

Leiden University, 2014
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences
MA Political Science



**The Gravitational Pull of Twelve Stars.
European Union Public Diplomacy and Its Impact on
Foreign Policy Preferences of the Ukrainian Public.**

Master Thesis

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Word count: 18 039

Abstract

Globalisation and the information revolution made engaging in the conquest for “people’s hearts and minds” inevitable for international actors in order to be able to exert political and economic influence. Recent protests in Ukraine, which led to a change of the Ukrainian leadership and an international crisis, proved the power of public opinion. Even though the role of public diplomacy in IR is indisputable, there is still a significant gap in the IR literature on this topic, especially on public diplomacy of supranational actors. This thesis analyses public diplomacy of the EU in Ukraine between 2004 and 2014 and its influence on the foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public. Ukraine has a strategic importance for the EU and for the stability of the region. Ukraine’s geopolitical position, as well as competing western and eastern influences make the study of public diplomacy in Ukraine very relevant. In this thesis I analyse EU public diplomacy in Ukraine through the lenses of seven principal methods of EU public diplomacy- listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, international broadcasting and media, branding and development. On the basis of examination of these seven methods, changes in EU public diplomacy and the study of public opinion polls conducted in Ukraine, I argue that conducting public diplomacy through institutionalized political frameworks increases visibility and efficiency of the public diplomacy and therefore has a better chance to influence perceptions of a foreign public. I demonstrate that after the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 and Eastern Partnership in 2009 public support for the EU in Ukraine increased. Furthermore, I argue that whilst some of the methods of EU public diplomacy have a stable and gradual effect on the public opinion, others have a shorter but more noticeable impact. Specifically, mechanisms of public diplomacy that appeal to people’s values have a more stable and gradual impact on the public opinion, whereas mechanisms that influence people’s attitudes and opinions have a less stable but more visible effect. Moreover, this research reveals that the European Neighbourhood Policy is primarily focused on financial aid and assistance in development and other important tools of public diplomacy are, despite some progress reached in the past years, still neglected.

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Acknowledgement

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Adam William Chalmers under whose supervision I have completed this thesis. He has been exceptionally patient and supportive. Without his help, insightful comments and suggestions it would not have been possible to write this thesis.

I would like to acknowledge the academic and technical support of Leiden University. My appreciation goes to the lecturers and fellow students in the Program of Political Science, who gave me constructive comments and warm encouragement. I would especially like to thank Prof. Dr. Madeleine O. Hosli, whose course “Decision Making in the European Union” provided me with a solid background for my research.

Finally, I am grateful for the support of my parents, my sister Radka and my friend Adriana, whose support has been indispensable to me in wading through these days.

List of Abbreviations

CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EBU	European Broadcasting Union
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
EU	European Union
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
HR/VP	High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice-President of the European Commission (VP).
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
NIF	Neighbourhood Investment Facility
OPPOL	Opinion Polling and Research in the ENPI Countries and Territories
PR	Public Relations
WB	World Bank

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Introduction

“In a global information age, soft sources of power such as culture, political values, and diplomacy are part of what makes a great power. Success depends not only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins.” (Joseph S. Nye, 2005)

In November 2013 hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians rallied in Independence Square in Kiev demanding closer ties with the EU. Protests and civil unrests came as a reaction to President Yanukovich's decision to suspend preparations for signing of a new Association Agreement with the EU. The wave of demonstrations that entered history under the name “Euromaidan” resulted in a changing of the Ukrainian leadership and an intentional crisis. The Deposition of pro-Russian President Yanukovich triggered counter protests of pro-Russian activists in the east and south of the country. Clashes between pro-Western and pro-Russian activists resulted in numerous casualties and turned Ukraine into a battlefield. The Crimean peninsula in the south-east of the county largely populated by an ethnic Russian majority became the centre of Pro-Russian protests. After Russia took control of Crimea, the Ukraine crisis gained momentum and turned into an international crisis involving major world powers. Protests that led to the change of the Ukrainian leadership along with the geopolitical game of chess between the West and Russia demonstrate the power of public opinion. It is indisputable that public opinion matters and therefore it is important to understand how it is formed and changed. Even though the term “public diplomacy” is relatively novel, international actors have been employing its methods throughout history in order to influence opinions of a foreign public. In this thesis I analyse what influence EU Public Diplomacy has had on the foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public. This Eastern European state has been in an identity crisis since its independence in 1991 from the Soviet Union. In 2004, after the EU enlargement, Ukraine found itself sharing borders with two world powers: the EU on the west and the Russian Federation on the east. Since Ukraine gained independence there have been many debates regarding its geopolitical choices between a partnership with Russia or the EU. The Political and cultural situation in the region makes the concept of public diplomacy highly relevant. Ukraine has shifted its course several times over the last decades. This thesis aims to help to understand changes in Ukrainian foreign policy by analysing methods that the EU, one of the most influential actors in Ukraine, is using to shape Ukrainian public opinion.

Analysis of EU public diplomacy is not beneficial only for a better understanding of development in Ukraine but it also helps in understanding EU soft power and its influence. Cross (2013) claims that public diplomacy is of a great importance to the EU for several reasons. Firstly, there is a substantial gap between the EU accomplishments and how it is perceived in the world. In 2005, the average world awareness of the EU was 69 per cent, thus 41 per cent of the world still does not know that the EU exists. At the same time, out of 69 per cent of the world population that is aware of the existence of the EU, significant part had neutral or negative attitudes towards the EU (Gallup International, 2005). Furthermore, with regard to humanitarian aid the EU was largely perceived as weak in comparison to other world institutions such as the United Nations, World Food Programme, UNICEF, etc. Merely 41 per cent of the respondents evaluated the EU's activity in humanitarian aid as positive. These figures are shocking considering that according to figures published by the European Commission, the EU as a whole has been the world's biggest donor of humanitarian aid (European Commission, 2012). Public Diplomacy is a mechanism that can help the EU to promote its success and increase awareness of the EU. Second reason why public diplomacy is essential for the EU, especially in times of a rise in Eurosceptism, is that an effective public diplomacy can influence and strengthen EU identity also within its borders. Cross (2013) advocates that public diplomacy and domestic policy are interdependent. Internal politics influence public diplomacy but also vice versa as public diplomacy influences how EU citizens perceive themselves. Thirdly, the Euro crisis, Eurosceptism and internal frictions that the EU had to withstand in the last years sapped the EU's soft power and public diplomacy can be an effective tool to limit the extent of harm to the EU's image (Melissen, 2013). Effective public diplomacy can increase the EU's soft power and strengthen its position in the international arena. The EU has to endeavour not only to be, but also to be seen as, an important actor in world politics.

Public diplomacy towards Ukraine is especially important for EU foreign policy. The EU's official website states that Ukraine is "a priority partner" within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (EEAS b, n.d.). Ukraine's position at the crossroads of the West and East destines it to be in a zone of clashing geopolitical interests. Development in Ukraine has an impact on stability of the region. Moreover, the energy security of the EU is significantly linked to Ukraine, which is the main transit state for energy resources from Russia. Twenty per cent of the total gas consumed in the EU is transited through Ukraine.

Due to the globalization and growing interdependence, attraction and persuasion have become increasingly important foreign policy instruments; nonetheless public diplomacy is still neglected in the IR literature. Moreover, a prevalent part of the public diplomacy research is “historical (Cold War) and US centric” (Cross, 2013, p.3). This thesis aims to fill this gap and contribute to academic discussion on this highly relevant topic.

In this thesis I will attempt to answer the following research question:

- What influence did EU public diplomacy have on the foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian Public between 2004 and 2014?

Sub-questions:

- What changes in the EU public diplomacy policy had the most significant impact on Ukrainian attitudes towards the EU?
- How did the different mechanisms of public diplomacy influence Ukrainian attitudes towards the EU?

I argue that conducting public diplomacy through institutionalized political frameworks increases its visibility, efficiency and therefore has a larger impact on public opinion formation. I show that after the EU established the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership the support for the EU rose. Furthermore, I argue that different methods of EU public diplomacy have different impacts on Ukrainian public opinion. Mechanisms of public diplomacy that appeal to people’s values have a more stable and gradual impact on the public opinion, whilst mechanisms that influence people’s attitudes and opinions have a less stable but more noticeable effect on public opinion.

In order to verify my hypothesis I conduct a case study on the EU’s public diplomacy in Ukraine between 2004 and 2014. I look at EU public diplomacy through the lenses of the seven methods that the EU is using to engage with the Ukrainian public- listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, international broadcasting and media, branding and development aid. I analyse how these methods are employed and scrutinise their distinct influence. Through analyses of public opinion polls conducted between the 2004 and 2014 I will assess how changes in EU public diplomacy and different public diplomacy mechanisms translated into the changes in Ukrainian foreign policy choice.

This thesis is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter I will introduce the theoretical framework and the research design. The second chapter provides background information about EU-Ukraine relations and the third chapter is focused on analysis of methods of EU public diplomacy in Ukraine and their influence on Ukrainian public perception.

Literature Review

As a consequence of the increased importance of public diplomacy in international relations, the topic attracted the attention of various scholars and policymakers. However, as outlined in the introduction, the literature review of the available publications on public diplomacy led me to the conclusion that there is still a substantial gap in the literature, especially in the study of the public diplomacy of supranational actors. None of the publications on EU public diplomacy have fully explored the impact of the EU public diplomacy on the foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public. There is no available literature that would offer a comprehensive answer to my research questions. Thus, further research could be beneficial for the academic community and my thesis aims to reduce the gap in the IR literature on this topic. Below mentioned literature covers only parts of the complex issue of EU public diplomacy in Ukraine and will serve as a theoretical groundwork for my research.

