The Pragmatics of Prayer

A linguistic-pragmatic approach to the Liturgy of the Catholic Mass

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Thesis

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Abstract

I contrast naturally occurring conversation with the Liturgy of the Catholic Mass, focussing on speech acts, implicatures, the intersubjective/argumentative nature of language, and on uncooperative communication. This comparison allows me to determine what the characteristics of Mass are as an *activity type* (Levinson 1992), and to reflect from a Wittgensteinian point of view on the philosophical implications of the results gained. Ultimately, I show that human communication with the divine, i.e. prayer, closely resembles interpersonal communication in the ethical realm.

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AMDG

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'How are we taught the word "God" (its use, that is)? I cannot give a full grammatical description of it. But I can, as it were, make some contributions to such a description; I can say a good deal about it and perhaps in time assemble a sort of collection of examples.'

A diary entry by Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1949 (1984: 82)

Introduction: 'Don't think, but look!'

In the following pages, I will prove that faith in God in many respects is not very different from faith in other people, that confessions in prayer are strongly akin to the apologies we make to our fellow humans, and that hope for divine mercy is really not that different from our natural longing for human forgiveness. Furthermore, I will illustrate that where these matters *do* differ, they give us a refreshing look into the purpose of religious beliefs and practices. To do all this, I will take a linguistic-pragmatic approach to the Liturgy of the Roman Catholic Mass, based on the assumption that if pragmatics tells us how we do things with words, a pragmatic study of the Liturgy will tell us how we do things with the Word.

I will start from the idea that ordinary, everyday conversation is the 'natural habitat' of language, and that liturgical language is a deviation from the default situation. By describing both, I will show where and how liturgical language deviates from ordinary language, thus laying bare, as it were, the function Mass performs in the everyday lives of believers. Put differently, I will determine what the characteristics of Mass as an 'activity type' are.

Some elucidation is in order here. We know since Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* that human linguistic communication crystallizes into all sorts of different *language-games*. As is typical of him, Wittgenstein refuses to give a definition of what a 'language-game' is, but simply states that 'the question of "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?"' (1953: §108). If we wish to know what a word means, we must not look at what it refers to, but at how we use it. 'Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our activities' (1975: §229), and in order to see clearly what it means, we have to take the activities in which we talk into account as well, as one word may have as many meanings as uses. More recently, Levinson coined the term 'activity type' (which is roughly analogous to 'language-game'), to describe how our activities 'constrain what will count as an allowable contribution to each [linguistic] activity [and] help to determine how what one says will be "taken"' (1992: 97). The 'paradigm examples' given by Levinson are 'teaching, a job interview, a jural interrogation, a football game (…), a dinner party, and so on'. He locates each type along 'a gradient formed by two polar types, the totally prepackaged activity, on the one hand (e.g. a Roman Mass) and the largely unscripted event on the other (e.g. a chance meeting on the street)' (ibid.: 69-70).

In the first two chapters of this paper, I will compare precisely these two polar types. As said, I will regard naturally occurring conversation, such as a chance meeting, as the default form of human linguistic communication. We talk a lot – 'on average perhaps 16.000 words and 1200 turns at talk a day' (Levinson 2016:

6) – mostly in spontaneous, unscripted interactions. These can be categorized into all sorts of 'games' or activities, as shown by Wittgenstein and Levinson, but in this paper I take their shared features to distinguish them as a single overarching category of everyday conversation. The Liturgy, on the contrary, is a *text*, and as such Mass is indeed scripted in advance. This feature is a fundamental deviation from the standard use of language, one that must have a use of its own. There will be more of such telling differences, which I will line up and describe at the end of chapter 2. The past six or seven decades have seen the emergence of many linguistic-pragmatic theories on why everyday conversation is what it is. I will dedicate chapter 1 to a chronological overview of some of these theories, in order to lay bare five aspects of conversation. These aspects will function as a background in chapter 2 against which we can hold the Liturgy. Such a comparison will allow us to see where the Liturgy and ordinary conversation diverge, and what it is we do in Mass that we do not do in everyday talk.

Let me explain the relevance of such an investigation. The last couple of decades have seen a number of interesting biological, psychological and cognitive accounts of religious belief (Boyer 2001, Dawkins 2006, Dennett 2006, Hitchens 2007), most of which are critical, to put it mildly. These publications are doubtlessly necessary in the 21st century. Considering the evident dangers of modern religious fundamentalism and the long history *and* actuality of religious warfare, we will have to agree with Dennett that we 'can think of no more important topic to investigate' (2006: 7).

Nevertheless, it has always been my modest though firm conviction that these scientific explanations of religion are in at least one way completely besides the point: they treat religious behaviour as being grounded on false beliefs, whereas it may, as I will show in this paper, be primarily rooted in interpersonal relations between people (i.e. ethics, for lack of a better term) and the passions involved in such relations – which have nothing to do with epistemological beliefs in any primary sense. More specifically, these critical theories try to show that religion is flawed by proving that God is non-existent and even a 'delusion', while, as we will see, belief in and assertion of the existence of (the omnipotence of) God are not as central to religion as these theories assume. Thus, my view is opposed to scientism, and is basically in line firstly with fideism, the epistemological notion that religious belief is a *sui generis* phenomenon that cannot be reduced to other rational processes (James 1982), and secondly with functionalism, the anthropological view that religious behaviour needs not be explained through other types of behaviour (Radcliffe-Brown 1952).

As said, the present paper is a *linguistic-pragmatic* approach to Mass as a religious phenomena. One reason for this is that I found my own view most clearly reflected in the writings of a philosopher of both language and religion,

who has been associated both with fideism (Nielsen 1967) and functionalism (Clack 1996), namely Ludwig Wittgenstein. We will deal with Wittgenstein's philosophy in more depth in the third chapter. However, to illustrate the main purposes of this paper it is necessary to turn briefly to his *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough.*

James Frazer's *The Golden Bough* (1890), a famous landmark of Victorian study in mythology and religion, aims to show how mankind allegedly progressed from magical practices through religious rituals to scientific investigation. Wittgenstein criticizes Frazer for having a 'narrow spiritual life' (Wittgenstein 1993: 125) and for being 'much more a savage than most of his savages, for (…) *his* explanations of primitive practices are much more crude than the meaning of these practices themselves' (ibid.: 131). Frazer makes the magical and religious views of mankind 'look like *errors',* i.e. as bad hypotheses, faulty science, to which Wittgenstein famously replies: 'Was Augustine in error, then, when he called upon God on every page of the *Confessions*? (…) The very idea of wanting to explain a practice seems wrong', because 'compared with the impression which the thing described makes on us, the explanation is too uncertain'. Instead of striving to come up with a rational explanation for religious and ritualistic behaviour, 'here one can only *describe* and say: this is what human life is like' (ibid.: 119-123). It is important to note that such a refusal to provide explanations is a good example of how Wittgenstein deals with philosophical problems in general. His basic method of investigation is a strict critique of 'a mode of questioning that perhaps first came to explicit expression in Socratic questions such as "What is piety?" and "What is justice?"' (Franks 2006: 26). As philosophically challenging as such questions may seem, they are 'wrong' in that they take words and concepts that make perfect sense within the context of a particular language-game *out* of that context, to subject them to an 'investigation of essence' (ibid.: 27). In the words of Wittgenstein:

> *'When philosophers use a word – "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? – What* we *do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use'* (1953: §116).

If we want to know what the meanings of words are, or the essence of the things they refer to, we should not think of the words as entities with one reference, but as 'tools in a tool-box' (ibid.: §11) that may serve many purposes. For those who wish to know what uses our words have, Wittgenstein has a piece of advice that is

once again typical of his lifelong adherence to the principle of *simplex sigillum veri*: 'Don't think, but look!' (ibid.: §66).

The purpose of the present paper, then, is twofold: first, in chapter 1 and 2 we work towards a description of Mass as an activity type, second, in chapter 3 we use this description as an overview in order to determine how some of the liturgical keywords, such as 'God', are being used within the language-game of Mass. The main question, therefore, can be formulated as follows: *how does the language use in the Catholic Mass differ from naturally occurring conversation, and what do the differences tell us with regards to the pragmatics of religious language, and the use of some of the keywords of the Liturgy*? In sum, my aims are:

(1) to show in chapter 1 the complexities involved in everyday conversation, by paying attention to different (conversational) speech acts, implicatures, the intersubjective/argumentative nature of language, and to uncooperative communication,
(2) to contrast these complexities in chapter 2 with the language of the Liturgy, by applying the same theories to the Catholic Mass, determining as such what the characteristics of Mass are as an activity type,
(3) and to reflect in chapter 3 on the philosophical entailments of our results, with regards to fundamental issues such as the reality of God or the nature of salvation, by looking at how liturgical keywords related to such issues are being used in Mass.

This structure reflects our purposes: the first chapter will serve as a background for the second chapter, and both will in turn serve as a background for chapter 3. Ultimately, I will contend that Mass functions primarily at the interpersonal level, within the ethical domain of responsibility, guilt and forgiveness, and that as such the ritual closely resembles simple examples of everyday interaction between people.

To conclude, a bit more on corpus and theory. Why the Catholic Mass, and why a linguistic-pragmatic analysis? As for the first question, the main reason is simply that I am most familiar with it. However, I also believe that, due to its old age and highly eclectic nature (Chidester 2000: 73-78), Mass may serve perfectly as an example of any ritual, and that the results of this investigation will in some respects be the same for analyses of other liturgical texts or rituals. Therefore, the word 'prayer' in the title of this work should be seen as a broad term, referring to human communication with the divine in general, in both social and personal contexts. As for the second question, there are a number of reasons to opt for a

linguistic-pragmatic analysis. As mentioned above, a pragmatic analysis of the Liturgy will tell us what people *do* in Mass, as opposed to what they say. Secondly, numerous scholars have applied linguistic pragmatics (especially Speech Act Theory) to religious language before, but more recent developments in linguistics (such as on the notion of intersubjectivity) have been applied to this subject only rarely (Hilborn 1995: 430). Thirdly, since our comparison will not only point out where the Liturgy and ordinary language diverge, but also where they overlap, I believe our results will tell us something about language in general as well. Especially in the third chapter, we will see that our investigation may shed its light in two directions. Consequently, this paper is as much about language as it is about religion.

1.

The complexities of conversation

There is a growing consensus among linguists nowadays, that 'spontaneous dialogue between two or more people', should be regarded as the 'fundamental site for language use' (Clark 1996: 318). Everyday conversation is 'the core ecological niche for language, and still its primary use and the locus of its acquisition' (Levinson 2016: 6). Basic human linguistic communication is a 'turn-taking' process (Schlegoff 2007), in that it naturally involves a speaker saying something to a hearer, with the latter taking over the role of the former and saying something back. Tomasello argues that human language actually grew on top of a pre-linguistic 'highly complex, species-unique, psychological infrastructure of shared intentionality' (2008: 60) and 'as part of a broader adaption for collaborative activity and cultural life in general' (ibid.: 324). In other words, language must have emerged initially in teleological interaction, and kept on developing mainly there for perhaps thousands of years. Even the syntactic structures of language, including a phenomenon such as recursion, may have emerged from and may still get shaped by dialogue (Levinson 2013, Du Bois 2014). Even more strikingly, recent research has shown that the conversational model may actually underlie not only language but even human cognition in general (Pascual 2014). Socrates seems to have been thinking in the right direction, when in Plato's *Theaetetus* he described thought as a 'conversation of the soul'.

Then again, in its current shape this idea is not even a century old. The main idea had always been that language is fundamentally a means of exchanging information (Verhagen 2004: 9). Philosophers of language were primarily interested in what happens when a speaker says something to a hearer, and under what circumstances such utterances were true or false. This approach found its epitome in Logical Positivism, with as its major promoters philosophers such as Frege, Russell, the early Wittgenstein, and Ayers. It was not until Austin, among others, reacted against Logical Positivism, starting a line of thought that was later dubbed 'Ordinary Language Philosophy', that philosophers of language started paying attention to the way people use ordinary language in everyday situations. As things stand now, the pragmatic dimension turns out to be much more important for the semantic, grammatical and even syntactical ones than thought – or at least the latter three cannot be fully understood without taking the former into account (Verhagen 2005, Tomasello 2008, DuBois 2014). The purpose of this chapter is to sketch the complexities involved in conversation. In order to do this, we will give a brief chronological overview of some of the more important

philosophical and linguistic theories of ordinary language that emerged throughout the 20th and 21st century.

1.1 Speech acts

In 1955, J.L. Austin gave twelve lectures at Harvard University, which were published posthumously in a collection titled *How To Do Things With Words* (1962).[1] In these lectures, Austin reacted against the logical positivist standpoint that a proposition could only be meaningful if its truth can be verified. Such a view unrightfully discarded ordinary language as unimportant, focussing solely on non-natural languages such as logic, mathematics and scientific discourse. For Austin, this was a mistake, since ordinary language had to be ordinary for a reason, i.e. had to be correct or at least functional in its own right. Also, Logical Positivism overlooked the fact that language is not only used to *describe* the world, but also to *act* in the world (Chapman 2011: 50).

