

# A political and social contextualisation of the 1980s for post-colonial migrants in France



Amadou Gaye, 'Cité de transit de la Butte Rouge, Chatenay Malabry' (1980).

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Migration, Cities and Global Interdependence

Governance of Migration and Diversity

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Abstract:

This research aimed to understand the different mechanisms of integration in France throughout the 1980s by looking into the differences in strategies at the national and local level, their degrees of influence and impact of peoples' daily lives. This research focuses on the developed mechanism and framing for integration in France through three distinct governments under the presidency of Valérie Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterrand. Through parliamentary debate analysis emerged different frames based on political perceptions of immigration, integration, racism, exclusion, hatred and policy strategies. While research carried at a local level focused more on social mobilisation and inclusivity to develop a frontal and pacific confrontation to hatred, racism and exclusion. To carry out this study, online and physical archival material documents were selected. The doors of 'SOS Racisme' were for the second time in their history opened for research. Based on archival material, this study outlined that governance mechanisms and different framing were elevated at a national and local level of governmentality. It was concluded that due to a lack of understanding and physical exclusion of migrant population, a gap between communities was created. With the election of Mitterrand as President, new strategies for integration were developed and laid ground for social mobilisation to form. Hence, leading to a bottom-top approach and new means of understanding for a more fundamental perception of national wide diversity and integration strategies.

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## Introduction

### The Study

This study seeks to understand integration structures and multi-level governance mechanisms in the French political context of the 1980s. The study considers the contextual vision of the neighbourhood in order to understand migrant related perception of integration seeking to break down inclusive/exclusive policies and realities. The paper focuses on whether we can observe linear developments and perceptions of integration policies, or whether, despite a change of political perception and public opinion, migrants' situation stagnated at the local level. To fully explore the depth of the integrative discourse at a national and local level, it is crucial to consider decolonisation, racism, alienation, human capital, inclusion and exclusion theories. Doing so, the research grasps the politico-social mobilisation as a governance mechanism, while outlining the pressure felt by 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation migrants in the 1980s. It is therefore key to explore these elements and the existing literature in the French integration discourse.

Culture is an essential consideration when focusing on the relation that migrants have with France. 'Black, Blanc, Beur', an idealistic phrase that is written into French cultural history as the emblem of the 1998 victory in the Football World Cup and a symbol of the winning Republican Integration policy: showcasing solidarity amongst dominant ethnic groups in France at the time.<sup>1</sup> Twenty years later, France wins another Football World Cup, and players such as Kylian MBappé – French-born with ethnic ties to Algeria and Cameroon - represents the future of France's Black, Blanc, Beur culture.

### Question

The research aims to answer one question and two sub-questions explored through the chapters:

Research question:

1. How and why did consecutive national governments and local organisation 'SOS

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<sup>1</sup> C.M. Fleming, *Resurrecting Slavery. Racial Discrimination legacies and white Supremacy in France* (Philadelphia, 2017) 1.

Racisme' prioritised the integration of the post Algerian War migration (1962) differently through their framing and perception of discrimination and inclusion?

Sub-questions:

1. How did parliamentary debates, based on neighbourhood governance of integration, before and after the election of President François Mitterrand, positively or negatively reflected integration and discrimination for 2<sup>nd</sup> generation colonial migrants (between 1978 to 1989)?
2. How did local level governance, through the association 'SOS Racisme', served anti-racism and inclusivity through mobilisation up to 1990?

## Historical Context

The fractured landscape of France's postcolonial migrant ethnicities has a physical segregation component, based on the location of post-World War Two (WWII) neighbourhoods and group identification.<sup>2</sup> The government's means and efforts to maintain public social housing, while investing in various programs (like the prioritising special funds for education and urban maintenance) are both interesting elements to study for a wider understanding of the lack of mobility and impeded integration outcomes for certain communities. Migrant integration, postcolonial migration and their outcomes have been widely studied in French academia.<sup>3</sup> Algerian immigration to France in particular had a huge impact both socially and politically. In 1945, France, looking to restructure its work force and industrial infrastructure, largely relied on guest workers from overseas colonies following the Second World War.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, a special emphasis has pressured researchers to extensively study the Algerian repatriation efforts from 1962 onwards and its socio-political implications and later consequences.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, similar research has covered Black History in France, framing it with discrimination, racism and the development of diasporic anti-racist mobilisation. The present research is especially important in that it completes such studies, while using a similar framework. Yet it is distinctively unique in the way that it frames the rise of anti-racist movements as deconstructing ethno-racial boundaries of mobilisation. For

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<sup>2</sup> Pascale Blanchard, Nicola Bancel and Sadrine Lemaire, *La Fracture coloniale. La société Française au prisme de l'héritage colonial* (Paris, 2009).

<sup>3</sup> F. Barclay, *France's Colonial legacies. Memory Identity and Narrative* (Cardiff, 2013).

<sup>4</sup> Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, 'Les aléas des politiques migratoires: 1945-1981', *Migration Société* 3 (2008) 63-70.

<sup>5</sup> Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire, *La Fracture coloniale. La société Française au prisme de l'héritage colonial*.

postcolonial migration, tackling the root causes of discriminatory relations and political implications are fundamental to adequately illustrate the integrative discourse. Three angles that aim to understand a fracture between postcolonial migrants of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation and French institutions is commonly written about in the historical context: migration to France, decolonisation and riots.

### Migration to France

At the dawn of the post WWII era, the perception of migration was dominated by the expectation of long term traditional Italian migration into the southern regions. However, shifting demographics and the offset of declining Colonial Empires, re-rolled the dices for the rules of migratory trends and game. As a consequence, short term migration became extremely popular and expanded to include Algerians, Yugoslavians, Portuguese, Moroccans, Spanish, Sub-Saharan, Tunisians and Turkish migrants.<sup>6</sup> Outlining this rapid shift of migration, the 2<sup>nd</sup> of September 1945 Ordinance and 20<sup>th</sup> September 1947 Law gave French nationality to residents of overseas colonies and facilitated migration into the metropolitan territory: reshaping the conventional corridors of migration to and within France.<sup>7</sup> France's shifting migration landscape was dominated by voluntarism from the colonies: regular migration policies targeted guest workers to enter the metropolitan territory to rebuild itself. This boosted numbers of regular migration into France by 90% from 1946 to 1949, attaining 265,000 regular workers from Algeria and 214,000 Italians, classified as a cheap workforce.<sup>8</sup> The major migrant populations post-WWII included 629,000 Italians in 1962, 607,000 Spanish in 1968, 759,000 Portuguese in 1975 and 711,000 Algerians in the same year.<sup>9</sup> The latter became, by 1975, the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> minorities in Metropolitan France, mostly working secondary tiers jobs including private and public construction jobs and industry.<sup>10</sup> Ironically, with the image of a

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<sup>6</sup> 'Depuis quand la France est-elle une terre d'immigration?', *Musée de l'histoire de l'immigration*.

<http://www.histoire-immigration.fr/questions-contemporaines/les-migrations/depuis-quand-la-france-est-elle-une-terre-d-immigration> (2007); Frédérique Cornuau and Xavier Dunezat, 'L'immigration en France: concepts, contours et politiques', *Espace population et sociétés* 2 (2008) 331-352.

<sup>7</sup> Costa-Lascoux, 'Les aléas des politiques migratoires: 1945-1981', 66.

<sup>8</sup> Costa-Lascoux, 'Les aléas des politiques migratoires: 1945-1981', 66.

<sup>9</sup> Valérie Morin, 'Première partie : L'histoire de l'immigration en France après 1945', *Musée de l'histoire de l'immigration*. <http://www.histoire-immigration.fr/des-ressources-pour-enseigner/parcours-histoire-de-l-immigration-en-france-depuis-1945/premiere> (2007).

<sup>10</sup> Valérie Morin, 'Première partie : L'histoire de l'immigration en France après 1945', *Musée de l'histoire de l'immigration*. <http://www.histoire-immigration.fr/des-ressources-pour-enseigner/parcours-histoire-de-l-immigration-en-france-depuis-1945/premiere> (2007).

prisoner sentenced to death and digging his own grave, the migrant minorities built their ivory towers, residential neighbourhoods, and without knowing, constructed their exclusion. It is crucial to outline the difficult relation and questions related to Algerian migration: the extent to which the Algerian migrants held a unique status in France's postcolonial migratory landscape. March 19<sup>th</sup> 1962 marked the end of the Algerian Independence War, a conflict considered by some as a Civil War (on contrary to other colonies, Algeria consisted of three French departments). The question of Algerian migration into France is largely traumatic and based on forced migration and hostile reception. France and Algeria were allegedly giving up on land perceived as lawfully theirs: on one side, diversified Algerians ethnicities and on the other, believers of a French Colonial Empire. A trend outlined by Frantz Fanon as framed by the dominant and dominated relation in the Colonial setting. An abnormal situation, requires abnormal actions: reflecting to a larger extent the essence of French policies to manage Algerian migration. The French Republic from the 27<sup>th</sup> December 1968 mechanised bilateral agreements to regularise migration into France from 35,000 yearly Algerian entries into France. This was later revised to 25,000 a year from 1975 onwards.<sup>11</sup> This granted Algerian migrants nine months in which to find a job, after which they would be granted a five-year stay. The 27<sup>th</sup> December 1968 marked the end of the institutional *laissez faire* (1949 to 1968).<sup>12</sup> Leading to a wild and poorly managed 'Ghettoisation' of migrants in 'temporary slums' near heavily industrial areas in the Rhône, Île de France and Bouche du Rhône region.<sup>13</sup>

Overall, immigration policies remained the prey of global markets and economic growth trends, and from 1968 a series of social restructuring policies aimed to lower immigration while resettling families already living in France. The creation of social action plans aimed to develop urban policies while developing the creation of social neighbourhoods (HLM complexes) for migrant families and the increase of education rates among children aimed to improve integration.<sup>14</sup> Predominantly the department of the North, Moselle, Rhône

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<sup>11</sup> Valérie Morin, 'Première partie : L'histoire de l'immigration en France après 1945', *Musée de l'histoire de l'immigration*. <http://www.histoire-immigration.fr/des-ressources-pour-enseigner/parcours-histoire-de-l-immigration-en-france-depuis-1945/premiere> (2007).

<sup>12</sup> Soraya Nahal, *Les parias de l'histoire: le problème des Harkis dans la France contemporaine. Aspects politiques et juridiques* (Faculté de Droit, Sciences sociales et politiques, Sciences économique et de gestion, Administration économique et sociale Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV 2008), 16.

<sup>13</sup> Nahal, *Les parias de l'histoire: le problème des Harkis dans la France contemporaine. Aspects politiques et juridiques*, 16.

<sup>14</sup> Nahal, *Les parias de l'histoire: le problème Harki en France contemporaine. Aspects politiques et juridiques*, 126-127; Costa-Lascoux, 'Les aléas des politiques migratoires: 1945-1981', 68.

and Bouche du Rhône and in Île de France.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, in 1971 71,000 individuals benefited from these actions.<sup>16</sup> Throughout the 1970s, the economic instability that punctuated French development had an impact on budget allocation for social actions and the initial migrant-led initiatives rose to denounce social and political discrimination. While the late 1960s marked the development of initial social action to govern and assimilate Algerian immigration into France, the 1970s showed a false impression of governance interrupted by the restriction of immigration into France and the rise of riots.<sup>17</sup> By 1975, the number of 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation migrants amounted to approximately 3,442,000 individuals: around 7% of the active population, mostly living in HLM complexes.<sup>18</sup>

### The rise of the Front National and a new French Crucible

Republicanism, integration and post-colonialism are part of the French historical discourse that frames French national memory. With the independence of Algeria, the development of far-right parties influenced developments surrounding the idea of a lost colonial empire and the supremacy of French culture and way of life. Violent acts of racism, such as the murder of Algerian migrants both by the police and by neo-fascist groups, marked a peak in racist violence and the first wave of anti-migrant movements in France.<sup>19</sup> The development of xenophobic currents, the rise of racist violence correlated with the rise of the Front National (FN) and their access to politics at a parliamentary level in the early 1980s.<sup>20</sup> Through the commoditisation of the FN, on both a political and societal level, a French anti-racist mobilisation also rose as a united national response, canalising resentments towards France's colonial heritage and diversity. Such mobilisation and the rise of the FN represent a struggle that endures in France today: accepting the idea that France is a multicultural post-colonial nation and the fundamental challenge represented by the FN. Thus, a new crucible can be outlined by the opposition on the one hand, the attempts to integrate while rejecting racism. On the other hand, an ideology clinging on a former colonial rhetoric of civilisation, domination

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<sup>15</sup> Benjamin Stora, 'Les Algériens pendant la guerre d'Algérie', in Antoine Marès and Pierre Milza, *Le Paris étrangers depuis 1945* (Paris, 1995) 299-308, 304-305; Mohand Khellil, 'l'émigration algérienne en France au XXe siècle', *Homme et migrations* 1295 (2012) 12-25.

<sup>16</sup> Costa-Lascoux, 'Les aléas des politiques migratoires: 1945-1981', 67.

<sup>17</sup> Costa-Lascoux, 'Les aléas des politiques migratoires: 1945-1981', 67-70.

<sup>18</sup> Costa-Lascoux, 'Les aléas des politiques migratoires: 1945-1981', 67-70.

<sup>19</sup> Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire, *La Fracture coloniale. La société Française au prisme de l'héritage colonial*.

<sup>20</sup> Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire, *La Fracture coloniale. La société Française au prisme de l'héritage colonial*.



and race.

### Riots and migrant mobilisation

The early 1980s saw some of Europe's most violent outbursts of migrant mobilisation – such as Lyon's 'hot summer' or the Brixton race riots: the spectre of rebellion under the motive of ethnic based clashes with the police in urban areas.<sup>21</sup> In 1981, although riots happened nationally, Lyon was the theatre for some of the fiercest and notable urban violent acts.<sup>22</sup> Having a clear perspective for the development of the 1981 riots, from a local perspective, would be an interesting shift in the French discourse: looking at it from a pre-emptive perspective rather than a reactive one. Overall, the shift of actual debates regarding elements of the 1981 riots would involve focusing on the inevitability of the events instead of considering a domino effect as a consequence of the 1981 urban violence. Understanding political mechanisms of integration policies, from a different perspective, includes a triangulation bridging analysis of local struggles, urban policies and lived experiences of the policies through the creation of migrant mobilisation under the form of anti-racist organisation. In 1983, due to a political stalemate regarding institutional racism and urban violence, a march was organised from Marseille to Paris, crossing France from South to North, in the first migrant mobilisation against racism and for equality.<sup>23</sup> Raising a deeper type of mobilisation with the aim to construct, from a bottom-up approach, an inclusive Republic that would recognise diversity as opposed to segregating it through the HLM.<sup>24</sup> Marking a new type of mobilisation that, although popular, ran out of breath shortly after its creation. Replaced with the creation of SOS Racisme (1984), this event marked the beginning of a more structured type of migrant

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<sup>21</sup> Dave Waddington, Fabien Jobard and Mike King, *Rioting in the UK and France. A Comparative Analysis* (Oxford 2009); Sophie Body-Gendrot, 'Making sense of French urban disorders in 2005', *European Journal of Criminology*, 13:5 (2009) 556-572.

