intermarried with Malays. Of course, it became easier when the Arabs came from certain traditional family of *Habaib* or *Sayyid* assumed as the direct descendent from the prophet that gave them high dignity and privileges in the view of Malay Muslims. Sjarif Abdoel Rahman Alkadri, the founder of Pontianak Sultanate, even had married two Malay royal members before he became the sultan.⁹⁷ Moreover, his success to establish Pontianak sultanate as an Arab house with predominantly Arab as either ruler or subject was a hallmark of their political influence in the region. Additionally, the same held true of Kubu, the neighboring Sultanate founded by stranger king of a Hadhrami *Sayyid*.⁹⁸ According to Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells, an important element that made the political power those *Sayyid* sultans had prevailed was the capability to set up alliance with other superior power in particular with the Dutch.⁹⁹ Moreover their personal charisma was another additional aspect which was a prefect

⁹⁵ Heidhues, p. 55.

⁹⁶ Uljee, *Handboek*, p.51.

⁹⁷ E.B. Kielstra, *West Borneo*, pp. 7-8.

⁹⁸ J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "The Sayyid in Eighteenth-Century Maritime Southeast Asia", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 40, pp 567-591.

⁹⁹ J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "Stranger-kinsmen as Stranger-kings", p. 79.

ingredient to uplift their superiority toward the people. In this regard, some examples have been provided by Veth. While he is describing the celebrations and festivals held during Friday praying and *Ramadhan* (fasting month) in Pontianak, Veth to some extent captures the way the sultan fostered his legacy as a sacral ruler and profane figure, and sealed the obedience of his subjects through the religious rituals.¹⁰⁰

As the Arabs, the Dutch in West Borneo were very small and even insignificant in number. Their presence could be traced back to the VOC era. Initially the company attempted to gain control for pepper trade in southern Borneo, but haunted by local violence and betrayal of trust, the company's grip over the trade diminished gradually.¹⁰¹ In another part of this Island, the low volume of trade activity in the western part of the Borneo caused by the impediment of the natural challenges made the region not much attractive to the VOC. Only due to once obtaining 100 Spanish Dollars from gold and diamonds trading in the first incidental contacts, the Dutch company endeavoured to make connection with West Borneo.¹⁰² Considering the lack of manpower caused too many difficulties for the VOC to conclude trade contract with local authorities, this early attempt actually ended up nowhere. Benefits obtained from the trade did not cover the expenses, especially when the company was dragged into the internal conflict between Sukadana and Landak. Interestingly, the VOC was enabled to establish its foothold in West Borneo through the help of its Javanese alliance: Banten. Having assisted Banten obtaining a claim to its superiority in western Borneo, the company was able to penetrate the region. In 1779, the VOC obtained preferential treatment in commercial transactions from Sjarif Abdoel Rahman Alkadri, formerly Banten's vassal. In return, the VOC supported him to subjugate Mempawa and attack Sukadana. By that time, no single vessel could embark to West Borneo harbours without having permit from the VOC and the Sultan. Eventually, Banten was no longer interested on this region due to the high expense, and the same also held true for the company which left West Borneo even before its collapse towards the end of eighteenth century.¹⁰³

The Dutch flag was hoisted again in West Borneo during colonial time. Following its return to the Indonesian archipelago after a short British interregnum, the Dutch colonial government, as the successor of the VOC, attempted to reaffirm its former territory. The new Dutch commissioner for Borneo Jacob d'Arnaud was assigned to make a contact with the

¹⁰⁰ P J Veth, *Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling*, vol I, p.19.

¹⁰¹ T.J. Lindblad 1998, *Between Dayak and Dutch*, p.8

¹⁰² Leyden John, *Sketch of Borneo* (Batavia: Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences, 1814), p.25.

¹⁰³ Van Goor, "Seapower, Trade and State-formation" pp. 96

local principalities in West Borneo as well as in southern part of the island. Two important coastal states: Pontianak and Sambas immediately recognized the Dutch sovereignty. A number of other contracts with local principalities was smoothly sealed, some administrative changes were gradually taken, and in 1820s some Dutch officers roamed deeper into the Kapuas Basin to gather direct information about the inhabitants there.¹⁰⁴ For Batavia, exercising direct government toward its peripheries was out of the question as it would only lead to the ineffectiveness. Consequently, the Dutch colonial government preferred to rule West Borneo indirectly by concluding certain terms of agreement with the local principalities as indigenous self-governments (*landschappen-met inlandsch zelfbestuur*).

However, the Dutch efforts to reassert their position in the Netherlands Indie particularly in the periphery was being stunted by number of wars especially Java war (1825-1830) then followed by Padri in West Sumatra and Aceh. In West Borneo, the Dutch were also fighting a series of wars against the Chinese *kongsi*. Having subjugated rebellious Chinese *kongsi*, peace and tranquillity was created which enabled the Dutch to consolidate their power. All of this was not until well into the late nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century.¹⁰⁵ In this period, the colonial government was not only able to conquer the territory but also to exercise the sovereignty. Over time, the colonial government practiced its jurisdiction and taxation, combated smugglers, undesirable migrants as well as head hunting practices, and attempted to draw maps in order to fix the messy border among either the traditional domains or between the two colonial territories.¹⁰⁶ The resurgence of colonial power in West Borneo was also marked by a number of developments of public facilities such roads and schools, and religion. Whereas the Dutch let Islam spread over the coastal belt in particular to avoid a religious unrest, they also facilitated the Capuchin mission to enter into the interior which meant the deeper penetration of the Dutch authority in the inland of Borneo. Although the role of the Dutch was very central and their power was also superior, the number of the Dutch settlers in West Borneo was very small.

¹⁰⁴ V.T. King, *The People*, pp.138-9

¹⁰⁵ See for instance Elsbeth Locher-Scholten (1994). "Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago Around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate" in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 25, p 93. J.Th. Lindblad, "Economic Aspects of the Dutch Expansion in Indonesia, 1870-1914", *Modern Asian Studies* 23 (1989): 5.

¹⁰⁶ Reed L. Wadley, "Boundaries, Territory and Resource Access in West Kalimantan, Indonesia 1800-2000" in Reed Lee Wadley, *Environmental change in native and colonial histories of Borneo: Lessons from the past, prospects for the future*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000, p.139.

Table II

	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920
European	104	207	199	324	314	374	839

Sources: G.L. Uljee, 1925 p. 46

Mirroring the narrative over the people and power above, it is needless to say that within the political constellation of West Borneo, numbers were not that important. Dayaks consisted of about 40% of the total population and remained relatively constant in number. Regardless the populous number of the Dayaks, the absence of political organization made them less significant and resistance against the foreign oppressors with typically better political organization only led them into a deep suffering. The Dutch and the Arabs were two minor groups in regard of population but politically dominant. As Pontianak sultanate, ruled by small number of Arab nobilities, rapidly extended its authority and even successfully triumphed in the competition with other Malay principalities, while the well organized Dutch emerged as a central power broker in the region.

Eventually, having mapped the people and power relation in West Borneo, this leads us to another question: whether or not a solitary power would become superior. In quest to the answer, the following discussion will bring forward some dramas from late nineteenth century to explain why alliance became politically pivotal in West Borneo.

III. Tension and cooperation

As reflected from the abundance historiographical contributions, there are some tensions that can be fit into two substantial discourses on West Borneo history. These discussions touch upon an issue which problematizes the dynamics of West Borneo as a borderland and also concern the mutual conflict among the existing powers.

Adjoining with Serawak, West Borneo demarcated a frontier of the two colonial powers that actually designated the landscape as a territory with contested authorities. Examining the motives of the VOC to establish a foothold on the western coast of Borneo, the Utrecht historian Van Goor argues that it was the intention to secure the company's trade territory rather than seeking trade profit.¹⁰⁷ He may be true in a way that the company, which initially had been interested in the gold and diamonds trade, could not acquire profit adequately. The company's anxiety toward another European power in the archipelago and its colonial pride, kept the VOC on the western coast of Borneo.

¹⁰⁷ Van Goor, "Seapower, Trade and State-formation", pp. 100-3.

Triggered by piracy toward its commercial ships by Sambas, in 1812 the British navy embarked on the western coast of Borneo and attacked the sultan's palace. As a result the royal family was forced to flee to the hinterland. Just after the British interregnum, having handed Java and other islands over to The Dutch, a visionary British officer called Raffles remained keen on gaining a foothold in the archipelago. After casting a look at the western coast of Borneo, he considered that this region would be a strategic possession for the British. This expectation almost materialized in 1817-18 when the two coastal states, Sambas and Pontianak which fought against each other, invited the British, as they did also to the Dutch, in order to win the war. Unfortunately for the British, the Dutch who came earlier had concluded an alliance with the principalities. Later on the rivalry of these colonial powers involved more tensions since the stranger king James Brooke, a British adventurer, began to reign as the white Rajah of Serwak in 1841.¹⁰⁸ Graham Irwin who has elaborated on this in his book shows the exaggerated Dutch responses to the progression of Brook in Serawak.¹⁰⁹ Provoked by British activities in the neighboring Borneo, the Dutch colonial government boosted its attempts to consolidate its western coast territory into a solid possession and to strengthen its effective control over the hinterland. However, tension on the frontier was more complex than an exercise of territorial possession like defining a fix demarked border. Undesirable migration was a common problem on the frontier in the case of the Iban. Whenever they felt oppressed, hindered from the access of the goods or imposed with heavy burdens, either taxes or compulsory service, they would easily migrate to British Borneo.¹¹⁰ Worried by the frequent salt smuggling along the frontier, the Dutch strengthened their control over the salt monopoly by establishing posts along the border which prevented the inland people to obtain cheap salt from Serawak.¹¹¹ A successful salt monopoly was necessarily to ensure the colonial control over the inland population, to seal their obedience as subject, and to energize the *hulu hilir* system from which the Malay rulers in the coastal belt also benefited.

Since maintaining the frontier was an almost impossible task, the Dutch colonial government utilized the 'diplomatic' way to control the frontier. As in the late nineteenth

¹⁰⁸ Malcom McDonald, *Borneo People*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1956, pp.23-33. See also Reed L. Wadley, "Trouble on the Frontier: Dutch-Brooke Relations and Iban Rebellion in the West Borneo Borderlands, 1841-1886" in *Modern Asian Studies*, 35, 200, p.624.

¹⁰⁹ Graham Irwin, *Nineteenth-Century Borneo: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry* (the Hague: 's-Gravenhage, M. Nijhoff, 1955)

¹¹⁰ Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*,

¹¹¹ Reed L. Wadley, "Boundaries, Territory and Resource access in West Kalimantan, Indonesia 1800-2000", p.139.

century, when the Dutch permission to the British's punitive expedition to raid Iban in the Dutch Borneo, the colonial government in Pontianak concluded a deal with the inland population insisting that they stay closer under the Dutch control.¹¹² If one looks into the twentieth century colonial archive, one will easily find that the 'colonial rivalry' between the Dutch and British no longer occurred. For example, friendly toned correspondences between the resident of Borneo with Brooke in 1914 concerning cooperation in looking for some fugitives who had been involved in Mempawa unrest.¹¹³ Another letter is also tells of cooperation when the British colonial government of Borneo offers to send back a group of the Dutch subjects who had escaped from West Borneo. And even if some colonial rivalries were still existed, it did not fire the tension in the region as did the mutual conflicts within the West Borneo society: rivalries among the principalities; clashes within the *kongsi*, indeed, warfare between the Chinese *kongsi* against the rest.

The *hulu hilir* system that prevailed could enable one entity to control the other. Veth, who in his book commonly typifies Malay inhabitants as opium users and pirates, critically deems the Malays' predatory and devilish race which behaved below the standard morality, and used to act oppressively toward inland inhabitants.¹¹⁴ Actually, like the other sultanates in archipelago, Malay rulers in West Borneo had expansionist intentions, apart from having their internal problem of succession. In the early seventeenth century, two prominent coastal powers, Sukadana and Landak attempted to conquer each other. Later on, Sambas, Mempawah and Landak also got involved in a similar rivalry.¹¹⁵ In its early establishment, Pontianak immediately overpowered Mempawah to escape the menace imposed by the Bugisnese nobility of Mempawah. Further, this newly established sultanate also attempted to gain more control over its neighboring gold deposits and along the coastal belt. Many times, Pontianak conflicted with Sambas, although, geographically speaking, these palaces were separated by a great distance. Pontianak took advantage when Sambas pirates hijacked a British commercial ship. It sided with the British and welcomed its military force to set up posts in Pontianak. Thus the rivalry between these two principalities endured for a long time.

To assure the flow of exotic goods from the hinterland Malay principalities used straight control, subjugation, piracy and the like, by means warfare. Having advanced weaponry was certainly one decisive aspect that made every war with Dayak an unbalanced

¹¹² Reed L. Wadley, "Punitive Expedition", p. 623.

¹¹³ Henry de Vogel, 27 Mei 1915, N.A. 2.10.52

¹¹⁴ P J Veth, *Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling*, vol I, in *inleiding*, p.XXXI

¹¹⁵ P J Veth, *Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling*, vol I

affair. Furthermore, the Malay sultanates possessed more man power which could be recruited easily during warfare. The structure of Malay power assured that all subjects of the Malay rulers were naturally conscripted into the army through the war. Other allies for the sultan were the slaves, *orang dalam* (people who live within Malay compounds), *orang sungai* (people who live beyond Malay compounds but still within sultan's territory, mostly in the rivers), Bugis Wajo who live in coastal and definitely the subjugated Dayak.

As the Malay sultanate, the Chinese also used to be drawn into internal conflicts among themselves. Initially there were a lot number of Chinese kongsi operating in West Borneo, but the number decreased significantly within a few decades due to internal conflict.¹¹⁶ As Heidhues has noticed, in order to survive by gaining territorial possession, the *kongsi* tended to subjugate other kongsi to gain control over the gold enclaves. Eventually, the Chinese kongsis had to encounter the Dayaks. Although some Chinese successfully maintained friendly relationship and did intermarry with the inland people, the majority of the Chinese *kongsi* also used oppression to subdue Dayak particularly the indigenous gold diggers, and annexed their gold depot. Veth notes a remarkable killing of large numbers of Dayak who were poisoned by Chinese during a gathering festival.¹¹⁷

An important step for the political resurgence of the Chinese group was the development of independent *kongsi* federations which incorporated hundreds even thousands *kongsis'* members at several mine centers. There were three dominant federations in West Borneo, mostly situated in gold mine sites, namely: Fosjoen (Monterado), Lanfang (Mandor), Samtiokioe (formerly part of Fosjoen in Monterado).¹¹⁸ This development not only had made the Chinese kongsi becoming more organized and connected but also successfully reduced the internal conflict within the Chinese community, which certainly made them more powerful. Gradually, they could escape from the apanage system which initially had established by the Malay rulers to control them. Their hegemony became more robust since they were able to control more Dayak lands which were formerly belonged to the sultan. In addition, they also used and treated the sizable Dayaks groups in the same way as the Malay rulers did. For Malay principalities, losing their Dayak subjects meant that they could not extract inland product and imposed taxes.