Austin developed his theory throughout the twelve lectures, ending up in a different place than where he started from. First of all, he gave a number of examples of sentences that allow speakers to *do* things, instead of merely say something:

(1) I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.
(2) I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.
(3) I give and bequeath my watch to my brother.
(Austin 1962: 5)

In each of these examples, the speaker performs an act (christening a ship, betting with somebody, giving away something in a will) by uttering a sentence. Instead of describing a state of affairs, these *performative* sentences constitute a state of affairs. Whereas the examples in (1)-(3) may not seem so ordinary after all, there are other examples of performative utterances that are used by speakers on a more daily basis, such as 'I apologize', 'I object', or 'I give my word' (Levinson 1983: 228).

Probably the most important of Austin's insights is his distinction between three types of *force* that all utterances have, and that allow speakers to perform three kinds of acts:

[1] I will in some cases refer to Levinson's *Pragmatics* (1983), in addition to the primary works of the authors who we will be discussing, due to the efficiency of Levinson's examples.

(i) *locutionary act*: the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense and reference
(ii) *illocutionary act*: the making of a statement, offer, promise etc. in uttering a sentence (…)
(iii) *perlocutionary act*: the bringing about of effects on the audience by means of uttering the sentence (…)

(Levinson 1983: 236)

To give just one example: when someone says 'It's freezing in here!' to another person sitting by the open window, this performs (i) the *locutionary act* of saying something, (ii) the *illocutionary act* of directing someone to closing the window and (iii) the *perlocutionary act* of getting someone to close the window (and/or annoying someone by bossing them around etc.) From such observations, it becomes very clear why Austin was right in attacking logical positivist thinkers for their obsession with language as a tool for description. Even such a simple sentence as 'It's freezing in here!' conveys different kinds of meaning that have nothing to do with truth or falsity, but that help people communicate in ways that are fundamental for everyday interaction.

Austin's theory was in many respects perfected by J.R. Searle, who coined the term 'speech acts'. What the term refers to for Searle coincides mostly with Austin's notion of 'illocutionary act', meaning the act a speaker performs *in* saying something. Searle distinguished between five basic illocutionary acts (see table 1 on the next page). We will briefly explain the criteria in the three rightmost columns. The *illocutionary point* of an utterance is the function it performs in a communicative interaction. For example, a request and a command have the same point, namely to get somebody to do something (Searle 1976: 3), and as such they are directive acts. The *direction of fit* of an utterance means whether its propositional content aims to match a state of affairs in the world (*words-to-world*, as with representatives, e.g. 'The earth revolves around the sun'), or whether it tries to change (a state of affairs in) the world (*world-to-words*, as with directives and commissives, e.g. 'Close the window!' or 'I'll pick you up at five'). Expressives have no direction of fit, because 'the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed' (ibid.: 12). Declarations correspond to Austin's performatives, in that they *establish* facts in the world. This means they have both directions of fit, in that they make something to be the case, which is the case if and only if these required words are uttered. The *sincerity condition*, finally, is 'the psychological act expressed in the performance of the illocutionary act' (ibid.: 4). When a person asserts that p, he therein expresses the *belief* that p, and when he requests someone to do p, he expresses the *desire* that the other person does p.

Illocutionary act	*Illocutionary point*	*Direction of fit*	*Sincerity condition*
Representatives (e.g. asserting, concluding)	to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something being the case	words-to-world	belief
Directives (e.g. requesting, questioning, commanding)	to get the hearer to do something	world-to-words	want (wish, desire)
Commissives (e.g. promising, threatening, offering)	to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to some future course of action	world-to-words	intention
Expressives (e.g. thanking, apologizing, congratulating)	to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs (…)	Ø	?
Declarations (e.g. declaring war, christening, firing from employment)	to bring about some alternation in the status or condition of the referred-to object(s)	words-to-world and world-to-words	Ø

Table 1: an overview of illocutionary acts (Searle 1976, Levinson 1983: 240)

These are the basic things we do with words. Crucially, Searle concluded his investigation by saying that 'often, we do more than one of these at once in the same utterance' (ibid.: 22-23). For example, if someone utters the expressive 'Brrrr!', this may well be at once an expressive ('I'm cold'), a representative ('It's cold in here') and a directive ('Close the window'). In this case, the expressive is a *direct* speech act, and the representative and directive are *indirect* speech acts (Levinson 1983: 263). The crucial point of Speech Act Theory (SAT) is that speakers in even the most ordinary interactions are not so much merely exchanging information *by* saying things, but are constantly performing actions *in* saying things, with the actions performed often outnumbering the things explicitly said. Everyday conversation as such is a highly complex form of 'joint action' (Levinson 2016: 1). In the next paragraph, we will discuss how Conversation

Analysis further developed SAT, by proving that there is an even higher density of speech acts to be found in excerpts of simple conversations.

1.2 Speech acts in Conversation Analysis

As revolutionary as SAT may seem, 'research (…) boomed for little over a decade (in the 1970s and 1980s), and then went out of fashion' (Levinson 2016: 2). However, in Conversation Analysis, a number of interesting observations have been made that seem to prove that Searle's classification is not exhaustive.

Conversation Analysis (CA) broke away from the sociological school of ethnomethodology in the 1970s, as an attempt to do away with 'unmotivated theoretical constructs and unsubstantiated intuition' (Levinson 1983: 295). Conversation analysts aim merely to transcribe real-life conversations, focussing on the bare structural patterns in the data. The results have proven to be surprising, to say the least: conversations are richly structured, showing dozens of complex and recurring patterns. CA's main critique of SAT is that it 'inherited from traditional philosophy the single act or utterance as its fundamental unit' and overlooks 'the sequential infrastructure of talk-in-interaction' (Schlegoff 1988: 61). Austin and Searle based their classifications on 'arm-chair' examples, not on actual recorded data of naturally occurring conversations. Because of that, they overlooked a number of crucial features of real-life talk, such as its interactional structure of 'adjacency pairing' and all sorts of purely conversational acts.

An adjacency pair consists of an initiation and a response, such as greeting-greeting, offer-acceptance, question-answer. One pair is 'composed of two turns by different speakers, [which are] adjacently placed (…) [and which] are relatively ordered into first pair parts and second pair parts' (Schlegoff 2007: 13). Here is a simple example:

(4) A: Would you like a cup of coffee? (First Pair Part)
B: No, thanks. (Second Pair Part)

One important aspect of adjacency pairs is that second pair parts can be used to identify first pair parts. Consider the following example:

(5) A: She says you might want that dress I bought, I don't know whether you do.
B: Oh thanks, well, let me see I really have lots of dresses.
(Levinson 2016: 8)

It is only from the *thanks* in B that we learn that A was an offer, because there was nothing in A that indicated this. Levinson calls this *thanks* a speech act, because 'this is how we check that we are understood – we expect a response of a certain type' (ibid.).

Adjacency pairs can be expanded in three positions:

← Pre-expansion
A First Pair Part
← Insert expansion
B Second Pair Part
← Post-expansion
(Schlegoff 2007: 26)

Within these expansions, speakers often perform actions that are purely conversational, such as pre-invitations, go-aheads and repair-initiators. We will look at these three examples.

An example of a pre-expansion is a *pre-invitation*, such as 'Are you doing anything tonight?', which is 'ordinarily understood (…) as a preliminary to a possible invitation' (ibid.: 30) and not as a request for information. Other examples of pre-expansions are pre-offers and pre-announcements.

An example of a *go-ahead* is 'what' in the following conversation:

(6) A: Did you hear the terrible news?
B: No. What.
(Levinson 2016: 11)

As Levinson points out, 'describing [A] as a question would miss its basic function, namely to check whether a news announcement should be made; line [B] makes clear it should' (ibid.). The 'what' in B tells the speaker of A to 'go-ahead' and announce the news.

A basic example of a repair-initiator is when someone says 'Excuse me?' because he or she could not make out what another person was saying.

It is important to note that the different expansions within adjacency pairs can be adjacency pairs themselves, and that insert expansions can have insert expansions, so that first and second pair parts get separated by other pairs. This centre embedding of adjacency pairs gives conversation a recursive structure (see Levinson 2013 for examples of such 'pragmatic embedding').

Here is a fictional example of an ordinary conversation through the lens of CA:

Conversation	Expansions and speech acts
1 A: Are you doing anything tonight?	← *pre-exp.: pre-invitation*
2 B: Not really. Why?	← *pre-exp.: go-ahead*
3 A: You want to go ice skating?	← *first pair part: offer*
4 B: I'm sorry?	← *insert exp.: repair initiator*
5 A: You want to go ice skating with me?	← *insert exp.: repair*
6 B: Well, I'm not really into that.	← *second pair part: decline*
7 A: Okay.	← *post-exp.: sequence-closing third*
8 B: Yeah.	← *post-exp.: pre-closing*

Table 2: a fictive conversation containing an adjacency pair with pre-, insert- and post-expansions

Notice how in the left column there are five questions in a row, which in Searle's account would perform roughly the same act, whereas in the right column we see that for CA each of these questions performs a different conversational act. The core issue here is that 'all speech acts are necessarily interactional in character' (Levinson 2016: 9). Whereas Searle's theory provided us with an overview of the five basic actions interlocutors may perform in hypothetical situations, CA shows that actual interlocutors in spontaneous conversation perform all sorts of purely procedural actions as well.

1.3 Conversational implicatures

As we have seen, SAT explained how speakers may perform multiple actions in one utterance. Another way to talk about this is to say that speakers sometimes *mean* something different than what they *say*. So when I say 'It's freezing in here!', and you close the window, this can only happen if you grasp right away that my words convey some sort of pragmatic meaning along with their semantic content. In 1975, H.P Grice published an article called 'Logic and Conversation', which aimed to describe 'the nature and importance of the conditions governing conversation' (1975: 43). Grice focussed on the difference between two levels of meaning, namely what is said and what is implicated (ibid.: 58). The reason that hearers are able to grasp implicated meanings that are wholly absent from the explicit content, is that they always assume the speaker to adhere to what Grice dubbed the Cooperative Principle:

> *Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged* (ibid.: 45).

Speakers are at all time expected to be cooperative, so that any utterance has to convey at least *some* relevant meaning. Deviations from the principle carry meaning in themselves, and these are what Grice calls *implicatures*. He goes on to distinguish four maxims and submaxims, which function as 'guidelines for the efficient and effective use of language in conversation' (Levinson 1983: 101):

Category	*Supermaxim*	*Submaxims*
Quantity	Ø	1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the present purposes of the exchange). 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
Quality	Try to make your contribution one that is true.	1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Relevance	Be relevant.	Ø
Manner	Be perspicuous.	1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 2. Avoid ambiguity. 3. Be brief. 4. Be orderly.

Table 3: Grice's four basic maxims of conversation (ibid.: 45-46)

These maxims are the reason why conversation, and more generally human communication, is a coherent and successful affair nine times out of ten. Participants in a conversation assume that the other is loyal to the cooperative principle, hence to the maxims in table 3, and most of the time rightly so. Whenever one participant says something that at first sight seems uncooperative, or 'besides the point', the meaning of that utterance must be somewhere else than *in* the words. Flouting or violating one or more of the maxims adds extra layers of meaning to explicit content. For example, when 'at a genteel tea party, A says *Mrs. X is an old bag* (…) and then B says *The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't it?*, B has blatantly refused to make what he says relevant to A's preceding remark (i.e. B has openly flouted the maxim of Relevance, TZ) [and] thereby implicates that A's remark should not be discussed, and, perhaps more specifically, that A has committed a social gaffe' (Grice 1975: 54).

Another interesting aspect of (some) implicatures is that they are cancellable, which allows for a strategic type of language use. Here is a good example by Pinker (2007: 394): when I get pulled over by a police officer for speeding, and I

say to him: 'Maybe the best thing would be to take care of it here', he may righteously infer that I flouted the first maxim of Quantity (and/or the second maxim of Manner) by omitting from my utterance the more explicit suggestion of bribery. Now, if the officer were honest and would wish to arrest me for bribery, I could simply cancel the implicature and say that it was not what I meant at all.

Grice showed that language contains a whole dimension of implicit meanings, communicated through subtle or blatant manipulations of conversational maxims. The underlying mechanism that makes this possible is the cooperative principle, i.e. the mutual assumption of speaker and hearer that they are participating in a joint activity, and that they act accordingly. In the next paragraph, we will discuss how this notion of cooperation has been developed further.