Chaban and Vernygora (2013) in their article "*The EU in the Eyes of Ukrainian General Public: potential for EU public diplomacy?*" identified several problems connected to the EU public diplomacy. The authors indicate that EU public diplomacy is "disjointed", "under-resourced" and "over-ambitious" as it targets the public within and also outside its borders (Chaban and Vernygora, 2013, p.71). After analysing the results of several surveys concerning perception of the EU in several aspects Chaban and Vernygora (2013, p.23) concluded that "While the EU-Ukraine official interactions are mired in contradictions and empty rhetoric, attentive listening to the Ukrainian general public reveals opportunities for both the EU and Ukraine." Authors advocate that the EU is relatively good in monologue; EU norms such as peace, democracy, human rights come across and attract Ukrainian people. However, EU performance is poor when it comes to dialogue and collaboration (Chaban and Vernygora, 2013).

Preceding the break out of the turmoil in 2013 Dr. Lytvynenko delivered a speech under the auspices of the OSCE Talks. In this speech he focused on the importance of the topic dealing with the issue of competing foreign influences in Ukraine and their effect on the country's stability and prosperity. He talked about the public diplomacy of several foreign players in the Ukraine including Russia, and the EU and pointed out the differences in the messages either of the actors are trying to send across to the Ukrainian public as well as variance in the

instruments and infrastructure employed to deliver these messages. According to the author, the EU message focuses on the potential of the Ukrainian integration into the developed EU's "heaven" whose gates have already opened for other former socialist countries. Russia on the other hand focuses on the projection of its power as well as their great history and cultural affiliation with Ukraine.

One of the few comprehensive and up-to-date publications on EU public diplomacy is "European Public Diplomacy. Soft Power at Work" edited by Cross and Melissen (2013). Through exploring all levels of the EU Public Diplomacy- subnational, national, transnational, and supranational it succeeded to partly fill the gap in the IR literature on the mechanisms behind EU soft power. Although, the publication does not sufficiently cover the topic of the impact of EU public diplomacy efforts in Ukraine, it offers an interesting insight into the EU public diplomacy in general. Chapter written by Cull was especially beneficial for this research. He facilitates analysis of public diplomacy by defining its constituent elements.

"Foreign policy of the EU, assessing Europe's role in the world" (2010) edited by F. Bindi, provides some relevant information, however it does not directly tackle the issue of the impact of EU public diplomacy on the foreign policy preference of the Ukrainian public. Chapters by Casier, Giusti and Penkova helped me to comprehend the background of the ENP and complex EU-Ukraine relations as well as the importance of Russian influence on the outcome of the EU efforts in Ukraine.

There is significantly more research conducted on the topic of public opinion. An analysis of public opinion is an indispensable component of any profound study of public diplomacy and its impact. Worcester, who dedicated his career to the research of public diplomacy and his contribution to the field of public opinion studies, is widely recognized. He claims that the formation of public opinion is influenced by "three levels of thought"- opinions, attitudes and values. He implies that each "level of thought" is formed differently and has a different impact on public opinion. His theory serves as a theoretical framework for one of my main hypothesis, which claims that different methods of public diplomacy have different effects on public opinion depending on which level of thought they are influencing.

In this thesis I examine the influence of EU public diplomacy on Ukrainian public opinion. Various scholars point out limits of examining public opinion formation. Davison (2007)

warns that public opinion formation is a very complex process influenced by a combination of many external factors and circumstances and therefore it is difficult to measure and predict it. With regard to the complexity of public opinion formation I study EU public diplomacy in Ukraine through seven different dimensions. I analyse seven principal methods that the EU employs to shape Ukrainian public perception and evaluate their influence. Giusti and Penkova (2010) recognized EU influence of Ukrainian public opinion, but at the same time they highlight Russian influence on Ukrainian public opinion. Even though this thesis is focused on EU public diplomacy, it does not omit Russian influence. The main issues tying Ukraine and Russia are outlined in this thesis.

With regard to the fact that researched topic: the EU public diplomacy in Ukraine between 2004 and 2014 is actual and dynamic, the research is aggravated by the lack of profound studies and comprehensive publications on this issue. Therefore, in this thesis I will use various scholarly articles, internet sources as well as primary sources: official reports, policies and public opinion surveys.

1 Theoretical Framework and Research Design

1.1 Theoretical Framework

In order to conduct systematic research it is crucial to define central terms- public diplomacy and public opinion. The notion of “public diplomacy” is dynamically defined. This dynamic is caused by the fact that scholars try to reflect the changing environment of international politics. There is no single, universal definition of public diplomacy and many existing definitions are incomplete or unclear. Moreover, there is lack of agreement between scholars when specifying the actors of public diplomacy, the channels and instruments that can be used as well as the ultimate goal of public diplomacy. A. Gullion (1965), who coined the term “public diplomacy” defines public diplomacy as “the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions.” Gullion’s definition reflects how the term public diplomacy is understood in this thesis. This definition is also in line with the EU’s perception on public diplomacy. In a booklet published in 2007 by the European Commission, it is stated that “Public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes. It seeks to promote EU interests by understanding, informing and influencing” (European Commission, 2007). “Public opinion” can be defined as “the collective view of a defined population“ (Worcester, 2013, p.1).

It is widely recognised that Public Diplomacy has an impact on public perception, however the power of its influence depends on the way it is conducted. In this thesis I will analyse the impact of EU public diplomacy on Ukrainian public perception in two dimensions. Firstly, I will analyse the effect of creating an institutionalized political framework for conducting public diplomacy on its efficiency and strength of its influence. Secondly, I will analyse the distinct influence of different methods of public diplomacy on public perception. In order to examine the influence of public diplomacy on public perception it is necessary to look at the methods that actors of public diplomacy are using to influence a foreign public. In other words, it is crucial to define what public diplomacy consists of. According to Cull (2013) public diplomacy has five constituent elements- listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange and international broadcasting. Cull (2013, p. viii) states that “ The first and foundational way in which any international actor should engage a foreign public is by

listening to that public.” Listening enables an international actor to identify specific values and needs of a target public and adjust its public diplomacy accordingly, therefore listening is a prerequisite for efficient public diplomacy. The second element of public diplomacy is advocacy. Advocacy is defined as “engaging foreign public through the explanation of policy” (Cull, 2013, p. viii). It is typically considered as the key element of public diplomacy. Explanation of policies raises awareness and helps shape opinions of a foreign public in the desired way. The third method that actors use to engage a foreign public is cultural diplomacy. This method is based on the exchange of artistic, linguistic and other cultural forms. Principal aim of this method is to foster mutual understanding (Cull, 2003). The fourth element is exchange-“engaging a foreign public by two-way exchange of persons” (Cull, 2013, viii). Exchanges foster personal links between a domestic public and a foreign public and give individuals an opportunity to experience and understand life in another country. International broadcasting and information management includes broadcasting in third countries, promoting the international actor in national media of the third country and media monitoring. The media represents the main source of information for most of the public and their influence on their opinions is undisputable. With respect to the complexity of public opinion formation I endeavour to encompass all principal means by which the EU influenced the Ukrainian public, therefore besides five constituent mechanisms of public diplomacy presented by Cull (2013) I will also analyse EU’s financial aid and assistance in development and branding. Including these methods of influencing a foreign public is in line with Gullion’s definition of public diplomacy. EU policy towards Ukraine is to a large extent focused on financial aid and assistance in development, therefore it is an important aspect shaping their relations and it cannot be omitted. “Branding” is defined as “giving products and services an emotional dimension with which people can identify”(Ham, 2011, p.1). “Brand” is commonly defined as “a customer's idea about a product; the brand state comprises the outside world's ideas about a particular country“ (Ham, 2001, p.1). Term “ nation branding” was coined by Simon Anholt in 1996. Academics also often employ terms “state branding“ or broader term “place branding“. I consider it important to include branding in the analysis because image building is directly linked to attractiveness. Furthermore, including branding provides me with an opportunity to include knowledge of PR and communication studies in my research. Gilboa (2008) argues that scholars and practitioners of international relations overlook relevant literature and knowledge of other social and behavioural sciences which leads to limited and incorrect findings. By including branding into my analysis I aspire to partly solve this problem.

The seven elements of public diplomacy introduced above represent methods of public diplomacy. I will study the impact of EU public diplomacy in Ukraine through the lenses of these seven methods. Study of overall influence of EU public diplomacy on Ukrainian perception is inseparable from studying distinct methods of EU public diplomacy. I argue that not only employing these methods is important for the final outcome, but also the way how they are employed matters. Moreover, different methods influence public opinion in different ways. Public diplomacy can be conducted with or without an institutionalized political framework. An institutionalized political framework increases visibility of public diplomacy and therefore has a better chance to reach the target public and influence its perceptions. At the same time, a political framework increases efficiency of conducting public diplomacy. In 2004 the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy that represents the political framework for policy towards EU neighbours and in 2009 it launched its Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative that supplements ENP and is focused on eastern neighbours. In my first hypothesis I argue that conducting public diplomacy through institutionalized political frameworks such as ENP and EaP is likely to increase Ukrainian public support for the EU.

Worcester claims that Public opinion is influenced by three “levels of thought”- opinions, attitudes and values. He advocates that in order to measure public opinion it is important to distinguish between their distinct influences on public opinion. He metaphorically defines “opinions” as “the ripples on the surface of the public’s consciousness, shallow, and easily changed”, attitudes are “the currents below the surface, deeper and stronger” and finally, values in his view represent “the deep tides of public mood slow to change, but powerful” (Worcester, 2013, p.11). As it is clear from the definition, opinions are very unstable and they can be easily manipulated, attitudes are firmer than opinions but can alter as a consequence of a new fact or event. Values are the most silent, but also the deepest and the most powerful. They are very stable and unlikely to change. It is almost impossible to transform them through propaganda or communication in a short term (Worcester, 2013). All three levels of public opinion defined by Worcester are extremely important to be considered when analysing public opinion polls and changes in public opinion. Worcester’s theory of formation of public opinion led me to my second hypothesis: I argue that whilst some of the seven defined methods of EU public diplomacy have a stable and gradual effect on the public opinion, others have a shorter but more noticeable impact. Specifically, mechanisms of public diplomacy that appeal to people’s values have a more stable and gradual impact on the public opinion, whilst mechanisms that influence people’s attitudes and opinions have a less stable

but more visible effect on public opinion. For example, cultural, diplomacy and exchanges create common values and influence public opinion long term. Branding helps the EU to create and project a certain image. The EU has been projecting itself as symbol of stability, prosperity and democracy. These are values that attract Ukrainians steadily and therefore influence their attitudes over a longer period of time. Whilst methods of public diplomacy such as financial aid or development projects appeal to people's opinions and attitudes and therefore they influence public opinion in a more visible but also less stable manner. After providing large financial aid to Ukraine its support for the EU is likely to significantly rise. However, this support is unstable and it is expected to drop after the development projects are ended and financial aid is exhausted.