<sup>22</sup> Stéphane Hessel, 'Le devoir d'insertion, vingt ans après. Le grand tournant des années 70 et les défis actuels', *Migration Société* 3 (2008) 53-62.

<sup>23</sup> Philippe Jasselin and Laurent Sablic, 'Marche pour l'égalité et contre le racisme', *Institut National de l'Audiovisuel*. 2 December 1983, <https://www.ina.fr/video/PAC06017981/marche-pour-l-egalite-et-contre-le-racisme-video.html> (22 August 2019); Bernard Langlois et al., 'Marche pour l'égalité et contre le racisme', *Institut National de l'Audiovisuel*. 3 November 1983, <https://www.ina.fr/video/CAB8302218401/marche-pour-l-egalite-et-contre-le-racisme-video.html> (22 August 2019); Catherine Eme Ziri, 'L'arrivée de la marche anti raciste à Paris', *Institut National de l'Audiovisuel*. 3 December 1983, <https://www.ina.fr/video/LXC03033663/l-arrivee-de-la-marche-anti-raciste-a-paris-video.html> (22 August 2019); Albert Ripamonti, 'L'arrivée de la marche pour l'égalité et contre le racisme à Paris', *Institut National de l'Audiovisuel*. 3 December 1983, <https://www.ina.fr/video/LXC00011694> (22 August 2019).

<sup>24</sup> Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire, *La Fracture coloniale. La société Française au prisme de l'héritage coloniale*.

mobilisation that included a frontal mobilisation against racism. Such urban violence, arguably, demonstrated the failure of the previous governments' ability to govern and assimilate the various migrant fluxes into France. Setting the scene of a deep inter-ethnic gap amongst migrant groups and native French population.

## Historiography

### Political Discussion on Pluralism and Multiculturalism

Political discussion around integration and the pluralism of French society (in terms of identity and religion) has been widely studied and represents a major part of the literature on post-colonial migrants. For a faction of the population, being Muslim in the French secular Republic is a challenge: the republic's integration policies for Islamic migrants is far from efficient.<sup>25</sup> For Anna Bozzo, secularism has a dimension of personality in the public space while Islam is represented as a pride.<sup>26</sup> Denying this pride is rejecting a common future through the pluralistic nature of France's social makeup. The political relation between Islam and French politics can be observed from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Republic onwards. For Bozzo, the relation has been marked negatively and framed as a 'menace permanente', a relentless menace.<sup>27</sup> Her study considers the 1905 law – separating Religion from State Institutions to maintain secularism - in Algeria and the creation of a political class, that included white secular 'values' on Islam in Algeria: creating an elite class that was aware of the limitation of the law for the Muslim minority (in the French Empire) and politics. Arguably, shaping the claims that constructed the Algerian mind-set in opposition to the French colonial empire. In turn, after their independence, this trail of thought was re-asserted by an Islamic identity that became dominant in the Algerian community and threatening to the metropolitan France.<sup>28</sup>

A position and a historical development that Thomas Deltombe and Mathieu Rigouste also seem to have framed as central to understanding the political discussion and general view that French politicians held towards Algerian migration and Islam until 1981. However, they identify the threat that the Algerians constructed around the idea of the production of the 'Arab'

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<sup>25</sup> Anna Bozzo, 'Islam et République: Une longue histoire de méfiance', in Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire (eds.), *La Fracture coloniale. La société Française au prisme de l'héritage colonial* (Paris, 2005)75-82.

<sup>26</sup> Bozzo, 'Islam et République: Une longue histoire de méfiance', 82.

<sup>27</sup> Bozzo, 'Islam et République: Une longue histoire de méfiance', 82.

<sup>28</sup> Bozzo, 'Islam et République: Une longue histoire de méfiance', 82.

figure caricatured against the Republic, basing their argument more on *leitkultur* (leading culture) rather than Religion.<sup>29</sup> The French society for them was profoundly scared of a metissage Islam as the Figaro (Magazine) pointed out: ‘will we still be French in 30 years?’.<sup>30</sup> The ‘Arab’ figure was created in the media and utilised to elevate the space for a political discourse based on integration and identity. An image that represented discourses that were founded on the fear of identity loss from France's civilisational identity perspective. An image that is, in some way, close to what Agamben described as the ‘Muselmann’ - the human being stripped from his essence and losing any civil identity.<sup>31</sup> The Muselmann then becomes a concept that falls outside of the frame of the State: he then bears witness to his loss of dignity while his agency is stripped down to a spatial void. Such a perception emerged in the 1970s and then was prominent on both the public and political scene in the 1980s. A transition of this fear can be elevated on a political level, from integration debates to the inclusion of migrants in politics and in some cases, in the Republic.<sup>32</sup> Creating an integrative trend that was also observed by Bozzo: the political perception of integration was one way and represented a dead end for diversity.<sup>33</sup> Exemplified, perhaps, by a former societal debate of the food served in the public school’s menus: the fierce opposition to cultural metissage and the refusal of the presence of a Halal menu in the Republic’s kitchens.<sup>34</sup>

Secondly, in parallel, following integration through political perception for migrants, the urban setting as a field of control was also perceived. For Deltombe and Rigouste, a parallel between identity and the Banlieues can be noted: using the term ghetto to signify the physical location of population as well as their exclusion, referring to the American integration as a parallel.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, the construction and the political recuperation of the ‘Arab’ created a gap between citizens and values while flirting with racial exclusion discourses (portrayed as negative by the two authors) through terms of ‘real’ and ‘fake’ French citizens based on area

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<sup>29</sup> Thomas Deltombe and Mathieu Rigouste, ‘L’ennemi intérieur: la construction médiatique de la figure de l’‘Arabe’’, in Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire (eds.), *La Fracture coloniale. La société Française au prisme de l’héritage colonial* (Paris, 2005) 191-198.

<sup>30</sup> Deltombe and Rigouste, ‘L’ennemi intérieur: la construction médiatique de la figure de l’‘Arabe’’, 196.

<sup>31</sup> John Lechte and Saul Newman, ‘Agamben, Arendt and human rights- Bearing witness to the human’, *European Journal of Social Theory* 15:4 (2012) 522-536, 526.

<sup>32</sup> Deltombe and Rigouste, ‘L’ennemi intérieur: la construction médiatique de la figure de l’‘Arabe’’, 196.

<sup>33</sup> Deltombe and Rigouste, ‘L’ennemi intérieur: la construction médiatique de la figure de l’‘Arabe’’, 196.

<sup>34</sup> Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, ‘L’école au défi de l’espace alimentaire Halal’, *Histoire, monde et cultures religieuses* 4:32 (2014) 103-118.

<sup>35</sup> Deltombe and Rigouste, ‘L’ennemi intérieur: la construction médiatique de la figure de l’‘Arabe’’, 197.

of residence.<sup>36</sup> Creating the myth of immigration as menacing for the greater French society helped create the image of migrants as: ‘delinquent’ and ‘Islamist’. Following this creation, Nadia Nahal viewed the urban setting as one dominated by exclusion and the negative frame that was included by the historical relocation of the Algerian migrant population.<sup>37</sup> Her second chapter focuses on the reception and initial placement into camps and, later, into social housing. By exploring the judicial and political acts and negotiations around the Harki (Algerian auxiliary troops fighting for France during Algerian War of independence) case study with their exile from Algeria. She highlights the processes by which Harkis and Pied Noirs (Europeans formerly living in Algeria) were treated differently, while explaining a decrease of interest from the State from the mid-70s. The negative framing of the Algerian population through neighbourhood exclusion, based on the political discourses entails the portrait of Algerian migrants (and postcolonial migrants in general) as threatening until the 1980s and persists to this day. Resulting in their exclusion from the mainstream populations and their gradual abandonment.<sup>38</sup> Possibly, a good embodiment of such residential isolation endured by assimilated migrant communities is Mathieu Kassovitz’s movie ‘La Haine’. Outlining a diversified France derived from migrants living in social neighbourhoods and treated like animals in a cage - opposed to the mainstream population living in Paris incarnated by ordinary and secondary spectators. And in this case, subject to institutional violence, exclusion, racism and a deep lack of both social and physical mobility, but ultimately pushed to act in both violent and pacific types mobilisations.

Thirdly, a second political implication can be noted in the way the national history was constructed. Namely, with the access to power of François Mitterrand, a transition of interest was noted, through which the Socialists developed a more inclusive frame for the political discussion surrounding integration. Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, for example, suggested that a change of power between political parties – and the development of new policies (urban) – influenced power relations between migrants and civil and political society through mobilisation.<sup>39</sup> Through this transition, she argues, that the vision regarding post-colonial

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<sup>36</sup> Deltombe and Rigouste, ‘L’ennemi intérieur: la construction médiatique de la figure de l’‘Arabe’’, 198-199.

<sup>37</sup> Nahal, *Les parias de l’histoire: le problème Harkis en France contemporaine. Aspects politiques et juridiques*, 126-127.

<sup>38</sup> Bozzo, ‘Islam et République: Une longue histoire de méfiance’; Deltombe and Rigouste, ‘L’ennemi intérieur: la construction médiatique de la figure de l’ ‘Arabe’ ’; Nahal, ‘Les parias de l’histoire: Le problème Harki dans la France contemporaine, aspects politiques et juridiques’.

<sup>39</sup> Jacqueline Costa-Lasocux, ‘Les aléas des politiques migratoires: 1945-1981’, *Migration Société* 3:117-118 (2008) 63-70.

migrant, radically changed as a civilisational struggle was elevated by the Socialists. Notably, through the creation of the ZEPs (Educational Priority Zones), education was a way to elevate stigmatised population from poverty on a neighbourhood level. A view that is confirmed by Lydie Heurdir through exploring the ZEPs in 1981 and the impact it had on the targeted population.<sup>40</sup> The paper has a moral element on the creation of the ZEPs, exploring the realisation that the State could not let ‘endangered’ neighbourhoods ‘die out’.<sup>41</sup> The perception of the Socialists to treat neighbourhoods from a premature ‘death’ shows the central importance that policies like the ZEP had: hinting towards a profound political and social turn. Although considering the ZEP as a success in her paper, it was solely carried through a national level of frame analysis. Involving a misrepresentation and a gap within the literature in the 1980s through the analysis of local organisations. Nonetheless, the evolution of such urban policies does exist, but again, from a bureaucratic perspective. Marc Bonneville, for instance, explores the Urban development as central to explain integration in France to explain the birth of the ZEP policy.<sup>42</sup> Providing an overlook of the urban development for social neighbourhoods that were built from 1966 to 1970, assessing their impact on the regional population. Further diving into socio-economic results that led to the abandonment of the Banlieues.

The thesis explicitly inquires on one side, the rejection of this pluralism while on the other, efforts to bring isolated communities into the social mainstream. By covering this link, the thesis brings together what multiple research papers have done individually. Creating a holistic approach, easing the conceptualisation of the period rather than covering mandates and political trends one by one. This paper will therefore create a fresh and innovative narrative to put into perspective major shifts in the governance of post-colonial diversity in France between 1980 to 1989.

### Social Inequalities and urban violence

The urban setting has widely been studied from an integration perspective in relation to group formation and identity development. Didier Lapeyronnie argued that economic and social

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<sup>40</sup> Lydie Heurdir, ‘Classement en ZEP et moyens supplémentaires: réalité ou illusion? Regard historique sur une question sensible et mal connue (1981- 2001)’, *Carrefours de l’éducation* 1:33 (2012) 201-217.

<sup>41</sup> Heurdir, ‘Classement en ZEP et moyens supplémentaires: réalité ou illusion?’ 201-217.

<sup>42</sup> Marc Bonneville, ‘Planification et développement urbain dans l’agglomération lyonnaise: essai d’évaluation pour la période 1968-1982’ *Revue géographique de Lyon* 57:2 (1982) 93-116.

categorisation forced migrants to move into Banlieues.<sup>43</sup> Through this lens, he and other authors have specifically given a cultural, ethnic and ‘racial’ dimension to discrimination and segregation.<sup>44</sup> Through a racialised perception of integration and discrimination, Lapeyronnie argues that:

‘The experience of discrimination and segregation, and possibly the feeling of being defined as being part of a perpetuating ‘civilisation deficit’ in the discourse of power, whilst being subjected to the injunctions of integration at the instant where the host society deprives you from the means to construct a future, evoking the ‘colony’, epitomises for a population issued from immigration, ‘a past that does not seem to pass’’.<sup>45</sup>

Considering social housing and personal reduction based on discrimination and segregation seems to be a major argument in the literature as other authors have perceived this argument through this scope.<sup>46</sup> Interpreting the consecutive use of ‘civilization’, ‘colony’ and ‘a past that does not seem to pass’ is crucial for this thesis’ overarching argument. Outlining the exclusionary and difficult integration that seemingly preserved civilisational elements of a relation dominated by an elite political class on its dominated subjects. Hinting towards the classification of neighbourhoods as the perpetuation of a colonial mind-set on both side. Perceiving integration as a ‘permanent deficit of civilization’ and on the other hand for migrant population, ‘a past that does not seem to pass’. Supporting this analysis, John Tuppen considers the ethnic and age composition of the Minguettes estate (theatre of the 1983 Lyon’s Hot Summer)- exploring the links between social exclusion, unemployment and background of its inhabitants. His research overseas the evolution of the problems encountered at the local level, while giving a parallel of national debates on integration. Adding a multi-level perspective to Lapeyronnie’s argument through looking at the ground reality.

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<sup>43</sup> Didier Lapeyronnie, ‘La banlieue comme théâtre colonial, ou la fracture coloniale dans les quartiers’, in Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire (eds.), *La Fracture coloniale. La société Française au prisme de l’héritage colonial* (Paris, 2005) 209-218.

<sup>44</sup> Lapeyronnie, ‘La banlieue comme théâtre colonial, ou la fracture coloniale dans les quartiers’; Dietmar Loch, ‘Immigrant youth and Urban riots: a comparaison of France and Germany’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35:5 (2005) 791-814.

<sup>45</sup> Lapeyronnie, ‘La banlieue comme théâtre colonial, ou la fracture coloniale dans les quartiers’, 214.

<sup>46</sup> John Tuppen, ‘After Les Minguettes: ‘problem’ housing estates in France’, *European Urban and Regional Studies* 2:4 (1995) 367-371.

