Libya: The EU's failure to act in concert

Analyzing the interests of France, the UK, Germany and Italy

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Abstract

The purpose of this analysis is to present and test a theory that aims to explain the failure of EU foreign policy. There seems to be consensus that for the greater part the failure of a coherent and active EU foreign policy can be explained by intergovernmentalism. The presented theory will focus on states' cost-benefit calculations on three levels: the domestic level, the national level and the international level. The theory aims to explain the failure of EU foreign policy. In the analysis I will only deal with the responses of France, the UK, Germany and Italy as they can be considered the group of the great European powers. The theory has produced four independent variables on the basis of which five hypotheses are formulated. In the case of Libya different domestic or foreign policy considerations have prevailed in different member states. The analysis showed support for all the formulated hypotheses and therefore the theory presented in this thesis does explain the failure of EU foreign policy. However in the Italian case the independent variables bilateral relations (indicator political relations) and domestic politics showed some overlap. We can conclude that high-risk military crisis management under the CSDP instrument will not be a feasible option until some fundamental issued about Europe's strategic identity are resolved by the member states. It is however unlikely that this will happen in the near future.

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1. List of acronyms

AWACS:	Airborne Warning and Control System
CSDP:	Common Security and Defence Policy
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ECHO:	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European Commission
EEAS:	European External Action Service
EMP:	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EPC:	European Political Cooperation
ESDP:	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS:	European Security Strategy
EMP:	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EU:	European Union
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
HR:	High Representative of the Union for foreign Affairs and Security Policy
LI:	Liberal Intergovernmentalism
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NTC:	National Transition Council of Libya
PSC:	Political and Security Committee
QMV:	Qualified Majority Voting
UfM:	Union for the Mediterranean
UK:	United Kingdom
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
UN OCHA:	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
US:	United States

2. Introduction

In December 2010, a street vendor in Tunisia set himself on fire in protest at his treatment by local officials. The vendor's protest exposed the deep frustrations of a nation dealing with abusive leaders, high unemployment and poverty. His act ignited a public rage that had long been brewing under the surface and became the catalyst for the Tunisian revolution and the wider Arab Spring. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled Tunisia since 1987, was forced from office on 14 January 2011. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign on 11 February 2011. Libya is situated between Tunisia and Egypt and was ruled by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi for over 40 years. Gaddafi seized power of Libya in a bloodless military coup in 1969. Inspired by the success in Egypt and Tunisia, social media-based activists agreed on a '*Day of Rage'* in Libya on 17 February 2011. On 15 February 2011 riots in Benghazi were triggered by the arrest of human rights activist Fethi Tarbel, who has worked to free political prisoners. The riots soon turned into a general uprising against the Gaddafi regime. Gaddafi did not have any intention of relinquishing power without a bloody fight and the regime responded with massive repression and violence against civilians.

Just under 20 years after Jacques Poos famously and prematurely declared the 'hour of Europe', the European Union (EU) was again faced with a crisis at its doorstep. The Arab Spring was the first test for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty should have made it easier for the EU to be more active and coherent in its approach. However, while several EU member states have resorted to military means to offset Gaddafi, no serious proposal about launching a military Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission under the Petersberg tasks was ever put on the table (Brattberg 2011:1). The no-fly zone over Libya was initially enforced by a multi-national coalition -spearheaded by France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US)- and eventually the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) took sole control of all operations. The disunity over a vital conflict in the EU's vicinity amounts to a disintegration of the EU as a political actor. As one diplomat has put it: "CFSP died in Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under

which we can bury it." (Menon 2011: 76).

Given the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, the member states are the major actors of the CFSP (Regelsberger 2011:17). This thesis aims to analyze the EU's failure in Libya by analyzing the divergent responses of four selected member states in Libya and their influence on the EU foreign policy. Intergovernmentalism explains the relative failure of the EU foreign policy by emphasizing that national governments will always endorse their own interests (Hoffmann 1966: 882). I will present theory that aims to explain the EU's failure in Libya, based upon (liberal) intergovernmentalism and the literature review. The theory will focus on the cost-benefit calculations of a state on three levels: the domestic level, the national level and the international level. The research question of this thesis is: *Which dimensions of intergovernmentalism explain the EU's failure in the case of Libya?*

This thesis will show that different domestic and foreign policy considerations have dominated EU states' calculations over Libya. French President Sarkozy was faced with upcoming elections. Decisive action in Libya could enhance France' reputation on the global stage and boost his chances to get re-elected. In the UK the importance of the transatlantic alliance has prevailed. In Germany traditional German value-oriented foreign policy and concerns over federal state elections have led to an anti-intervention stance. And lastly, Italy's initial inaction was motivated by an attempt not to jeopardize the bilateral relations between Libya and Italy. In the light of this, there was little that the 'EU foreign minister' could do.

The next chapter will set fourth a literature review on the failure of EU foreign policy. Subsequently I will provide a theory that aims to explain the EU's failure in foreign policy. In chapter four the research design of this thesis will be described. Thereafter there will be a chapter that contains some background information about the EU's response to Libya. Chapters six through nine analyze the responses to the Libyan crisis of respectively France, the UK, Germany and Italy. The final chapter shall provide a conclusion based upon the findings of the analysis.

3. Literature review

Many efforts have been made to conceptualize the EU's international role. The basic underlying assumption behind many of these categorizations is that the EU is a sui generis entity that is trying to pursue its goals by cooperation and dialogue rather than a balance of power logic (Bretherton & Vogler 2006: 35). In handling serious political crises, especially those involving armed conflict, the Union has rarely acted as one, or acted effectively (Cameron 1998: 66). The major split over Iraq (2003) and the earlier failure in the former Yugoslavia have illustrated the shortfalls of EU foreign policy. The EU has not yet been able to dismiss the frequently used narrative *`economic giant, political dwarf'* (Medrano 2001: 155). The dominating opinion seems to be that the EU is unable to conduct coherent foreign policy. Coherence can be defined as the absence of contradiction between different crisis management policies and instruments often referred to as "consistency" and the existence of synergetic effects between them (Missiroli 2001: 5).

In 1993 Hill published a highly influential article- '*Europe's 'capability–expectations gap'*. The central argument of this article was that the capabilities of the Community had been talked up to the point where a significant capability-expectations gap exists (Hill 1993: 310). Hill (1993: 315) saw the capability–expectations gap as having three primary components, namely, the ability to agree, resource availability, and the instruments at the EU's disposal. In general the literature has offered three explanations for the failure of EU foreign policy: explanations on the national level, the supranational level and the international level.

The first explanation focuses on the national level. The limit for EU foreign policy is set by what individual states do or do not in their national foreign policies (Hill 1993: 324). The failure of the EU to speak with 'one voice' can be explained by the desire of member states to maintain sovereign regarding foreign policy decisions. Hoffmann highlighted the dichotomy between low politics and vital national interests or 'high politics' such as security and defence, where national governments are less willing to transfer their authority to a supranational body (Hoffmann 1966: 882). The intergovernmentalist

approach emphasized the importance of the national governments and underlines that national governments would always endorse their interest within a broader system (Ibid.).

From a rationalist perspective the CFSP is best understood as a '*mixed motive game'*. Though the member states share a common interest – the influence of international affairs- they may still fail to cooperate because they may not overcome problems of compliance and distribution (Wagner 2003: 582). Wagner (2003: 583-584) refers to the CFSP as a *'fast coordination game'* as the institutional design of the CFSP is dominated by coordination instead of collaboration and is characterized by great time pressure. Except a possible loss of reputation, non-compliance with the common positions on international events does not elicit any sanctions at all (Wagner 2003: 585).

Toje (2003:138) has argued that there is a consensus-expectations gap which is apparent in the approach of EU member states to virtually all the great foreign policy questions of the day. It is beyond doubt that member states have conflicting positions regarding where the EU should stand internationally. Some states have an almost 'pavlovian reflex' when it comes to follow the US, while others refuse to be sycophantic to the US (Robert 2002: 24). Following the crisis in Iraq the common perception was that the Europeans have fallen in two camps which can largely be attributed as Atlanticists and Europeanists (Stahl et al. 2004).

There has been argued that in fact the consensus-expectations gap is primarily exist between Berlin, Paris and London. In the real world, a single member-state or even a coalition of smaller member states will find it very difficult to hold out if Germany, France and the UK are in agreement (Keukeleire 2001). As former EU Commissioner for external relation Chris Patten (2005: 15-160) has stated: "there is no European policy on a big issue unless France, Germany and Britain are on side." Should the three choose to act in concert, they might play a similar leadership role in the EU as that played by the US in NATO (Keukeleire 2001).

The second explanation for the failure of a coherent EU foreign policy focuses on supranational level. The argument here is that the ineffectiveness of CFSP can be

explained through the weak institutionalism of the supranational decision-making structure (Forster and Wallace 1996). Whereas the EPC was designed to coordinate national foreign policies, the CFSP is expected to create a common policy. However a common foreign and security policy is difficult to achieve by the intergovernmental method (Regelsberger 2011: 17). Hill (1993: 316) has argued that a foreign policy worth of its expectations requires an executive capable of taking clear decisions on high policy matters, and of commanding the resources, instruments to back them up and a sophisticated bureaucracy at their disposal.

Because of the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP coupled with the lack of leading role for the Commission and almost insignificant input of the European Parliament, the EU seems almost handcuffed when seeking to find a unified voice regarding foreign policy (Cameron 1998: 66). Many remain sceptical of EU superpower ambitions. Allin & Jones (2011: 212) have argued that the cruel truth is that without America, Europe lacks the capability to project force on the world stage. However Gordon (1997: 75) has argued that the EU does not suffer from a lack of material resources, but that the failure follows from the reluctance to delegate sovereignty to centralized institutions.

