The causes of External Recognition:

A Crisp Set Analysis

Master Thesis

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Abbreviations

cs/QCA – crisp set qualitative comparative analysis

DV – dependent variable

fs/QCA – fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis

H1 – hypothesis 1 (same for the H2; H3; H4; H5)

IV – independent variable

mv/QCA – multivalue qualitative comparative analysis

QCA – qualitative comparative analysis

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

US – Unites States

WWII – Second World War

Introduction

The twentieth century witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of newly created states, especially big changes are noticeable after WWII as the number of states almost quadrupled (Coggins, 2011a: 27-28). The United Nations officially had 51 members by 1945 when it was created; at the moment there are 193 official members (United Nations, 2014a). Coggins (2011a: 28) demonstrated that secession was the most common cause of state creation, Pavkovic (2008: 1) supported her idea by claiming that secession became the principal way of gaining independent statehood. Despite that, not all the 'attempted secessions' are so successful: some of the entities that claim to be independent states are not recognized internationally. Without the international recognition these states cannot keep diplomatic and economic relations, join international organisations or sign international treaties (Fabry, 2010: 7).

There are a number of entities such as Abkhazia, Taiwan, Somaliland, East Timor, to name a few, that are all secessionist *de facto* independent states which are able to fulfil formal criteria of statehood. Despite that, they are treated differently by the international community, and external recognition was only granted for East Timor; meanwhile, others remain unrecognized and cannot fully exercise their sovereignty (Caspersen, 2012; Caspersen and Stanfield, 2011). As long as the pattern behind the selective recognition of new states is unclear and while ongoing secessionist conflicts persist around the world, it is important to assess the factors regarding international recognition. This thesis aims to answer the following research question: what are the main factors behind the external recognition of newly created states? In other words, why are some secessionist states externally recognized while others are not?

Different theories stemming from the disciplines of political science, international law, philosophy and ethics provide answers to this question. It is argued here that the question of state acknowledgement can only be answered by combining these various theoretical approaches. As such, hypothesis in this thesis are derived from a few different competing theories. It is argued here that there is not one specific factor that leads to external recognition; rather, there is a set of factors that together explain selective recognition of secessionist states. In order to answer the research question and to define this set of factors qualitative comparative analysis is used in this work. More precisely, the crisp set that is analysed using fs/QCA 2.5 programme.

1. Literature review

Although states are considered to be the main actors of the international system, and secessionism has become the main avenue for the creation of states, this process has gained much more interest in academia outside political science. It is a widely discussed topic among scholars of international law: the issues of right of self-determination (Radan, 2011; Cop and Eymirlioglu, 2005), secession in the framework of constitutionalism (Macedo and Buchanan, 2003), border disputes in the case of secession (Johanson, 2011) and other questions are widely discussed. Legal and political philosophy is another discipline that examines various issues such as the legitimacy of secession and a peoples' right to decide (Buchanan, 2003).

Meanwhile, in the field of political science issues of secession are discussed relatively less. Most attention has been dedicated to those countries that managed to secede, and especially, to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to the controversial case of Kosovo. Other cases, especially those that remained unrecognized have often been left out of most discussions. However, during the last few years the disputes over Kosovo and the recent secession of South Sudan have triggered

growing attention to the secession and creation of new states in the twenty-first century. Radan (2008; 2011) is one of these contemporary authors who concentrates on legality and explanations of secession. His definition of the term is used throughout this thesis. Secession, according to Radan (2008: 18-19), 'is a creation of a new state upon territory previously forming part of an existing state.' Consequently, the unfinished or unsuccessful attempt to create a new state is called the 'attempted secession'. What is more, the term 'secessionist state' in this work is also employed to name a state that is not (yet) recognised by the international community, although it has proclaimed its *de facto* independence. The instruments and manner of the creation of a new state, whether it is a violent conflict, threat of force or a mutual agreement does not change the outcome, so these issues are outside the scope of this thesis.

It was argued elsewhere (e.g. Peterson, 1997) that external recognition does not play any role in the creation of the state, and as long as this newly created state meets the requirements of statehood, it is a state. These requirements are set in the Montevideo Convention of 1933: permanent population, defined territory, effective governance and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933). However, as real world cases prove, unilateral secession is still a taboo in the international system—even if a secessionist state fulfils all the formal requirements (Fabry, 2008: 52). This is why I both support a constitutive theory and assert that only external recognition of a state creates that state. As Fabry (2008: 51) put it, it is a 'foreign acknowledgment that gives the community the standing of a sovereign state in international relations and law,' and thus unrecognized states are not able to exercise their full sovereignty. In his article, Fabry (2008) showed that international recognition is essential for a secessionist state in order to exercise full sovereignty.

If an entity is not internationally recognized but fulfils all the formal statehood requirements, it can be called a *de facto* independent state, or as Caspersen (2011; 2012) called it, an 'unrecognized state'. Caspersen examined all of the different aspects of unrecognized states: their status, origins, capabilities of state building, function within the international system, likely future trajectories, etc. Her definition of the unrecognized or *de facto* independent state is also used throughout this thesis. The state is called an 'unrecognized state' when: 1) it has achieved de facto independence covering at least two-thirds of the territory to which it lays claim, including the main city and the key regions; 2) its leaders are seeking to develop further state institutions; 3) the entity has existed at least for 2 years; 4) the entity has not gained international recognition or has only been recognized by a patron state and few other states of less importance; 5) the entity has declared formal independence (Caspersen, 2012: 6, 11).

Another author, Siroky (2011: 47), explained the reasons that lead to international recognition of secessionist states and asserted that different existing explanations can be grouped in three main categories according to the unit of analysis: 1) those that concentrate on the secessionist group, 2) the secessionist state and 3) external actors of foreign powers. Sometimes, scholars use mixed explanations that include factors from all of the above categories. Siroky (2011) argued that extremely impoverished or very distinctive ethnic groups; weak, poor, and ineffective mother states; political and economic support from external forces; and support of ethnically similar external forces are all factors that shape and influence secessionist movements and have an impact on their outcomes. Although Siroky's work did not draw the exact causal links and did not present any concrete theory, it is useful as a review and grouping of existing theories. His findings are supported in this thesis, and in order to build an explanation of external recognition, factors from all three categories are incorporated. It is assumed that recognition is given only when these factors act together.

The first category, as mentioned above, stresses the importance of the secessionist group. Two different approaches are identified within this category. Some authors claimed that the general right to secession exists only when the group in question (secessionist group) has suffered injustices, while others claimed that group's ethnic distinctness plays the most important role. The former idea was held by A. Buchanan, (1991; 2003) who asserted that a group can only secede and be recognized internationally when: 1) physical survival of its members is threatened by actions of the parent state (e.g. policy of the Iraqi government towards Kurds in Iraq) or 2) it suffers from violations of basic human rights (e.g. East Pakistanis who seceded to create Bangladesh), or 3) its previously sovereign territory was unjustly taken by the mother state (as with the Baltic Republics). Similar claims were supported by Dersso (2012: 231), who pointed out that external powers are more willing to recognize a secessionist group when it has suffered violations of human rights or systematic discrimination (it can be ethical, regional, economic, etc.). Moreover, Orentlicher (2003) in her study of democratic principles behind the external recognition also asserted that the international community should recognize unilateral rights to secede when a secessionist group has survived serious injustice and exclusion. Finally, Sterio (2013: 60-61) included injustice and violation of human rights as one of the four factors essential for external recognition. She claimed that the secessionist group must prove that it has been subject to oppression or has faced human rights' violations; otherwise it cannot have international support. The first hypothesis summarized these considerations.

Hypothesis 1: international recognition is more likely if the group in consideration (secessionist group) has suffered injustices or human rights' violations.

Another group of scholars that stresses the importance of the secessionist group claims that external recognition is more likely if the secessionist group is ethnically

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distinctive from the majority or the ruling elite in a parent state. Heraclides (1991: 19) argued that if the secessionist group is ethnically (or otherwise culturally) different from a parent state, the role played by the group's inequality or disadvantage becomes secondary. In other words, a group's distinctness is the most important factor for the secession. The same view was held by Song (2003) who maintained that being a distinctive nation within the parent state gives people a right for self-determination, and this right should be supported by the international community. Casperson (2012: 54-55) added that an ethnically different secessionist group will receive even more international support if there are people of the same ethnicity living in another (for example, neighbouring) country. Accordingly, the second hypothesis stressed the significance of ethnical distinctiveness.

Hypothesis 2: international recognition is more likely if the secessionist group is ethnically different from the majority or ruling elite in a patron state.

The second category of authors derived their explanations from the state level. Many scholars who refer to the state level indicators stress various capabilities of secessionist states that help them gain international support. However, scholars differ in their opinion about the specific factors: Buchanan (1997), Orentlicher (2003), Sterio (2013) maintained that the newly created state must ensure that no (or less) human rights' violations will appear; Caspersen (2012: 54-55) demonstrated that recognition is more likely when the secessionist state is economically stronger and receives some economic support from outside, but links with the supporting patron state are not too tight and do not make the secessionist country a puppet; Siroky (2011: 54-56) claimed that popular international support is gained if a new state is economically stronger and provides better services for its citizens. Finally, Sterio (2013: 60-62) asserted that recognition is more likely if the mother states are military, politically or structurally weaker as it makes them lose control of a secessionist region, and

the international community is more convinced to act in favour of recognition. All together these factors imply that the secessionist state offers better governance and quality of life to its citizens compared to what was provided by a parent state[1].