Moreover Dietmar Loch considers that the life situation and the subject perception of their reality being of a central importance in the expression of their frustration and the rise of violence in social neighbourhoods.<sup>47</sup> In the perspective of their placement on the social ladder, the following pattern was argued by Loch. Group integration into the white middle class can be assisted through qualitative results of education, while on the other hand, if integration is failed, a different group of people – with a poor education and vocational training – may find themselves trapped in the urban underclass.<sup>48</sup> Socio-spatial segregation is thus symbolised by the cycles of life spent in the Banlieues and vocational schools. Moreover, educational disadvantage, unemployment and poverty are now increasingly linked to poor neighbourhoods. This creates the idea of ‘divided cities’, due to urban and housing patterns in France: insisting on the perpetuation of discrimination and what Lapeyronie described as a ‘passed that does not seem to pass’.<sup>49</sup>

Lastly, racism through this form of disadvantage was extensively discussed by other academics. Discrimination and racism was felt through the lack of education, adequate housing and pressure from institutions (like the police) and was correlated to area of residence. In this context, Hajjat perceived the exclusion of Algerian migrants as linear, which ultimately resulted in urban violence through migrants’ inability to express themselves through political representation.<sup>50</sup> The feeling of exclusion embodied Lyon’s rebelling youth between 1981-1983: a view that Michelle Zancarini-Fournel also supported.<sup>51</sup> Adding to this analysis, Annie Collovald linked urban violence to political change and adaptation. Collovald argues that outbursts of violence expresses social and mental distress elements from the collective public debate.<sup>52</sup> They both identified that social exclusion and failed assimilation while perceiving localised segregation and targeted police violence as direct causes of the urban violence in France between 1971 and 1981.<sup>53</sup> This line of argument suggests that urban violence is a consequence and expression of a misrepresentation of the marginalised migrant youth.

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<sup>47</sup> Loch, ‘Immigrant youth and Urban riots: a comparaison of France and Germany’, 792.

<sup>48</sup> Loch, ‘Immigrant youth and Urban riots: a comparaison of France and Germany’, 792.

<sup>49</sup> Loch, ‘Immigrant youth and Urban riots: a comparaison of France and Germany’, 793.

<sup>50</sup> Abdellali Hajjat, ‘Rébellions urbaines et déviances policières. Approche configurationnelle des relations entre les “jeunes” des Minguettes et la police (1981-1983)’, *Cultures conflits* 1:93 (2017) 11-34.

<sup>51</sup> Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, ‘Généalogie des rébellions urbaines en temps de crise (1971-1981)’, *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire* 4:84 (2004) 119-127.

<sup>52</sup> Annie Collovald, ‘Des désordres sociaux à la violence urbaine’, *Actes de la recherche en sciences* 136-137 (2001) 104-113.

<sup>53</sup> Zancarini-Fournel, ‘Généalogie des rébellions urbaines en temps de crise (1971-1981)’; Collovald, ‘Des désordres sociaux à la violence urbaine’.

Furthermore, the second generation Algerians in France underwent political exclusion. Contextually, the French political dimension of discrimination/exclusion is rather strong when compared to what the Republic claims to offer to her citizens.

The literature explores social inequalities and the rise of violence in social neighbourhoods, while detailing - without being too explicit - the reproduction of some colonial framework through the scope of neighbourhoods. However, the existing discourses do not use a clear mechanical framework to describe this relation. This thesis relies on a link between the colonial mind-set of governance and the conceptualisation of neighbourhoods to outline a mechanical relation between the State and French handling of migration. Thus, attempting to make sense of an intricate relation in the second half of the twentieth century that consecutive French governments had with citizens with migrant backgrounds. Thus, the notion of cross ethnic mobilisation will be introduced in relation to the overarching feelings of exclusion and discrimination of migrants and their actions taken: adding to the existing literature.

### Algerian Migration, Identity and Integration

Lastly, a few studies have indicated that postcolonial migrants, especially Algerian migrants, have undergone an identity crisis due to their tumultuous relation with French governments and policies. Importantly, considering the decolonisation period that followed 1962, the idea of a changing crucible has been widely explored. Yvan Gastaut and Ahmed Boubeker, have separately researched the effect of Algerian integration on diversity and the changes it brought to the perception of French identity.<sup>54</sup> Boubeker, interestingly explains a feeling of rejection that is double faced and transitional. Exploring 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Algerian migrants' feeling of misrepresentation in France as a 'mal-être' (social unease): referring to it as the 'malaise des banlieue' (social neighbourhood's uneasiness).<sup>55</sup> Linking the stranger form within (being the Algerians) to a colonial trauma that remained untouched and untreated: 'a lived history, through the long weave of the experience of a humiliated subject, continuing his struggle for recognition in the dark side of the golden legend of the French crucible'.<sup>56</sup> The stranger is not

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<sup>54</sup> Yvan Gastaut, 'Marseille cosmopolite après la décolonisation: un enjeu identitaire', *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 67 (2003) 1-12; Ahmed Boubeker, 'Le creuset Français ou la légende noire de l'intégration', in Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire (eds.), *La Fracture coloniale. La société Française au prisme de l'héritage colonial* (Paris, 2005) 183-190.

<sup>55</sup> Boubeker, 'Le creuset Français ou la légende noire de l'intégration', 187.

<sup>56</sup> Boubeker, 'Le creuset Français ou la légende noire de l'intégration', 188.



the one that comes from elsewhere, but rather the one that permanently reproduces himself through social exclusion. In the context of his study, Algerians and other postcolonial migrants experienced this exclusion through the Banlieues.<sup>57</sup>

A colonial heritage is therefore underlined in the State's relation to minorities that found themselves in the Banlieues and HLM complexes. Patrick Simon argues that the necessity to decolonise the mind of the population through accepting diversity in the French context.<sup>58</sup> His argument of identity creation and integration for migrant population and communitarian relation is done through the valorisation of diversity. Simon draws a portrait of the French political system as one that keeps its hierarchy intact. Avoiding to treat its responsibilities tied to the acknowledgment of diversity, reproducing over time the same inequalities: the native's supremacy. He identifies the relation between 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation migrants through norms and policies that dictate the relations between the majority and the minorities while explaining colonial heritage as related to a duty of insertion.<sup>59</sup> Describing the French model of integration as volatile and subject to change for post-colonial migrants. Simon insists on this mismatch and argues that up to 1991, different perceptions and a State 'laissez-faire' towards migrants and integration policies, was observable.<sup>60</sup> This created room for the rise of significant associations/institutions like the SLPM (Service de Liaison et de Promotion des Migrants) (early integration office based on urban private-public-partnership goals at a regional level) and their regional goals for minorities. Moreover, integration could have possibly varied depending on the region.

In terms of Algerian migration, identity and integration, the research uses the existing literature as a basis and framework to identify the relation that migrants had with the home society. A relation that has been described by academics and researches as exemplified by the post-colonial subject feeling of humiliation and inferiority through various aspects. The perception of this specific discourse, is however, dominated by the Algerian migrant community, but can also be observed in other communities. Thus, the thesis draws on this framework, but without appropriating it. The research aims to take a broader angle from the

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<sup>57</sup> Boubeker, 'Le creuset Français ou la légende noire de l'intégration', 188-189.

<sup>58</sup> Patrick Simon, 'La république face à la diversité: comment décoloniser les imaginaires?', in Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire (eds.), *La Fracture coloniale. La société Française au prisme de l'héritage colonial* (Paris, 2005) 237-246.

<sup>59</sup> Simon, 'La république face à la diversité: comment décoloniser les imaginaires?', 242-243; Stéphane Hessel, 'Le devoir d'insertion, vingt ans après. Le grand tournant des années 70 et les défis actuels', *Migration Société* 3 (2008) 53-62.

<sup>60</sup> Simon, 'La république face à la diversité: comment décoloniser les imaginaires?', 244.

existing literature, but draws on the ideas argued by Gastaut, Boubecker, Simon and Hessel.

### Research gap

Concerning the thesis, the current academic angle of postcolonial integration has three main trends (when looking between the 1970's up to 1983): 1) Political Discussion on Pluralism and Multiculturalism, 2) Social Inequalities and urban violence, 3) Algerian Migration, Identity and Integration. Although this study will draw from these three elements, it seeks to understand a political and societal development of the perception of integration policies from an under researched perspective: a triangulation between governance, racism and mobilisation. Comparing these levels can help distinguish the effect of dominant and dominated trends that have affected migrant population at a national level through urban policies, discrimination and local level governance. This research is particularly important to carry out (in the French context) as it is linking these three angles to create an overall argument that considers the decolonisation of neighbourhoods policies and the deconstruction of ethno-racial boundaries of anti-racist mobilisation. In addition, it is important to question the urban perspective at the core of the integration problem in France and as a direct consequence of the issues. Offering a more concise and narrow interpretation of post-colonial integration consequences and trends. Overall, this research offers an analysis of the space and structure by which types of migrant mobilisation, developed through the expression of discrimination: a political urban framing vs. social reality and rise of anti-discriminatory associations. Furthermore, the thesis offers an intricate understanding of multi-level governance in the light of inclusion and exclusion for migrant's integration.

### **Theory**

The task at hand is especially challenging due to its complex nature and traumatic past. In this optic, to fully grasp the theoretical framework filling the research gap, numerous arguments have to be underlined. A multi-layered challenge cannot have a single argumentative explanation. Thus considering a large variety of theories is crucial for the interpretation of analysed sources while developing a fresh narrative.

## Decolonisation and Institutional Racism/ Discrimination

Frantz Fanon's views on decolonisation will be utilised in order to explain exclusion and State relation through the framework of the dominant and the dominated: contextualising forms of institutional racism as a theory through governance. Fanon defines the external categorisation and dominant forces in the confines of the State and its colonies. Transposing his views of colonial confinement to the neighbourhood can be useful to consider his interiorising perspective and categories. Colonial subjects find themselves 'déréalisés' (de-realised) by the way they were treated within the colonies.<sup>61</sup> The colonies are considered as physically isolated from metropolitan France and subject to external forces (governance mechanisms) simplifying issues found within them, treating them with force: creating a social fracture.<sup>62</sup> The social fracture is thus directly related to colonial heritage through the reproduction of an imposed model and historical frames: social fracture equals colonial fracture. Although Fanon's work dates back to 1961, which for some might be considered as outdated, the framework he relies on can be modelled for this research paper. Thus, neighbourhoods can contextually represent colonies, and the people living in it live as the colonised beings: a decolonisation of the neighbourhood can then be an interesting perspective to look at the parallel between governance and mechanisms for integration. On the one hand, there exists the political elite. On the other, there exists the people living in the neighbourhood and object to discriminatory forces.

### Migrant mobilisation

Migrants' mobilisation is often referred to as to explain mobilisation of underrepresented populations. In chapter 10 of *The Age of Migration*, mobilisation is considered to be: 'mobilisation of immigrants and ethnic minorities outside the normal channels of political representation is often linked to experience of exclusion, either through racist violence or institutional discrimination'.<sup>63</sup> Migrant mobilisation mentioned by the research will be analysed as cross-ethnic mobilisation, based on the experience of racism and discrimination of more than one community. The research will view the creation of opportunity structures as

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<sup>61</sup> Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (C. Farrington, Trans) (New York, 1963) 214.

<sup>62</sup> Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (C. Farrington, Trans) (New York, 1963).

<sup>63</sup> Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas, and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration, International Population Movements in the Modern World*, (Basingstoke 2013) 258.

fighting vulnerability creation, providing migrants with opportunities to mobilise through local structured mechanisms.<sup>64</sup> To explain this type of migration mobilisation, this paper will refer to the deconstruction of ethno-racial boundaries for mobilisation. Fleming frames mobilisation of migrant groups as potentially ethno-racial: mobilisation can be considered as boundary oriented.<sup>65</sup> A collective identity can be used as a representation for mobilisation and developed around a collective identity. When framed around a traumatic event, such as enslavement, she considers that mobilisation can be exclusive (by its members) and inclusive (by the type of exposure it might attract).<sup>66</sup> However, considering mobilisation as being bounded to ethnicity can be limiting. In this thesis' case, through the lens of SOS Racisme, migrant mobilisation is viewed as the opposite: representing mobilisation from a deconstruction of an ethno-racial boundary perspective through a highly diverse mobilisation. While having a central traumatic event, mobilisation occurred on the premise of an idea rather than around an identity; allowing mobilisation to be cross-ethnic.

#### Institutional and Problem Alienation

Alienation theory is made up of several characteristics, including social, problem, political and institutional.<sup>67</sup> The characteristics that will be used in this research include institutional and problem alienation. Institutional alienation includes the 'estrangement from the complexities of problem situations (as migration and diversity) because of the institutional logic of various institutions relevant to migration governance (such as welfare states, citizenship regimes)'.<sup>68</sup> This paper will refer to this specific type of alienation in the way policies excluded migrant's voices and opinions (through representation) at a national level. Notably, it has been reported that politicians issued with a migrant background were not included in senatorial debates until 1981 and the election of François Mitterrand.<sup>69</sup> Contextually, this theory will prove useful: 'institutional alienation has led to contradictory governance responses in various settings [...]

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<sup>64</sup> Ruud Koopmans, 'Migrant mobilisation and political opportunities: variation among German cities and a comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30:3 (2003) 449-470.

<sup>65</sup> Fleming, *Resurrecting Slavery*, 72-74.

<sup>66</sup> Fleming, *Resurrecting Slavery*, 73.

<sup>67</sup> Peter Scholten, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Complexity and the Dynamics of Migration and Diversity Policies*, (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018).

<sup>68</sup> Peter Scholten, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Complexity and the Dynamics of Migration and Diversity Policies*, (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018) 42.

<sup>69</sup> Castles, de Haas and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 256.

with as consequences, not only institutional stress, but also contradictory outcomes'.<sup>70</sup>

The thesis will also consider problem alienation. Problem alienation includes the 'estrangement of policies and governance actors from complex problem developments, involving meaninglessness and simplifications or denials of complexity'.<sup>71</sup> This type of alienation will be used to explain the development of policies that lacked assertive field knowledge. For example, the development of the 'Sécurité et Liberté' act ensure safety in post-colonial migrant neighbourhoods, while the Police was partially made of anti-migration far right wing extremists.

Overall, both types of alienation will be crucial to perceive the types of discrimination migrants had to face while trying to integrate. Linking both institutional and problem alienation, represents a broader image and difficulties endured by postcolonial migrants. In this sense, the thesis perceives the governance of postcolonial migrants to be carried without a clear direct representation whilst over-simplifying problems related to their integration into the mainstream society. Additionally, it offers a possibility to create a perceived link between local and national debates and policy development.