Many authors, such as Gilboa (2008), Cross and Melissen (2013) advocate that constructivism offers some interesting insights and promising prospects for studying public diplomacy. Constructivism emerged in the 1980's as a critical reaction to neo-realism and neo-liberalism that are based on the assumption that the IR are shaped by the states' pursuit of the power and wealth. Constructivism on the other hand emphasizes the "ideas" and claims that they "can transform organization of the world politics, shape the identities and interest of states and determine what counts as legitimate action." (Baylis, Smith, Owens, 2011, p. 149). This theory studies the way in which the world is changed and shaped by the human actions. Constructivism gained significant support after the Cold War, when ideas and actions of the public led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. "Public diplomacy, like constructivism challenges the primacy of material power in achieving outcomes, and offers an alternative model of practice that understands the normative or ideational structures underpinning audience identities and gains influence by engaging through the shared understandings of this intersubjective dimension, including through social interaction and interplay." (Byrne, 2012, p.3)

1.2 Research Design

In order to answer the research questions I will conduct a case study on EU public diplomacy in Ukraine in the 10-year time frame 2004-2014, thus from the time Ukraine became an EU neighbour on the 1st of May 2004 until the 1st of May 2014, when this research was completed. Foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public are shaped by the nature of complex EU-Ukraine relations and overall attitudes of the Ukrainian public towards the EU.

Therefore the study of influence that EU public diplomacy had on the foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public is inseparable from the analysis of all major factors that influence relations between the two actors. To encompass the complexity of the impact of public diplomacy on public opinion, it is important to examine separate methods of public diplomacy and observe their distinct influence. With the regard to theories elaborated and explained in the previous section the methods of public diplomacy that will be analysed are listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, international broadcasting and media, branding and development aid. I will study changes in EU public diplomacy; I will examine how the creation of instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership translated into changes in the foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public. I will study the impact of different public diplomacy mechanisms on the formation of opinions, attitudes and values of Ukrainians and I will examine how these “three levels of thought” influence public opinion.

Data necessary for the analysis will be acquired by studying available literature on EU public diplomacy. I will also draw on information from the EU official website- europa.eu and analyse reports issued by EU institutions, Eurobulletins, Newsletters and official documents issued by the EU Delegation to Ukraine. I will scrutinize the official EU policies within the frameworks of the European Neighbourhood Policy and The Eastern Partnership. In addition, I will examine the public opinion polls conducted by the EU, Razumkov Centre and PEW Research Center conducted between 2004 and 2014. In order to improve the “listening” capability of the EU and gain a better understanding of the specific challenges of individual ENP countries and ascertain how they view their neighbour, the EU launched The EU Neighbourhood Barometer project. Until this date, a comprehensive EU neighbourhood barometer survey in Ukraine was conducted only once- in 2012, on the sample, 1,000 respondents used a method of face-to-face interviews. Furthermore, EuropeAid Directorate-General of the European Commission, launched project Opinion Polling and Research in the ENPI Countries and Territories (OPPOL). In 2009 and 2010, three polls in ENP countries were conducted within the OPPOL project. The surveys were focused on EU perception and EU awareness and were conducted on the basis of 110 interviews with opinion leaders in Ukraine. Since 2004 The Ukrainian Razumkov Centre has conducted several public opinion polls focused on Ukrainian perceptions of the EU. Each survey was conducted with a sample of 2 000 respondents. The American PEW Research Center carried out a survey in 2011 that involved 1 000 respondents. The most substantial part of my research will be based on the

Razmukov centre's survey focused on foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public. This survey was conducted repeatedly, in total twenty-seven times between 2002 and 2012 and once in 2014. The respondents were asked a question: "Which foreign policy direction should be a priority for Ukraine?" On the basis of this data I will verify two main hypotheses introduced in the theory section and I will evaluate the EU neighbourhood policy.

2 EU- Ukraine Relations

The following chapter is dedicated to the study of EU-Ukraine relations. The nature of their relations has a direct impact on Ukrainian public perception on the EU and it shapes their opinion on what foreign policy direction should be a priority for Ukraine. The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first one, I will introduce actors of EU public diplomacy, afterwards I will study the political and legal framework of the EU-Ukraine relations and in the last part I will analyse the strong external influence of Russia on EU- Ukraine relations.

2.1 Actors and Institutions

Before conducting research on the influence of EU public diplomacy it is crucial to define who conducts EU public diplomacy. According to Guillon's definition, governments of states are not the only practitioners of public diplomacy. Besides governments of states, international organizations, corporations, interest groups or various types of individuals can also be involved in influencing a foreign public and therefore conduct public diplomacy. However, for the purpose of this research it is necessary to narrow down the relevant actors and institutions that will be analysed. I will primarily focus on the public diplomacy conducted by common EU institutions.

Even though the common European project was launched more than a half century ago, the EU is still a developing actor and its institutions are transforming in time. A significant change in the actors that conduct EU public diplomacy was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in 2009. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the external service of the EU was often criticised for being fragmented. Public diplomacy was conducted by the Council Secretariat and the Commission. EU public diplomacy was focused on "infopolitik", that means providing basic information about the Union through EU Information Centres across the world (Duke, 2013). One of the main goals of the Lisbon Treaty was to make the EU more visible and coherent. In the field of public diplomacy the Lisbon Treaty brought four major changes that influenced its conduct and efficiency. First of these changes was the creation of the new post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), who is a permanent chair of the Council of EU foreign ministers and, at the same time, a Vice-President of the European Commission (VP). HR/VP represents a bridge between two major

EU institutions- the European Commission and the Council of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty provided legal grounds for the creation of the body that supports the work of the HR. This body is known as the European External Action Service (EEAS) and represents the second important change. As a response to the creation of EEAS, the institutions of the Commission responsible for foreign policy also transformed. External policy matters within the mandate of the European Commission are now managed by the new Directorate- General of the Commission - “The Service for Foreign Policy Instrument” (FPI). The third major change is represented by the official transformation of the European Council into an EU institution and creating the post of Council’s permanent president. Creation of the President of European Council and HR led to the fourth and final change, which was reducing the importance of the EU rotating presidency of the Council of the EU held for the period of six months by one of the member states by separating European Council and Council of the EU. The country holding the presidency is no longer chairing or leading the European Council and in the Council of the EU, the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs is now chaired by the HR. This transferred more of the leadership to the supranational level and decreased possibilities for shifts in foreign policy priorities every six months after the change of the presidency, thus enabled the EU to send more consistent message to its foreign partners (Cull, 2014).

The important institution shaping EU-Ukraine relations and Ukrainian attitudes towards the EU is the diplomatic mission of the EU in Ukraine. The permanent delegation representing the interest of the EU in Ukraine was established in 1993 under the name “The Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine”. In 2009, after the Lisbon Treaty, the EU diplomatic mission was converted into the “Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine” (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, n.d.).

The official website of the Delegation of the EU to Ukraine enumerates four main responsibilities of the diplomatic mission, of which last two are directly linked to public diplomacy:

- implementation of the EU development projects in Ukraine,
- monitoring implementation of the EU-Ukraine agreements,
- increase awareness of the EU, its institutions and its programmes,
- explain EU development and policies (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, n.d.).

Even though the Common Foreign and Security Policy has become more coherent over time and some powers have been transferred to the supranational level, the EU still remains an intergovernmental organization. At the moment, EU member states retain decisive power and relative independence in the field of foreign and security policy. Furthermore, even though the Lisbon Treaty strengthened the links between different institutions responsible for the conduct of public diplomacy, the Treaty also created new actors that have to cooperate in the realm of foreign affairs, which can lead to problems with coordination. The overall external image of the EU remains fragmented on both the horizontal and vertical level (Cull, 2013).

2.2 Political and Legal framework

On the 1st of May 2004 ten, mostly eastern countries, joined the EU. The 2004 enlargement was the largest single expansion of the EU and besides institutional and internal challenges it also entailed two external challenges for the new enlarged “European family”. Firstly, new eastern borders brought the EU closer to unstable areas and secondly, including some former communist countries, while excluding others encompassed the danger of creating new dividing lines which could have an adverse effect on the mobility of goods and persons between countries that joined the EU and their non-EU neighbours. These two fears led to the creation of a political framework which regulates the EU relations with its neighbours. In 2002 the EU launched the “Wider Europe” policy, which later developed into the “European Neighbourhood Policy” (ENP). At present, the European Neighbourhood Policy provides the political framework for bilateral cooperation between the EU and 16 neighbouring states. Since 2009, the ENP has been supplemented by three regional initiatives: the Eastern Partnership, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED) and the Black Sea Synergy. Relations with Ukraine are regulated under ENP’s eastern division- The Eastern Partnership (EaP) (EEAS b, n.d.).

Through the ENP the EU commits to develop deeper political and economic cooperation built upon shared values, such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy and sustainable development. In other words, the EU shapes its immediate vicinity in its own image by formulating conditions for the partner countries and providing financial, development and other incentives to comply with them. According to Casier (2010) the ENP to a certain extent represents shift in EU policy. In the past, the EU strived to enhance security and stability on the continent through enlargement, thus by “extending” its model of

democracy and stability. However, the EU started to experience “enlargement fatigue” and the ENP offered an alternative way to enhance security in the region by “exporting” its model of democracy and stability.