Finally, the third explanation for the failure of a coherent foreign policy focuses on the international dimension. Peterson (1998: 11) has argued that EU's behaviour as an international actor is conditioned by its transatlantic relations. The attitude taken by the US towards the EU helps explain why the latter has been unsuccessful in attaining the position of significant international actor (Ibid.). On the one hand, the US always hoped that Europe would become a more relevant actor in international politics in order to share the burden of global management. On the other hand, the US never really desired the emergence of an autonomous political actor that would potentially represent a serious competitor (Ibid.). The US would have more influence on the European foreign policy if NATO were the only collective security institution in Europe (Ibid.).

Hofmann (2009: 46) has argued that while it is hard to characterize the NATO-CSDP relationship as either competitive or cooperative, overlap has generated a number of feedback effects. The prior existence of NATO and the existence of two alternative

security institutions continues to influence how the institutions evolve—how each institution defines security interests and how states adjust the mandate of each institution to address changes in the security environment (Hofmann 2009: 45). While the US was supportive of the European Security and Defence Identity, the European pillar inside NATO, former US ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, once called ESDP "the most serious threat to the future of NATO." (Burns 2003 in Hofmann 2009: 49). President Obama has gone on record as supporting Europe's buttressing of its defence capability, but America's 'euro- enthusiasm' has limits and there is an especial wariness that a strengthened ESDP come at the expense of weakening NATO (Fortmann et al 2010: 4).

4. Theoretical Framework

The literature review showed that in general three explanations are used to explain the EU's inability to consolidate foreign policy: explanations on the national level, the supranational level and the international level. Given the nature of the CFSP the member states- and in particular those responsible for foreign affairs in national governments - were and are the major actors of the system (Regelsberger 2011: 17). There seems to be consensus that for the greater part the failure of a coherent EU foreign policy can be explained by intergovernmentalism. The real issue is not the decision-making structure of CFSP itself, but the political will of the domestic actors (Stavridis & Hill 1996). Cassen (2003: 15) goes as far as arguing that "deciding how and by whom EU policies are implemented before deciding what should be implemented" is not an innocent choice, as it allows member states to deflect attention from themselves and their retention of sovereignty in foreign affairs while blaming the supranational actor for its inability to make decisions. Situations, not institutions, shape foreign policy decisions. Neither a "Foreign Minister" nor the External Action Service will change this fundamental dynamic (Haine 2011: 13). For those reasons in this thesis I will present a theory based upon intergovernmentalism.

Intergovernmentalism privileges the role of national states and argues that European integration is driven by the interests and actions of nation states (Hix 1999: 15). According to intergovernmentalists, there are costs and benefits attached to European cooperation. The main aim in engaging in this qualitative cost-benefit analysis is to protect their national interests (Cini 2009: 89). Hoffmann (1966) has argued that there are clear boundaries between more dramatic economic integration possible in the areas of low politics, and the very political domain of high politics such as security and defence policy (Cini 2000: 92).

Since the early '90s Moravcsik's theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) has become one of the most important accounts of the European integration process. Drawing upon intergovernmentalist insights, it offers a theoretical approach that is much more rigorous than its antecedents (George & Bache 2001: 13). In 1988 Putnam published an

influential article in which he explored the dynamics of domestic and international politics using the metaphor of two-level games (Putnam 1988). LI explicitly deals with the interface between domestic and international politics and incorporates both realist and neo-liberal elements (Rosamond 2000: 136). LI is based on assumptions drawn from the 'rational actor model' in that it assumes that states behave rationally, 'which means that the actions of states are assumed to be based on utilizing what are judged to be the most appropriate means of achieving their goals' (Nugent 1999: 509). Moravscik uses a three-step process to define his theory. The first step is drawing on liberal theories of national preference formation. The preference formation of a state is influenced by a variety of actors. Moravscik stresses that domestic economic interests are most important for a state when forming a national preference (Moravscik 1998: 4). The second step is interstate bargaining. The outcomes of international bargaining between states are determined by the preferences and bargaining power of states (Moravscik 1998: 7). The final step is supranational institutions that tend to make cooperation more likely as institutional delegation reflects the desire for credible commitments (Moravscik 1998: 3-4).

LI is often criticized for focusing only on 'history-making decisions' (treaty change in particular) and for ignoring day-to-day politics. It has been claimed by Scharpf (1999: 165) that LI the theory can only be applied to cases of intergovernmental negotiation where economic integration is the main concern. As pointed out by Hoffmann these low politics differ from the very political domain of high politics such as foreign policy (Cini 2000: 92). The function that supranational actors perform in sensitive policy domains is severely curtailed (Cini 2009: 90). LI does not sufficiently explain the failure of EU foreign policy. Therefore I will present a theory that will draw upon the insights of (liberal) intergovernmentalism and the literature review. The theory aims to explain the failure of the EU foreign policy. From the theory I shall derive four independent variables that will analyze which dimensions of intergovernmentalism explain the EU's failure in the case of Libya.

The presented theory will focus on states' cost-benefit calculations on three levels: the domestic level, the national level and the international level.

1. *The domestic level cost-benefit calculus*

The domestic level cost-benefit calculus is based on Moravcsik's national preference formation and focuses on the domestic politics of a member state. The assumption is that the national interests of states derive from the domestic politics of a member states. The domestic politics of a member state are likely to be influenced by public opinion, especially in the case of upcoming elections of a multi-party government.

2. *The national level cost-benefit calculus*

The national level cost-benefit calculus draws upon the assumption that domestic economic interests are most important. Moravscik has stressed that national preferences of a member state s reflect a balance of domestic economic interests, rather than any political bias of politicians or national strategic security concerns. The economic interests on the national level are determined by the individual payments of member states.

3. *The international level cost-benefit calculus*

The international level cost-benefit calculus mostly derives from the literature review. It is beyond doubt that member states have conflicting positions regarding where the EU should stand internationally. Some states have an almost 'pavlovian reflex' when it comes to follow the US and consequently prefer NATO over CSDP (Robert 2002: 24). The second element adds an international dimension to national preference formation: the influence of bilateral relations between the member state and the state where intervention is considered. Bilateral economic relations draw upon the assumption that national preferences of a member state s reflect a balance of domestic economic interests. Bilateral political relations focus on cost-benefit calculations beyond economic interests. In addition the international level cost-benefit calculus focuses on the relations of a member state and its allies, in particular the US.

5. Research Design

5.1 Dependent Variable

The Arab Spring was the first test for the CFSP of the EU under the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. While the changes should have made it easier for the EU to be more active and coherent in its approach to Libya, the performance of the EU was criticized for being too slow, too weak, too divided, and essentially incoherent (Koenig 2011: 1). The dependent variable in this thesis is the failure of an active and coherent EU approach to Libyan crisis. The aim of this thesis is to analyze why the EU failed to conduct a coherence and active response to Libya by focusing on the responses of four selected member states.

5.2 Independent Variables & Hypotheses

This thesis aims to analyze which dimensions of intergovernmentalism can explain the EU's relative failure in Libya. The independent variables are expected to influence the responses of the selected member states and thereby the response of the EU. The theoretical framework has provided a theory that focuses on cost-benefit calculus on the domestic level, the national level and the international level. The independent variables will be derived from these cost-benefit calculi. The cost-benefit calculus on the national level will generate one independent variable: domestic politics. The national cost-benefit will also generate one independent variable: individual payments. The international cost-benefit calculus will generate two independent variables: Atlantic ties and bilateral relations.

IV1: Domestic politics

The first independent variable that might explain the response of the selected member states is domestic politics. Study has shown that there is a substantial congruence between public opinion and public policy (Page & Shapiro 1983: 188-189). Policy outcomes are consistent with the preferences of public majorities 55 percent of the time (Page & Shapiro 1983: 188). Consistency was highest with foreign policy decisions with

67 percent (Ibid.). This indicates that governments are particularly sensitive for public opinion when it comes to foreign policy. Therefore the independent variable domestic politics is mainly about public opinion. The public opinion in a member states might be influenced by the member states' national security identity (Stahl 2005: 7). The national security identity can be identified by the dominant security discourse undertaken by a state (Rieker 2006: 9). The national security identity can be shaped by historical events or certain expectations of the international community. The government might convergence to public opinion because it sees responsiveness to the public opinion as an obligation (Page & Shapiro 1983: 188-189).

Upcoming elections make governments particularly vulnerable for public opinion. Based upon the assumption that the government aims to remain in office and maximize its influence, the political elite will be more responsive to public preferences. Depending on the point of view of the public opinion, upcoming elections might trigger the government to support or oppose a military intervention. Another element that might trigger the responsiveness is the influence of a multi-party government. Multi-party governments are producing relatively vulnerable governments that consequently are likely to be more responsive to public mood swings and preferences (Hobolt & Klemmemsen 2005: 384). In addition multi-party government parties that are electoral competitors must negotiate any differences or risk a change in government and thus the process and policies will be different than processes and policies made in the context of single-party rule (Ibid.).

The variable domestic politics focuses more on the decision of a member state to resort to military means than the involvement of the EU. However if a member state is opposing the use force, it will very likely veto a decision that will deploy a mission. As all decisions on military deployments are taking by consensus, non-compliance with the common position does not elicit any sanctions, except a possible lost of reputation (Wagner 2003: 585). This leads to my first hypothesis.

H1: The more the public opinion of a member states opposes a military intervention, the less supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military

implications

IV2: Individual payments

The second independent variable will be the individual payment for a member state in case of a military operation. The expenditure on CFSP operations is to be financed from the Community budget, unless the operation involves military or defence implications (or in case the European Council unanimously decides otherwise). In case of a military operation the expenditure is charged to the Member States and will be divided according to Gross Domestic product (GDP) (unless the European Council unanimously decides otherwise). Member states pay any costs arising from the maintenance and upgrading of their own national military capabilities which are made available for EU missions. Member states also pay the direct costs of their own participation in any specific operations. For operations that involve military or defence implications a very complex budgetary system has been devised whereby operational costs are assessed and distributed among member states according the principle that costs 'lie where they fall' (Keatinge & Tonra 2009: 22). The Union budgets only supports a small fraction, about ten percent, of what are referred to as 'common costs' necessary to keep decision-making structures and administrative support in place (Ibid.). These costs are than charged to the member states according to an index based on the GDP of a state. The GDP of the selected member states will therefore be the indicator of this variable. It has been stated that national finance ministers tend to be the determining factor and that the complex cost-base of different kinds of operations has directly impacted on member states' positions vis-à-vis deploying and participating in such operations (Ibid.). This leads to my second hypothesis.