1.4 Intersubjectivity and argumentativity

One thing that sets humans apart from virtually the entire animal kingdom, is 'our ability to 'take another's perspective'' (Verhagen 2005: 2). This ability forms a foundation for the 'fundamentally cooperative nature of human communication' (Tomasello 2008: 6). Because human beings are able to see others as intentional agents like themselves, they are remarkably good at detecting *intentions* in the behaviour of conspecifics (i.e. recognizing the illocutionary points and sincerity conditions in the communicational behaviour of others). This is why humans are capable of communicating by pointing and pantomiming, as well as by other forms of body language, such as direction of gaze or facial expression: although the communicative signal may be extremely simple – e.g. a pointing index finger – the cooperative principle makes it transparent for both sender and receiver that something is *meant* with the gesture (e.g. 'Look at that!'). Cooperation-experiments with chimpanzees and human children, involving such basic communicative signals as pointing, have led Tomasello to conclude that:

> *'[h]uman cooperative communication is more complex than ape intentional communication because its underlying social-cognitive infrastructure comprises not only skills for understanding individual intentionality but also skills and motivations for shared intentionality'* (2008: 321).

Now, as Verhagen points out, if human communication is fundamentally a joint activity 'then we should also expect that it has repercussions for the content that is systematically coded in linguistic symbols (words and constructions)' (2005: 4). If language has emerged and developed further over time mainly in interactional settings, words and constructions should display a fundamental *intersubjectivity*,

rather than *subjectivity*. We will explain these terms briefly, showing how the roles they play differ in terms of *construal*.

The term *subjectivity* refers to a twofold complex: on the one hand it means that 'the conceptualization by a subject is distinguished from the 'object' of conceptualization (…), [o]n the other hand it means that the choice for words and constructions is often 'personal', 'not shared'' (ibid.: 4-5). Langacker points out, as quoted by Verhagen, that 'the relationship between a speaker (or hearer) and a situation that he conceptualizes and portrays, involve[s] focal adjustments and imagery' (ibid.). This relationship is what Langacker calls *construal*, and it is because of this that whenever we represent a state of affairs by speaking about it, we inherently represent, or construe it in *some* way as opposed to other possible ways (e.g. active/passive, word order, temporal aspect etc.).



Figure 1: The subjective construal configuration (ibid: 5)

Figure 1 is a schematic representation of this relation. The speaker is represented by the V (viewer), the construed state of affairs by the top-circles. The vertical line corresponds to the construal relation between subject and object, which determines the configuration of the represented state of affairs.

Intersubjectivity is in nearly all respects the same as subjectivity, except that it incorporates the cooperative nature of language, and recognizes the fact that speakers in the vast majority of cases construe a linguistic signal *while taking the hearer into account*. Verhagen represents this relation as in figure 2:



Figure 2: The intersubjective construal configuration (ibid: 7)

In this view,

> *'[t]he point of a linguistic utterance, in broad terms, is that the first conceptualizer invites the second to jointly attend to an object of conceptualization in some specific way, and to update the common ground by doing so'* (ibid.).

The notion of 'common ground' (Clark 1996) will be crucial later, so I will expand on it for a moment here. To interpret a speaker's utterance it is not enough to know what it refers to. We must also 'be able to determine: what is [the speaker's] intention in directing my attention in this way? But to make this determination with any confidence requires (…) some kind of joint attention or shared experience between us' (Tomasello 2008: 4). In order to understand what somebody wants to achieve with a communicative act, you have to be able to take their point of view – which is only possible if you share at least some 'form of life' (Wittgenstein 1953: §23). In Clark's words:

> *'Everything we do is rooted in information we have about our surroundings, activities, perceptions, emotions, plans, interests. Everything we do jointly with others is also rooted in this information, but only in that part we think they share with us'* (1996: 92).

This shared information is what Clark calls 'common ground'. One important dimension of common ground is that two interlocutors do not only share it, they also know of each other that they know that they share it. Clark defines this as 'common ground (reflexive): *p* is common ground for members of C if and only if: (*i*) the members of C have information that *p* and that *i*' (ibid.: 95).

Focussing again on intersubjectivity, there is one major implication of this aspect of language. If it is true that interlocutors in conversation regard their activity as a joint attempt to reach a certain goal or understanding, and that language therefore fundamentally involves a sort of *we-intentionality* (Searle 1995), then it may well be true that '[human] language is also fundamentally a matter of regulating and assessing others, with exchange of information perhaps being secondary' (Verhagen 2005: 9). The word 'also' here means 'as with communication in other species'. As Owings and Morton have shown, animal communication is built on a *dyadic* relationship between speaker and hearer (Verhagen 2008: 308). In the case of the alarm calls of vervet monkeys, for example, which alert conspecifics that a predator is approaching, there seems to be no reason to think of these calls as *referring* to the predator. Instead, the meaning of such a call is simply to direct conspecifics, i.e. to instantly change

their conduct to a more alert one. Due to the intersubjective nature of human communication, it seems that our language may well be such a *dyadic* system too, with built into it, as it were, a referential, *triadic* system involving a speaker, a hearer and an object of joint attention (ibid.). Chimpanzees also use an 'intentional structure comprising the communicator's social intention as his fundamental goal, and his "referential" intention as a means to that goal' (Tomasello 2008: 50-51). Projected onto Verhagen's model of intersubjectivity, this view can be clarified by saying that language mainly functions at the intersubjective level, as represented by the horizontal line between 1 and 2, and that the vertical line (construal) and the upper-horizontal line (the description of a state of affairs) are merely means to an end:



Figure 3: The fundamental dyadic relation between speaker and hearer

One theory that lines up perfectly with this view, is that of *argumentativity*. According to this theory, normal language use is never just informative, but always 'argumentative', meaning that

> *'the default condition for ordinary expressions (...) is that they provide an argument for some conclusion, and this argumentative orientation is what is constant in the function of the expression, while its information value is more variable'* (Verhagen 2008: 311-312).

Not only is human language fundamentally an intersubjective affair, it is also inherently an argumentative affair. In addition, for the same reasons that Verhagen expected the intersubjective nature to surface in linguistic structures (construal), he expects this for the argumentative aspect as well. One famous example of an utterance that may seem merely informative, but really conveys an argumentative meaning, was given by Ducrot and borrowed by Verhagen (2005: 11):

(7) There are seats in this room.
(a) But they are uncomfortable.
(b) # And moreover, they are uncomfortable.

In (7), an argumentative inference would be that there is a certain amount of comfort in the room. This shows from the fact that when this inference is cancelled, the additive conjunction gives an infelicitous result, as in (7b). Therefore, 'an addressee has to take the utterance of [7] as an attempt by the speaker to induce inferences of a specific kind; that is, as an operation in dimension S (the intersubjective dimension, TZ) of the construal configuration' (ibid.: 12).

1.5 Uncooperative communication

Something that may already have become quite clear from the theories mentioned above, is that language is an exquisite tool not only for cooperation but also for deception, misleading and manipulation. If there is a principle for cooperative communication that we can or cannot adhere to, there is, needless to say, also such a thing as uncooperative communication. Quite little attention has been paid to this dimension of language yet, but recently work has been done to fill the gaps.

Oswald states that 'the Gricean framework is unsuited to fully capture a phenomenon as complex as deception' (2010: 100). Of the greatest importance, perhaps, is his observation that if language is fundamentally cooperative, in order for deception to be successful, there needs to be an underlying level of cooperation for deceptive utterances to work. Put simply, if I lie to you by saying I did not take the money from your desk, in order for that lie to work and deceive you (as an example of uncooperative communication), you need first to understand the meaning of my words, grasp my reasons for saying them, recognize any possible implicatures etc. – which in the Gricean framework requires cooperation. Oswald solves this paradox by distinguishing between three types of cooperation. First, *communicative cooperation* (CC) is a 'minimal level of cooperation' that functions as a 'default assumption language users make about the 'upcoming' and expected meaningfulness of locutions (or verbal contributions) in the conversation' (ibid.: 21). Second, *informational cooperation* (IC) is 'cooperation in the making, transmission and interpretation of meaning', and as such constructs 'the actual, dynamic (…) meaning in conversation' (ibid.: 27). This is the level of cooperation on which the mechanisms exposed by Searle and Grice function. Whereas CC constitutes the 'mere possibility' of the transmission of meaning, 'the goal of IC is to ensure that a *specific* meaning gets across' (ibid.: 29). The top-level is *perlocutionary cooperation* (PC). As the term

'perlocutionary' already suggests (see paragraph 1.1), this level of cooperation is concerned with the extra-linguistic goals of interlocutors, i.e. the effects speakers wish to bring about with an utterance.

It is at the top-level that deception comes into play, because 'we witness in everyday conversations, particularly in situations where interests between speaker and hearer conflict, that conversational participants do not work jointly towards a shared goal' (ibid.: 32). Therefore, Oswald defines deception as 'a covert failure to PC-cooperate' (ibid.: 101). When I lie to you about not having stolen your money, CC and IC are necessarily successful (for otherwise there could be no communication at all); however, because it is my goal to have you believe something that is not true, and because you are not aware of that goal, we do not cooperate at the perlocutionary level.

We will look at one more striking example of uncooperative communication, before moving on to an overview of this chapter. Meibauer describes lying 'as a speech act in which the liar has the intention to deceive the addressee about the facts and about their own beliefs' (2014: ix). He relates how it is possible to lie with implicatures, and illustrates this with the *Story of the Mate and the Captain* (ibid.: 123). Suppose a captain and his mate on board of a ship get into a quarrel. The captain, who never drinks, accuses the mate of drinking too much. The next morning, the mate writes the following entry in the ship's logbook: 'Today, October 14th, the captain is not drunk'. What is interesting about this example is that whereas the mate's entry in the logbook is true, the implicature it conveys is false. In Meibauer's words:

> *'[A] reader will understand that this is an exception because the captain is usually drunk (...). The calculation of the implicature starts from assuming a presumptive violation of the maxim of Relevance, for entries in logbooks must be relevant'* (ibid.).

There are many more dimensions to Oswald's and Meibauer's accounts. For our present purposes, however, it is sufficient to take over from their works the crucial observation that although human language is fundamentally a cooperative affair, this does not mean that it cannot be used uncooperatively.

1.6 Five aspects of conversation

So, why 'the *complexities* of conversation' as the title of this first chapter? What is the red line running through each of the theories we discussed in the previous paragraphs? Can we point out a number of fundamental aspects of naturally

occurring conversation that these theories lay bare? I distinguish five of such aspects:

1. *Action* – It becomes clear from our overview that conversation is a form of action. SAT has shown that interlocutors in a conversation may (sometimes unconsciously) perform all sorts of acts in speaking, and that these acts need to be recognized by hearers in order for speakers to achieve what they intended to do. Additionally, CA revealed that speech acts are inherent to the structure of even the most basic conversations, and that even at the micro-level of a single adjacency pair, the acts performed by an utterance may be crucial for the conversation to continue successfully. Furthermore, the argumentative view of language shows how seemingly purely descriptive utterances may have an underlying argumentative meaning, and that language is a tool primarily for directing others – which is of course an act. Finally, it was shown by Oswald and Meibauer that uncooperative communication works on the perlocutionary level of cooperation, and that lying should be regarded as a speech *act*.

2. *Cooperation* – Conversation is a cooperative process. The acts we perform in speaking are often directed at others, and at our collaborative undertakings with others. Furthermore, interlocutors in an ongoing conversation take each other's perspectives, which allows them to omit information from utterances, as they assume that the other is able to recognize implicatures and to make certain inferences. Conversation is a 'joint activity', involving the speaker's assumptions and beliefs about the hearer's assumptions and beliefs (and vice versa), and the ability to put such information about each other to use in the process. Even with respect to *uncooperative* communication, cooperation is an aspect of conversation that is crucial, since deceiving or misleading someone by using language requires at least some level of mutual understanding.

3. *Strategy* – I would argue that conversation is more or less (relative to different contexts) a strategic affair. SAT and Gricean implicatures have shown how speakers can use the discrepancy between the literal content of an utterance and its implicatures, to perform multiple (indirect) acts at the same time, or to imply things that can later be cancelled. Linguistic manipulations are not only useful in situations such as an attempt to bribe a police officer (see paragraph 3.1), but serve their function in all sorts of ordinary face-to-face communication as well, as described in politeness theory (Chapman 2011: 132), or as can be seen with honorifics (Potts 2007).

4. *Uncertainty* – A simple yet very important observation is that 'although people talk in order to get things done, they don't know in advance what they will actually do' (Clark 1996: 319). That is, naturally occurring conversation contains a great deal of uncertainty, possible confusion and misunderstandings. Some of the conversational speech acts observed by CA function exclusively to erase

sources of uncertainty, such as repair-initiators and repairs, pre-invitations, pre-questions and their subsequent go-aheads. Other examples are *gist*, which 'allows for clearing up any possible misunderstanding in terms of the semantic meaning of the language used' (e.g. 'Do you mean this Monday or next?') and *upshot*, which 'allows for clarification of the pragmatic meaning behind the language used' (e.g. A: 'I'm cold', B: 'You mean you want me to close the window?') (McCabe 2011: 39). Of course, this aspect of conversation follows directly from the previous ones. 'We are creating social action as we interact, and we constantly analyze our interlocutors' conduct as we participate' (ibid.: 37). It is only natural that our analyses of the intentions and strategies of others are sometimes wide of the mark, which makes spontaneous conversation a doubtful business.