Unlike the inland indigenes, the Chinese were capable seafarers and were able to obtain import products. When they were still under the control of the Malay rulers, these

¹¹⁶ Gade Ismail, "Politik Perdagangan", p. 46

¹¹⁷ P J Veth, *Borneo's Wester-Afdeeling*

¹¹⁸ Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, p. 55.

people were prohibited from direct trading with the foreigners but through the hands of Malay rulers. The situation turned differently since independent federations emerged. Then, the Chinese prevailed in conduct directing trade with the coast. Moreover, the Chinese federations like formerly the Malay had done, monopolized the import goods for the inland people. As a consequence, the Malay lost not only their subjects but also their grip on the inland trade monopoly. This meant that the emergence of *kongsi* federations jeopardized the downstream hegemony and disadvantaged them economically.

Considering their sources of wealth were deprived by the Chinese, Malay rulers regarded the emergence of powerful *kongsi* federations as a threat and therefore tried to subdue the Chinese again, but they could not easily overcome them as they had done in the past. The Chinese were better organized and their number had increased significantly. In two prominent principalities called Sambas and Pontianak, the Chinese population had even surpassed the Malay. Although that it was possible for the rulers to levy conscriptions, the power balance had shifted, and in fact a number of Dayak groups were siding with the Chinese. Consequently the danger became more difficult considering that among the Malay powers there was no unity and more often than not they were engaged into a mutual conflict.

The Dutch colonial government was also disadvantaged by the upsurge of the Chinese federations in West Borneo. In this regard, the Dutch became allies for the Malay rulers in order to control the Chinese. For instance, soon after the Dutch embarked, various coastal sultanates engaged into contracts with the Batavia by which they asked the Dutch to subdue the Chinese into colonial direct subjects. Since the Dutch had very limited knowledge about West Borneo, neither its terrain nor its political landscape, controlling the Chinese *kongsi* was only possible with the help of the local rulers. The success to oppress the Chinese *kongsi* therefore enabled them to enforce taxation and impose their jurisdiction on the Chinese, as well as the Dayak. By doing so, both the sultanates and the Dutch earned wealth from taxes and internal trade.

The actual tension in West Borneo during nineteenth century was reflected from the series of wars against Chinese federation, or so called *kongsi* wars in three periods (1822-24, 1850-54 and 1884-5). The nature of *kongsi* wars was very dynamic not in the least because of the complex character within the alliance. Therefore it could not be simply generalized as a series of battles between Chinese against the Dutch and the allies. For instance, although the foundation of federation had limited internal conflict, turbulence still existed among dominant federations. Engaged into an internal conflict and threatened by betrayal, in 1822, Samtiokioe asked an alliance with the sultan of Sambas and the Dutch, who then answered

the request by sending military assistance.¹¹⁹ Another example was the involvement of Chinese on the Dutch side on the battlefield. While the second period of the *kongsi* war was raging in early 1850s, the Dutch detachment employed large number of Chinese coolies to transport their heavy carriers passing difficult terrain. In doing so, the Dutch only made deals with Chinese headmen who were able to mobilize Chinese coolies and guaranteed their loyalty. However, due to bad treatment from the Dutch troops toward Chinese coolies, this cooperation quickly ended. In contrast, the Dutch's ally of Panembahan Mempawa appeared reluctantly to support the Dutch during the war until the colonial government provided him with amounts of food and weapon.

Considering those facts, West Borneo was a heterogeneous society in which the power balance shifted dynamically. Having an alliance was a decisive aspect for political survival. Economically speaking, a small volume of the coastal economic activities prevented the local principalities to obtain their wealth from external trade, on the other hand made them almost entirely depend on the internal trade conducted upstream. Regarding the nature of *hulu hilir* system in West Borneo, it could only be controlled by force, by oppression or subjugation, and the like. It meant that no solitary power could overcome the rest without setting up an alliance, as in the past, smaller potentates had to attach to the bigger polities in order to survive, and the coastal states were always keen on cooperating with outsiders. Advanced military technology, particularly, made the Dutch colonial power supreme and therefore it provided comfortable niche of protection for the local powers. Having defeated the Chinese *kongsi*, the Dutch's supremacy found no challengers and they began exercise more power over this region and to extend its control over each polity. On the other hand, the mutual relationship between the Dutch and local rulers still remained although politically speaking the local rulers' authority had being curtailed.

¹¹⁹ Heidhues, *Golddiggers, Farmers and Traders*, p. 81.

Chapter Two

Exercising the colonial power

The mutual dependency and the strengthening of the ethnic sentiment

In the aftermath of the Kongsis wars, the political developments of West Borneo were strongly marked by the prevalence of the colonial power. When Batavia extended its control and subjected the other powers to its superiority, this some for the traditional rulers. Their power was curtailed as they lost some of their former political and economical privileges including the lucrative monopoly on the *hulu hilir* trade system. Notwithstanding this, the alliance still remained, as, *rust en orde* was maintained without significant violations.

This chapter explains the political arrangements, especially between the colonial authority, the traditional rulers and the Chinese community, which enabled a power balance to surface in this region. First an important feature in West Borneo will be examined in the period following upon the kongsis wars, namely the increasing regional economic activities which replaced the monopolies of the coastal principalities' on trade.

I. Economic expansion and diminishing the *hulu hilir* system

The Dutch kongsis wars prompted a number of important developments in West Borneo. According to Davidson one of the important features after the kongsis wars was migration.¹²⁰ Since the war against the Chinese Kongsis of Monterado in the 1850s the Dutch had employed Madurese soldiers who were considered very aggressive and good in fighting. As a result a substantial number of the Madurese came to this region. This went well with the government's efforts to settle the vast but sparsely populated land of West Borneo in the early twentieth century. The Madurese saw this as an opportunity to lift up their living conditions considering that their own island was arid and densely populated. Therefore, continuous waves of the Madurese's migration to this region were brought about largely on their own initiative. During the rubber boom of in the 1920s, the influx of migration increased significantly.¹²¹ This was followed by the Government's need of massive labour to carry out road-building projects. Then, the depression in 1930 forced even more helpless Madurese to leave their island and migrate to West Borneo. The Madurese population grew significantly in West Borneo not only due to the migration but also because of the way in which they set

¹²⁰ J. Davidson, *From Rebellion*, p. 28-31

¹²¹ M.S. Heidhues, *Golddiggers*, p. 273-5

up families by arranging intermarriage with local Malay and raising their children as Madurese. In this way, eventually, the Madurese migration would also contribute to ethnic violence that mostly occurred in post-colonial period.

The number of Bugisese settlers in West Borneo also increased. In the early twentieth century, it turned out that the Bugisese had contributed 5% of total population of this region. Interestingly, the coming of these people was especially linked by the slave trade which had grown since the preceding period.¹²² An observer in 1925 reported, this sort of local rulers' businesses was still very prevalent by the turn of the century and even in the following years due to the absence of the colonial government intervention against the slave trade.¹²³ But the government was not the only one to blame for the massive slave trade considering that it had actually forbidden the slave trade in this region.¹²⁴ However, the fact that slave trade still continued somehow mirrors the basic problem of the colonial state to rule its periphery where it was too weak to enforce the law.

Another migration which was significantly growing was the Chinese. Although initially the number of the Chinese migrant influx had decreased since the kongsi wars, it gradually recovered in the following years. The number of Chinese migrants was climbing to its peak in 1912-1914 but it is said that during World War migration from China to West Borneo declined. In the first decade of twentieth century, number of the Chinese population reached 48.348 or approximately 10% from the total population. This was almost two times higher than number of the Chinese inhabitants at the end of the kongsi war. Furthermore, during the second decade of the twentieth century, the number of Chinese settlers in this region surpassed 100.000. Migration contributed to this development.¹²⁵ While the Chinese migration was increasing, the colonial government attempted to control it. The government levied upon the Chinese migrants high taxes especially in the form of passes for traveling. In the 1910s, the Chinese had to pay about f. 25 to obtain a pass, but a decade later it cost no less than f. 100.¹²⁶ However, this kind of burden particularly imposed upon the Chinese, either in the form of taxes or compulsory works, eventually contributed to instigate a number of protests that will be elaborated in the end of this chapter.

¹²² J. Ozinga, *De Echonomsche ontwikkeling der Westerafdeeling van Borneo en de Bevolkingsrubbercultuur*, p. 84.

¹²³ Uljee, *Handboek*, p. 122.

¹²⁴ IG 1882, II p. 550

¹²⁵ M.S. Heidhues, *Goldiggers*, p. 130

¹²⁶ M.S. Heidhues, p. 133

Economically speaking, the condition of West Borneo quickly recovered from the war and became relatively stable. This enabled the regional economy to flourish. In the twentieth century there was an increase of export products such as copra in the coastal area, and gutta percha (indigenous rubber), spices and pepper in the interior. Unfortunately, the Dutch had overrated the economic potential of West Borneo. In the early twentieth century West Borneo exported the highest volume of forest products in The Netherlands Indies, but export products quickly decreased within a couple of years, and became less substantial in the second and third decade of this century.¹²⁷ As Jeroen Touwen has shown, Batavia had to pay the costly expenses to manage the West coast of Borneo.¹²⁸ On the other hand, the attempt to boost export-oriented products had turned fertile land from rice fields into plantations. In addition, the consequence for the lack of rice supply for this region caused West Borneo to increasingly depend on imported rice. In this case, the Chinese somehow played an instrumental role in running the economy. For instance, when the hinterland inhabitants who engaged in agriculture saw their harvest fail, the Chinese traders could supply the rice.

As already explained by the middle of the nineteenth century, the gold mines had been exhausted; consequently the Chinese were pushed to participate in trade and plantations. By extending their economy activities, particularly in the trade, the Chinese became themselves engaged in the *hulu hilir* system. The Chinese, played role of middleman, replaced the former economic position of the traditional aristocracies by directly handling the hinterland's need for imported goods and thereby energized the inland economy. The Dutch colonial service officials often welcomed the presence of the Chinese traders because of their ability to reach even the uppermost settlement in this region. Unlike the sultans who had obtained monopoly due to the inland inhabitants' dependency to the imported goods such as salt and opium in doing trade, the Chinese traders came with different approaches. Their years of experience in the interior allowed them to acknowledge the inland population and their needs, so that the Chinese traders easily negotiated with them. It appears the Dayak cooperated more easily with the Chinese than the Malay. Their position as the middleman enabled the Chinese traders to provide the buyers with the advance debt.¹²⁹ Therefore, they could easily trade with the Dayak population to obtain the exotic goods of the hinterland. In his *Handboek voor de Residentie Westerafdeeling van Borneo*, Uljee notes the role of the Chinese traders:

¹²⁷ M.S. Heidhues, *Goldiggers*, p. 144

¹²⁸ Jeroen Touwen, *Extreme in Archipelago*, p. 392

¹²⁹ Jeroen Touwen, p. 210.

*De Chinees, door jarenlange vestiging, kent de bevolking en haar behoeften; hij staat met haar door middel van het voorschottenstelsel in voortdurende aanraking; zijn ruilhandel in het binneland geeft hem op den Europeaan een grooten voorsprong; zijn tokobedrijf aldaar niet minder.*¹³⁰

Notwithstanding this, the new economy opportunities that attracted large number Chinese to West Borneo were only materialized through political change. In the past, the traditional rulers had monopolized the *hulu hilir* system to ensure their existence. This mechanism had provided the port principalities with source of wealth, in forms of goods and taxes, and enabled them to exercise sovereignty by subduing the hinterland people. Due to the importance of this system, the coastal rulers always responded any violation toward this system in extreme ways by means war. As Kielstra has noted, it is argued that the first kongsi war in 1820s had been triggered by the presence of the Chinese-aliens within the *hulu hilir* system: they had ruined the monopolistic trade system and hampered the hinterland supplies reaching the coast.¹³¹ At the same time the hinterland inhabitants had been more or less freed from the traditional rulers' grip. By the turn century, the colonial government limited the sultans' power through the *korte verklaringen* or short political contracts. As consequence, the sultans' privileges upon *hulu hilir* system were even more reduced. This had only been possible through the political intervention of the colonial government. One of the most important steps by the government was the effort to abolish piracy. Initially, the coastal rulers and inhabitants used piracy as a sort of mechanism to maintain their trade monopoly of *hulu hilir* system. They hijacked or plundered ships which attempted to sail upriver to the hinterland. Therefore once piracy had been reduced, the Chinese traders could join the river trade system of this region. For example, at the end of nineteenth century, the government urged the Pontianak sultanate to secure the river estuary and coastal region from the pirate.

*De sultan en de grooten van Pontianak zullen den zee- en rivierroof met alle in hun bereik zijnde middelen krachtadig tegengaan en doen tegengaan, en geene schuilplaats noch eenige andere hulp of medewerking hoegenaamd verleen, noch toelaten dat die verleend worden, aan zee- of rivierrovers, noch aan personen die hun bekeud zijn of aangewezen worden als zoodanig bedrijf uit te oefenen of daarin betrokken te zijn.*¹³²

These negotiations between the government and the Malay polities determined the political developments of West Borneo post Kongsi war. A couple of years before the last

¹³⁰ Uljee, *Handboek*, p. 88.

¹³¹ Kielstra, *Onze Euwe*, p. 42.

¹³² *Indische Gids* 1882. I. p. 543

Chinese's kongsi federation was disbanded, the Dutch colonial government had concluded number of treaties with local principalities in West Borneo.¹³³ Of course, those were not made for the first time. For the Pontianak sultanate, the treaties had been renewed in 1879 when the new sultan named Syarif Yusuf Alkadrie was inaugurated.¹³⁴ The treaty was repeated in 1895 when Syarif Yusuf Alkadrie passed away. While the Pontianak sultanate had not yet decided on a new king, the Dutch officers brought the family of the former sultan to the negotiation in the following year. However, the new agreement between the Dutch and the sultanate did not reflect significant changes from the previous one.¹³⁵ If one takes a closer look to the negotiation, one may gauge the nature and extent of the political relation between the colonial government and the traditional rulers. By accepting the treaties, the local rulers had recognized the colonial sovereignty and, as a consequence, they had to place their authority under the colonial sovereignty and obey a number of restrictions proposed by the colonial government.