H2: The more member states have to contribute financially to EU-led missions, the less supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military or defense implications.

IV3: Atlantic ties

The third independent variable is the Atlantic ties of the member states. The indicator of this variable is the position of the member states on the relations with the US and consequently the position of the member states on the role of NATO. According to Howorth (2005: 40) it is widely accepted that the biggest challenge to the commonality of the CFSP is the achievement of intra-European consensus on how to manage relations with the US. It is beyond doubt that member states have conflicting positions regarding this relation. Some states have an almost 'pavlovian reflex' when it comes to follow the US and consequently prefer NATO over CSDP (Robert 2002: 24). This leads to my third hypothesis.

H3: The more state favour Atlantic ties, the supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military implications

IV 4: Bilateral relations

The independent variable bilateral consists of two indicators: economic and political relations. As with the independent variable bilateral relations focuses more on the decision of a member state to use military means than using the EU institutional framework. As member states have the ability to veto the all CSDP decisions, the position of the individual member states is essential.

Economic relations can be defined as the commercial relations or connections between countries. A member state might oppose the resort to military means, as it would damage the existing relations and therefore untimely damage the economy of a member state. The importance of this indicator might me increased considering the impact of the global financial crisis. This leads to my fourth hypothesis.

H4: The more member states have economic relations with Libya, the less supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military implications.

In addition to economic relations, states can have strong political ties. Political ties refer to diplomatic relations and valuable cooperation in other fields such as immigration, human smuggling and terrorism. Political relations between states can effectuate cooperation on these fields, but can also increase economic relations between two countries (and vice versa). If a member state participates in a military intervention this could be damaging for the existing bilateral agreements and for potential future agreements, especially when regime change does not take place in the intervened state. This leads to my fifth hypothesis.

H5: *The more member states have political relations with Libya, the less supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military implications.*

5.3 Case selection

In order to analyze which dimensions of intergovernmentalism can explain the EU's failure in Libya I will look at the responses of France, the UK, Germany and Italy. When looking at the relative capabilities of the EU member states using the indicators of economic strength, military expenditures, and population, Germany, the nuclear powers France and the UK, and Italy stand apart (Shuster & Maier 2006: 227). In addition, France and the UK are permanent members of the UNSC. During the Libya crisis Germany was a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Posen (2006: 164) argues that the EU's most capable powers, especially Britain and France, but also Germany and to some extent Italy, should be at the heart of the developments of EU foreign policy because they are the only member states who can consider such an effort. Crowe (2003: 546) has argued that while all member states are equal, there is a need to recognize that some naturally contribute more than others, and take more of the burden and the risk, whether in political clout, financial resources or military capabilities (Crowe 2003: 546). Chris Patten (2005:159–160) stated that there is no European policy on a big issue unless France, Germany and the UK are on side. A single member-state or even a coalition of smaller member-states will find it very difficult to hold out if France, Germany and the UK are in agreement. The selected member states can be considered the group of the

great European powers, the analyze of their behaviour will be essential in order to explain the EU's failure in Libya and more in general the relative failure of EU foreign policy.

5.4 Methods of analyze

In order to answer the research question I shall use the method of process tracing. Process tracing has the goal to bring theory closer to what really goes on in the world. It directs one to trace the process in a very specific, theoretically informed way. The process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process- the causal chain and causal mechanism- between independent variable(s) and the outcome of the dependent variable (George & Bennett 2005: 204) Process tracing is an indispensable tool for theory testing and theory development (George & Bennett 2005: 205). Process tracing requires carefully mapping the process, exploring the extent to which it coincides with prior theoretically derived expectations about the workings of mechanism (Ibid.). The data used in process tracing is qualitative in nature, and includes historical memoirs, interviews, press accounts and documents. The data that will be used to test the first hypothesis is data on the public opinion of a member state. As the Libya crisis came unexpectedly member states were compelled to take a stance within a relatively limited amount of time. However in some cases there were polls conducted that indicate whether the public opinion favoured or opposed the resort to military means. Public opinion can be influenced by the national security identity of a member state. Data on national security identity can be found in the literature. In order to test the second hypothesis, the most important data will be the (relative) GDP of the four selected member states. The (relative) GDP can be found in the CIA World Fact Book. To test the third hypothesis I will look Atlantic ties of a member state and the influence on the state's foreign policy. As there is extensive research on the influence of Atlantic ties on foreign policy, this information can also be found in the literature. The data that will be used to test the fourth and fifth variable are the existing economical and political bilateral relations between Libya and the selected member states (en perhaps any potential agreements).

6. The relative failure of the EU in Libya

The following paragraphs provide some background on the EU's failure to respond adequately in Libya. The first subchapter describes the relations between the EU and Libya. Hereafter there follows a subchapter that gives a short history of EU foreign policy and more in particular EU crisis management. The final subchapter briefly describes the EU response to the crisis in Libya.

6.1 EU-Libya relations

Bilateral relations between the EU and Libya were virtually nonexistent until 1999 (Zoubir 2009: 405). The EU did not include Libya in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). However in 1999 Libya attended the Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers. During the conference it was agreed that Libya would access into the EMP once UN sanctions were lifted. In November 2008 the EMP was superseded by Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Libya refused to join the UfM as it was of the opinion that it would divide the African Union and the Arab League, both of which Libya is a member. Libya did have an observer status which allowed it to maintain relations with the EU without accepting the conditions it had imposed on the other member states.

After Libya's decision in December 2003 to abandon its nuclear program the relations between the European countries and Libya were boosted. In June 2005, the Council of Ministers adopted concrete measures to cooperate with Libya against illegal immigration. As Libya is a vital source of energy for the EU member states the EU and Libya started negotiating over a Framework Agreement in November 2008. It has been argued that democracy and human rights were not at the forefront of EU-Libya relations (Zoubir 2009: 415). The EU merely was trying to legitimize EU member states' energy and migration concerns (Ibid.).

6.2 EU Crisis Management

The CFSP has its origins in the 1970 European Political Cooperation (EPC). The failure of the EU to adequately response to the crisis in Yugoslavia, led to the desire to strengthen the EU's foreign policy. However during the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, the instinct to retain national prerogatives at all costs had regained the upper hand (Nuttall 1996: 23). The CFSP was introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht. The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the Petersberg tasks into the EU's institutional framework. The Peterberg tasks cover a great range of possible military missions and are formulated as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management. The office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign Policy and Security Policy was created to coordinate and represent the EU foreign policy. The Amsterdam Treaty allowed Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) for decisions applying a common strategy defined by the European Council and for any decisions implementing a joint action or common position already adopted by the Council. However, if a member states resorts to a veto for important reasons of national policy the decision must be taken by consensus again. The Treaty of Amsterdam provided for expenditure on CFSP operations to be financed from the Community budget. However when the operation involves military or defence implications or in case the European Council unanimously decides otherwise, expenditure is charged to the member states and is divided among the member states according to GDP. In 1999 the EU adopted the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with the aim to improve the ability of the EU to act autonomously in security matters. In December 2003 the EU member states adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS): '*A Secure Europe in a Better World*'.

One of the primary objectives of the Lisbon Treaty was to allow the EU to become a more effective global power (Menon 2011: 75). The ESDP was replaced by CSDP and its remit was expanded to include joint disarmament operations, post-conflict stabilization and the fight against terrorism. Voting on CFSP matters in the European Council and Council mostly continues to require unanimity. One simple rule governs decision-making in the area of CSDP: all decisions, including decisions to initiate specific missions, must be taken unanimously. This rule is absolute for decisions with military implications.

Participation in specific missions is made on a case-by-case basis by national governments, and thus depends on national decision-making. In effort to ensure greater coordination and consistency in EU foreign policy the Treaty of Lisbon created a High Representative of the Union for foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), merging the post High Representative of the CFSP and European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy. The HR is vice-president of the European Commission and presides over the Foreign Affairs Council. The HR is assisted by a civilian and military staff; the European External Action Service (EEAS). The HR shall implement CFSP decisions and generally puts the CFSP into effect. Additional assistance is provided by Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is part of the Council of Ministers.

6.3 The EU response to the Libyan uprisings

The first EU-level reaction to the violence against civilians in Libya was a declaration issued by HR Ashton on 20 February. In her following declaration on 23 February she announced that the EU had decided to suspend negotiations with Libya on the EU-Libya Framework Agreement. On 20 February, the EU responded to Italy's formal request for assistance with the massive influx of migrants and launched the Frontex Joint Operation Hermes 2011 (Koenig 2011: 5).

The EU implemented the (economic) sanctions against Libya adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and went beyond them. On 28 February, the Council adopted decision 2011/137/CFSP implementing UNSC Resolution 1970 and imposing an arms embargo against Libya and targeted sanctions on 26 persons related to the Gaddafi regime. On 10 March and 21 March (European Council 2011b), the EU extended these restrictive measures to key Libyan financial entities and another 11 persons. Following UNSC Resolution 1973, the EU imposed further sanctions on 24 March by amending Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP. On 12 April, the EU extended the asset freeze to 26 energy firms accused of financing Gaddafi's regime, thereby imposing a *de facto* oil and gas embargo. The Council adopted further sanctions on 7 June targeting Libyan port authorities.