5. *Fluctuation* – A final feature of conversation that became apparent from this chapter is that it is constantly in flux: the *meaning* of words and constructions in naturally occurring and ongoing conversation may change surprisingly fast. All of the above theories have shown that a word or construction may mean one thing or perform one act at any given time, and mean or do something entirely different a moment later, such as in example (7), where the noun 'seats' conveyed an argumentative meaning almost entirely by itself, due to the particular intersubjective context. We will give one more very striking example here, taken from a recent paper by Du Bois on dialogic syntax. Consider the following excerpt from a conversation:

(8) A: Yet he's still healthy.
B: He's still walking around.
(Adapted from Du Bois 2014: 368)

What happens here, is that 'the second speaker's substitution of verbal *walking around* for the first speaker's adjectival *healthy* invites the inference that it is an alternative to *healthy*' (ibid.). The meaning of the verb 'to walk around' has suddenly changed completely, because now 'healthy and walking around [can be seen] as two contrasting values on an ad hoc scale of health' (ibid.: 369).

These aspects taken together make everyday conversation into a complex affair. As mentioned in the introduction, the overarching concept of everyday conversation can of course be cut up into all kinds of language-games or activity types. This means that many of the conversational mechanisms described by the theories in this chapter will play a major role in one activity type and no role whatsoever in another. For example, in the case of an interrogation in a courtroom 'it is unlikely that either party assumes the other is fulfilling the maxims of quality, manner, and especially quantity' (Levinson 1992: 76), whereas at a

wedding or a dinner party such strategic and uncooperative communication plays a far less prominent role.

However, such nuances need not worry us here: our main point from the onset was that naturally occurring conversation in general involves at least some of the above aspects, and that as such it displays a high complexity. In fact, speakers often do not know which activity type they are participating in (e.g. due to what Walton & Krabbe have dubbed 'illicit shifts' between types (1995: 65)), and are therefore in many cases not even sure themselves about which of the five aspects are most prominent. As such, the varieties in frequency and intensity of the conversational mechanisms across different activity types add yet another level of complexity to the overarching category of everyday conversation as a whole.

2.

The pragmatics of liturgical language

In this chapter, we will analyze the Liturgy of the Roman Catholic Mass (see appendix[2]), in order to determine to what extent the five aspects of conversation, as lined up in the previous chapter, can be found in Mass as well. We may expect there to be significant differences, if only because the words and sentences of the Liturgy are fifteen to twenty centuries old, whereas most naturally occurring conversations between two or more people vanish into thin air as soon as the last word has been said. Each of the members of the congregation attending Mass knows in advance what will be on the menu – a situation that is diametrically opposed to everyday conversations. Such obvious differences do not seem to need much further investigation. However, as we will see in this chapter, it is useful to make even the obvious differences explicit if we want to give a full description of Mass. Furthermore, they will have interesting consequences on deeper levels, as will become clear in the third chapter.

2.1 Action

We have seen how a conversation in many ways is a chain of actions, performed by both interlocutors. That this counts for ritual language as well has been observed often before. SAT has been applied to religious (mostly biblical) and ritualistic language, predominantly in the fields of theology, anthropology or the philosophy of religion (Evans 1963, Ladriere 1973, Bailey 1993, Hilborn 1994, Rappaport 1995, Wolterstorff 1995, Briggs 2001 and Williams-Tinajero 2008 among others). Especially Austin's notion of the performative force of language has been used to talk about the meaning of religious language. Austin himself already understood that his ideas had at least some relation to religious ritual, as becomes clear from his examples involving acts such as christening and baptizing (1962: 24). Searle too surmised the usefulness of SAT for the study of religious language, stating in a footnote that 'when God says 'Let there be light' that is a declaration' (1976: 15).

However, there are of course more speech acts involved in the Liturgy than just declarations. Wheelock gives a nice overview of which types of sentence

[2] Each of the liturgical utterances in the appendix has been numbered. In this chapter and the following, I will refer to an utterance by giving its number, e.g. (2), and sometimes by giving the number and the utterance itself, in which cases I will put them between arrowheads e.g. <(2) Amen.> (source: http://www.latinliturgy.com/OrdinaryFormMassText.pdf).

mood are most common in Mass, as presented in table 4, which may serve as a helpful orientation here:

	Indicative	**Imperative**	**Optative**
1. Percentage (of all utterances in Mass)	ca. 50%	ca. 25%	ca. 25%
2. 1st person	ca. 40%	Ø	ca. 66% 3rd pers. to 1st pers.
3. 2nd person	ca. 20%	80% directed at Jesus/God, 20% at the congregation	ca. 22% 3rd pers. to 2nd pers.
4. 3rd person	ca. 40%	Ø	ca. 11% 3rd pers. to 3rd pers.

Table 4: Wheelock's analysis of the different moods in Mass (1984)

The first striking observation is that Mass does not involve any questions, i.e. sentences with interrogative mood, whatsoever. Also, it becomes clear from Table 4 that in 50% of the cases, the sentences in Mass indicate that something is the case (5), in 25% they express a command (4), and for the remaining 25% they express a wish or desire (7). Wheelock gives a few more interesting statistical facts: the 1st pers. indicative sentences, which make up 40% of all the indicatives, have as their major verb categories 'confessing (5), professing belief (43), praising (24), offering (90), and praying (89)'; 80% of the imperatives in Mass are directed towards Jesus (10) or God (17), the other 20% being uttered by the priest to the consecration (4); most of the optative sentences are 3rd pers. to 1st pers. blessings, such as (7), whereas the remaining cases are 3rd pers. to 2nd pers. (3) or 3rd pers. to 3rd. pers. (84) optatives (1984: 65-72).

However, as insightful as this overview may be, it is important to note here that the mood of an utterance and its illocutionary point may of course deviate completely, if only for the fact that some speech acts are indirectly conveyed. Returning to the example of 'It's freezing in here!', we need to recall that although the mood of the sentence is indicative, as a speech act it is not only a representative, but (possibly) also a directive and/or expressive. We may expect to find such indirect speech acts in the Liturgy as well. In table 5, on the next page, I give an overview. I have lined up the five basic illocutionary acts along both the vertical and horizontal axis. The utterances that fall into a box flanked by the same illocution on both sides (e.g. representatives-representatives) are pure examples of that type, whereas utterances that fall into a box with two different types have features of both (with no emphasis on which illocution is more direct than the other).

	Representatives	*Directives*	*Commissives*	*Expressives*	*Declarations*
Represent-atives	(15), (18), (20), (22), (24-26), (28), (38), (40), (45-60), (62-64), (66), (67), (70), (71), (74), (76), (77), (85), (101-103), (116), (123), (124), (127)	Ø	(43), (44), (61), (65), (67)	(69), (72), (75), (78), (86), (88), (122)	(2), (6), (8), (27), (33), (43), (44), (61), (65), (68), (89), (93), (97), (106), (109), (128), (132)
Direct-ives	Ø	(4), (9), (10), (19), (21), (23), (30), (34), (81), (82), (90-92), (94-96), (98), (99), (107), (112), (114), (115), (117-121), (133)	(118), (119), (129)	Ø	Ø
Commiss-ives	(43), (44), (61), (65), (67)	(118), (119) (129)	Ø	(35), (129)	(43), (44), (61), (65),
Express-ives	(69), (72), (75), (78), (86), (88), (122)	Ø	(35), (129)	(3), (7), (11), (12), (31), (32), (35-37), (39), (42), (73), (79), (80), (83), (84), (87), (100), (104), (108), (110), (111), (113), (125), (126), (129-131)	(17), (29), (41), (135)
Declara-tions	(2), (6), (8), (27), (33), (43), (44), (61), (65), (68), (89), (93), (97), (106), (109), (128), (132)	Ø	(43), (44), (61), (65),	(17), (29), (41), (135)	(1), (5), (13), (14), (16), (105), (134)

Table 5: The distribution of speech acts in Mass

I will briefly illustrate my reasoning in categorizing the utterances in this way, by discussing two examples. I have categorized <(17) we give you thanks for your great glory, Lord God> as an expressive-declaration, because in Searle's book thanking is an expressive speech act (1976: 12), which, I would contend, is declaratively performed in uttering the words (see also Levinson 1983: 228). <(118) keep me always faithful to your commandments> is a commissive-directive, in that it commands God to keep the speaker faithful, which in fact expresses the speaker's intention to remain faithful.

A number of noteworthy observations can be made on the basis of this overview. Firstly, as said, the Liturgy too seems to contain a lot of indirect speech acts, which shows from the fact that many of the utterances can be categorized

under multiple types of illocutionary point. Hilborn too points out that the utterances in a church service display a high degree of 'pragmatic ambivalence' (1994: 309), and that the liturgy 'reveals considerably (…) complex, categories of multivalent illocutionary action' (ibid.: 310). For example, when discussing the Credo (43)-(68), Hilborn states that an utterance like <(43) I believe in one God, the Father almighty (...)> is an 'assertive-expressive-commissive', because in such a case the 'assertive-expressive discourse will either *effect* commitment, or else more typically mediate *re*-commitment (…) to truth-claims made already' (ibid.: 314). Although (43) would strictly speaking not be a commissive in a SAT-account, I do agree with Hilborn that it can be interpreted that way, leading me to categorize the four explicit professions of belief in the Credo, namely (43), (44), (61) and (65), under several illocutions. I applied this line of reasoning to a few other utterances as well. Secondly, we see that there are no purely commissive illocutions in Mass. It seems that even though participants in Mass clearly mean to commit themselves to future courses of action, this dimension of Mass is mainly implicit, resonating in other utterances, such as the professions of belief in the Credo mentioned above. Thirdly, we see how table 4 and table 5 roughly coincide, in that the prevalence of indicatives/representatives, imperatives/directives and optatives/expressives is equal in both overviews. Fourthly, it is interesting to note that Mass indeed seems to involve a lot of performative language.

We will return to some of these observations later. For now it is enough to conclude that the aspect of action, so ubiquitous in everyday language, is also an obvious aspect of the Liturgy. Searle's conclusion that 'there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language' in naturally occurring conversation applies equally well to Mass.

With regards to the *conversational* speech acts, we will discuss them mainly in the fourth paragraph of this chapter. However, looking closely at the Liturgy, we can already point out thirteen adjacency pairs in Mass. I give an overview of these in table 6 on the next page (in which I have called the optative utterances 'evaluations', meaning that they express a wish and as such make an evaluation of reality, and in two cases dubbed an utterance 'completion', in that they finish an utterance initiated by another speaker). What becomes clear from this overview, is that Mass only displays a truly conversational turn-taking construction when the priest, deacon and the people are interacting with one another (i.e. mainly in the Introit and Gradual). Contrastingly, when the priest, deacon and/or people address Christ or God, neither of the latter two ever *replies*, which makes these segments (e.g. Gloria, Offertorium, Eucharist) more like monologues, or recitals. That is, these parts may still be seen as 'conversational' in the broader context of Mass, except that in these segments, the addressees are listening, yet not responding.

Utterances in Mass	Adjacency pair type
(1) – (2)	Inform - Acknowledge
(4) – (5), (6)	Request - Acceptance
(7) – (8)	Evaluate - Acknowledge
(28) – (29)	Inform – Acknowledge
(30) – (31), (32) – (33)	Request – Acceptance – Acknowledge
(36) – (37)	Evaluate – Complete
(38) – (39)	Inform - Acknowledge
(40) – (41)	Inform - Acknowledge
(82), (83) – (84)	Request - Acceptance
(110) – (111)	Evaluate - Complete
(127) – (128)	Inform – Acknowledge
(131) – (132)	Evaluate – Acknowledge
(133, 134) – (135)	Request – Acceptance

Table 6: The adjacency pairs in Mass

2.2 Cooperation

As I mentioned in the introduction, little research has been done concerning the intersubjective or cooperative nature of language and what this means for religious language use. However, Verhagen writes that

> *'even in the absence of an actual speaker, an addressee (for example, the reader of an ancient text) always takes a linguistic utterance as having been intentionally produced as an instrument of communication by another being with the same basic cognitive capacities as the addressee'* (2005: 7).

Are participants in Mass 'readers' of the 'ancient text' of the Liturgy? On the most basic level – the CC-level of Oswald – they are, in the sense Verhagen meant, 'readers': they assume indeed that the words of the Liturgy are meaningful and relevant, and as such they try to deal with the text as being written by intentional agents. Yet, on the levels of IC and PC, they are not so much readers as *performers,* in that they are not trying to grasp the intentions of the writer(s) of the text, but that of the other participants as the *recitalists* of it. That is, they are not interested in what was meant with the words when they were first written down or spoken, but in what is meant with them in the present performance of the ritual. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, some segments of Mass display a clear conversational structure, others a monological structure. Therefore, the whole of Mass should be regarded as an *interplay* of different intentional agents, each with their own specific, intentional role. These agents are, quite simply: the

priest, the deacon, the people (the *human* agents), Christ and God (the *divine* agents).