Hypothesis 3: international recognition is more likely if a secessionist state provides more effective governance and better quality of life for its people than the parent state.

Finally, the third category concerns external factors. Coggins (2006; 2011; 2011a) proved in her works that these factors are as important as the internal. She demonstrated that states within the international community (most importantly – the biggest and most important states) will act on their own political motives while deciding upon recognition. The main factors to look at are those that shape the power games between the Great Powers: their relation with the parent state, disorders in domestic politics, etc. The author's main claim was that realist theories of international relations should be taken into consideration when explaining the support of the most important states of the international system. The same ideas were adopted by Sterio (2013), who concluded her book with the claim that rule of the Great Powers became the most important in theory of external self-determination; therefore, the motives of these countries should be studied carefully. Saideman (2011) also based his research on the assumption that support from the strongest players in the international community is essential for the success of secessionist movements. He concluded that power and parochial interest govern the foreign policies of the most powerful countries and their decisions towards states' recognition. Additionally, Walker (1998: 36) argued that most states (including the Great Powers such as Russia and the US) are reluctant to recognize the new members of the international community because of the risk of

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[1] It is suggested by scholars (e.g. Devers, et al., 2013: 11) to combine closely related conditions into one larger 'super condition' so that a number of conditions in qualitative comparative analysis would not be too large (explained below in greater detail).

self-determination and separatism within their own borders. To sum up all these discussions, the hypothesis are based on Coggins's (2006: 62-65) assumptions about the behaviour of the most powerful states and their external and domestic security considerations on the question of recognition.

Hypothesis 4: international recognition is more likely if the Veto Powers[2] are not beset by separatist challenges at home (by the time when a question of recognition is raised abroad).

Hypothesis 5: international recognition is more likely if it weakens the enemies of the Veto Powers and does not weaken their friends.

2. Time frame and selection of the cases

The cases were chosen from the time period of 1992 to the present day because during the Cold war era secessionist countries had different possibilities and constraints that are not present today (mainly due to another form of secessionism – decolonization) (Caspersen, 2012: 11). What is more, although dissolution is also a kind of secessionism, there are many different interpretations in both political science and international law about the cases of the Soviet Union, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, so these events were left out. Finally, due to the scope of the research it was too difficult to include more cases and extend the time frame.

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[2] I use the term 'Veto Powers' instead of Coggins's 'Great Powers' because the five countries I chose for my analysis are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and only they have a right to veto admission of newly created states. These countries are: The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France and China. Additionally, according to Coggins (2006: 96-97), they were the strongest and the most materially capable and influential players in the international system during the time period from 1992 to present, which makes them more interested in global issues such as secession and enables them to greatly influence decisions on international recognition.

All the cases that were included in the research were either states that managed to succeed and gain recognition after 1992 or that had existed as unrecognized states (the criteria of unrecognized states are mentioned above) until 2013 and had fulfilled the Montevideo criteria. These criteria helped to eliminate such entities as Western Sahara (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) and Aceh movement because they did not control more than 70% of the clamed territory. Moreover, territories that maintained a very high level of independence but had not officially proclaimed their intentions of independence such as Puntland in Somalia or Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan were also excluded from the research (Caspersen: 2012: 8-11).

Due to its limited length this research excluded ex-secessionist states that re-seceded. That means the cases that in the time period of 1992 to the present day were unrecognized states, and because of some developments do not enjoy this status anymore. For example, Chechnya in 1996-2000 was claiming its independence from Russia, but after the war it was made to renounce these claims. Other cases of re-secession which were not included to the research: Bougainville (1975-1997) in Papua New Guinea, Republika Srpska (1992-1995) and Republika Srpska Krajina (1991-1995) in Croatia, Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka (1986-2009), Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq (1991-2004) (Caspersen, 2012:12).

The cases of Taiwan and Kosovo were treated as unrecognized states, because they were not members of the UN and they were not recognized by some of the most powerful countries in the international system (Caspersen, 2012: 10).

All the states that were created by secession after 1992 were part of the research, with an exception of Montenegro as its secession in 2006 might be understood as the continuation of a dissolution process of the former Yugoslav republic. Montenegro's

secession was very unproblematic—supported by a mother state and based on the precedents of the other countries that seceded in 1992 (Sterio, 2013: 49-50).

It means there are three secessionist countries that gained recognition in the time period from 1992 to the present day: East Timor, South Sudan and Eritrea. Eight unrecognized or *de facto* independent countries were also examined: Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Transnistria (also called Transdniestria), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Kosovo and Taiwan (Caspersen 2012: 12; Caspersen and Stansfield, 2011: 185; Pavković and Radanan, 2007: 257-259). Table 1 shows all of the selected cases as well as the mother state from which they seceded or attempted to secede and the dates of either independence or of the announced but unrecognized independence.[3]

Table 1: Research cases

Case	Mother state	Year of recognition or attempted secession
East Timor	Indonesia	2002
South Sudan	Sudan	2011
Eritrea	Ethiopia	1993
Abkhazia	Georgia	1992
Nagorno Karabakh	Azerbaijan	1994
Somaliland	Somalia	1991
South Ossetia	Georgia	1992
Transnistria	Moldova	1991-1992
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	Cyprus	1974
Kosovo	Serbia	1999
Taiwan	China	1971

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[3] All three recognized states were admitted to the UN (denoting recognition) in the same year as they proclaimed their independence.

3. Research design

The qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a research design that makes this project unique because it is a middle ground between case-oriented (qualitative) and variable-oriented (quantitative) approaches. The goal of this strategy is to combine the best features of both approaches (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 223). The method was developed by Charles Ragin for a comparative case study research with the small- and moderate-N datasets (for those research studies ranging from 5-10 and from 50-80 cases) (Delreux and Hesters, 2010: 4). It is said to be among the most widely influential and most innovative strategies in social science methodology (Thiem and Dusa, 2013: 87; Breiger, 2009: 243).

The method is based on the logic of Boolean algebra (see more: Ragin, 1987) and is carried out by special computer programmes. Using this method one has first to produce a data table, wherein each case is displayed as a combination of conditions (with dichotomous variables that have values of 0 or 1[4]) and an outcome (also having a value of 0 or 1). Afterwards a truth table is produced (mostly by using computer programmes), and it reconstructs data as a list of configurations[5]. Every such configuration might correspond to a few observed cases (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 224). Next, a Boolean expression can be constructed, which is a long formula consisting of configurations described in a truth table. Finally, Boolean minimization, a procedure that reduces long Boolean expressions to their shortest possible expression (also called minimal formula)[6] and is the main procedure of comparative qualitative analysis, is performed. This minimal list of prime implicants unveils

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[4] Dichotomous values are only used for cs/QCA (as applied in this research); for a fuzzy set QCA various values between 0 and 1 are possible, meanwhile values of mv/QCA can be 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc.

[5] 'A configuration is a given combination of some conditions and an outcome' (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 224).

[6] Computer programmes allow researchers to find these minimal formulas by analysing empirically unobserved but logically possible cases.

the regularities in the data and allows researchers to make generalizations and interpret this minimal formula, possibly in terms of causality (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 225).

One of the advantages of the QCA method is, that being a middle way between qualitative and quantitative approaches, QCA consolidates contradicting goals of both strategies. As a qualitative method, it requires a thorough knowledge of the cases therein (needed in order to complete a data table, resolve possible contradictions, interpret the final solution[7]), and thus allows researcher to gather in-depth insight and capture the complexity of cases (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 223; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 6). As a quantitative approach, it allows researchers to analyze more cases than other case-orientated methods, thus enabling researchers to produce generalizations. Additionally, as put by Rihoux and Lobe (2009: 224), 'the Boolean algorithms allow the minimal formulas that are parsimonious, i.e. that can be expressed with the fewest possible conditions within the whole set of conditions that are considered in the analysis'.

What is more, the idea that each cause has its own single, independent impact on the outcome is rejected in the QCA; it is instead replaced by the assumption that several causes can be present simultaneously (a combination of factors thus lead to an outcome), that is so-called 'conjunctural causation' (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 8-9). As it is argued in this work that external recognition might be caused by a set of distinct conditions, this is an appropriate method whereby one might assess these conditions.

Another big advantage of the QCA is that it allows researchers to assess and identify different combinations of causal conditions that are capable of generating the same outcome. It means that not only several factors in one configuration may lead to an outcome, but that even different configurations of factors can lead to the same outcome (Sehring,

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[7] On the other hand, the results are drawn from the specific calculations and not directly from the case studies; that is why a less detailed analysis of the cases is allowed (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 6).

Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 2). Using Boolean algebra, QCA can evaluate multiple conjectural causation, i.e. different paths (that is, different sets of conditions) that lead to the same outcome (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 8-9). Additionally, the method enables researchers to observe those situations wherein a given condition is combined with other conditions that may sometimes act in favour of the outcome, and sometimes, when differently combined, that act against it (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 8-9; Delreux and Hesters, 2010: 4-6). In other words, the certain (or given) factor, depending on its configuration with other factors, can have either a positive or negative effect on the outcome (Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 2). Using other methods such factors would be considered as irrelevant; meanwhile, with QCA one assumes that causality also depends on its underlying configuration (Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 2-3).

Finally, this method is ideal to analyse this study's breadth of cases, as eleven cases is too broad for an in-depth case analysis whereas it is also too limited for the quantitative analysis. Qualifying case numbers for this method could be between 5 and 50, but the ideal number is from 8-10 or 20-30 (Norkus ir Morkevičius, 2011: 48-52). It is as well 'a particularly powerful tool for theory testing' (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 225) that helps test this study's hypothesis and its main assumption that recognition of secessionist states is determined by both internal and external explanatory factors. As a middle way, this method allows to examine more independent variables than a simple qualitative analysis, however, less than a statistical research. General rule is to keep a balance between a number of cases and a number of conditions. Ideally, it should be 3-4 cases for each condition, but the common practice mostly ranges between four and six conditions (Rihoux et al., 2013: 178; Devers, et al., 2013: 10).

Crisp set QCA analysis was chosen instead of fuzzy set QCA because the hypothesis did not require an assessment of the level or degree of the conditions. Instead, the presence or absence of the described hypothetical conditions is important (that is, differences in kind matter more than differences in grade), so the cs/QCA was a more appropriate choice in this case (Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 19). What is more, dichotomization means some degree of simplification which allows researcher to reduce the complexity, that is, to explain difficult social phenomenon in a less complicated and less complex manner (Yamasaki, De Meur and Rihoux, 2009: 148-149). Although this choice resulted in the loss of some information (while coding information to dichotomous variables), this 'loss' is compensated by the in-depth knowledge that the researcher gains while examining the cases and which is later used when interpreting results and resolving contradictions. Finally, cs/QCA allows a greater degree of generalization and produces more parsimonious results than does fs/QCA.

Computer programme fs/QCA 2.5 was used in the research to analyze data and to conduct other procedures of the crisp set analysis. Additionally, all the operations were carried for the second time using TOSMANA 1.2.3.0 in order to verify if the same results were obtained with both programmes and to confirm the robustness of obtained findings. The same results were obtained in all cases, thus the identical tables are not displayed in this thesis. Both programmes use the same logic and the same procedures for the data analysis, fs/QCA 2.5 was chosen because it also allows examine the consistency and coverage (explained in further details bellow).

4. Operationalization and discussion of variables

4. 1. External recognition

The dependent variable—external recognition—was measured by a membership in the UN. Although membership does not mean that all of the UN member states recognize the secessionist country, it does allow the newly created country to enjoy all of the privileges of sovereignty on the international stage. What is more, it means that more than two-thirds of UN members have supported the independence of the newly created state (United Nations, 2014b). Pavković and Radan (2007: 36) argued that admission to the UN qualifies a secessionist state as recognised and independent and called it 'the ultimate form of recognition of independence.' Information on the history of recognition was provided in an official website of the UN (United Nations, 2014c). If the secessionist state was recognized and admitted to the UN it got a positive value 1, if not – it got 0.

4.2. Violations of human rights and injustice

As for the independent variables, the first one concerned human rights violations and injustice (either violation of human rights or injustice had to be present). Injustice was understood as the existence of discriminatory or repressive policies towards the secessionist group. Qualitative data of the Minorities at Risk (2014a) reports were analysed in order to identify if there were any violations of the rights or unjust policies towards the secessionist group[8]; additional secondary sources were also taken into consideration. For recognised states, injustice in the year of independence and a time period of 10 years[9] before the secession was analysed, whereas for attempted secessions – 10 years before the announced secession and the

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[8] No information was given on the East Timor case, the secondary literature sources were analysed instead.
[9] The period of 10 years was chosen because policies or violations do not happen in one day and are carried out/developed throughout some time.

time period until 2014 when it was existing as an unrecognized state. If there were violations of human rights or unjust policies during this time, the value for this variable was 1, if not – 0.

Eritrea, South Sudan, East Timor and Kosovo were the only places where injustice or strong violations of human rights occurred. As for Eritrea, after WWII it was incorporated into federation with Ethiopia and enjoyed strong autonomy. However, in 1962 the new Emperor imposed a strong centralised rule and abrogated all rights of autonomy for Ethiopia. The Tigrayans, who are the majority in current Eritrean territories, lost their political rights and privileges (even the official Arabic and Tigrinya languages were replaced by Ahmaric), and Ethiopian leaders repressed the opposition (prohibition of Eritrean national symbols, imposition of the censorship) (Minorities at Risk, 2014b; Sturman, 2011: 498; Giorgis, 2010: 6). Similar patterns of injustice were also found in Sudan where the South and North had been divided since colonization: the southern people were restricted from political participation and decision-making, Sharia law was imposed (although the majority of southerners were not Muslim). What is more, despite the fact that the South has always been less developed, the Sudanese government did not attempt to improve the quality of life in the underdeveloped South (Minorities at Risk, 2014c; de Kock, 2011: 505). East Timor, though, was a different case as Indonesian rule over the country was marked by violations of human rights such as 'extreme violence and brutality of the armed forces,' human massacre (it was estimated that 60,000 – 200,000 Timorese were killed), terrorizing civilians, and rape (Sterio, 2013: 5-6; Salla, 1997: 161-162). Finally, Kosovars in Serbia suffered repression and discrimination in most of the spheres of life (lower standards of living, restrictions of voting, etc.), exclusion from political life, ethnic cleansing, displacement and resettlement of the population that led to international intervention (Minorities at Risk, 2014d).

Meanwhile, in the other cases of Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Somaliland and Taiwan the secessionist regions have high levels of autonomy and are entitled to decide themselves upon the most important issues. No political, linguistic, religious or other injustice was reported (see: country profiles for the each case in Minorities at Risk, 2014a). The Turkish Cypriots do not have representation in the government, and most of them do not vote in the elections; however, it is their choice and mean of protest. Economically and culturally, they are also not discriminated and enjoy full autonomy (Minorities at Risk, 2014e).

4.3. Ethnic differences

The second independent variable is ethnic differences. In order to identify if the secessionist group was ethnically different from the rest of the population at the time of (attempted) secession information about the ethnic composition from the CIA World Factbook (2014) was used. The data was gathered for the year of proclamation of independence, in cases there this information was inaccessible the data from the closest census was used. In a few cases where the data about ethnicity was not provided, other official reports were used. If most of the population in secessionist territory was ethnically different from the majority of the population in a mother state the value 1 was given for this variable, if not – 0.

Table 2 outlines the ethnic composition of the mother states and the secessionist states. Other major cultural differences that were stressed in a literature are also presented in a table to give the thorough overview of the cases. Notably, Somaliland is the only case there ethnical differences do not exist, although both Somaliland and Somalia are composed of different tribes/clans, they have common ancestral origins and all of them are ascribed to Somali people (Ssereo, 2003: 24-26).

Table 2: Ethnic differences

Case	Ethnic groups in a secessionist state	Ethnic groups in a mother state	Other major cultural differences (that cause problems or dissatisfaction between the mother state and the secessionist state)
East Timor	Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian); Papuan; small Chinese minority	Javanese 40.1%; Sundanese 15.5%; Malay 3.7%; Batak, Madures, Betawi, Minangkabau, Buginese, Bantenese 16.9%; other 23.7%	Religious differences: most of the Indonesians are Muslim meanwhile most of the Timorese are Christian
South Sudan	Local tribes, black Africans: Dinka 35.8%; Nuer 15.6%; Shilluk; Bari; Kakwa; Kuku; Mandari; Ndogo; others	Sudanese Arab~70%; other 30%	Religious differences: most of the Sudanese are Sunni Muslim while South Sudanese are animist or Christian
Eritrea	Tigrinya 55%; Tigre 30%; Saho 4%; Kunama, Rashaida, Bilen (6%); other 5%	Oromo 34.5%; Amhara 26.9%; Somali 6.2%; Tigray 6.1%; Sidama 4%; Gurage, Welaita 4.8%; other 17.5%	-
Abkhazia	Abkhaz 44.7%; Hemshin Armenian 20.8%; Georgian 18,6%; Russian 10.9%; other 5% (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 9-10)	Georgian 83.8%; Azeri 6.5%; Armenian 5.7%; Russian 1.5%; other 2.5%	- (N.B. Linguistic difference exist, but Abkhazian autonomy is granted a right to use Abkhaz as an official language)
Nagorno Karabakh	Armenian (~95%, according to the official figures of the local governance); ~5% other (Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, 2005)	Azerbaijani 91.6%; Lezgian 2%; other 6.3%	Religious (majority of Muslim in Azerbaijan and majority of Armenian Aspostolic Christian in Azerbaijan) and liguistic (Azerbaijani vs. Armenian)
Somaliland	Majority of Somali (no official census)	Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15%	-
South Ossetia	Majority of Ossetians (no official census)	Georgian 83.8%; Azeri 6.5%; Armenian 5.7%; Russian 1.5%; other 2.5%	-
Transnistria	Moldovans 31.9%; Russians 30.4%; Ukrainians 28.8%; other 8.9% (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, 2004)	Moldovan/Romanian 78.2%; Ukrainian 8.4%; Russian 5.8%; Gagauz 4.4%; other 3.2%	Various disputes between the ethnic Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians) and Moldovans are salient; linguistic differences (Cyrillic vs. Latin alphabet for Moldovan language) (Roper, 2001: 106-107)
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	Majority of Turkish Cypriots (no official census)	Greek 77%; Turkish 18%; other 5%	Religious differences: Turkish Cypriots are Muslim and Greek Cypriots are Christian
Kosovo	Albanians 92%; other 8%	Serb 83.3%; Hungarian 3.5%; Romany, Bosniak 4.1%; other 5.7%; undeclared 3.4%	Notable religious (Muslim vs. Christian) and linguistic differences (Alabian vs. Serbian) differences
Taiwan	Taiwanese 84%; mainland Chinese 14%; indigenous 2%	Han Chinese 91.6%; Zhuang 1.3%; other 7.1%	-

