

# Securitizing Climate Change - Why the Way Climate Change is Framed Matters

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*An analysis on how the framing of climate change as a security issue affects the inclusion or exclusion of non-state actors in climate change policymaking.*

MASTER THESIS

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**List of abbreviations**

CGP	Citizens' Global Platform
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNA	Centre for Naval Analysis
CNAS	Center for New American Security
COP15	Copenhagen Summit
COPs	Conferences of the Parties
DoD	Department of Defense
DV	Dependent Variable
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GHG	Green House Gasses
IISD	The Institute for Sustainable Development
IPCC	International Panel of Climate Change
IV	Independent Variable
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NIC	National Intelligence Council
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USGCRP	US Global Change Research Program

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**ABSTRACT**

The purpose of this thesis is to explore and test whether framing climate change as a security issue impacts the way non-state actors can participate in national and global climate change policymaking. While it has been argued, in general terms, that securitizing an issue creates a state-centric security response, it has yet been untested to what extent this impacts environmental NGOs and civil society in climate change policymaking. After an analysis of the discourse on climate change over the past decade, I posit that since 2007 we have seen and will continue to see an increase of environmental NGOs indirectly excluded from climate change decision-making processes by states. This thesis, therefore, contends that climate change should be de-securitized and approached with a multidimensional climate change framework, incorporating a green theoretical standpoint. Drawing from an extensive questionnaire and two case-studies, I evaluate the role of non-state actors in climate change policymaking. The results suggest that the more climate change is framed as a security issue, the more non-state actors are *indirectly* excluded from climate change policymaking.

*“Today, more than ever, ‘green’ and ‘peace’ really go together”*

NATO Secretary General: Anders Fogh Rasmussen. 2009

## INTRODUCTION

With high greenhouse gas emissions and environmental degradation, one of the world's greatest challenges today is finding a balance between meeting the fundamental needs of humans and at the same time protecting the world and creating a sustainable future. Climate change is not only an issue in the future, but one that we can observe in the present day (European Commission, 2008). The central task set by the climate change policymakers is to limit the global rise in temperature to no more than 2 degrees to achieve the two-degrees-Celsius goal (Geden, 2010). Climate change issues are a product of humans' modernization of science, technology and economics (Beck, 1992:40). However, they are unintended issues that create unforeseeable effects beyond state borders. With little awareness of climate change and its impacts in the 1980s, climate change has in the last decades risen to become one of the most discussed environmental issues. Unfortunately, we still do not have a successful approach that finds a multidimensional policy framework for this global problem.

In the past five years an increasingly accepted way of approaching climate change and its impacts is by framing climate change in terms of a security issue. This conceptualization of climate change was initiated due to the anticipation that it would bring more attention to climate change issues, thus shifting it from 'low' to 'high' politics (Eckersley, 2006:263). The increasing global awareness of the urgency to combat climate change has however simultaneously occurred alongside the increasingly discontent amongst non-state actors regarding their exclusion from the conferences at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in 2009. This observation, therefore, leads to the following research question: *To what extent does framing climate change as a security issue affect the inclusion or exclusion of environmental non-state actors in climate change policymaking?*

Accordingly, the main aim of this Master Thesis is to test the assumption that the securitization of climate change reduces and limits NGOs' involvement in the climate change policymaking process. The securitization of an issue is believed to create a state-centric approach. However, this is a long-held but largely untested assumption and consequently this thesis will test whether the securitization of climate change leads to the exclusion of non-state

actors from the decision-making process. The main argument presented in this thesis is that the linkage between climate change and security is a counterproductive strategy that has shifted climate change into the arena of security which essentially emphasises a narrow, military, and state-centric response. Consequently the corollary of framing climate change as a security issue and thus framing it as 'high' politics has resulted in a demand for a state-centric and a more unilateral approach to combat climate change issues. This ignores the necessity of acquiring valuable input from environmental non-state actors. Therefore this thesis will deductively test the assumption that the securitization of climate change reduces the involvement of nongovernmental organization (NGOs) in climate change policymaking. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the solutions to curb climate change issues lie beyond state-actors and governments, and are instead situated within the cooperation of the civil society, NGOs and the epistemic community that collectively constitute a multidimensional framework.

The necessity for an efficient approach to combat climate change seems urgent. This research is hence of importance and relevance since climate change reveals a global transnational problem that has affected and will have an effect on different dimensions. Thus, it demands solutions from various fields and disciplines. If climate change conferences and summits act in a state-security focused manner it will decrease the likelihood of addressing climate change issues effectively. By conducting this research this thesis will challenge state-centric theoretical perspectives on climate change policymaking both globally and nationally.

I will commence my research by first of all presenting the current literature debate that outlines the different positions regarding this thesis' topic. Then, I will assert my assumptions and theories derived from the current literature debate, followed by an outline of my research design. The next section will begin with the background to this research-topic followed by the analytical part, which is divided in two chapters. These chapters will provide an overview of the process of securitizing climate change on an international and national level, stressing the role of discourse and issue-framing. Chapter three will analyse the global climate change debate and whether non-state actors play an important role within the UNFCCC, thus testing the hypothesis on a global level. Chapter four will present two case-studies (United States and Finland) to test the hypothesis on a national level. Finally, based on my overall findings and analysis, a main conclusion is drawn.

In this context, it must be noted that framing climate change as a security issue has shifted the debate on climate change policymaking from environmental to the security arena. This

causes non-state actors to become indirectly less involved. The security arena traditionally does not cooperate with non-state actors. Therefore it is not necessarily a *direct* move by states to exclude non-state actors from policymaking, but rather it is the result of shifting the task of policy formation to the security sector. The case studies will explore whether the less climate change is securitized, the less exclusion takes place (as will be analysed on hand of the Finnish case). The American case-study investigates whether tackling climate change in the security arena naturally reduces non-state actor's involvement. On an international level, however, we see a rise and fall of non-state actor involvement. However, specifically towards the end of the 2000s this has shown some decreases, which as the findings will indicate is due to the state-centric attitude; therefore, this thesis predicts that the shift of tackling climate change in the Security Council will most certainly result in non-state actor's exclusion. To gain a further understanding of the current debate on the various concepts mentioned and their relation to each other I will now commence with the literature debate.

## CHAPTER ONE

The objective of this first chapter is to provide an outline of the previous research into - and the secondary commentary on – the role of securitization of climate change; and the implications for inclusion or exclusion of non-state actors. There are two connecting elements that are of concern within this analysis:

- 1) The literature overview will first demonstrate what has previously been written on the linkage between security and climate change. It is of importance to establish this link to be able to discuss whether the securitization of climate change is either a beneficiary mechanism or a hindrance to the desirable formation of a global multidimensional framework tackling climate change.
- 2) To be able to analyse what role the securitization of climate change (independent variable) has on the inclusion and exclusion of non-state actors in climate change policymaking on a multidimensional framework (dependent variable), the second part of the literature overview will outline the current literature on the dependent variable. This will be done by presenting the current debate on state-centric initiatives (exclusively government to government) to tackle climate change issues, and those that involve the idea of incorporating non-state actors to create a multidimensional framework.



The goal of this preliminary analysis is to highlight and explore the current literature portraying the issues within the climate change debate. It will also endeavour to uncover the grey area within this field. The uncertainties attached to climate change and its possible future impacts increase the difficulty for finding a 'holistic approach' that incorporates both non-state actors and state actors in combating or preventing climate change. The literature on climate change contains a persistently evolving dynamic. Its fluidity thus assembles an obstacle for gaining an accurate insight into the general debate on climate change policymaking.

The key concepts on which this analysis will draw are: **1<sup>st</sup>** Securitizing climate change; **2<sup>nd</sup>** Inclusion or exclusion of non-state actors, the idea of a multidimensional framework or a state to state- centric approach. I highlight the similarities and differences in the research on the field of the securitization of climate change issues, and the debate of the inclusion or exclusion of non-state actors in the global approaches to combat climate change issues. Based on my exploration of the literature I will state what I expect to find, which will form my hypothesis.

### **1.1. Analytical literature**

#### *a) Securitization of climate change:*

It is undisputable within the literature that over the last decades environmental issues have been recognized as a security issue (Ullman, 1983; Homer-Dixon, 1999). However, the conceptualization of climate change as a security issue has generated various complexities. The literature on the securitization of climate change entails a deviation on whether this linkage is fruitful or counterproductive. Firstly, I will draw on the debate referring to the framing of security issues and the scope of the security field.

The literature is divided on whether security should remain as a static and rigid concept that ought not to incorporate non-traditional threats or whether the definition of security should be widened to incorporate issues as those created by climate change (Barnett, 2001; Dalby, 2002; Krause and Williams, 1996). The literature, building on the securitization theory by the so called Copenhagen School, presents some debate on how the discourse of framing climate change as an security issue, thus utilizing "speech act", has implications on how it is dealt with (Huysmans, 2006; Buzan et al. 1998). The Copenhagen School theory argues that once climate change is framed as a security issue, the means of approaching it will be altered and adapted accordingly (Dalby, 2009). It is also stressed that the label 'security' carries

difficulties within its very term. According to Huysmans (2006:25) the label 'security' carries the notions of emergency and high priority. This demands and allows exceptional actions to be taken (Buzan et al. 1998). Consequently, linking a subject to the security sphere should not be done lightly, since one cannot predict the outcomes of securitizing a specific issue (Dabelko, 2009; Hartmann, 2010).

There are two dominating conflicting arguments within the securitization debate. On the one hand it is argued that the securitization of climate change has been an amenable movement, moving it to "high politics" as a means to prioritize the issues, raise the profile of climate change and to consequently receive greater attention and resources (Buzan et al. 1998; Dabelko, 2008; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007, Barnett, 2003; Brown et al. 2007; and De Wilde, 2008). On the other hand it is argued that the securitization of climate change is a counterproductive act. Security institutions are originally designed for traditional threats. Moving climate change into the security field, and thus placing it among other security issues, is demanding a narrow state-centric approach that requires military attention (Brown and McLeman, 2009:292; Deudney, 1990; Buzan et al. 1998:29; Buckland, 2007).

The literature draws on two key reoccurring arguments for contesting this movement. First, defining climate change as a 'security issue' is argued to be motivated by bureaucratic interests. Shifting climate change into the "high political" focus is a strategic move and has tactical implications to create the opportunity to extort resources, and allows powerful actors to utilize this mechanism to impose new rules and policies (Buzan et al. 1998; Selin and VanDeveer, 2003; Barnett, 2003; Brown et al. 2007; Eckersley, 2006:263; Detraz, 2011:107). Also, it is increasingly argued that securitizing environmental issues and climate change is observed as a mechanism for Western countries to increase access to resources and a way of controlling their Western consumption pattern (Barnett, 2001; Dalby, 1999, Barnett, 2003; and Brown et al. 2007). Building up on these bureaucratic motivations neglects the fundamental concerns associated with environmental issues (Dabelko and Dabelko, 1995:7; Brown et al. 2007; Hartmann, 2010).

Second, and most importantly for this thesis, is the argument that incorporating climate change issues within the national security agenda is counterproductive, since it tends to undermine the cooperation of global actors and especially non-state actors (Floyd, 2008).

Critiques on utilizing the language of security in regard to climate change contend that climate change does not pose an intentional threat and secondly, "because the label 'security'

is traditionally associated with the state, the term 'environmental security' implies that a state response is most appropriate" (Waever, 1995:65). Bringing climate change in the national security arena 'militarizes' the problem, demanding military means, which show little compatibility to means of combating climate change issues (Barnett, 2003; Detraz and Betsill, 2009). In fact, tackling climate change through military means ignores the core issues of environmental issues, and due to the borderless nature of climate change there is no symmetrical enemy that requires to be fought by military means in the first place (Parkin, 1997:44). Thus, linking climate change to security also brings in the "zero-sum rationality", which results in the claim of a winning and a losing actor.

The literature, however, presents the case that environmental issues demand cooperative actions on a global scale independent of national borders (Deudney, 1990). Along these lines Buckland (2007) argues that climate change issues ignore national boundaries. Therefore, defining environmental issues and climate change as a security issue and requiring a state-centric approach, puts the securitization move of linking climate change to security into question. This claim is in accordance with the realist theorists, who define security in a more static and narrower way, implying that security issues are 'high-politics' and 'state-bound', perceiving states in competition for security and hence requiring security issues to be tackled by military measures (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:80).

Those in opposition to this claim argue that the focus should consequently shift from state-centric to the individual within a global system (Græger, 1996:109). State-centred approaches hinder the formation of a global multidimensional framework dedicated to combating climate change (Floyd, 2008:63). Some of the literature therefore makes a strong claim to de-securitize climate change issues.

To summarise, the literature analysed draws on the notion that de-securitization is the desired approach for tackling climate change policymaking more effectively (Buzan et al, 1998:23; 29, Waever, 1995:56).

*b) The merits of inclusion of non-state actors - Why climate change issues are not just state issues.*

This part of the analysis will demonstrate the importance of involving non-state actors in policymaking. Non-state actors are referred to as "any organization that does not have a formal or legal status as a state or agent of a state, or as a constituent subunit of a state such as a province or municipality" (Raustiala, 2001:97). The role of NGOs, civil society, and the

epistemic communities all fit this definition. Epistemic communities are of particular interest as a player in international climate change regime (Haas, 1992) and are referred to as “networks of knowledge-based experts” (Karns and Mingst, 2010:19,226). NGOs and civic commitment carry the potential to provide effective means towards combating and preventing climate change.

The aim of NGOs is to create an environmental consciousness among the population. It is argued that the NGO community plays a vital role in the climate change debate. First of all, NGOs are based on dedication and motivation, and are not constrained by a bureaucratic entity; secondly, they tend to act on local problems and create awareness with preventative measures (Chitra, 2003; Gemmill and Bamidele-Iz, 2002; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Karns and Mingst, 2010). NGOs create local awareness which is a more desirable policy strategy than solely creating state to state top-down emission reduction targets, which neglects other areas of impacts (Betsill and Corell, 2001). Non-state actors have been argued as representing the interests of individuals and local concerns more adequately than state-actors (Raustiala, 2001).

Nongovernmental organizations provide expertise in a wide spectrum of issues; they also assist in framing the issue on a global level (Karns and Mingst, 2010:18). According to Karns and Mingst (2010:18) NGOs indirectly play a significant role within the United Nations by assisting in providing information and raising awareness to certain issues.

A measure to effectively tackle climate change should involve citizens in formulating and manifesting policies, made possible mainly through the participation of NGOs in the national and international climate change framework (Held and Harvey, 2009:9). This way is also most representative of democratic institutions (Princen and Finger, 1994; Raustiala, 1997; Dingwerth, 2007:16). Furthermore, NGOs are perceived to better “serve as intellectual competitors than governments”. These organizations often offer analytic and technical skills to delve into the matters at hand; “their success and rewards derive from being recognized as contributors to improved policy outcomes” (Esty, 1998:136). Generally, NGOs act as a bridge between the State and public opinion and they have a bottom-up approach to the issue at stake (Princen and Finger, 1994).

Non-state actors and their role within international relations were first noted in the 1970s. Academics analyzed non-state actors’ influence on states and established a theoretical model

that focused on the complex interdependence of both states and non-state actors in an international debate (Keohane and Nye, 1972).