In other words, the Government exercised its sovereignty, jurisdiction and economic organization in the traditional realms through the conclusion of contracts with the local rulers. Another important point within their agreements was that the traditional rulers were prevented from handing over their territory to the other colonial powers, or set up any direct relationship with them. For instance, the ports of Pontianak and Sambas could be closed for foreign ships if they had no special permission from the Dutch officer. Sometimes it was even more subtle as the sultanates were not allowed to receive any kind of present or gifts from foreigners. Furthermore, also according to the contract, the government was entitled to give concession to any plantation and mining company to establish or to continue its activities in West Borneo. As part of the agreement, the government also required the traditional rulers to be more open for foreign investment. In comparison with the other regions in the archipelago, the presence of foreign enterprises and investment to the western coast of Borneo was very small.¹³⁶ For natural exploitation and preservation, such as forest exploitation, the Dutch administration cooperated with the sultans or their *mantri* (minister) by consulting them first before coming to decisions.¹³⁷

¹³³ *Indische Gids* 1882. I. p. 543, 47

¹³⁴ *Indische Gids* 1882. I. p. 543-50. The former king named Sultan Hamid Alkadrie I (reign 1855-1872).

¹³⁵ *Indische Gids* 1896, deel II, p. 349-50.

¹³⁶ Jeroen Touwen, *The extreme*, p. 208

¹³⁷ Map of *bosch-exploitatie concessies, landbouw-conssesie en erfpacht*, and *mijnbouw concessies* is avaiable in Uljee, *handboek*, apendix.

While the contract gave an abundance of privileges to the Dutch, it actually limited the sultan's power. As consequence, by the turn century, the traditional rulers had lost almost all of their economic and political privileges including their former monopolies and taxes. In politics, for instance, all of correspondences addressed by and to the sultans or *mantri* would only be conducted under the auspices of the Dutch resident. In the field of law, the colonial government assumed the right to exercise justice over all the inhabitants from any ethnic groups who had settled in the region. The traditional jurisdiction was gradually reduced but even then, the cooperation and help from the traditional rulers were still invited. Furthermore, ordinances and regulations concerning duties, taxes and leases, in which the sultanates had formerly enjoyed all sorts of incomes, were decided upon by the resident and eventually the revenues were ceded to government.¹³⁸

In return for their obedience, the authority of Batavia confirmed the legitimacy of the local rulers in their territories. Moreover the colonial power also provided them protection from any violations against their sovereignty. Considering the occurrence of ethnic feud, as explained before, the Dutch's protection was the main reason why the local sultans approached the colonial government since the early nineteenth century. Having protection from the colonial power would enable them to survive. Indeed, an important issue within the negotiation concerned the revenue paid by the government to the sultans. Since taxes, corvee, natural resources, and trade monopoly had been assumed and regulated by the government, the traditional rulers lost almost all of their sources of income. To maintain the existence of traditional aristocracy, and to guaranty their prosperity, the colonial government provided the sultans with a certain some amount of money as income and revenue. For example, the Pontianak sultanate, which was valued to have a massive economy potential as well as a substantial number of inhabitants obtained *f.* 50.400 annually.¹³⁹ The smaller sultanates, either economically or politically, would obtain a smaller income which ranged from some *f.* 12.000. To decide upon the amount of revenue that would be received by the sultan, apparently, the Dutch valued the number of inhabitants (subjects) more than the size of the territory possessed by the sultans, because their number determined the sum of money that could be earned from taxation and the number of people that could be conscripted for compulsory works.

¹³⁸ *Indische Gids* 1882. I. pp. 543-50.

¹³⁹ *Indische Gids* 1882. I. p. 549.

The changes in the economic system and the political landscape after the kongsi wars certainly affected some small potentates which were located in the upper river regions. In this case, due to the lack of economy potential and the limited number of subjects, the government considered them unworthy and therefore was not keen on negotiations. Hence they easily collapsed. In 1913, the resident of West Borneo received letters from two local rulers of Djongkong and Silat. The two were small potentates in the far-upper Kapuas—one of the latest populated areas of hinterland according Map of West Borneo in 1925. Through their letters, those local rulers urged the colonial government to ‘take over’ their regions, although it was not clear whether they were proposing for *gouvernements grondgebied* (direct rule) or inviting for political contract as *zelfbesturende landschappen*. Above all, their intention was to ask the government for financial aid in exchange for their sovereignty.¹⁴⁰ The king of Silat begged the government to subsidize 41 members of his royal family, the king of Djongkong also tried to negotiate for financial help to do pilgrimage to Mecca in turn for his submission. Having consulted to Batavia, the resident finally refused their offers. Some potentates also tried to avoid bankruptcy by abandoning their territory and escaping to another place. Like the Chinese who tried to get cheap opium by moving to the Brooke’s Borneo, some poor local aristocracies in hinterland also managed to flee to his region in search of a better living.

II. Strengthening centralization and local cooperation

Just as the kongsi wars came to an end, the Netherlands Indies was on the eve of profound changes in the political order of the whole colony. In West Borneo interior, the colonial presence was also increasing. As the twentieth century began, Dutch colonial policy acquired a new territorial definition.¹⁴¹ In West Borneo, as tranquility and order emerged after the kongsi war, the Dutch attempted to expand through the interior of West Borneo. J. Ozinga termed the political development during the kongsi war as ‘*pacificatie van de binnenlanden van West-Borneo*’. During this period, the Dutch endeavored to advance up the river and the upland of this region.¹⁴² In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the colonial government began to reach out the interior through territorial regulation, missionary work and scientific expeditions.

¹⁴⁰ Mins van Kol, PV 1913-1914. 2.10.52, fische 421

¹⁴¹ Ricklefs, *A history*, p. 193.

¹⁴² J. Ozinga, *De Echonomsche*, p. 84-5.

Besides assuming control over the Chinese districts, the government converted three areas in hinterland, mainly Dayak territories, into *gouvernement groundgebied* namely Meliau, Tanah Pinoh, Kapuas Hulu—the uppermost settlement in West Borneo about 1000 km from Pontianak. The colonial officers had actually come into contact with this area a bit earlier, since mid nineteenth century. Their intention was mainly to secure the border from any encroachments by the Brooke and—as they portrayed themselves as peacemakers—to put an end to mutual warfare.¹⁴³ However, the colonial exercise in the hinterland became more intensive by the early twentieth century. This eventually put the Dayak under direct rule of the colonial authorities; they were no longer subjected to the local rulers.

In the late nineteenth century, the church started its missions with the cooperation of some Chinese and first concentrated its activities in the port town, Singkawang but with little success. The church was closed soon because of a lack of human resources. After 1900, the government granted permission to start missionary work in as yet some “unoccupied” areas in Borneo—as well as Moluccas, Timor, and Sulawesi. Due to political reasons especially to stem the penetration of Islam, the government even actively supported these missionary activities.¹⁴⁴ Slowly missionary’s work gained pace but only after 1905 the Roman Catholic Church was granted exclusive access to West Borneo.¹⁴⁵ While the mission was growing, the church gave more attention to the Dayak population in the hinterland. Some posts were established in Sejiram (1906), Laham (1907), Lanjak (1909) and Putussibau (1913). The Dayak responded to the church activities differently. For instance, the Iban and Maloh were reported to resist to the church as they considered it not necessary to convert, whereas the other Dayak sub-groups such as Taman even showed hostility toward the mission.¹⁴⁶

However, the missionaries made a contribution to the fight against slavery and to put an end to headhunting. Some missionaries also successfully helped the Dayak to evade the Malay oppression. As Karel Steenbrink notes, in 1930s the most expert missionary called Flavius Huybers advocated the Maloh to defend their land against Minangkabau-Malay who endeavored to possess the land with insufficient compensation.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, an important feature of the Catholic mission in hinterland was that it forged the Dayak identity and

¹⁴³ M. Eilenberg, *At the edge*, p. 89.

¹⁴⁴ Jihar Artonang, Karel Steenbrink, *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, p. 139. Karel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia 1808-1942: A documented history* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003), p. 302.

¹⁴⁵ J. Davidson, *From rebellion*, p. 34.

¹⁴⁶ M. Eilenberg, *At the Edge*, p. 131

¹⁴⁷ Karel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia*, p. 302.

transformed into political consciousness.¹⁴⁸ It also established a CVO (*Cursus Volksschool Onderwijzer*) in Nyarukop—a Dayak-Chinese mixed settlement. It was an extension from a teacher's course programme. Many of its graduates continued to missionary school, Catholic teacher school, or worked as teacher in local schools before emerging as prominent local politicians in the following decades.

The Anglo-Dutch rivalry also instigated the Dutch to consolidate their territory in the borderland. In West Borneo, the government encouraged a number of explorers who were courageous enough to roam the jungle of this region. Of course, their contributions became influential not only for science but also for politics. As P.J. Veth who in 1850s wrote his two compendia about this region to serve the Netherlands' interest on the western Borneo economic prospect, the explorers were also motivated by political aspects. Summarizing the change of the government's view upon the hinterland, Jurrien van Goor eventually argues 'increasing the Dutch government involvement followed a growth of economic activity, while learned societies in the motherland and the colony itself were pressing for the exploration of the unknown part of the greatest islands.'¹⁴⁹ The first largest expedition to reach the upper Kapuas was conducted in 1883-4, led by Professor Molengraaff.¹⁵⁰ The thirty years old medical officer in this expedition, A.W. Nieuwenhuis, was chosen to stay behind for ethnographical research among the Dayak. In 1896-7, after his return from Lombok war, Nieuwenhuis set up another extensive journey from Pontianak in the west to Samarinda in the east that put his name as the first explorer who crossed the Island of Borneo. He repeated the journey in 1898-1900 and therefore he is considered as the most famous explorer in the Netherlands Indies. During his journeys, Nieuwenhuis not only compiled the unknown knowledge of the exotic interior but also brought various inland populations to his political negotiation.¹⁵¹

Thus, in Borneo politics were strongly marked by the intention of Batavia to centralize the power and strengthen its control upon its periphery. By 1900 here and

¹⁴⁸ J. Davidson, *From rebellion*, p. 35.

¹⁴⁹ Jurrien van Goor, "A.W. Nieuwenhuis (1864-1953): Explorer of Central Borneo", in Victor T. King *Explorer of South-East Asia: Six lives* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), p. 231

¹⁵⁰ Initially, smaller expedition had been done by The KNIL major called Georg Müller in 1825. However, this mission failed since the Dayak ambush sent him and his crew to an end. In addition, the story about Georg Müller's expedition was mainly reported by Nieuwenhuis gathered from the Dayak, about 60 years from Georg Müller's death.

¹⁵¹ Jurrien van Goor, "A.W. Nieuwenhuis", pp. 229-80. See also comment of Victor T. King, "introduction", p. xiii

elsewhere in the archipelago about 300 traditional states came under Dutch control.¹⁵² Underlining colonial practice in the late nineteenth century, Carl A. Trocki argues that the colonial metropole tried to ‘domesticating the former ruling class or else or create entirely new classes to perform the mundane functions of colonial government’.¹⁵³ In the case of West Borneo, although the government found it necessary to employ Javanese *pangreh pradja* in order to improve administrative matters of this region, the colonial authority found a form of accommodation with local polities such as the Malay rulers, the Chinese, and the Dayak. It meant that the exercise of colonial control was operated through the indigenous structures, also known as indirect rule. In this regard, contrasting colonial practice of indirect rule in Burma and the Netherlands Indie, J.S. Furnival argues that unlike British in Burma, ‘the Dutch have tried to conserve and adapt to modern use the tropical principles of custom and authority’.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, in an attempt to consolidate the colonial power after the Kongsis wars, the government either created or maintained the existing traditional hierarchy.

Since the VOC period, the Dutch had been acquainted with the role of the Chinese intermediary as shown in Batavia where the Chinese *kapitan* played a pivotal role.¹⁵⁵ This was also applicable in West Borneo where it was initially used to bridge difficulty in communication caused by different languages. Since the Chinese expanded to the hinterland, the needs for a Chinese officer increased. After Kongsis war, the government found necessary to create a new hierarchy. Therefore, they stepped up to form a new Chinese administration consisting of Chinese *kapitans* who were situated in the Lanfang’s former territories; *laothays* who were responsible for smaller settlements and *kaptjongs* who were posted in village level.¹⁵⁶ However, the number of Chinese officers in this region was inconsistent and significantly reduced during the economic malaise in 1930s. In addition, not all of Chinese officers were paid; some of them were even without salary. In return for their service, the government allowed some of them to share in the salt or opium monopoly. The official reports confirmed that those people were poor and less authoritative, hence quite often they asked to resign early.¹⁵⁷ Sometimes their position also brought difficulty as in 1912 when a

¹⁵² D. G. E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia* (New York, 1981) p. 62.

¹⁵³ Carl A. Trocki, “Political Structures in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries”, p. 23

¹⁵⁴ J.S. Furnival, *colonial Policy and Practice*, Cambridge: UK, 1938. p. 10

¹⁵⁵ Mona Lohanda, *Kapitan China in Batavia*,

¹⁵⁶ Initially, the Dutch had employed *kapitan* who were selected associated with the Kongsis, but the taught to be pro-Dutch. Worrying their loyalty, the Dutch changed these appointees *kapitan* by selecting some Chinese who had not connection with the former *Kongsis*. M.S. Heidhues, *Golddiggers*, p. 171.

¹⁵⁷ J.H. van Driessche, 8 December 1912, MvO, N.A. 2.10.52.

number *laothays* and their family were cruelly murdered during popular unrest.¹⁵⁸ However, the help of Chinese officers for the government was instrumental in exercising the colonial authority rule over the Chinese populations, and useful to maintain some administrative matters even to provide intelligence information.