On 11 March an extraordinary European Council meeting on Libya was being held. The summit communiqué stated: "the member states will examine all necessary options, provided there is demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region." (Council of the European Union 2011). The endorsement of a no-fly zone had been blocked by Germany, however Germany was not the only EU member sceptical of military involvement. According to a European diplomat, "some member states were not in favour of a CSDP operation." (Koenig 2011: 11). The summit communiqué welcomed and encouraged the National Transition Council of Libya (NTC). The NTC was not recognized as the sole representative, but merely as a political interlocutor of Libya (Council of the European Union 2011).

After the Arab League had called for a no-fly zone, the UNSC adopted resolution 1973 on 17 March. Germany abstained from voting, along with Brazil, Russia, India and China. In his address to the Paris Summit for the Support to the Libyan People on 19 March van Rompuy stated the EU stood ready for further action in the field of humanitarian aid (van Rompuy 2011). On 1 April the Council adopted a decision on EUFOR Libya, a military operation to support humanitarian assistance operations in Libya that would be deployed when requested by the United Nations Office for the coordination of Humanitarian affairs (OCHA). The belated decision to approve a military mission to support humanitarian assistance in Libya smacked more of face saving than effective intervention (Menon 2011: 75). On 22 May the EU opened a Liaison office in Benghazi in order to support "the nascent democratic Libya in border management, security reform, the economy, health, education and in building civil society" (Vogel 2011). The EU and its Member states have provided over €150 million in financial and in-kind aid to Libya (Koenig 2011: 9).

As the EU was internally blocked by Germany, a serious proposal about lancing a military CSDP mission was never put on the table. The following chapters will analyze the role of France, the UK, Germany and Italy in the Libya crisis and how this affected the EU policy.

7. Case I: France

7.1 Introduction

The slow and controversial reaction of the French government to the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia was heavenly criticized by the French public opinion (Célestin, Hargreaves & Dalmolin 2012: 295). In the end of December, as the uprising in Tunisia got under way, French foreign minister Michele Alliot-Marie François Fillon visited Tunisia on holiday and flew twice on a private jet belonging to businessman Aziz Miled, a man with close links to the former Tunisian leader. On the same trip her parents signed a property deal with Aziz Miled. In addition, President Sarkozy backed the offer of Foreign Minister Michele Alliot-Marie to assist the Tunisian security forces in repressing opposition to the Ben Ali regime (Célestin, Hargreaves & Dalmolin 2012: 296). Prime Minister Francois Fillon, for his part, was hosted on his holiday by the government of ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. The affairs embarrassed President Sarkozy and in some eyes symbolized the unhealthy personal proximity between French politicians and autocratic leaders in the Middle East (Ibid.). Sarkozy seized on the uprising in Libya to lead the way to international military intervention against the Gaddafi Regime (Célestin, Hargreaves & Dalmolin 2012: 295). This chapter will analyze the French response to Libya and how this response influenced the EU's response.

7.2 Analysis of the French Response

In order to compensate the inadequacies of his foreign policy in Tunisia and Egypt, Sarkozy took the lead in the Libya crisis (Echague, Michou & Mikail 2011: 333). Sarkozy was one of the first head of states to condemn the unacceptable use of force against Libyans and on the advice of the philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy, Sarkozy was the first to receive and recognize Gaddafi's opponents (Henry 2012: 412). The unilateral decision to recognize the NTC as the sole representative of Libya displeased other EU members (Koenig 2011: 10). It took place one day before the Extraordinary Council meeting on 11 March and the unilateral decision therefore prevented the evolution of a common EU strategy towards the NTC. A spokesman for HR Ashton stated: "we cannot

unilaterally rush into recognizing groups" (BBC News 2011a). The foreign ministers of Italy and Spain emphasized the need for the EU to act with one voice. The foreign minister of Spain had stated that recognition must have been the result of agreement among all of the countries of the European Union (Ibid.) The foreign minister of Italy emphasized that Italy wanted a European unanimous decision in order to act credibly (Ibid.).

President Sarkozy was leading the calls for a no-fly zone to be enforced over Libya. Consequently, in a joint letter addressed to the president of the EU Council Sarkozy and Cameron called on "their European partners, their Allies, and their Arab and African friends to draw plans for a no-fly zone or other options" (Sarkozy & Cameron 2011). The letter was sent one day before the Extraordinary Council meeting of 11 March. The next day concrete plans for a response to the crisis were presented, but Sarkozy and Cameron failed to persuade the European Council to endorse a no-fly zone. At the EU summit it became apparent that the EU was divided. A serious proposal about launching a military CSDP mission to enforce the Libyan no-fly zone was never put on the table.

Despite having failed to secure European support France, the UK and Lebanon circulated a draft resolution on Tuesday 15 March 2011 after the Arab League had called for a no-fly zone. After the resolution was adopted Sarkozy invited several heads of state on 19 March to a Paris Summit for Libya people in order to create a coalition of the willing. Sarkozy officially announced the beginning of a military intervention in Libya with France's participation on 19 March 2011, a move that was well received by the majority of the French political class and public opinion. As Erlanger (2011a) has mentioned: 'France began the bombing, to general political applause at home, even from the Socialists'.

On 23 March 2011, France, the UK and the US agreed that NATO would take over the military command of all military operations. The US had indicated that it wanted a limited role in the intervention. Sarkozy tried to persuade the UK to set up an Anglo-French command for all military operations in Libya. French foreign minister Alain Juppé stated: "the Arab League does not wish the operation to be entirely placed under

NATO responsibility." (Erlanger 2011b). As it was clear that Germany would oppose a CSDP mission, an EU operation was never a viable option. France was unable to convince the UK of an Anglo-French command for all military operations in Libya and on 31 March 2011 NATO took sole command of all operations.

IV1 Domestic politics

The French participation in the military intervention was a move well received by the majority of the French public opinion and the political elite. This was hardly surprising as the slow and controversial reactions to the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia were heavily criticized by the French public opinion. Sarkozy took the lead in the offense against the Gaddafi regime in order to compensate the inadequacies of his foreign policy in Tunisia (Echague, Michou & Mikail 2011: 333). He was determined to prove its commitment to human rights and democracy. As a permanent member of the UNSC France has hardly proved to live up to the status as independent great power that the membership of the Permanent Five bestows on them (Hill 1997: 89). France cherishes a notion of defence policy that goes beyond the use of civilian power (Irondelle & Merand 2010: 33). By taking the lead France would redress its reputation as defender of human rights and enhance its reputation on the global stage (Chrisafis 2011). The French response to Libya has been linked to the 2012 presidential elections in France. During the Libya crisis Sarkozy's approval ratings were at an all-time low and Sarzkozy hoped that decisive action would boost his rating and give him a better chance of being re-elected the next year. Turkey's Europe minister Bagis openly accused Sarkozy of exploiting Libya for his own electoral needs: "An European leader began his election campaign by organizing a meeting that led to a process of air strikes against Libya. He acted before a NATO decision, and his act was based on his subjective evaluation of a UN resolution" (Watt, Hopkins & Traynor 2011). The 1958 Constitution has firmly established foreign policy as the exclusive preserve of the President (de La Serre 1996: 19). The French president is fully responsible of the French foreign policy.

IV2 Individual payment

France is one of the richest countries in the EU. It ranks second after Germany with a GDP of 15,80 % relative the total GDP of all member states (see annex 1). If the mission in Libya were deployed by the CSDP, France would have been responsible for 15,80 % of the common costs. However as France was participating in the coalition of the willing- and even willing to set up an Anglo-French command- it was willing to pay, this variable is rejected.

IV3 Atlantic ties

Ever since World War II, French foreign policy has tried to assert the country's international role, usually in reaction to the United States (Meunier 2000: 106). A well-known peculiarity of French cultural identity is its anti-Americanism, stemming partly from its humiliating reliance on American help in the two World Wars and the collapse of its empire (Ibid.). France has sought never again to be dependent on the US (Howorth 2008: 40) and has always been in favour of creating the capacity for Europe to act autonomously in the military sphere. Since 1966, France had one foot in NATO and the other outside it. On 19 March 2009, Sarkozy officially announced the return of France to the integrated military command of NATO. This has been seen as the end of France' 'religious war' with NATO (Irondelle & Merand 2010: 34).

France was leading the calls for the imposition of a no-fly zone, but did not specifically call for a CSDP mission. While France has always been in favour of the EU acting autonomously in the military sphere, the French focus seemed to be taking the lead in order to enhance France's reputation (and consequently increase Sarkozy's chances in the upcoming elections) and not on EU involvement. As it became apparent at the EU summit and confirmed when voting on Resolution 1973 that the EU was internally divided, a CSDP option never was a viable option. France did try to persuade the UK to set up an Anglo-French command for all military operations in Libya instead of a NATO command, showing it wanted Europe to take responsibility independent from the US.

IV4 Bilateral relations

France had considerable economic relations with Libya which were strengthened through the signing of numerous contracts, most notably the endorsement of contract worth € 10 billion announced by Sarkozy in December 2007 (Zoubir 2009: 405). The political relations between France and Libya were tense in the aftermath of the1989 UTA Flight 772 bombing. France, as well as other nations affected by this bombing, had tried to seek financial compensation from Libya. The economic relations between France and Libya did not preclude France of taking the lead in calls for the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya and eventually be the first country use military force against the Gaddafi regime. As the French government did not have any bilateral agreements with the Gaddafi regime that it aimed to preserve, the hypothesis on political relations is not relevant. The prospect of lucrative economic relations and political relations might have influenced the decision of France being the first to recognize the NTC.

7.3 Findings of the French Response

Sarkozy was the first leader to say that Gaddafi must go, the first to recognize the NTC and the first to eventually use military force against the Gaddafi regime (IISS 2011: 2). Sarkozy seemed determined to intervene in Libya, despite the lack of a common EU position. Analysis of the first independent variable shows that public opinion was in favour of military intervening in Libya. Sarkozy whose approval ratings were at an all-time low hoped that decisive action on Libya boost his chances at getting re-elected. There is no support for the first hypothesis as public opinion was in favour of a military intervention.