4.4. Effective governance and quality of life

The third independent variable concerning effective governance and quality of life was measured by looking at the Freedom Index provided by the Freedom House (2014) because its calculation entailed both political rights and civil liberties. Political rights ratings in this index were based on the following subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government, while civil liberties ratings were based on freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. Additionally, various economic indicators (poverty headcount ratio, employment, GNI per capita) as well as different indicators of welfare (public spending on education and health, ratio of people obtaining primary education, ratio of population with access to drinking water source) were taken into consideration. Although all possible cases utilized data from the World Bank (World Bank, 2014), there was no data for some unrecognized states. In such cases the information from various reports was considered (UNDP/World Bank, 2008; World Bank, 1997; International Crisis Group, 2010; Gunadvi and Kucukcifci, 2009; Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf, 2003; Institute of Political Research, 2009). In order to decide upon a value for this variable, the Freedom Indexes between the parent and the secessionist states were compared at the time of announced independence (when possible). Secondly, the indexes for unrecognized states were compared for all of the years that the secessionist state was not recognized (until 2014)[10]. Finally, other mentioned indicators were reviewed for the same time periods. If for more than half the time that the *de facto* independent state was unrecognized and was providing more effective governance and better quality of life than the patron state, the value for this variable was 1, if not − 0.

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[10] For the recognized states only the year of announced independence was observed.

Only three cases demonstrated better Freedom House indexes than their mother states: Somaliland, Taiwan and South Sudan. In the same three cases other economic indicators also yielded better results when compared with their mother states. South Sudan, however, performed only slightly better than Sudan in most of the indicators,[11] or even worse, when comparing access to the drinking water. However, its superior protection of civil liberties and fast development of education services and infrastructure led to the conclusion that it was performing slightly better and was also trying to provide the better quality of life to its citizens (Dagne, 2011).

4.5. Separatist challenges within the borders of the Veto Powers

As mentioned above (see: Literature review) the Veto Powers that were mentioned in hypothesis 4 and 5 are: The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France and China. These five states are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and only they have a right to veto admission of newly created states.

The fourth independent variable is the existence of separatist movements within the Veto Powers. In this work, the list of separatist movements in the world was used (provided by Coggins (2006: 367-374), and only those movements that were still active during the time frame of this research were considered. For the unrecognized countries I compared the length of a new country's period of non-recognition with the existence of a separatist movement in at least one[12] of the Veto Powers. If a separatist group afflicted the Veto Power member during more than half of the duration of the new country's non-recognition period, the value for this variable was 0. For instance, Kosovo announced its independence in 1999; from 1999 to the beginning of 2014 the years 1999, 2000 and 2008

[11] The notably better performance was only in the case of civil liberties.
[12] I assumed that one is enough because each of the Veto Powers has a right to veto the recognition of a secessionist state if it is worried about potential challenges to their own security.

were marked by separatist challenges in one of the Veto Powers (explanation is given in the next paragraph), as it is less than half of the time, value for this case is 0. For recognized countries I assumed that the value for this variable was 0 if at least one of the Veto Powers had secessionist problems at the time when the recognition was given to the newly created state.

Most of the Veto Powers (with an exception of the US) had problems with separatist groups at home, however the activity of these groups differed during the time, and most of them were only active for a short time. For this reason, the activity of these groups was also analysed, and it was assumed that the Veto Power had secessionist problems only when the civil war between the Veto Power and separatist groups was happening, or when the separatist group was permanently and actively fighting, organizing terror attacks, and/or rioting. Peaceful arrangements there the Veto Power recognizes separatist claims and is willing to negotiate it (such as Scotland in The UK) were not taken into consideration. In the case of Russia, Chechnya was the separatist group in civil war with Russia from 1994-1996 and from 1999-2000; afterwards only sporadic attacks or bombings were organised in the region, and it was compelled to refuse independence claims (Caspersen, 2012: 12; Minorities at Risk, 2014f). The second Veto Power with the separatist challenge was France and its Corsican region in which 1996-1998 mark the peak years of rebellion activity. However, following the assassination of a high French official in 1998, only individual bombings—rarely causing much damage or costing any lives—were registered (Minorities at Risk, 2014g). The UK is the third Veto Power that was taken into consideration, and during the time period of 1992-1998 it was beset by violent riots and bombings in a region of Northern Ireland. The Good Friday accord was signed in 1998 to renounce violence, disarm and free the prisoners (Minorities at Risk, 2014h; Gregory, 2010). Finally, China has also faced challenges in its domestic policies as Tibet has been a source of disturbance for a long time.

Nonetheless, China has always managed to control Tibetan protesters, and only sporadic outbursts of violence were recorded there. Despite that relative peace, what were initially minor and peaceful protests escalated suddenly into spurts of violence before the Olympic Games, in 2008. These comprised the largest demonstrations and caused the greatest number of deaths thus far, therefore the year of 2008 was also included in the research (Dumbaugh, 2008). As a result, the years of 1994-1996; 1999-2000; 1990-1998; 1996-1998 and 2008 were marked by daunting separatist activities in at least one of the Veto Powers.

4.6. Relations between the Veto Powers and the mother state

Finally, the last independent variable was the relation between the Veto Powers and the mother state. The list of militarized interstate conflicts (Correlatesofwar, 2014) was first analyzed, and it was assumed that if there were any military clashes between at least one of the Veto Powers and the parent state during the time of attempted secession[13] the relations were not good, and the value given for this variable was 1. What is more, if there were serious diplomatic problems (such as a sudden rupture in diplomatic relations or a recall of all diplomats) between one of the Veto Powers and the mother state, the value 1 was also given to this variable. Information regarding diplomatic relations was attained from the websites of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the embassies of respective states.

The only military conflict throughout this time was between Georgia and Russia in 2008. Additionally, diplomatic relations between the two were announced as dissolved. The diplomatic problems appeared in two cases – between the UK and Sudan and between the US and Serbia. As for the UK-Sudan case, some British aid agencies and their staff members were expelled from Sudan due to the crisis in Darfur and amidst continuing pressure to

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[13] For unrecognized states – the time period from proclamation of independence until 2014, for recognized – during the year of independence.

extradite the President of Sudan. The same issue of extradition also triggered diplomatic problems between the two countries, including the withdrawal of some British diplomats. Although the recall of the Serbian ambassador from the US and temporal evacuation of the American embassy also happened during this time, it was not considered as a crisis of diplomatic relations due to the fact that officials soon commented that this was due to domestic unrest in Serbia; they also stressed that there was no reversal of diplomatic relations (Woehrel, 2013: 9).

5. Application of the qualitative comparative analysis

As mentioned earlier, fs/QCA 2.5 was implemented to analyze the crisp-set and apply the rules of Boolean algebra that comprise the crisp set QCA. As it is recommended in a relevant literature (Hanley, 2011: 21), I carried out three analyses: 1) a first analysis that excluded unobserved cases and thus generated a complex QCA solution for [1] and [0] outcome, which means for recognition and non-recognition respectfully (e.g. what leads to recognition and non-recognition of secessionist states?); 2) the second analysis, which included not-empirically-observed but logically-possible combinations, thus yielded the most parsimonious solution for the [1] and [0] outcomes; 3) the third analysis consisted of intermediate solutions for the [1] and [0] outcomes.

As mentioned earlier, each condition (or independent variable) and the resulting outcome (or dependent variable) were derived following careful examination of existing literature, and the rules for dichotomizing these conditions were established (see Operationalization and discussion of variables). Furthermore, in this study each condition and outcome will be shortened as following:

- recognition (DV) – external recognition of the secessionist state;

- injustice (IV; H1) – violations of human rights and/or injustice;

- difference (IV; H2) – ethnic differences;

- quality of life (IV; H3) – effective governance and quality of life;

- challenges (IV; H4) – separatist challenges within the borders of the Veto Powers;

- enemies (IV; H5) – relations between the Veto Powers and the mother state.