In general terms, according to Keohane and Nye (1972) the neoliberal approach to the idea of multilateral decision-making is first and foremost taking place on a state-to-state foundation. The literature demonstrates that NGOs on a global scale have increasingly played an important role in the formation of multilevel environmental governance (Peters and Pierre, 1998; Betsill and Corell, 2001).

Neorealist's and neoliberals perceive international and national policymaking fundamentally through a state-centric lens (Estabrooks, 2008). States are thus perceived as holding absolute power and authority and do not recognize any other authority (Reus-Smith, 1998:7). Also the realists' approach states that NGOs have no real power in international policymaking, especially in regard to security issues, whereas states are the referent object since they seek to strategically ensure their national interests and security (Mearsheimer, 2001:21).

Overall, the literature demonstrates the shift away from perceiving the state as an exclusive actor, whose policies are only fixed to its state boundaries, to the idea of joint action on a global level of both non-state actors and state-actors. A multidimensional network, also referred to as global environmental governance, is characterized as a framework on a global level that doesn't solely consist of collaborating states, but also includes non-state actors such as civil society's, NGOs, the epistemic communities and international organizations (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Biermann and Pattberg, 2008:13; Eckersley, 2006; Karns and Mingst, 2010:15). These experts are meant to be independent from the state. This conception of climate change governance is the adverse conception of that of state-centric theories (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Lipschutz and Mayer, 1996; Chasek, 2000).

The main argument for a global multilevel network is the idea that it will merge the different levels of actors from the political, social, scientific, and economic field that will subsequently establish a coherent mechanism to incorporate the different levels of influence (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Arts, 2005).

The literature demonstrates that epistemic communities are perceived as being necessary in areas that are governed by uncertainties, and thus demand additional insight from a different level of discipline (Haas, 1992; Nasiritousi et al. 2011). These 'experts' often receive an influential position within these frameworks and are heavily relied upon. This is especially apparent within climate change policymaking. Climate change issues are accompanied by

many uncertainties, especially those uncertainties related to science. Therefore, climate change is the ideal case for presenting the importance of expert non-state actors playing a role within this field (Raustiala, 2001:114; Nasiritousi et al. 2011:4). However, they also argue that security related policymaking arenas do not favour the inclusion of non-state actors (Steffek, 2010). Moreover, the inclusion of non-state actors into an international or national debate can be granted on the notion that some states seek to increase their status among the non-state actors, hereby exploiting non-state actors in favour of their political position for symbolic reasons (Tallberg, 2010; Nasiritousi et al. 2011).

According to Raustiala (2001) even though NGOs play a fundamental role in the UNFCCC, they do not have unlimited access to the negotiations between the government officials. Only when their expertise is really needed will NGOs be invited, but frequently the expertise of NGOs is neglected by the states involved in the decision-making process. Some authors argue that the notion of “access” to outcomes of conferences is a democratic value enshrined within society. Notwithstanding, within policymaking frameworks this access can often be denied (Wirth, 1996; Dingwerth, 2007:16).

The inclusion of non-state actors can also have its disadvantages within the international community, especially among developing countries protesting against the idea of non-state involvement. Their claim is that these non-state actors are funded by Western donors, and are therefore presenting an agenda heavily influenced by a Western perspective (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008).

Regime theory also sees climate change policymaking as the central duty for states alone, related to the concept that governments are the sole authority in international decision-making (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006:146). Besides, non-state actors, having reached their zenith in popularity up to the beginning of the 2000s, civil society now finds itself increasingly facing disdain, and under attack by scholars, and politicians, which is evident in international and national conferences (Encarnación, 2006). This goes hand in hand with the judgmental onslaught against NGOs, resulting in their alienation.

In traditional terms, non-state actors were hardly acknowledged to play a role within international relations (Raustiala, 2001). However, the literature demonstrates the need for more empirical evidence on the importance of non-state actors playing a crucial role within international decision-making process, hence, forming a global multidimensional framework.

And yet, when analyzing the literature, it becomes clear that there is actually very little literature that does not favor NGO involvement at both national and international levels. The only opposition comes from the government officials themselves (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1995; Dingwerth,2007:40). Nevertheless one should also note that hardly any literature examines the actual influence NGOs have had on policy outcomes (Betsill and Corell, 2001; Dingwerth,2007:41); instead, most of the focus is on whether they have a role at all.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2.1. Theory

The theoretical framework will establish the most relevant theories that will guide the deductive research of this Master Thesis. The theories that play a central role within this thesis also form the foundation for the formation of my hypothesis. The theoretical framework plays an essential role in explaining the phenomena that have been observed, as opposed to merely describing the observations made. The assumption, that this thesis aims to test, is based on a narrow state-centric perspective, however this thesis believes that one should, instead, aspire to a multidimensional framework for climate change policymaking, argued alike by green theorists. To achieve a multidimensional framework, this thesis argues one has to first reframe and thus de-securitize climate change.

As the above analysis has demonstrated, framing climate change as a ‘security issue’ has not been explicitly applied in existing literature to explain inclusion or exclusion of non-state actors in national or global climate change policymaking. This assumption is yet untested. Instead the current literature refers more broadly speaking to the notion that the term ‘security’ is fundamentally associated with the state. Therefore this thesis’ theoretical framework focuses on this gap within the existing literature and hence offers a unique approach. The following graph demonstrates the theoretical assumption made for my analysis:

Graph 1. Possible impact of securitization on climate change policymaking (Issue-Framing, State-centric theory):



This thesis argues that the following approach is more desirable and will only be achievable if climate change has been re-framed in non-security rhetoric, i.e. de-securitized.

Graph 2: Global Climate change governance constituting a multidimensional approach (Global Governance and Green Theory):



a) *Securitization Theory:*

The link between climate change and security has been constructed through the process of *securitization*. As noted in the previous chapter, this thesis will draw on the Copenhagen School and its notion that securitization refers to a “speech act” which indicates the role of rhetoric in framing something as an exceptional threat. Also, according to the Copenhagen School, for the “securitization move” to have been successfully accomplished, there has to be the evidence that the securitized issue has been accepted and implemented by the wider community (Buzan et al. 1998:25). Securitization is a “more extreme version of politicization” and places an issue “above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998:23).



Specifically, politicization of climate change is the way in which climate change was framed prior to its securitization. Politicization of climate change demands an enhanced approach creating a cooperative framework that necessitates different actors and resources for decision-making (Waever, 1995:57). Waever (1995) draws on *de-securitization* as a strategy of removing a subject matter from the security agenda. Indeed, this would imply a movement from securitization back to politicization. Clearly, the main argument of this thesis supports the notion that de-securitization is more desirable for creating a multidimensional approach towards climate change policymaking, which, as will be highlighted below, is the central argument by green theorists.

In the following, I will argue against the concept of securitization along the same lines as Deudney (1990) argued against the environment-security nexus. Foremost, because climate change is not a state problem only, most environmental, and in this case, climate change issues “affect the global commons beyond state jurisdiction” (Deudney, 1999:193). Securitizing climate change issues logically leads to a militarization of the issue. Since, military threats according to Dalby (1999:194) require a “secretive, extremely hierarchical, and centralized response”. In contrast, climate change issues require ‘husbandry’, and a global multidimensional response. It is therefore counterintuitive to solely frame climate change, which traverses across state boundaries, as a security problem.

Expanding the security realm will lead to a multitude of political and social problems. According to Waever (1995) there are no such concepts as ‘international’ or ‘individual’ security. Only ‘national’ security exists, which is the ‘security of the state’. Actually, there is neither literature nor a tradition of security in ‘non-state’ terms (Waever, 1995:48). This state-centric notion is the theory which is being applied to support the main argument within this thesis.

*b) Issue-framing:*

In order to analyze the influence of the securitization of climate change on the participation of NGOs in climate change policymaking, it is also relevant to draw on the generic process, namely ‘issue-framing’. Issue-framing is applied to explain why a certain problem, in this case the framing of climate change as a security issue, has come to play a significant role in finding a solution to this problem. Michel Foucault argues that discourse is a strategic act that enables certain behaviour, and shapes opportunities for those who frame the subject (Foucault, 1988:100).

The impact of shifting an issue into a new context can be profound. In other words, this implies that by ‘miss-framing’ an issue’, the core issues at stake will not be tackled effectively. Framing an issue by redefining it, transfers it into a new context, thus creating a new perception of it, and accordingly, demanding a new response (Goffman, 1986:10). The way issues are articulated and thus the way they are understood, changes the response to them. In this way, the perception of a national security threat posed by climate change, arises much more from the security label that has been given to climate change than from the facts of the actual distress that is caused by climate change. This also implies that framing an issue is not an objective mechanism. Instead, the lens applied towards perceiving a certain issue varies between cultures, individuals and organizations and is likely to change over time.

*c) State-Centric Theories vs. Global Governance and Green Theory:*

Having established that issue-framing plays a central role in analyzing the causation between the securitization of climate change and the inclusion or exclusion of NGOs in climate change policymaking, I will now outline the theoretical framework of state-centric theories and its countering theories: global governance and green theory. The former theories are the foundation for the hypothesis, due to the fact that framing a problem in security terms, leads to addressing the issue with state-centered solutions (Waever,1995:65). A state-centric response involves negotiations exclusively between governments. The findings in this thesis can be perceived through the lens of issue-framing, and will demonstrate that a multidimensional framework is the more desirable approach for climate change policymaking.

The state-centric theorist’s main claim is that states are the sole and fundamental actors in decision-making processes on both the national and the international level. Regime theory supports these notions and sees the state as unitary, with its power residing in the national government (Okereke and Bulkeley, 2007). Besides, this implies that countries are unlikely to cooperate with non-state actors. State-centric theory promotes the importance of ‘the national interest’, a synonym for ‘national security’, and according to Wolfers (1952:481) ‘national security’ is a contrived mechanism for government legislation.

As NGOs have proven to be recognized actors in policymaking, both globally and nationally, the ‘realist’, ‘neo-realist’, ‘neo-liberal’ and ‘regime theorist’ apparently do not comprehend the reality of the necessity to involve non-state actors within policymaking(Bull,1977). This

has resulted in inspiring the need for new theoretical responses such as ‘global governance’ and ‘green theory’.

In general, global governance theory stresses the role of NGOs in national and international policymaking (Okereke and Bulkeley, 2007:13). It encompasses the idea of a multidimensional framework that provides decision-making power and participation to global, national and sub-national actors. The emerging and merging of diverse actors creates the possibility of a more coherent approach to addressing climate change issues (Moore, 2009). A multidimensional framework to climate change policymaking creates the opportunity for local actors and communities to participate. Global governance theory is further applied to support the main idea of this thesis that a multidimensional framework is preferable for effective climate change policymaking. However, to realize such a framework this thesis argues that the issue of climate change needs to be reframed.

Green theory is more specifically related to both climate change policymaking and the promotion of the concept of a global environmental strategy that seeks to include diverse actors and voices from those who hitherto have not played a role in policymaking. Green theory focuses especially on the role of environmental NGOs, scientists, the epistemic community, and indigenous people. It supports the notion that a state-centric approach towards resolving problems which are on a global and transnational scale, such as climate change, are an inadequate approach towards finding effective solutions to environmental problems (Eckersley, 2006:255). Green theory thus opposes regime theory, neorealist and neo-liberalist approaches to climate change policymaking. Accordingly, the green theory will be applied to support the argument that a multidimensional framework is a more effective way of approaching climate change issues (Eckersley, 2006).

Green theory is this thesis’ ‘sensitizing concept’ for the qualitative research, and has served as an interpretive device for “guidance in approaching empirical instances” and suggests “directions along which to look”, which is in contrast to the standard definitive theories that “provide prescriptions of what to see” (Blumer, 1954:7). The theories mentioned above will be used to analyze the variables and explain the observations that constitute my thesis.

## **2.2. Variables**

Reviewing the existing literature, one finds only an indirect reference to the inclusion or exclusion of non-state actors in claims that security issues traditionally demand a state-centric response. I have, however, examined this notion, and have come to the following variables to

test this thesis' main assumption - that framing climate change as a security issue (IV) amounts to constraining the inclusion and or participation of non-state actors in both national and international climate change policymaking, and thus limiting the formation of a global multidimensional environmental framework (DV). I will examine the influence of the independent variable (IV) on the dependent variable (DV) and thus test whether they form a causal relationship.

The dependent variable will constitute the foundation of this research, which is the inclusion and exclusion of non-state actors in climate change policymaking. The reason why this thesis stresses the importance of non-state actors is: (1) because they are independent of the State's national interests, and therefore, generally more objective; (2) they, by and large, possess more expertise on the topic than governments do; and (3) non-state actors are more likely to be of a transnational nature themselves (Dingwerth,2007).

Based on reviewing the literature, I shall analyse the untested assumption that the securitization of climate change (IV) leads to the exclusion of non-state actors from climate change policymaking. This will form an analysis of the global and the national level, and will draw on the role of issue-framing in relation to climate change policymaking.

Table 1: The Independent and Dependent variables that will be examined within this thesis:

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Dependent Variable</b>
Securitization of Climate Change	Inclusion and exclusion of non-state actors: Inclusion of non-state actors in climate change policymaking amounting to a global multi-dimensional framework; as opposed to the exclusion of non-state actors leading to a state-to-state approach on climate change policymaking; and on a national level the inclusion or exclusion of non-state actors in climate change policymaking.
<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
The type of arena (environmental, political, security-related); discourse on the environment; speech acts; issue-framing.	Relied upon for input; access to meetings; participation; activities; invited to climate change policymaking debates; involved in national or international climate change policymaking; or excluded.

*a) Indicators:*

In order to specify what non-state inclusion or exclusion implies, this thesis will draw on several factors, including: whether or not non-state actors have been invited to join state actors at a global summit or conference on climate change issues; whether non-state actors are permitted to have input into these debates; whether the information and knowledge provided by a non-state actor is relied upon / used; whether non-state actors are granted access to official documents; and finally, whether non-state actors play an active role within the decision-making process on climate change issues.

Additionally, I will differentiate between *direct* and *indirect* exclusion. A direct link would suggest an open and deliberate government policy or legislation against the inclusion of non-state actors. However, an indirect link suggests underhand methods for exclusion, so that there does not appear to be any direct link between their exclusion and government policy.

**2.3. The logic behind the causality between IV and DV**

As has been argued by Corell and Betsill (2001:101) one has to move beyond the mere questioning of the extent of participation that NGOs have within the international climate change regime. One should better look at the actual conditions that influence the participation level of NGOs. One of these conditions, according to Corell and Betsill (2001:102), is the “framing of the issue under negotiation”. Framing an issue in a particular way can create a context that invites and privileges the involvement of certain actors, particularly in relation to securitization, which allows elites to make decisions based on the excuse of ‘exceptional circumstances’.

As Waever (1995:55) points out: by uttering ‘security’, a state-representative manoeuvres a particular development into a specific area, thereby claiming a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. For example, linking climate change to economics has in the past limited the participation of NGOs, since industry and business delegates feared that the views of NGOs could cause negative losses for industrialized economies (Corell and Betsil, 2001:103). In the same manner this Master Thesis therefore argues that by mainly framing climate change as a security issue, NGOs are yet again excluded because ‘national interests’ are at stake.

Altogether, based on the review of the existing literature and the theoretical framework, I propose the hypothesis:

*The more climate change is framed as a security issue, the more likely are non-state actors excluded from climate change policymaking.*

The two chapters below will test the hypothesis in relation to both the global and national levels, with the overall premise that framing climate change as a security issue will lead to the exclusion of non-state actors from climate change policymaking.