### Segmented Assimilation

Portes and Zhou consider segmented assimilation as potentially dangerous. In the context of migrant's integration patterns, it often resulted in a systematic descent into the underclass.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, if the context of reception is negative (and it was for Algerian migrants following the Algerian War of Independence), the pattern by which migrants assimilate into poverty and into the underclass is observed and perpetuated. Through apparent discrimination based on race, residence and absence of social mobility, a cycle a poverty is created, alienating migrants from the host society.<sup>73</sup> Through the 'ghettoisation of the Banlieues', and their lack of social mobility, segmented assimilation is important to include in the research. Furthermore, it will be conjointly used alongside the overarching idea of neighbourhood-based segregation of multiple life domains, including residence, work and education.

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<sup>70</sup> Peter Scholten, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Complexity and the Dynamics of Migration and Diversity Policies*, (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018) 43.

<sup>71</sup> Peter Scholten, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Complexity and the Dynamics of Migration and Diversity Policies*, (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018) 43.

<sup>72</sup> Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, 'The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 530:1 (1993) 74-96.

<sup>73</sup> Portes and Zhou, 'The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants'.

## Human Capital

Neoclassical and human capital theory perceive migration as a function of geographical difference in the supply and demand of labour.<sup>74</sup> Human capital can be considered as the accumulation of skills, habits and moreover is a concept that can be invested in to improve over time. Using a neo-classical approach would imply an increase of capita over time and investment (through education for example). For instance, in this research, human capital is at the heart of the debates surrounding segmented assimilation, as empowerment through education is done by improving human capital. Structural constraints in receiving countries often enable migrants to accumulate enough capital (money, networks and information) due to their activities and move upwards in the host society, thus perpetuating a system of biased oppression.<sup>75</sup> Contextually, the two theories can be merged together in order to break migrants' perpetuated poverty and vulnerability through improving the newer generation's human capital through education.

## Material and Methods

This thesis utilises three types of primary sources for the analysis, found in both physical and online archives. For the national level of governance, a parliamentary focus will be carried out. Thus, the sources will be drawn from the French Senate website. The dates included in the research were between 1978 and 1989, giving an overview of the governmental transition of 1981, as well as the assessment of specific laws such as the 'Liberté et Sécurité' act and the 'ZEP policy'. Keywords were used to identify possible sources. The search was based on the following terms: ZEP, Security and Freedom, Marche des Beurs, integration, Migration, Immigrants, Racism, Police, Politics of the city, Social mobility, Economic development, Decentralisation, SOS Racisme, Education, Social inclusion, Algeria, Violence and Urban development. These searches generated a total of 112 results, providing a basis for the selection of 6 parliamentary debates and law ratification documents that were relevant for the study. Parliamentary debates and law ratification documents were central to the research as they provided a national level of governance analysis. These type of sources are crucial for such

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<sup>74</sup>Castles, de Haas and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 240-241.

<sup>75</sup> Castles, de Haas and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 240-241.

research as they provide a solid representation of the political mind-set at a given time.

Looking at the parliamentary debate provides a clear cut vision of the political trends and eases frame elevation for specific political groups. However, Silverman considers using them as a ‘risk of presenting an exclusively elite and subjective view of reality’.<sup>76</sup> Given that the task at hand is to, initially, identify a national level of governance this is therefore not a problem. Additionally, Annie Collevald assesses the use of Parliamentary debates as being relevant because they ultimately elevate local concerns (of migration for example) at a national level.<sup>77</sup> Thus, using parliamentary debates can prove to be extremely useful for the elevation of crucial issues through generic societal problems like integration. Frame analysis in this case is very common as it helps determining key thematic analysis for political discourses.<sup>78</sup>

For the local aspect of governance, SOS Racisme’s archives were used to highlight their perception of racial issues in France, while seeking to understand their perception of the struggle in France. For this, the same time period for material was identified as the starting point for source selection (1978 to 1989). Thus, guaranteeing the selection of a maximum number of sources. Keywords were, however, still at the centre of the research and included: Harlem Desir, Housing, Press Review, Racism, Education, Committees, National Front, Youth and Millitant.<sup>79</sup> Not having digitalised archival documentation could have restricted the possible results for the search but targeting the newspaper articles and images kept in the archives of SOS Racisme proved to be an effective approach

Using newspapers as mediatic sources allowed the identification of a parallel between local and national means of governance as between the social and the political perspective of key events and topics. The sources were extremely useful in assessing the development of SOS Racisme from several key topics and struggle. Furthermore, from the mediatic documentation, a frame analysis was undertaken to understand the key themes and perceptions of the media. Including all political horizons, reducing the risk of bias or unbalanced approach, for both the political discourse and local level implication of SOS Racisme.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Stephanie J. Silverman, ‘“Regrettable but Necessary?” A Historical and Theoretical Study of the Rise of the U.K. Immigration Detention Estate and Its Opposition’, *Politics and Policy* 40:6 (2012) 1131-1157, 1113.

<sup>77</sup> Collevald, ‘Des désordres sociaux à la violence urbaine’ 105.

<sup>78</sup> David Snow, Rens Vliegthart and Catherine Corrigan-Brown, Framing the French Riots: A Comparative Study of Frame Variation, *Social Forces* 86:2 (2007) 385-415.

<sup>79</sup> Translated from: Harlem Désir, Logement, Revue de Presse, Racisme, Education, Comités, Front National, Jeunesse et Millitant

<sup>80</sup> Marlou Schrover and Tycho Walaardt, ‘The influence of the media on politics and practices: Hungarian refugee resettlement in the Netherlands in 1956’, *Journal of Migration History* 3 (2017) 22- 53.

Additionally, from these sources, a number of photographs were found. The use of photographs is tricky as the context in which photographs are taken can potentially be fluid for interpretation. Leaving each viewer with a certain degree of bias and personal understanding. But also provides an honest and immersive outlook on key elements such as demonstrations and strikes. The use of photographs was most useful while searching about the youth implication within SOS Racisme, as they fall outside of the realm of media and were often used to report key events with key youth actors. Photographs are useful, for instance, to capture fluid movements (such as music concert and demonstration) as they are improvised and represent a raw take on a specific event. However, Dona Schwartz notes: ‘photographs are inherently ambiguous, their specifiable meanings are emergent in the viewing process’.<sup>81</sup> Using photographs, however, offers an original and efficient tool to cover specific event, and offers a strong visual representation of social movements, local initiatives and thus makes it vital for local level analysis.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Dona Schwartz, ‘Visual Ethnography: Using Photography in Qualitative Research’, *Qualitative Sociology* 12 (1989) 119-154, 122.

<sup>82</sup> Steven J. Gold, ‘Using Photography in Studies of Immigrant Communities’ *American Behavioral Scientist* 47:12 (2004) 1551-1572.



## Chapter 1 - Political contextualisation: Institutional Racism and Alienation

Prior to and during the 1981 national election campaign - which resulted in François Mitterrand becoming the first Socialist President of the 5<sup>th</sup> Republic - institutional racism and alienation had been major issues. 1980s France was at the junction of two political lenses, the conservative - that had been in power since the beginning of the 5th republic in 1958- and socialist, whom won the election in 1981. This decade is central in the development of the French crucible in terms of diversity, tolerance, integration and development of migrant's rights. In parallel, and also central to the rise of xenophobic currents, racist violence, the birth of urban violence and 'rodeo riots'. This initial chapter will explore the development by which the political discourse shifted from forms of discrimination to a frame where the urban setting became crucial in the creation of migrants' agency. Representing the symptoms of a changing society that has intrinsically questioned its ethnic make-up and its melting pot ideals. These were the precursor of a profound social illness and the implosion of the Republican integration system while crystallising a weakening of the 'État providence' (that had been a model between the 1960s and 1970s). Parliamentary debates have to be considered under the first sub question: how did parliamentary debates, based on neighbourhood governance of integration, positively or negatively reflect integration and discrimination for 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Algerian migrants between 1978 to 1989? At the turn of the 1970s, the institutional vision of Algerian migrant's protection and integration created a discriminatory setting while denying a relational complexity between the State and Algerians migrants. Indeed, the integrative debates were initially centred around the Algerian communities. With the election of François Mitterrand, the neighbourhoods developed an agency for politically alienated migrants.

### 1.1. Institutional Racism

The years 1980 to 1981 are crucial to consider the elevation of underlined themes and mentalities in political context of the decade. Through parliamentary debates and the analysis of racist acts, the discrimination felt by migrants can be decrypted under institutional racism. These saw a resurgence of racist and anti-Semitic acts.<sup>83</sup> Outlining difficulties faced by migrants and elevating their relation with the police force.

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<sup>83</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 14 October 1980.

An opposition can be observed through the debate centred around the work of the Police. On the one hand, the right wing coalition in power before 1981 was focused on efforts to control migrant populations to protect them from discriminatory acts. While the opposition denounced acts of repressive discrimination from the government. The mistreatment of the issue at hand further widened gaps between communities.<sup>84</sup> The governance of migration through the Police was for the senatorial majority – the UNR conservatives (Gaullist) and Centrist parties - a strategy to protect them from racist acts. Concerns of this vision and the lack of positive activism was central to the opposition. More specifically, the Socialist Party (PS) and the Communist Party (PCF) framed the issues of insecurity, institutional violence and racism from a migrants' perspective. The UNR as well as the Right wing parties were not far from considering Algerian migrants as enemies of the French Republic. While the PCF and PS were considering them as fighting for emancipation and collective freedom. The derived policies in the context of the 1980s that can follow these different lines of political culture are for the right wing, set to control and for the left wing, set to protect. Nevertheless, on a meta-level, discriminatory and racist frames were a major concern for both the conservative government of the early 1980s as well for the left-wing opposition. In the 6<sup>th</sup> period of first ordinary session of 1980, the Socialist representative reminded the conservative prime minister of the rise of racist and anti-Semitic violence that had occurred in the 1970s up to 1980. Socialist Senator of Paris, Cécile Goldet, numbered a total 83 deaths and hundreds of injured, inflicted on the account of aggression correlated to racist violence.<sup>85</sup> While identifying anti-Algerian right wing extremist commandos – Legion Charles Martel (1973 to 1983) and Commando Delta (1961 to 1983).<sup>86</sup> Consolidating the racist nature of these acts, Marcel Debarge (PS) denounced the development of 'black racism' based on the normalisation of right wing extremism (specifically the rising Front National).<sup>87</sup> Pointing out at the vulnerability of the Algerian and North African migrant population and their exposure to racist acts and the State's failure to protect them:

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<sup>84</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 14 October 1980; France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Décembre 1980.

<sup>85</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 14 October 1980 (Cécile Goldet) 3.

<sup>86</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 14 October 1980 (Cécile Goldet) 3.

<sup>87</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 14 October 1980 (Marcel Debarge) 6

‘May 30<sup>th</sup>, 1980, aggression against a young Algerian in Bondy; on June 2<sup>nd</sup>, a Molotov cocktail thrown under a porch where young Algerians are usually stationed; 8<sup>th</sup> of June, shots against North Africans’.<sup>88</sup>

In this context, the implication of the police force in the protection of migrant communities on a national level can be questioned. A gap between lower classes living in social neighbourhood – such as Bondy - and the governing classes can be outlined by looking through the inactivity of the governing actors. Outlining this inaction by the State, Félix Ciccolini (PS) gave a further enumeration of the racist acts while directly linking them to radicalised extremists groups:

‘From 1971 to 1977, 70 Algerians immigrants were murdered, in turn these murders were claimed by groups and commandoes whose names were mentioned earlier. From June 1977 to September 1980, 150 fascist and racist attacks in our country’.<sup>89</sup>

The actions undertaken by the State seemed to have been limited. The opposition insisted that the measures taken to fight racism were insufficient.<sup>90</sup> Institutional inactivity and reluctance to take strong and efficient measures seemed to be overarching with a misconception and the oversimplification of the more profound societal problem. Blinded governing actors developed estranged policies by denying complex problems: resulting in oversimplified solutions.<sup>91</sup> Furthermore, a clear gap is outlined by the opposition by which the problems at hand is clearly outlined: the rise of violence and racist acts.<sup>92</sup> Identifying a lack of governance and misunderstanding the reality of the desired policy development. Questioning the actual impact of policies made by governing bodies, can be legitimate if it does not fully recognise a deeper understanding of the issue at hand. Thus, the governance response is inadequate towards a factual feeling of insecurity, while being misinterpreted from its original purpose.

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<sup>88</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 14 October 1980 (Marcel Debarge) 6.

<sup>89</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 14 October 1980 (Félix Ciccolini) 25.

<sup>90</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 14 October 1980 (Cécile Goldet) 4.

<sup>91</sup> Peter Scholten, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Complexity and the Dynamics of Migration and Diversity Policies*, (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018) 39.

<sup>92</sup> Peter Scholten, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Complexity and the Dynamics of Migration and Diversity Policies*, (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018) 39.

Additionally, pointing out the security frame from the debate is crucial for a better understanding of migrants' life and their relation to institutional bodies. Debarge (PS), openly criticised the composition of the police force in charge of security for all of France's residents:

'Police syndicates have confirmed the existence of members of the far right in the police's ranks: the national Police'.<sup>93</sup>

Given the nature and the rise of racist acts, it is foreseeable to note a gap of trust between migrant populations and the French Police force supposed to protect them. Recognising distrust from the population towards institutional forces can be understood, as part of the Police force had ties with extreme right wing organisations that were battling against the Algerian population in metropolitan France as existing. Insecurity is thus framed as belonging to specific populations when facing institutional forces that consisted of racist elements. Institutional racism is therefore observable as part of the police was affiliated with racist movements and by process of affiliation, to anti-Algerian movements. Furthermore, outlining this process Goldet (PS) remarked that the Police was notably famous to carry operation against left wing organisations while wearing 'an eye patch on the right eye' - making an allusion to the head of the Front National: Jean Marie Le Pen.<sup>94</sup> Although not dominant in the overall debate, the insecurity immanent from the discussions is of central importance to classify the relationship between migrant population and the police force. Security is, in this regard, appropriated by both the State and the local migrant population. On the one hand, the politicians using security to govern its population through their police force, while on the other hand, the migrant communities feeling insecurity from the police itself. Creating a paradox and a rupture between the governing and the governed.

Furthermore, the true political representation of migrant groups on a national political level can be discussed in the development of positive and well implemented policies. As pointed out by H el ene Luc (PCF), the direct lack of security towards migrant groups can legitimise policies aimed to govern them - under the cover of a safety net.<sup>95</sup> Using the fear created by acts of racism as a mean to re-enforce police controls on migrant population for example. She notes when discussing the 'S ecurit e and Libert e' act:

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<sup>93</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, S enat, 14 October 1980 (Marcel Debarge) 10.

<sup>94</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, S enat, 14 October 1980 (C ecile Goldet) 3.

<sup>95</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, S enat, 14 October 1980 (H el ene Luc) 15.