With regard to the above mentioned and the ENP strategy paper issued by the Commission of the European Communities (2004), the main objectives of the ENP were security, stability, preventing the emergence of new dividing lines and naturally the EU’s economic and political interests. Consequently, it is not surprising that according to the EU’s official website, Ukraine is currently a “priority partner” within the European Neighbourhood Policy and its facet “Eastern Partnership” (EaP). Firstly, from the geopolitical point of view, Ukraine’s position on the West-East crossroad gives this former socialist state strategic importance for maintaining security and stability in the region. As recent developments proved, the competing influences make Ukraine prone to civil unrests which also affect the EU. Secondly, the 2004 enlargement placed barbed wire on the gates of all Ukraine western neighbours-Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, which made Ukraine one of the countries potentially most affected by the “new diverging lines”. And finally, EU energy security is largely connected to Ukraine. It is the main transit country for the gas supplies from Russia to the EU.

Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2007) developed three models to explain the export of EU values and norms through the accession process. These models can also be applied to the ENP, they include the “external incentives model”, “social learning model” and “lesson-drawing model”. The first one is based on conditionality, which essentially is “reinforcement by reward”. The conditions usually involve democratic reforms, openness and transparency of political and economic structures in the exchange of financial incentives or assistance in development. The new EU strategy “more for more” stipulates that countries that successfully comply with EU conditions will get more support. The second model is based on the “gravitational pull” that the EU exerts on its neighbours. According to this model a state accepts rules and norms if they are considered as legitimate or appropriate. The last model implies that disillusion with the domestic situation can be a driving force behind a state’s inclination to the “European solution”. In the case of Ukraine all of the three models are present to a certain extent. The EU has already provided its neighbour incentives worth billions of euros to motivate them to reform. Further, the statistics prove that Ukrainians perceive the EU as symbol of democracy, stability and prosperity and finally, according to EU

Barometer (2012) people are largely dissatisfied with the domestic status quo and believe that the EU has the potential to solve their problems.

Since Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, the EU and Ukraine have been gradually developing relations and cooperating. In 1998 the EU and post-soviet republic signed a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, which to the present day represents the core of the legal framework for their relations. After the 2004 enlargement, when Ukraine became an EU neighbour, both actors started to give higher priority to their relations and began to seek deeper cooperation. Consequently, in 2007 parties launched negotiations on a new Association Agreement. Negotiations were completed in 2011 and in 2012 the EU Foreign Affairs Council confirmed the Union's determination to sign the Agreement as soon as Ukraine undertook actions to fulfil EU's conditions focused mainly on institutional reforms toward a more democratic and transparent political and economic system. In 2013 President Yanukovich shelved plans to sign the new Agreement with the EU, which led to civil protests and the change of leadership. In 2014 the EU and Ukrainian interim government signed core provisions of the original agreement (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, n.d).

One year after Ukraine and the EU became neighbours, they endorsed the Action Plan, which entrenched their bilateral commitments and interest. The Action Plans are core elements of the European Neighbourhood Policy. They set out an agenda for reforms of neighbouring countries in order to approximate more to EU standards and promote "common values", the EU in return offers assistance in implementing these reforms and various political and economic concessions. As Ukraine and the EU started to seek deeper cooperation and negotiate a new Association Agreement, the Action Plan was, in 2009, replaced by EU-Ukraine Association Agenda which was later in 2013 updated as a consequence of new developments. This agreement was designed to facilitate entry into force of Association Agreement and to prepare Ukraine for its implementation by democratizing its structures (EEAS a, n.d.).

2.3 Russian Influence on EU-Ukraine Relations

As mentioned above, the EU has the capacity to apply all three models of effective export of its norms and values in Ukraine, however, its position on the crossroads between the Russia and the EU, make the Ukrainian case *sui generis*. The EU underestimated Russian influence

on the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich and his decision to suspend preparations to sign an agreement with the EU took many EU officials by surprise. It is impossible to examine EU-Ukraine relations without considering Russian influence in Ukraine. No less than 24 per cent of the Ukrainian population are Russian speakers, living mostly at the east and south of the country. Furthermore, 17 per cent of the population are ethnic Russians (CIA, 2014). Since independence the country shifted its foreign policy direction several times. The west is largely pro-European, whilst east and south regions are pro-Russian.

In 2010, Giusti and Peknova identified four main factors that tie Russia and Ukraine. The first one is economy. Ukraine used to be an essential part of soviet military industrial complex and ever since its independence Russia has been trying to maintain economic ties with the former soviet republic. Russia is the main exporter and importer of Ukraine. In 2012 26 per cent of Ukrainian exports was destined to Russia and 32 per cent of Ukrainian imports originated in Russia. The EU as a whole is Ukraine's second largest trading partner (CIA, 2014). Russia tried to attract Ukraine to join the integration of former Soviet Republics- The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, Ukraine accepted only the status of "associate member" because the government was afraid it would harm its cooperation with the EU and hinder its admission to WTO which Ukraine joined in 2008. In 2014, following the annexation of Crimea Ukraine withdrew from the CIS completely. Ukraine's membership in the WTO and Free Trade Area plans with the EU challenge Russian economic leadership in the post-soviet region (Giusti, Peknova, 2010).

Another significant factor, which is often behind Russia- Ukraine disputes is gas. (Giusti, Penkova, 2010, p.134). Ukraine's energy security largely depends on Russia. Ukraine- Russia relations were strained by the disputes over the gas supplies several times over the last decades. Around 80 per cent of the gas supplies from Russia to the EU flow through Ukraine, which amount to approximately 20 per cent of all gas consumed in the EU. Russia accused Ukraine several times for diverting gas flowing to the EU and using it for its domestic purposes. Ukraine was regularly unable to pay for its supplies from Russia on time and despite several agreements the frictions continued. In April 2014 Ukraine's overall debt to Russia for the supplies of natural gas reached over \$3 billion (ITAR-TASS, 2014). In November 2013 the debt was lower but still significant and Russia threatened several times to cut off the supplies to Ukraine. Ukraine's energy dependence and debt enabled Russia to exert

great political leverage. Russia held Yanukovich in check and the energy issues certainly had an influence on foreign policy decisions of Ukrainian leaders. After the unrest that broke down in Ukraine last year the gas issue still plays a role. Russia announced an increase in the price of gas for Ukraine in order to push u and punish the former soviet state for its “infidelity”. The EU, in return pledged to frantically assist Ukraine in order to settle its obligations towards Russia (ITAR-TASS, 2014).

The third important factor that ties Russia and Ukraine is security. Russia strives to maintain its influences and dominant power position if the region. Therefore when Ukraine applied for the membership in NATO, Russia perceived this step as a threat to its national security. If Ukraine entered the Alliance, Russia would find itself sharing a direct border with a third NATO member. Plans to join NATO were shelved after 2010 elections, when Yanukovich was elected. Furthermore, at present joining NATO doesn't enjoy big poplar support (Giusti, Penkova, 2010).

As a fourth factor influencing Ukraine- Russia relations the authors predictively defined the Crimea region. Already in 2010, Giusti and Penkova warned that strong Russian nationalism and aspirations of pro-Russian activists in the region to join Russia can pose a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty. The Crimean issue is connected to the Russian Black Sea Fleet that is operation in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Sevastopol, the city in the south west of Crimean peninsula is the base for the Black Sea Fleet and has strategic importance for Russia. Ukrainian integration into western structures, especially NATO would not only threaten Russian control of its gas transit routes, but at the same time endanger the position of its naval forces, which have been present in the region since the 18th century.

In addition to the four factors presented by Giusti and Penkova (2010), there are also strong cultural, historical and religious ties between Russia and Ukraine. The EU should consider all dimensions of the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle when developing its new strategy towards Ukraine. As recently proven, Russian influence in the region and particularly in Ukraine cannot be underestimated. It has a great impact on EU-Ukraine relations and does have an influence on EU-Russian relation. Following the turbulent development in Ukraine, the EU, in order to express support to the interim pro- western government in Kiev, decided to abandon its strict policy of conditionality. In March 2014 it signed core elements of the Association Agreement previously rejected by Yanukovich. After the direct involvement of Russia, Kiev

was looking up to the EU for help. The EU which is often criticised for being solely a soft power, found itself in a difficult situation. The EU decided to respond to Ukraine's request for help though legally committing to trade concessions and generous financial assistance. The EU also imposed several economic sanctions on Russia. However, Russia is the third biggest trading partner of the EU and due to economic interdependence these sanctions are expected to have adverse effects also on the economies of the EU member states (Baker, Elgood, 2014).

In 2010, Giusti and Penkova stressed the importance of the awareness of Russian influence. They warned that in order to maintain stability in the region Russia should be included in "western solutions" to Ukrainian problems and western policies towards the region should take Russia's interests and capabilities into account. Today, four years after the publication of their recommendations we can assess that the west and the EU did not succeed to translate their recommendations into their policies and the current crisis is proving that their analysis was well founded. The authors conclude that weak ENP based principally on financial incentives and lacking in response to other needs of the "partner countries" is not having the desired effect on the foreign public nor their governments, but instead it is provoking Russia and exacerbating its "aggressive tone". Maybe the EU can draw a lesson for the future in order to make the ENP more efficient and successful in reaching its main strategic goal-stability at its gates. Furthermore, the EU remains primarily an economic integration and its CFSP is still weak. Military conflict in its neighbourhood reveals the limitation of EU crisis management capabilities and certainly does not enhance EU soft power in the region. Peace and stability are one of the founding principles of the EU and promotion of the stability is in the EU's vital interest. Therefore in order to avoid future escalation of tensions in the region, the EU has to take the interrelationships of the EU- Ukraine -Russia triangle into account when developing its strategies towards the eastern neighbourhood (Giustiy, Penkova, 2010,)

3 Constituent Elements of EU Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy can be conducted through various mechanisms. The academic society is not unified on the issue of constituent parts of public diplomacy and the boundaries of what constitutes public diplomacy are grey. For the purpose of this research I decided to analyse constituent parts of public diplomacy defined by Cull (2013) as listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, international broadcasting and media. In addition, I will also examine EU branding and EU financial aid and assistance in development. I consider these seven elements the most relevant and influential in EU-Ukraine relations. In this chapter I will analyse the EU's capability to use each of these public diplomacy methods to engage with the Ukrainian public. All of the mentioned elements shape EU-Ukrainian relations, influence attractiveness of the EU and consequently affect foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian public. In the last section of this chapter I will explain how public opinion is formed and changed and I will analyse how distinct elements of the EU public diplomacy differently influence formation of Ukrainian public opinion, depending whether they appeal to people's values, attitudes or opinion.