The first step before carrying out the QCA was to make a dichotomized data table that would summarize all the information concerning the existence or absence of dependent and independent variables in all cases. As mentioned previously, [1] was given if the condition was present in a particular case and [0] – if it was not.

Table 3: Dichotomized data

Case Name	Recognition	Injustice	Difference	Quality of Life	Challenges	Enemies
East Timor	1	1	1	0	0	0
South Sudan	1	1	1	1	0	1
Eritrea	1	1	1	0	1	0
Abkhazia	0	0	1	0	1	1
Nagorno Karabakh	0	0	1	0	1	0
Somaliland	0	0	0	1	1	0
South Ossetia	0	0	1	0	1	1
Transnistria	0	0	1	0	1	0
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	0	0	1	0	1	0
Kosovo	0	1	1	0	0	0
Taiwan	0	0	1	1	1	0

In the next step the Truth table (Table 4) was created using the fs/QCA 2.5 programme. This table represents the first 'synthesis' of the raw data table (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 44). It is understood simply as a table of configurations as it demonstrates the configurations of conditions associated with a particular outcome among the observed cases (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 44-45). For example, in Table 4 one can see that the coexistence

of injustice, distinctness and challenges, together with the absence of quality of life and enemies are associated with a presence of recognition (this is a configuration in the third row). By looking at Table 4 one can also see that this configuration was observed in one of the cases – Eritrea. In other words, this table matches the empirically observed combinations with their outcomes and the empirical cases representing these combinations. Using this 'synthesis' eleven cases were transformed into seven configurations.

This table also demonstrates that there are 2 cases exhibiting contradictory configurations (marked with a letter C in the table). According to Delreux and Hesters (2010: 5), two cases cannot be logically defined by the same combination of conditions and must display a different outcome, which is called a contradiction. As one can see, East Timor and Kosovo are contradictions in this research study. In this case, typical strategies of removing or re-examining these conditions cannot be applied[14] (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 48-49). According to one of the other options offered up by scholars (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 50) it is possible to proceed with an analysis and retain even the contradictory data in the table, which has been done in this study. However, this problem will be addressed again in the following section; in addition, its implications for the results and other possible strategies will be discussed.

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[14] According to Rihoux and De Meur (2009: 49-50), there are a few typical strategies for resolving contradictions (however it was not possible to adopt these strategies in this research): 1) add extra conditions (the model would get too complex, while thenumber of cases would be a bit too low for 6 conditions); 2) replace one of the conditions (not valid for theory testing); 3) reconsider the definition of the outcome variable (the variable was well justified); 4) reconsider the cases (the cases were justified in existing academic literature, however this option will be further discussed in a subsuquent section); 5) recode contradictory cases as [0] on the outcome value (doesn't make sense in a case of East Timor); 6) use frequency criteria (cannot be used with only 2 cases).

Table 4: Truth Table

Injustice	Difference	Quality of life	Challenges	Enemies	Recognition	Case Name
1	1	0	0	0	C	East Timor, Kosovo
1	1	1	0	1	1	South Sudan
1	1	0	1	0	1	Eritrea
0	1	0	1	1	0	Abkhazia, South Ossetia
0	1	0	1	0	0	Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
0	0	1	1	0	0	Somaliland
0	1	1	1	0	0	Taiwan

Following the Truth Table, the key operation of cs/QCA – the Boolean minimization – was carried out. fs/QCA 2.5 software was used to minimize the configurations and non-observed cases were not included in this first operation. The software utilized configurations from Table 4 in order to carry out Boolean minimization algorithms. The result is displayed in a Table 5 and the same result is described in a formula. The same solution was obtained using TOSMANA software. Conditions in capital letters show that a condition was present while the ones in minuscule letters reference the absence of a condition.

Table 5: Boolean minimization formula for [1] outcome (RECOGNITION)

Boolean minimization formula	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*QUALITY OF LIFE* *challenges*ENEMIES	0.333333	0.333333	1.000000
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*quality of life* *CHALLENGES*enemies	0.333333	0.333333	1.000000

Solution coverage: 0.666667

Solution consistency: 1.000000

$$INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*QUALITY\ OF\ LIFE*challenges*ENEMIES +$$

$$INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*quality\ of\ life*CHALLENGES*enemies \rightarrow RECOGNITION$$

As one can see, this formula shows the same results that can be observed from empirical cases, which is why it is also called a 'descriptive' formula and rarely proceeds beyond the observed cases (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 57). The formula consists of two terms, both of which result in RECOGNITION. These two terms represent two different paths that ultimately lead to recognition of secessionist states. Additionally, it is possible to manually modify this formula and produce a more structured version. The first part of this formula illustrates the necessary conditions, meanwhile the second part – INUS conditions (insufficient but necessary parts of a condition which is unnecessary but sufficient)[15]:

$$INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*\{\frac{QUALITY\ OF\ LIFE*challenges*ENEMIES}{quality\ of\ life*CHALLENGES*enemies} \rightarrow RECOGNITION$$

The modified formula is not more parsimonious (as no conditions were eliminated), but it shows what is common between the recognised secessionist states: all of them suffered injustice or violations of human rights and their population was ethnically different from that of the mother state.

What is more, the second analysis was performed to see the opposite result: what leads to the non-recognition of the secessionist state. The following formulas and Table 6 demonstrate the results that were obtained using fs/QCA 2.5 (the same results were obtained repeating the same procedures with TOSMANA software).

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[15] This term will be explained in greater detail bellow.

Table 6: Boolean minimization formula for [0] outcome (non-recognition)

Boolean minimization formula	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
injustice*DIFFERENCE*quality of life*CHALLENGES	0.625000	0.625000	1.000000
injustice*QUALITY OF LIFE*CHALLENGES*enemies	0.250000	0.250000	1.000000

Solution coverage: 0.875000

Solution consistency: 1.000000

injustice*DIFFERENCE*quality of life*CHALLENGES + injustice*QUALITY OF LIFE*CHALLENGES*enemies → recognition

$$\text{injustice*CHALLENGES*}\{\frac{\text{DIFFERENCE*quality of life}}{\text{QUALITY OF LIFE*enemies}} \rightarrow \text{recognition}$$

In order to achieve more parsimony (i.e. less complex results) and find the shorter solution, the logical remainders (logically possible but non-observed cases) were also analysed: the programme automatically selected logical remainders that were useful to obtain a shorter minimal formula, added them to the set of observed cases and made simplifying assumptions about them. The result is demonstrated in Table 7, in which six simplifying assumptions were made (essentially, the programme found six paths that should lead to recognition). What is more, the table shows the distribution of solution coverage (what percentage of cases each solution covers) and consistency (how consistent each solution is). Table 8 shows the same procedure and the simplifying assumptions for a [0] outcome, that is, for non-recognition.

Table 7: Minimization with logical remainders for [1] outcome (RECOGNITION)

Solution (simplifying assumptions)	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
INJUSTICE*CHALLENGES	0.333333	0.333333	1.000000
QUALITY OF LIFE*challenges	0.333333	0.000000	1.000000
challenges*ENEMIES	0.333333	0.000000	1.000000
INJUSTICE*QUALITY OF LIFE	0.333333	0.000000	1.000000
INJUSTICE*ENEMIES	0.333333	0.000000	1.000000
QUALITY OF LIFE*ENEMIES	0.333333	0.000000	1.000000

Solution coverage: 0.666667

Solution consistency: 1.000000

Table 8: Minimization with logical remainders for [0] outcome (non-recognition)

Solution (simplifying assumptions)	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
injustice	0.875000	0.875000	1.000000

Solution coverage: 0.875000

Solution consistency: 1.000000

There is, however, a zone 'in between' the most complex and the most parsimonious solutions. As mentioned earlier, the complex solution (or Boolean minimization) utilized only the empirically observed cases whereas the parsimonious solution incorporated any combination that provided a simpler solution (Ragin, 2008b). Yet for parsimonious solutions, decisions on logical remainders were made automatically and without regard to theoretical insights, therefore some simplifying assumptions might not make sense. This is why it is useful to also obtain the intermediate solutions that do not include logical remainders which are inconsistent with the researcher's theoretical knowledge (said

researcher manually sets the circumstances under which a condition contributes to the outcome, meaning that the researcher decides if a condition should be absent or present for the outcome to occur) (Legewie, 2013). Intermediate solutions for [0] outcome and [1] outcome are demonstrated bellow in Table 9 and Table 10, respectfully.