The French support does not show evidence for the second hypothesis and thus must be rejected. France was willing to pay for its participation in the intervention and was even willing to set up an Anglo-French command. In addition the economic relations between France and Libya did not preclude the French decisive action against the Gaddafi regime. Therefore the hypothesis on economic relations must be rejected. As France only had

marginal political relations with Libya, the indicator political relations of the independent variable bilateral relations did not influence the French response.

As the EU was internally divided a CSDP mission was never a viable option. France did however propose an Anglo-Franco command as it saw the Libyan operation as an excellent opportunity for France and the UK to engage in joint operational and political leadership under a bilateral ad-hoc command structure (IISS 2011: 3). The proposal shows France's intention for Europe to be responsible for the crisis at his doorstep and solve the crisis independently from the US. The UK preferred NATO command and while France initially opposed, eventually it gave in. The full return of France to NATO might have made it easier for France to accept NATO-command. As France had fully returned to NATO, it could still play the desired important role in the conflict and Sarkozy could still present this achievement to French electorate.

France has always been the driving force of the CFSP. It is not unlikely that the Libya crisis has caused France to focus on cooperation with the UK instead of the EU. The Libya crisis showed France once more that the other larger member states cannot be relied upon in the area of security and defence and are not willing of capable to prevent a crisis at its doorstep. It has to remain seen how much value France will give to the EU as a vehicle for common security policies. French foreign minister Juppé gave the following devastating judgment "The CFSP of Europe? It is dead," (Ash 2011).

8. Case I: the UK

8.1 Introduction

Following the death of Gaddafi British Prime Minister Cameron stated: “today is a day to remember all of Colonel Gaddafi's victims, from those who died in connection with the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, to Yvonne Fletcher in a London street, and obviously all the victims of IRA terrorism who died through their use of Libyan Semtex.” (BBC News 2011c). The statement reflected the troubled relationship the UK had with Libya over the years. UK-Libya relations were normalized in 2004 when British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Gaddafi and Blair announced a "new relationship" between the two countries. It has been argued that the UK was eager to normalize relations in order to allow the UK to participate in a revival of the Libyan economy (Joffé 2001: 87). While Euro-Libyan economic relations had continued to grow, the UK had not experienced a similar expansion (Ibid.). Along with France the UK played an important role in the imposition of the no-fly zone over Libya. This chapter analyzes the UK’s response to the crisis in Libya and how it affected the EU response.

8.2 Analysis of the British response

While Sarkozy was leading the calls for a no-fly zone to be enforced over Libya, at first Cameron held out the prospect of imposing sanctions. In an interview with al-Jazeera television in Doha Cameron played the prospect of military action against Libya down by stating: "I do not think we are at that stage yet. We are at the stage of condemning the actions Colonel Gaddafi has taken against his own people.” (Watt and Wintour 2011).

On 24 February it was reported that Cameron had spoken to President Obama and that they had agreed to coordinate on possible multilateral measures on Libya (BBC News 2011a). When Cameron revealed that he had asked the Ministry of Defence to work with our allies on plans for a military no-fly zone, he was forced to defend the no-fly zone plan after US Defence Secretary Robert Gates dismisses the idea as ‘loose talk’ and said it

could only be created after an attack on Libya (BBC News 2011b). UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague insists the UK is "absolutely in line" with the US in preparing plans for a possible "no-fly zone" and that the international community realizes it is only a "contingency" plan (Ibid.).

On 9 March Cameron claimed in the House of Commons that the UK was leading the way in the push for a no-fly zone over Libya. Cameron joined forces with Sarkozy as they sent a letter addressed to the president of the EU Council on 10 March in which they called upon their European partners, their Allies, and their Arab and African friends to draw up plans for a no-fly zone or other options (Sarkozy and Cameron 2011). It was reported that the following day at the EU summit Cameron publicly clashed with HR Ashton about the endorsement of a no-fly zone. A spokesman of Ashton had warned that a no-fly zone would be highly risky and could end up killing large numbers of civilians (Schipman 2011). When asked, Cameron denied being frustrated that EU leaders had not backed a possible no-fly zone. In addition he stated: “Of course the EU is not a military alliance and I don't want it to be a military alliance. Our alliance is NATO.” (Traynor & Watt 2011).

The UK played a significant role in the imposition of the no-fly zone in Libya. Along with France and Lebanon it drafted the UNSC resolution which was approved on 17 March. On 19 March, a multi-national coalition, spearheaded by the UK, the US and France began the broad campaign of air strikes against Gaddafi. The US had pointed out that it wanted a limited role in the military intervention and hand over control of the commands as soon as possible. On 27 March NATO took control of all military operations in Libya. While France wanted an Anglo-Franco military command, the UK was not in favour and preferred a NATO command. Eventually France gave in and NATO took sole control of all operation on 31 March. On 29 March the UK convened the London Conference of more than forty countries with interests in the resolution of the conflict in Libya on 29 March, and co-chaired the first meeting of the UK-conceived Contact Group with Qatar in Doha on 13 April

IV1 Domestic politics

Prime Minister Cameron was keen to take the lead in Libya mindful of its role as a major European military power (Shepard 2011: 9). Cameron was the Prime Minister of a single-party government and did not face upcoming elections at the time of the Libya crisis. Hi was therefore less vulnerable to the public opinion than some of the other member states. However as the British public opinion favoured a military intervention and Labour leader Ed Miliband had given his full backing to military action (BBC news 2011b), the pressure of upcoming elections or a multi-party government was unlikely to change the policy outcome.

IV2 Individual payments

The UK has a GDP of 13,75 % relative to the total GDP of all EU member states and ranks third (see annex I). As with France, the individual payments that the UK would have been responsible for did not influence the UK's policy. The UK participated in the military intervention and consequently paid for their part in the intervention. Therefore the hypothesis on individual payments does not find any support.

IV3 Atlantic ties

The UK has always favoured strong Atlantic ties and has struggled to maintain a privileged position within NATO, underpinned by the continued deployment of British ships and troops around the world, and by special nuclear and intelligence ties to the US (Wallace 2007: 57). The 'special UK-US relationship' has underpinned British foreign and defence policy since World War II (Wallace & Phillips 2009: 263). Britain's claim to privileged partnership over other European states in the post-war world was based upon the claim that Britain had global interests—and global military reach—beyond Germany, France or Italy (Wallace & Phillips 2009: 282). The UK considers itself the bridge between the US and EU(rope), a view that is mocked by other EU countries which have

their own direct dialogues with Washington. (Wallace & Phillips 2009: 278). Since 1998, British policy has tended more toward bandwagoning with the US than to balancing U.S power (Posen 2006: 167). However Britain's bandwagoning is strategic: the UK hopes of acting as a durable bridge between the EU and the US (Ibid.). The US will take Europe more seriously if they improve their defence capabilities. If the UK is seen as the agent of the improvements its standing with the US will rise (Posen 2004:13).

The Libyan case showed multiple times that the UK wanted to preserve the special UK-US relation. Early on Cameron spoke to Obama and it was reported that they had agreed to coordinate on possible multilateral measures on Libya. In addition, when UK revealed it was working on a plan for a no-fly zone and US Defence Secretary Robert Gates dismissed the idea as loose talk, UK Foreign Secretary insisted the UK was "absolutely in line" with the US in preparing plans for a possible no-fly zone. Finally where France saw the Libyan operation as an excellent opportunity for France and the UK to engage in joint operational and political leadership, this proved to be a step too far for the instinctively Atlanticist British (IISS: 2). The UK did join forces with Sarkozy and pushed the EU summit to endorse a no-fly zone over Libya, it is unclear whether the UK intended the mission to be deployed by the CSDP. Right after the EU summit Cameron stated: 'Of course the EU is not a military alliance and I don't want it to be a military alliance. Our alliance is NATO'. While we should keep in mind that Cameron stated this after the EU summit had failed to back a possible no-fly zone, the statement is in line with the British view on defence. In November 2010 the UK and France coordinated their military efforts and the UK had stipulated that cooperation was to be completely independent of the institutions of European defence in Brussels, which they called 'paralyzing' (Brown 2011: 285). The Brits viewed the bilateral accord as strengthening of NATO (Ibid.). As a CSDP mission was never a viable option we cannot conclude that the UK would have preferred NATO command over a CSDP command, even though this might have been the case.

IV4 Bilateral relations

Due to the death of the British police officer Yvonne Fletcher, the support of the Gaddafi regime to IRA and the bombing of a Pan Am flight, the relations between the UK and Libya had been tense. As a consequence the UK had over the years not experienced a growth in economic relations similar to other EU countries (Joffé 2001: 87). UK-Libya relations were normalized in 2004 when British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Gaddafi announced a "new relationship" between the two countries. Since 2004 the economic relations between the UK and Libya have been strengthen. However the relations did not stop the British government to push for and participate in a no-fly zone over Libya. The UK did not have any bilateral agreements with the Gaddafi regime that it aimed to preserve and for this reason the hypothesis on political relations is not relevant.

8.3 Findings of the British response

Analysis of the British case shows that the UK remains focused on the special relation between the UK-US. There are no indications that the UK would have opposed a CSDP mission and preferred a NATO mission. However when France proposed an Anglo-Franco command, the UK showed a clear preference for a NATO command and averted to let Europe bear responsibility for a crisis at its doorstep. The UK was willing to take a leading role and even to join forces with France, as long as it was consistent with the US and preferably under the protection of NATO. Taking into account that the UK had called the institutions of European defence in Brussels 'paralyzing' (Brown 2011: 285), the statement of Cameron on NATO as the UK's military alliance, and the fact that the UK turned down the French proposal to engage in joint operational and political leadership analysis of the British response shows support *for H3: The more member states favour Atlantic ties will, the less supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military implications.*

The other independent variables do not find any support. Economic relations between the UK and Libya did not preclude the UK from intervening and the UK had only marginal

political relations with Libya there is no support for the hypothesis on political relations. The same can be concluded for the hypothesis on individual payments as the UK contributed military to the Libyan intervention. Finally, there is no support for the hypothesis on domestic politics as the British public opinion and political elite supported the intervention.