“sécurité et liberté” to fight the perpetrators of terrorist attacks, Mr. Peyrefitte, has demonstrated the true colours of this Government: using violence and the feeling of insecurity to impose on the French a set of repressive measures that will subsequently be used not against the perpetrators of this violence, but rather against those combating the violence of your own economic, social and political policies’.<sup>96</sup>

When the law was put into action, a sense of discontinuity between the lived grounded reality and the directives set to manage the concerned migrant populations appeared. The security for some can be detrimental for certain groups' freedom. In the wake of a racially violent decade, such laws gave the impression to empower the police force instead of protecting citizens. While knowing the tense climate and the insecurity emanating from the police to Algerian migrants such means to govern seemed to be missing the point, a bridge between communities appeared to be impossible. This highlighted the incapacity of the government to address the struggle against discrimination, developing integration mechanism; hinting toward forms of racism from the police force. This can be linked to political alienation as it appears that the issue at hand estranged the migrant population from having a direct say or representation within the debates. This misrepresentation can be outlined as crucial in putting forward the alienating nature of the parliament and the over simplification of the issue.

## 1.2. Institutional alienation

Outlining this divergence of opinion and strategy, the controversial laws of ‘Sécurité et Liberté’ (final text adopted in December 1980) is especially interesting in outlining both political strategies and racist acts while discriminating certain communities.<sup>97</sup> In the context of the rise of insecurity for certain communities in the early 1980s, such laws had the potential to implement a sane relationship between the police and inhabitants of social neighbourhoods issued of post-colonial diversity. Pierre Carous (Rassemblement pour la République (RPR)) emphasised the nature of identity controls for multiple occasions.

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<sup>96</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 14 October 1980 (Hélène Luc) 16.

<sup>97</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Décembre 1980.

‘The control is made strictly necessary in the context of judicial research or to prevent a breach of public order, including an attack on the security of persons and property’.<sup>98</sup>

The law, based on the notion of security to protect individuals' safety, is developed on multiple cases of aggression and reports of insecurity. But it is interesting to note that the directives for the control can be linked to certain communities – notably the Algerian communities. The stigmatisation of certain groups in the wake of the 1980s was omnipresent and can be reinforced using identity checks based on physical identity traits. The issue at hand is not necessarily the control that is carried out, but rather by which means it is done. Integration emerged as a source of legitimisation for governments to carry out intervention on and for migrant populations.<sup>99</sup> Contextually, the legitimisation of such practices – using identity as a focal point - seems to be allowing the police force to act on both instinct and general procedures set by discriminatory guidelines.

Identity control, as it was performed is against the idea of mainstreaming migration and is counterproductive for individuals' integration in the wider society. Such policies made by representative of institutions (i.e. the police) can seem to be put in place to govern uncontrollable dynamics related to migration and diversity.<sup>100</sup> Thus, the relation to institutional alienation is represented through a gap between the Algerian migrants and the policy's aims, notably carrying out identity controls, to manage violence. Between pages 61 and 63 of the text of the law, the word ‘identity’ was noted 15 times relating it with the justification of arrests in the case of unjustifiable checks.<sup>101</sup> Keeping in mind that these laws are meant to be carried out in neighbourhoods where violence might occur and where the demographic was dominated by 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Algerian migrants. The term identity is a central part of this law: not only as a guarantor of safety and freedom for some but also discrimination based on looks for others. A lack of perspective can be observed by the inexistent consideration of local initiative-led governance, denying local population's opinion in policy development. Likewise, the allusion of this discrimination can be noted by the recurring reference to the ‘stranger’ (as in being a

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<sup>98</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Décembre 1980 (Pierre Carous) 19.

<sup>99</sup> Peter Scholten, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Complexity and the Dynamics of Migration and Diversity Policies*, (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018).

<sup>100</sup> Peter Scholten, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Complexity and the Dynamics of Migration and Diversity Policies*, (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018).

<sup>101</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 December 1980. (Pierre Carous) 61-63.

foreigner).<sup>102</sup> Pierre Carous (RPR), proposed four articles meant to identify and manage the stay permit of migrants on French soil directly by the police administration.<sup>103</sup> Placing and reducing migrants' identities outside of the frame of the State. Thus, alienating the concerned populations at an institutional level (by reducing their voice) and over simplifying their problems and giving inadequate solutions (i.e. more police controls) instead of treating root issues.

The combination of both the nature of the controls and the overarching identity checks, framed the law as discriminatory. The 'Sécurité et Liberté' act was put in place, ignoring the opposition that clearly outlined issues related to the trust felt by migrant communities towards the police. Consequently, elements of political alienation can be outlined by the lack of trust in the police force, as well as a clear misrepresentation of actors of the concerned communities, this results in the exclusion of migrants from the national frame and realm. Together with institutional racism, such types of alienation are detrimental to the concerned communities as, ultimately, they would be unable to concretely voice their concerns.

With changing governance and ideology that came with François Mitterrand's election, Algerian migrants and migration related diversity was put forward through a different frame. The use of neighbourhoods was crucial in giving agency to migrants while reducing their alienation: neighbourhoods would serve a symbolic purpose.

### 1.3. Urbanism and exclusion

After the 1981 elections that saw François Mitterrand's appointment as President, the social tissue between communities was renewed. Parliamentary framing on issues related to the Algerian migrants' integration shifted. Migration related diversity was no longer considered as a problem, but rather as an opportunity to be managed. Integration became a central priority, appearing as a duty towards communities that had been neglected. Algerian integration through the neighbourhood became a crucial part of the parliamentary debates. For instance, frames of justice and equality related to the urban development were focal elements of this shift.<sup>104</sup> This can be pointed out in pivotal moments in migrants mobilisation history in France. Notably, the

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<sup>102</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 December 1980. (Pierre Carous) 61-63.

<sup>103</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 December 1980 (Pierre Carous) 9; France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 December 1980 (Pierre Carous) 23; France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 December 1980 (Pierre Carous) 59; France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 December 1980 (Pierre Carous) 62.

<sup>104</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Décembre 1983; France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 12 Juin 1987.

1983 first ‘march against racism and for equality’ had a major impact on a political level and elevated the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Algerian generation migrants’ exclusion from the French mainstream culture.

On the surface, migrant populations were estranged from the debate although being the central actors of the hardships in neighbourhoods. The voices elevating their issues is at this point in time, represented by the civil society and cross-party mainstream politicians. Through their mobilisation they were able to raise hardships that they were dealing with on a daily basis: which were relayed at a parliamentary level. Thus, the appearance of urban development became key in the debates and living in the ‘Cité’ was considered significantly harder:

‘Life is more difficult in the ‘Cité’ des 4,000 in La Courneuve than in the residential neighbourhoods of the western suburbs of Paris’.<sup>105</sup>

Geographically, La Courneuve was one of the neighbourhoods where post-colonial Algerian migrants were placed after the Algerian War of independence (see Appendix 1). The geographical element is of crucial importance in denoting forms of exclusion, as it portrays the belonging of minorities to specific neighbourhoods. Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, the reproduction of the colonial heritage mind-set could have been perpetuated by both means of governance and a relationship of governing and governed.<sup>106</sup> The neighbourhood in this way plays a vital role, both in the perpetuation of social norms of dominant and dominated, by excluding populations from the mainstream society.<sup>107</sup> Having set neighbourhoods with an easily pinpointed migrant population, eased its symbolic purpose regarding alienation theory. The estrangement that represents the neighbourhoods, can facilitate the excluding and alienating identification of migrant population by serving a political purpose.<sup>108</sup> Referring to neighbourhoods as a unit of measurement – as a scale for hardship for example - illustrates migrants' social exclusion and points out their intra-communal lack of political representation and thus migrants' political alienation.

Identifying the urban frame in the debate allows a legitimisation of problems offering a classification represented by the belonging to a specific neighbourhood. Furthermore, the

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<sup>105</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Décembre 1983 (Charles Lederman) 34.

<sup>106</sup> Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (C. Farrington, Trans) (New York, 1963).

<sup>107</sup> Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (C. Farrington, Trans) (New York, 1963).

<sup>108</sup> Peter Scholten, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Complexity and the Dynamics of Migration and Diversity Policies*, (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018) 41.



urban setting can potentially be a frame that represents a lack of job opportunities, racism and an inexistent political representation. Charles Lederman, Paul Quilès, Robert Badinter and Pierre Ceccal used the frame of the urban setting to group different issues.<sup>109</sup> Depending on their political affiliation their argumentation was different and ranged from unemployment to racism, to social justice and alienation.<sup>110</sup> Additionally, the agency given to neighbourhoods to exemplify issues can also be used to answer to wider issues that are endured by an institutionally alienated population:

‘When he received ‘les marcheurs des Minguettes’, Mr. the President of the Republic announced that legislative provisions were under consideration; you confirmed it to us. Once adopted, they will ease the struggle against racism on several levels’.<sup>111</sup>

As previously introduced, the Minguettes is a neighbourhood that saw rodeo riots near Lyon and marked the frustration of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Algerian postcolonial migrants – including racial discrimination, racist violence and a lack of opportunity.<sup>112</sup> The march that started in Marseille - with several migrants from Minguettes - and finished in Paris had a huge impact in both the political and social sphere, thus representing the discontent voice of a generation.<sup>113</sup> Symbolically, the Minguettes and its population became the presentation of these problems while being recognised and considered by the political sphere, and in this case, received by the President. Although the topic shifted, it is possible to question the actual underlying impact that these changing frames had if the institutional body still remained dominated by a white mainstream class.<sup>114</sup> Within the institutions, the alienation of the migrants from the debates and the policy development can lead to a falsification of the policy.<sup>115</sup> If the product of the debates

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<sup>109</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Décembre 1983 (Charles Lederman, Paul Quilès, Robert Badinter and Pierre Ceccal) 4324-4331.

<sup>110</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Décembre 1983 (Charles Lederman, Paul Quilès, Robert Badinter and Pierre Ceccal) 4324-4331.

<sup>111</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Décembre 1983 (Lederman) 34-35.

<sup>112</sup> Tuppen, ‘After Les Minguettes: ‘problem’ housing estates in France’, 367-371; Collovald, ‘Des désordres sociaux à la violence urbaine’, 104-113.

<sup>113</sup> Tuppen, ‘After Les Minguettes: ‘problem’ housing estates in France’, 367-371; Collovald, ‘Des désordres sociaux à la violence urbaine’, 104-113.

<sup>114</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Décembre 1983 (Charles Lederman, Paul Quilès, Robert Badinter and Pierre Ceccal) 4324-4331.

<sup>115</sup> Peter Scholten, *Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Complexity and the Dynamics of Migration and Diversity Policies*, (Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018).

is not directly considering the voice of the concerned neighbourhoods' residents. Furthermore, receiving 2<sup>nd</sup> generation migrants from the march is a positive development and a change from the traditional political convention. However, the impact of such reunions can be questioned in regards to the legitimacy of future actions and the efficiency of the proposed policies.

To answer the research question, different consecutive national governments perceived the integration of Algerian communities through their framing of physical exclusion and inclusion. Racism and alienation are both present in the early stages of the debate in the early 1980s while the neighbourhood became of importance as the creator of agency. However, as seen in the theory, it can potentially lead to positive development, as the neighbourhood then frames a range of problems together. Giving agency to the concerned people while allowing the policy makers to adequately create policies to improve their daily life while positively improving their neighbourhood. On the other side, as the concerned social neighbourhood gathered a high density of ethnicities, the risk of a physical exclusion/segregation of communities was potentially created by policy makers. The exclusion of populations can be accentuated by an enclosed physical area where policies and subjects can be outlined as the following: a relationship dominated by politicians and where migrants are the substance to versatile change.

To answer the first sub-question, parliamentary debates - based on neighbourhood governance of integration – reflected a framework by which the political class excluded the migrant population from the debate. Hence, reflecting a misunderstanding of the underlying issues at a local level and in this case, the neighbourhood: a place where discriminatory identity checks, violent acts of racism and specific policies can be implemented. An interesting understanding from this angle can be offered by Fanon and explained as a colonial mind-set. A confined space (i.e. the colony) is subject to forces that have a dominant and dominated relationship.<sup>116</sup> Setting the stage for the idea that the neighbourhoods with high density of postcolonial migrants, are subject to similar institutional forces that were observable in the colonial past.

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<sup>116</sup> Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (C. Farrington, Trans) (New York, 1963).

## **Chapter 2- Political contextualisation: Social mobility and structuring youth mobilisation**

Education was of primary importance for Mitterrand's 1981 government. Through a re-adjustment of budget, it became a crucial element for governance and policy change throughout his mandate. A trend that is confirmed by the introduction of the ZEP policy (Prioritised Educational Zones), consisting in a decentralised perspective on education which would consider the local context and actors while opening public funding in zones that were subject to social inequality and high rates of academic underachievement (including not obtaining a high school diploma or language inabilities).<sup>117</sup> The sought impact of the ZEP policy was to structure integration efforts for the youth from a migration background, notably (by the 1980s) for youth of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation. Through such policies, two theoretical frameworks can be envisioned and accentuated in parliamentary debates. Social mobility through educational investment in disfavoured zones can be envisioned as a means to unseal segmented assimilation and vulnerability creation through developing human capital.<sup>118</sup> Breaking off a system that encouraged the downward assimilation migrant population into the underclass.<sup>119</sup> Developing a more classical form of mobilisation based on migrants' participation into national politics through an institutionalised framework of inclusion based on culture and accessibility. Observing change at a parliamentary level is extremely important to understand the flourishing of political structures meant to oil the integration process. Therefore, to answer the first sub question, 'how did parliamentary debates, based on neighbourhood governance of integration, positively or negatively reflected integration and discrimination for 2<sup>nd</sup> generation migrants between 1978 to 1989?', this chapter will explore the investment in both education and urban development, through the creation of social mobility meant to set a basis for future canalised mobilisation. Three elements of parliamentary debates will be considered in relation with the ZEP urban restructuring policy: i) education, ii) youth, iii) urbanism and inclusion

### **2.1. Education and Social mobility**

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<sup>117</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 1 July 1981 (Alain Savary- Education Minister).

<sup>118</sup> Portes and Zhou, 'The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants' 82-96.

<sup>119</sup> Portes and Zhou, 'The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants' 77-82.

In the 40<sup>th</sup> session of the Parliament of 1981-1982, the development of education in social neighbourhoods appeared by linking integration and education to the ZEPs.<sup>120</sup> Putting forward education as a means to integrate is a development that symbolises the mind-set of the Socialist presidency: to invest in migrant youth by providing them with structured opportunities to move up the social scale. The message is therefore clear, living in a social neighbourhood/or a prioritised area does not deny you from building up individual human capital. Offering a possibility for the migrant communities in France to develop their skills and socially integrate.