In the case of the Dayak, the government began to bestow traditional positions of authority to each administrative entity by employing cooperative chiefs named *tumenggong* and his second, the so-called *patih*. Not all of those leaders were selected by the Dutch; some of them were chosen by the tribe members themselves.¹⁵⁹ As a consequence, the government could not easily trust these Dayak chiefs. Eilenberg argues that 'the *temenggong* more often than not took the side of kin rather than that of the Dutch'. However, since the colonial power extended its rule and more Dayak were felt themselves to be direct subjects of the colonial government, the role of those Dayak leaders was important. In reality although the Dutch had assumed some Dayak territories under their direct control, the presence of colonial power in Dayak territories remained quite limited. For instance, the government could only post about 12 officers in Putussibau, who were responsible for maintaining a vast area of the unknown. In another case, to find a criminal who had escaped to the Dayak territory, the resident only had few troops at hand.¹⁶⁰ In this and other cases *tomenggongs* and *patih*s played an important role by mediating between the colonial administration and the local population, to resolve various disputes and to provide information to collect taxes conscript, as well.

Despite the Dutch had contributed a lot to curtail the Malay rulers' rights politically and economically after the kongsis wars, needless to say, the Malay rulers were still the main brokers of the colonial authority. While the colonial power had insufficient apparatus to exercise its sovereignty, it continued to depend on those Malay elites. According to Heidhues, since the *korte verklaring* was introduced the political dominance of the Malay rulers was reduced because they became less capable to enforce taxes and corvee. However, what was concluded in the contract did not always materialize into practice. In this regard, Davidson argues that the indirect rule practice actually enabled the Malay rulers to produce revenue and to ensure law and order on behalf of the Dutch through the imposition of taxes and compulsory labour.¹⁶¹ With the implementation of indirect rule, the Malay elites probably

¹⁵⁸ See also The Siauw Giap, "Rural unrest in West Kalimantan, " in W.L. Idema, *Sinica Leidensia*, *Institutum Sinologicum Lugduno Batavum*; vol. 15, Leiden: Brill, 1981.

¹⁵⁹ M. Eilenberg, *At the edge*, p. 91

¹⁶⁰ Min. van Kolonien, *PV*, N.A. 2.10.52

¹⁶¹ J. Davidson, *From Rebellion*, p. 31

still enjoyed their former economic and political position although it was officially reduced. On the other hand, the rulers also depended on the Dutch in order to maintain their legitimacy and to operate the economy. *Rust en orde* was also one of major concerns of those Malay rulers. The Malay aristocracies were very aware with any feasible insurrection. At this point, they became dependent on the Dutch. The following narrative briefly gives an example of resistance to show how this mutual relationship was utilized to survive. To overcome the lack of force, in order maintain *rust en orde*, the government made full use of the information network. Cooperation of locals was very much important to determine the political stability in this region. According to the archival data it appears that a number of rumours circulated. Many of these were reported by local aristocracies.

The government's concerns revolved around such issues as headhunting, local dissatisfaction (caused by taxes, corvee or decreasing revenue), smuggling, undesirable migration, and the like. The *Politieke Verslagen*, however hardly mention anything about the emergence of a nationalist movement. As the preceding periods had concerned the ethnic tension as major problem in this region, traditional feud became less significant in the post war period. Apparently, these did not surface until the end of colonial period. In 1938 Resident Oberman admitted that the traditional feuds still existed but did not give serious problems to the government.¹⁶² Anyhow according to Heidhues nothing more serious happened than what happened between 1912 and 1914.¹⁶³

In the second decade of the twentieth century, some international matters began to worry the government such as the revolution in China (1911) which was assumed of having ties with the Chinese secret societies in West Borneo. All activities related with the Japanese were closely watched too.¹⁶⁴ In the government reports since 1912 onwards, the formation of Chinese Republic frequently appeared in number reports by translating Chinese newspapers or official correspondences.¹⁶⁵ It seems that the government watched the political situation in China, and looked for connections with the Chinese organizations in Borneo. Most of these reports highlighted the *Shubao She* (also referred as *de Soe Po Sia*), a leading Chinese

¹⁶² J. Oberman, NL-HaNA, Koloniën / MvO, 2.10.39, inv nr. 265, (p. 107).

¹⁶³ M.S. Heidhues, *Golddiggers*, p. 163.

¹⁶⁴ For example see NL-HaNA, Koloniën / Geheime Mailrapporten, 2.10.36.06, inv.nr. 3.

¹⁶⁵ H. Mouw, 25 Oktober 1912. Vertaling een bericht, aangetroffen in den grootsche dagbladen van China, de Min Li Pao 12 Februari 1913, aanplakbiljet in Poasar Baroe 23 jan 1913, in Min. van Kolonien, *PV*, 1915-1916, N.A. 2.10.52

reading club based in Pontianak, as a sub-organization of a progressive movement in China called *Tongmeng hui*—the predecessor of the *Kuomintang* or nationalist party.¹⁶⁶

Two insurrections materialized in a short time, in 1912 and 1914. In April 1912, some violence made by Chinese inhabitants broke out in Budok a sub district of Pemangkat. This was followed by a wide spread proclamation insisting people to refuse every obligation levied by the government included taxation and conscript labour.¹⁶⁷ Six months later a number *laothay* were killed and several Chinese settlers were accused for those murders. Two years later in Mempawa, groups of people marched to the town in an early morning and attacked the government offices and burned down the government's opium and salt warehouses. During the action the town was guarded by twelve Dutch soldiers. Threatened, they withdrew from their posts and hid in an empty house of the local authorities that had been emptied by the owner just before the riot broke out.¹⁶⁸ Like some Chinese traders who had fled to Singapore just before the turbulence, the Malay rulers had also preferred to leave the town to find a safe refuge. The effort to overcome the riot had to wait until the reinforcements would come from Java. This only confirmed the weakness of the colonial forces situated in West Borneo.

All of information about the insurrection in 1914 was extensively reported by the acting resident called Henry de Vogel on 27 May 1915.¹⁶⁹ Attempting to present a robust elucidation of the insurrection, Vogel assembled a two-years-bundle of reports that had been collected from various sources. His report nuanced that the insurrection in 1914 was inevitably connected with the wave of the Chinese resurgence sparked by the nationalist movement in China. By doing so, he denied that outrageous taxes and corvée—levied upon the population to support his road building project—had instigated the riot.¹⁷⁰ Interestingly through his report, Vogel tried to convince his superintendent by saying that actually he had

¹⁶⁶ H. Mouw, 25 Oktober 1912. Min. van Kolonien, *PV* 1915-1916, N.A. 2.10.52. The report referred it as *de Tong bing hwe* or *Tung meng Hiu*

¹⁶⁷ H. Borel, 29 Dec 1914, Min. van Kolonien, *PV* 1915-1916, N.A. 2.10.52. The proclamation stated: "Wy, broeders van Chineeschen stam, hebben keer op keer in meningerlei opzicht van den Hollanders een minderwaardige behandeling te verduren en dat reeds sind lang tyd. Telkens weer vernamen wy, hoe de Hollanders, nog niet zoo lang geleden, ellendigen insloten en die berichten deden ons de haren te berge ryzen." ...In dezen toon gaat het door, eindigend met een aansporing, om geen belasting te betalen."

¹⁶⁸ The Siauw Giap, "Rural unrest in West Kalimantan," p.146

¹⁶⁹ Henry de Vogel, 27 Mei 1915. Min. van Kolonien, *PV*, N.A. 2.10.52

¹⁷⁰ De Telegraaf, 2 January 1912. In 12 January 1912, one of the Dutch's expert in Chinese matters Henri Borel—who before he resigned was the head of Chinese affairs in Pontinak—wrote a controversial article in the Dutch newspaper *de Telegraaf*. Borel's article argued that although the Chinese Republic had brought dignity and pride towards the dispersed Chinese including those in Borneo, but that injustice and heavy burdens, especially the tax levied on them, were the source of dissatisfaction which potentially fired the tension in the West Borneo.

detected the feasible turbulence long before the insurgence occurred. Therefore, he referred to the letter from Mohamad Thaufiek, Panembahan Mempawa.

On 17 July 1914, Panembahan Mempawa wrote an official letter addressed to the controller called Laverman reporting wide spread rumours that about brewing resistance and called for government attention and early prevention.

“...the Chinese and the Dayak has bonded together agreeing to rebel against the government. The Chinese will provide money and the Dayak are asked to make the plan executed”.¹⁷¹

However, Laverman did not convince. He categorized this information full of uncertainty and surfaced a political tendency. In this case Panembahan Mempawa asked the authority to seize weapons from the Dayak and to conscript them into a compulsory works to examine their political intention. Eventually, the way in which *rust en orde* was maintained confirms that the local aristocracies depended on the Dutch especially in order to maintain the situation.

To sum up, this chapter shows that in the period after the kongsi wars the cooperation, that previously had been set up by the local rulers and the Dutch, was extended by including the Chinese—the former enemy, and the Dayak especially for civilizing efforts. This arrangement was carried out at some expense of the Malay rulers as the Dutch presence increased and as the economy expanded especially through the growing influential Chinese role. However the government was only able to arrange the power balance by limiting the power of Malay aristocracy which initially had dominated almost all of the substantial aspects in this region such as the local politics and the *hulu hilir* economy. Although the traditional rulers' power was curtailed, and even some of the small rulers collapsed, several local realms such as Pontianak and Sambas were able to maneuver to their own benefit in many unintended ways. In this regard, the great intention of Batavia to extent its control over the periphery during this period was hampered. The colonial government continued to depend on the existing elites to govern the region. This made the ethnic political identities prevail. Each people withdrew deeper in their own ethnic *zuil* (pillar) and became more depended on their ethnic leader. Because the Dutch were unable to bring a real state to all the inhabitants of Borneo, they only institutionalized a system of ethnic bosses in modern Borneo. This system determined the regional politics during the rest of the colonial period, although it was interrupted by the Japanese invasion but then re-emerged just after the Japanese surrender.

¹⁷¹ ...orang cina sama orang Dayak soedah menjadi satu dia punya permoefakatan maoe mendoerhaka dengan dengan Gouvernement. Orang Tjina jang kaloear ongkos dan orang Dajak jang disoeroehnya melawan.

Chapter three

No road to revolution:

The regime changes and the return of the pre-war political system

This chapter touches upon the period after the colonial state collapse and in the early independence Indonesia. It gauges the reason behind the political stance of Pontianak sultanate, as well as the other pro-Dutch entities in West Borneo, to welcome the return of the Dutch in this region. An interesting feature surfacing in West Borneo after the Occupation was the quick revival of traditional power that initially had been badly devastated during the Japanese period. Through a sort of negotiation, the Dutch granted the status of *Daerah Swapradja* to the West Borneo in which the back bone was formed by the former *zelfbestuuren*. This chapter problematizes the reason why the principalities were keen to re-embrace the Dutch. Furthermore, why was the political development of West Borneo strongly marked by the emergence of the traditional authority, the system that the Dutch had entrenched just after the Kongsi Wars had ended?

The political pattern in Indonesian history after the war shows that the short period of Japanese interregnum usually instigated an extreme social transformation in the following period. After the Japanese Occupation, there were a large group of revolutionary Indonesians. They had received military training during the Occupation and were infused with nationalist and anti-Dutch feelings and free from the outsider's control. Those ideas had never been given by the Dutch although many people had been serving for the Dutch royal army. With the anti-Dutch attitude emerging, the return of the NICA after the Occupation was sparking the social revolution especially in Java and Sumatra.¹⁷² In this regard, the revolutionary circle also targeted the traditional aristocracy in order to kick out feudalism which was viewed as an extension of colonial rule. For instance, a great number the traditional elites and their families were jailed and killed in Aceh.¹⁷³ In Java, social revolution occurred almost everywhere and resulted in a massive number of victims.¹⁷⁴ Even, in East Borneo the republicans attempted to maneuver within the political constellation which was played by the NICA. Underlining the situation after the Occupation, Ricklefs argues that the republican were keen on use the

¹⁷² M.C. Ricklefs, *A History*, pp. 268-276

¹⁷³ Anthony Reid, *The blood of the people: Revolution and the end of traditional rule in northern Sumatra*, (Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979)

¹⁷⁴ Anton Lucas, *Peristiwa Tiga Daerah: Revolusi dalam revolusi*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1989). His book convincingly captures "social revolution" in the northern part of Java.

people's power to overthrow the headman of a community and replaced him with a man from their own side, all in the name of 'the people's sovereignty'.¹⁷⁵ As consequence, in major part of the archipelago, local elites with the anti-Dutch attitude were emerging to remove or at least to challenge the old leaders—a holdover of the pre war period—who in majority were yearning for the return of the Dutch.

Interestingly only little efforts were made by the nationalists in West Borneo and only a fragile revolutionary sentiment emerged in this region. Unlike the revolution that occurred elsewhere in Java or Sumatra, in West Borneo the response was relatively muted. Rarely did open fighting occur. None of the ruling sultans was overthrown by people force. Every entity in West Borneo after the war lived in their ethnic pillar and remained strongly connected to their ethnic leaders. On the other hand, only a limited response was given to the newly establish state called Indonesia. Even, after the Occupation, the Dutch were able to return to the prewar system easily. The Dutch's attempt to form a federal state ran smoothly as Davidson said, 'the formation of federal state met with stiff resistance but not in West Kalimantan'.¹⁷⁶ In this regard, the Dutch granted *zelfbestuuren* (*Daerah Swapradja*) to West Kalimantan which showed a contradiction with the other parts in the archipelago. In places where the anti-Dutch and anti-feudalism attitude emerged, the existence of traditional rulers was actually under threat. Even Sukarno's attempt to bestowed his loyalist-aristocracies in Surakarta with a special autonomous status as *Daerah Swapradja* failed due to strong opposition from Tan Malaka's Marxist groups in that region. They assumed that the establishment of *Daerah Swapradja* would only lead to the emergence of feudalism. Additionally, the king of Kasunanan Solo was also reported two times being kidnapped by dr. Muwardi's group called Barisan Banteng (Buffalo Column).¹⁷⁷ But, those kinds of incidents did not happen in West Borneo.

This indicates that the Japanese occupation had only little influence on the social transformation of the region although it had removed the top layer of West Borneo society. This can be understood by explaining the influence of the Japanese occupation on the political developments of this region, either on elite level or in society at large.

¹⁷⁵ M.C. Ricklefs, *A History*, p. 268.

¹⁷⁶ J. Davidson, *From Rebellion*, p. 39

¹⁷⁷ M.C. Ricklefs, *A History*, p. 274. For more elaborative example see Soejatno Kartodirdjo, *Revolution in Surakarta 1945-50: a case study of city and village in the Indonesian revolution*, Ph. D. Thesis Australian National University, 1982.