Table 9: Intermediate solutions for [1]outcome RECOGNITION

Solution (simplifying assumption)	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
DIFFERENCE*INJUSTICE*challenges	0.333333	0.333333	1.000000
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*QUALITY OF LIFE* *ENEMIES	0.333333	0.333333	1.000000

Solution coverage: 0.666667

Solution consistency: 1.000000

Formula: INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*$\{\dfrac{challenges}{QUALITYOFLIFE*ENEMIES}$ = RECOGNITION

Table 10: Intermediate solutions for [0] outcome (non-recognition)

Solution (simplifying assumption)	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
CHALLENGES*qualityoflife*injustice	0.625000	0.250000	1.000000
enemies*injustice*CHALLENGES	0.625000	0.250000	1.000000

Solution coverage: 0.875000

Solution consistency: 1.000000

Formula: CHALLENGES*injustice*$\{\dfrac{qualityoflife}{enemies}$

Before discussing the results, there are several more operations that must be carried out. First of all, for the assessment of each separate condition one should also check

the coverage and consistency of each. Consistency represents the extent to which a condition leads to an outcome (Elliott, 2013). Put simply, it demonstrates how well each condition explains the outcome and is often compared to statistical significance in qualitative research (Ragin, 2008a: 110-117). The particular condition is necessary (necessity is further explained below) only when its consistency value is 1 (Devers, et al., 2013: 34). Table 11 illustrates the consistency of each condition for the outcome RECOGNITION, and Table 12 demonstrates consistency for [0] outcome (non-recognition)[16]. It is also important to remember that, according to the QCA experts, the recommended consistency threshold is 0.75 (Ragin, 2009: 121).

The tables also demonstrate another statistical measurement – coverage. According to Elliot (2013: 5), coverage illustrates how many cases within the observed outcome are represented by a particular causal condition. In other words, this measure shows the degree to which a condition explains the observed outcome. The bigger the coverage is the more empirical importance each condition has; this measure is similar to correlation in quantitative methods (Devers, et al., 2013: 35). What is more, very often the higher the coverage is, the lower the consistency becomes, because the condition or combination of conditions that covers many cases has less explanatory power for each case. If there is a high consistency, but the coverage is low, the result is not compelling as it does not describe many cases. However, if there is a high degree of coverage and low consistency, such a result does not make a strong causal argument and is not worth any further consideration (Elliot, 2013: 6). While assessing results there should thus always be a balance between consistency and coverage.

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[16] Although theory does not suggest that reverse conditions would lead to a [0] outcome, it is interesting to examine whether some of them would have an impact on non-recognition.

Table 11: Consistency and coverage of conditions for [1] outcome (RECOGNITION)

Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
INJUSTICE	1.000000	0.750000
DIFFERENCE	1.000000	0.300000
QUALITY OF LIFE	0.333333	0.333333
challenges	0.666667	0.666667
ENEMIES	0.333333	0.333333

Table 12: Consistency and coverage of conditions for [0] outcome (non-recognition)

Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
injustice	0.875000	1.000000
difference	0.125000	1.000000
quality of life	0.750000	0.750000
CHALLENGES	0.875000	0.875000
enemies	0.750000	0.750000

It should be noted that consistency and coverage do not apply only for the particular conditions, but they also hold the same importance for combinations of conditions (i.e. simplifying assumptions). Nevertheless, no additional analysis is required to assess combinations of conditions as this was done automatically for each calculation. In some of the tables one can notice 'different kinds' of coverage: raw coverage, unique coverage and solution coverage. De Meur and Rihouh (2009: 64) give a simple explanation of the

differences between these terms: if one thinks about the outcome RECOGNITION, raw coverage is the proportion of 'recognized cases' (that means cases with an outcome RECOGNITION) that are covered by a given combination of conditions (but the same cases can also be covered by other combinations); unique coverage shows the proportion of 'recognized cases' that no other combination covers; solution coverage is the proportion of 'recognized cases' that are covered by all the combinations given in a table. For instance, if one considers the combination QUALITY OF LIFE* the challenges in Table 7 (the second simplifying assumption in the table), then the raw coverage is 0.333333, which means that this combination pertains to 33.(33)% of cases in which the secessionist state was recognized. Meanwhile, unique coverage is 0.000000, and it shows that all of the cases exhibiting the final result of this combination can also be achieved by other combinations. The solution coverage 0.666667 shows that all of the combinations given in Table 7 explain only 66.(66)% of all the cases in which recognition was given to secessionist states.

Another term that should be explained here is the 'necessary (combination of) conditions'. These are the (combination of) conditions that must be present for the desired outcome to occur; the outcome cannot happen without a necessary condition, and the absence of a necessary condition would always lead to the absence of an outcome (Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 3). Put simply, necessary conditions are always present when the outcome occurs. However, the presence of a necessary condition does not always imply the presence of an outcome because the necessary condition might have to be accompanied by yet another condition in order to cause an outcome. A particular condition has to be both necessary and sufficient[17], meaning that it would always be observed in every case when the result occurs[18] (Elliot, 2013: 25; Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 3). If one

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[17] Following the same logic, sufficient (combination of) conditions are those that are present when a particular outcome is observed in some cases but that are not present in others (Elliot, 2013: iii)

[18] Necessary and sufficient conditions almost never appear in a social reality.

condition is neither sufficient nor necessary by itself but is part of a configuration that has a causal effect on an outcome, it is called an INUS[19] condition (Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 3). Appendix 1 provides examples of these types of conditions.

Additional analysis is needed for solving the contradictory configurations. As both Kosovo and East Timor had the same combinations of conditions that ultimately led to different outcomes, one has to return to the primary assumptions about these cases. Kosovo definitely raises more doubts than East Timor. Although it is not a member of the UN, it is already recognized by 107 states worldwide (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo, 2014). This study, however, assumes that it is not quantity of supporters but power that matters most in the international system; thus, recognition from such states as Tonga, Lesotho or Tuvalu is not as important as non-recognition from powerful states such as China or Russia. Additionally, there is still an ongoing debate about the status of Kosovo among legal and political science scholars (e.g. Vidmar, 2009). This is why an additional analysis was carried out (excluding the Kosovo case) in order to find new Boolean minimization formulas, parsimonious results, intermediate solutions for both [1] and [0] outcomes. The results are reflected in Appendix 2, and they are taken into consideration while discussing the research results.

6. Discussion of the results

In this section, each condition will first be discussed separately with attention paid to both research results and empirical findings. Afterwards, the combinations of conditions will be reviewed, answering the question of this research – what combination(s) of conditions lead to the recognition of secessionist states. Finally, some limitations and recommendations for

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[19] INUS - **i**nsufficient (not sufficient by itself) but **n**ecessary components of causal combinations that are **u**nnecessary (because of multiple paths) but are **s**ufficient for the outcome (Ragin, 2008b).

future research will be introduced.

6. 1. Violations of human rights and injustice

The first hypothesis in this work stated that violations of human rights or unjust policies towards the secessionist group make recognition of a secessionist state more likely. This independent variable proved to be a necessary but insufficient condition (one can see it from the results of Boolean minimization formula and from the independent solutions with- and without the inclusion of Kosovo) which led to recognition as it was present in all of the three recognized states (East Timor, South Sudan and Eritrea). To the contrary, it was missing in all of the unrecognized states with an exception of Kosovo. However, serious violations of human rights and unjust policies were employed against Kosovar people at the time of Milosevic's rule; meanwhile, independence of this entity was announced almost ten years after his resignation. If independence instead of autonomy (with UN supervision) would have been announced by Kosovar people while repressions were still present or immediately after NATO intervention, recognition might have been possible much earlier than nearly ten years later, especially considering the fact that current Serbian authorities claim to be willing to ensure strong regional autonomy and equal rights for Kosovo Albanians (Vidmar, 2009). Despite that claim, Table 11 demonstrates that, while not even considering the case of Kosovo (total coverage 0.750000), this independent variable had a high importance on the outcome (it was both consistent and demonstrated a vast coverage). What is more, after excluding the Kosovo case, injustice not only thoroughly explained the recognition of secessionist states (consistency 1.000000) but also covered all the cases (Table 17).

In addition, the analysis shows that absence of injustice also leads to non-recognition, although it is not sufficient but is a necessary part of this outcome (Table 10). This means that if there are no unjust policies or violations of human rights, the possibility

that a secessionist entity will remain unrecognized is considerably high. Absence of injustice is also the only parsimonious solution with- and without excluding Kosovo (Tables 8 and 15, respectfully) that leads to non-recognition. Although the results explain the [0] outcome very well (consistency 1.000000) (Table 12), one cannot claim that this generalized parsimonious solution can alone explain non-recognition of all secessionist states. First of all, in all of the empirically-observed unrecognized cases it was not sufficient (only necessary). Second, seven empirically-observed cases (excluding Kosovo) are not enough to deny the theories (discussed in literature review) that consider recognition to be comprised of a combination of factors instead of one particular condition. Third, if one considers cases that were excluded from this research such as re-seceded Chechnya, the existence of human rights violations did not lead to recognition.

To sum up, violations of human rights or unjust policies towards a secessionist group is a necessary condition that leads to the recognition of a secessionist state, and it has a strong explanatory power. Though it is not sufficient by itself and has to be present in concert with other conditions. The same can be said about the conditions that lead to non-recognition of a *de facto* state, as absence of injustice is an important factor for the international community to not recognize the state, although it is not by itself sufficient.