Social framing is put forward to point out the importance of integration, while insisting on the status and the potential that neighbourhoods can channel for migrant populations. While social mobility can be hindered by a lack of education, social and physical exclusion are the result of a failure to integrate in the mainstream society. Resulting in an integration path that is obstructed by the descent into permanent poverty and the direct assimilation into the underclass: creating vulnerability, inexistent social mobility and apparent social inequalities.<sup>121</sup> National governing frameworks creating bridges through social mobility, was perceived to be primarily achievable through a direct relation of integration through education. The objective was clear to the actors as Gérard Delfau (Group of European Democratic and Social Rally (RDSE)), who identified the grand lines on the policy:

‘Faced with the phenomenon of school dropouts, evident in some suburbs, the answer comes through the creation of priority education zones [...] its like this that immigrants from the Banlieues, enjoying the delights of Polyeucte, will avoid schooling failure and therefore the failure to socially integrate’.<sup>122</sup>

Social mobility entails the ability to move up on the social ladder. Thus for integrating, migrants should be given the mobility to achieve better than previous generations. Investing in integration through education is a means to impede elements of vulnerability creation that have been framed in for the Algerian community: racism, discrimination and geographical stigmatisation.<sup>123</sup> Through previous modes of integration and problem alienation, the prior

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<sup>120</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 5 Decembre 1981.

<sup>121</sup> Portes and Zhou, ‘The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants’ 77-82.

<sup>122</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 5 Decembre 1981 (Gérard Delfau) 3659.

<sup>123</sup> See chapter 1.

government pushed migrant population to stagnate at the bottom of the social ladder without any real means of mobility. The ZEPs were thus an effort to create social mobility through a more structural social integration, protecting migrant youth from school failures and vulnerability creation. Integration is a key term of the debate and is directly referred to 18 times over 11 pages.<sup>124</sup> Contextually, integration is being framed as a socio-economic perspective while being used as a tool of empowerment. Fighting exclusion by investing in education is then considered important in helping integration while simultaneously dealing with vulnerability creation.

Framing education as central, is key in identifying its role in the wider investment and upheaval of migrant communities. Using education as a frame, putting forward the importance that the Socialist government places in youth, and their willingness to improve ground situation for 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation migrants. Education is essential in this debate as actors linked with improving local population's potentials for job market opportunities while considering a diversity in background:

‘The established prioritised education programs will have for endeavour to include the overall renovation of pedagogy as well as professional training formation [...] they need to be enlarged to fit the different cultural needs of the concerned students’.<sup>125</sup>

Considering diversity implies that - at the national and local level - efforts will be made to invest in the development of a diversified youth issued from migration. Their inclusion in a wider improvement of flexibility for the job market would result in the reduction of a gap on the social ladder: inducing their mobility. The development of their social mobility through education relates to the combination of structural integration and positioning and socio-cultural integration, including i) cultururation ii) interaction through contacts iii) identification perspective.<sup>126</sup> Education also has the potential to elevate migrants from lower social classes while being at the forefront of social and human progress.<sup>127</sup> Aligning the fundamental driving

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<sup>124</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 5 Decembre 1981 (Gérard Delfau) 3661, 3673, 3677, 3678, 3680, 3682, 3688, 3690, 3691, 3696, 3697.

<sup>125</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 5 Decembre 1981 (Alain Savary- Education Minister) 3658.

<sup>126</sup> H.Esser, ‘Migration, Sprache und Integration’, *AKI Research review*, 4 (2006) 1-119.

<sup>127</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 5 Decembre 1981 (Hélène Luc) 3677; France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 5 Decembre 1981 (Germain Authié) 3685.

role of education in the State, is therefore a central governance mechanism in giving structure to and a change of mobility for 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Algerian migrants, helping their integration in the mainstream. Nonetheless, the tone set by Alain Savary (Education Minister from 1981 to 1984) was set as the centre of the issue and key in reducing social inequalities.

The ZEPs were crucially important, as they represented the recognition of inequalities and were created to target areas that needed educational improvement, to trigger integrative efforts. If the idea of integration at that time was constituted of a mainstream, the ZEPs represented the tributaries to a new French crucible. Alain Savary describes the primary role of the ZEPs as reducing inequalities and reinforcing pedagogical actions where the State judges necessary to reduce social inequalities.<sup>128</sup> Social inequalities can be cornered as the following: overcrowded classes, high rates of unemployment and socially inaccessible neighbourhoods.<sup>129</sup> H  l  ne Luc (PCF) elevates the changing nature and the collective perspective of the ZEP as a transition to social inequalities from an individual perspective to a more overarching one:

‘The creation of the ‘zones prioritaires’ should and has to develop into a significant progress in the struggle against inequalities and socio-cultural inequalities [...] We celebrate even more such improvements, as we recognise the will to create these zones as a mean to positively improve and recognise the existence of a disparity with respect to education success rates, which is now more than an individual achievement, but a social one’.<sup>130</sup>

The ZEPs recognised a wider societal problem, in which discrimination and a lack of opportunities for migrant population is taken into account. Such policies imply an investment in 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation migrants' human capital, which would then arguably increase. Additionally, recognising a wider social problem related to education and acting upon it, can be interpreted as reducing labour market limitation. Attempting to deconstruct Algerian migrants' segmented assimilation from the underclass, while significantly improving life perspectives with the creation of opportunities and improving social mobility.<sup>131</sup> Finally, the fight against social inequalities was not considered limited to the ZEPs or education: fighting

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<sup>128</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, S  nat, 5 Decembre 1981 (Alain Savary-National Education Minister) 3658.

<sup>129</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, S  nat, 5 Decembre 1981; France, *Parliamentary Debates*, S  nat, 5 Decembre 1981, (Alain Savary- Education Minister) 3670.

<sup>130</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, S  nat, 5 Decembre 1981 (H  l  ne Luc) 3678.

<sup>131</sup> Castles, de Haas and Miller, *'The Age of Migration'*, 212-246.

inequality was framed with an overarching perspective by a change of mentalities at several levels for future generations.<sup>132</sup>

## 2.2. Education and structuring youth mobilisation

Education and youth were directly linked in efforts to deal with what is referred as a ‘crisis’ in parliamentary debates.<sup>133</sup> In December 1981, Senator François O. Collet (RPR) reported the main challenges relating to the ZEP policy. Three major themes are explored in this report when talking of these challenges. Namely, three major frames are reported as expected effects of the ZEPs: i) crisis solving, ii) formation/education and iii) structured mobilisation. These elements had the intention to develop socio-cultural integration from a culturisation perspective to deal with labour market discrimination and develop interaction between diversified communities. In this report, culturisation is understood to be the link between education and investment in the youth. And is framed as developing structural integration and future labour market opportunities to reduce social inequalities between communities. Developing the youth’s education potential and mechanism can be perceived as creating spaces for future structural mobilisation through resources.<sup>134</sup> Resource creation and allocation can create room on three different levels: 1) eligibility to specialised government programs and funds; 2) the exemption from traditional prejudices through ‘bridges’ and 3) resources made from networks in co-ethnic communities.<sup>135</sup> The eligibility for communities to specific government programs (such as the ZEP) and the accessibility to resources were put at work to create room for youths’ mobilisation in co-ethnic networks and inter-ethnic dimension. The way in which the report describes the issue and the urgency by which it has to be treated with ‘crisis’ as a key term and an indicator of its priority. However, what did the report consider to be the solution for this crisis and more importantly, what were the targeted groups and by which means were they meant to benefit from the State?

On page 76 of the report, the term crisis puts under the light the hardships endured by certain specialisations of the French educational system at the beginning of François Mitterrand’s mandate.<sup>136</sup> François O. Collet (RPR) in his report considered that it is a priority

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<sup>132</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 5 Decembre 1981, (Alain Savary- Education Minister) 3658.

<sup>133</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Decembre 1981 (François Olivier Collet) 76.

<sup>134</sup> Portes and Zhou, ‘The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants’, 82-96.

<sup>135</sup> Castles, de Haas and Miller, ‘*The Age of Migration*’, 212-246.

<sup>136</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Decembre 1981 (François Olivier Collet) 76-78.

to target youth groups (of the public sectors seeing them as the most vulnerable ones) that had dropped out of schools at an early age in the 2<sup>nd</sup> of 3<sup>rd</sup> cycle of education (middle and high school).<sup>137</sup>

‘In 1973 to 1978, school dropouts of the youth with a ‘formation de base réduite’, meaning youth that did not complete their first cycle of second degree education (middle school), or did not complete a short professional traineeship fluctuated between 33% and 26%, representing on average 50, 000 over 5 years’.<sup>138</sup>

Youth school dropouts is contextualised to state the importance of developing the youth’s human capital, symbolising a gap that is apparent between communities in France. As explored in the historiography, rates of unemployment in the youth was largely dominated in social neighbourhoods by Algerian migrant populations.<sup>139</sup> Having between 26% to 33% school dropouts in social neighbourhoods puts into perspective the importance of investing in the youth and developing their human capital for their insertion into the active sector. Developing a more structured education system, with more possibilities for society at large, seems to be implied in the report:

‘The democratisation of education, schooling prolongation, the development of technical education and professional formation, has to progressively certify workers to steady and sustainable employment [...] recognising a right to social promotion and long lasting training to reevaluate manual labour in the light of improving working conditions’.<sup>140</sup>

‘Democratisation’ and ‘social promotion’ are directly referring to the access of greater possibilities for the underclass of the French population. Revalorising work and developing human capital through the prolongation of the schooling period was perceived necessary for restructuring the youths' education. Such mechanisms, aimed to create a long lasting and progressive means for Algerian migrants' integration into the mainstream. Additionally, re-

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<sup>137</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Decembre 1981 (François Olivier Collet) 76.

<sup>138</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Decembre 1981 (François Olivier Collet) 76.

<sup>139</sup> See historiography.

<sup>140</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Decembre 1981 (François Olivier Collet) 26.



enforcing educational channels would act as the developer of the cultururation and interaction of communities based on skills obtained through their schooling. Human capital was, in this sense, a major concern for the Senate and subject to great analysis and debates.

Lastly, the creation of the ZEP represents a structural investment for a strong basis for a migrant youth to collectively integrate while creating opportunities through possible cross-cultural mobilisation. Furthermore, the implication of educational syndicates (equivalent of Unions) can create a more solid basis for youth mobilisation.

‘Developing a greater dialogue with trade unions at all levels is crucial. Firstly, in the definition of our economic and social policies, whereby their presence and input can be added in consultative instances of the commissions and planning’.<sup>141</sup>

Syndicates play a central role for multi-level-governance mechanism, while including a social and economic situational reality endured by the youth. The use of syndicates can be perceived as a form of politically formed and canalised mobilisation. Migrant mobilisation is normally created through the lack of political representation and implication – migrants mobilise when they feel underrepresented and cannot raise their voices and opinions through institutional means.<sup>142</sup> The creation and development of youth mobilisation through a youth syndicate can be seen as the development of structured means of representation through contact. In this sense, syndicates play the role of a contact point, representing a pluralist France where the diversity can be represented on a formal level. The use of syndicates can represent the foundation for cross-cultural mobilisation: putting in contact the youth of different background, collectively discussing issues treating education and youth.

### 2.3. Urban policies and inclusion

The ZEP policies were of central importance for reducing urban inequalities through educational action in focused areas. Youth and education were framed together in efforts to combat unemployment by reducing migrants' set vulnerability and setting channel, easing mobilisation. It is necessary to stress the urban perspective of this policy: the ZEP was primarily

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<sup>141</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 16 Decembre 1981 (François Olivier Collet) 17.

<sup>142</sup> Castles, de Haas and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 258, 278, 281.

a policy that sought to inject funds in disadvantaged areas. Restructuring neighbourhoods and their social development to improve run down areas.<sup>143</sup> Thus, outlining the inclusive impact that the ZEP policy is key in the discourse at hand. Cultural transfer was central to the ZEP development as being zones vulnerable to social inequalities. Developing neighbourhood accessibility alongside cultural transfer through education is key for fighting vulnerability and easing integration. Hence, policy of inclusion through cultural transference at a group level considered and developed. Two main elements imply the state's interest to carry out cultural development and reducing social inequalities. Favouring the access to both education and careers while talking about the ZEP:

‘The transfer of the correlative resources will be carried out under conditions ensuring the equal treatment of all departments’.<sup>144</sup>

The accessibility to schools or to education was perceived as a key concern for the policy makers and was marked by free transports to school for underprivileged students. Doing so, the ZEP policy massively invested in students' ability to access school - no matter the social status. The anticipated result was a decrease of unemployment and school dropouts through youth participation into the French education system. Inclusion of migrant youths into the education system also meant the participation of higher education and subsequently access to the job market

‘It also has an important role in transferring knowledge from the University into the workforce’.<sup>145</sup>

The access to the job market would serve an inclusive purpose, reflecting the diversity of a multi-ethnic population - in the case of France in the late 1980s and early 1990s the ethnic population was highly diversified.<sup>146</sup> The urbanist perspective of the ZEP to create the neighbourhood's capacity to generate a syncretism of the multi-ethnic population through education.<sup>147</sup> The inclusion of the diversity emanating from social neighbourhoods can be

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<sup>143</sup> Castles, de Haas and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 225.

<sup>144</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 5 Decembre 1981 (Alain Savary-Education Minister) 53.

<sup>145</sup> France, *Parliamentary Debates*, Sénat, 5 Decembre 1981 (Alain Savary-Education Minister) 8.

<sup>146</sup> Castles, de Haas and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 228.

<sup>147</sup> Castles, de Haas and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 224.

observed by fighting vulnerability creation through the development of individual human capital and creating the foundations for mobilisation. Thus, from developing the educative potential of a neighbourhood through the inclusion of its diversified population, the aim of the ZEP policies was foremost meant to structure education as an organic web. With the function of tying a multicultural France together, through the creation of specialised policies aiming to reduce social inequality through contact and inclusion. Framing inclusion as a transfer of knowledge from communities through a process of national community formation.

To answer the research question, President François Mitterrand's government perceived migrant integration through the ZEPs through a more wholesome approach. The balance changed from pin-pointed governance of migrants - implying an Algerian community as seen in chapter 1 – to a governance of diversity and inclusion. The lack of structural integration through education emphasised a lack of social mobility for second and third generation was vigorously combated through the ZEPs.<sup>148</sup> A wider generative vulnerability can be linked to an overarching institutional discrimination and alienation set by previous dogmas. Henceforth, alienation and vulnerability creation are closely linked as they are both types of state negligence (in term of integration) toward migrant populations. A feeling of marginalisation and segregation is what the ZEP policy was put in place to deal with: through education the Socialist government aimed to eradicate socio-economic inequalities through community wide mobilisation. Considering the ZEP policy through the framework of fighting vulnerability, improving mobility and creating the basis for mobilisation is thus a useful tool to assess efforts of youth inclusion. Investing in education and youth meant to develop opportunities available at a local level through the ZEPs.