The question is then: to what extent are these agents cooperating (i.e. taking each other's perspectives, forming joint goals and focussing their joint attention thereon)? As for the interactional relation between the priest, deacon and people, a first striking observation is that all requests and offers are accepted and none are refused (see table 6). By the same token, also clearly visible in table 6, each of the adjacency pairs that have as their first pair part an informing or evaluating utterance, have as their second pair part an acknowledgment, or completion. Furthermore, each of the utterances by the priest that conveys a directive illocutionary point and is addressed at the people (which make up 20% of all imperative utterances, see table 4) have as a result that the requested action is indeed executed. Finally, it is of interest here that the etymological meaning of the word *amen* is 'so be it' (Chidester 2000: 75). As this representative-declaration is uttered eight times throughout the Mass (seven times by the people, once by the deacon), it may serve as another indication of the absolute agreement between the priest, deacon and people on all utterances and speech acts in Mass. We conclude, then, that the human agents are definitely to a high degree cooperating with each other. Agreement seems to be a landmark feature of the interactional speech in Mass. Just imagine how absurd it would be if the priest were to utter <(71) it will become for us the bread of life>, with the people replying in unison: 'No, it will not', or 'We are not so sure about that'.

At this point, we have to say some things about the *common ground* (see paragraph 1.4) of the participants in Mass. Clark distinguishes between 'communal common ground' and 'personal common ground' (1996: 100), of which the former is most important here. Communal common ground stems from the fact that 'we often categorize people by [cultural communities] as a basis for inferring what they know, believe, or assume' (ibid.). For example, when Pete discovers that Jane is a linguist from Australia, he knows that she is a member of two communities, namely linguists and Australians, and he infers from this a vast number of beliefs and assumptions on the part of Jane (such as that she is familiar with linguistic terminology, knows certain things about the history of Australia etc.). Now, if Pete is also a linguist, then he shares with Jane the communal *inside information* ('particular information that members of [a] community mutually assume is possessed by members of the community') of the community of linguists (ibid.: 101). In the case of religious communities, members share a form of 'expertise' on at least a number of aspects, such as 'religious doctrines, rituals, icons, historical figures' etc. (ibid.: 103). Furthermore, they share a 'specialized lexicon', exclusively used within their community (with concepts such as 'Holy Spirit', 'Lamb', 'Son of God'), and they carry out 'routine actions', as

'procedures for joint activities' (ibid.: 109) (e.g. confessing at the start of Mass, as in (4)-(6)). At a deeper level, participants in Mass share certain types of knowledge that Clark calls 'ultimate inside information' (ibid.: 110). Mass is something to be experienced physically (talking, listening, washing, kneeling, eating), and such private sensations are completely subjective. However, Mass is of course a collective procedure. Therefore, even such ultimate inside information is actually part of the inside information of the community of participants in Mass, and as such is part of the intersubjective dimension – which shows how detailed the common ground of the participants in Mass is.

Indeed, we may conclude from all of the above that the common ground and the adherence to the cooperative principle in Mass are actually extraordinarily deeply rooted and fixed, on all three levels of cooperation (CC, IC and PC). Amazingly, all of this is in a way already conveyed simply by the attendance of those present at Mass, in that 'the people who take part in church, synagogue or mosque rites are displaying their membership in [their] religion' (ibid.: 117) through their attendance, to themselves and each other (see also Rappaport 1995: 76). Their attendance is an indexical *demonstration* of their sharing in the communal common ground and adhering to the cooperative principle within that particular community. This coincides nicely with our observation in the previous paragraph, that the commissive illocutions in Mass are always conveyed indirectly through other illocutions. The act of committing oneself to the community and the truth-claims in Mass needs not be explicitly performed, since it resonates, as it were, in all the other acts performed therein. The best example of this is the recital of the Credo, which is uttered by all human agents and is directed at themselves.

2.3 Strategy

Knowing how deeply rooted and fixed the common ground of the participants in Mass is, we may expect there to be little to no strategic language use involved. In a context where everybody agrees with one another, and even states collectively and simultaneously that they do, there seems to be little room nor interest for deception or personal benefits. Hilborn, too, states that 'it might seem axiomatic that a Christian 'believer' would not say what s/he 'believed to be false', and especially not in worship' (1994: 350). Still, the Liturgy exhibits many cases in which the literal meaning and the implied meaning of an utterance differ, as became clear from those utterances in table 4 that fell into a mixed box of two illocutionary acts. Hilborn points out that Grice's remarks on metaphor are also of interest here, even lecturing that 'any linguistic analysis of religious discourse must take metaphoric inference seriously if it is to be sensitive to the operation of

such discourse' (1994: 338). Although I agree with Hilborn, I will not treat metaphor too extensively here, since I view it as mainly a semantic issue, not a pragmatic one. Just to mention one example: when in (120) Christ, represented by the host, is called 'Lamb of God' by the priest, this can be seen as a violation of the first maxim of Quality, since the priest obviously does not believe that Christ is literally a lamb. However, the congregation will infer 'that the speaker is attributing to [Christ] some feature or features in respect of which [Christ] resembles (…) the mentioned [animal] (Grice 1975: 53). As such, (conventionalized) implicatures play an important role with regard to the symbolic imagery in Mass.

Does Mass involve any strategic language use in the sense of uncooperative communication? Do people lie, deceive or manipulate in Mass – is that even possible? It seems not, because although 'not all who participate in liturgical discourse are equally, or even barely, committed to its truth claims (…), *ritual* and *institutional* prerogatives supersede personal intentionalities' (Hilborn 1994: 352), meaning that it would not really matter if some of the participants in Mass did not fulfil each of the *sincerity conditions* appropriate to the different speech acts (see table 1). The priest may utter <(112) Let us offer each other the sign of peace> while thinking 'I could not care less if we did or not', but this is not likely to be the case, because if it were, there would be no reason for him to participate in the ritual in the first place. Besides, the ritual could be executed further without any problems. Strangely enough, it really is more important that the priest *speaks* the words, than that he *believes* in them.

Does the Liturgy contain utterances that function first and foremost on the intersubjective level, and only secondarily on the objective level (see figure 3)? Taking a step back and glancing from a bird's-eye-view at the 135 utterances listed and numbered in the appendix, we notice how practically *all* of them are concerned more or less directly with the ongoing ritual. That is, they function primarily within the relationship between speaker and hearer, i.e. priest and congregation, priest and Christ/God, priest and deacon and congregation and Christ/God. This needs not surprise us, as we had already determined in paragraph 2.1 that directives are abundant, and that Mass as a whole displays a primitive conversational structure. It seems that if we were to call Mass a 'conversation', it would be, in a way, a *self-referential* conversation, in that the things said by the interlocutors deal mostly with their interpersonal relations (e.g. (5), (6), (13)-17)), and that whole segments of the interaction are explicit procedural utterances (e.g. (4), (28), (30), (70), (89)), addressing what needs to be done next. This primary dyadic relationship also becomes clear from Wheelock's observation that Mass has basically five major themes ('utterance types sharing a common topic'), namely confession, praise, belief, prayer and sacrifice (1984: 70), each of which

involves at least two agents. So, Mass is really an intersubjective, and even argumentative procedure, in which the triadic relation of speaker-hearer-object is secondary to the dyadic relation of speaker-hearer. Therefore, figure 3 (repeated here as figure 4) is a proper representation of Mass as well, since the ritual too functions primarily on the *lower* horizontal line, at the intersubjective level:



Figure 4: The primary dyadic relation in Mass

2.4 Uncertainty

We saw in the previous chapter that everyday conversation involves a lot of uncertainty. We often do not know in advance what we are going to say, or what the other person is going to say, and as such are not sure how the conversation will unfold, in what direction it will take us. On top of that, even though human communication on the whole is an ingenious and extremely efficient procedure, conversations often suffer from confusion and misunderstanding. As we have seen, CA laid bare conversational mechanisms that function specifically to erase such uncertainties (e.g. repair-initiators and repairs, pre-requests, pre-questions, go-aheads, gist, and upshot). Obviously, none of these issues play a role in Mass. We already concluded from Wheelock's overview in table 4 that the Liturgy contains no questions. Neither the priest, the congregation, Christ or God are addressed in interrogative sentences – this function of language simply plays no role in this particular activity. Such conversational speech acts as repair-initiators, gist or upshot are unthinkable in Mass: it would for example be absurd if the people were to reply collectively to the utterances of the priest by saying 'We beg your pardon?' or 'Did you mean pray *right now*?'[3]

In Gricean terms we could say that 'the parameters of Relevance in liturgy are more sharply defined than in, say, a 'casual chat' between friends' (Hilborn 1994:

[3] The only conversational speech acts that can be said to play a role in Mass are perhaps procedural speech acts. (1)-(3), for example, can be seen as a pre-announcement to (4), or to what follows in general, as goes for the announcements of the reading in the Gradual, such as (28), (38), (40). Examples of post-expansions can be found as well, such as (7), which may be regarded as a sequence-closing third, followed by the pre-closing in (8).

352-353). The range of allowed-for contributions to the ongoing activity is extremely limited in Mass; participants cannot suddenly start discussing last week's football game or the latest developments in quantum mechanics (unless perhaps the priest, if he refers to such unrelated matters to illustrate a relevant point). We can state quite plainly that the aspect of uncertainty, as paramount as it is in naturally occurring conversation, is not shared by Mass.

2.5 Fluctuation

Turning to the aspect of fluctuation, finally, we need to understand once more the gravity of the old age of Mass, as opposed to the spontaneous occurrence of everyday dialogical interaction. When I tell you that 'It's freezing in here!', and you are sitting by the open window, the context determines the *directive* meaning of my remark. If you then close the window, and one minute later I repeat my complaint, the directive meaning is not there anymore. The semantic meaning of my words was consistent throughout both utterances, but the pragmatic meaning differed completely. Similarly, when Ken angrily calls out 'Joanne!', to make his girlfriend come downstairs because they are late for the party, his utterance of her name means something different than when he says it a minute later in the car, in the following exchange:

(9) Joanne: That is so typical of you, Ken.
Ken: That is not at all typical of me, Joanne.
(Adapted from Du Bois 2014: 361)

In (9), the utterance of 'Joanne' echoes that of 'Ken', and conveys irony, while back in the house the same utterance had a directive meaning ('Hurry up!'). Such an example shows how the use of words in different language-games determines their meaning, and how in conversation we sometimes makes a 'dialogical shift' (Walton & Krabbe 1995: 100) from one 'language-game' to another swiftly and unannounced.

Such rapid alternations of meanings are wholly absent from Mass. There, speakers have nor take the liberty to alter the meaning of words and constructions in the process, as interlocutors in conversation often do. The high level of agreement between the participants encompasses the meanings of the words used in the ritual – both in the semantic and the pragmatic sense. Meaning in Mass is not in flux. On the contrary, it has remained practically unchanged (except for sporadic revisions of theological doctrine) for two millennia.

2.6 Mass as an activity type

At last, we can take a step back and scan the landscape of this chapter, in order to sum up our conclusions. Table 8 (on page 36) presents a rough overview of our findings. Of course, we ought to be more precise. Therefore, we will first define the notion of activity type a bit more sharply.

Levinson defines activity types as 'goal-defined, socially constituted, bounded, events with constraints on allowable contributions' (1992: 69). Clark adopts Levinson's definition, basic distinctions and examples, but goes on to refine the whole thing, opting for the term 'joint activities'. He distinguishes five main gradients of difference:

Dimension of variation	**From**	**To**
Scripted vs. unscripted	marriage ceremony	chance meeting
Formal vs. informal	city council meeting	gossip section
Verbal vs. nonverbal	telephone call	football game
Cooperative vs. competitive	business transaction	tennis match
Egalitarian vs. autocratic	making acquaintance	class lecture

Table 7: The main differences between joint activities (Clark 1996: 31)

Also, Clark agrees with Levinson that joint activities are goal-defined, but he distinguishes further between the *domain goal* (the dominant goal), *procedural goals* (e.g. doing it properly and efficiently), *interpersonal goals* (e.g. maintaining contact with fellow participants) and *private agendas* (ibid.: 34).

Let us combine the defining traits given by Levinson and Clark and see if and how they are represented by the joint activity of Mass. First of all, Mass is of course a socially constituted joint activity, executed only by the Catholic community. Also, it has a ceremonial opening and closing and as such is tacitly bounded. As we have seen, it allows for virtually *no contribution* from external sources at all. As for Clark's dimensions of variation in table 7, we have already seen that Mass is scripted, formal and cooperative. As for the verbal/non-verbal distinction, Mass lies somewhere in between these two far ends, since therein the 'words and acts are related and integrated in most complex ways' (Levinson 1992: 70).[4] There is also a clear autocratic dimension to Mass, in that the priests and deacons are on a higher hierarchical level than the congregation, the latter group being responsible only for about 8% of all the utterances, consisting mostly of

[4] Although Levinson is definitely right in emphasizing the importance of gestures and physical acts in Mass, I have chosen not to discuss them in the present paper, and have consequently not incorporated them in the appendix. See Wheelock (1984) for an interesting (quantitative) analysis of these gestures (e.g. the different positions at the altar, genuflecting, kissing the bible, joining or extending hands etc.).

short, affirmative phrases. Then again, there is an egalitarian dimension as well, in that the human agents as a group are equally subordinated to the divine agents, since the latter are yet on a higher level than the priests and deacons.