9. Case III: Germany

8.1 Introduction

Germany's role in the two World Wars has shaped the country's post-1945 security culture and its security and defence policy. Germany is trying to find the right balance between assertiveness and restraint in its foreign policy (Meiers 1995: 96). After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Germany's security environment changed fundamentally and Constitutional Court ruling in 1994 cleared the path for the employment of German armed forces abroad under the following conditions: authorization by the German parliament; compliance with international law; use of force for primarily humanitarian reasons; participation in a multinational coalition. However in the Libya crisis Germany opposed military intervention at all costs. While German foreign Minister Westerwelle was one of the first EU leaders to call for economic sanctions, Germany was very sceptical of the imposition of a no-fly zone and determined to avoid military action (IISS 2011: 2). This chapter analyzes the German response to the Libya crisis and the influence that this response had on the outcome of the EU response.

9.2 Analysis of the German response

Germany was one of Member states that called for the EU to act tough with Libya. During the first days, German Foreign Minister Westerwelle projected an image as a promoter of tough measures declaring, "The time of appeals is over. Now is the time for action. Germany will take the lead while some other EU-members have been hesitant." (Dembinski & Reinold 2011:4). After the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1970 Germany called for stricter sanction against the Gaddafi regime as Westerwelle claimed that the existing economic and weapons sanctions levelled against the country did not go far enough. According to Westerwelle the sanctions needed to target Gaddafi's cash flow.

From the very beginning Germany was sceptical about a possible no-fly zone over Libya. Angela Merkel told the EU summit of 11 March that a no-fly zone was potentially dangerous: "What is our plan if we create a no-fly zone and it doesn't work? Do we send

in ground troops? We have to think this through. Why should we intervene in Libya when we don't intervene elsewhere?" (Tisdall 2011). At the EU Summit Germany blocked Anglo-Franco plans to endorse a no-fly zone. After the G8 Westerwelle again voiced opposition towards military action by stating: "We are very sceptical about a military intervention and a no-fly zone is a military intervention." (Ibid.).

On 17 March, Germany broke ranks with its EU partners and NATO allies when it abstained in the vote on UNSC resolution 1973. Foreign minister Westerwelle officially justified the decision by stating that the risks of a German participation in military engagement were considered to outweigh the benefits (Koenig 2011: 11). The abstention shocked Germany's closest EU and NATO partners: as they united to avert a bloodbath on Europe's doorstep Germany withheld both legal and moral support. Westerwelle argued that that it would not have been honest to vote in favour of the resolution and then decide not to send troops (Ibid.). Westerwelle's statement that Germany "shared the values" in the resolution was an attempt to pull the wool over the public's eyes and suggested to analysts a total confusion in Germany's foreign policy (Rousseau 2011). However as Germany is a candidate for a permanent seat on the UNSC, they surely did not take their decision lightly, as short-term negative consequences for their candidacy were to be expected (Renard 2011: 2).

At the Paris Summit German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated: "As everyone knows Germany will not take part in any military measures and for this reason only we abstained in the vote. Our abstention should not be confused with neutrality." (Waterfield 2011). However on 21 March 2011 German Foreign Minister Westerwelle again voiced his opposition against the no-fly zone by stating, "we calculated the risks and if we see that three days after this intervention began, the Arab League has already criticised this intervention, I think we had good reasons." (Ash 2011).

While initially opposing NATO-command, Germany did not veto the plans of NATO to take sole control of all operations. This would have been an extremely costly move and Germany decided to keep its dissent from interfering with NATO's effectiveness (Keller 2011:106). Consensus within NATO is clearly differentiated from 'unanimity, which

would require an actively stated vote in favour of a measure (Gallis 2003: 2). Germany did not participate in the operation but did begin participating in AWACS surveillance missions in Afghanistan, freeing up other NATO resources for the Libya operation (The Economist).

IV1 Domestic politics

The role that Germany has played in the two World Wars has influenced the country's security and defence policy. Germany has remained sceptical towards military intervention in security questions (Rummel 2009). While German population knows that the country can no longer abstain from displaying solidarity in international efforts at collective security, its proving hard for Germans (particularly East Germans) to understand and accept the reasons for and obligations of international intervention (Rummel 1996: 53). Germany will rather be active in all those other areas where it has a long standing tradition of international participation such as humanitarian help, mediation, or political, technical and financial assistance (Rummel 1996: 54). Germany's post-war aversion to the use of military force is sharpened by its unpopular deployment in Afghanistan (The Economist 2011). Although the population supported the democratic movements in the Arab world, a military mission on the African continent was regarded very critically in Germany. According to a survey just over six out of ten Germans agreed with the decision not to intervene directly in Libya. Moreover the poll showed that German public opinion did not consider military intervention to be a viable option or the best solution to the problem (Rousseau 2011). The considerations of the German government were strongly influenced by the population's deliberations on the acceptance of a military mission (Ibid.).

The importance of public opinion was triggered by the upcoming federal state elections that took place 10 days after the vote on Resolution 1973. The most important reason that has been mentioned for Germany's abstention were the upcoming federal state elections. It was reported that Westerwelle had overruled career diplomats who wanted Germany to vote with its allies on Resolution 1973 (The Economist). During the Libya crisis the federal government of Germany consisted of a coalition of CDU/CSU (Merkel) and FDP

(Westerwelle). Westerwelle is one of the least popular foreign policy ministers Germany has had in a long time and he had hoped that distancing Germany from the bellicosity of France and Britain would help his party in the elections (The Economist 2011). Ironically Merkel criticized the Red-Green government in 2003 for having voted against the war in Iraq by accusing the government of sacrificing Germany's Atlantic loyalty on the altar of electoral interests (Faggioli 2011).

IV2 Individual payments

The common costs of an EU operation with military implications will be charged to member states and be divided according to member states' GDP. In 2011 the GDP of Germany accounted a relative 20,35 % of the total of member states (see annex 1) and consequently Germany would be responsible for 20,35 % of the common costs. While there is no clear indicator that the German response was led by financial considerations it is known that Germany, which contributes the most under the GDP scale, has become increasingly sensitive to the costs of missions in areas that it does not consider political priorities (Menon 2011: 83). Germany did not block NATO's mission and kept his dissent from the Alliance effectiveness Germany (Keller: 106). With a NATO mission (as opposed to a CSDP mission) the US would be bearing the largest financial burden.

IV3 Atlantic ties

Since the end of World War II, one of characteristics of Germany's foreign policy practices is the *'culture of restraint*'. The culture of restraint refers to behaviour patterns of German decision makers whereby striving for national interests and the claiming of leadership are avoided in favour of close cooperation with partners in institutional contexts (Berger 1998 in Frank 2011: 134). The so-called Sowohl-als auch policy – meaning close relations with France and the United States- is another pattern of German foreign policy. Germany's traditional role elements as a bridge had been contested frequently (Miskimmon 2007: 149). During the Iraq crisis, a conflict between Germany's roles as "American ally" and 'France's partner could be observed. The lessons learned from the EU's split and the transatlantic rift had resulted in reinforcing the importance of

further European integrations and cooperation with the US (Meyer 2006: 103-106). Whereas the Red-Green government attached greater importance to Paris' expectations in the field of security and defence policy (Frank 2011: 134), under the chancellorship of Angela Merkel Germany's foreign policy role there was a resurgent Atlanticism (Ibid.). However in the case of Libya all Germany's allies were in favour of military intervention. According to a recent paper by the European Council on Foreign relations, Germany is pursuing a new 'non-aligned foreign policy' (The Economist 2011). Eventually, Germany did not veto a NATO-command. However we cannot conclude that Germany did not block the NATO mission because it preferred a NATO mission over a CSDP mission.

IV4 Bilateral relations

Relations between Germany and Libya were tense in the late 1980's following a discotheque bombing in Berlin. However economic as well as political relations between Libya and Germany had been restored. Already in 1997, Germany was Libya's second "most important trading partner" and Germany had better economic relations with Libya than with the US (Zoubir 2009: 409). In 2004, a German delegation visited Libya and met with the Libyan President to discuss bilateral ties, mutual collaboration and landmines that were planted by Germany during World War II. There was reported that the meeting resulted in "the inking of big deals in the energy sector, ushering in a brand-new relationship between Libya and Germany." (Ibid.). While Germany opposed military intervention, it was one of the first countries to condemn the use of violence and call for the imposition of economic sanctions. It is unlikely that the economic relations between Libya and Germany were reasons to oppose military intervention in Libya.

In 2004, a German delegation visited Libya and met with the Libyan President to discuss bilateral ties, mutual collaboration and landmines that were planted by Germany during World War II. However, there are no bilateral agreements that serve the interests of Germany to the extent that it influenced the policy outcome.

If any bilateral relations were of influence it were the bilateral relations with the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) bloc. The other four abstainers were all members of the BRIC bloc and the countries are some of the most significant emerging powers on the international scene, both politically and economically. Germany has very strong economic and political interests in these countries and the abstention would not hurt Germany's relation with the BRIC bloc (The Economist).