I. The Japanese interregnum

On 10 May 1940 Germany Nazi attacked the Netherlands. It forced the Dutch Queen and government to flee to London,¹⁷⁸ therefore the mother country could not provide any enforcement in order to defend the Netherlands Indie when the Japanese came to invade in 1942.¹⁷⁹ After the Nazi's attack on the Netherlands, *staat van oorlog en beleg* (the state of the war and siege or SOB) was declared for the Netherlands Indies.¹⁸⁰ To boost the Netherlands Indies' self-defence, the government stepped up the mobilization of military personnel, and increased the budget, as well.¹⁸¹ They stimulated common citizens to participate in the paramilitary and war support organizations such as *Stadswacht*, *Landwacht*, COVIM (*Comite tot Organisatie van Vrouwenar beid in Mobilisatie*), LBD (*Lucht Burger Dienst*), and Pekope (*Penolong Korban Perang - war victim aid*).¹⁸² The more intensive preparation was occurred in East Borneo where the Governor, Dr. B.J. Haga, mobilized the inhabitant into his programmes including form a small corps of well-armed Dayak known as the Barito Rangers.¹⁸³ The *Stadswacht*, as well as *landswacht*, was a popular institution that successfully gathered a large number of recruits from various ethnic groups. Although none account specifically reported the war preparation in West Borneo, evidence from the Japanese occupation reported that the Japanese authority attempted to make use of the paramilitary groups of the pre-Occupation years.¹⁸⁴

On 8 December 1941 morning, the Japanese's Aircrafts bombed the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor and invaded British Malay, then followed by war declaration against US and

¹⁷⁸ Although the Dutch government fled to London, they still attempted to manage the colony from London. See Elly Touwen-Bouwsma, "De Indonesische nationalisten en de oorlog met Japan: houding en reacties" in Petra Groen and Elly Touwen-Bouwsma (eds), *Nederlands Indie 1942: illusie en ontgoocheling*, ('s-Gravenhage: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1992), p.57.

¹⁷⁹ The condition turned out that the Netherlands Indie had to help the Netherlands government in London. Not only giving financial aid to support the queen, the Netherlands Indies also helped the British RAF during battle of London by donating 334.000 pound sterling collected from people, to armament them with some Spitfire aircrafts. *Berita Oemoem*, 29 October 1940.

¹⁸⁰ P. Post (ed), *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War* (Boston-Leiden: Brill 2010), p. XV. As early prevention, about 2.400 German citizens and approximately 500 members of the NSB (the National-Socialist party) were arrested. This was done fairly indiscriminately as also people with mere German family names found themselves arrested. Anyhow this was for the first time that a massive number of Europeans in the Netherlands Indies received a harsh treatment. See in Jeroen Kemperman, "Introduction" in Jong, L. de, *The Collapse of Colonial Society* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), p.27. Jacob Zwaan, *Nederlands-Indie 1940-1946: Gouvernementeel intermezzo 1940-1942* (Den Haag: Uitgeverij Omniboek, 1980), pp. 15-17.

¹⁸¹ L. de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog 11b* (Leiden: Nijhoff, 1984), p.301. See also P. Post, *The Encyclopedia*, p. XVI.

¹⁸² They also assessed any chances to conscript the Indonesian into the *inheemse militie* (the indigenous militia).

¹⁸³ Oei Kat Gin, *The Japanese*, p.23.

¹⁸⁴ Kaori Maekawa, "The Pontianak Incident and the Ethnic Chinese in wartime Western Borneo" in Paul H. Kratoska (ed), *Southeast Asian Minorities in the Wartime Japanese Empire*, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002) p. 159.

Britain from Tokyo. Responding to this attack the Netherlands Indies government declared war to Japan even earlier than the US and British.¹⁸⁵ On 19 December 1941, Pontianak and the other towns in West Borneo were targeted by Japanese bombers. Eventually, this attack killed hundreds of inhabitants. Finally, on 29 January 1942, the first Japanese's ship landed, and West Borneo was entering “*zaman bintang*” (the star era).¹⁸⁶

a. West Borneo society during the Occupation

Contrasting the reception toward the coming of Japanese army in Brooke's Borneo and the Dutch's Borneo, the Malaysian historian, Oie Kat Gin pinpoints that a friendly welcome was shown in the Dutch's Borneo. He based this consideration on the idea that Dutch colonialism was less accepted by the local inhabitants, in comparison with the Malay attitude towards the Brooke administration before the arrival of the Japanese, who were seen by Malay, Chinese and Dayak as liberators.¹⁸⁷ This might be true particularly for East Borneo, but not for the western part of Borneo. Anyhow, for sure, hardships materialized soon after the Japanese army had embarked to West Borneo not only for the Dutch but also for the rest of West Borneo's inhabitants. Since the Japanese documents could not be consulted for this research, the political activities and developments during this period are difficult to determine. Nevertheless, reports provided by the Australian marine intelligence describe that within the first year of the occupation, the road from Pontianak through Kubu was successfully built and heavy machine guns were situated in Pontianak.¹⁸⁸ This confirms the possibility that a massive labor force the so called Romusha were used. Interestingly, unlike the other parts of the former Netherlands Indies such as Java, Sumatra and Bali, the Japanese authority apparently was not really keen on boosting their army by using the local population, and reluctantly mobilized Indonesian society into its programmes.

After nearly six months ruled by the Japanese Army, the Dutch Borneo was transferred to the Japanese Navy's under naval administration called *Minseifu* headquartered in Makassar. As the American historian, George Kanahale, has pinpointed the main policy of the Japanese naval authority had the intention to form strong auxiliary forces in the territories under its control. The best example was Bali where the Japanese authority had attempted to

¹⁸⁵ Peter Post (ed.), *The Encyclopedia*, p. XVI.

¹⁸⁶ Local termed the Japanese time as “Jaman Bintang” because Japanese army wore uniform with a badge of the star.

¹⁸⁷ Oei Kat Gin, *The Japanese*, pp. 72-3.

¹⁸⁸ NL-HaNA, Marine/Tweede Wereldoorlog, 2.12.27, inv.nr. 57, 58

set up the most powerful force in the archipelago by cooperating with the local aristocracies. Yet, this cooperation was quite small in West Borneo. An instrumental attempt to stimulate the society into was done through *Hookudan*, a war support organization said equivalent with *Seinendan* and *Heiho* in other places. However, it only succeeded to mobilize a few hundreds of youth, in majority Malay inhabitants.¹⁸⁹ Their number was insignificant compared with the existing forces in East Borneo. Politically speaking, since the Japanese authority had curtailed existing social organizations in West Borneo, a Japanese sponsored party called *Nisshinkai* was formed. This organization was expected to propagate the Japanese agenda, similar with *Gerakan Tiga A* in Java. Eventually, *Nisshinkai* was also banned due to deep anxiety of the authorities. Anyhow, those facts confirm the lack of local involvement in West Borneo during the Occupation which elsewhere usually became the precursor for the emergence of the republican in the post war period. In this regard, Kanahale argues that apparently the Japanese authority distrusted the local people and therefore they only set up limited mobilization.¹⁹⁰

During the occupation, the Japanese authority relied on the *Kaigun Tokubetsu* (the naval police) or better known as *Tokkeitai*, an instrumental force which was said equivalent with *Kempeitai* in Java.¹⁹¹ But, unlike *Kempeitai* which was considered more professional and had better training, *Tokkeitai* in West Borneo consisted of Japanese teenagers with less military training and it was said to be rather ineffective. Moreover, due to the lack of human resources, these policemen were helped by some Indonesian personnel prepared by the Dutch colonial government prior the wartime who then served the Japanese authority in their old-Dutch-uniforms and weapons.¹⁹²

The Japanese use to be blamed for the abnormally bad economy during the Occupation in the archipelago. Some post-war accounts noted the wide spread of famine and poor health care in West Borneo.¹⁹³ Due to the insufficient rice production in this region, the pepper plantations were converted to produce food supplies. Apparently, rubber plantations, in which number of the Japanese enterprises had operated it since prior the war, were still being continued.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁹ M.S. Heidhues, *Golddiggers*, pp. 200-2

¹⁹⁰ George Kanahale, *The Japanese occupation of Indonesia, prelude to independence*, Ph. D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1967. p. 131

¹⁹¹ Peter Post, "Occupation" in P. Post, *The Encyclopedia* p.155. M.S. Heidhues, *Golddiggers*, p. 201

¹⁹² K. Maekawa, "The Pontianak Incident", p.159.

¹⁹³ H.J. Harmsen, *West-Borneo: Kalimantan Barat*, (Pontianak: 1947) p. 15.

¹⁹⁴ P. Post, "Characteristics of Japanese Entrepreneurship in the Pre-War Indonesian Economy" p. 311

As elsewhere, the Dutch in west Borneo were also facing difficulties during the World War II. All of the Dutch possessions were seized including the Dutch enterprises, newspapers and schools. The Dutch inhabitants, as well as Eurasians, were put in the internment camps. A piece of letter from Sandakan in former British's Borneo written by a KNIL sergeant major after the Occupation expressed the harsh conditions felt by the Dutchmen in Japanese occupied Borneo.¹⁹⁵ About 800 KNIL troops were held as prisoners of war. In the first three months, they were jailed in the Pontianak interment camp. Some troops managed to escape but mostly failed and were recaptured. To deter the rest, three of the escapees were sentenced to death: tortured in front of their comrades and eventually beheaded.¹⁹⁶ In July, the prisoners were removed to Kuching, where they spent the war time as conscripted laborers.

Like the Dutch, the other inhabitants also suffered during the Occupation. The Chinese community, which was economically substantial in this region, suffered the most. They had been at the onset of the war against the Japanese since their homeland had being attacked in 1937. During the Occupation, their possessions were sized and a great number of the Chinese dwellers in West Borneo were killed. Moreover, massive damage was also inflicted on the Malay rulers. Since they had designated their relationship with the Dutch as a comfortable niche for their sustainable sovereignty due to their long history of alliance, during the Occupation they lost not only political dominance but also their sources of wealth. Although the Japanese authority initially allowed the Malay rulers to continue to live in their palaces, the Malay's power had already been attenuated particularly when the Navy began to take control of the region. The Dayak had little contact with the Japanese during the Occupation. It was assumed that the Japanese were not very interested in roaming the jungle-clad hinterland only to meet people that they considered to be inconsequential.¹⁹⁷ However, not all of the West Borneo inhabitants were victimized by the Japanese. For instance, although the Chinese in majority suffered the most, some of them also cooperated with the Authority as translators, guides, informants, speculators or spies.¹⁹⁸ A post-war letter addressed to the War crimes tribunal written by the representative of the Kuomintang party in West Borneo after the Occupation indicated number of Chinese inhabitants having collaborated with the Japanese.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵ Australian War Memorial, Serie Number AWM 54, inv.nr. 41/4/2A. For the digital version of this archive see <http://beeldbank.nationaalarchief.nl/viewer/schaduwarchief/2.22.21/624/0005>

¹⁹⁶ He detailed many kinds of tortured methods such as putting the cigarette's end (filter) into their ears or nose.

¹⁹⁷ J. Davidson, *From Riot*, p. 37

¹⁹⁸ M.S. Heidhues, *Golddiggers*, 210

¹⁹⁹ NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst ,2.10.62, inv.nr. 1304.

b. The massacre and diminishing the elite

While the Occupation had triggered very little social transformation at the lower level of West Borneo's society, the Japanese did significant damage to the local elites. The peak of their suffering began in early 1943 when the Japanese police discovered a clandestine plot to overthrow the *Minseifu*. As the Japanese authority alleged, this plan was arranged by the former Dutch governor of South-East Borneo, Dr. B.J. Haga, from his internment camp. As consequence, more than 200 people were detained, 24 of them were executed after the trial process, and the rest was killed in secret. From their further investigation, the Japanese police claimed that they had found evidence showing a link between "Haga's plot" with another similar plan in West Borneo.²⁰⁰ Therefore, in October 1943 the Japanese began to arrest hundreds of people suspected of anti Japanese attitude in West Borneo. Those people were indicated to be involved in a plot called "Pontianak affair". Having information from those arrested people, the next seizure of even more people then followed in November until January the coming year. Some post-war accounts determined that the number of the captives, arrested from October 1943-January 1944, climbed up to 2000. It did not stop here. Following the "Pontianak affair", in August, the Japanese *Tokeitai* detected the Chinese community in Pontianak and Singkawang had been arranging another rebellious plan named as the "Chinese conspiracy" aiming to set up a Chinese-dominated autonomous state under the Kuomintang government.²⁰¹ To overcome this, the Japanese police arrested more than 300 inhabitants who soon were beheaded in Sungai Duri.

Using these three chains of allegations: the Haga incident, Pontianak affair, and Chinese conspiracy, the Japanese authorities declared war on the ongoing multiethnic of resistance formed by various ethnic groups including Dutch-Eurasians, Malays-Arabs, Chinese, Dayaks, Javanese, Minang, Bugis, Bataks, Ambonese, Manadonese. Regarding the incidents in Pontianak, the Japanese authority accused a former member of Partindo who had turned to communist had bound those ethnic groups to resist against the authority. Therefore, thousands of individuals from various ethnic groups and professions were captured, tortured and finally killed—the majority was beheaded even before facing the judge.

Reporting the incident in Pontianak, in 1 July 1944, the Japanese publication called *Borneo Simboen* revealed the so-called "Pontianak affair". While posting some photos and the list of the perpetrators, the government announced that 'a rebellious` conspiracy against

²⁰⁰ *Borneo Simboen*, 1 July 1944, pp.1-2.

²⁰¹ *Borneo Simboen* (Pontianak), 1 Mart 1945. See also Oei Kat Gin, *The Japanese*, pp.107-8.

the government had been demolished'.²⁰² Included in the list were 12 ruling sultans (during the Occupation called as *dukoh*) in West Borneo with significant numbers of members of the royal families. It was claimed that this group planned to eliminate the Japanese by poisoning them. With the Japanese gone, this group would set up *Negara Borneo Merdeka* (Independence state of Borneo) with the help of the Allies.

The Pontianak incident is called by the local people the *penyungkupan*, an action to seize or kidnap people then to put their head into a sack (*karung*) and to transport the victims using cars with black covers. Interestingly, this was done with the Japanese-collaborators such as some prominent members of *Menseibu* and the Japanese-sponsored youth organization, Nisshinkai, who were raided during their meeting in Pontianak. The majority of the victims “during the Pontianak incident” were the Chinese who made up to 900 casualties; and to lesser extent the various ethnic groups of ethnic Indonesians, about 500—including 12 ruling sultans. Among the other principalities, the Pontianak royal house lost most of its members.