To answer the first sub-question, parliamentary debates – dealing with the ZEPs – reflected a framework where social mobility directly benefited from new forms of inclusion based on neighbourhood policy planning and development of human capital. The extent to which the future integration can be developed through human capital positively framed efforts to integrate previously excluded communities. Youth mobilisation through pacific demonstration was from the 1983 (and the rise of the 'marches for equality and against racism') onwards a major type of mobilisation that had a profound impact in both the social and political realms.

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<sup>148</sup> Patrick Simon, 'France and the Unknown Second Generation: Preliminary Results on Social Mobility', *International Migration Review* 37:4 (2003) 1091-1119.

### **Chapter 3 – Local contextualisation: deconstructing ethno-racial boundaries and SOS Racisme**

The previous chapters predominantly considered policy elements and realities from a national parliamentary perspective. Therefore, aligning a chapter considering the local level is crucial to elevate the outcomes of the policies and parliamentary frames regarding the governance of migration. On the one hand offering a multi-level dimension to integration efforts while discerning local level strategies responding to previous policies. In most of the parliamentary debates, actors have discussed how to solve, trigger and develop national integration mechanism objectifying migrant integration as sole result of policies. Two dimensions remain unsolved: 1) the actual representation of migrants' diversity at a national level of debate and policymaking; 2) local level governance and the prioritisation of macro level issues. From 1981, with Lyon's hot summer and in 1983 and the rise of the Marches for equality and against racism, the French social and political realms were confronted with a seemingly outdated integration system. Diversity became an issue of social importance rather than solely occupying the political realm. The 1983 March for Equality and against Racism was especially important for the social sphere, as it canalised the underrepresented Algerian migrant youths' integrative problems and profound unease.<sup>149</sup> A certain unification of the youth against racism and discrimination measured the importance of cross-ethnic mobilisation. Indeed, the mobilisation was perceived as a forefront against racism, concerning a diversified sample of the French population. Setting aside traditional means of mobilisation and forms of anti-racist organisation: framing SOS Racisme as unique in the anti-racist organisation development. Its perception was not considered as bounded to one ethnic group but rather as a collective problem. Youth cross-ethnic mobilisation initially happened through cooperative actions and were mainly spontaneous. From 1983 onwards, anti-racist mobilisation formed the youths' inspiration to gain a real bargaining power and leverage in reflecting their belief of a pluralist French State. From the offset of the mobilisation, key figures like Harlem Désir and Julien Dray embodied a voice that could not accept racism in their vision. In 1984, they created 'SOS Racisme Touche pas à mon Pote' (don't touch my friend), a movement that initially embodied a civilizational fight against racism and anti-semitism. To answer the question: 'How did local

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<sup>149</sup> Amadou Gaye, 'Portefolio commenté du photographe Amadou Gaye', *Africultures* 1:97 (2014) 14-27.

level governance, through the association ‘SOS Racisme’, serve anti-racism and inclusivity through mobilisation in the Parisian region in its early days?’. This last chapter will explore a local dimension of diversity governance. Considering collective group framing of the youth as a base for SOS Racisme’s mobilisation. Elevating it as a collective entity, including a wide representation of anti-racist doctrine as their foundation. By doing so the local means of governance and migrant’s integration can be put into perspective.

### 3.1 Youth and cross-ethnic mobilisation

Cross-ethnic mobilisation was a characteristic of the rise of SOS Racisme through different levels. It is interesting to consider the diversity of actors from within the organisation and the type of mobilisation they managed to surround anti-racist activism. Cross-ethnic mobilisation, in this chapter, represents the ability of an idea to confederate a large number, seizing an opportunity beyond ethno-racial types mobilisation. Fighting racial discrimination has been academically researched through activist groups defined by ethno-racial boundaries.<sup>150</sup> SOS Racisme however, marks another type of mobilisation that deconstructed ethno-racial boundaries. SOS Racisme aimed to tackle more than one representation of discrimination: having a bigger range to mobilise also meant to regroup different types of activism. Therefore, the type of mobilisation that SOS Racisme developed was characterised by its cross-ethnic dimension.

The fight against racism, by 1984, was a societal problem that had already mobilised through several ‘marches’. Although the marches outlined the importance of anti-racist mobilisation and the need for better representation, they quickly ran out of breath. A void can then be perceived in anti-racist mobilisation. Policies aimed to reduce racism by promoting education and inclusion of migrant communities were advanced at a national level with the aim to develop at a local level. Following the empowerment of the youth through education, it is important to understand who has been mobilised in SOS Racisme from 1984 onwards.

From footsteps of the marches, it is interesting to see how anti-racist mobilisation managed to transpose anti-discriminatory rhetoric, going beyond ethno-racial boundaries to reassemble a socially shattered landscape. A major strength for SOS Racisme was its potential to mobilise the youth. As explored in the previous chapters, youth was framed as central for

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<sup>150</sup> Fleming, *Resurrecting Slavery*, 61-91.

the Socialist governance, resulting in dynamic that facilitated youth mobilisation. Notably through the inclusionary use of the youth in already existing syndicates was encouraged as a type of mobilisation. Through collected mediatisation that was directly linked with SOS Racisme and their anti-racist campaigns, youth (specially in high schools) was one of the main targeted groups for SOS Racisme.

At a high school level, two main means of mobilisation were relayed by the media: through the distribution of badges and events (conferences and political debates) under the frame of struggle against fascism and discrimination.<sup>151</sup> Fighting against racism was a major way to frame youth mobilisation through the SOS Racisme. Based on a fundamental general idea of mobilisation, the anti-racism struggle was appropriated as a duty by the youth. Considering a fight against racism, the youth appeared to be the first in line in fighting discrimination for a societal renewal. High schools were described as a playground for both political and non-political mobilisation and a field of opposition for ideology: reflecting a divergence of opinion.<sup>152</sup> Implying that the mobilisation was not defined by a feeling of belonging or identity but rather through a natural occurring development. There were no ethnic or racial criteria in the group projected identity. But rather the common idea and goal to deconstruct former racist dogmas, rhetoric and the wider discrimination that affected millions of French citizens. Following the creation of the slogan ‘Touche pas à mon Pote’ and the very popular badges that came with it, mobilisation against racism was growing stronger by the month. Creating a tidal wave effect for youth that joined SOS Racisme as early as 1984.<sup>153</sup> ‘Touche pas à mon Pote’ represented the ethno-racial deconstruction by including the diversified nature of the movement and projected a multicultural France as being tied by a collective kinship.

Individual popularity, is central in the rise and the success of SOS Racisme in high school.<sup>154</sup> The success of the badge is also central in the youth mobilisation against racism: buying a badge meant that you wanted to marginalise racist individuals and wearing it reflected your engagement. A trend that was confirmed through its popularity, the creation of several

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<sup>151</sup> ‘La guerre des badges’, *Midi libre*, 4-5-1985; ‘La ‘guerre des badges’ n’aura pas lieu’, *Le Figaro*, 22-5-1985; ‘Les Reactions’, *Gai Pied*, 11-5-1985; ‘‘Touche pas à mon Pote’ ou la guerre des jeunes contre le racisme’, *L’veille de la Haute Loire*, 10-3-1985; ‘Mardi 7 mai contre le racisme rassemblement du souvenir de la solidarité, de la lutte et de l’espoir’, *L’écho du centre*, 3-5-1985; ‘Touche pas à mon Pote’, *Panorama d’aujourd’hui*, 4-1985, 32.

<sup>152</sup> ‘La ‘guerre des badges’ n’aura pas lieu’, *Le Figaro*, 22-5-1985; ‘‘Touche pas à mon Pote’ ou la guerre des jeunes contre le racisme’, *L’veille de la Haute Loire*, 10-3-1985.

<sup>153</sup> ‘Touche pas à mon Pote’ can be translated to: don’t touch my friend.

<sup>154</sup> ‘La ‘guerre des badges’ n’aura pas lieu’, *Le Figaro*, 22-5-1985.

badges and the messages that were written on it (see Appendix 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14).<sup>155</sup> The diversity of badges can symbolise their success in antiracist campaigns and SOS Racisme's will to re-use a symbol (the hand) that has continuously worked. The large horizon on which the youth could potentially mobilise on varying from: education, integration, anti-apartheid, employment and voting rights. Thus a mobilisation became cross-partisan and included participants from various political, social and racial backgrounds at a youth level.<sup>156</sup>

A diversity of political message can be seen as a signifier of the diversity of causes that SOS Racisme appropriated and framed as part of racism. Accordingly, having a wider reach in opinion for possible mobilisation (i.e. including the fight of racism to be a societal struggle), can result in a cross-ethnic mobilisation as more individuals would potentially be physically and ideologically involved in the struggle fought by SOS Racisme (see Appendix 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14). A large mobilisation potential entails a variety of mobilising perspective, thus through the diversification of these opportunities the badges implied a large mobilising force. High schools' and universities' youth mobilisation were largely relayed by the media as a moral concern, which seemed to have been used to explain the rise of SOS Racisme. Through different channels of mobilisation – such as syndicates, political youth associations and Jewish organisation - France's youth managed to find a common voice to raise against the forms of discrimination (see Appendix 2).<sup>157</sup>

Local level of governance at the school level can be observed through the democratisation and the ability for the youth to mobilise on a large scale. This can be represented by the diversity of actors that mobilised in the streets, raising a united voice: rejecting racism and other forms of discrimination (see Appendix 1). Appendix 2 can initially be utilised to outline the diversity found in the first civil assembly organised by the head of SOS Racisme. There Harlem Désir (key figure of SOS Racisme), is surrounded by a diverse group of speakers at an anti-racist convention. Furthermore, two major elements can be

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<sup>155</sup> 'Touche pas à mon Pote' ou la guerre des jeunes contre le racisme', *L'éveil de la Haute Loire*, 10-3-1985.

<sup>156</sup> 'Melting Pote', *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 17-4-1985; 'Mardi 7 mai contre le racisme rassemblement du souvenir de la solidarité, de la lutte et de l'espoir', *L'écho du centre*, 3-5-1985; 'Après la fête: ils sont tous pour', *L'évènement*, 20-6-1985; 'La prise de la Concorde', *Libération*, 17-6-1986; 'Six doigts de la main', *L'évènement*, 6-1985; 'S.O.S. Racisme', *Le Monde Libertaire*, 27-6-1985; 'Un antiracisme qui s'accommode de la ségrégation sociale', *Lutte Ouvrière*, 30-11-1985; 'L'appel du 'Pote Money' de SOS Racisme', *Libération*, 25-6-1986, 15; 'Le concert international de SOS Racisme à réuni 300 000 personnes', *Le Monde*, 21-6-1988; 'La mode est aux Noirs', *Le Monde*, 8-11-1988; 'Dans les écoles, une semaine contre le racisme', *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 24-4-1989.

<sup>157</sup> Mardi 7 mai contre le racisme rassemblement du souvenir de la solidarité, de la lutte et de l'espoir', *L'écho du centre*, 3-5-1985; 'Touche pas à mon Pote', *Panorama d'aujourd'hui*, 4-1985, 32.

elevated from Appendix 15, 16, and 17. Firstly, the reader can observe a high level of ethnic diversity from the picture: reflecting that issue related to fighting racism can also be mobilised through networks outside of ethno-racial boundaries. Secondly, the youth was framed by people demonstrating as ‘fertile’. Using fertile as a reference is interesting as it implies that individuals can be modelled and therefore, repairing wrongdoings is crucial in fighting hate crimes. Working with the youth was set a priority for the actors partaking in the demonstrations. Moreover, animators of the demonstrations were part of the youth, reflecting a local level of initiative and governance; giving a real sense of cross-ethnic and diverse implication and elevation of relevant points (see Appendix 17). Legitimising the relevance of these arguments accentuated at a local level and the relevance of their claims form a bottom-top perspective.

Ultimately, the range of potential causes to mobilise the youth enabled a deconstruction of ethno-racial boundaries mobilisation. Through this type of mobilisation, the nature of the causes fought for were expanded through diversity. Youth mobilisation was cross-ethnic and acted as wide wall against types racism and discrimination. Other elements have however to be considered to grasp the impact and the deconstruction of ethno-racial boundaries of mobilisation is the use of music (specially concerts) and its role in anti-racist campaigns.

### 3.2 Music and Mobilisation

A central element to mobilisation was the use of music (as a cultural asset) to relay anti-racist campaigns and to regroup large amount of individuals. The way that the media framed the use of musical concerts to fight racism – and the way SOS Racisme used music - was its ability to go beyond political opinion: individual cross-party interest to music. One main concert organised by SOS Racisme represented the central use that music played for the organisation: the event organised in 1985 on Place de la Concorde particularly marked spirits. The idea that the music scene represented the French melting pot and the mix of cultures through cultural transition was particularly present in the media. Music also represented for SOS Racisme and Harlem Désir a way to massively and transnationally mobilise against racism, insisting on the inter-ethnic potential of mobilisation that the fight of racism had to offer. The use of cultural artefacts (in this case music) is often tied to one ethno-racial belonging to transmit pride and memory. For instance, in the Haïtian case, Fleming considered the use a music as a transmitter of memory and used for a commemorative purpose.<sup>158</sup> To consider this

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<sup>158</sup> Fleming, *Resurrecting Slavery*, 70.



mobilising potential, the role of music and the manner by which it was framed, perceiving it as a mobilising tool in the struggle against racism and discrimination. Specially to relive and tell the experience of deeply traumatic events like slavery, uprooting and racism.<sup>159</sup> Furthermore, the manner by which music mobilised through SOS Racisme is held as different: again overcoming ethno-racial boundaries by its nature and tackling an issue not as the transition of a traumatic memory but rather by denouncing recent discriminatory events and acts.

Relaying the idea that France was a multicultural country and relaying the melting pot image, the media represented the Concorde concert as the embodiment of the ‘melting pot’. This insisted on the idea that SOS Racisme was a multicultural organisation and that its members were from a largely diverse background.<sup>160</sup> The idea that a diversified united population would unify under the banner of fighting racism is a political opportunity that was largely conveyed as a demonstration of force of the SOS Racisme: the concert managed to gather between 200,000 to 500,000 people from all the areas of Paris.<sup>161</sup> Reflecting a ‘melting pot’ and alluding to the range of diversity that leaders of SOS Racisme wanted to reflect and impose as a fact. Hence, reflecting the deconstruction of ethno-racial boundaries: a cross-ethnic mobilisation around a cultural aspect. Through the music, a cultural mixing was noted through musical diversity, the audience attending the concert and its popularity holding a gathering purpose.<sup>162</sup> Framing the mobilisation using the word *metisage* entails overcoming ethno-racial boundaries and thus framing the mobilisation for the Concorde concert as cross-ethnic mobilisation.