## **2.4. Research design**

### *a) Case selection:*

To assess the extent to which framing climate change as a security issue affects the inclusion or exclusion of environmental non-state actors in climate change policymaking this thesis will first analyse climate change policymaking on the international level (Chapter 3). This will be done namely by analysing climate change policymaking within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Chapter Three's primary purpose is to observe and establish whether over time there has indeed been evidence of exclusion of non-state actors, which will test the hypothesis<sup>1</sup>.

Additionally, I test the hypothesis on a national level by conducting two case studies —USA and Finland. The selection of my cases is based on findings from conducting a media-analysis with the research database FACTIVA. This analysis has demonstrated that by entering the search terms 'national security' and 'climate change' from 1990-2012, the results are that amongst the developed countries the USA has framed climate change issues as a national security issue the most; and Finland has done so the least. Therefore, these cases are selected on the basis of the variation of the independent variable (high and low levels of securitization). Evidently, both of the case studies represent democratic countries. Democratic values ideally entail the notion of representing the citizen's views. If I had chosen for a relatively un-democratic country, this would have made my case studies unreliable and invaluable.

### *b) Data Collection:*

The sources that I have used are (1) primary sources: UN framework convention on climate change texts, Conferences of the Parties (COPs) summaries, Media Reports, IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, The number of admitted observatory NGOs

([www.unfccc.int/public/ngo.pl](http://www.unfccc.int/public/ngo.pl)); Government websites; American and Finnish national security policies; American and Finnish national climate change policies (2) secondary sources: academic journals/books.

*c) Methods:*

In the introduction to Chapters (3) & (4) I will begin by verifying the independent variable by means of text-analysis to demonstrate the securitization of climate change on both the national and the international level. Analysing the discourse can be a valuable tool to establish the securitization of climate change and its possible effects on the participation of non-state actors in climate change policymaking (Feindt and Oels, 2005:164).

As noted earlier, I shall analyse the discourse surrounding climate change policymaking on a global (Chapter 3) and national (Chapter 4) level. The discourse-analysis will assist in confirming that 2007 is the benchmark for the securitization of climate change. The first step to demonstrate that securitization has taken place (speech act) will be tested by analysing changes in policy statements, obtained from database searches using FACTIVA and Google Scholar, and the shift of climate change into institutions not usually engaged in climate change policymaking.

To test the wider acceptance of climate change as a security issue, this thesis will investigate the change of discourse in the media using the media-analysis tool FACTIVA, which specifically draws on global media releases. This will especially clarify the different sequences in the change of climate change discourse. Media is chosen as a relevant tool since media is argued to portray public opinion and vice versa (Talbot, 2007:5). Using media text-analysis, I will determine the securitization of climate change discourse in order to select the cases. The discourse-analysis will function as a qualitative method. A qualitative method is of particular value in this thesis, since it is directed towards finding the significance of the securitization of climate change on the inclusion and exclusion of non-state actors.

Chapter Three will, after demonstrating that securitization has taken place on a global level, clarify the picture of the current global climate change policymaking. This will be demonstrated by using qualitative research in the form of a questionnaire and by analyzing secondary literature. This will assist in demonstrating the general perception of NGO involvement in the UNFCCC climate change policymaking.<sup>2</sup>

Data for this chapter was collected by surveying 789 NGOs that have been admitted to UNFCCC COPs before and after 2007. The questionnaire consisted of seven questions and was sent out by email to 789 NGOs (See appendix 2.). However, 121 emails were returned as failed delivery. Forty respondents replied that they did not have the required knowledge or resources to fill-in the questionnaire. Only 24 respondents (3.6%) filled out the questionnaire. Since this constitutes only a small percentage, the questionnaire's results do not offer a highly generalizable picture of the global trends. However, they definitely do portray a valuable insight into the international climate change policymaking.

Chapter Four will also first apply text-analysis to demonstrate the securitization of climate change on a national level, and consequently aims to test the theoretical assumption that the securitization will lead to the exclusion of non-state actors. This thesis conducts two case studies to deliver a qualitative and therefore more insightful description of the phenomenon. The theoretical assumption within this thesis will be tested on case studies on hand to explore whether there is congruence between the expectation and the findings (van Evera, 1997:56). However, case studies also present some limitations, e.g. it is hard to draw a clear cause-and-effect conclusion; also it is difficult to generalize from these results; and there can be bias in the collection of the data (Stake, 1995). Furthermore, to gain an even better insight I conducted a semi-structured phone-interview with a nongovernmental organization located in Washington DC, focusing on climate change.

## **2.5. Background to the Analysis of Chapter Three and Four**

To test the assumption that securitization of climate change reduces non-state actor's involvement in policymaking I will first outline the necessary background to the research that I will conduct. The framing of climate change as a security issue first emerged in the mid-2000s.

To be sure, there has been various ways of framing climate change. Towards the end of the 1980s, focus was concentrated on climate change issues as a scientific matter first, generally researched by scientific organizations such as the World Climate Research Program. Scientization frames climate change as an issue that needs to be tackled by the scientific community. Politicization on the other hand, involves a more enhanced approach to create a global cooperative framework that necessitates different actors and resources for decision-making. Climate change was placed on the political agenda in the 1990s which was apparent through the creation of the Rio Summit /UNFCCC (1992), UNCCD (1994) and the Kyoto




Protocol (1997) that concentrate on climate change related issues. I will only concentrate on the latter framing: the shift from politicization to securitization as it illustrates the shift of the agenda-setting on climate change issues, gradually prioritizing it as a “most urgent security danger” (Brauch, 2008:2).

To investigate when the securitization took place, I analysed the media discourse on climate change using the FACTIVA database, between 1990-2012. I have analysed the text for the following specific words within FACTIVA:

<b>Search Term (climate related)</b>	Climate Change; Global Climate Change
<b>Search Term (security related)</b>	Security; National Security

The following Graph 3 demonstrates the media coverage on the climate change security nexus over the past decade. It is clearly demonstrated that the benchmark that has been established for this thesis’ analysis – 2007, is also apparent within the media-analysis.

Graph 3: Presents the Number of Media Reports for the Search Terms: “Climate Change” and “National Security”:



The climate change security link is not only projected within media discourse, but drawing from the text-analysis, a crucial observation reveals that the link between climate change and

security is not made by environmentalists nor by climate change experts, but by governments, politicians and military actors (see Appendix 3.).

In addition, reviewing the literature, it becomes evident that the influence of NGOs relies on the relationship a non-state actor can develop with the particular government. This thesis will distinguish between 1) activist and 2) partnership NGOs. The latter constitute a partnership agreement with the state, affecting the NGO's level of influence on policy implementation. As will be shown later, this plays an explanatory role in establishing a NGOs influence, not only on the national government but also on their role on a global level.

Advisory NGOs that form a partnership with the government are likely to depend on the state since they don't actively distinguish between the perpetrators of the problem (most Western industrialized nations) and those offering solutions (Green preventative solutions). The performances by partnership non-state actors generally tend to comply more with the government's own attitude (Andresen and Gulbrandsen, 2003:19). Activist NGOs, on the contrary, are perceived as more radically independent of the government's position. This thesis argues that it is paradoxical for NGOs to form intensive partnerships with state governments. These partnerships construct a 'critical collaboration' in which NGOs have a dual task of collaborating with the particular governments, but simultaneously opposing those government policies unfavorable to the intrinsic principles held by the NGOs themselves (Riley, 2002:22). Therefore to test this thesis' hypothesis it is vital to recognize the difference between activist and partnership NGOs. Obviously, this will also create an interesting case for future research.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Will National Security Control Global Climate Change Policy?

This chapter will establish the securitization of climate change on an international level through text-analysis. Consequently, it will outline the role that NGOs play within the international climate change debate, utilizing qualitative research in the form of a questionnaire and by analyzing secondary literature. This will amount to indicating the actual participation of non-state actors in the international climate change debate.

#### 3.1. The Global trend of Securitizing Climate Change

##### *a) United Nations Security Council*

The Security Council meeting on the 17<sup>th</sup> of April 2007 was the crucial point when climate change was recognized as a security issue. In fact, this debate also showcased that most member-states perceived climate change as a threat to their state's national security. Margaret Beckett, the UK's ex-foreign secretary, was one of the key players in bringing climate change forward to the United Nations Security Council, and strongly argued that climate change issues would result in "disruption on a scale not seen since WWII" if action wasn't taken soon enough (UNSC, 2007).

It has become increasingly evident that the UNSC has set the landmark by discussing climate change issues as a credible security issue. For instance, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated in the July 2011 Conference: "Climate change not only exacerbates threats to peace and security, it is a threat to international peace and security." He also declared: "The facts are clear: climate change is real and accelerating in a dangerous manner" (UNSC, 2011). Some member-states called for the necessity of creating an International Tribunal for Climate and Environmental Justice to endorse sanctions against those states that did not fulfill their emission reductions.

##### *b) UNFCCC and Side-Events*

Halldor Thorgeirsson, Director for Implementation Strategy at the UNFCCC Secretariat, argued that the security issues are beyond UNFCCC scopes, and reasoned for the need to tackle the subject in a more security focused forum (German Federal Foreign Office, 2011:7). At the Copenhagen Climate Summit (2009) there were several actors who linked climate change to security. One can clearly observe this in the following statements: "Climate change

is an issue of security both locally and internationally”<sup>3</sup>. The Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), for example, states in its commentary on the Copenhagen Climate Summit: “It is become increasingly clear that action on our emissions now may shape our security in the future” (Brown and Crawford, 2009:1). The institute also describes climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ with the result that climate change problems “may turn violent”, and lead to failed-states. Notwithstanding, they make a valuable statement that “we should not assume that people will automatically fight when conditions get difficult” (Brown and Crawford, 2009:2). This indicates that framing climate change as a security issue may not be based on accurate scenarios or predictions. The worst-case-scenarios that have been described, are demonstrating the ultimate possibility, but may actually not represent reality as such.

### **3.2. Why do NGOs Matter in the First Place? - The Role of Non-State Actors in the UNFCCC**

The central arena where different actors have the opportunity to discuss one common global problem is the UNFCCC. The introduction of the UNFCCC has been perceived as a defining moment for non-state actors to gain an established position within international diplomacy (Raustiala, 2001:96). Conferences of the Parties meet on a frequent basis where governments have increasingly allowed for NGOs, in form of observatory parties, to be part of the climate change policy process during the 1990s and early 2000s. However, there is no clear definition of what constitutes ‘access’, ‘participation’ or ‘observatory party’.

Nevertheless, the UNFCCC has encouraged cooperation with non-state actors in order to benefit from their knowledge and influence in the decision-making processes.<sup>4</sup> The UNFCCC states that “any body, or agency, whether national or international, governmental or nongovernmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention (...) may be so admitted unless at least one-third of the Parties present objection”.<sup>5</sup> In fact, reality may paint a quite different picture.

As noted before, the aim of this thesis is to examine why there is a trend in the rise and fall of the participation of non-state actors in the global climate regime. This will be tested by evaluating whether the framing of climate change as a security issue has led to a decline of non-state actors participation in the UNFCCC. The fundamental notion underlying this analysis is the claim that a multidimensional climate change policy approach is more desirable in combating climate change issues.

### 3.3. The Global Case

The first operational step in this thesis was writing to non-state actors that have an observatory status at the UNFCCC. In addition to studying the definition of an ‘observatory party’ provided on the UNFCCC website, I chose to apply a questionnaire in order to receive a more qualitative overview through the experiences of these parties at the UNFCCC conferences and to supplement the research with a deeper understanding of how the actual processes involved produce policy outcomes.

The non-state actors selected for the questionnaire are organizations that have been granted observatory status to this date at the UNFCCC, obtained from the UNFCCC website. These organizations are in a unique position to illustrate a valuable insight into the changes that have occurred over time in the UNFCCC, depending on the year of entry of the organization. Keeping 2007 in mind as the benchmark for securitization, I will analyze what impact the link between security and climate change has, or could have, regarding the involvement of non-state actors within climate change policymaking.

The questionnaire covered the nature of participation by the organizations at the UNFCCC, by looking at their access to the meetings; the role state governments played in including or excluding organizations from the debate; opportunities to participate in government decision-making on climate change policies; any changes in government support for their organization (the term ‘support’ can include funding); acknowledgment of credibility / legitimacy, and whether these perceptions had changed over time (see appendix 2.). These introductory questions were followed by two questions that related more specifically to the securitization of climate change: did the NGOs perceive that the discussion of climate change in the UNSC would significantly affect their organization’s involvement in climate change policymaking in the future? And had they already perceived any differences in their organization’s role in climate change conferences due to the securitization of climate change? From these questions I will analyze whether one can observe a *direct* or *indirect* exclusion of non-state actors from climate change policymaking.

### 3.4. Main Findings

Before presenting the main findings one has to take into consideration that the majority of NGOs and non-state actors are from developed countries. The only two respondents that were neither European nor American were from Argentina and Kenya. The cause may be due to what one representative responded to the questionnaire: “meetings are made increasingly in

expensive destinations, to where participants from developing countries cannot attend without financial aid, of course the most affected is the participation of NGOs.”<sup>6</sup> This, seems to support the notion that the exclusion of NGOs from developing countries is inevitable.

Analyzing the responses to the questionnaire I focus on: 1) NGOs activities during the COPs; 2) whether the NGOs had access to negotiations; and 3) whether NGOs were excluded from the negotiations. Researching the three categories will give a clearer picture of NGOs role in the UNFCCC. Beyond this thesis' scope, albeit important for future research, would be an investigation into the extent of the influence on policy decisions from NGO participation.

#### a) Activities

To gather a wider understanding of how non-state actors participate at the UNFCCC I listed the activities described by the majority of non-state actors from the questionnaire.

Table 2. The Activities by Non-State Actors in the UNFCCC:

<b>Activity:</b>	<b>Organization:</b>
Holding side-events	Bellona Foundation; British Council; Ecologic Institute; Greenbelt Movement; The Danish Society of Engineers; Institute of Environmental Studies; The Swedish Environmental Research Institute; Low Carbon Futures; Erklärung von Bern; UNESA
Handing out information-brochures	Swedish Environmental Institute
Meetings and discussions with other NGOs	Cooperate Europe observatory; Institution for Environmental Studies
Observing informal and some formal negotiations	Zoi Environment; UNESA; BGSU; Ecologic Institute; EPOTEC
Commenting on negotiations	Bellona Foundation
Advocating	Ecologic Institute; Greenbelt Movement
Networking purposes	World Future Council

*Source: Questionnaire responses (See appendix 2.).*

**b) Access**

Some respondents stated that they were given the opportunity to provide comments on negotiations;<sup>7</sup> or were allowed to contribute scientific evidence to policy formations;<sup>8</sup> the majority was not invited to closed sessions and the general consensus showed that they had “[o]nly access to informal meetings”.<sup>9</sup> A representative from the NGO Fundacion Agreste, stated that NGOs were generally only interacting or holding debates with other NGOs, which were held separately to those meetings exclusive to government officials.<sup>10</sup> Fundacion Agreste claimed that by having NGOs only as a ‘representative’ at extended meetings, their presence simply serves to “only fulfill the role to legitimize the development of a ‘participative’ strategy”; in other words their real input was not taken into consideration for informative but more for symbolic purposes.<sup>11</sup>

The general perception that one gathers from the responses of most NGOs is that they actually were not welcome to the main international forums. The access to formal side-events however did not encounter any problems. Side-events do not form part of the official decision-making process, and thus only take place at the side of the formal central meetings.<sup>12</sup> Another representative stated that their organization has since 2009 only had access to informal meetings during the COPs.<sup>13</sup> Non-state actors that have a good reputation and especially those NGOs that have a partnership with a particular state government will still be “briefed informally as negotiations proceed”<sup>14</sup>. As mentioned above, this demonstrates that participation also depends on the partnership or relation that a non-state actor has with a particular state government.