Apparently, the arrest in the Pontianak Sultanate had also been conducted in the most forceful way. In early morning of January 24th, 1944, the Pontianak palace was raided by a group of the Japanese police officers. The seventy-four year-old-sultan, Syarif Muhammad Alkadrie, was considered to be the ultimate target. With him, the Japanese police also arrested no less than sixty royal members. They were transported across the Kapuas River for the last time, and never returned. The police continued to patrol around the palace in order to capture the youngest son of the sultan, Syarif Abdulmuthalib, who had successfully managed to escape from the detainment. Finally, the young noble surrendered after the Japanese police promised him that the sultan would be released in exchange. Outside Pontianak, the arrests of sultans and their royal family were done in more civilized and gentler ways. For instance, the police had to wait for the Sultan of Mempawa to finish his lunch, and in Sukadana they even helped the Sultan to prepare his belongings.²⁰³ However, in the end they met the same fate.

²⁰² Taken from the original title in Malay: “*Komplotan besar jang mendurhaka melawan pemerintah soedah dibongkar sampai keakar-akarnya*”. See *Borneo Sinboen*, 1 July 1944, p.1.

²⁰³ Syafaruddin Usman, *Peristiwa Mandor: Sebuah tragedy dan misteri sejarah*, Pontianak: Romeo Grafika, 2000, pp. 14-20. The author—a journalist and untrained historian—recorded the tragedy by relying his data on oral history. Another fascinating account on the Japanese occupation in West Borneo is a historical novel written by M. Yanis. Although his work is considered as a fictitious account, the narrative is actually based on the true story. During the Occupation, M. Yanis was working in Japanese company named Sumitomo. He diligently noted any event during the Occupation in his diary that in 1986 was issued in a limited number under

After the Occupation, people began to debate the reason behind the killings in Pontianak. The debate revolved around the issue on whether the killing done as a calculated genocide or a senseless massacre. However, post war investigations considered this allege as an implausible and an excuse solely to eliminate these elites.²⁰⁴ Nevertheless, there is the fact that the victims were the ruling king and his family, wealthy Chinese, Dutch speaking and educated people. Within this time a generation of prominent and politically influential figures and dignitaries were removed from the society. Politically speaking, the massacre changed the political landscape of West Borneo in a radical way. Since the traditional rulers had been murdered, in 1944 the Japanese preferred to employ trustworthy bureaucrats such as the acting resident, A. Asikin Noor, newly imported from Bandjarmasin, an anti-Dutch enclave in South-East Borneo.²⁰⁵

II. The weak revolutionary sentiment

The Japanese surrendered to the Allies in mid-August 1945. In Jakarta, Sukarno and Hatta on behalf of the people, proclaimed the Indonesian independence. However, it took a week for the people in Borneo to know the proclamation of Indonesian independence. Soon, red-white flags were hoisted in West Borneo towns and also waved at the Pontianak palace.²⁰⁶ Following the Japanese capitulation in West Borneo, the Australian Army that came with the NICA (Netherlands Indie Civil Administration) embarked on Pontianak on 17 October 1945. It was after two full months of interregnum between the Japanese Occupation to the Ally's control. In the first day report, a Dutch officer informed that no single Dutch flag was waving, whereas red-white and Kuomintang flags were everywhere, even the pictures of Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of Kuomintang, were posted in the towns.²⁰⁷ The Dutch complained to the Australians because they were acting passively thus enabling the republicans to maneuver aggressively. Moreover, the NICA also complained when it turned out that some pamphlets supporting Indonesian independence were circulating that had been brought by the Australian soldiers who had connections with Indonesian nationalist refugees in Australia.

title "*Catatan yang tertinggal*". M. Yanis, *Kapal Terbang sembilan: Kisah pendudukan Jepang di Kalimantan Barat*, (Pontianak: Panca bakti, 1983).

²⁰⁴ For more elaborative debate on the motive behind Pontianak affair see Ooi Kat Gin, "Calculated strategy or senseless murder? Mass killing in Japanese-occupied South and West Kalimantan 1943-1945" in P. Post *Encyclopedia*, pp. 212-8.

²⁰⁵ NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 01292

²⁰⁶ NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 01292

²⁰⁷ NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 01292

On the other hand, at arrival of the Allies and the NICA, A. Asikin Noor, the resident who during this moment was still very pro-republican, instructed the people only to follow the orders from the Australian Army, and to disobey the Dutch. Relying on the Allies to maintain order, he also disbanded the PKO (*Penjaga Keamanan Oemoem*, public security guard), an organization that was expected to watch over the former Japanese warehouse and to guard stockpiles of food and strategic goods. To restore order and to process the transfer of sovereignty, a meeting between the Allies and the NICA with twelve representatives of the West Borneo inhabitants was held on the day of the arrival. The Dutch thought the majority of the people who were attending the meeting, especially the Malay and the administrators who were holdovers from the Occupation, would appear to be pro-republican, whereas the Chinese would be neutral.²⁰⁸ Eventually, since the Allies considered Indonesia to be non-existent and the Sukarno-Hatta government to be illegal, the sovereignty of the former Netherlands Indies was handed over to the NICA. Upon its return, the NICA attempted to re-impose Dutch authority through diplomacy and force.²⁰⁹ However, the political landscape of West Borneo had been reformulated. Whereas the traditional rulers' power had been ruined in the preceding period, three new powers had emerged, namely the republicans, the Chinese and the Dayak.

a. Post-war's powers

Compared with the other republicans in the archipelago, the existing of the pro-republic forces in West Borneo was considered weak. The Dutch intelligence report at the early arrival estimated that about 1000 men republican operated in Pontianak, the majority them Malay.²¹⁰ Later, it turned out that this was an exaggerated number. The major enclaves of the republicans in West Borneo were Ketapang where about 300 former Heiho members were still active, and to a lesser extent Sambas.²¹¹ According to the report, a band of "Pemuda" (youth-republican) in West Borneo was attempting to hamper traffic in the Kapuas River in order to hinder the flow of food supplies.²¹² The report spelled out few names of its ringleaders. Among others, G.I.A. Soedarso, the director of the Missie hospital in Pontianak,

²⁰⁸ Wall, *Officiële Bescheiden betreffende*, deel I, pp. 455-9. NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 01292

²⁰⁹ For a fascinating examination about military aspect during this period see J.A. de Moor, *Westerling's Oorlog: Indonesië 1945-1950, de geschiedenis van de commando's en parachutisten in Nederlands-Indië 1945-1950* (Amsterdam : Balans, 1999)

²¹⁰ Wall, *Officiële Bescheiden betreffende*, deel I, p. 446.

²¹¹ Böhm, *West Borneo*, pp. 36-41

²¹² Wall, *Officiële Bescheiden Betreffende*, deel II, pp. 108-9.

was considered as a key figure within the nationalist circle.²¹³ Having support from Sjahrir, on 18 Mei 1947 he formed GAPI (Gabungan Persatuan Indonesia) to oppose federalism.²¹⁴ Due to his political activity, he was sentenced to jail for six years in 1948.²¹⁵ With him, Abdoelrachman Oemri, a Sumatran who had worked as propagandist during the Occupation, was regarded as another prominent republican leader.

However, politically speaking, there were two full months of vacant power in West Borneo before the Australian Army arrived. That was the moment when the Java-based republicans attempted to consolidate their links and reinforce the power throughout the archipelago. The first attempt of the republicans to boost forces in West Borneo failed since a Javanese former member of KNIL and Heiho called Captain Mulyoto who had been sent to arrange field preparation in West Borneo, was caught before action.²¹⁶ From him, it was revealed that the republican forces in West Borneo depended on the reinforcement from outside, especially from Java. In Yogyakarta, the heartland of the republicans, a group of Borneo migrants who were settled in Java formed IPK (*Ikatan Perjuangan Kalimantan-Kalimantan Struggle Bond*) and published an instrumental magazine under title *Mandau*, taken from the name of the Dayak's machete.²¹⁷ It aimed to stimulate the republicans' struggle in West Borneo against the coming of the Dutch and later also against federalism. This organization also supported the establishment of "Laskar Kalimantan", groups of well armed republicans in Borneo to be incorporated with the TNI (Indonesian national army). In West Borneo, two republican's newspapers called *Terompet Pemuda* and *Suara Rakjat* were circulated daily in Pontianak and Singkawang. Those echoed the republican's voice to give balance toward the Dutch-supported newspaper "Borneo Barat".

Another emerging power in the post-Occupation era were the Chinese. The end of World War II placed China as one of the winners because of its success to defend the country from the Japanese invasion. As elsewhere in South-east Asia, the Chinese militia called *Po An Tui* (*Boandui*) sprang up like mushrooms after the rain. They hoped Kuomintang troops would come to West Borneo and incorporate this region into China's overseas provinces.. The Chinese in West Borneo suddenly became well armed and even dared to force the other

²¹³ Wall, *Officiele Bescheiden betreffende*, deel I, p. 446.

²¹⁴ *Terompet*, 7 January 1947, p. 3

²¹⁵ *Mandau Menuju Kesatuan*, c. 1948, p. 90

²¹⁶ NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 01291

²¹⁷ Perdjoeangan Poetra Kalimantan jang berada diloeaar kalimantan, *Trompet*, 16 Januari 1947, p. 1

inhabitants to bow their body before the Kuimintang's flags.²¹⁸ A couple of clashes between Chinese and Malay-Republicans sparked in Pontianak killing three victims and injuring many others.²¹⁹ In the Chinese population enclaves, such as the Chinese districts, the presence of the republicans was almost none existent, and only in the areas where Chinese were very few, as in Ketapang, did incidents between the Chinese and the republican arise. While comparing Chinese in Java and West Borneo during the revolution, eventually Heidhues argues that the Chinese of West Kalimantan were mostly bystanders in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict, but many of them were active in the struggle for local power.²²⁰

As well as the Chinese, the Dayak were also growing powerfully after the Japanese occupation.²²¹ As reported in 1945, a group of Dayak chiefs marched from their jungle to the Pontianak palace to retaliate against the remaining Japanese soldiers just after the Japanese capitulation. Since their target did no longer exist, their presence made another impact on the sultanate that was being threatened by Malay-based Republican. According to Dr. Böhm's testimony, while storming Pontianak town after the capitulation, the Dayak did not only kill a number of the Japanese soldiers, but also hunted for Malay's heads.²²² Another Dutch report written by W. R. Beeuwkes noted that he had encountered a big parade of the Dayak people in Poetoessibau that tried to show their loyalty toward the Dutch. During the parade, the participants carried a portrait of the queen that had been kept by a Dayak chief during the Japanese period.²²³ Anyhow, since the Dayak were substantial in number and their warriors were feared due to their long history of fighting, the Dayak became a pivotal to determine the power balance in this region.

While the underlining Dayak society was gaining mass power, the Dayak's elites were also forming a political bond. In the past Dayak had been easily subjugated due to the lack of its political bond, but after the occupation, for the first time they became more organized and unity. For their new leaders, the loss of the local elites during the Occupation made the revolution era a propitious time for grabbing power.²²⁴ Some Dayak elite members capitalized on the interregnum to gain a political position. An important step was the

²¹⁸ More about Koumintang and the Chinese political activities after wartime see Rapport van Nica-ambtenaar voor Chinese zaken (Abell), 29 okt. 1945 in Wall, *Officiële Bescheiden betreffende*, deel I. pp. 468-71

²¹⁹ Some crashes, in which the Chinese involved, continued to happen. Those fights also included number of Madurese inhabitants as happen in 1948. Wall *Officiële Bescheiden betreffende*,

²²⁰ M.S. Heidhues, "Bystanders, participants, Victims: The Chinese in Java and West Kalimantan, 1945-46", unpublished material, p. 23.

²²¹ H.J. Harmsen, *West-Borneo*, pp. 4-5.

²²² Böhm, *West Borneo*, pp. 36-41

²²³ Wall, *Officiële Bescheiden betreffende*, deel III, p. 606.

²²⁴ J. Davidson, *From Rebellion*, p. 37.

establishment of DIA (Dayak in Action, latter transformed into [Partai] Persatuan Daya or PD). The emergence of Dayak's party actually reflected the success of the Dutch education and Catholic mission in this region. The founders of DIA, such as F.C. Palaunsoeka; Ovang Oeray; A.F. Korak and Th. Djaman, had revolved around the catholic mission, and since 1941 they had attempted to set up a niche for their political aspiration and movement.²²⁵ With help of a Javanese pastor R. Adikardjana, in the end of October 1945 the Dayak party was formed.²²⁶ Soon, this party successfully gathered about 50.000 members, and issued a magazine titled "*Keadilan*" (justice) that was published three times a week.²²⁷

As Davidson has argued, an interesting feature shaping the Dayak revival was the "Jeffersonian idealism" to oppose colonialism and any kind of oppression which had never been articulated in practice.²²⁸ In reality, the Dayak elites, who owed a lot to the Dutch Catholic mission and school, were keen to attach themselves to the Dutch. Therefore their voices were somehow ambivalent. The best example was the spokesperson of Party Daya—Oevang Oerey who dropped-out from the seminary boarding school in Nyarukop.²²⁹ He condemned colonialism to create an antagonism between Malay and Dayak although the two share the same origins and blood. In another occasion, he declared that 'only with and by the Netherlands might the fate of Dayak be enhanced'. Moreover, he also blamed feudalism, as well as colonialism, that had sent his ethnic group into a backward condition. He said colonialism and feudalism had worked like *suami-isteri* (husband and wife) in order to oppress the Dayak which he concerned as the indigenes of Borneo but who were always treated like foreigners. He emphasized that the oppression by the Malay-supported feudalism upon the Dayak was much worse than the Dutch Colonialism. Paradoxically, he inclined to take cover under the shadow of the Sultan of Pontianak when the latter became the most powerful symbol of feudalism.²³⁰

Regarding the Dayaks' position within the local political constellation, De Rooy—the NICA chief officer of Morotai, underlined:

Behoudens een enkele uitzondering staat de Dajaksche bevolking buiten iedere activiteit en is loyaal tegenover het Nederlandsche bestuur; zij verwacht van ons

²²⁵ Syafrudin Usman, Isnawita M Yahya, *J.C. Oevang Oeray: Harkat martabat dayak pengabdian tiada henti putra Kalbar*, (Pontianak: 2007)

²²⁶ Interestingly, a Catholic-Chinese named Lim Bak Meng became a member of PD. J. Davidson, *From Rebellion*, p. 39.