6.2. Ethnic differences

The second hypothesis of the research claimed that in order to get international recognition a secessionist group has to be ethnically different from the majority of the people in the parent state. However, the research results demonstrate that in most of the cases (with Somaliland as the only exception) the ethnic population of a secessionist group was NOTor? different from that of the mother state. There was no distinction between recognized and unrecognized secessionist states: ten out of eleven cases (nine out of ten if Kosovo is excluded) entailed

ethnically distinctive secessionist group. This means that this condition cannot explain the different outcomes among the cases even though the results show that ethnical difference is a necessary but insufficient condition for the recognition (in both Boolean minimization and intermediate solution, with and without Kosovo), and it also explains the outcome well (consistency 1.000000, see Tables 11 and 17). It is important to note that this condition covers only around 30% of cases (Tables 11 and 17) and is therefore too low for such a condition to be treated as important (Legewie, 2013).

What is more, the absence of an ethnically different secessionist group has no importance for non-recognition of the state (very low consistency in Table 12 and Table 21). Because most of the unrecognized secessionist states also had an ethnically distinctive secessionist group, it may be concluded that ethnical difference is probably not a factor that leads to (non-)recognition but is instead the factor that encourages a secessionist group to secede from an ethnically different mother state.

Finally, I carried out one more additional operation to identify results without this condition: Boolean minimization, intermediate solutions, parsimonious solutions and analysis of necessary conditions for [0] and [1] outcomes were performed. The absence of this condition did not have any influence on the final results as all factors remained the same, except in the intermediate solutions and Boolean minimization that obviously no longer contained DIFFERENCE. However, neither consistency nor coverage results changed.

To conclude, research results show that the ethnic difference of a secessionist group was not an important factor. As mentioned in the literature review, both the unjust policies and ethnic differences conditions are backed by those scholars who claim that recognition first of all depends on the secessionist group. However, these scholars often note that their ideas contradict each other. The results of this research supports the claims of so-

called 'remedial right[20]' scholars (Buchanan, 1997).

6.3. Effective governance and quality of life

The theory suggesting that those secessionist states that provide better governance and better quality of life to their citizens than does the mother state are more likely to be recognized. However, the consistency and coverage rates for this condition are very low (see Table 11), thus it does not have a strong explanatory power and is not relevant for the final results. Empirical results also did not demonstrate any causal relationship: only South Sudan provided better life quality and better governance to its citizens than did its mother state, Sudan. However, both countries performed very similarly in most of these indicators. In addition, the cases of Taiwan and Somaliland (both unrecognized, but both performed better than the parent states) contradicted the theory. It is possible that operationalization of this variable was not correct and one should look instead at different indicators, but as long as there is no agreement among scholars who stress the importance of state-level factors, it is difficult to decide what exactly (economic factors, other indicators of the quality of life, services provided by the state, civil liberties, etc.) should be analysed.

On the other hand, the absence of better governance and quality of life provided by the secessionist state might increase the chances of its non-recognition. According to the research results, it is an INUS condition for intermediate solutions (including and excluding the case of Kosovo), and its consistency and coverage – although not high – is sufficient enough to be treated as having some causal importance. It could be possible that this condition does not have an effect on the decision of the international community to recognize a secessionist state, but it could influence their choice not to (especially because it is neither

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[20] Buhanan (1997) claims, that there are two types of scholars that stress the importance of the secessionist group: 1) 'remedial right' supporters (or those who claim that violations of human rights or unjust policies are the reasons that lead to successful secession) and 'primary right' supporters who believe that any ethnic or cultural differences mean that a group has a right to secede and should be recognized.

sufficient nor necessary, but is only an additional INUS condition). In such a case Taiwan and Somaliland would be treated as exceptions to a general trend, but examination of more cases is required in order to make a good judgment.

In conclusion, the findings of this research demonstrate that better governance and quality of life does not play a role in the recognition of secessionist states, yet its absence might influence other countries not to recognize a secessionist state. Nevertheless, further examination of this condition and additional cases are necessary in order to strengthen these findings.

6.4. Separatist challenges within the borders of the Veto Powers

Scholars who stressed the importance of external factors suggested that Veto Powers are more willing to recognize secessionist states if they are not beset by separatist challenges domestically. The research results demonstrate that recognition was granted to two out of three countries while there were no separatist challenges within the Veto Powers. The only contradictory case here was Eritrea. However, as Giorgis (2010) and Sturman (2011) suggested, the strongest powers lost their interest in Eritrea following the Cold War, thus it is possible that recognition was just a sign of ignorance: at the time it was considered a geopolitically unimportant place and was not treated as a salient precedent that would affect the domestic equilibrium of the Veto Power. Kosovo constitutes another case that opposes the theory, yet the contradictory nature of this case has already been discussed in previous sections. Although consistency of this condition was low (see Table 11 and Table 17 for the results with and without the case of Kosovo, respectfully), empirically it demonstrates a logical causal relationship, which suggests that perhaps more cases should be analysed before making a final judgement about this INUS condition. What is more, additional simulation of necessary conditions excluding the case of Eritrea brought the consistency score to 1.000000.

Moreover, the findings for [0] outcome produced even more favourable results. High consistency and coverage (see Tables 12 and 21), especially excluding the case of Kosovo, show that the presence of separatist challenges has actually contributed to the Veto Powers not recognizing secessionist states, and that it was even a necessary condition that led to non-recognition (Table 10).

One more important observation should be made here: despite often being beset by separatist challenges at home, Russia has been one of the few nations worldwide to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia[21], while failing to recognize Kosovo. On the one hand, this fact implicates that there are other, more complex explanations influencing the behaviour of the Veto Powers. On the other hand, it does not mean that separatist challenges within one of the Veto Powers have no effect on that Power's decisions regarding recognition as it is known to be one of the necessary but not sufficient conditions. As already mentioned, examination of more cases is needed to provide stronger proofs for this condition.

6.5. Relationship between the Veto Powers and the mother state

The last condition is a relationship between the mother state and the Veto Powers, or more precisely, that recognition is more likely to be granted if it weakens the enemy of one of the Veto Powers, as was stated in the hypothesis. The empirical findings did not produce any justifications for this hypothesis: Sudan was the only mother state that had intense relations with one of the Veto Powers (the UK), meanwhile Indonesia (the parent state of East Timor) always maintained strong ties with the Great Powers, and the Veto Powers were almost indifferent to Ethiopia (mother state of Eritrea). On the other hand, relations among each of the Veto Powers and Serbia are good, but the European Powers and the US have recognized

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[21] It also encourages Transnistria's right of self-determination, however it has not officially supported its independence.

Kosovo whereas Russia and China are opposed to doing so. In addition, in the case of Moldova the previously healthy (albeit occasionally inconsistent and uncertain) relations with Russia began deteriorating precisely as a result of the conflict regarding Transnistria and its self-determination; therefore, it was actually the other way round. It was not the intense relations between Russia and Moldova that rallied Russia's support of Transnistria (Chirila, 2013), but it was the support given to this secessionist entity that influenced the relationship between the two countries. Finally, one more trend is to be noticed: as most of the parent states are not powerful players in the international system they attempt to maintain good relations with the Veto Powers, and thus are willing to negotiate status of the secessionist entity (e.g. Indonesia recognized East Timor in order to keep good relations with the US, and Serbia has been negotiating Kosovo's autonomy).

Coverage and consistency for this condition are also extremely low and do not show any strong causal relationship between the condition and the outcome. Although it is an INUS condition among the intermediate solutions, statistical- as well as empirical results suggest that this is more of a sporadic coincidence than a causal relationship. On the other hand, the results suggest that if there are good relations between the mother state and the Veto Power, the latter is more likely to support the sovereignty of the parent state than the secessionist entity's right of self-determination. Consistency for a [0] outcome is high enough (see Tables 12 and 21) to assume that the absence of hostile relations is an INUS condition, which in combination with other conditions results in non-recognition.

6.6. What leads to recognition?

As one can see in Table 9, there are two intermediate solutions that lead to the recognition of a secessionist state. The first combination suggests that unjust policies or violations of human rights and ethnic differences, together with the absence of internal challenges within the Veto

Powers, must be present to recognize a secessionist state. Furthermore, the second combination suggests that in addition to the presence of injustice and ethnic differences, a better quality of life and intense relations between the mother state and one of the Veto Powers must be present. Although some of the discussed conditions might not wield a strong explanatory power in themselves, they carry more weight as a combination. However, each of these paths covers the unique and low percentage of the cases (as well as the whole solution). As mentioned earlier, the results with a very low coverage cannot lead to reliable conclusions. Nonetheless, the first combination is convincing as it could possibly explain the cases of both East Timor and South Sudan. Eritrea's case would be an exception, but not an entirely deviant one, as it has possibly not been considered as an important precedent as yet, and the Veto Powers had doubted its influence on the developments of separatist challenges within their baorders. As for the second explanation, it could only explain developments in the case of South Sudan, in which both INUS condition are not proven by this research, rendering this combination an extreme outlier. There is also another intermediate solution that was obtained after solving the contradiction and excluding the case of Kosovo. This solution suggests that the combination of injustice and ethnic differences is the primary catalyst of recognition, yet as previously mentioned, ethnic difference does not exhibit signs of any empirical logic. Additionally, exclusion of this condition does not affect the results: the same combinations with the same coverage and consistency are produced without including ethnic differences. As a result, it stands that the combination of injustice and absence of separatist challenges is the most plausible explanation for the recognition of secessionist states, but further studies are necessary to prove these (see below).