The most compelling responses that support the main assumption of this thesis, were provided by those NGOs that pointed out that there had been particular changes in their experience of a shifting attitude towards their participation. The major issues that became apparent regarding the participation of non-state actors within the UNFCCC were from the Copenhagen summit in 2009 (COP15) onwards. From 2009 onwards we witnessed the unprecedented exclusion of some NGOs and observatory organizations. The Copenhagen COP15 became very restrictive towards registered non-state actors, such as civil society groups and NGOs, and made it hardly possible for them to participate or even access the Copenhagen Summit venues.<sup>15</sup>

Excluding observatory parties from the central sessions has made it even more difficult for NGOs to actively engage.<sup>16</sup> The participation and access, as claimed by most respondents, had drastically changed since COP15. A further respondent claimed that up until the Copenhagen Summit the Institution for Environmental Studies was able to participate more than they were

able to do so since COP15.<sup>17</sup> Generally, the accepted participation of NGOs within the UNFCCC conferences had been satisfactory. It has however, not surprisingly, become more difficult since COP15.<sup>18</sup> The accreditation to the climate change conferences is not possible for those who are representative of the wider public.<sup>19</sup> The increase in limited access to NGOs since the Copenhagen summit creates an obstacle to achieving the fundamental goals of NGOs, such as the participation of youth and local communities in climate change policymaking conferences, which would be representative of the wider population affected by climate change.

Not only has the access become increasingly limited and more formal, also the access to the information concerning negotiations has been more restricted as well.<sup>20</sup> Professor Raymond Saner, the Director of Diplomacy-Dialogue, has been attending the climate change conferences since 1998 and has witnessed an evident curtailing of non-state actors within climate change policymaking.<sup>21</sup> Diplomacy-Dialogue observed an *indirect* exclusion from participation in the state itself through reduction in research funds; and by deliberately denying or limiting vital access to climate change policy-related data. There have been further disturbing government strategies evidenced by the exclusion of NGOs from several recent climate change conferences, either through lack of invitations or late invitations, *indirectly* disqualifying their contribution to climate change policymaking.<sup>22</sup>

It must be noted, though, that some NGOs had a more positive perception of the participation and access of non-state actors within the UNFCCC. Several NGO representatives stated that the participation of NGOs has increased due to the pressure of media and the general public in the last years.<sup>23</sup> However, they did not state what they meant by participation and to what levels of access this has led.

### **c) Exclusion from Negotiations**

In accordance with this thesis' argument, a significant number of contacted NGOs stated that they do not think that climate change is a matter for security agencies, but should be discussed among scientists and agencies specializing in environmental issues to achieve more realistic climate change policies.<sup>24</sup> Holding a green theoretical perspective, another respondent supported the notion that climate change issues should not be tackled in a security related arena.<sup>25</sup> Tackling climate change within the Security Council is also believed by the respondents to be counterproductive since a) generally the Security Council participants do not possess the required expertise on environmental issues, and b) the Security Council is less likely to incorporate non-state actors within their policymaking, naturally leading to further



restrictions to non-state actors' access. The result would be the narrowing down of the debate to the national interests of the 'big five'. Consequently, the NGO Diplomacy-Dialogue, for example, has been less willing to invest their efforts and time into the UNFCCC since the advent of the securitization process, and their contrived exclusion from conferences.<sup>26</sup>

The majority of respondents commented on the changes during 2009 at the Copenhagen Summit. Those organizations that had taken part the longest provided some particularly useful information on the changes that have occurred over the past decade. During the 2009 COP in Copenhagen the majority of activists and NGOs were indeed unable to attend the conferences. This was, allegedly, for 'security' reasons to prevent clashes between NGOs and the heads of state governments (Euronews, 2009). Donna Oglesby (2010:20) argues that there were further underlying reasons for excluding the NGOs from participating in the climate change summit. Emily Mulligan, an Australian climate change NGO policy advisor, stated: "Other interests are over represented within the Bella Centre, whereas it seems that those arguing on behalf of the science and our environment are excluded from the process" (Funder and Langhoff, 2009).

Moreover, in the aftermath of COP15 there was substantial discontent about the increased exclusion of civil society. A senior climate change policy adviser from Oxfam stated that the COP15 had revealed that the "traditional approach to international negotiations, based on brinkmanship and national self-interest, is both unfit for pursuing our common destiny and downright dangerous" (Oxfam, 2009). Yet again, state sovereignty appears to remain supreme.

Most NGOs strongly opposed the actions carried out by the UNFCCC reinforcing the impression that the 'golden age' of NGO involvement has passed. Michel Dorsey from the Climate Justice Now Network argued that the UNFCCC is "actively trying to pull countries and peoples movements back into the waste bin of pre-World War times of info-control, totalitarianism and other crude and inhumane forms of suppressing basic 21st century democratic rights and freedoms" (Rizvi, 2009). Several other NGOs argued from a similar standpoint, supporting the notion that there has been a change in the inclusion of civil society within the UNFCCC (Rizvi, 2009). Consequently, this supports the argument that post-2007, NGOs have been given less chance to participate in climate change policymaking. This restricts the decision-making to the authority of powerful states that follow, first and foremost, their evident agenda of maintaining their national interests as the supreme task.

Nevertheless, during both the early 2012 and the current climate change talks pre- Rio+20 there has been a strong resurgence of the involvement of non-state actors and civil society: “For the sake of the planet we urge everyone to free themselves from the veils of egoism, nationalism, and narrow, short-term interests and act with the responsibility you have as trustees of the present and the future generations” (Rio + 20, 2012b). A significant number of members of civil society explicitly expressed their concern that the language applied by governments, emphasizing that the head of the states represents the “peoples of the world”, is rather disingenuous since global climate change forums have increasingly excluded civil society and NGOs in the past few years (Rio+20, 2012b).

### **3.5. Limitations**

Apart from the relatively low number of respondents, there are several other limitations that hinder a generalization from the responses, i.e. the majority of respondents have only obtained observatory status post 2006 (13 NGOs). This means that one cannot make an analysis of the changes that may have taken place pre and post 2007. Moreover, a limitation to the research is the process of securitization itself, as it is still continuously evolving. The transformation and outcome will only become fully clear in the near future. However, the qualitative research is still valuable to demonstrate NGO perceptions of their role in the UNFCCC, and to glean a better understanding of the possible future.

### **3.6. Discussion**

At first instance, the increased inclusion of non-state actors during the 1990s was caused by the introduction of a new scientific issue, i.e. ‘climate change’ into the political arena. Governments previously felt it necessary to draw on the knowledge and views of environmental experts. Definitely, climate change has since undergone a new shift in the past five years, whilst framed as a ‘national security issue’. This has led to this thesis’ expectation that a security perspective logically demands a more state-centric solution to safeguard national interests from the possible menace of climate change. Surely, this begs the questions whether NGOs matter in a world still ruled by sovereign states that prioritize their national interests; and whether NGOs only constitute a strategic and symbolic cog for state actors (Raustalia, 2001:115).

The above research aims at testing the hypothesis that the more climate change is securitized, the more likely non-state actors will be excluded from climate change policymaking. Actually, the findings show that the expectations can, to a certain extent, be confirmed. The

securitization of climate change has evidently been applied on a global level, and according to the results from the questionnaire, there has been a generally negative perception of NGO participation on a global level since 2009.

Despite the generally positive perception regarding the inclusion of NGOs in environmental policymaking, it is disappointing though to find that they are not always welcomed in climate change negotiations. This deliberately, or *indirectly*, restricts their contribution to climate change policymaking, which is most visible through the control of their access and procedures of participation. Therefore granting NGOs 'observatory status' does certainly not permit them anything near the powerful role that the states play within the formal decision-making process.

Besides, the relationship between non-state actors and states in the UNFCCC can be argued to be a one-way relationship, where states choose to acquire input from NGOs according to their political agenda. It is thus expected that states will remain the main actors in the international system and therefore the vision that we hold from the mid-1990s apparently does not constitute more "than a minor affair with a minor mistress" (Anderson and Rieff, 2005:36).

All in all, in relation to the results of my questionnaire, I would contend that one cannot link the change in non-state actor's participation within the UNFCCC solely to the securitization of climate change. A *direct* link would imply that there has been a complete exclusion of NGOs from the exact moment of securitization in 2007. However, the questionnaire and especially the qualitative methods do not possess the capacity to empirically demonstrate that the exclusion of some of the NGOs is solely due to how the subject is framed.

The findings do show, however that it is a more gradual and *indirect* process. This can range from withholding invitations to NGOs to climate change policy discussions; sending the invitations very late so that in practice NGOs are disqualified from registering; the softening-up of NGOs by inviting them into the government's underbelly so that they will compromise their advocacy; and termination of government funding; while at the same time giving the impression that NGOs are welcome to participate (but in the castrated form of observers). All these observations point into the direction of an *indirect* strategy to their exclusion.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### State centralized securitization of climate change versus non-state expertise and community activism - Two case studies - USA and Finland.


Having tested the hypothesis on an international level in Chapter (3), this final chapter will apply a comparative design comprising of two different in-depth national case-studies, to test the hypothesis that – the more climate change is securitized, the more likely non-state actors will be excluded from the debate on combating climate change issues. However first, this chapter will apply text-analysis to establish the case-selection, justified by the variation of the independent variable (securitized or not securitized). Media analysis will embody a suitable text-analysis tool.

Of course, this thesis does not deny that there are severe implications caused by climate change, and certainly welcomes the increased attention for this global issue. Nevertheless, the increased coverage of climate change in traditional security institutions (Security Council; NATO; national security and defense forums) may most probably lead to spin-offs in other areas. As Joanna Lewis (2011:12) has noted, framing climate change as a purely national security issue is controversial since it raises the level of urgency, leading to the militarization of climate change “at the expense of cooperation”.

#### 4.1. Justifying the case-selection

The main indicator for choosing the two case-studies was based on the results of processing the search terms ‘climate change’ and ‘national security’ into the FACTIVA search-database. This listed the number of countries covering the issue from 1990 to 2012. The findings from the text-analysis in Chapter Three have demonstrated that securitization has for the most part taken place in Western countries. Hence, I have chosen two Western countries with fundamentally opposite approaches. Based on the variation of the independent variable, the United States was selected as the country that frames climate change as a national security problem, while Finland was chosen as the contrasting case (See graph below).

Graph 4: Media Reports Listed According to Countries:



The case-studies below will analyze the role of NGOs in national climate change policymaking and test whether there are any incidents that demonstrate non-state actor exclusion. The case-studies were selected to serve as a test of the validity of this thesis’ hypothesis.

The next section will outline the American and Finnish national climate change policymaking process and will investigate whether in the two opposing case-studies there is an evident difference in the inclusion or exclusion of non-state actors in their policymaking.

#### **4.2. Case-Study (1): The United States of America**

*“If the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.”*

Abraham Maslow quoted in Pumphrey (2008:259).

The Russian saying by Abraham Maslow, quoted above is appropriate to the case of the United States since it stresses how the USA uses a military perspective to solve a diverse range of problems. The American policymakers tend to view issues through a military or security lens manifested in a state-centric perspective on the issue, excluding the role of other actors more adequately suited to the role of climate change policymaking. I commence with

verifying that the securitization of climate change has indeed taken place in the US, by text-analyzing national policy statements.

*a) Framing climate change as security issue:*

American scientists played the leading role in identifying climate change as a scientific issue and advocating the need to react to the phenomena of climate change (Moser, 2007:124). The disastrous results of the hurricane season were hotly debated in relation to climate change (2005), creating high-level attention to the urgency of tackling natural catastrophes and the need for effective climate change policymaking. This was a time of a strong politicization of climate change issues. Political actors made climate change a central issue in the US Congress. By conducting text-analysis it became evident that post- 2006 climate change had, actually been framed as security issue within the US (See appendix 1.).

Foremost, the National Security Strategy of the USA (2006) focused for a considerable part on the national security challenges accompanied by climate change. Particularly the Centre for Naval Analysis (CNA) played an active role in promoting climate change issues as a security matter in 2007. It constituted a group of retired US military experts who declared climate change to be a ‘threat multiplier’ and consequently a major threat to US national security (CNA, 2007). They released a report on the threat of climate change on national security. A strong security discourse was undertaken in relation to the prospect that climate change and “the chaos that results, can be an incubator of civil strife, genocide and the growth of terrorism” (CNA, 2007:22).

In 2008 the US National Intelligence Estimate considered climate change to be a major security issue. Furthermore, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI invested their resources into the analysis of climate change issues, suggesting to take the role of tackling the issue (Mabey, 2009). The USA National Intelligence Council (NIC) followed up these claims and assessed the possible impact on US national interests: “global climate change will have wide-ranging implications for US national security interests over the next 20 years (National Intelligence Council, 2008:4). After this, influential reports followed from the Center for New American Security (CNAS) and other prominent security and defense related bodies (Sherry, 2010).

This duly demonstrates how policymakers and high-profile defense departments more and more started viewing the implications of climate change through a security lens (Briggs and VanDeveer, 2011:141). One major observation to be made here is that the U.S climate change

policymaking shifts constantly from inaction to action, which can be linked to the way the issue is framed and can be dependent on a certain crises that revokes attention to the topic (Bryner, 2008:334). Having established that it is evident that climate change is framed as a security issue post-2006 in the US, the following sections will describe and explain the access and involvement of non-state actors in climate change policymaking in order to further test the validity of the hypothesis.

*b) Non-state actor's inclusion or exclusion of climate change policymaking:*

This section will evaluate whether NGOs are being included or excluded from participating in climate change policymaking in the United States, and in particular, if this has changed after the securitization of climate change, post-2006.

Environmental NGOs in the United States are generally perceived to have a firm standing within the United States and receive generous donations from private foundations (Schreurs, 2002). However, their role within policymaking has arguably decreased. NGOs focused on climate change are seen as 'very left liberal', and as expressed by Potter (2011) - environmental NGOs are accordingly perceived as "green is the new red". This view is accompanied by the increase in framing radical environmental activists as 'terrorists', which has led to increased scrutiny and surveillance of legitimate environmental activists (Vanderheiden, 2008:300).

Furthermore, according to Moser (2007:139) there have been several traditional climate change advocates who have become quieter, or have simply gone out of business. This is accompanied by an increase in mainstream environmental NGOs located in Washington. Mainstream environmental NGOs are however being accused by other smaller NGOs of being too close in collaboration with powerful elites and thus neglecting their true values. This also implies that the U.S. government does not necessarily exclude NGOs from the decision-making process *directly*; it instead is setting up partnerships as a way of controlling them. In this way it may be that "co-operation with target groups will be more effective than confrontation- but politically it may be difficult for some of the NGOs to swallow" this pragmatic compromise (Andresen and Gulbrandsen, 2003:22). This can also lead to an indirect exclusion of smaller NGOs which do not seem interesting or threatening enough for powerful elites.