The 1985 Concorde concert was especially important in the way it was recognised by the government. Although SOS Racisme was not a politicised organisation, it was serving a political purpose and was framed by the media as a political tool (in the context of the concert) as it held an anti-communitarian aspect.<sup>163</sup> The mobilisation was then transformed from a non-conventional one to an almost political mobilisation prioritising anti-communitarian framework as a political element.<sup>164</sup> The state was including diversity and the struggle of SOS

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<sup>159</sup> Fleming, *Resurrecting Slavery*, 71.

<sup>160</sup> ‘La prise de la Concorde’, *Libération*, 17-6-1986; ‘Melting Pote’, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 17-4-1985; ‘Le PS orchestre la ‘*nuit des potes*’’, *Le Quotidien*, 15-4-1985.

<sup>161</sup> ‘Melting Pote’, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 17-4-1985; ‘Le PS orchestre la ‘*nuit des potes*’’, *Le Quotidien*, 15-4-1985.

<sup>162</sup> ‘Après la fête: ils sont tous pour’, *L’évènement*, 20-6-1985; ‘La prise de la Concorde’, *Libération*, 17-6-1986; ‘Six doigts de la main’, *L’évènement*, 6-1985; ‘S.O.S. Racisme’, *Le Monde Liberaire*, 27-6-1985; ‘Melting Pote’, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 17-4-1985; ‘Le PS orchestre la ‘*nuit des potes*’’, *Le Quotidien*, 15-4-1985.

<sup>163</sup> *Le Monde Liberaire*, 27-6-1985; ‘Melting Pote’, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 17-4-1985; ‘Le PS orchestre la ‘*nuit des potes*’’, *Le Quotidien*, 15-4-1985.

<sup>164</sup> *Le Monde Liberaire*, 27-6-1985; ‘Melting Pote’, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 17-4-1985; ‘Le PS orchestre la ‘*nuit des potes*’’, *Le Quotidien*, 15-4-1985; ‘Après la fête: ils sont tous pour’, *L’évènement*, 20-6-1985.

Racisme as its own. Insisting that the Socialist government perceived the concert as an example of a mechanism for integration through the use of culture and mobilisation. Tying its societal combat and the fight against racism, as related to the Socialists, excluding the right wing from the anti-racist discourse. From this perspective the government was making a clear divergence from previous government's institutional racism through the recognition of the importance of migrant populations and their demands. Extreme mobilisation – like at the Concorde - physically embodied the rejection of previous forms of exclusion (thus previous forms of alienation), while the political appropriation (through the media) included both local governing actors and the ones they directly represented within the political debate - linking the local and national levels of governance. Developing the impact and the leverage force of migrants (through SOS Racisme) at a political level. In this interesting turn of events, migrant mobilisation became a formalised political mobilisation. The appropriation of the anti-racist organisation and the link to culture is interesting. As the previous chapter had observed that cultural exchanges were elements of inclusivity for development of migrants' integration. Cultural exchanges are particularly interesting to consider as a basis for mobilisation. Inclusion through culture – as a message from the government - is particularly interesting perspective to explain the political appropriation of the event.

Subsequently, elements of the shifts of migrants and anti-racist unconventional mobilisation is framed as political. The political recuperation of the concert for socialists' incentives marked an intention to recuperate anti-racist and anti-discrimination arguments. Creating a strong basis on which future generation could mobilise upon: claiming SOS Racisme's struggle as a Socialist one. However, this is not surprising as seen in chapters 1 and 2, the main actors that framed anti-racism as a national and moral issue, were on the left side of the political spectrum. The right wing parties remained largely excluded in the fight against racism and discrimination. Therefore, cross-ethnic mobilisation at a political level, overcoming ethno-racial boundaries was not necessarily represented at a political level. For true inclusion of migrants' struggle, SOS Racisme's ability to defend their ideals has to consider the movement's elements of inclusion through education. In order to judge if it considered it as having an impact on social mobility.

### 3.3 SOS Racisme: inclusion and exclusion through education

Education was considered at the forefront of the integration system by the socialist government and remained a largely debatable element at parliamentary level. Policies such as the ZEP, were meant to trigger the integration rate through the enhancement of social mobility. Assessing the impact of such policies through vision of local actors can help to formulate an initial assessment of perspective for such policies. Two major elements can be noted: 1) Education was a platform and a tool for SOS Racisme to intervene and alerting about discrimination; 2) Education remained of primary concern for SOS Racisme and embodied limitation of the integration system in France. The access to education, as previously considered as representing inclusion, was still an element that mobilised anti-racist lobbyists. The ZEP policy had for intention to reduce spatial segregation through accessibility and future inclusion, however, it remained a problem in President Mitterrand's second mandate.

SOS Racisme widely relied, through its networks, on Public infrastructure – through schools for example - to take action and share their message. Working with the government (e.g. through access to infrastructure), shows the politicisation of the movement and its incorporation into national level governance, while carrying research and expertise from a bottom-up approach. The creation of a yearly ‘week against racism’ represents the cooperation between State and SOS Racisme.<sup>165</sup> In this interesting turn of event, multi-level governance mechanism were put in place by the state to use non-state actors at a local level to help manage diversity related topics. One conclusion can already be drawn as a limitation of the ZEP policy as front player for integration: it still remained largely segregated. As migrants still lacked perspective from both an accessibility perspective as well as experienced difficulties incorporating the job market.<sup>166</sup> SOS Racisme insisted on the ZEP areas as largely resembling ‘Ghetto’ where socio-economic hardships remained unchanged and where a lack of public investment was still too often observed.<sup>167</sup> Although the development of the ZEP were established to enhance integration through inclusion, it seems that the initial issue (segregation and exclusion) remained largely unchallenged and still omnipresent. SOS Racisme framed education as the symbol of unaccomplished equality.<sup>168</sup> Entailing at a local level a lack of depth

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<sup>165</sup> ‘Jospin traque la discrimination de l'école aux élections’, *Libération*, 24-5-1989; ‘Dans les écoles semaine e contre le racisme’, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 25-4-1989; ‘M.Lionel Jospin plaide pour l'intégration par l'école’, *Le Monde*, 25-4-1989.

<sup>166</sup> ‘Jospin traque la discrimination de l'école aux élections’, *Libération*, 24-5-1989; ‘Dans les écoles semaine le contre le racisme’, *Le quotidien de Paris*, 25-5-1989; ‘M.Lionel Jospin plaide pour l'intégration par l'école’, *Le Monde*, 25-4-1989.

<sup>167</sup> ‘M.Lionel Jospin plaide pour l'intégration par l'école’, *Le Monde*, 25-4-1989.

<sup>168</sup> ‘Jospin traque la discrimination de l'école aux élections’, *Libération*, 24-5-1989

from national level governance and the actors in charge of the law. Alternatively, it shows that perhaps, elements – such as accessibility through transports and segregation - that were perhaps put in second importance instead of being properly and thoroughly approach. SOS Racisme brought local expertise, through their large youth network to the table and became a viable force as a field expert.

Having signs of discrimination as an issue at a local level remained a central issue to policy makers and got appropriated and relayed by SOS Racisme as one of most notable discriminatory elements of the Socialist government. Furthermore, the state failed to create frames that were inclusive to all of the Republic's children (see Appendix 18).<sup>169</sup> Spatial segregation remained a central element with discriminatory traits for SOS Racisme. Accessibility, remained inexistent and the gap – related to social mobility - that was meant to have been reducing remained seemingly untouched. Interaction between communities was portrayed as inexistent, and the 'melting pot' image remained inaccessible while the vulnerability of the population due to an absence of mobility on the social ladder and location remained unaffected by the ZEP. Nonetheless, relying on movements like SOS Racisme represented the government's intentions to change strategy to re-enforce the ZEPs ability to trigger integration based on local level expertise.

Overall, the use of SOS Racisme through education and their investment is representative of the limitation of the integration system put in place by the ZEP. However, a change of strategy relying on local actors as experts represented a step forward of investment in education

To answer the research question, President Mitterrand's government perceived migrant integration through the appropriation of local means of governance incarnated as SOS Racisme. Developing a multi-level mechanism approach to integration by fighting racism. Two central elements related to SOS Racisme point this out in this chapter. Firstly, the political recuperation of the movement through its cultural outlook had a restricting impact as the exclusion of the right wing parties meant the politicisation of the movement. Thus making SOS Racisme a tool to fight racism but also an exclusionary political body. Furthermore, SOS Racisme became a political tool and suffered from its affiliation with the government it no longer represented migrants but rather a government. Sealing SOS Racisme with the future of the Socialist

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<sup>169</sup> 'Un antiracisme qui s'accommode de la ségrégation sociale', *Lutte Ouvrière*, 30-11-1985; Le droit de vivre, 'Pédagogie de l'anti-racisme', *Le droit de vivre*, 5 June 1985.

government, marking its decline by affiliation of Socialist integrative failures. With for example the 1990 riots against the socialist government, marking a societal disbelief in SOS Racisme doings and locking its fate.

To answer the second sub-question, SOS Racisme served as an inclusive anti-racist mean of local governance. Cross-ethnic mobilisation through youth mobilisation and music was put forwards as one of the main elements from which the initial success of the movement could be observed. The deconstruction of ethno-racial boundaries facilitated an analysis that considered cross-ethnic mobilisation as a way to judge the societal impact that the movement carried. Reflecting a new wind of mentality that considered the fight against racism and discrimination as fundamental for the development of the French crucible while recognising diversity.

## Conclusion

This study took into account one research question and two sub-questions:

- 1) How and why did consecutive national governments and local organisation ‘SOS Racisme’ prioritised the integration of the post Algerian War migration (1962) differently through their framing and perception of discrimination and inclusion?
  - 1.1) How did parliamentary debates, based on neighbourhood governance of integration, before and after the election of President François Mitterrand, positively or negatively reflected integration and discrimination for 2<sup>nd</sup> generation colonial migrants (between 1978 to 1989)?
  - 1.2) How did local level governance, through the association ‘SOS Racisme’, served anti-racism and inclusivity through mobilisation up to 1990?

Firstly, before the Mitterrand years, the national governments perceived the integration of migrants’ communities through framing of physical exclusion and inclusion. Deliberately, linking migrants, migration and security in the same perspective. The initial policies concerned neighbourhoods where a density of ethnicities promoted a risk of physical exclusion and segregation. This was the case because initial framing mainly targeted the Algerian communities by excluding them from the actual debate. Creating a framework where they were almost stripped of their citizen’s essence and considered as second rate individuals; close from being a danger for the mainstream French communities. With Mitterrand presidency, a more mainstream approach was then favoured for integration. Mitterrand, through the ZEPs, had a more wholesome approach. Hence, it was observed that the balance changed from targeted governance of migrants to a governance of diversity carried by inclusionary strategies. This can be explained by a lack of structural integration through education. Exemplified by the absence of social mobility for second and third generation migrants. Which was vigorously combated through the ZEPs. This can be clarified by the understanding that a societal gap led to the steady alienation of migrant minorities.

Secondly, a changing approach with the mainstreaming policies (ZEPs) was a crucial social program. The ZEPs also had a down side: creating an invisible identifier and possibly influencing the negative connotation that the 'Cité' has, as a troublesome area. As discussed in chapters one and two in reference to parliamentary debates on integration, security, education and protection the line between inclusion and exclusion was constructed as frail. This was developed because of an inadequate understanding of group realities and sometimes inappropriate solutions and policies. Often disregarding local expertise and means of governance. Overall, because of such policy developments, these frameworks created a gap between local and national level of governance, thus, creating the basis for local mobilisation to develop. The image of filling a hole in a wall would be appropriate to visually exemplify the role that local mobilisation played in this context. Because of inadequate understanding, policy strategies and a double edged ZEP policy, the consecutive governments (before and after Mitterrand's election) created the basis for social mobilisation. Generating a space where the revalorisation of diversity through the eyes of the youth and a changing political landscape were two rising forces.

Thirdly, SOS Racisme would fill this space through the emergence of multi-level mechanisms. Because SOS Racisme served as an inclusive anti-racist mean of local governance, it managed to reset the inclusionary and integrative debate in France: in itself becoming a powerful political statement of diversity as success. Because music as well as cross-ethnic and youth mobilisation were expressed as the main elements of this achievement, they influenced the representation of the local perception for exclusion and inclusion. SOS Racisme, however, quickly became a political asset to fight racism as well as an exclusionary political tool for the right wing. The power of SOS Racisme was its ability of shifting - in the context of integration - the debate from an exclusive problem to an inclusive one. Indeed, because integration dogmas were initially targeting the Algerian communities, SOS Racisme incarnated the integration trend as an inclusive and societal problem. Being the concern of diversity rather than migration. Hence, the three chapters pointed out the mechanical elements of mobilisation. Framing it – and in this research: SOS Racisme - as consequence of badly developed and misled governance of diversity.

Therefore, it can be concluded that because of mis-governance and the ignoring of local realities, a deep social divide was exposed in this research - which to some extent persists today. Namely, 1980s France organically responded to failed governance through peaceful mobilisation and diagonal representation across different social classes and backgrounds.

Exposing a positive mechanism of response triggered by a diversified and cross ethnic mobilisation - pointing out the importance of multi-level mechanism to foster integration and deal with societal problem. After having established that the right and left political wing governments treated migration with technocratic approaches, promoted exclusion rather than inclusion (promoted at different degrees).

This research is important as it carried is a fresh and innovative look that outlined two mechanical trends. Initially, by drawing an intricate exclusionary and inclusionary integration trends in 1980s France. And later, the political usage of SOS Racisme as a tool to fight discrimination, parenting it to the Socialist strategy for inclusion in the Republic. Finally, research including SOS Racisme needs to be pushed further in the light of cross-ethnic mobilisation and boundary externalisation to explore the fight against Racism. Indeed, this could be done by looking into Culture as a mediator and an anti-racist apparatus. SOS Racisme is one of a kind organisation that has rarely been thoroughly exposed in academic literature. It deserves more light for its utilisation of culture to fight racism, for acting as a canal for youth and social mobilisation against discriminations and for its annexation into the political world.

This research explicitly stands out as an illustration of the importance of local level expertise for governance and the use of popular culture. For example, under the form of music and the Concorde concert as a statement against discrimination. The research is however limited in the way it treated the importance and the accomplishment of local level governance and SOS Racisme. Indeed, it would also have been interesting to cover more anti-racist organisation development to establish a clearer demarcation for SOS Racisme. As an end note, it would be beneficial in the future to also consider SOS Racisme during the 1990s and until the end of President Mitterrand's second mandate (1995): giving a more wholesome story rather than its initial successes.



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
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
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
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
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