3.1 Listening

Cross (2013), Chaban (2013), Vernygora (2013) and others also agree that effective public diplomacy cannot rely only on speaking but must also incorporate listening in order to adjust the message the actor wishes to send to the foreign public to specific needs and values of that public. Listening allows the practitioner of public diplomacy to craft policies that have a better chance to reach its strategic objectives. Neglecting listening can lead to misunderstanding and eventually to a counter-productive public diplomacy. Messages that proved effective in attracting one nation do not have to evoke the same effect when sent to another nation. Not every nation shares the same values and public diplomacy has to reflect cultural diversity and public diplomacy strategies have to be developed on a case by case basis.

Listening must be systematic in order to be effective. The domestic situation of a target nation can change in time which can lead to a change in the priorities of its leaders and the public. Ukraine is a great example of these dynamics as after the crisis broke out the Ukraine's

priority shifted from economic development to security and stability. It is of crucial importance to systematically observe the development in the target country and to be able to flexibly react to the changing priorities of the public. Many authors point out that despite the importance of listening, this constituent element of public diplomacy is often overlooked and undervalued by policy makers. The EU itself is often subjected to criticism for favouring monologue instead of dialogue. Casier (2010) claims that the ENP and cooperation agreements the EU signs with its neighbours within this political framework are too “EU centric”. He further notes that they are over focused on financial and development aid and do not tackle other needs and requests of the partner countries, such as visa facilitation in the case of Ukraine. He criticises that the partnerships within the ENP are asymmetric and recommends that the EU should undertake more effort to evaluate how the ENP is perceived by partner countries. I agree that listening is an essential part of effective public diplomacy which is to a certain extent neglected by the EU in its policies; however, in my opinion the asymmetry in the EU relations with its neighbours is an inevitable consequence of the large difference in the economic and political capacities between the EU and its “partners”. The EU financially supports the development of its neighbours and if the EU would not ask for any quid pro quo, then the relationship would be truly asymmetric. At the same time, the EU is not able to fulfil all the requests of the partner countries. Facing the domestic disagreement on the issue of immigration and enlargement fatigue, questions such as visa facilitation are very sensitive and the EU can make only limited concessions in this regard.

Another critic of the EU’s ability to “listen” is the Ukrainian public. The EU Neighbourhood Barometer survey from 2012 proves that the EU fails to listen to the Ukrainian nation. 40 per cent of respondents agreed that “Communication from the EU does not take into account the reality of life in Ukraine”, whilst only 29 per cent think the opposite. On the other hand, the EU significantly improved in listening to the Ukrainian public in the recent years. In 2012 the EU conducted its first comprehensive public opinion polls aimed at detecting Ukrainian domestic problems, their attitudes towards the EU and their awareness of the EU (EU neighbourhood Barometer, 2012). In addition, the EU recently launched the ENPI Regional Communication Programme that encompasses opinion polling, media monitoring, social media monitoring in ENP countries. Furthermore, The Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid carried out three surveys in ENP countries between 2009 and 2010. This initiative was running under the name “Opinion Polling and Research in the ENPI Countries and Territories” (OPPOL) (European Commission, 2013). Better Listening is also

assured by the establishment of common EU-Ukrainian institutions. In the Co-operation Council, Co-operation Committee and Parliamentary Co-operation committee, representatives from the Ukrainian government and experts from both partners meet and discuss the implementation of the agreements and main issues of cooperation. Furthermore, there is an annual summit held between Ukrainian president and president of the European Council and European Commission. (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, n.d)

3.2 Advocacy

There are many channels that an actor can use to reach a foreign public in order to raise awareness and knowledge of the actor and its policies. The EU advocates its policies mainly through its website, through the EU Information Centres and EU delegations.

Ukraine is a relatively closed country; barely 32 per cent of Ukrainians own a valid passport for travelling abroad. Between 2008 and 2013 only 12 per cent of Ukrainians visited the EU (Lytvynenko, 2013). For this reason the work of the EU Delegation in Ukraine, as well as their activity online; represent the key channels to reach the Ukrainian public. The EU delegation in Kiev promotes European values in Ukraine through various channels, giving the most emphasis to “Euroclubs“. They were set up in Ukraine in 1995. Euroclubs aim to increase awareness of the EU, support for the EU by informing the Ukrainian population about the Union and benefits of the EU-Ukraine cooperation. Euroclubs in Ukraine are focused primarily on school children and youth. Moreover, the EU delegation regularly publishes Newsletters, Eurobulletins and EU Co-operation news, highlighting key events of the EU-Ukraine cooperation. All Newsletters and Eurobulletins are issued in Ukrainian. This is a logical move since only a small percentage of Ukrainians speaks English. EU Co-operation news is published in English. Between 2008 and 2014, the EU delegation developed nearly 300 Newsletters and more than 100 Eurobulletins. They encompass economic and political matters, as well as the social and cultural dimension of the cooperation (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, n.d.).

Another, important channel of EU advocacy is the EU official website- europa.eu. It provides detailed info about the EU and every aspect of its work. In addition, the EU has several specialized online info centres, including an online EU Neighbourhood Info Centre that was launched in 2009. The EU structure and processes of its work are very complex; therefore it is

important to pass the information to public in a very clear and simplified way. The EU is notoriously known for often failing in this task and for many, even EU citizens, the EU comes across as “confusing”. The EU is an intergovernmental organization and completely unified image is not possible at this stage of its integration. Understanding the mosaic of 28 member states is difficult itself, yet the EU supranational institutions confuse the external observers even more by failing to project a unified message at the horizontal level of EU governance. The public has to find different pieces of information on different websites. For example, there are at least three official websites run by the EU informing the public about the EaP. The complex picture has to be extracted from several sections on the official website of the EU- Europe.eu, secondly from the official website of the EU neighbourhood Info Centre- enpi-ingo.eu, but also from its own website easternpartnership.org. Some of the information on different websites are complementing each other, whilst others are rather tautological, which creates a confusing overall picture. The results of public opinion polls in Ukraine in 2012 underpin this claim. Only 41 per cent of Ukrainians think that communication from the EU about Ukraine is easy to understand¹ (EU Neighbourhood Barometer, 2012). The survey made by Opinion Polling and Research in the ENPI Countries and Territories in 2009 also proves that the EU failed to explain the complexity of the EU and its institutions in many aspects. Random respondents were given a basic knowledge test about the EU. Only 39 per cent of Ukrainians knew how many member states the EU consisted of. Only 41 per cent were aware that European Investment Bank (EIB) is an EU institution, but striking 62 per cent thought that UNICEF is (OPPOL, 2009). Another problem is that even though the information the EU provides often do not effectively reach the Ukrainian public. Even though the EU yearly invests millions of euros on raising awareness of the EU, 48 per cent per cent of the Ukrainians think that there is not enough information on the EU available, and only 40 per cent think that there is sufficient level of information about the EU² (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 2012). The EU has to endeavour not only to speak but also to be heard and understood. This chapter demonstrates that the information reaching the Ukrainian public is not sufficient and is not easy to understand.

¹ See chart 2, p.44

² Ibid.

3.3 Cultural Diplomacy

Another method how to attract the foreign public and develop attitudes towards the EU is subsidizing cultural exports and cultural cooperation. Many scholars consider cultural diplomacy to be an independent field of diplomacy, whilst others considered it to be part of public diplomacy. US department of state Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy in its report form 2005 labels cultural diplomacy as “a linchpin of public diplomacy” (US Department of State, 2005).

One of the main cultural events organized by the EU in Ukraine is the European village, annually held in Kiev. The European Village visitors receive information on the EU, its history and its cooperation with Ukraine. Along with the informative part, the European village includes sport and cultural events, such as football matches and music concerts. The European village is organized by the EU delegation to Ukraine with cooperation with EU member states, Kiev city administration and the Ukrainian government. In 2007, when the EU celebrated its 50th anniversary, marking 50 years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, nearly 60 000 people visited the European village in Kiev and reports of the event were broadcasted on national TV and published in the newspapers (European Commission, 2007).

Whilst the European village is targeted for Ukraine, Europe Day is a cultural event that fosters unity across Europe. In principle, there are two Europe Days. On the 5th of May Europe celebrates the establishment of the Council of Europe and on the 9th of May Europeans remember the Schuman Declaration that is perceived to be the funding text of European integration. In Ukraine, Europe Day is celebrated during the third weekend in May. Europe Day celebrations were established in Ukraine in 1993. During this weekend numerous cultural events are organized across the country. Ukrainians can taste food from across Europe and enjoy performances from European musicians and artists (EU, n. d.). According to the Razmukov centre, around 60 per cent of Ukrainians do not consider themselves as Europeans, thus events that promote European unity are a vital part of EU public diplomacy efforts in Ukraine.