Turning to the goals of Mass, we see that the domain goal is the salvation of the participants, who re-enact the Last Supper and sacrifice Christ in order to 'be filled with every grace and heavenly blessing' and 'bring eternal life' to themselves (113). As for procedural goals, we notice how, for example, the first two utterances in Mass are already an announcement stating that what is to follow will be performed in a particular way, *in the name of*. Also, many of the directive speech acts in Mass are directed at God, asking him to make the ongoing procedure 'spiritual and acceptable' (98)-(100). Such utterances are an indication of the importance of ceremonially determined actions. The interpersonal goals are of course clearly reflected in the intense level of cooperation and in the underlying commissive point (90)-(92). Consequently, there really are no private agendas in Mass (i.e. nobody is joining the activity for personal benefits that others are not aware of), and even if there were, they would not really influence the activity, since the institutional rules supersede any private intentions.

Lifting from the rightmost column in table 8 the most important linguistic features, and combining them with the abovementioned defining traits, we can give a characterization of Mass as a joint activity (borrowing some formulations from Searle (1976: 22-23)):

The Roman Catholic Mass is a scripted activity that:

(a) is participated in and performed by members of the Catholic community, who
(b) interact with each other and with Christ/God in formal dialogical and monological conversation,
(c) always communicating in a completely cooperatively manner,
    (c1) by telling each other and Christ/God how things are and
        (c1.1) by always agreeing thereon,
    (c2) by trying to get each other and Christ/God to do things and
        (c2.1) by always doing these things (when possible),
    (c3) and by expressing their feelings and attitudes,
(d) demonstrating therein that they commit themselves to the community, the hierarchical order within the community, the ongoing event and to the truth-claims made in the event, as such
(e) bringing about (social and personal) changes through their utterances,
(f) to achieve the goal of the activity: the salvation of all participants.

The mission of the first two chapters is hereby accomplished. We have determined precisely what sort of joint activity Mass is, simply by describing those features that lie on the surface of Mass, i.e. that make up its form, as opposed to its content (Rappaport 1979). By 'correctly piecing together' linguistic-pragmatic surface phenomena 'without adding anything', we have come up with a clear and useful description of *what* people do in Mass, and of *how* they do it, without asking for the essence or meaning of the ritual, allowing 'the satisfaction being sought through [an] explanation [to] follow of itself' (Wittgenstein 1993: 121). In the next chapter, we will continue in this vein, focussing more closely at how some of the liturgical keywords are used.

Aspect	**Naturally occurring conversation**	**Liturgy of the Roman Catholic Mass**
1. *Action*	√ = joint activity = dialogic (turn-taking) structure = five basic illocutionary acts = functions within the dyadic relationship between interlocutors = use of conversational speech acts	√ = joint activity = monologic structure with interjected adjacency pairs = main illocutionary acts: representatives, directives and expressives + underlying commissive point = functions within the dyadic relationship between interlocutors
2. *Cooperation*	√ = involving any number of interlocutors = possible non-cooperation on PC-level = online creation of implicatures = online adjustment of common ground	√ = involving five interlocutors, divided into two groups (human and divine) = complete cooperation on all three levels = only conventional implicatures (metaphor) = no adjustments of common ground = participation as an indexical sign of adherence to the activity
3. *Strategy*	√ = personal intentionalities supersede (any) institutional rules = possible non-cooperation on PC-level = argumentative orientation	X (?) = institutional rules supersede personal intentionalities = complete cooperation on all levels
4. *Uncertainty*	√ = confusion, misunderstanding = possible non-cooperation on PC-level = unknown course of action = conversational speech acts specifically meant to erase uncertainty	X = complete agreement on semantic and pragmatic meaning = complete cooperation on all levels = course of action known in advance
5. *Fluctuation*	√ = constant change of semantic and pragmatic meaning	X = complete agreement on semantic and pragmatic meaning

Table 8: The differences between ordinary conversation and the Liturgy

3.

Philosophical implications

As I announced in the introduction, the purpose of this paper is twofold. We have reached our first goal by giving a clear description of the pragmatic dimension of Mass. With this description and the Liturgy in the appendix close at hand, we are now in the perfect position to take our cue from Wittgenstein once more, and look more closely at how some of the keywords in the Liturgy are really used. Instead of asking 'What is God?', 'Does God exist?' or 'What is salvation?', we will examine what the specific use of nouns such as 'God' or 'Son', or verbs such as 'confess' or 'accept', can tell us about fundamental Christian concepts such as divinity and salvation. First, we will focus on the reality of God, by describing the relationship between the human agents on the one hand, and the divine agents on the other. Second, we will discuss the nature of salvation, zooming in on the peculiar role of some of the performative verbs in Mass. Thirdly, we will make a crucial observation concerning the common ground of the community. Finally, we will discuss some activity types similar to Mass, and 'turn around' to determine what the counterparts of liturgical language in everyday conversation are, using the results of our investigation to draw a conclusion about naturally occurring conversation as well.

3.1 The grammar of God

We have not yet discussed one important dimension of interaction in Mass, namely that between the human and the divine agents – between the priest, deacon and congregation on the one hand, and Christ and God on the other. As said, the latter two never 'talk' in Mass[5], i.e. they never reply to any of the directive and expressive utterances directed at them. Requests for acceptance (90), protection (92), and inclusion (96) are not demonstrably received as such. In fact, it is not even clear if Christ and God are present, while the whole event in certain respects revolves around them. It would be perfectly conceivable that one or more of the participants in Mass were appointed to voice the replies of these divinities, as such involving them in the dialogical sequences, making them tangible participants in the conversational construction. Why is the explicit presence of Christ and God (simply 'God' from hereon) not a requirement for Mass to be a successful activity?

[5] Christ is of course directly quoted in (102)-(103). However, precisely because these are citations, uttered by the priest, they do not count as utterances of Christ. This is also my reason for not numbering them separately.

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein writes that 'grammar tells what kind of object anything is', which means that looking at how a word is used (in what contexts it plays a role, which words or constructions it is combined with etc.), allows us to see more clearly what the nature of the referred-to object is. He lets this remark be followed by a brief but essential interjection: '(Theology as grammar)' (1953: §373). Let us look, then, at the grammar of the word 'God'. Kellenberger endows us with a helpful example:

> *'[T]he Psalmist is doing many things in the Psalms: rejoicing in God, blessing God, praising God, asking of God, thanking God, crying out to God, and at times expressing his sense of being far from God. One thing the Psalmist is not doing is formulating an epistemological theory'* (1990: 160).

Nowhere in the Psalms does it say: 'O Lord, you exist' or 'O Lord, I doubt that you are really there', but that is 'not to say that no epistemic concepts are at work in the Psalms (…): the Psalmist *beholds*, he *finds* God, he *discovers* God's presence'. He is simply 'not trying to prove God's existence to himself or to anyone' (ibid.: 160-161). Similarly, the whole question of the existence of God plays no role in Mass, but is simply part and parcel with all the other acts and utterances of the process. We have seen that the participants in Mass are doing many things as well: *acting in the name of* God (1), *confessing to* God (5), *praising, blessing, adoring, glorifying* and *thanking* God (13)-(17), *believing in* God (43), *commanding* God (81), *granting offers to* God (90), *recounting* the story of the Last Supper to God (101)-(103). Looking at this broad variety of acts, beliefs and attitudes that involve God, it seems that the existence and presence of the divine is, as it were, 'built into' the fabric of Mass, and as such needs not be explicitly confirmed. Why, we feel inclined to ask, does Mass not begin with a statement like 'The Lord is unquestionably real, therefore we will now…' or 'O Lord, if you are there, please accept this offer…'? The answer is: because the reality of God is *determined by* the activities in Mass – his 'ear' is built into the words addressed at him.

Learning to know the reality of God means learning how to use the word 'God'. The reality of the divine follows from the practical applications of the divine in the lives of believers, not the other way around (Martin 1984: 609). For example, what becomes clear from these observations, is that although God is to a certain extent definitely an anthropomorphic concept, there are also 'holes' in the grammar of our language involving God, if we were to regard it as really describing a human being (Wittgenstein 1996: 71). For example, we act in God's name, we confess to him, we thank, praise and command him, but we do not tell

God a joke or ask him for directions to the bookshop. Also, we speak of God's voice, eyes and hands, but not about his eyebrows or elbows (ibid.). Such observations make it clear that even though believers address God with titles such as 'Father', 'Son', 'King', 'Lord' etc., his reality is not assumed to be of the same ontological category as that of actual fathers, sons, kings or lords. Only certain aspects of such earthly phenomena contribute to the conception of the divine, and these aspects constitute the grammar of God.[6] Looking at the different actions we carry out with regards to God (praise, ask, thank, confess, command etc.), we can conclude that the aspect of real-life interpersonal relations that is most noticeably reflected in the relationship between the human and the divine in Mass, is the *ethical* dimension of responsibility, guilt and forgiveness. This already became clear from some of Wheelock's major themes of Mass (confession, praise, belief, prayer, sacrifice), which served as an indication of how Mass functions mainly within the dyadic relationship between the participants (cf. paragraph 2.3). The theme of confession, for example, deals directly with the interpersonal relationship between speaker and hearer, with the former confessing to the latter to be forgiven. So, when we project the interaction between the human and the divine agents in Mass onto Verhagen's model of intersubjectivity, we see that it too functions primarily at the intersubjective level:



Figure 5: The primarily intersubjective interaction between the human and the divine agents in Mass

The appropriateness of figure 5 also shows from the fact that believers never just inform God about something purely for the sake of informing (if only because he is often assumed to be all-knowing – that, too, is part of the grammar of God). Interaction with the divine hardly ever concerns humans describing states of affairs in the world to their deities, but nearly always involves humans expressing certain wishes, desires, regrets etc. about how the world ought to be (see criterion

[6] As Hilborn already pointed out, the key terms here are metaphor and metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson also state that 'the conceptual systems of cultures and religions are metaphorical in nature' and that 'symbolic metonymies that are grounded in our physical experience provide an essential means of comprehending religious and cultural concept' (1980: 40).

(c3) on page 44). This also helps to explain the underlying commissive point of Mass (reflected in criterion (d)): when reciting the Credo, for example, (which contains many of the purely representative illocutions in table 5), believers are not so much informing each other or God about states of affairs in the world, but are really reconfirming to each other that they still commit to the creedal truth-claims – and that they intend to keep doing so in the future. Using Searle's terminology, we could say that the Credo has a *world-to-words* direction of fit (see table 1).

We see how the language of Mass *shows* that the ritual should be seen as the dyadic interaction between human and divine agents, with the former petitioning the latter to be forgiven and granted mercy, and that the reality of God is perfectly adapted to this goal, in that he is almighty and able to listen, accept and forgive. Such are the divine qualities needed by the congregation in order for them to achieve salvation – and therefore precisely those qualities are attributed to God in the performance of the ritual. Human beings do not forgive, accept, grant, bless, command or approve with their feet, elbows or eyebrows, but with their voices, eyes, ears and hands; and because God has to perform precisely those acts in the lives of believers, there is no use for feet, elbows and eyebrows, and all the more for hands, ears, eyes and a voice in the conception of God. As such, the grammar of God is *shaped in the act* of asking him for forgiveness.

3.2 The performance of salvation

We have seen how the divine agents are often addressed by the human agents through directive and expressive speech acts. Looking more closely at *what* it is that the human agents request or command God to do, we notice that in most cases, these are precisely the demands for salvation that we would expect to find:

(7) '*forgive* us our sins'
(79) 'may we be *accepted* by you'
(84) 'may the Lord *accept* the sacrifice'
(90) '*accept* and *bless* these gifts'
(91) '*grant* her peace'
(92) '*grant* that in all things we may be defended'
(94) '*accept* this oblation'
(96) '*command* that we be delivered'
(98) 'be pleased, to *bless*, *acknowledge*, and *approve*'
(107) '*command*' that these gifts be borne'
(124) 'only *say the word* and my soul shall be healed'
(131) 'may almighty God *bless* you'

These acts of salvation (the italicized verbs) that the human agents demand from God, are all *performative* acts (except for 'command', which is a directive), embedded in directive and expressive speech acts. They are precisely those acts that the human agents cannot perform by themselves. The community wishes to be forgiven and blessed, and it is their offer that has to be accepted, acknowledged and approved – i.e. the whole point of the activity is that *they* will be saved, but this can only be done by God. There is no explicit confirmation, however, of whether this demand is successful.