As mentioned in Chapter (3), it is crucial to acknowledge the difference between the two types of NGOs, which is also of importance on a national level in the USA. These are: 1) The

activist NGOs which rely heavily on membership and public support. Activist NGOs have, if at all, informal contacts with decision-makers. They have some permission to give advice in 'friendly' delegations, and are most likely to advocate their views outside the decision-making forum to enhance their stance on climate change policymaking; 2) Climate change partnership NGOs in contrast enjoy the access to inside information and have the authorization to advise governments. Apparently, they provide their expertise to the government based on a mutual agreement (Andresen and Gulbrandsen, 2003:2 and Oberthür et al., 2002:4).

This distinction is of great importance since this thesis argues that one cannot value the input of partnership NGOs as much as that of independent advocacy NGOs. The latter is unrestricted and independent of the government's agenda. As already mentioned, critics argue that partnership NGOs have 'cheated' on their own traditional values by being in partnerships with the elite power holders (Moser, 2007:136). This thesis stresses this notion because it makes it harder to distinguish between whether NGOs are *actively* being excluded, or whether the increasing number of NGO-government partnerships has led to the claims of activist NGOs falling on deaf ears. The results of the phone-interview indicate below that NGOs carry a fear that by opposing policies this could lead to the silencing of the NGO's interests in the future. NGO partnerships with the state can well imply compromises to the state on climate change decision-making.

As a matter of fact, the U.S. government relies primarily on research by the US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) which involves thirteen federal agencies that scientifically assess the impacts of climate change and thus inform policymakers about their research (The White House). This could, however, be perceived as biased information since it mainly relies on state funded scientists who participate in the climate change policymaking. They tend to ignore the views of non-state actors. Also, the USA national security analysis on the impacts of climate change is based on the reports of the IPCC. The IPCC is one of the principal epistemic communities related to climate change studies, however, as recently documented, the IPCC has been mainly funded by the US. Over the past decade, the IPCC has annually received an average of \$3.1 million dollars from the U.S. government (GAO, 2011). This instance supports the notion of how states can want to control the scientific output in their political favour (Raustiala, 2001:98).

Apparently, there are more political strategies geared towards controlling civil society groups' compliance with the political agenda. For instance, prominent climate change activists Sierra Club and Earth First are part of a long list of organizations and individuals being targeted due



to the threat they are perceived to pose against the United States national interest and its national security. Rising Tide is one of the organizations that the government perceives as threatening, and which is placed under surveillance by the FBI (Eilperin, 2012). Rising Tide is a grassroots organization opposing state sponsored climate change solutions. It promotes community based solutions through education, publishes reports, and holds non-violent protests. In my view it is disturbing, to say the least, that an advocacy organization, who is non-violent in nature and who promotes climate change reduction- a topic affecting a global audience, should be listed as posing a threat to national interests. The labeling of climate change advocates, as a dangerous threat to national interests due to their opposing views to government initiatives is, according to environmentalists, a tactic to actively exclude them from participating in national climate change discussions (Eilperin, 2012).

Schlosberg and Rinfret (2008:265) claim that environmental policies are perceived “as a threat to the imperatives of the state”. When actors other than the state try to play a role in climate change policymaking, this is perceived as a threat to the state’s national interests. This view supports a state-centric approach and is likely to cause the decrease of the non-state actor’s involvement in climate change policymaking. It strongly contradicts a green theorist’s perspective which emphasizes equal significance to all types of actors in approaching global climate change issues in a comprehensive way.

This thesis’s main theoretical assumption - securitization of climate change leads to the exclusion of non-state actors - can also be supported by the following evidence. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) has made confidential their assessment of the impact of climate change on U.S. security. This automatically denies the freedom of information to those most affected, namely, the public and civil society. The former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates granted the implementation of a national defense strategy that focused on preparation for issues caused by climate change. However, this was an unreleased report, not allowing any other actors to discuss the implementation of such decisions (Homeland Security News, 2008).

To establish a deeper understanding of the role of environmental NGOs in the U.S. Federal state government, and to find whether there are any restrictions that could be caused by the securitization of climate change, I conducted an additional semi-structured phone-interview with a senior researcher from the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, a Washington based non-profit organization.<sup>27</sup> The semi-structured phone-interview was carried out with an expert on national policies and environmental regulation. In overcoming the

limitations of my questionnaire I chose to conduct the phone-interview with this expert because she focused her research on emerging trends and issues within climate change policymaking, and so was most relevant to the focuses of this thesis.

The phone-interview contained an open discussion with a few guiding points that mainly focused on whether 1) the organization had received any objection by the Federal state government in their policy suggestions; 2) if there were any changes in the government support towards their organization; 3) whether there were any cuts in funding; and 4) whether the securitization of climate change has had any impact on their organization.

In summary, the phone-interview established that since there is huge discrepancy between Democrats and the Republicans on climate change issues, the NGO “was careful in not taking a strong position in their stance on climate change” because there is “political turmoil” around the climate change policy-debate.<sup>28</sup> Apparently, the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, was very worried about accusations of being partisan. Also, the messaging about climate change had changed over time. This has led to a decrease in the negotiations between the NGO and the government.

The NGO has released one small paper lately as a policy suggestion on carbon-tax. This paper was hardly taken into consideration. Furthermore, the interviewee stated that there has been less funding from the federal government towards their GHG reduction research. The interviewee, nevertheless, perceived the shift towards the security and defense sector as a positive shift because there were no cuts in funding within that sector. The department of Defense remains “heavily funded” compared to funding in other departments.<sup>29</sup>

The most important point established in the discussion with the expert is the evidence of an increase in attendance at environmental conferences by members of the defense sector.<sup>30</sup> This finding opens up a new perspective by shifting focus from examining the inclusion or exclusion of NGOs in the state debate on climate change policymaking, to the acknowledgment that the securitization of climate change has led to security and defense department-members actually now visiting environmental debates. This could be of vital interest for future research that might uncover the motives by security sector-members for attending environmental research related forums.

Furthermore, the central environmental body within the United States is the Environmental Protection Agency. It has the principal responsibility and authority for implementing

environmental regulations and policies in the U.S. EPA aims at clarifying specific, relevant issues, and assist in implementing climate change regulations. Recently, the US government's Office of Management and Budget (2012:43) decided to terminate its grants to the EPA's 'Local Government Climate Change' initiative. The funding was initially for local communities to engage in reducing GHG emissions, sustaining the importance of a bottom-up approach to tackling climate change issues.<sup>31</sup> The government's justification was that the projects' focus was too broad. It was argued that the federal government already has more effective policies for curbing GHG emissions. It has therefore encouraged the concept that future climate change policies should rely only on partnership NGOs.

Observing the arenas that have incorporated climate change policymaking, it becomes apparent that the majority of actors are from non-environmental related backgrounds (See appendix 4.). Shifting climate change to the responsibility of military-actors creates a barrier to NGOs cooperating effectively in the decision-making process on climate change issues. Traditional security issues, which are covered by military actors, make cooperation between military and civil society unlikely (Abiew, 2003:16).

The difference in organizational structure is a major obstacle for cooperation since environmental NGOs are not as hierarchical as military institutions. Also, NGOs are likely to be co-opted into signing a partnership with the government. This may lead to NGOs compromising their impartiality for the sake of the government's political agenda. A further fundamental hindrance to incorporating climate change NGOs into the security arena is due to the very nature of military issues, often being operated as extremely sensitive issues and under secrecy. This nature consequently prevents an open debate on the implementation of the most expedient policies.

Also, by shifting the debate into a different forum that has little knowledge on the actual climate science, it has insufficient environmental awareness to be able to discuss ways of curbing climate change. Ironically, the DoD, which is one of the main actors within the security arena engaged in climate change policymaking, is a major carbon emitter itself, contributing significantly to global warming (Null, 2010:4).

*c) Alternative explanations for NGO inclusion/exclusion:*

While this thesis assumes that the securitization of climate change plays the major role in leading to the exclusion of non-state actors, it does take other explanatory factors into

consideration. Without any doubt, the United States' advanced institutional design creates a further obstacle to non-state actor's involvement. These obstacles are mainly due to the "competition between levels of government, a privileging of the economy, and a limited conception of the public good" (Bomberg and Schlosberg, 2008:344).

These hindrances may also be caused by conflicting political attitudes between The Republicans and Democrats on climate change policies (Purvis, 2012:14). As is widely known, the Bush administration has rejected signing the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. The Republican Party generally rejected climate science as a whole. This has led to denying those actions by the EPA that might be supportive of the notions formulated in the Kyoto Protocol (Schreurs, 2002). However, there has since been a considerable change in attitude by the Republican Party regarding climate change policies. The Republicans have at last accepted the existence of climate change and are formulating their own climate change policies, basically using a nationalist sovereign perspective, finding support from those against a global governance approach on tackling climate change issues (Oglesby, 2010:29). A statement by Bryner (2008) is worthy of note here. He claims that there was a noticeable alteration in climate change politics by the end of 2007 and that both major parties of Congress have introduced "aggressive climate change bills" (Bryner, 2008:333). Climate change activists now face difficult challenges in the wake of the American power struggle. The independent journalist Will Potter (2011) even stresses that the United States is engaged in underhand measures similar to the COINTELPRO tactics during their communist years, namely, the constant surveillance of selected groups, but today it is climate change activists under suspicion.

*d) Discussion:*

The main expectation was that framing climate change as a national security issue would lead to the exclusion of non-state actors from climate change policymaking. The findings primarily show, as already established in Chapter (3), the exclusion of non-state actors is accomplished as an *indirect* process. This implies that by shifting the climate change policymaking into the security arena, it automatically excludes non-state actors from the decision-making process. This is because the security sector, by nature, deals with issues that are being perceived as highly sensitive national and international issues. Consistent with a state-centric theoretical perception, this means that climate change policymaking will increasingly be categorized as 'high politics' and will not include any actors apart from government actors (Estabrooks, 2008:23; Willetts, 1996:1). Secondly, the *indirect* exclusion only occurs through symbolically

including NGOs, so that they will abandon their advocacy. This also occurs by means of the termination of government funding; and covert harassment of non-state activists.

The findings of the American case's analysis reveal that NGOs which have a differing agenda to the government could possibly constitute a threat to the government's interests and are thus not included. It is noteworthy how over the years there have been a considerable amount of partnerships formed between the government and NGOs. Those NGOs aligned with the government, enjoy funding, as they work more closely with government elites. Also, Newell (2000:132) states that NGOs appreciate working with the government since they attain a higher degree of access, even though their motives may change their original values.

The analysis has shown that the US approach towards climate change does not comply with a global environmental governance perspective, but rather prefers a state-centric perspective. It is a fascinating paradox that although climate change is of global concern, constituting one of the main problems necessitating international cooperation, it instead generates the very opposite - national focused policies (Briggs and VanDeveer, 2011:148). This observation supports the concept that a state-centric approach will not change unless one moves away from the security nexus and interprets climate change policymaking with the mindset of green theorists. Moving away from this security link is in line with this thesis' argument - only feasible if climate change is re-framed

What's more, given that this thesis followed a deductive model, testing a theoretical assumption to find observations that confirm the theory, I was aware of the possibility that I would encounter a disparity between my expectations and the observations made. As established above, one factor which impairs the relationship between NGOs and the government on policymaking is the political nature of the dominant party at the time of policymaking.

The change of the US administration in 2001 from the Democratic Party to the Republicans has presented a vast decrease in the access given to NGOs in climate change negotiations. Environmental NGOs no longer enjoyed the privileges they had received under the Clinton Administration (Andresen and Gulbrandsen, 2003:8). This observation implies that the securitization of climate change is not the only major factor in including or excluding NGOs from climate change policymaking. When the Democrats were back in power there was no strong exclusion of NGOs per se, however, as mentioned earlier, NGOs were excluded *indirectly* due to an obvious change in arena.

To conclude, there has not been found a clear-cut pattern of inclusion and exclusion of non-state actors before and after 2007. Surely, observing the trend in environmental NGO involvement in the United States can only be limited as climate change has only very recently been accepted as a 'man-made' issue. In general, climate change policies did not constitute a priority for the US government until the last decade. However, the findings do validate the hypothesis that framing climate change as a security issue *indirectly* excludes NGOs from the decision-making process because the arena that tackles the climate change issues has shifted from the environmental and political spheres towards the security sector.

### **4.3. Case-Study (2): Finland**

#### *a) Climate change discourse in Finland:*

As the media-analysis has presented, Finland has hardly at all framed climate change as a national security issue, unlike the United States. Instead, the climate change issues in Finland are framed in non-securitized terms, and therefore the discourse in policy statements and media is more scientific and politically engaging.

Evaluating the results from the FACTIVA media analysis, demonstrated that there were very few reports for Finland framing climate change as a national security issue. Looking at the Finnish Security and Defense Policy in 2009, it did however mention the implications of climate change on scarcity of resources, which, as highlighted in the reports, do not automatically amount to national security threats to Finland (Finnish Security and Defense Policy, 2009:9). Analyzing the Finnish discourse, the security-climate nexus is not strong, particularly when compared to other European countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany, whose rhetoric further strongly emphasizes the security implications of climate change. The Security and Defense Policy (2009:55) does however suggest that the decrease in natural resources within the Arctic region *may* have implications on future security policies of Nordic countries.

The following section will outline how the lack of securitization of climate change enables the possibility for Finnish non-state actors to actively engage in national and global climate change policymaking.

#### *b) The inclusion of climate change non-state actors:*

Finland's political system consists of a parliamentary democracy. The parliamentary system has divided its power between the president and the prime minister. The president's role lies

in directing national security and responsibility in foreign affairs. The prime minister carries the primary responsibility in all the other governmental areas. Finland's average temperatures are expected to rise more than the world's average temperature. To minimize the implications of this, the Government actively participates in events related to curbing emissions (Finnish Environment Institute,2011). In comparison to other states, Finland's emissions are relatively small. Nonetheless, it aims at reducing its energy consumption considerably.

Finland, as opposed to the United States, was one of the 192 parties ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. It strongly supports the urgency in curbing climate change. Its viewpoints on climate change, and the inclusion of NGOs is positive and values the participation of NGOs not only in the global Climate Change regime, but also domestically. In this regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly stated that environmental NGOs play a powerful part in negotiations and decision-making on new policy implementations (Nummelin,2009).

Generally, Finland strongly supports the idea of a multilateral and multidimensional system to combat climate change impacts on an international level (Security and Defense Policy, 2009:89). The analysis of Finnish climate change policies and their environmental strategy demonstrates that their attitude towards climate change policymaking on an international level is in accordance with a global governance perspective and more precisely follows similar motivations as those by green theorists who strongly argue for an international cooperative framework involving diverse actors.

In contrast to the United States, Finland strongly supports the idea of a de-centralized decision-making process, which would enhance the quality of decision-making. In Finland, this involves the role of NGOs, who receive considerable support for their influence. This is to create a multidimensional framework encompassing non-state actors in the decision-making process.