An important part of culture is language. The EU has 24 official languages, with the most common communication language and lingua franca being English. Languages play an essential role in enhancing unity and understanding. Knowledge of the same languages is a

prerequisite for an effective communication between people. European languages in Ukraine are promoted mainly by EU member states and their language agencies. Allians Française has its office in ten cities across the Ukraine, the British Council is represented in four cities and the Goethe Institute also has its office in Kiev. The EU on the central level is lacking in this regard. The fact that Ukraine has the lowest English language learning rate in Eastern Europe signals that the lack of effort of the EU on the central level is consequential. Velychenko (2006) points out that English is the second foreign language in Ukraine after Russian. A common history and presence of significant Russian minority in Ukraine are not the only reasons for this. Russia is actively engaged in promoting Russian in Ukraine. There are many Russian language schools present in Ukraine. In addition, many of the specialized books at Ukrainian schools and universities are available only in Russian. At the same time, learning English is for many Ukrainians perceived as a not commonly available luxury (Velychenko, 2006).

Poland and Germany are one of the loudest and active advocates of strengthened cooperation with EU's eastern neighbours. Poland and Germany play an important role in organizing the European Village project in Kiev. They are also active in another aspects of cultural diplomacy, for example Ministry of for affairs of Poland recently coo-financed the Eastern Partnership – Perspectives of Cultural Diplomacy Conference in Kraków, in order to “to initiate a discussion on prospects of development of the Eastern Partnership and set new goals in the context of Cultural Diplomacy” (EastBook, 2013).

In this chapter I pointed out the importance of an active cultural diplomacy in Ukraine. The majority of Ukrainians do not feel culturally attached to Europe and therefore projects such as the European Village and Europe Day, which strive to promote European Unity and stimulate feeling of European identity amongst Ukrainians, are important tools of public diplomacy. However, the EU fails in promoting European languages in Ukraine and without an effort in this regard the gap between Ukrainian society and the EU public cannot be diminished. Furthermore, due to strong Russian endeavour to promote Russian in Ukraine, the EU passive stance can be dangerous.

3.4 Exchange

The fourth element of public diplomacy that enhances mutual understanding and personal connections between EU citizens and citizens of third countries is exchange. According to

Scott-Smith (2008, p.174) exchange programs are "oft-neglected but arguably most successful element of public diplomacy, from the perspective of diplomatic history and international relations."

The EU exchanges of people with third parties, including Ukraine, are mainly focused on students, education staff through Erasmus + and government officials, NGO's , journalists and other professionals through European Union Visitors Programme. Youth from the EU and third countries can also join the European Voluntary Service.

In 2004, The EU launched the Erasmus Mundus mobility programme. The EU has been exchanging students and academic staff with third countries in order to deepen cooperation in the field of education, improve the quality of European education, promote the EU as a centre of excellence and bolster intercultural understanding. In 2014, the EU introduced a new programme called Erasmus + that absorbed all EU schemes for education including Erasmus Mundus. The new programme also offers the possibility for grants for development of joint master courses between Ukrainian and EU universities. Besides education and training, Erasmus + is focused also on sport (EACEA, 2014). The budget for Erasmus + for the period 2014-2020 is 14.7 billion euro, which represents a 40 per cent increase compared to previous years (European Commission, 2014b). According to the EU official website more than 4000 Ukrainians are expected to receive grants to participate in Erasmus + 2014-2020 university exchange programme (European Commission, 2014c). Furthermore, the website of the EU Delegation to Ukraine and European Commission offer information about other possibilities to study in Europe.

Ukrainian citizens between 17 and 30 can also participate in the exchange through European Voluntary Service (EVS). EVS project is based on cooperation between organisations in the EU and third countries. Participants can apply for posts that can last from 2 weeks up to 12 months in a wide range of fields, ranging from culture, sport, education, environment, economic development, cooperation etc. Even though it is volunteer projects, the participants are provided with an accommodation, food and pocket money, thus most of their living costs are covered, which makes participation in this program relatively accessible. The current budget presumes that more than 7000 Ukrainians will be able to gain a practical experience in the EU through EVS initiative or through funding for the mobility of youth workers (European Commission, 2014c).

The EU Visitors Programme has been a joint initiative of the European Parliament and European Commission since 1974. Every year, the EU invites professionals from the third countries, including Ukraine for five to eight days to EU institutions to gain knowledge of the EU, its policies, and meet professionals from the EU. The EU Visitors Programme is according to the website of the EU Delegation to Ukraine open for “government officials, journalists, trade unionists, educators, non-governmental organisations and other professionals with career-related interests in the European Union.” Only five to six professionals are selected from Ukraine each year (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, 2011).

Erasmus +, European Voluntary Service and EU Visitors Programme represent important initiatives that facilitate exchange between EU citizens and Ukrainians. The highest number of Ukrainians have a chance to come to the EU for an exchange through Erasmus programme. The EU is gradually developing and extending this programme. However, the number of exchanges between EU citizens and Ukrainians is still low. For illustration, In the single academic year- 2007/2008, the Erasmus program enabled around 210 000 EU students and academics from the EU to participate in exchange within the EU, while only 800 students, teachers and researchers from Ukraine, which has population over 44 million people, received Erasmus Mundus scholarships between 2007 and 2011 (EU, 2009). Even after a 40 per cent budget increase for the Erasmus Mundus only around 1 800 Ukrainians a year will have a chance to participate in the exchange through Erasmus+, European Voluntary Service and EU Visitors Programme combined. Changes and reforms in the exchange programs represent a step forward; however this method of public diplomacy is still under-used.

3.5 International Broadcasting and Media

The development of international broadcasting corporations that are able to reach the public in more countries at the same time as well as endeavour to be presented in the national media of third countries have been important parts of foreign policy strategies since the technical developments allowed it. European states have been pioneers in engaging with the public of third countries though government support of international broadcasting corporations since the 1920s (Cull, 2013). The new information has era brought new possibilities for reaching a foreign public. Besides traditional channels as newspapers and TV, new channels, such as the internet and social media, have emerged. The information has become more accessible and harder to control and subject to censorship. At present, governments are including social

networks more and more in their public diplomacy strategies. Also the EU's ENPI Regional Communication Programme is focused also on social media monitoring along with media monitoring.

Assuring that the EU appears in the national medias of third countries is the responsibility of the 139 EU Delegations around the world that are actively cooperating with media in the host countries. Their work, according to the website of the European Commission involves:

- co-funding or co-producing documentaries and radio shows;
- providing information for radio quizzes and games and offering prizes;
- finding speakers for panel discussions;
- arranging for interviews by the head of delegation;
- placing adverts in the written press;
- producing TV spots;
- co-financing press supplements;
- holding round-table debates with the press;
- providing articles ready for publication. (European Commission, 2007)

The Delegation of the EU to Ukraine has the Press and Information Section which is raising awareness of the EU through various information activities. These activities include administrating the official website of the delegation, Newsletters, Eurobulletins, EU-Ukraine Cooperation Newsletter, brochures, audio-visual products, press conferences, seminars and press releases about EU events. Besides English sources of information, EU Delegation also provides publications in Ukrainian and Russian (Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, n.d.).

The EU is less active when it comes to support of European international broadcasting corporations in Ukraine. In 1993, The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) established its radio broadcast in Ukraine, called "BBC Ukrainian". BBC Ukrainian broadcasted in Ukrainian, bringing domestic and international news. BBC Ukrainian radio broadcasting was directed from their headquarter in London, with cooperation with the office in Kiev. Nevertheless, since 2011 BBC Ukrainian exists only online. Lytvinenko (2013, p.4) observes that "As a direct source of information, European media are not particularly important in terms of influencing Ukrainian public opinion. However, the BBC, CNN, and others are the most essential sources of international information for the Ukrainian media and elites."

Limited influence of BBC, TV5Monde, Deutsche Welle and other European broadcasting networks correlates with the small amount of Ukrainians speaking English, French, German or other major EU languages. In order to use the full potential of this public diplomacy tool it is first necessary to promote learning European languages in Ukraine.

In contrast, Russia is very successful in broadcasting in its language in Ukraine. In 2012, the Ukrainian newspaper Pravda even published an article about “russification” through TV and radio. According to statistics they published more than 60 per cent of the total circulation of newspapers are in Russian. Furthermore, 83 per cent of magazines and about 87 per cent of books are published in Russian. The popular news network reveals that only 28 per cent of TV programs in Ukraine are in Ukrainian, whilst 44 per cent are in Russian and 28 per cent are bilingual (Pravda, 2012).

In recent years the EU has extended its cooperation with the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which is a union of public service broadcasters in and around Europe. The EBU was launched in 1950 by 23 broadcasters from Europe and today it has 76 members from 56 countries. The EBU founded the Eurovision Song contest project that is widely known in Europe. It also initiated the Euronews channel which broadcasts news from a pan-European perspective in 155 countries around the world. In 2012, the EU and EBU signed the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding. In this document the EU and EBU committed to cooperate in supporting the development of sustainable and independent public service media serving the democratic society in the EU neighbourhood. In 2013 the EU announced that it plans to deepen cooperation with the EBU (EU Press Release Database, 2013). The EBU plays an important role in promoting EU values and culture, influences opinion of millions of people around the world through the Euronews channel brings European nations including Ukraine together thanks to initiatives like the Eurovision song contest and it supports the independence of information. Considering that the EU lacks its own broadcasting initiative, it is crucially important that the Union closely cooperates with the EBU.

3.6 Branding

In the Globalisation and information era, image and branding have become important foreign policy tools. Actors without strong brands have difficulties to attract economic and political attention. Branding has been affecting political reality of states, as well as of subnational and

supranational actors, such as the EU (Ham, 2001). In the last decade several opinion leaders, started to measure the image of places. The most influential are Anholt- GfK Roper Nation Brands Index measuring global perceptions of countries and cities across several dimensions and the international ranking of soft power conducted by Monocle in cooperation with The Institute for Government.