As research results as well as empirical observations neither prove nor deny some of the conditions, it is difficult to make judgements concerning the parsimonious solutions. And again, the coverage of these solutions is too low to be considered a robust

result. The first solution (see Table 7), however, acts against the logic of theory, and at least within the frame of this research, it explains an exceptional case rather than a causal relationship; thus, one should not consider it at all. Other solutions demonstrate the need to examine more cases to enable the programme to make more reasonable assumptions about the logical remainders and perhaps achieve a higher coverage. Injustice, which is the only parsimonious solution after excluding Kosovo, is without a doubt a necessary part of the solution, but it cannot be called a sufficient one as it would otherwise also lead to the recognition of Kosovo, and there would be no need for exclusion. Results of the opposite analysis that scrutinized the combinations of conditions that lead to non-recognition demonstrate much higher coverage; thus, these combinations exhibit a much stronger causal relationship with the outcome. This strength can be explained by the fact that most of the examined cases appeared to be unrecognized states, which enabled the programme to make better generalizations. As displayed in Table 10 and Table 20, the secessionist state is not recognized when unjust policies towards the secessionist group are absent and when the Veto Powers are beset by separatist challenges within their own borders. In addition, recognition is not granted to those secessionist states who do not offer a better quality of life to their citizens, or when the Veto Powers have friendly relations with the parent state. The first path, though, is generated by making assumptions based on the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia[22], but if one keeps in mind the fact that Russia (the only Veto Power that had hostile relations with the parent state, Georgia) was the only one to recognize these secessionist entities, the cases might be interpreted as exhibiting characteristics attributed to the second path. The only parsimonious solution (Tables 8 and 19), or the absence of injustice, is again a necessary but insufficient condition (as it is insufficient to explain the case of Kosovo) and

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[22] These cases are not covered by the second path as there were no friendly relations between Russia and Georgia, thus the programme made assumptions that another condition, the absence of better quality of life, must be the explanatory condition.

thus, such a generalization would not always lead to the expected outcome.

Conclusion

To sum up, this research revealed that unjust policies and/or violations of human rights by the mother state is a necessary condition that leads to the recognition of secessionist state. However, as it was assumed in the beginning of this thesis none of the conditions alone can explain the recognition: none of them are both necessary and sufficient, meaning that the combination of conditions is required to explain this complex phenomenon. This work has also demonstrated that the absence of the separatist challenges within the Veto Powers in a combination with injustice form the most plausible explanation for the recognition. Nevertheless, better quality of life and better governance in a secessionist state (than in its parent state) as well as hostile relations among the parent state and the Veto Powers might also act in a combination with unjust policies, yet the further analysis is required to make these findings more robust. As a result, only the second hypothesis can be rejected: ethnic difference between the mother state and the secessionist state appeared to be irrelevant for the external recognition.

The main limitations of this research were related to the lack of cases: it was difficult to make profound evaluations concerning some of the conditions (especially the relation between the parent state and the Veto Powers, as well as the presence of the separatist challenges within the Veto Powers). The coverage of solutions was also affected by the lack of cases as it did not allow the programme to make robust assumptions about the logically-possible but empirically-unobserved cases. However, the QCA methodology allows the addition of more cases to the research. Although it was not possible to do so within the scope of this thesis due to it its limited length, it is recommended to add secessionist entities that re-seceded as well as to extend the time frame so that the case of dissolution of the Socialist

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be added. This might also allow the researcher to create an extra condition if needed.

Concerning the chosen independent variables: if the addition of more cases does not provide more robust results, the IVs quality of life and enemies might be re-examined. For the former, the researcher should turn back to the literature and choose the most suitable and convincing theory among scholars who stress the importance of the secessionist state-level factors for recognition. Choosing one particular theory instead of integrating the ideas of several scholars would help to operationalize this variable in a more precise manner and might produce better results. As for the IV enemies, each Veto State and its relations with the parent state could be analysed separately, or the analysis of the Veto Powers could be reduced to the analysis of the most important Great Powers in the international community. This would help to avoid an inaccuracy that occurred in some cases such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia where Russia was the only Veto Power that recognized these entities and the only one that had hostile relations with their parent states. Although this fact acts accordingly with a theory, statistically it was not possible to observe this logical relationship. In addition, the research also shows that there is a need to identify and examine new potential conditions and possibly include them into research. First, as it is demonstrated by the case of Eritrea, the CNN effect might be an important factor. The assumption was made in this work that the Veto Powers might have recognized Eritrea simply because they did not find it threatening to their domestic problems as the case was not widely escalated. In addition, escalation of the problem in a mass media might also trigger an attention of electorate which could influence the choices made by the politicians within the Veto Powers. Second, more attention could be given to the reasons that lie behind the behaviour of the Veto Powers, as in that they might have additional interest in the secessionist states, i.e. making them their own puppets (as Russia did with Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria) or capitalizing on economic interests

(Taiwan is recognized by some microstates that are said to be paid for giving recognition), etc. Third, one might also examine the importance of a geographical proximity (would a secession of a small state far from the Veto Powers challenge them as much as secession in their neighbouring states? Or is it beneficial for the Veto Powers to recognise secessionist groups in neighbouring states in order to weaken them?). Finally, the power games between the Veto Powers might also be important: they might not give a recognition if that would be treated as an offensive act by another Veto Power (e.g. the Veto Powers do not recognize Taiwan as they want to maintain friendly relations with China).

At the end of a day, having confirmed only the first hypothesis (unjust policies and/or violations of human rights lead to the recognition of the secessionist state) and rejected the second one (ethnic differences do not have influence on the recognition), the other three remain for the consideration of a future research. An addition of some extra cases and possibly and inclusion of additional conditions are also essential for the further analysis.

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Appendix 1. Types of conditions

Table 13: Types of conditions

Example	Type of condition
A → Z	A is both necessary and sufficient condition.
A*B → Z	A and B are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions.
A+B → Z	A and B are sufficient (but not necessary) conditions.
A*B + X*Y →	A, B, X, Y are INUS conditions. A*B and X*Y are sufficient (but not necessary) combinations of conditions.

Appendix 2. Research results excluding case of Kosovo

Table 14: Boolean minimization formula for [1] outcome (RECOGNITION), excluding case of Kosovo

Boolean minimization formula	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*qualityoflife*enemies	0.666667	0.666667	1.000000
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*QUALITYOFLIFE*challenges* *ENEMIES	0.333333	0.333333	1.000000

Solution coverage: 1.000000

Solution consistency: 1.000000

Table 15: Minimization with logical remainders for [1] outcome (RECOGNITION), excluding case of Kosovo

Solution (simplifying assumption)	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
INJUSTICE	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000

Solution coverage: 1.000000

Solution consistency: 1.000000

Table 16: Intermediate solution for [1] oucome (RECOGNITION), excluding case of Kosovo

Solution (simplifying assumption)	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
DIFFERENCE*INJUSTICE	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000

Solution coverage: 1.000000

Solution consistency: 1.000000

Table 17: Consistency and coverage of conditions for [1] outcome, excluding case of Kosovo

Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
INJUSTICE	1.000000	1.000000
DIFFERENCE	1.000000	0.333333
QUALITY OF LIFE	0.333333	0.333333
challenges	0.666667	1.000000
ENEMIES	0.333333	0.333333

Table 18: Boolean minimization formula for [0] outcome (non-recognition), excluding case of Kosovo

Boolean minimization formula	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
injustice*DIFFERENCE*qualityoflife*CHALLENGES	0.714286	0.714286	1.000000
injustice*QUALITYOFLIFE*CHALLENGES*enemies	0.285714	0.285714	1.000000

Solution coverage: 1.000000

Solution consistency: 1.000000

Table 19: Minimization with logical remainders for [0] outcome (non-recognition), excluding case of Kosovo

Solution (simplifying assumption)	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
injustice	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000

Solution coverage: 1.000000

Solution consistency: 1.000000

Table 20: Intermediate solutions for [0] outcome (non-recognition), excluding case of Kosovo

Solution (simplifying assumption)	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
CHALLENGES*qualityoflife*injustice	0.714286	0.285714	1.000000
enemies*injustice*CHALLENGES	0.714286	0.285714	1.000000

Solution coverage: 1.000000

Solution consistency: 1.000000

Formula: CHALLENGES*injustice*$\{\frac{qualityoflife}{enemies}$

Table 21: Consistency and coverage of conditions for a [0] outcome (non-recognition), excluding case of Kosovo

Conditions tested	Consistency	Coverage
injustice	1.000000	1.000000
difference	0.142857	1.000000
quality of life	0.714286	0.714286
CHALLENGES	1.000000	0.875000
enemies	0.714286	0.714286