Nummelin (2009) also states that one of the main benefits of NGOs is their ability to raise awareness on climate change issues. The Finnish government systematically encourages climate change NGOs to be involved in a dialogue with the Ministry on climate change issues in particular, and their knowledge and research are also utilized in the formation of climate change policies (Nummelin,2009). The decision-making power lies with the government; however, the preparation of the climate change policies is shared between many different actors and ministries. The ministry of foreign affairs is however responsible for the international climate change policymaking in regard to the financing of adaption plans in

developing countries; and assists in preparing actions that need to be taken in developing countries (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The following four Ministries play a crucial role within the climate change debate: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of the Environment; Ministry of Employment and the Economy; and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. They all play a pivotal role in preparing the Finnish stand on climate change issues, the targets, and their stance on emission trading within the European Union (Prime Minister's Office Publications, 2009:150).

Not surprisingly, Finland doesn't only tackle climate change issues nationally, but also engages in for instance supporting the Pacific Islands, and the Caribbean, in combating climate change issues (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). This confirms that they do not have a state-centric attitude to tackling climate change issues, preferring to openly share their knowledge with other countries in achieving cooperatively solutions to climate change issue.

Finland greatly values the role of local communities in decision-making, and perceives them as an important actor in curbing climate change. Neuvonen, a member of the Demos Helsinki think tank, stressed the value of civil society and local communities (Prime Minister's Office, 2008). He argued that top-down legislation does not work in a modern society; people are far more willing to act if there are local initiatives engaging the people to behave environmentally friendly. This demonstrates that because the climate issue is not framed as a security issue, it enables a more bottom-up approach to tackling the issues, and welcomes a multidimensional approach in accordance with a green theory perspective. The report promoted the idea of engaging politicians, civil society, media, the private sector and the government to play an important role in raising awareness. It was especially stressed that a 'yes we can' attitude will motivate the public to adapt to an environmental friendly lifestyle (Prime Minister's Office, 2008). As a matter of fact, these results were incorporated in the negotiations on the government's foresight report on climate and energy policy.

Intensive cooperation between the Finnish government and civil society has a long history of cooperation. Finland in general stresses the significance of the role of actors traditionally outside of the governmental framework. Thus, climate change NGOs plays a key role in Finland's climate change policy implementation. The government relies on the insights that are provided by NGOs, and consequently NGOs and the government are working together closely. NGOs are particularly valued in Finland because they are perceived as representing the interests of the general public.



The Finns strongly believe that climate change policy is enhanced through these forms of cooperation (Finnish Ministry of the Environment, 2012). The Ministry of the Environment works the closest with the NGOs and prepares the national position for climate change conferences on both a national and international level (such as for the UNFCCC). The Climate Forum, for example, constitutes a good practical example of a body that succeeds in merging the roles of different actors and presents the results to the Ministry of Environment. It researches both background studies on climate change and creates public awareness schemes. The Climate Forum consists of: ministries, government departments, local communities, the private sector, and NGOs (Finnish Ministry of the Environment, 2012).

Traditionally, Finland has always supported the role of NGOs both nationally and on a global scale. Some environmental NGOs have therefore been also selected to work in partnership with the government. The partnerships consisted of providing NGOs with long term support, and in return, the NGOs had to meet particular criteria (ECOSOC, 2008). As mentioned above, with regards to the United States, this may limit NGOs impartiality and might lead to them having to make compromises in relation to their goals. As was noted above, in Finland these partnerships were built up on the notion to cooperatively increase the climate policy objectives and promote sustainability. The role of NGOs has increasingly shifted from merely being knowledge providers to having an influential position in policymaking, giving advice, and assessing the effectiveness of climate change policies.

Finland's involvement in supporting civil society can be illustrated by their close cooperation with NGOs and civil society on the global development agenda (ECOSOC, 2008). This provides a general perception of the Finnish position on non-state actor's importance. Finland regularly engages with the civil society and has for instance also invited NGO representatives to join international conferences on behalf of the Finnish delegation.

A further example of Finland's dedication to hand power in decision-making to non-state actors such as NGOs and civil society, is through the set up of the Citizens' Global Platform (CGP) which focuses on the incorporation of civil society in climate change policymaking (ECOSOC, 2008). This initiative is arranged to give unheard citizens a voice on problems that have an effect on a global scope. Finland's plan for post-Kyoto is to introduce a more multidimensional mechanism to include civil society and NGOs in accordance with a multidimensional governance perspective (ECOSOC, 2008). Hence, Finland's approach towards tackling climate change issues presents a 'holistic' approach incorporating all types

of actors that jointly represent the voices of the wider population (Lammi and Tynkkynen,2001).

c) *Discussion:*

Compared to the US, Finland's position on the role of NGOs within climate change policymaking, is definitely more straightforward and lucid: curbing climate change cannot be achieved by the central government alone. Analyzing the literature it becomes evident that an all-embracing multidimensional approach, involving all the various actors, can be regarded as the most fruitful approach in combating the climate change both nationally and internationally. This strategy enables both civil society and the government to optimize the utilization of available knowledge and resources. Finland sees the quintessential need for civil society and NGOs to raise the awareness within the public to challenge the warming of the planet.

The Finnish case-study demonstrates that there are no obvious restraints on NGOs participating in climate change policymaking. To be sure, the very opposite is apparent. Both civil society and NGOs are heartily welcomed in the debate. The test-hypothesis states that *the more climate change is securitized, the more non-state actors are likely to be excluded from climate change policymaking*. Alternatively, this would imply that *the less climate change is securitized, the less non-state actors are excluded from climate change policymaking*. The latter version presents congruence between the theoretical assumptions and the observations of the Finnish case study and would make the hypothesis valid. However, the weaknesses of this finding is that a single case-study does not carry enough strength to make an all-encompassing generalization that all those states which have securitized climate change are excluding non-state actors from their climate change policymaking. Although as highlighted above, this key insight is in accordance with this thesis' theory, supporting the notion that because security issues are treated within a state-centric manner, this would naturally exclude non-state actors, such as NGOs and civil society, from the decision-making debate.

## CONCLUSION

In the introduction to this thesis the question was raised to what extent framing climate change as a security issue affects the participation of environmental non-state actors in climate change policymaking. On basis of this thesis' theoretical assumption that securitization of climate change leads to the exclusion of non-state actors, I conducted extensive research into whether environmental non-state actors are being excluded from climate change policymaking. The analysis of the securitization of climate change as the independent variable contributed towards improving our understanding on how framing an issue in terms of security may indeed have influence on the degree to which NGOs are excluded or included in global or national climate change policymaking.

The key international and national findings were, generally, congruent with my expectations. Nevertheless, a causal link to the securitization of climate change may not solely be based on these observations. Surely, this doesn't imply that there is no causation at all. It, however, means that other factors are also playing a role within the inclusion or exclusion of non-state actors. In the UNFCCC's case, the sheer size of the negotiations had a significant role in the exclusion of non-state actors. In the USA case-study, another factor which came up during my research was the political system itself. Another major factor has also been established, namely the distinction between partnership and advocacy NGOs, which have influence on whether NGOs have the opportunity to participate in climate change negotiations.

According to the theoretical framework on which this thesis was based,, a stark contrast between the two case-studies regarding their exclusion or inclusion of non-state actors in national and international climate change policymaking would be expected. The UNFCCC case findings have indicated an increase of *indirect* exclusion of non-state actors, by giving NGOs no more than a symbolic position in climate change talks. The Finnish case presents a strong compatibility with green theorists' ideas and values and supports the notion of an international multidimensional framework. As I found, the United States presents an *indirect* exclusion of non-state actors by shifting climate change issues into the security arena, which is congruent with the state-centric approach. The security sector, by its very nature, deals with issues that are perceived as highly sensitive national and international issues.

From these findings it can be conceived that climate change is gradually being tackled in different arenas than before: from environmentally focused organizations into nowadays the defense and security arena. This observation confirms this thesis' expectation that the alarmist

rhetoric on climate change can indeed lead to a schism between non-state actors and policymakers. This also indicates that shifting climate change issues into a security arena on an international level, such as the Security Council, will automatically reduce NGO involvement, consequently diminishing the number of actors involved in climate change policymaking to a few powerful states.

With the Rio+20 (2012a) coming up, non-state actors are already assembling to discuss their particular role and their participation within the decision-making process. This may optimistically lead to a rise of civil society again, achieving the same levels of acknowledgement they received previously during the 1990s. This research is therefore of significance in the build-up to Rio+20, 2012, since it stresses the need to incorporate diverse actors to solve a global transnational concern, hence demanding an alternative to exclusively state-centric approaches.

More generally speaking, the results of this thesis suggest that a different discourse on climate change can be more fruitful in combating the climate change issues within national and global debates. This thesis illustrates that by framing climate change in non-securitized terms, it will foster a multidimensional approach that promotes a bottom-up approach to the fundamental problems of climate change, which is more in accord to 'green-political' thinking. Actually, this claim is congruent with the observations made in the Finnish case-study.

In sum, finding global and local solutions to a global world that has been impacted by climate change definitely demands a multidimensional approach that bears a range of actors that provide diverse tools of power and knowledge. The current climate change policymaking approach on both the international and the national level has not produced any major successes yet, and therefore strongly necessitates appropriate combinations from instruments of power, from both state and non-state actors.

Framing climate change issues in terms of security may certainly have brought the issue forward and raised its urgency, but it seems this tactic is eventually counterproductive. This thesis concludes that increased non-state actor participation strengthens climate change policymaking and therefore supports the notion to re-frame, and thus de-securitize, the climate change issue, in order to bring it back to a different arena that incorporates diverse actors on many different levels. This would motivate a more positive strategy and promote more preventative tactics rather than solely looking at the security implications that climate change can have on national interests.

The central recommendation of this thesis is that one needs to frame climate change in a way that is solution-oriented and incorporates a global perspective based on the values enshrined in green theory. Climate change should, therefore, increasingly be framed in terms of the global and regional socio-economic and environmental concerns that demand a more multidimensional approach, which is compatible with green theory.

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### Notes

[1] The UNFCCC is the most representative body as a case-study for the global level since it is the official organization established to create a cooperative framework to limit greenhouse-gas emissions and reduce the impact of climate change. To achieve greater global cooperation the UNFCCC introduced the Kyoto Protocol. The UNFCCC has 195 parties involved in negotiating a procedure for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, post-2012.

[2] I will generally apply the term 'civil society' or 'NGO' but may make references to other terms ('non-state actor' and 'epistemic community').

[3] Wangari Maathai, 2009. Nobel Peace Laureate, 15<sup>th</sup> December, Copenhagen.

[4] UNFCCC, Article 4.1

[5] UNFCCC, Article 7.6

[6] Questionnaire, Official, *Fundacion Agreste*, Argentina, 02/05/2012

[7] Questionnaire, Svend Soyland, Senior Advisor on International Climate, *Bellona Foundation*, Norway, 25/04/2012

[8] Questionnaire, Jen Cross, PA to the Director, *Low Carbon Futures*, UK, 24/04/2012

[9] Questionnaire, Christine Eberlein, Official, *Erklärung von Bern*, Switzerland, 24/04/2012

[10] Questionnaire, Official, *Fundacion Agreste*, Argentina, 02/05/2012

[11] Ibid.

[12] Questionnaire, Mike Koefman, Official, *Planet Hydrogen*, UK, 24/04/2012

- [13] Questionnaire, Katarina Buhr, Official, *The Swedish Environmental Research Institute*, Sweden, 23/04/2012
- [14] Questionnaire, Svend Soyland, Senior Advisor on International Climate, *Bellona Foundation*, Norway, 25/04/2012
- [15] Questionnaire, Belen Balanya, Official, *Corporate Europe Observatory*, Belgium, 28/04/2012
- [16] Questionnaire, Sarah Ahmed, Official, *World Future Council*, 04/05/2012; and Otto Simonett, Official, *Zoi Environment*, Switzerland, 24/04/2012
- [17] Questionnaire, Laurens Bouwer, Official, *The Institution for Environmental Studies*, Netherlands, 25/04/2012
- [18] Questionnaire, Michael Mehling, President, *Ecologic Institute*, USA, 23/04/2012
- [19] Questionnaire, Sarah Ahmed, Official, *World Future Council*, 04/05/2012
- [20] Questionnaire, Andrew P. Kroglund, Director of Information and Policy, *Utviklingsfondet*, Norway, 25/04/2012
- [21] Questionnaire, Prof. Raymond Saner, Director, *Diplomacy-Dialogue*, Switzerland, 21/05/2012
- [22] Ibid.
- [23] Questionnaire, Dr. Ebenhack, President, *Ahead Energy*, USA, 24/04/2012; and Christina Rivero, Official, *UNESA*, Spain, 23/04/2012
- [24] Questionnaire, Alan Reed, Official, *EPOTE*, USA, 24/04/2012
- [25] Questionnaire, Rémi Gruet, Senior Advisor on Climate & Environment, *The European Wind Energy Association*, Belgium, 23/04/2012
- [26] Questionnaire, Prof. Raymond Saner, Director, *Diplomacy-Dialogue*, Switzerland, 21/05/2012
- [27] Phone-Interview, Sara Hayes, Senior Researcher, American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, USA, 09/05/2012

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] The initiative focused on projects such as making buildings more energy efficient, supporting local initiatives, and using land more effectively.

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**Appendix**

- 1) To find the following reports; policy statements; speeches etc. I inserted the key words: *climate change; security, national security, international security*, in search engines and databases such as: JSTOR, Google, UN Reports Homepage, FACTIVA.