Branding has sparked fierce academic discussion over the past decade and has many proponents and critiques. Ham (2001) views place branding positively. He believes that branding represents a more benign alternative to nationalism. Branding techniques used to form an image and strengthen national identity are in his opinion surpassing aggressive and dangerous techniques of nationalism and contributing to peace and tolerance. Many realists, on the other hand, diminish the real influence of branding. Their claim is built on the premise that all political actors, including a politically engaged public are rational and make their decisions on the basis of strategic calculations. But, as Ham (2001) points out the processes of world politics are far more complex. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that people, who are provably influenced by branding and image in their everyday choices when buying consumer products, would decide solely on the basis of rational analysis when making political decisions. Also public opinion experts such as Davison (2007) agree that opinion leaders can influence public opinion by inventing slogans and symbols. “Once enunciated, symbols and slogans are frequently kept alive and communicated to large audiences by the mass media and may become the cornerstone of public opinion on any given issue” (Davison, 2007, p. 8).

Place branding is practiced within the EU on several levels; EU as a whole, member states, region and even cities are trying to engage external audiences by creating an attractive image. Well known symbols that externally represent the EU are its flag, motto and anthem. The Omnipresent blue flag with twelve stars in a circle is the most recognized EU symbol. The EU flag even further inspired flags of other countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, where the EU was largely involved on their way “to stability and independence”. Due to the successful integration of the post war continent and pioneering in human rights and sustainable development, the EU is perceived as symbol of democracy, prosperity and stability. Furthermore, thanks to its history, worldwide known events and educational system, the EU is often perceived as a centre of excellence and culture. On the other hand, the EU is also associated with certain negative attributes and many of its achievements are disregarded.

In addition, according to Gallup International (2005) over 36 per cent of the world does not have an opinion on the EU and views it as “neutral”. Ham (2001), Cull (2013), Cross (2013) and others claim that The EU is selling itself short and that there is a significant gap between EU’s image and its importance and achievements. One of the examples of this is little knowledge of the world about the EU’s outstanding efforts and achievements in humanitarian aid, which I outlined in the introduction.

The EU is most often criticized for being incoherent and unclear. Especially, in the field of CFSP the EU as a whole is often exposed to criticism for being disjointed, slow and weak in its response. As Helwing (2013) points out, this criticism could be attributed to a large “capability-expectations“ gap. Bonfield (2012) claims that the HR is "all hat and no cattle". Often too ambitious and misleading speeches by the HR and other EU officials make the public and international partners believe that Europe has found its single voice that can unite and replace all 28 previously existing ones. Even though Lisbon brought more powers to the supranational level, the last word remains with member states and CFSP remains prevalingly intergovernmental. An example of misleading speech setting faulty expectations was HR’s speech in Brussels in 2009: “Our security and defence policy is now a reality, and our capacity in the area of crisis-management is making a real difference on the ground. There is much to be proud of where there was only a common will ten years ago. We do not just make declarations, we act to monitor, to protect and to stabilise with concrete results“ (Ashton, 2009). The “capability- expectations gap” can result in disenchantment and negatively influence how the EU is perceived both inside and outside its borders. The problem is relevant also in the case of Ukrainian perceptions of the EU as over ambitious statements can cause Ukrainians scourged by unrests to expect the EU to help more than just with its diplomacy and economic sanctions. Overall, the EU in the field of CFSP, with regards to its powers and instruments at its disposal, proved a better peace mediator and manager of civilian assistance than crisis manager. Therefore, it could be beneficial if the EU officials focused on these capabilities of the EU in their official speeches. The EU should highlight its strengths, without deepening “capability-expectations gap”. As the GfK research institute states in its publication “Place Branding encompasses measuring (...) identity, evaluating its strengths and weaknesses and building and communicating differentiating and winning characteristics” (GfK, n.d.).

Cull (2013) indicates that EU diversity that is today often associated with “incoherence” doesn’t have to be necessarily negative. The EU should, in the spirit of its motto, endeavour to stress the benefits of its diversity. He reminds us that military strengths and “coherence” invoke hegemony and fear and can produce negative attitudes. “The optimal solution for the EU is to be seen as a glorious mosaic of 500 world-class cities or 250 regions or 28 member states rather than one blue and gold-starred leviathan, and yet have the central authority to truly benefit all the parts” (Cull, 2013, p.xii).

Above, I expressed claims that the EU is successful in promoting its symbols, especially its flag, and projecting its fundamental values, but also that the EU is at the same time perceived as incoherent and unclear. These claims are confirmed by results of public opinion research on the Ukrainian perception of the EU conducted by OPOL in 2009. “The vision of the EU is based mainly on stereotypes like democracy and economic growth and development and some symbols like flag with stars and the euro. (...) The image of the EU is quite positive but unclear” (OPOL, 2009). For 44 per cent of Ukrainians the EU conjures up a positive image, for 37 percent neutral, for only 10 per cent negative³ (EU Barometer, 2012). Most Ukrainians do not know or do not understand the EU’s structure and workings. Despite the fact that according to an OPOL survey only 39 per cent of Ukrainians knew the correct number of EU member states, 93 per cent of them recognized the EU flag (OPOL, 2009). The flag that the EU currently uses to represent itself was originally the flag of a different organization- the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe invited other European institutions to adopt the flag to symbolize Europe’s unity. Consequently, the European Economic Community, which was the precursor to the EU, adopted the flag in 1980’s. At present, due to the EU’s higher political profile and frequent use of this symbol, the flag is more often associated with the EU than with the Council of Europe. However, the fact that the EU and Council of Europe share the same flag and anthem could be one of the reasons why 55 per cent of Ukrainians think that council of Europe is an institution of the EU (OPOL, 2013).

Furthermore, the EU is often connected to certain exclusivity. States that want to join the EU have to withstand a long accession process and fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. Therefore EU membership represents a certain affirmation of stability and development and symbolizes a certain “status and place in the intentional community” (Ham, 2001). However, the

³ See chart 3, p.45

exclusivity can also backfire. Due to the long list of conditions that candidate countries have to fulfil before they can join the Union, many Ukrainians perceive the EU as a “distant dreamland” and some scholars describe the EU as a “gated community”. Even though, the EU within ENP presumes to cooperate with partner countries without integrating them into the Union, the accession to the EU is part of the national strategy of Ukraine.

To conclude, the EU enjoys a relatively positive image in Ukraine, however it has to endeavour to gain the “hearts and minds” also of 37 per cent of Ukrainians that do not have an opinion about the EU and alter the perceptions of 10 per cent that view the EU negatively. One of the ways to achieve this is by projecting a clearer image and promoting understanding of EU institutions and workings. Furthermore, in order to avoid disenchantment and a negative image the EU should strive to decrease the current “capabilities- expectations gap”. In order to take attention away from its incoherent and relatively weak CFSP it should stress its abilities and achievements as a mediator. The EU’s diversity is currently often associated with a lack of coordination and incoherence; however the EU can shift this negative perception by emphasizing positive sides of its heterogeneity. And finally, I demonstrated that there is a gap between EU image and its importance in the world politics, therefore it is crucial that the EU promotes more its achievements and take credit for its accomplishments.

3.7 Financial aid and assistance in development

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the “European Neighbourhood Policy” and “Eastern Partnership” represent the main political frameworks for the regulation of EU- Ukraine relations. Even though the EU collaborates with more countries through these platforms, Ukraine is recognized as a “priority” or a “key” partner.

Decisions made within the ENP and EaP were implemented through a financial instrument- “The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument” (ENPI). ENPI was launched in 2007 and in 2014 it was replaced by the “European Neighbourhood Instrument” (ENI). Another important financial instrument to gather and provide resources for financing projects agreed upon within ENP is the “Neighbourhood Investment Facility” (NIF). NIF brings together grants from the EU Commission, voluntary donations from EU member states and loans from European Public Finance Institutions. Between 2007 and 2013 NIF contributed €

745 million to development projects in neighbouring countries (EU Neighbourhood Info centre, n. d.).

Development aid is a key instrument within ENP. In 2007-2013, the EU provided partners with over € 12 billion in grant money for the implementation of ENP projects (EU Neighbourhood Info centre, n. d.). Regarding Ukraine, the EU as a whole is the largest donor to this eastern neighbour. Since its independence, EU support to Ukraine has exceeded €2.5 billion. Moreover, the annual support for Ukraine is increasing. Whilst in 2002 the EU invested €47 million, in 2009 the figures more than doubled and reached € 116 million (EEAS a, n.d.).

After the crisis in Ukraine broke out, the EU Commission, in order to demonstrate its support for Ukraine, released a document named “Support Package for Ukraine”. In this document the EU pledges to provide Ukraine overall support of a tremendous €1 billion over the upcoming years from the EU budget and EU based international financial institutions” (European Commission, 2014). Besides macro financial assistance, assistance in reconstruction and development, trade concessions and visa liberation, the core element of the support package is also assistance in the energy security sector, which is an important issue in Ukraine. The EU further commits to assist in stabilising the country (European Commission, 2014). This is likely to appeal to Ukrainians. A public opinion poll conducted in Ukraine by Razmukov Center in 2014 reveals that security is currently perceived as one of the most important areas of cooperation with the EU.