²²⁷ H.J. Harmsen, *West-Borneo*, p. 5.

²²⁸ J. Davidson, *From Rebellion*, p. 41

²²⁹ Syafrudin Usman, Isnawita M Yahya, *J.C. Oevang Oeray*, p. 9.

²³⁰ *Mandau*, in Davidson, *From Rebellion*, p. 40.

*bescherming tegen de uitbuiting door en het economisch overwicht van de Chineesche en Maleische bevolking (...) die tijdens de Japansche bezetting voor de Dajaks onaangename maatregelen als gedwongen arbeid en padileveranties ten uitvoer moesten leggen. De Dajak verlangt naar rust en orde om zich aan den landbouw te kunnen wijden, doch tevens naar meerdere medezeggenschap in de bestuursvoering over het Dajaksche gebied.*²³¹

Further, van Klinken, quoting the Dutch reporter, has noted that the Dayak, together with the Papuan and the other marginal groups were "backward minorities seeking protection", for this reason they always tried to embrace the Dutch. In this regard, after the Dayak's elites became involved in the Malino conference, their political stance was clear: they were at the end of the pro-Dutch spectrum.²³²

To sum up, the post-war political constellation in West Borneo reflects that the ethnicity became the back bone of the newly emergence powers. People were bound into their own groups based on their ethnic identity as it had been the case prior to the Occupation. The ethnic bossism eventually determined the political situation in the following period. The emergence of Chinese and Dayak found only little opposition from the Malay republicans who, to some extent, quite depended on the help of Javanese republicans. On the other hand the muted response to the revolution, unlike what occurred in Java and Sumatra, enabled the NICA to reconsolidate its power and set up a federal state. However, since almost all of the elites in the West Borneo had been removed during the occupation, the main problem for the NICA was to select the right man who able to facilitate their plan in order to encircling the Republican in Java.

b. The return of the sultan and the DIKB

During its return, the NICA had been encountering great difficulty to penetrate Java and some parts of Sumatra where the anti-Dutch sentiment was firing. Jeopardized in Java, the NICA more focused on the outer-regions particularly Borneo and Great East. Its objective was to create small autonomous territories based on ethnic unit, surrounding the headquarters of the republican.²³³ In West Borneo, the Dutch faced a different political landscape which had badly deteriorated during the Occupation. As the Japanese had killed all of the reigning sultans in West Borneo, needless to say the Dutch had lost their best allies. Reflecting the postwar political situation in West Borneo, dr. Hoven reported:

²³¹ Wall, *Officiële Bescheiden betreffende*, deel III, p.606-7

²³² Gerry van Klinken, "Colonizing Borneo", p. 31.

²³³ See A.J.S. Reid, *The Indonesian national revolution, 1945-1950*, pp. 104-20

"... dat nagenoeg de geheele intelligentie in deze residentie door de Japanners is uitgemoord, zoodat de zelfbesturende landschappen, die het overgrootste deel van het territoir beslaan, geheel "onthoofd" zijn."²³⁴

The man in charge to execute this matter was Lt. Governor-General H.J. van Mook, a Semarang-born Dutchman who spent the wartime in Australia. Additionally, prior the Japanese occupation, he was considered as a hero, the 'saviour of the nation' for his success handling the highly demanding Japanese in negotiations.²³⁵ A closer look to his background, apparently he was a type of moderate Dutch officer. Having been trained in Leiden during the heyday of the ethical policy he was deeply influenced by the ethical ideas of van Vollenhoven and Snouck Hurgronje.²³⁶ He had strong opinions about the colony that people in Indie did not constitute one nation but agglomerated entities which were unified by the Dutch. However, Van Mook believed that the independence for Indonesia had become the aim of the Dutch since before ethical policy. As Robert Cribb has remarked him, 'Van Mook was frustrated by the metropolitan Dutch insistence on restoring authority and on limiting concession to the nationalist during revolution period'. But, on the other hand, his own insistence that the Dutch retain a tutelary role during an extended transition to independence instigated great anger among the nationalists.²³⁷ Above all, van Mook assumed that establishing *rust en order* was the main priority in order to resolve the Indonesian-Dutch conflict post-Occupation.

Handling the situation in West Borneo after the transfer of power he ordered the NEFIS' director S.H. Spoor that "*Het zeer gewenst [is] het uiterste te doen om de westerafdeeling in de hand te houden*".²³⁸ Since coercion would only instigate more counter-act; and potentially end up in bloody turbulences by which *rust en order* could not be established, a sort of negotiations should be engaged in. Whereas in Eastern Indonesia the NICA employed the top-bottom model, considering the ethnic divergence of West Borneo, apparently bringing all of the ethnic entities to the negotiation table turned out as an effective strategy.²³⁹ In doing so, van Mook acknowledged two kinds of republicans namely extremist and moderate. Extremists was considered people with a strongly anti-white attitude, mostly

²³⁴ NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv.nr. 3174.

²³⁵ L de Jong, p.30. Since early 1940 the Japanese had been urging proposal, followed by imposing threat, to the Netherlands Indie government in order to obtain concision for mineral exploration especially oil. Whereas the Dutch government in London reluctantly accepted some demands and the Governor General of the colony was under threat, van Mook eventually sealed deal with pride for standing to the Japanese.

²³⁶ Yong, Mun Cheong, *H. J. van Mook*, p. xx

²³⁷ R. Cribb and A. Kahin, *Historical dictionary of Indonesia*, pp. 278-9.

²³⁸ Wall, *Officiële Bescheiden betreffende*,

²³⁹ Gerry van Klinken "Colonizing Borneo" p.30.

Japanese collaborators and therefore no reasonably dealing could be sealed with this group. He included in this circle nationalists such as Sukarno, Hatta, even the sultan Yogyakarta. The moderate group consisted of people who could be approached to resolve the Indonesian-Dutch conflict as Sjahrir.

In West Borneo, the Dutch deemed officials, such as the residents and mayors, to be part of the moderate group. Many approaches were employed to lure those people. In November 1945, an official letter claimed that the Dutch had successfully gained total support from the resident and the majors. Latter, the former resident, A. Asikin Noor spent the rest of revolution period roaming the rivers, visiting the remote hamlets in hinterland to propagate the agendas of the federal state. However, since these the Japanese holdover administrators had never been the actual patron for the West Borneo feudalistic society—mostly they were newcomers, without primordial legacy, even somehow hated due to their previous Japanese collaboration—their importance was only to disable the republican to maneuver through the administrative system in this region.

An important step for the Dutch political action in West Borneo was to restore the sovereignty of the traditional aristocracies who were considered still very loyal to the Dutch, but at the same time felt under the threat of the republicans. As the traditional rulers re-emerged, they could be useful to mediate the negotiations between the Dutch and the various ethnic groups in West Borneo. In the first day of their return, the Dutch saw the Pontianak sultanate was still politically pivotal among the other principalities. The man on the throne of the Pontianak sultanate was Syarief Taha Alkadrie, the distant-grandson of the former sultan who had survived the Japanese Massacre. He was the representative of the traditional rulers during the meeting with the allies. The Dutch officers saw him as a teenager king, apparently less than 18 years olds, who well maintained relation with the republican but without having special opinion toward this group.²⁴⁰ Apparently the young sultan of Pontianak did not meet the Dutch's expectation.

The best candidate to represent the West Borneo society in the negotiation went to another son of the former king who survived the massacre. He was Syarif Muhammad Abdul Hamid Alkadrie, a KNIL officer who just released from jail after had spent three and a half years during the war imprisoned in Java.²⁴¹ In a secret return to surprise his people as the

²⁴⁰ Wall, *Officiele Bescheiden betreffende*, deel I, pp. 456. NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 01292

²⁴¹ NL-HaNA, Alg. Secretarie Ned.-Ind. Regering, 2.10.14, inv.nr. 3174. Wall, *Officiele Bescheiden Betreffende*, deel II, pp. 441-2.

report said, or probably to avoid republican ambush,²⁴² this flamboyant KNIL captain embarked to Pontianak in the end October 1945 to receive the crown of the sultanate and to be bestowed with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of the Dutch royal army.²⁴³ Indeed, the figure of Sultan Hamid II fitted the Dutch, but only in the beginning.

Assessing the situation after the inauguration of Sultan Hamid II, the Dutch officers praised him in an optimistic tone. Reports said that the presence of Sultan Hamid II had undoubtedly contributed to 'kick the nationalist's wave out to the sea'.²⁴⁴ Moreover, the Dutch claimed that the presence of Sultan Hamid II made their authority accepted easily by the people therefore, as General Spoor expected, in the near future the sultan should be involved to more important political actions rather than solely kept him sitting on the throne.²⁴⁵ In this regard, Sultan Hamid II also played a pivotal role to handle sort of negotiations with the Dayak. Sultan Hamid's position in the army as a high-rank KNIL officer enabled him to recruit Dayaks to serve for his forces and to fill other posts in police department. He also succeeded to approach the Dayak's elites as Oevang Oerey who in 1946 companied him attending Malino conference.

Although he had spent most of his life in the military, the new sultan was now considered a new player in the Indonesian political arena, and only by 1945 his name was widely known.²⁴⁶ This perhaps held also true for the people in Pontianak, considering he had shortly stayed in Pontianak, about five years during his babyhood. The rest, he had been outside. The first three following years were spent in Singapore raised by Miss S. Fox and Miss E.M. Curties, his two British nannies.²⁴⁷ When he was an eight years boy, he moved to Yogyakarta to study in the elementary school. In this town he met Raden Mas Dorodjatun, the crown prince of Kasultanan Yogyakarta who latter known as Hamengkubuwana IX.²⁴⁸ In

²⁴² The Dutch intelligence was considering a plot to annihilate him that almost been materialized through the hands of M. Djadjadi, a republican assassin from Pangkalanboen-Kota Waringin. Wall, *Officiele Bescheiden Betreffende*, deel III, pp. 605-6

²⁴³ NL-HaNA, Buitenlandse Zaken, 45-54, 2.05.117, inv.nr. 14051.

²⁴⁴ Wall, *Officiele Bescheiden Betreffende*, deel I, p.

²⁴⁵ Wall, *Officiele Bescheiden Betreffende*, deel I, p

²⁴⁶ See comment from another (Mr) Hamid Algadrie (a Javanese-Arab descendant who was a fanatical republican and the founder of Partai Arab Indonesia) about Sultan Hamid II. As prominent figure in Indonesian-Arab, Mr. Hamid Algadrie said the he only knew Sultan Hamid II in 1945 when the Sultan of Pontianak asked hem to arrange meeting with Sjahrir, one of the first Indonesian politician who met the sultan. Latter, they would meet each other again in prison. Hamid Algadrie, *Suka Duka Masa Revolusi* (Jakarta: UIP, 1991), pp. 62, 65-7.

²⁴⁷ Frans Dingemans, *Hamid II Alkadrie Sultan van Pontianak: Zijn rol tijdens de Indonesische revolutie 1945-1950*, doctoraalskriptie, Instituut voor Geschiedenis Utrecht, 1989, p. 7.

²⁴⁸ Prasadja, *Proces Peristiwa*, p. 98. They met again in the Netherlands when Sultan Hamid II was being trained in Breda and Hamengkubuwana was studying in Leiden.

1926, Hamid Alkadrie took his secondary education in Bandung and managed to continue his study in the technical academy at the same town. But, before graduated, in 1933 he went to the Netherlands to join KMA (*Koninklijk Militaire Academie*) at Breda. In 1936, he was sworn in as a 2nd Lieutenant of the KNIL and firstly stationed in Malang East Java. Before the war he served the royal army in Manggar near Balikpapan, but since the town was felt under the Japanese control, he was ordered to boost the Dutch's anti-panzer detachment in Central Java.²⁴⁹

In this regard, The Dutch worried about the sultan's the religious background. His opponent apparently attempted to defame the sultan by making use of religious sentiment. Frequently, the republican accused him of being an impious Moslem as having the Dutch education background, serving for the queen, also marrying a Dutch lady. Moreover, having been raised by British and Scottish nannies, Sultan Hamid II was said not only fluently speaking English but also knowing Christianity.²⁵⁰ If this was true, it could make him absolutely ineligible for the Pontianak crown, an Arab house—a Moslem state that gained the legacy from Islamic world. Concerning this issue, General Spoor expected that the sultan would get help from the legacy of his devoted-Moslem ancestors, to whom the inhabitant in this land owed their religion.

While he was active in the national politic, the sultan was actually trying to win over the people's obedience in his early years of reigning the Pontianak sultanate. To some points, it was related with his legacy as a ruler of an Islamic court. In order to approach the Malay "floating mass", for instance, the sultan arranged a number of religious events and rituals. He invited groups of *hadra*, a collective supererogatory ritual, to perform in his palace but then asked them to take of the oath of allegiance to the sultan under Al Quran.²⁵¹ In 1947, he did hajj to Mecca facilitated by KNSM (*De Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij*). In his return from Mecca, he spent a couple days to make a state-visit in some countries in Middle-East with the financial aids from the Dutch royal house.²⁵² Additionally, the Dutch council in Cairo made use of his visit for propaganda by introducing him as an official guest from 'the independence traditional-state' called Pontianak which was gently struggling against groups of resistance supported by Japan referring the nationalist. In 1947, calling memory over people misery and cruelty during the Japanese Occupation he built a

²⁴⁹ NL-HaNA, Buitenlandse Zaken, 45-54, 2.05.117, inv.nr. 14051.

²⁵⁰ Frans Dingemans, *Hamid II*, pp. 7, 20

²⁵¹ Kami tida' bersenang hati, *Trompet*, 16 Januari 1947. p.4

²⁵² NL-HaNA, Buitenlandse Zaken, 45-54, 2.05.117, inv.nr 24679

statue in Mandor, a place where the massacre was done. Later, he invited Van Mook to announce the statue officially. Coincidentally, in the relatively same time, leaflets calling public opposition against the alliance between the Dutch and the sultan saying that he would levy heavy taxes as well as propaganda written by a certain Misawa—a Japanese—triggered resistance in society.²⁵³



Photo of Sultan Hamid (left) and Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX (right) taken by Charles Breijer during the Inter-Indonesian Conference in Kaliurang Yogyakarta. Sources: the Nationaal Archief photo collection.