**1.1. (Table 3) Non-securitized discourse on Climate Change**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Event / Source</b>	<b>Climate change discussed within political and science related forums:</b>
<b>1988</b>	IPCC	Called on political arena (35 Countries) to find mechanisms to cope with the consequences of Climate Change – Creation of IPCC. Combining scientific experts (epistemic community) and politics.
<b>1992</b>	Earth Summit Rio de Janeiro	178 Countries gathered to discuss environmental problems such as climate change. This resulted in the United Nations Framework on Climate Change.
<b>1995</b>	Second IPCC Report	Climate change was only referred to as causing economic, social and environmental problems. There was no mentioning of a security threat yet.
<b>1997</b>	Kyoto Protocol	Legal obligation for industrial countries to cut their carbon emissions.
<b>2000</b>	Kofi Annan’s statement at the United Nations Environment Program	Drawing on the interdependence of all nation states to combat climate change
<b>2001</b>	Third IPCC Report	Presenting more evidence on attributing climate change to human activities
<b>2005</b>	a) Kyoto Treaty b) G8 -Gleneagles Summit July 6-8	a) Put into effect, US did not sign b) The UK put forward the need to tackle climate change within the political arena. The G8 committed their support to improve global warming
<b>2006</b>	a) Al Gore’s ‘Inconvenient Truth’ documentary b) G8 + 5 Legislator’s Forum, Brussel	a) Documentary encouraging action towards combating climate change b) Environment and climate change debate that involved: states, business and NGOs which made the forum a truly multi-stakeholder process
<b>2007</b>	Bali Road Map	Political negotiations on a new climate change treaty

**1.2. (Table 4) Climate change –Security discourse:**

Year	Where/Event/Occasion	Statements (speech acts) linking Climate Change to the security realm
2002	UNFCCC conference Bonn, German Federal Ministry for Environment; Ministry of Development; Foreign Affairs	Climate change was for the first time mentioned as a threat and the risk of conflict was increasingly more likely to be induced by climate change
2004	a) Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission  b) Secretary General during High-level panel on threats, challenges and change	a) Climate change – “the real threat to global peace”  b) Referred to security threats increased through climate change and environmental degradation
2006	a) Professor Alan Dupont – Senior Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy  b) Symposium on Sustainable Development and Security at the European Parliament on May 31 (IES)  c) Conference on Greening Foreign and Security Policy: The Role of the European Parliament, Brussels, December 6. Including speeches amongst others from e.g.: <i>The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Germany; The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency; Crisis Group International; Institute for Environmental Security; Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; Member of EP Foreign Affairs Committee, EP Subcommittee on Security and Defense, and NATO Parliamentary Assembly; Public diplomacy Division, NATO Headquarters; Defense Advisor, US Mission to the European Union; Project Manager,</i>	a) International insecurity through climate change; focus shouldn't only be on the implications of climate change on economic or environmental issues but also on the implications on security; He recommended that the Australian Intelligence Community to focus on climate change issues and classify it as a security challenge.  b) The symposium was aimed at raising Climate change and its related issues into the European Union's existing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but also to form it as part of the European Security Strategy.  c) This Conference discussed and laid out the links between security and climate change

	<i>UNDP; Head of Office, UNEP; Director Environmental Affairs, Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI; UK Military Representative to NATO &amp; EU; Specialist Peace and Disarmament, Green/EFA Group European Parliament</i>	
<b>2007</b>	<p>a) Fourth IPCC Assessment Report on Climate Change</p> <p>b) British Foreign Secretary Margaret Becket, UN Security Council</p> <p>c) Rt. Hon. David Miliband MP, Foreign Secretary, Chatham House Speech, July 19</p> <p>d) Rt. Hon. David Miliband MP, Foreign Secretary, College of Europe Speech, Bruges, November 15</p> <p>e) Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security (OSCE), November 30</p> <p>f) United Nations Security Council; Report SC/9000</p> <p>g) UNDP – Human Development Report (HDR)</p> <p>h) CNA Report: National Security and Threat of Climate Change , April 17</p>	<p>a) Climate change was linked to <i>vulnerability</i> and <i>conflict</i>.</p> <p>b) ”Climate change is a core issue for the European Union’s foreign and <i>security</i> policy”...“climate change is a <i>serious threat</i> to international security so achieving <i>climate security</i> must be at the core of foreign policy”.</p> <p>c) “Our <i>security</i> relies on tackling instability and injustice at home and abroad. It requires cooperation with countries on terrorism, migration and organized crime. It requires collective action on the great existential threats, from nuclear proliferation to climate change.”... “focus on addressing one of the greatest threats to our future prosperity and security: climate change.”</p> <p>d) “Energy insecurity and climate change which threatens our security as well as our prosperity“,“climate change threaten to create a scramble for resources. And rogue states and failing states risk sparking conflicts, the damage of which will spill over into Europe.”</p> <p>e) OSCE identified climate change as an enactor of conflict and insecurity.</p> <p>f) First time that climate change was officially debated as a security issue within the UN Security Council; over 50 statements by different countries; but also exposed deep divisions on the linkage; the climate change debate was convened by Britain</p> <p>g) Focused on the consequences of climate change on human security</p> <p>h) Military think tank report on climate change leading to failed states, wars, political instability and insecurity and</p>

	<p>how it may affect US national security and US military. Military officers and US Security consultants frame climate change as a “threat multiplier” that may trigger violent conflicts. It also refers to the possible increase of terrorism due to climate change</p> <p>i) Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 8</p> <p>j) Joint Paper by the EC and High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana , June</p> <p>k) US Climate Change and National Security Conference, Chapel Hill, March</p> <p>l) Senator Hagel and Senator Feinstein introduced the bipartisan “Global Climate Change Security Oversight Act”</p> <p>m) Sixty-first Session of the United Nations General Assembly - Statement by H.E. Ambassador Joao Salgueiro, Permanent Representative of Portugal to the UN, on behalf of the EU, August 1</p>	<p>i) Argued that climate change conflict could lead to the end of globalization</p> <p>j) Focused on international security and climate change</p> <p>k) Focused on the national security implications of climate change</p> <p>l) Argues that climate change issues are a clear and serious danger to US security.</p> <p>m) Climate change was described as a global challenge and as a international security issue</p>
<b>2008</b>	<p>a) The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</p> <p>b) World Bank workshop on Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Washington DC, March 5–6</p> <p>c) EU foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana at the European Council, March 11</p> <p>d) US National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030, June 25</p> <p>e) Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, March 14</p> <p>f) Follow up with recommendations of Javier Solana to High Representative and European Commission Report, December 18</p>	<p>a) Climate change is to be regarded as an international security issue. That leads to “increased social tension and political conflict” (UNHCR, 2008:3).</p> <p>b) Links climate change to armed conflict.</p> <p>c) Warned that Europe must be prepared for resource wars and waves of climate change refugees.</p> <p>d) Climate change is argued here to have “wide-ranging implications for US national security interests”.</p> <p>e) Recognizes the climate change – security link and states that it is a “threat-multiplier” it thus calls for a comprehensive policy response.</p> <p>f) International security and climate change</p>
<b>2009</b>	<p>a) UN General Assembly Resolution A/63/281</p>	<p>a) Motivated by EU Member States and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS), they request all UN bodies to</p>

	<p>b) UNFCCC COP Poznan and Copenhagen</p> <p>c) Security Implications of Climate Change, OSCE Region Chairmanship Conference Bucharest, October 5</p> <p>d) Environment, Climate Change and Security –Facing the Challenges – EU Presidency Conference, October 14-15, Stockholm Sweden. Initiated by the Swedish Defence Research agency (FOI)</p> <p>e) The Cabinet Office, UK 2009</p> <p>f) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) speech by Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen; Speech at Copenhagen Climate Summit</p> <p>g) Sixty-Fourth Session, Follow up outcome of the Millenium Summit, Report by the UN Secreatry-General. September, 11</p> <p>h) COP 15 UNFCCC Copenhagen Climate Summit, Plenary meeting</p>	<p>address climate change issues and the threat of global climate change.</p> <p>b) Side events were held at both summits that discussed the threat of climate change to international security</p> <p>c) Focused on regional scenarios that presented security issues produced by climate change.</p> <p>d) The Climate change and security link was discussed by a wide international audience.</p> <p>e) The national security strategy stated that climate change is a major factor for insecurity. Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office support this notion. Which underscores the securitization of climate change.</p> <p>f) Stated that climate change constituted one of the international security issues.</p> <p>g) Climate change was referred to in terms of a possible security threat.</p> <p>h) "Climate change is a real, growing and burning issue. It affects our security and our economies."</p>
<b>2010</b>	?	?
<b>2011</b>	<p>a) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon at the UN Security Council Meeting, SC/10457</p> <p>b) UN Security Council Statement SC/10332</p> <p>c) Speech by Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary UNFCCC, Madrid, February 15</p> <p>d) German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin: Climate diplomacy in perspective: from early warning to early action, October 11<sup>th</sup></p>	<p>a) "Climate change is a real threat to international peace and security"</p> <p>b) Discussed climate change creating conflicts</p> <p>c) Addressed how climate change is linked to security issues</p> <p>d) Addressed the security implications of climate change and they "stressed the importance of enhancing the dialogue on climate change and security" (p.1.)</p>
<b>2012</b>	<p>a) The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, New York, Guide by Melissa Gillis</p>	<p>a) Within this military report on nuclear weapons, it was claimed that climate change was referred to as a 'contemporary threat' that could not be</p>

	<p>b) Edward Davey, Secretary of state, energy and climate change. Speech at “Climate and Resource Security Dialogue for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” Conference. London, March 22<sup>nd</sup></p>	<p>addressed by nuclear weapons. Instead governmental resources should aim at developing ways to combat e.g. climate change. Incorporating climate change in a military debater regarding arms, demonstrates how enshrined climate change has become in the security discourse.</p> <p>b) Discussed climate change from a diplomatic perspective and pointed at the threat multiplier that climate change presents and its effects on international security.</p>
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(Table 2: Securitization of Climate Change debate)

**2) Questionnaire:**

1. What year did you first attend the UNFCCC conferences?
2. In which ways, if any, does your organization participate in UNFCCC conferences? How, if at all, has this changed over time?
3. How would you characterize your organization’s access to UNFCCC meetings (i.e., formal or informal meetings, closed sessions of subsidiary bodies, bodies dealing with political or security sensitive matters)? How, if at all, has this changed over time?
4. What role, if any, do state governments play in including / excluding your organization from the climate change debate? Has there been any objection, by a member-state, towards the participation of your organization within climate change conferences? If so which state and in which conference was this the case? How, if at all, has this changed over time?
5. To what extent, if any, has your organization experienced changes to government support for your organization with regard to climate change advocacy? (Support can include funding; acknowledgment of credibility / legitimacy; being given the opportunity to participate in government decision making on climate change policies).
6. In which ways, if any, will discussing climate change in the UN Security Council affect your organization’s involvement in climate change policy making the future?
7. Have you perceived any differences in your organizations participation and role in Climate change conferences due to the securitization of climate change (around the year 2007)?

**Thank you for your kind cooperation!**

**2.1. Answers to Questionnaire:**

<b>Observatory Organization at UNFCCC</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Question 1:</b>	<b>Question 2: .</b>	<b>Question 3:</b>	<b>Question 4:</b>
Ahead Energy (Dr. MJ Ebenhack) President and CEO	USA	Nairobi, 2006	We have sent delegates to the major conferences	No change over time; there is lots to learn at these meetings.	No change over time; state governments play no role in including or excluding our organization.
Bellona Foundation (Svend Soyland) Senior Advisor, International Climate	Norway	The Rio Conference, COP 8, 2000	At COP 13 in Bali we mainly commented on the negotiations and our founder sat in panels on several side-events. At COP 14 in Poznan information stand and held side-event on Carbon Negative Solutions. At COP 15 in Copenhagen we established a new tradition with the Bellona Solutions Room were we organize our own series of side-events. Connections to all major negotiating teams, BINGO and their members and relevant UN entities such as UNIDO, UNDP, IEA and IMO.K3	We have access in the same manner as any other observer organizations, but due to our good standing we will be briefed informally as negotiations proceed.	We have been encouraged to support and participate at COPs and never experienced that any party has tried to marginalize our organization. It is all a matter of adding value to the meetings and behaving properly.
Beyond War (William L Hallmark)	USA	Beyond War was not admitted as an observer until 2011	We sent delegates to Durban primarily focused on the rights of nature campaign.	We did not attend the Cancun conference because of our concerns about the more limited access.	We are not aware of any resistance from governments other than the shift in rules governing access at Cancun
BGSU (Shannon Orr)	USA	2002	Observations for research purposes	No change over time, we're not really trying to get access as we are interviewing NGO	Not at all, since this is a not a goal of our organization
British Council (Andrew Pillsbury)	UK	2007	As part of the youth constituency	Informal - part of the youth constituency. Not invited to closed sessions but full accreditation for the main conference. Particularly take part in official side events with similar organisations and in unofficial side events.	We work closely with the official UK delegation but we are not part of it

<p>Corporate Europe Observatory (Belen Balanya)</p>	<p>Belgium</p>	<p>2000, COP6, Poznan 2007, Copenhagen 2009,</p>	<p>Copenhaguen was very restrictive of registered NGOs, and made very difficult access. We normally participate with other campaigning groups on climate. reports exposing how corporate lobby is influencing EU decision making on climate change policies</p>	<p>Copenhagen was very restrictive with NGO access to the summit venue, also for registered civil society groups</p>	<p>The Danish government played a big role in the way COP15 restricted civil society participation, but was not something specifically on our group</p>
<p>Dickinson College (Neil Leary Director)</p>	<p>USA</p>	<p>2009</p>	<p>We attend as an observer organization for education and research purposes, interview delegates to gain an understanding of their positions on issues in the negotiations and the motivations for their positions. This has not changed.</p>	<p>Access is sufficient for our purposes and has not changed</p>	<p>No member state has objected to my organization attending the COP</p>
<p>Diplomacy Dialogue (Professor Raymond Saner, Director)</p>	<p>Switzerland</p>	<p>1998</p>	<p>We attend cops but not on regular basis and some of the preparatory meetings in bonn</p>	<p>The unfccc meetings have become very technical, also more political also within the ngo networks, some ngos formed alliances and act a self appointed interlocutors to governments showing some traditional signs of negotiation tactics and behaviour (hording information, exclusion of other ngos etc)</p>	<p>Our state-switzerland- cannot exclude researchers and ngos from attending international conferences however, like other governments, it can provide incentives (research funds, special mandates to represent some government offices at international conferences) which give them indirect power to exclude others who do not have same access to funds and priviledged information</p>



<p>Ecologic Institute (Michael Mehling, President)</p>	<p>USA</p>	<p>2005</p>	<p>1-2 staff member have been actively involved as advisors/negotiators for the German delegation since before 2005. Otherwise mostly passive attendance (learning, meeting partners, networking); typically also active involvement in 1-2 side events. More recently (2009-) also organization of side events (1-2 per COP)</p>	<p>Generally good, but it has become more difficult since COP15 (surprise!)</p>	<p>No - our involvement (only 2-3 participants on average) and role in the broader debate are probably too low-profile; the staff members working in advisory capacity (with red badge) have a different status anyway</p>
<p>Economic Development Foundation (IKV) (İlge Kivilcim)</p>	<p>Turkey</p>	<p>2009 (COP 15)</p>	<p>IKV is represented by a researcher specialized on climate change and environment policy of the EU and Turkey</p>	<p>We believe that formal and informal organizations attending the conference should be recognized as one where other partners are included in the way of meeting the objectives of environmental actions. So that participating enable us to strength our network and inform Turkish business world and public sector.</p>	<p>we have a significant responsibility in projecting current information and support for related disciplines of environmental policy in Turkey. Within the position of our responsibility, we will therefore provide a considerable help and best practices on topics setting environmentally near-future goals for Turkey. There is not an objection made by a member state</p>
<p>EPOTEC (Alan Reed)</p>	<p>USA</p>	<p>1999</p>	<p>We attended as observers as part of our research and originally as a consultant to UNCTAD.</p>	<p>Our participation was in the plenary sessions of both COPs and Subsidiary Bodies. Our main information source was the briefing sessions of the WBCSD and publications of hundreds of organizations. In some COPS (e.g. Marrakesh) and SBs (e.g. Lyon), we also made presentations.</p>	<p>We no longer attend Kyoto meetings. Our principals have all retired. We were never contacted or obstructed by any governmental or public body, except the UNFCCC secretariat. We were completely free to come and go, to register through the UNFCCC, and participate in all public events.</p>

Erklärung von Bern (EVB) (Christine Eberlein)	Switzerland	2010	On panel in workshop, participant in workshops, meetings with Swiss delegation for lobbying etc.	Informal meetings	No objection to our participation, but we are not a member of the official delegation.
Fundacion Agreste	Argentina	COP10, 2004 in Argentina	We have participated in conferences and the various networks and opportunities for participation of civil society. In recent years much has changed due to the high number of people who want to attend these meetings, especially with private interests related to carbon credit business. It also happens that meeting are made increasingly in expensive destinations, to where participants from developing countries can not attend without financial aid, of course the most affected is the participation of NGOs.	Our foundation is an observer member.	In Argentina, the government carries on at this time the second phase of preparation of national strategy on climate change, in which the Foundation is participating in the framework of the arguments between NGOs. The Foundation never received objections from any member of the UNFCCC.
Global Commons Institute (Aubrey Meyer)	UK	1990	GCI articulated and then advocated Contraction & Convergence [C&C] for UNFCCC-compliance since that time	C&C has become widely accepted in principle within and beyond UNFCCC over the last 20 years	No complaints
Greenbelt Movement (Francesca de Gesparis)	Kenya	2006	Presence, side events, meetings- more staff as time goes on	Was very high when our founder was present	No, its more of a general action to keep NGOs out unless an NGO is part of the party
The Danish Society of Engineers (Pernille Hagedorn-Rasmussen)	Denmark	2009	We have a booth and participate i sideevents and talk with people with in the engineering community. No change for the past 3 years.	We are not very close to the actual meetings - talk mostly with participants on technical issues	The Danish state plays no role in our participation.