9.3 Findings of the German response

The German government was compelled to take a stance within a relatively limited amount of time and with the upcoming elections in mind the German government let itself be guided by the public opinion. Public opinion in Germany is still heavily influenced by Germany's role in the two world wars. Germany will rather be active in all those other areas where it has a long standing tradition of international participation such as humanitarian help, mediation, or political, technical and financial assistance (Rummel 1996: 54) and poll showed that German public opinion did not consider military intervention to best solution to the problem (Rousseau 2011). Germany has a multi-party government during the Libya crisis. Multi-party government are producing relatively vulnerable governments that consequently are likely to be more responsive to public mood swings and preferences (Hobolt & Klemmemsen 2005: 384) Westerwelle had hoped that distancing Germany from the bellicosity of France and Britain would help his party in the elections. Analysis of Germany's response shows clear evidence for *H1: The more the public opinion of a member state oppose a military intervention, the less supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military implications*

There are no clear indications that Germany was led by financial considerations, notwithstanding it is well known that Germany has become increasingly sensitive to the costs of missions in areas that it does not consider political priorities (Menon 2011: 83). As there are no indications Germany was affected by the costs of an operation, we can only speculate whether the independent variable individual payments influenced the German behaviour. For that reason we cannot reject or adopt H2: *The more member*

states have to contribute financially to EU-led missions with a high GNP, the less supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military or defence implications.

There are no indications that the bilateral relations between Germany and Libya influenced the policy outcome. In addition, while Germany opposed military intervention, it was one of the first countries to condemn the use of violence and call for the imposition of economic sanctions.

Germany's foreign policy is characterized by the called Sowohl-als-auch policy- close relations with France and the United States- a policy that has been put to the test frequently. Whereas the Red-Green government attached greater importance to Paris' expectations in the field of security and defence policy (Frank 2011: 134), under the chancellorship of Merkel there was a resurgent to Atlanticism (Ibid.). However in the case of Libya all Germany's allies were in favour of military intervention. According to a recent paper by the European Council on Foreign relations, Germany is pursuing a new 'non-aligned foreign policy' (The Economist 2011). Eventually Germany did not veto a NATO-command. However we cannot conclude that Germany did not block the NATO mission because it preferred a NATO mission over a CSDP mission and therefore we cannot adopt the hypothesis on Atlantic ties. It has been argued that a veto would have been an extremely costly move (Keller 2011:106). Consensus within NATO is clearly differentiated from 'unanimity, which would require an actively stated vote in favour of a measure (Gallis 2003: 2). Germany decided to keep its dissent from interfering with NATO's effectiveness and even participated in AWACS surveillance missions in Afghanistan to free up other NATO resources for the Libya operation (The Economist 2011). The abstention of Germany in the UNSC has damaged the credibility and unity of transatlantic alliance. If Germany had vetoed the NATO command it would have isolated itself in the alliance. The participation in AWACS surveillance missions in Afghanistan shows that Germany is scrambling to reassure its allies.

The Libya crisis raised questions about Germany's ability to play a global role in foreign policy, even as its economic power and influence grow. However it mostly raised

questions about the CSDP. Foreign minister Westerwelle officially justified the decision to abstain by stating that the risks of a German participation in military engagement were considered to outweigh the benefits. However, the cost-benefit analysis did not seem to give much weight to a coherent EU approach on Libya. Following the criticism on the intervention expressed by Westerwelle, it was reported that the French foreign minister Juppé had stated: "While French and British pilots risk their lives in action, the German foreign minister is virtually encouraging the Arab League to make further criticism. A word that springs unbidden to my mind is Dolchstoss (stab in the back)." (Ash 2011).

10. Case IV: Italy

10.1 Introduction

Undoubtedly, Libya's most important ties were with Italy, the country's former colonial power. The Italian government maintained close ties with the Gaddafi regime and Italy has benefitted from Libya on a scale that does not enjoy with any other member state. The Arab Spring had caused a massive influx of migrants from North Africa. The uprisings in Libya had put the reception and protection systems of several EU Member states, Italy and Malta in particular, under strain (Koenig 2011: 5). The EU responded to Italy's formal request for assistance in coping with ongoing and prospective migratory flows and launched the Frontex Joint Operation Hermes 2011 on 20 February. The consequences of the migrations flow soon became a bone of contention within the EU (Koenig 2011:10). Italy decided on 5 April to issue temporary residence permits to refugees granting them free circulation in the Schengen area. France and Germany accused Italy of violating the "Schengen spirit" and threatened to restore border controls. Italy on his turn accused that the EU member states failed to show solidarity and that Italy has been left alone (Ibid.). This chapter analyzes Italy's response to the Libya crisis and how this affected the EU's response to the crisis.

10.2 Analysis of the Italian Response

On the same day the Ashton expressed the EU's grave concern over the unfolding violence in Libya, Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, pressed by reporters on whether he had spoken to Qaddafi since the uprising began, said: "No, I haven't been in contact with him. The situation is still in flux and so I will not allow myself to disturb anyone." The Italian opposition criticized the reaction of Berlusconi, arguing that Italy should have taken the lead in condemning the use of violence considering as it is the closest Western ally of Libya. Instead when the world rushed to condemn the situation in Libya, Berlusconi held back and Berlusconi refused to use his personal connection to Gaddafi to urge a cessation of violence (Lombardi 2011: 35). The statement of Berlusconi was not consistent with the diplomatic wording agreed on at EU level.

However on 26 February Italy's foreign minister Frattini announced that the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation with Libya had been 'de facto suspended.' (Miranda 2011: 14). The treaty included a non-aggression clause which guaranteed that Italy would not allow the use of its territory for any "hostile act" against Libya or engage in "direct or indirect" military action against its former colony. Early on in the crisis Italian finance minister Tremonti publicly warned his EU colleagues about the effects of economic sanctions and of the destabilizing effects if Arab governments were to withdraw the vast sums invested Europe (The Economist 2011a). Italy initially opposed the economic sanctions against Libya, but after intense lobbying agreed on imposing them. When the violence continued, it was reported by an Italian source that Italy would not oppose EU plans on extended sanctions (Miranda 2011: 14).

When the UNSC approved resolution 1973 of 17 March 2011 Italian leaders were forced to make a decision they very much wanted to avoid; maintain its longstanding relation with Libya versus its traditional solidarity with EU partners and NATO allies. At the Paris Summit on Libya of 19 March Italy offered the use of seven military bases to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya and protect Libyan civilians from Gaddafi's troops. When the US announced that it would withdraw its forces, Italy was calling on its allies to bring the air strikes under NATO command. Italy even threatened to withdraw authorization for the use of its military bases if NATO would not take over command (Lombardi 2011: 36). Italian forces were initially not permitted to engage in combat, but on 25 April Berlusconi informed NATO that the caveats on Italy's military contribution were being removed (Lombardi 2011: 37).

When French President Sarkozy unilaterally recognized the NTC as Libya's sole legitimate representative, foreign minister of Italy Frattini had emphasized the need for the EU to act with one voice. He stated, "Italy wants a European decision that everyone shares unanimously because that's how we act credible." (BBC News 2011a). Despite that Italy decided to formally recognize the NTC as the countries only legitimate interlocutor on bilateral relations on 4 April 2011, after meeting with a representative for foreign policy of the NTC in Rome. An Italian official stated: "We followed down the same path as France a couple of weeks later. If others don't play by EU rules, we find our

own way. But this should have been decided at EU level." (Koenig 2011: 10).

IV1 Domestic politics

An IPSOss-MORI poll, published on 12 April, revealed that 40% of Italians favoured intervention (Lombardi 2011: 33). While Italy did not face upcoming elections the coalition partner of Berlusconi's party, Lega Nord, opposed intervention and would have constrained any desire by Berlusconi to take an active role in addressing the unrest in Libya (Lombardi 2011: 32). Berlusconi's legal problems had increased his political dependency on Lega Nord (Ibid.). Lega Nord repeatedly voiced its opposition to a military intervention in Libya.Therefore in order to maintain unity of the government Berlusconi was initially unable to take an active role.

IV2 Individual payments

In 2011 Italy's ranked fourth in GDP with a relative GDP of 12.51% in the EU (see annex I). When the US announced that it would withdraw their forces, Italy insisted a NATO command instead of the proposed Anglo-Franco command. There are no indications that -if a CSDP mission was a viable option- the Italian government would be influenced by the prospect of paying 12.51% of the common costs. Despite the impact of the global financial crisis on the Italian economy, Berlusconi approved the use of Italy's air force in NATO strikes on 25 April, a decision that also had financial consequences (Lombardi 2011: 37).

IV3 Atlantic Ties

Since the end of the Cold War, Italy has emphasized ties with the US to enhance Italy's international prestige (Lombardi 2011: 31). Contrary to some of its European partners, it supported the US in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of Libya Italy initially was reluctant to resort to military means. However when the UNSC had adopted resolution 1973, it offered the use of its military bases. When the US announced to withdraw their forces Italy insisted that the operation would be taken over by NATO and even threatened to withdraw authorization for the use of its military bases. While not

directly preferring a NATO mission to a CSDP mission, it does indicate that Italy has a strong preference for NATO as their military alliance.

IV4 Bilateral relations

One of the main reasons why Italy followed the course it did during the first weeks in Libya were economic considerations. The economic relations between Libya and Italy have expanded considerably since the 1970s and were serving the interests of both countries. The economic benefits were centred on the energy sector as 85% of Libya's oil production was exported to European countries and Italy was deeply involved un exploiting this resource. Italy has been Libya's largest trading partner, and was the source of nearly 20 percent of Libyan imports and the destination of 40 percent of its exports. Italy has investments worth an estimated USD 11 billion in Libya, much of which is concentrated in the holdings of oil giant ENI. Libya has invested vast sums in Italy, with the result that it has become a major stakeholder in the country's economy. Given the size of Libya's presence in Italy's economy, the government would even at the best of times have sought to protect the investments. However, the impetus to do so was reinforced by the efforts of the government to mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis (Lombardi 2011: 38). The loss of liquidity should Libyan funds have been withdrawn or otherwise made unavailable would almost certainly have had a negative impact on what was already viewed as a weakened economy (Lombardi 2011: 39). Early on in the crisis such thinking was evident when Italian finance minister Tremonti publicly warned his EU colleagues about the effects of sanctions. So long as it appeared that the international coalition was not committed to regime change, there was no incentive for Italian policymakers to turn their back on the lucrative commercial relationship that had been built up over the past decade, the unravelling of which could do considerable harm (Ibid.).