The EU is currently funding more than 250 distinct projects across Ukraine. EU development programmes are targeting a wide range of sectors, with focus on fostering democratic reforms, administrative capacity building, infrastructure development and energy security (EEAS a, n.d.). The EU donated vast amount of subsidies to Ukraine through ENP and EaP. Lot of EU projects directly reached ordinary people, which beyond doubt helped to enhance positive attitudes towards the EU. ENP was launched in 2004 and EaP in 2009, both times the support for the EU was significantly increased⁴. The EU Neighbourhood Barometer conducted in Ukraine in 2012 reveals that 40 per cent of Ukrainians believe that the EU is the most capable actor to help economic development in their country. In other words, 40 per cent of

⁴ See chart 1.A, p. 42

Ukrainians believe that the EU is more capable of fostering the economic growth of Ukraine than their own national government or Russia. According to polls national government had the trust of 44 per cent while CIS countries, including Russia, only 14 per cent. However, the same survey revealed that 76 per cent of Ukrainians believe that the EU should have a greater role to play in the economic development of their country. Only 40 per cent of the Ukrainian public agree that the support of the EU currently contributes a lot to the development of Ukraine. Ukraine over the past years received the highest support, yet the average result from other EaP countries was one percent higher (EU Neighbourhood Barometer, 2012). An OPPOL research (2009, p. 19) confirms that “Compared with other international players in Ukraine, the EU is considered as one of the contributors in economic matters only after the International Financing institutions (IMF/WB, EIB/EBRD).” These mixed results imply that even though many Ukrainians are aware of the great economic power of the Union and are attracted by its development projects and its capacity to help Ukraine to develop in the future, a significant part of the population is not aware of the extent of help that is currently flowing to Ukraine. As I mentioned above the EU is the largest donor to Ukraine and since its independence the support for Ukraine has reached over € 2.5 billion. These figures are tremendous, therefore, mixed recognitions of EU efforts seem surprising. It is clear that the EU is lacking in promoting its financial aid. Economic development is one of the priority areas where Ukrainians would like to see greater involvement of the EU, thus the EU can improve its image in Ukraine by rising awareness of EU development aid. It is a logical premise that financial support would improve attitudes towards Europe and the opinion polls prove it⁵. After the launch of the ENP and EaP the support raised. Conducting public diplomacy through an institutionalized political framework increases its visibility and therefore has a better chance of influencing awareness and attitudes. The results of an OPPOL survey (2009) proves that ENP and EaP make EU development aid to Ukraine more visible and help the EU take credit for its efforts. According to the survey 95 per cent of Ukrainians have knowledge of ENP and EaP initiatives. However, they still lack information about the extent of the aid that Ukraine receives through these initiatives.

⁵ See chart 1.A, p. 42

3.8 Public Opinion Formation

Public opinion is increasingly influential in IR. Public protests that led to a change of government in Ukraine are one of many reminders that public opinion matters. In order to study how public opinion can be effectively used as a part of foreign policy strategies, it is important to understand what public opinion is, how it is formed and how can different methods of public diplomacy influence it. My second hypothesis claims that mechanisms of public diplomacy that appeal to people's values have a stable and gradual impact on public opinion, whilst mechanisms that through certain events directly influence the reality of a foreign audience and influence their attitudes and opinions have a less stable but more noticeable effect on public opinion. This hypothesis is built upon the study of the Past President of the World Association of Public Opinion Research Sir Robert Worcester (2013). He claims that public opinion consists and is influenced by three "levels of thought"; values, attitudes and opinions. As elaborated in the theory section, opinions are the most unstable and easy to influence, attitudes represent more firm beliefs that are harder to confound and values are the most stable "deep and powerful tides" (Worcester, 2013). Opinions can be altered relatively easily by certain events or new information and they can have a significant, however unsteady impact on public opinion. I argue that financial aid and a number of development projects provided through ENP and EaP are influencing mainly opinions and attitudes. As demonstrated in the previous section, public opinion polls prove that after 2004 and 2009 when these political frameworks were launched the inclination of Ukrainians towards the EU significantly rose and caused the sharpest changes in public opinion in the given time frame (Razmukov Centre, 2004-2012)⁶. However, according the Worcester's theory this influence is likely to be unstable and once the development projects are terminated and financial aid decreases or is exhausted public support for the EU in Ukraine is expected to decline. On the other hand, most of the development projects, as well as conditions tied to financial aid are aimed to increase the level of democracy in Ukraine and reform its institutions, economy and society according the "western model". This approximation of political, economic and social structures can bring the EU and Ukraine closer and influence public opinion long term. Nevertheless, the current difference between EU and Ukrainian systems are too large and it is questionable how long it will take to approximate it to EU standards to the extent that it will have a visible impact on public opinion. Therefore, in order

⁶ See chart 1.A, p. 42

to assure steady support for the EU it is necessary to invest alongside development aid in other methods of public diplomacy which are analysed in the previous sections of this chapter, especially on the elements of public diplomacy that are based on attraction through promoting shared values and creating new shared values. Cultural Diplomacy is by many scholars recognized as an effective tool of bringing nations together and attracting foreign audiences. Exchange programs enhance intercultural understanding and contribute to the creation of personal connections between people from the EU and Ukraine. Advocacy and branding raise awareness of the EU by promoting its achievements and enhancing its soft power. Broadcasting and media are widely recognized instruments of opinion formation. And finally, listening helps the international actor identify needs of target public, recognize shared values and tailor its public diplomacy strategies accordingly.

The soft power of the EU is inseparable from the values that the EU represents. I defend the opinion that values, such as prosperity, stability and democracy, which according to an OPOL survey (2009) Ukrainian public identify with the EU, have been pulling the Ukrainians towards the EU gradually over a long period of time. The claim that Ukrainians are attracted by these values is underpinned by the results of public opinion surveys that reveal the problems of the Ukrainian people and actors that they believe can solve these problems. According to the EU Neighbourhood Barometer (2012) 78 per cent of respondents judge the current economic situation in Ukraine as “bad” and 40 per cent of Ukrainians believe that the EU is the most capable institution to effectively help the economic development of the country, whilst only 14 per cent of them think that the CIS which includes Russia can offer a right solution to their economic problems (EU Neighbourhood Barometer, 2012). Furthermore, while most of Ukrainians identify the EU with democracy, 75 per cent of them are not satisfied with the level of democracy in their own country. In the time frame 2004-2012 the support for the EU was fluctuating but gradually rose almost 10 per cent, reaching its minimum during the euro crisis when EU soft power and its image of strong economic power was devaluated⁷ (Razmukov Centre, 2004-2012). Values and soft power are believed to have a steady, but not sharp influence on the changes of public opinion because the soft power of the EU is developing gradually. Significant change only happens if EU soft power is significantly strengthened or weakened, as happened during the euro crisis.

⁷ See chart 1.A, p. 42

Conclusion

As recent history has proven several times, starting with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, through the Arab Spring to the latest turmoil in Ukraine, public opinion and ideas can change the political direction of the country, a country's regime and even the world map. The Process of creation and distribution of ideas that can influence reality is highly important and the study of this process is necessary to comprehend recent events in Eastern Europe. At the same time, as outlined in the introduction and proved throughout the thesis, public diplomacy is of great importance for the EU. Effective public diplomacy helped architects of the EU to unite a divided continent. Public diplomacy also helps to increase EU's soft power in the present and certainly will play a role in its future. This research is aimed to help understand and explain EU public diplomacy in Ukraine and its impact on Ukrainian foreign policy preferences. The limited extent of this thesis could not encompass all the aspects of this complex issue, however I hope this paper succeeded in reducing the gap in the IR literature dedicated to this matter and that it will stimulate a new academic discussion.

To conclude, in this thesis I claim that the creation of an institutionalized and thus more visible political framework through which the EU conducts its public diplomacy towards Ukraine and implements its development projects in Ukraine is likely to invoke favourable attitudes towards the EU. Furthermore, development aid will effectively influence the public opinion of Ukrainians only if it is sufficiently advertised in an understandable and reachable way. Secondly, I advocate that the promotion of common values have a stable and gradual impact on public opinion, whilst mechanisms that influence attitudes and opinions of a foreign audience, such as a launch of a development project, have a less stable but more noticeable effect on public opinion. Financial incentives and development projects are directly influencing public opinions only whilst they are still in place. Moreover, this research revealed that the ENP is primarily focused on financial aid and assistance in development, whilst other important tools of public diplomacy such as listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchanges, international broadcasting and media and branding are, despite some progress reached in the past years, still neglected. Development aid has an unstable effect on Ukrainian attitudes toward the EU and the EU must endeavour to also develop other mechanisms of public diplomacy in order to effectively influence Ukrainian attitude toward the EU over a long period of time.


It is important to mention that this is not the first time that Ukraine has been on the crossroads of west-east. Events similar to those that broke out in 2013, also occurred in 1992-1994 and 2002-2004, although less violent and on the smaller scale. It is crucial to bear in mind that Ukraine shifted its foreign policy orientation several times before and it is impossible to predict if Ukraine will make a definite choice this time. The ultimate reach of the consequences of this turmoil that is scourging Ukraine at the present time is yet to be discovered and it will also depend on the reactions of the EU and Russia. The analysis can be useful for the future EU policies towards Ukraine or other CIS countries neighbouring the EU.

There are several limitations to my research. Firstly, it is focused on the specific case of Ukraine and thus many findings cannot be generalised and used in the EU's approach towards the countries in different regions outside the EU's neighbourhood. Furthermore, public opinion of Ukrainians has not been shaped solely by the public diplomacy of the EU, but also by influences of other world powers, particularly by Russia and by other external factors, which have to be taken into account. Davison (2007, p. 8) warns that "Because psychological makeup, personal circumstances, and external influences all play a role in the formation of each person's opinions, it is difficult to predict how public opinion on an issue will take shape. The same is true with regard to changes in public opinion. Some public opinions can be explained by specific events and circumstances, but in other cases the causes are more elusive". He claims that special events, especially crises can also have a strong impact on public opinion. The turmoil, instability and eroding sovereignty that Ukraine is facing at the moment can trigger unpredictable changes in public opinion. Moreover, for the purpose of this research I limited actors of the EU public diplomacy to supranational structures of the EU, however, the public opinion of the foreign audience can be shaped also by other actors, for example by individual members states, corporations, or various individuals.

10 Charts- Public Opinion Polls


1 Foreign Policy Direction Preferences

1.A “Which foreign policy direction should be a priority for Ukraine?” (2002-2012)



Source: Razumkov centre. Available at:
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=305


1.B “What community should be priority for Ukraine to enter?” (2014)



Source: Razumkov Centre. Available at:
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=919

2. Level of Information


“Could you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements concerning the European Union” (2012)



Source: EU Neighbourhood Barometer, 2012. Available at: http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/FactsheetENPI_wave2-UA-EN1.pdf

3. EU Image in Ukraine

“In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?” (2012)



Source: EU Neighbourhood Barometer, 2012. Available at: http://euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/FactsheetENPI_wave2-UA-EN1.pdf

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