On the one hand, then, we could conclude that Mass is an open-ended story, in that participants can only hope to have achieved their joint domain goal (which is of course a good reason to act out the whole thing again a week later). On the other hand, however, the underlying commissive point of Mass comes about through the complete cooperation among all agents (criterion (c), (c1.1) and (c2.1)). By the same token, the reality of God is intrinsic to and shaped by the ways in which the human agents collectively interact with him, meaning Mass also has an *underlying performative point*. That is, the reality of God is not a prerequisite for Mass, but is *declaratively constituted* in performing the ritual. As for salvation, we could say that the goal of Mass is reached by collectively addressing a demand for salvation at God, who has the will and power to grant such salvation, and whose reality is constituted *in the act* of demanding, meaning that the goal of the activity is achieved *by the performance* of its realization (see Rappaport (1995) for a similar view on the function of ritual and religion). The reality of God and the power of salvation are not (only) described, discussed, refined or confirmed in Mass, but are constituted, established, *made real* therein. Therefore, Mass actually has both a *world-to-words* and a *words-to-world* direction of fit, in that its performance makes something to be the case, which is the case if and only if it is performed. Interestingly, the word 'Eucharist' derives from the Greek *eucharistein*, meaning 'to give thanks' (Chidester 2000: 73). In paragraph 2.1, I categorized *thanking* as an expressive-declaration, in that the expressive act of thanking is declaratively performed in uttering the words. If Mass is essentially not only a ritual of salvation but also one of 'thanksgiving', that helps us understand where the underlying performative point partly derives from. (As said, *thanking* is also an expressive illocution. Since expressives have no direction of fit according to Searle, it seems Mass as a whole is a paradoxical activity that involves both *and* neither directions of fit at the same time.)

One indication of the underlying performative force of Mass is the abundance of 'felicity conditions' (Levinson 1983: 229). These are the required state of affairs that need to be in place in order for a performative utterance to do its job. For example, for two people to be married, the words 'I hereby pronounce you husband and wife' need to be uttered by someone with the legal authorization to

marry people (e.g. a priest). Likewise, Mass needs to be executed by a Catholic congregation, led by a priest in a required outfit, in an official church, on the appointed day, according to the scripted procedures etc. The ceremonial and ornamental aspects (dress, architecture, artworks), the scripted procedure (order of Mass, music, readings), the Liturgy itself – practically every aspect of Mass is a felicity condition, in that it cannot be omitted from the activity without the whole business losing its validity. The ritual could easily be performed in someone's living room on a Wednesday night, but that would simply not *count* as a Catholic Mass (Searle 1995: 43). Only when each of the required conditions are in place, can the ritual function as a framework within which the reality of God and salvation can be established. To give one purely linguistic example, the Liturgy contains many honorary titles of address (e.g. <(6) ever-Virgin>, <(17) heavenly King, almighty Father>, <(18) Only Begotten Son, Lamb of God> etc.). These can be seen as instances of 'social deixis', the aspect of language that establishes 'certain realities of the social situation in which the speech act occurs' (Levinson 1983: 89), such as the *tu/vous*-distinction in French. As such, honorific titles of address are a type of speech act (Potts 2007), in that they perform the act of establishing social hierarchy.[7] By addressing Mary, Christ and God with these titles, the participants express their awe, respect and love for them, dubbing them as 'authorized recipients' (Levinson 1983: 91), establishing the higher status of the referents, and the subordinate position of the community.

3.3 The reinforcement of common ground

Clark writes that joint activities consist of multiple 'joint actions', and that they are 'cumulative', in that 'each joint action add[s] incrementally to reaching [the domain] goal' (1996: 38). What cumulates, then, 'is the common ground of the participants about that activity – the knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions they believe they share about the activity' (ibid.). This is of course a feature that is also relevant for everyday conversation: everything interlocutors say to each other is automatically added to the common ground about that conversation. Clark distinguishes three parts of the common ground:

1. *Initial common ground*. This is the set of background facts, assumptions, and beliefs the participants presupposed when they entered the joint activity.

[7] Since these titles of address can be seen as speech acts, I could have numbered them separately in the appendix. However, for the sake of brevity I have chosen to regard them as part of the proper names referring to the divine agents in Mass.

2. *Current state of the joint activity*. This is what the participants presuppose to be the state of the activity at the moment.
3. *Public event so far*. These are the events the participants presuppose have occurred in public leading up to the current state.

(Clark 1996: 43)

Finally, Clark argues that 'accumulation of common ground occurs in all joint activities' (ibid.: 39). As we have seen in the second chapter, however, the common ground in Mass is exceptionally deeply rooted (in that the content of the *initial common ground* has been roughly the same for centuries), and outstandingly fixed (in that each of the participants knows not only what the *current state of the activity* is, but also what the next one will be, and the one after that etc.). As such, common ground in Mass does *not* cumulate: no new information is added to it as the event progresses. On the contrary, information that is already known and presupposed is reconfirmed in every single act and utterance in Mass. Even the 'background facts, assumptions, and beliefs' that make up the initial common ground are reconfirmed. The intense level of cooperation and the complete agreement among all participants, combined with the content and procedures that were scripted and established in advance, make Mass into a *reinforcement* of common ground – the reconfirmation of truths of which all members of the Catholic community are already deeply convinced, even before they enter the church to attend the ritual.

This observation is compatible with an important point made by some thinkers in the tradition of the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, which states that religious beliefs (and the propositions they entail) are comparable with those propositions that Wittgenstein called 'hinge propositions', in his collected notes *On Certainty* (*OC*). In these notes, Wittgenstein explores the implications of some issues put forth by G.E. Moore, concerning absolute epistemological certainty. Moore contended that he knew with certainty that propositions such as 'I am a human being', 'Here is a hand' or 'The earth has existed for many years' are true, and that 'the fact that he knows such things is itself fully adequate to conclude that the external world (…) exists' (Martin 1984: 594). Wittgenstein objected to this view, because belief in such propositions cannot be justified by referring to any form of evidence, since the propositions 'themselves are as certain as any possible evidence to which [Moore] might appeal' (ibid.). Moore's common sense propositions 'have a logically fundamental role in our language and knowledge about the world', in that they are part of our worldview, and as such determine the system, or framework, within which we determine whether other propositions are true or false. Wittgenstein calls Moore's propositions 'hinge propositions', because they have to remain firmly in place, in order for mental processes like

certainty and doubt to keep making sense as they 'revolve' around each other. The hinges of our thinking cannot be questioned, because that would destroy the whole point of investigating what is true and what is false. Therefore, the propositions that constitute our worldview cannot be *known* in the same way as more contingent propositions.

In this view, all of our talk about truth is rooted in a 'primitive and groundless form of sureness in belief' (Martin 1984: 601). This type of certainty can be compared to religious belief (*OC* §459), in that it 'does not rest on the fact on which our ordinary everyday beliefs normally do rest' (Wittgenstein 1996: 54). When we talk about religious beliefs, 'we don't talk about hypothesis, or about high probability. Nor about knowing. In a religious discourse we use such expressions as: "I believe that so and so will happen", and use them differently to the way in which we use them in science' (Wittgenstein 1996: 57). For example, Moore's proposition 'Here is a hand' (…) is quite unlike 'At this distance from the sun there is a planet.' The latter must be treated as a hypothesis, but not the former' (*OC* §52).

Like my beliefs that I have two hands, or that the sun will rise tomorrow, religious beliefs 'just are ultimately groundless' (Martin 1984: 603). In the same way that indisputable beliefs are true in that they underpin our entire worldview, 'fundamental religious dogmas are truths insofar as they constitute the immobile foundations of the religious faith and life' (ibid.: 605). Clark's notion of common ground is in many respects analogous to Wittgenstein's idea of a worldview, or 'form of life', one important distinction being that common ground is necessarily shared, whereas a worldview of immovable certainties is not. I would state, therefore, that (initial) common ground partly consists of the set of 'deep' hinge propositions that are mutually assumed to be shared by two interlocutors.

If Mass is the reinforcement of the common ground of the participants, then we see from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that participants do not reconfirm a number of random 'surface' propositions, but those that actually make up their worldview – the *hinge propositions* of their belief, the dogmas of the Christian church. As Martin writes, 'there is something extremely odd about the person who occupies himself in repeating to himself or in company with others the truisms of Moore' (1984: 611) Indeed, when we imagine a group of people gathering weekly to sing and recite together propositions such as 'We are human beings', 'We have two hands', 'The sun will rise tomorrow morning' etc., such a scene strikes us as very peculiar. However, we now understand that what goes on during Mass, and perhaps during other religious rituals, is, in a way, not very different. The crucial discrepancy is of course that a congregation reconfirming together Moore's propositions will meet with few objections from outside, whereas 'Christian beliefs have never compelled unilateral consensus'. In fact, the confirmation of

Christian beliefs are 'just what set the man of faith over against the masses' (ibid.: 612). We recognize that

> '*when the believer explicitly acknowledges those creedal beliefs which separate him off from most men, the act is not lacking significance. It is precisely the friction between the believer and the world which generates the occasion for confessing those truths of faith*' (ibid.).

The reinforcement of common ground in Mass constitutes a set of 'institutional facts' and a form of 'social reality' (Searle 1995), in that it sets a group of people apart from others, by emphasizing their mutual worldview. Inwardly the ritual has a binding function, whereas outwardly it constitutes separation. Importantly, this happens not on a reasonable basis, but on a much more passionate one. We have seen how Mass really functions in the intersubjective dimension (see figure 5), meaning that the epistemic beliefs of participants about facts in the world is really secondary to their goals on the interpersonal level. As Wittgenstein mused, religious belief is 'like a passionate commitment to a system of reference' (Wittgenstein 1984: 64) – i.e. a passionate commitment to a network of dogmas that make up the Christian worldview. Recalling the underlying commissive illocutionary point we detected in the second chapter, we can conclude here that Mass is a passionate and *collective* commitment to this worldview.

3.4 Counterparts

Now that we have lined up all of the trademark features of the language of the Liturgy, and discussed how some of the central components of the Christian worldview are established in Mass, we may now turn around, as it were, to see where the Liturgy and everyday conversation overlap. What can the Liturgy tell us about language use external to it? Are there any counterparts of the linguistic mechanisms in Mass to be found in naturally occurring conversation? Which other activity types resemble Mass most closely?

To start with the last question, the scripted and formal rigidity of Mass in general can be found in many other social activities as well, such as marriage ceremonies, council meetings, theatre, sport contests and festivals (Rappaport 1995, Searle 1995, Clark 1996). Also, each of these examples is a highly cooperative enterprise that constitutes social reality in much the same way as Mass does. Even in a football game, for example, the team players do not PC-cooperate, but they do collectively and cooperatively submit to the rules of the game, thereby establishing its reality. Furthermore, football games involve, on the part of the supporters, collective singing and reciting etc., which functions as the

reconfirmation of mutual commitment to the teams. If we zoom out here and think of how national anthems, motto's and languages in general contribute to the self-image of a nation, we see how Mass really has the same inwardly binding and outwardly dividing construction that other elemental forms of social reality have (Searle 1995).

We can draw an even more accurate analogy. What Mass is, basically, is people gathering to interact directly with an absent addressee in a reconciling manner. Therefore, the one naturally occurring activity that would resemble Mass most strongly would be when a group of people come together to apologize to an absent person, asking him/her to forgive them, offering gifts and honouring him/her in the process. As such, Mass seems intimately related to funerals, cremations, burials and other sorts of death processions. One crucial difference is precisely the emphasis on the culpability of the community in Mass. The main goal of Mass, the salvation of all members of the community through divine mercy (i.e. the *elimination* of their culpability), is what sets it apart from other activity types. If we look for a one-on-one counterpart of Mass in naturally occurring conversation, we are left empty-handed, because there are no spontaneous activities where people collectively try to achieve salvation.

However, if we subtly manipulate some of the features of Mass, we do find an equivalent in everyday interaction. A helpful trick here is to imagine that the absent addressee actually *is* present, and that the congregation is not a congregation but a single person. That is, if we imagine a situation where one person asks another person to forgive him/her in a face-to-face conversation, that would simply be what happens whenever two people are trying to restore harmony and come to terms with each other. Consider the following fictional dialogue:

(10) A: I'm so sorry, I'm such an idiot. I wish I had said no! I'm begging you, please forgive me.
B: Promise me that you will never do it again.
A: I can't do that. You know how it is.
B: Say it! Tell me that you promise!
A: Ok, I promise. I swear I won't ever do it again.
B: Good, we're okay. I forgive you.
A: Thank you so much. You're such an angel. I love you.
B: Yeah, whatever. I hope you've finally learned from your mistakes.