In addition, the political relations between Libya and Italy presumably did influence the Italian response. The high water mark in the political relations between Italy and Libya was reached in August 2008, when Berlusconi and Gaddafi signed the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation. The treaty included a formal apology for

colonial injustices alongside with a promise by Rome to spend USD 5 billion over twenty years on infrastructure projects as forms of reparation. In return, the Gaddafi regime promised to hinder illegal immigration by more aggressively patrolling its coastline. Italy agreed to pay $500 million for the supply and installation of electronic equipment along the Libyan coast. Gaddafi honoured its pledge and the results were in terms of numbers highly successful. The number of illegal immigrants declined by 98 percent, from 37.000 in 2008 to 405 in 2010, an outcome that the government presented as a significant achievement (Lombardi 2011: 39-40). Berlusconi warned that while the popular revolts could bring democracy and freedom but could also trigger the creation of a mass exodus of refugees. Analysis of the Italian response shows that the dependent variable political relations is interwoven with the independent variable domestic politics. Controlling the flow of illegal immigration was not only a means of shoring up electoral support as well as essential to maintain the unity of the government as Lega Nord promoted a hard approach (Lombardi 2011: 40).

10.3 Findings of the Italian Response

Examining Italy's approach to the Libyan crisis highlights the very different interest of EU member states engaged by crises that occur outside the border of the EU. Italy's response in the first stages of the Libya crisis was defined by two strategic objectives: commercial relations and illegal migrants. These factors initially encouraged an emphasis on more immediate national interests as opposed to European interests.

The bilateral relations between Italy and Libya best explain the initial inaction of Italy in the Libyan crisis. Italy has benefitted from Libya on a scale that does not enjoy with any other member states. As long as it appeared that the international coalition was not committed to regime change, there was no incentive for Italian policymakers to turn their back on the lucrative commercial relationship that had been built up over the past decade (Lombardi 2011: 39). The unravelling of these economic relations could create significant harm to Italy's already weakened economy. The Italian case therefore shows support for *H4: The more member states have economic relations with Libya, the less*

supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military implications.

Next to economic relations, Italy and Libya had strong political ties. Italy initially excluded a national involvement in the air strikes, due to these strong political and military ties with Gaddafi's regime and the unpleasant colonial past in the country (Miranda 2011: 17). The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation had the Gaddafi regime officially promise to hinder illegal immigration and the results in numbers were a great success. Therefore the Italian case shows support for *H5*: *The more member states have political relations with Libya, the less supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military implications.*

Analysis of the Italian response shows that the independent variables political relations and domestic politics can be interwoven. Controlling the flow of illegal immigration was mostly a means of shoring up electoral support. The coalition party of Berlusconi, Lega Nord had responded to the concerns of the Italian public by promoting a hard approach against illegal immigration (Lombardi 2011: 41). Lega Nord opposed intervention and would have constrained any desire by Berlusconi to take an active role in addressing the unrest in Libya (Lombardi 2011: 32). In the Italian case, public opinion did not only oppose military intervention. As the domestic variables political relations and domestic politics are so intertwined we cannot reject of adopt H1 on public opinion.

While Italy initially was reluctant to the idea of a no-fly zone, it did offer the use of seven of its military bases to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya. When the US announced it would withdraw their forces, Italy insisted that the operation would be taken over by NATO and even threatened to withdraw authorization for the use of its military bases. From Italy's viewpoint, CSDP is not to duplicate or to supersede NATO but to increase Europe's range of available options at least when it comes to dealing with crises in its neighbourhood (Ratti 2012: 95). One of the characteristics of Italian foreign policy is its adhesion to NATO. Italy has struggled for international recognition as an influential actor in world politics and has a firm conviction that it only counts in Atlantic relations if it counts within Europe (Foradori & Rosa 2008: 174). If France and the UK would have

engaged in a joint operational and political leadership, the Franco-British convergence would be strengthened. Consequently Italy's influence within Europe would decline. As a CSDP mission was not a viable option, there was no direct choice between a NATO and a CSDP mission. However as Italy NATO would be in command and even threatened to withdraw authorization for the use of its military bases, the Libyan case does show that Italy still values NATO as military alliance, presumably more CSDP as military alliance. Therefore the analysis shows support for *H3: The more member states favour Atlantic ties will, the less supportive they will be of the adoption of an EU operation that involves military implications.*

The initial inaction of Italy can best be explained by the bilateral ties between Italy and Libya. The unravelling of the lucrative economic and commercial relations could do considerable harm to the already weakened economy. The influence of the political relations between Italy and Libya is interwoven with the independent variable domestic politics as controlling coalition controlling the flow of illegal immigration was not only a means of shoring up electoral support but also essential to maintain the unity of the government. When it became clear that Gaddafi's days in Libya were counted, Rome's policy pivoted (Lombardi 2011: 36).

11. Conclusion

The Lisbon Treaty should have made it easier for the EU to be more active and coherent in its approach. The Lisbon Treaty should have enabled the Union to finally speak with one voice in its foreign policy. In effort to ensure greater coordination and consistency in the EU foreign policy the Treaty of Lisbon created a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, supported by the EEAS. Henry Kissinger once famously remarked: 'Who do you call when you want to speak to Europe?' Did the Lisbon Treaty finally provide an answer to this question? When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, Commission President Barroso had told a news conference the person to call on foreign policy issued was Catherine Ashton, the High Representative and that the so-called Kissinger issue had been solved. However, the Libyan crisis showed that when the EU is divided the High Representative will be the last to get a call.

The Arab Spring was the first test for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union under the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The Arab Spring has proven again that the EU is not up for the challenge, despite the changes that were made. This thesis aims to analyze why the EU failed again by focusing on the responses of France, the UK, Germany and Italy. As they are the four biggest member states they should be taking the lead in the CFSP, as the US takes the lead in NATO. As former European Commissioner for External Relations has put it, a single member-state or even a coalition of smaller member-states will find it very difficult to hold out if France, Germany and the UK are in agreement.

Division among the EU's most powerful member states on how to act in Libya has caused that no serious proposal about launching a military CSDP was ever put on the table. The Libya crisis especially raised new questions about Germany's ability to play a global role in foreign policy, even as its economic power and influence grow. Germany has however remained sceptical towards military intervention in foreign and security questions. The abstention in the UNSC was most devastating for a coherent EU policy, however a German vote in favour of Resolution 1973 would have changed the fact a CSDP was never a viable option.

Different domestic and foreign policy considerations have divided the 'Big 4' in de case of Libya. The French analysis show that the French President Sarkozy was determined to take the lead in the offense against the Gaddafi regime in order to enhance France' reputation on the global stage and boost his chances to get re-elected. In the UK foreign policy calculations have prevailed with the importance of the transatlantic alliance. Germany traditionally has remained sceptical towards military intervention in security questions and concerns over federal state elections have led to an anti-intervention stance. While there are no clear indications that Germany was led by financial considerations, it is not unlikely that the financial consequences were taken into consideration. Lastly, Italy tried to preserve the economic and political relations with Libya. The political relations were mainly concerned with immigration and controlling the flow of illegal immigration was not only a means of shoring up electoral support but also essential to maintain the unity of the government. As the analysis showed support, to a greater or lesser degree, for all the formulated hypotheses, the theory presented in this thesis does explain the failure of EU foreign policy. However in the Italian case the independent variables bilateral relations (indicator political relations) and domestic politics showed some overlap.

Analysis of the four selected member states has showed that different domestic or foreign policy considerations have prevailed in different member states. High-risk military crisis management under the CSDP instrument will not be a feasible option until some fundamental issued about Europe's strategic identity are resolved by the member states. First there needs to be more clarity how to manage relations with the US and consequently with NATO. Secondly, the EU needs a revised ESS, in which it set strategic goals on the resort to military means as opposed to 'softer' forms of power. Apart from the question whether the EU has the capabilities to facilitate rapid and effective crisis management, member states should first be willing to deploy military missions. Finally, decisions should be based upon the ESS and decision on deployment should not be interfered by bilateral relations and domestic politics. However, as the member states- and in particular those responsible for foreign affairs in national governments are the major actors of the system, it is very likely that the next crisis will end up with the same old story.

In the case of Libya, 'Europe' is not the EU. It is the member states – France and Great Britain in particular. And it is NATO, drawing upon the support of America's unique capabilities (Allin and Jones 2011: 212). With yet another division on a major crisis in the EU's backyard, the role of the CSDP needs to be seriously reconsidered. As it is proven again that the CSDP is not effective, the focus of some member states might swift to smaller European alliances such as a Franco-British cooperation. In addition, France's full return to NATO might increase the role that NATO will play in future crisis management. If the driving force of the CFSP will focus less on involvement of the EU can we indeed conclude that it has died in Libya?

By failing to determine the fate of Libya, the EU has lost additional capital in North Africa. EU rules stipulate that there can only even begin forming a common policy on a foreign issue if all its leaders agree that there should be one. The Libya case again demonstrated how unlikely that is on a burning issue involving possible military action. In addition it proved that the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty were not sufficient to solve the so-called Kissinger issue. As long as there is no European strategic identity, HR Catherine Ashton will be force to forward her receiving calls to France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and so on.

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Annex I: Relative GDP 2011 (EU)

	GDP (millions of US$)	Rank (EU)	Relative GDP (EU)
EU (total)	17.577.691		
Germany	3.577.031	1	20,35%
France	2.776.324	2	15,80%
UK	2.417.570	3	13,75%
Italy	2.198.730	4	12,51%
'Big 4'	8.770.927		49,90%

Source: CIA World Fact Book