Meanwhile, a conference was held at Malino in July 1946 aimed to assemble the federal states. Apparently the Dutch were surprised that their plan met the expectation of thirty-nine representatives of the traditional aristocracies, Christians and several ethnic groups of Borneo and East Indonesia who were keen to continue connection with the Dutch. Eventually the conference agreed on the formation of a state in Kalimantan and another for East Indonesia.²⁵⁴ In this case, the plan to form a single Kalimantan state was grounded by the stubborn enmity between Sultan Hamid Alkadrie and Sultan Parikesit from Kutai (East-Kalimantan). The two kings pushed so hard to be the *walinegara* (president) of the Kalimantan State. Later, it turned out that Sultan Parikesit was maintaining a link with some

²⁵³ NL-HaNA, Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, 2.10.62, inv.nr. 01296

²⁵⁴ M.C. Ricklefs, *A History*, p. 275

nationalist leaders in Java particularly Sjahrir.²⁵⁵ Their agenda was to use Kalimantan Timur as a political vehicle of republicans and to hinder political maneuver of the federalist through a single state of Kalimantan.

As a win-win solution, the Dutch eventually agreed with the formation of two states that divided Kalimantan into Negara Kalimantan Timur (East Kalimantan State) and Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat (DIKB—West Kalimantan Special Region)—a *swapraja* state. Sultan Hamid II led the DIKB, whereas his rival was taking charge in the east. It meant that van Mook's design to form one Kalimantan federal state had failed.

On 12 May 1947 the DIKB was officially formed. It was governed by a council consisted of forty members as the representatives from the traditional rulers and the major ethnic groups in West Borneo. Additionally, before the DKIB was set up, the Dutch agreed to convert three former *gouvernements gebieden*, namely Kapuas Hulu, Meliau and Tanah Pinoh, into three neo-landschappen (*zelfbestuurende landen*), and re-included another government-land in Tanah Seriboe into the Pontianak sultanate's territory.²⁵⁶ As a consequence, the traditional rulers, which formerly consisted of twelve sultanates, obtained three more seats in the DIKB council. The rest went to the Dayak (eight members), the Chinese (eight members), the Malay (five members), and the Dutch and Indo-European (four members). Nevertheless this, DKIB still reflected the traditional aristocracy dominance.

Without any balance from the other local elites, Sultan Hamid II had enough room to maneuver and therefore he became much more dominant. By this time, he became more demanding. Sometimes, he made decisions on his own. Van Mook himself was also dissatisfied with the sultan's contribution and the other federal-delegation during the New York conference in 1947. Regardless the stiff refusal to admit the federal-state delegation to involve in the conference given by United Nation, those people also only explicitly gave general situation about political situation in Indonesia instead of to plea the Dutch.²⁵⁷ Furthermore, at the Inter-Indonesian conference held in Yogyakarta, Sultan Hamid II showed his willingness to cooperate with Indonesia under the condition that the state be governed as a federal state.

Assessment about the role of the sultan during a number of conferences was given by Neher, the Dutch supreme board delegation. He reported that the Sultan had given significant contribution during the meeting as he had a clear mind, but the sultan surely had to be kept

²⁵⁵ Burhan Magenda, *East Kalimantan*, pp.39-40, 42-3.

²⁵⁶ H.J. Harmsen, *West-Borneo*, p. 1.

²⁵⁷ Yong, Mun Cheong, *H. J. van Mook*, p. 116.

from levity and fickleness.²⁵⁸ Moreover, in his letter to dr. L.J.M. Beel, Neher said “*Wij mogen niet vergeten, dat de sprong van subaltern naar Kolonel en Sultan een beetje groot en in te korte tijd is gemaakt en ook niet, dat hij in onze moeilijkste period bereid was om alles te doen...*”

As the sultan of Pontianak became increasingly demanding in the view of the Dutch, it turned out that the traditional aristocrats attempted to reassert their former possessions and strengthen their sovereignty, that had been devastated during the Occupation, through the DIKB council. On 10 May 1948, Sultan Hamid II in his position as the head of DIKB approved the resolution made by the federation of the principalities (“*Gabungan kerajaan-kerajaan*” in which he was also acting as the leader of the federation) on regulating the relation between the traditional authority and the DKIB. While they ceded a number of administrative matters to the council, they asked some other to be retained into their authority including: the internal affairs of each principalities, a court within the traditional jurisdiction, principalities police, possession of lands, forest products and villages, religion and customary law. Moreover, the resolution urged the DKIB to contribute 50% of the annual total expense of the principalities.²⁵⁹

Needless to say, as one of the most influential figures in the federal states, Sultan Hamid II was involved in number of conferences to resolve the Indonesian-Dutch conflict. However, his involvement on the national level eventually put the sultan’s political adventure to an end. Although he had gained a robust political position in West Borneo without significant resistance from the local republicans, he could not withstand against pressure from outside.

After the round table conference in 1949, the Dutch had to surrender sovereignty to the Republic United State of Indonesia (RUSI) which meant that all of the existing federal states should be incorporated into the new nation. During this period, Sultan Hamid was invited to sit in the national cabinet as minister. Although he had another choice to work in The Hague as a member an Indonesian-Dutch commission, surprisingly he decided to stay and took position as a minister without department which meant without any substantial jobs.²⁶⁰ During working as minister in RUSI cabinet, his remarkable contribution was only to design the national symbol of Indonesia—Garuda Pancasila. Politically speaking, he was

²⁵⁸ Wall, *Officiële Bescheiden Betreffende*, deel XIV, p. 453

²⁵⁹ *Besluit Gabungan Kerajan-kerajaan*, 10 May 1948

²⁶⁰ NL-HaNA, Spies, 2.21.402, inv. nr. 22.

becoming too far from his favorite position: the ministry of defence.²⁶¹ In this position, the Leiden graduated Sultan Hamengkubuwana, who he had known since his boyhood, was in charge.

A number of political changes occurred after the Roundtable Conference, yet one of the most sensitive issues revolved around military. As the conference had concluded, the RUSI's national army (APRIS-*Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat*) would be formed based on two existing forces: the TNI as backbone and the Indonesian KNIL soldiers as complement. This had instigated widespread fear among the former KNIL officers especially minority group such as the Christian, Manadonese and Ambonese.²⁶² In this regard, prior to the conference, Sultan Hamid had voiced a strong opinion that federal states should be allowed to maintain its own army. In 1950, the RUSI government planned to deploy a group of RUSI Army which consisted of the TNI but excluded the Indonesian KNIL members to be posted in Pontianak.²⁶³ Concerning this problem, Sultan Hamid strongly opposed the plan. Of course, as a KNIL officer, the deployment of the TNI did not meet his expectation.²⁶⁴ To mediate this matter, the Vice president, M. Hatta, went to Pontianak but unfortunately his journey did not resolve anything except that the minister of defense agreed to put his decision on hold for a couple months.

On the other hand, the republicans in West Borneo were welcoming the TNI that obviously would empower them. Since the end of 1949, the anti-federalism movement was increasing in the contrary the DKIB was decreasing. The republicans formed the *Komite Nasional Kalimantan Barat* (KNKB) that instigated a number of strikes to urge the DKIB to be dissolved. Moreover, they began to menace the sultan and treated him as a traitor. Later, during his trial, the sultan expressed his pathetic feeling as 'after having seven generations devoted their lives to the land (Pontianak), now people were provoked to kick him out from his land'.²⁶⁵ In Sultan Hamid's opinion, the republican political maneuvers had put him in the

²⁶¹ During the trial he denied that he was keen to take this position. Even he retorted some testimonies on it such as given by Anak Agung Gde Agung and Najoan. However, before the Roundtable Conference, he had conveyed this plan to General Spoor.

²⁶² See Najoan's Testimony on Prasadja, *Proces*, pp. 74-83

²⁶³ He had disappointed to found that the former KNIL members did not hold strategic position in the ministry of defense but only handled some administrative works (*hanya bekerja di belakang meja*).

²⁶⁴ In this case, he preferred to argue in his position as the head of the region. Considering the situation in West Borneo in which tranquility and order had been prevailing, he assumed to deploy thousands republicans did not make sense. Moreover, he was also disappointed that the minister had not consulted him before, but directly sent an order to facilitate the TNI with housing.

²⁶⁵ Prasadja, *Proces Peristiwa*, p.180.

trouble. He even wrote a letter to the Queen of the Netherlands begging Her Majesty to put intervene in the inter-Indonesian conflict in order to save the continuation of federalism.²⁶⁶

This problem eventually led the sultan of Pontianak to a more complicated scandal. In January 1950, Sultan Hamid called the APRA's commandant named Raymond "Turk" Westerling—who was responsible for massacre in Sulawesi during the *politionele acties*—and a Manadonese police intelligence named Frans Najoan to his room in Hotel des Indes.²⁶⁷ With the help of them, Sultan Hamid arranged a plot to kill three important persons in RUSI cabinet. According to the plan, it would be done during a cabinet meeting. Its objectives were to arrest the president; the vice president and the other ministers, but to kill Hamengkubuwana IX (the minister); Ali Budiadjo (secretary general of the minister of defence); and T.B Simatupang (military commandant). To cover the scenario, the sultan would receive light injuries, shot in his leg or hand.²⁶⁸ This plan never been materialized because a day before the scenario was designed, Westerling with his troops launched a coup in Bandung that killed about 86 TNI members and civilians.²⁶⁹ Since the two had been maintaining relation in which Westerling had ever asked the sultan to take commando of the APRA, Sultan Hamid was also accused of being involved in the Bandung incident although during trial he denied the accusation. On 6 April 1950, the sultan of Pontianak was detained, and three years later he was sentenced to prison for ten years. As the king was being jailed in Java the Pontianak sultanate was dissolved as well as the DKIB that was disbanded in Mart 1950.

²⁶⁶ His letter could be found in Prasadja, *Proces*, pp. 116-19. See also the documents collected by Paul Spies in NL-HaNA, Spies, 2.21.402, inv.nr. 22.

²⁶⁷ J.A de Moor, *Westerling's*, pp. 426-29

²⁶⁸ It based on the testimonies given by Sultan Hamid and Najoan. See Prasadja, *Proces*, pp.65-6

²⁶⁹ J.A de Moor, *Westerling's*, pp. 437-469, Kahin, George McTurnan, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952, p. 454-6.

Conclusion

In some parts of outer island during early Indonesia independence, revolutionary sentiment rang silently such as in West Borneo and other eastern parts of Indonesia. The case of West Borneo is one of the most remarkable in the Indonesian historiographical discourse especially due to the role of Sultan Hamid who provided stiff support to the return of the Dutch. Whereas in the other part of Indonesia Java and Sumatra showed great endeavor to remove feudalism and clientelism, in West Borneo the opposite emerged. Unlike the general pattern in the early independent Indonesia in which the revolution swept the traditional rulers away—killing some and humiliating all, the people of West Borneo re-embraced their old patrons who in turn were welcoming the return of the Dutch. Actually, during the short Japanese interregnum, the traditional sovereignty in West Borneo was devastated: all of the ruling sultans were killed, together with some prominent royal members. Interestingly, the surviving royal elites were reinstated soon after the capitulation and the pre-war political system based on ethnic bond was restored. This research has attempted to explain this paradox by tracing back almost a hundred years political dynamics of this region, focusing on the two rapid changes: after the kongsi wars and after Japanese occupation.

An important feature in the regional politics of the region inhabited by various groups of ethnic groups was the traditional feud. The Malay rulers successfully dominated the local politics and economy through their superiority in the *hulu-hilir* system. However, the hulu hilir system actually had predatory characters by which the Malay rulers submerged the other ethnic groups such as the Chinese and the Dayak, and also endeavored to expand their territory over the other local polities. As a consequence, to ensure the existence of their power, those Malay sultanates were keen on find outside assistance. The Pontianak sultanate is one of the best examples. This newly formed principality of the *hadrami* stranger king quickly assumed its power with the help of the Dutch and other outsiders. Their relationship with the Dutch became deeper and more complicated after the Chinese kongsi federation became more powerful. Therefore the sultans invited the help from the Dutch as well as the British.

Having overcome the Chinese kongsi federation through a series of wars, the political landscape of this region in the post war was determined by the Dutch who intended to

strengthen their power. The Malay rulers had to give up their privileges in hulu hilir system, but due to the lack of colonial power to reach the edge of the state, the political arrangement in West Borneo after the kongsi wars only enabled the Dutch to exercise authority and control this region through local elites. Thus these local rulers were able to continue in power beyond Dutch control. Therefore, while the Chinese were enjoying their economic role on trade and plantation, the traditional rulers were playing their political intermediaries position. During this period, co-dependence between the colonial government and the local elites of each ethnic groups was firmly established. While the Dutch needed the cooperation of the local elites to govern this region indirectly, those elites also called for the colonial power to ensure their economy activity or political position. By doing so, people in majority did not link directly to the state but through political brokers by which political power was institutionalized within the ethnic political identity. This system eventually entrenched ethnic bossism and strengthened patron client relationships which are even preserved in Borneo's politics today.

Another important change happened when colonial state collapsed by the Japanese invasion. In West Borneo the Japanese failed to be the precursors for the republicans and to cut off the traditional-clientelistic bond between the elites and their people. Since during the Japanese occupation almost all of the local elites were removed, the Dutch faced little choice during their return in the post-war period. Therefore they called one of the most suitable candidates called Sultan Hamid, who had served in the KNIL. The return of Sultan Hamid met only a weak resistance and he played quite a significant role in the beginning but then became increasingly demanding later on. Regardless his role, the political dynamics of this region after the war was determined by the return of the pre-war system by which people patronized their elites and therefore the traditional aristocracy which had been devastated during the Japanese quickly reemerged.

Tracing back nearly a hundred years of the political developments of this region, this research argues that two rapid changes in West Borneo—the periods after the kongsi wars and the Japanese occupation—contributed to the weak sentiment toward Indonesian revolution and the reemergence of clientelism during revolution period. In this regard, the Japanese occupation did not lead to social transformation but only damaged the top level of West Borneo society. The presence of the Malay based republicans was weak and even had to be reinforced from Java. Moreover, the society still lived within the grip of ethnic strife and therefore the Dutch could easily restore the pre-war system by granting the people with a self governed state. In the post Kongsi wars period, the colonial state failed to penetrate and to

directly exercise power in this region. As consequence, it energized the ethnic political identity which was mainly based on patron-client system. The indirect rule system deeply strengthened the ethnic bonds, hence the people of West Borneo in majority usually felt as a part of their ethnic group instead of as citizen of a nation state.

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