We notice that, like in Mass, the language in this dialogue functions primarily in the intersubjective dimension, at the interpersonal level between speaker and

hearer. Furthermore, with regards to speech acts, we find some direct parallels in the Liturgy, in some cases even with respect to semantic content:

Dialogue	**Liturgy**	**Speech act**
1. I'm so sorry	(17) we give you thanks for your great glory	*expressive-declaration*
2. I'm such an idiot	(123) I am not worthy that you should enter under my roof	*representative*
3. I wish I had said no	(73) may we come to share in the divinity of Christ	*expressive*
4. I'm begging you, please	(89) we make humble prayer and petition	*representative-declaration*
5. forgive me	(98) be pleased to bless, acknowledge and approve	*declaration embedded in a directive*
6. promise me that you will never do it again	(90) accept and bless these gifts	*declaration embedded in a directive*
7. tell me that you promise	(96) command that we be delivered from eternal salvation	*declaration embedded in a directive*
8. I swear I won't ever do it again	(43) I believe in one God	*commissive-declaration*
9. I forgive you	(14) we bless you	*declaration*
10. thank you so much	(17) we give you thanks for your great glory	*expressive-declaration*
11. you're such an angel	(24) you alone are the hole one	*representative*
12. I love you	(15) we adore you	*representative*
13. I hope you've finally learned from your mistakes	(31) may the Lord be in your heart and on your lips	*expressive*

Table 9: Parallel speech acts in ordinary conversation and Mass

In the introduction, I stated that faith in God is not very different from faith in other people. The point of this paper has been all along not that we interact with God like we do with humans, but that we interact with God *in a specific way,* which brings to light merely one specific aspect of our everyday interaction with humans. I have dubbed this the *ethical* aspect of interpersonal communication: apologizing, confessing, admitting, begging, commanding, praising, thanking; cooperating in trying to get in agreement; directly assessing and (re-)establishing our interpersonal relations – these are the things we do when we try to solve a conflict and reconcile with each other as human beings, and we do the same

things when we interact with the divine. Faith in God, therefore, is not like faith in other people's existence, but in their power to be compassionate and forgiving.

Another striking observation can be made from table 9. Allowing our observations to work both ways, we could say that if the middle column is the language of a ritual, and the right column shows that the middle and left columns overlap, then the dialogue in the left column is a 'little ritual' as well. This need not surprise us, because in fact, as became clear from the first chapter, language is inherently a ritualistic procedure. Whenever we talk, we adhere to principles, maxims, rules, regulations, and structured patterns, much like we do in Mass. Language really *is* a ritual, one that factually constructs social reality, in that it creates in-groups of speakers with their own conventionalized system of communication.

Once again, the crucial difference is not that Mass is a scripted ritual, but that it is a *completely* scripted ritual. We saw in table 8 that it involves no strategic, uncooperative use of language, no uncertainty about the upcoming course of the event, and no changes of meaning, whereas these features are intrinsic to naturally occurring conversation, no matter how conventionalized it is. Put simply, Mass can be seen as an ordinary dialogue, involving such basic acts as apologizing, confessing, forgiving and reconciling, which directly affect the interpersonal relationships of those involved. However, the liturgical dialogue is extraordinary in that it takes place within a completely institutionalized context, omitting all uncooperative intentions and possible confusion among participants. As such, the Liturgy is a maximally ritualized dialogue of reconciliation – a passionate conversation that once may have suffered from confusion and uncertainties, but which has solidified more and more over time, until it was 'carved in stone' and became a ceremony.

Conclusion

In the *Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough*, Wittgenstein compares religious rituals to 'kissing the picture of one's beloved'. Such an act is not based on an epistemological belief that it will have any real effect on the world, but is really an expression of a certain wish or desire, in that 'we just behave this way and then we feel satisfied' (1993: 123). I have shown that the participants in Mass too are ultimately not trying to exercise an influence on the world, but on themselves. Their belief in and interaction with God is a means to a goal – the goal being the relief of forgiveness. Similarly, our talk concerning our relationships with each other has as its purpose to effect those relations directly, and to establish a state of agreement. What believers do in Mass, therefore, is much like what we do when we talk to other people about our relationships with them.

We may wonder with Kellenberger how soon we would have gained these insights 'if we started with the question "What evidence is there for God's existence?" or the question "Is belief in God's existence properly basic?"' (1990: 162). Scientists such as Dennett, Dawkins or Hitchens, however, *do* depart from such questions, and try to prove that there is no evidence for God's existence, and that belief in God is an epistemic error. As such, they are blind to the fact that 'historical proof (…) is irrelevant to belief. This message (*The Gospels*) is seized on by men believingly (i.e. *lovingly*). *That* is the certainty characterizing this particular acceptance-as-true, not something *else*' (Wittgenstein 1984: 32). Even if tomorrow Dawkins would prove that Christ was not resurrected and that the existence of God is impossible, this would not at all touch the fundamental propositions of Christianity. To ask 'Does God exist?' is, in a way, as pointless as asking 'Does my neighbour exist?' What is important is how we relate to God and our fellow humans, because once we have encountered them, our relationships with both are real beyond doubt – perhaps even for atheists and solipsists.

Just like our language in general, our rituals get their meaning 'from the rest of our activities' – from the 'form of our lives'. The dogmas of Christianity, re-enacted and reconfirmed in the ritual of Mass, relate intimately to the ethical dimension of human life. With that conclusion before us, I will bring this paper to a close by citing Wittgenstein once more:

> *'Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.*' (1993: 44)

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Website

http://www.latinliturgy.com/OrdinaryFormMassText.pdf

Appendix: The Liturgy of the Roman Catholic Mass

(I) Introit

(1)	Priest:	In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.
(2)	People:	Amen.
(3)	Priest:	The Lord be with you, and with your spirit.
(4)		Brethren, let us acknowledge our sins, and so prepare ourselves to celebrate the sacred mysteries.
(5)	All:	I confess to almighty God and to you, my brothers and sisters, that I have greatly sinned in my thoughts and in my words, in what I have done and in what I have failed to do; through my fault, through my fault, through my most grievous fault;
(6)		therefore I ask blessed Mary ever-Virgin, all the Angels and Saints, and you, my brothers and sisters, to pray for me to the Lord our God.
(7)	Priest:	May almighty God have mercy on us, forgive us our sins, and bring us to eternal life.
(8)	People:	Amen.

(II) Kyrie

(9)	All:	Lord, have mercy.
(10)		Christ, have mercy.

(III) Gloria

(11)	All:	Glory to God in the highest,
(12)		and on earth peace to people of good will.
(13)		We praise you,
(14)		we bless you,
(15)		we adore you,
(16)		we glorify you,
(17)		we give you thanks for your great glory, Lord God, heavenly King, O God, almighty Father.
(18)		Lord Jesus Christ, Only Begotten Son, Lamb of God, Son of the Father, you take away the sins of the world
(19)		have mercy on us;

(20) you take away the sins of the world,
(21) receive our prayer;
(22) you are seated at the right hand of the Father,
(23) have mercy on us.
(24) For you alone are the Holy One,
(25) you alone are the Lord,
(26) you alone are the Most High, Jesus Christ, with the Holy Spirit, in the glory of God the Father.
(27) Amen.

(IV) Gradual

(28) Reader: The Word of the Lord.
(29) All: Thanks be to God.
(30) Deacon: Your blessing, Father.
(31) Priest: May the Lord be in your heart and on your lips
(32) that you may proclaim his Gospel worthily and well, in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.
(33) Deacon: Amen.
(34) Cleanse my heart and my lips, almighty God,
(35) that I may worthily proclaim your holy Gospel.
(36) The Lord be with you,
(37) People and with your spirit.
(38) Deacon: A reading from the Holy Gospel according to N.
(39) People: Glory to you, O Lord.
(40) Deacon: The Gospel of the Lord.
(41) People: Praise to you, Lord Jesus Christ.
(42) Deacon: Through the words of the Gospel may our sins be wiped away.

(V) Credo

(43) All: I believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible.
(44) And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Only Begotten Son of God, born of the Father before all ages.
(45) God from God,
(46) Light from Light,
(47) true God from true God,
(48) begotten, not made,

(49) consubstantial with the Father;
(50) through him all things were made.
(51) For us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven,
(52) and by the Holy Spirit was incarnate of the Virgin Mary,
(53) and became man.
(54) For our sake he was crucified under Pontius Pilate,
(55) he suffered death and was buried,
(56) and rose again on the third day in accordance with the Scriptures.
(57) He ascended into heaven
(58) and is seated at the right hand of the Father.
(59) He will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead
(60) and his kingdom will have no end.
(61) And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life,
(62) who proceeds from the Father and the Son,
(63) who with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified,
(64) who has spoken through the prophets.
(65) And one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church.
(66) I confess one baptism for the forgiveness of sins,
(67) and I look forward to the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.
(68) Amen.

(VI) Offertorium

(69) Priest: Blessed are you, Lord God of all creation,
(70) for through your goodness we have received the bread we offer you: fruit of the earth and work of human hands,
(71) it will becomes for us the bread of life.
(72) People: Blessed be God forever!
(73) Priest: By the mystery of this water and wine may we come to share in the divinity of Christ,
(74) who humbled himself to share in our humanity.
(75) Blessed are you, Lord God of all creation,
(76) for through your goodness we have received the wine we offer you: fruit of the vine and work of human hands,
(77) it will become our spiritual drink
(78) People: Blessed be God forever!

(79) Priest: With humble spirit and contrite heart may we be accepted by you, O Lord,
(80) and may our sacrifice in your sight this day be pleasing to you, Lord God.
(81) Wash me, O Lord, from my iniquity and cleanse me from my sin.
(82) Pray, brethren, that my sacrifice and yours
(83) may be acceptable to God, the almighty Father.
(84) People: May the Lord accept the sacrifice at your hands for the praise and glory of his name, for our good and the good of all his holy Church.

(VII) Sanctus

(85) All: Holy, holy, holy Lord of Hosts, heaven and earth are full of your glory.
(86) Hosanna in the highest.
(87) Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord.
(88) Hosanna in the highest.

(VIII) Eucharist

(89) Priest: To you, therefore, most merciful Father, we make humble prayer and petition through Jesus Christ, your Son, our Lord:
(90) accept and bless these gifts, these offerings, these holy and unblemished sacrifices, which we offer you first of all for your holy Catholic Church.
(91) Be pleased to grant her peace, to guard, unite and govern her throughout the whole world (…) in communion with those whose memory we venerate (…):
(92) through their merits and prayers, grant that in all things we may be defended by your protecting help.
(93) Therefore, Lord, we pray:
(94) graciously accept this oblation of our service, that of your whole family;
(95) order our days in your peace,
(96) and command that we be delivered from eternal damnation and counted among the flock of those you have chosen.
(97) We pray, O God,

(98) be pleased, to bless, acknowledge, and approve this offering in every respect;

(99) make it spiritual and acceptable,

(100) so that it may become for us the Body and Blood of your most beloved Son, our Lord Jesus Christ.

(101) On the day before he was to suffer he took bread in his holy and venerable hands,

(102) and with eyes raised to heaven to you, O God, his almighty Father, giving you thanks, he said the blessing, broke the bread and gave it to his disciples, saying: Take this, all of you, and eat of it, for this is my body, which will be given up for you.

(103) In a similar way, when supper was ended, he took his precious chalice in his holy and venerable hands, and once more giving you thanks, he said the blessing and gave the chalice to his disciples, saying: Take this, all of you, and drink from it, for this is the chalice of my blood, the blood of the new and eternal covenant, which will be poured out for you and for many for the forgiveness of sins. Do this in memory of me. (…)

(104) People: The mystery of faith.

(105) We, your servants and your holy people, offer to your glorious majesty from the gifts that you have given us, this pure victim, this holy victim, this spotless victim, the holy Bread of eternal life and the Chalice of everlasting salvation. (…)

(106) In humble prayer we ask you, almighty God:

(107) command that these gifts be borne by the hands of your holy Angel to your altar on high in the sight of your divine majesty,

(108) so that all of us who through this participation at the altar receive the most holy Body and Blood of your Son may be filled with every grace and heavenly blessing, through Christ our Lord.

(109) Amen. (…)

(110) The peace of the Lord be with you always

(111) People: and with your spirit.

(112) Priest: Let us offer each other the sign of peace.

(113) May this mingling of the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ bring eternal life to us who receive it.

(IX) Agnus Dei

(114) All: Lamb of God, you who take away the sins of the world, have mercy on us,
(115) grant us peace.

(X) Communion

(116) Priest: Lord Jesus Christ, Son of the living God, who by the will of the Father and the work of the Holy Spirit, through your death gave life to the world;
(117) Free me by this your most holy Body and Blood from all my sins and from every evil;
(118) keep me always faithful to your commandments,
(119) and never let me be parted from you.
(120) Behold the Lamb of God,
(121) behold him who takes away the sins of the world.
(122) Blessed are those called to the supper of the Lamb.
(123) All: Lord, I am not worthy that you should enter under my roof,
(124) but only say the word and my soul shall be healed.
(125) Priest: May the Body of Christ keep me safe for eternal life.
(126) May the Blood of Christ keep me safe for eternal life.
(127) The Body of Christ.
(128) People: Amen.
(129) Priest: What has passed our lips as food, O Lord, may we possess in purity of heart,
(130) that what has been given to us in time may be our healing for eternity.

(XI) Ite, missa est

(131) Priest: May almighty God bless you; the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.
(132) People: Amen.
(133) Priest: Go forth,
(134) the Mass is ended.
(135) People: Thanks be to God.