The Institute for Environmental Studies (Laurens Bouwer)	Netherlands	early 1990s	IVM participates in COPs, mainly through scientific presentations, and organisation of side events and participation in sessions during side events. This has not changed over time, probably we have had more people attending up until the Copenhagen conference, and less participation since.	IVM mostly attends side events during COPs, not subsidiary body meetings. This has not changed over time.	No role of governments, we are registered as NGO for COPs. We have not experienced any objection.
The Swedish Environmental Research Institute (Katarina Buhr)	Sweden	2008 (COP-14 in Poznan)	We are observers to the negotiations, we meet negotiators and other observers to exchange information, we present research at side-events and often have an exhibit there too.	We are mainly observers and can only go to meetings that are open. However, we do keep contact with negotiators on a more informal basis, also during the COPs.	I have not experienced this. We are not there to lobby and observing is not that provocative.
Low Carbon Futures (Jen Cross - PA to the Director)	UK	2008, Poznan	Hold official UN side events, panel members on other organisations side events, brief negotiation staff, contribute evidence based research to assist policy formation, attend various international fora and associated no official UN events	Good, and getting better through RINGO membership	State governments very helpful, strong demand for evidence based research

Planet Hydrogen (Mike Koefman)	UK	2001	We challenge to change approaches to climate mitigation by showing how hydrogen could displace all fossil fuels. We give out leaflets, demonstrate the principles of electrolysis and fuel cells with portable equipment, and talk with whoever we can find. There has been little change over time - the key players look on hydrogen as an amusing irrelevance.	Our access on the formal side at main meetings has been OK, as long as we do not try to approach the main international forum, where non-governmentals (as you must know) are not welcome. There has been little trouble arranging meeting rooms for our own presentations, and corridor spaces for our equipment - Barbara Black has been very helpful to this small NGO. In the corridors it is possible to pick up gossip (often interesting) and find out about the experiences (frequently disheartening) of smaller nations and island states. At SBSTA (one meeting only attended in Bonn) we were welcome in most discussions. We do not attend meetings every year (we have no money) so cannot comment on any trends which you might be looking for.	No state has tried to impede our participation in debate. We are small fry, and our government (UK) is relatively liberal.
UNESA (Cristina Rivero)	Spain	1997	As an observer of the negotiations and participating and/or organising side events	We participate in the open official meetings, as well as in closed meetings of our constituency, the Business and Industry NGOs and with our government delegation and other delegations briefings to civil society and interested groups. NGOs participation in the process has notably increased in the last years, mainly due to the increasing pressure and interest of business, media and general public.	Our government fully supports the participation of the different constituencies in the process and holds regular briefings with us during the negotiation sessions and at home

Utviklingsfondet (Andrew P. Kroglund - Director of Information and Policy)	Norway	2007	We participate at the COPs; we participate in the international Climate Action Network (CAN), and we participate in the Norwegian umbrella organization ForUM, which synchronizes input the Norwegian government on Norwegian positions	This has become a bit more formal recently, but we have been able to access as part of an enlargende official Norwegian delegation, as part of the NGO quota	Up until now the Norwegian government has been very open. They are talking about giving other actors (industry, science etc) equal access, thus maybe closing the pirlvelieged positions our NGOs have had...
The World Future Council (Sarah Ahmed)	Global	Bali, 2007	We have always used the COP for networking purposes and present our work to other stakeholders. As a small organisation we did not aim at political advocacy work directed at the negotiator.	The WFC has access to most of the sessions. It is rather a question of finding out about the meeting in time and get engaged. During the COP event over the years more and more sessions were closed for observer organisations which makes it even more difficult to actively engage.	State governments neither actively exclude nor include the WFC or generally observer organisations. There is a briefing for observer organisations by each country delegation at least once and max. twice during the COP event but this is rather a one way information channel. From our perspective it became more difficult to access information concerning negotiations.
Zoi Environment (Otto Simonett)	Switzerland	2009	We are following on the margins (participating only if we have something to say or reports to launch). We did for instance NOT participate in Durban (but in Copenhagen and Cancun). Thus, there may indeed be some 'fatigue' of participating in big conferences. The nature of our work being more assessment and communication, we are thus more interested in the IPCC.	In the earlier years, we were always part of the UNEP delegation, now we are on our own (after going through the accreditation procedures). Access, in particular to the COPs has become more difficult because of the sheer number of participants posing unsolvable logistical nightmares (Copenhagen).	We are small, invisible and non-advocating. Thus there was no real problem with this in the past

Organization	Question 5:	Question 6:	Question 7:
Ahead Energy (Dr. MJ Ebenhack) President and CEO	No change; no support ever	We will not be affected at all	No
Bellona Foundation (Svend Soyland) Senior Advisor, International Climate	The Norwegian, EU and US delegations where we have offices have been very supportive and we are invited to comment and provide input on negotiating positions ahead and as when the negotiations proceed. The Norwegian delegation have opened up for civil society participation through a so-called extended delegation. Our organization have received both practical and financial support by the Norwegian Government to continue the tradition of a Bellona Solutions Room.	Bellona Foundation have a general observer status to the UN and are part of the UNEP Governing Council. We have not been attending or monitoring activities in the UN Security Council in the past, but been in New York during UN General Assembly meetings.	N/A
Beyond War (William L Hallmark)	We don't receive any direct support and felt no change in access to the major meetings	Support the climate security nexus.	We were not involved in 2007 and are not aware of any change related to securitization
BGSU (Shannon Orr)	No changes	N/A	N/A
British Council (Andrew Pillsbury)	The UK foreign and commonwealth office, and the UK department of energy and climate changed have prized the work of the council, and we have worked together on a number of unofficial events involving young people in the run up to the COPs	We are not involved in policy making - that is the role of the official UK delegation. We are involved in building a community of interested young people across the globe with innovative practical approaches to combating climate change and in spreading understanding of the issues behind climate change.	N/A
Corporate Europe Observatory (Belen Balanya)	We do not engage on lobby with governments or Commission, we do research and report publications and campaigning with other groups for effective action on climate change	N/A	As mentioned before we only attended since 2007 Poznan and Copenhagen conferences
Dickinson College (Neil Leary Director)	Delegates of the US government have been extremely helpful, meeting with our students, granting interviews, and providing insights about what is going on inside the negotiations. The lead negotiator for the US has	I expect no effect. Discussion of climate change in the Security Council is supplementary to the UNFCCC process and would not, I don't think, replace that process.	No effect on our participation in the climate change conferences.

	invited our students to share with him their views on issues in the negotiations.		
Diplomacy Dialogue (Professor Raymond Saner, Director)	We have published on topic, attended cops, taught cc but have not been invited by swiss government officials in charge of cc to give presentations at national conferences, a form of indirect disqualification without coming out openly	Our ministry of foreign affairs and other offices in charge of cc keep un meetings under control by limiting dissemination of information about un meetings or by sending out information too late to give opportunity to act, also by carefully controlling selection of delegation attending un meetings	We are less enthusiastic about investing energy and time for unfccc meetings
Ecologic Institute (Michael Mehling, President)	Not necessarily change in nature, but change in volume of activities; the number and scope of projects/activities related to climate change has strongly expanded	We work somewhat on nexus of climate and security, but it is difficult to anticipate what concrete effect that is likely to have	Slightly, due to emergence of projects with security interface/aspect (e.g. Arctic, refugees, access to resources). But this has not had a tremendous impact on our participation in the climate change conferences.
Economic Development Foundation (IKV) (Ilge Kivildem)	If necessary, we inform the related department of Ministers.	N/A	It is clear to see that environmental policies are quite dynamic. Likely, they are highly interlinked with the direction of economic and social developments. More specifically, securitization, in this point, is an another debate we should consider. As we all know that the concept of climate change is officially stated as a 'securitized issue' at the UN Security Council. Due to this, there has normally been a change in 'perceptions' of how important climate change is in itself. Our researchers working on environmental policies of the EU and Turkey tries to reference the securitization of climate change within the recent decades.

<p>EPOTEC (Alan Reed)</p>	<p>In our active period from 1998-2009, we never had any interaction with governmental agencies. We did not participate in governmental decision-making.</p>	<p>Even if we were still active and involved, we would ignore actions of the Security Council. Our work was and would be in research and publicity regarding the global system for dealing with climate change. If governments decide to make climate change an issue in national security, we would just study the results, disseminate our interpretation, and make ourselves available for educational and consulting purposes.</p>	<p>We were aware of the increasing tendency for some governments to make climate change a security or national defense issue, but our attitude until now has been that climate change is a matter for science, education, industry, public policies in specialized agencies, not for the military or national security agencies.</p>
<p>Erklärung von Bern (EVB) (Christine Eberlein)</p>	<p>We are financially independent and do not take government support. Yet, the Swiss Government was very open to our advocacy and accepted new ideas.</p>	<p>no</p>	<p>No</p>
<p>Fundacion Agreste</p>	<p>The Argentine government has invited several organizations to participate in the creation of the National Strategy on Climate Change, the Foundation was invited from the beginning. Participation, although it has the opportunity to be heard, it is not full, ie NGOs participate in a discussion group where only interact with other NGOs, the government has separate meetings. Of the extended meetings only involves a NGOs representative of all others. It could be said that in this way NGOs only fulfill the role to legitimize the development of a "participative" Strategy. NGOs do not receive financial support or any other material resources to strengthen, expand and sustain their participation. To assist the COP of the UNFCCC NGOs do not receive any government assistance.</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>



Global Commons Institute (Aubrey Meyer)	No financial support exists. C&C is the basis of the UK Climate Act	GCI has said that climate change is a global security issue from the word go.	No change
Greenbelt Movement (Francesca de Gesparis)	Some	Not sure	At some times in 2009 excluded, and actions by UNFCCC security
The Danish Society of Engineers (Pernille Hagedorn-Rasmussen)	We do not receive any support or have asked for it..	We have from the very beginning argued that climate change and security closely related. But the UN Security Council discussion climate change have no effect for us.	no
The Institute for Environmental Studies (Laurens Bouwer)	We do not participate in climate change advocacy. We are a research organisation. We are however supported by different governments (including Netherlands and EU) to do research on climate change. There have not been fundamental changes in their support for our work.	No	No
The Swedish Environmental Research Institute (Katarina Buhr)	I have not noticed any changes in this regard.	I don't think it will have any significant effect.	N/A
Low Carbon Futures (Jen Cross - PA to the Director)	Increased interest for Copenhagen, fell off for Cancun, renewed levels of interest for Durban	Ensure that evidence based research is valued, our role remains relevant, and participating academics achieve REF rankings (research excellence frameworks) related to research being used	No
Planet Hydrogen (Mike Koefman)	UK government takes no deep interest in our ideas, action, literature or personnel. We responded to its call for contributions to the climate mitigation debate, but nothing we wrote was taken on board.	If we had more influence we would try to point out, via our few excellent MPs, that climate security (via a worldwide electrohydrogen energy system) would probably on balance also contribute to enhanced political security.	We are not close enough to Power to detect such a change, one way or the other. We have not attended any UNFCCC COPs since Milan.

<p>UNESA (Cristina Rivero)</p>	<p>The government support has increased along with the increased interest of businesses and other NGOs</p>	<p>We do not have contacts with the UN Security Council up to now</p>	<p>The differences we have experienced are due mainly to the increased level of interest for Climate change issues in the bussiness and industry community specially related to carbon market developments and carbon obligations.</p>
<p>Utviklingsfondet (Andrew P. Kroglund - Director of Information and Policy)</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>N/A</p>
<p>The World Future Council (Sarah Ahmed)</p>	<p>As we haven't focused on advocacy work during the UNFCCC process but more on the networking aspect we have not received any support.</p>	<p>It will not affect the WFC's involvement in the climate change policy making. Our aim is to bring the interest of future generations to the centre of policy making and provide decision-makers with effective policy solutions.</p>	<p>No not for the WFC itself. However, nowadays such protection and limited access can be an obstacle for what we strive for, which is the participation of youth in these conferences and of local communities. Instead, the process of accreditation is based on very different criteria and the access to these debates is usually not facilitated for who we believe are the key actors.</p>
<p>Zoi Environment (Otto Simonett)</p>	<p>We have continuous support for climate change advocacy, most recently a lot of focus has however shifted to adaptation (not our specialization) and regionally very focused advocacy. This is actually a good development: climate change being mainstreamed but how long this will last we don't know.</p>	<p>we have always been interested in analyzing the enviroment and security nexus and thus very much welcome the UN Security council addressing the issue. We are however also worried that this will lead to too much unreflected, alarmistic engagement with contrary impacts.</p>	<p>no, except that through this mainstreaming the whole UNFCCC business has grown wider and potentially more fragmented (maybe i am just getting nostalgic)</p>

3) Table 6: Outlying the major players in the construction of the security-climate change nexus

**Government Securitizing Actors:**

UN Security Council 2007; United Nations General Assembly UNGA 2009; US National Intelligence Estimate 2008; UK National Security Strategy 2009; European Council 2008, NATO 2008; UNFCCC; Australian ONA 2005; Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (UK, DCDC); Ministry of Defense (MOD); Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); German Planners 2005;

**The main security or military related organizations and think-tanks that acted as securitizing actors:**

Centre for Naval Analysis (CAN) Reports 2007; Chatham House; Woodrow Wilson; Royal United Services Institute- Independent thinking on Defense and Security (RUSI) (concentrating on the necessary responses that climate change requires from the Defense department); The International institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – Panel Discussion 2 at The UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen; International Institute for sustainable development (IISD)

**4) Table 7: The actors involved in shifting attention to the issues of climate change:**

<b>CNA Military Advisory board:</b>	<b>Decision and policy makers:</b>
	General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA US army chairman, military advisory board.
	Admiral Frank Skip Bowman, USN Former deputy administrator naval reactors, national nuclear security administration
	Lieutenant general Lawrence P. Farrell Jr. USAF former deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, headquarters US Air force
	Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II, USA Former Commanding General, US Army Material Command
	General Paul J. Kern USA Former Commanding General US, Army Material Command
	Admiral T. Joseph Lopez USN Former commander in chief, US naval forces Europe and allied forces, southern Europe
	Admiral Donald L. Don pilling USN, Former Vice chief of naval operations
	Admiral Joseph W. Prueher USN Former Commander in Chief of the US Pacific command (PACOM) and Former US. Ambassador to China
	Vice Admiral Richard H. Trulz USN, Former NASA Administrator, Shuttle astronaut and the first commander of the naval space command
	General Charles F. Chuck Wald, USAF Former deputy commander, headquarters US European Command (USEUCOM)
	General Anthony C. Tony Zinni, USMC Former Commander in chief of US central command (CENTCOM).

*(Source: National security and the threat of climate change, SecurityAndClimate.cna.org).*

