The Lagging of Dutch Women in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

The impact of the UNSC Resolution 1325 on Dutch women's deployment

in UN peacekeeping operations

MA International Studies

Leiden University

"If non-violence is the law of our being, the future is with women."

- Mohandas Gandhi (as cited in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007, p. 5).

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Date of Submission:	7 July 2017
Thesis (15 ECTS)	
Word count:	14.280

Abstract

In October 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed the resolution 1325 on gender mainstreaming. Several resolutions on this topic have followed and together these resolutions form the Women, Peace and Security agenda. This agenda encompasses all aspects of gender mainstreaming such as the protection of women's rights in conflict and post-conflict, the prevention of sexual abuse against women and the enhancement of women in United Nations peacekeeping operations. This thesis particularly studies the latter issue, urging the Member States to deploy more women peacekeepers in peacekeeping missions. The larger deployment of women in missions is of high importance since the inclusion of women peacekeepers has advantages for conflict and post-conflict societies. Therefore, the United Nations advises the Member States to adopt a National Action Plan and aims to fully support national governments to implement gender mainstreaming in their policies and guidelines. This thesis hypothesises that there is a gap between the increasing policies established by the Dutch government in favour of gender mainstreaming and the reality of vast under-representation of Dutch women peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations. An analysis of the Dutch National Action Plans and Defence Action Plan demonstrates how the official Dutch governmental discourse fails to increase the participation of Dutch women in peacekeeping operations. The three main observations, resulting from this analysis, are the lack of internal focus within the national policies and the Dutch society on gender mainstreaming, the use of the word 'women' instead of 'gender' and the fact that the Dutch government treats the implementation of the policies as a final goal, while these policies are merely a sub-part of a larger effort. Therefore, it can be concluded that the official Dutch government discourse on the Security Council resolution 1325 shows the gap between the little change in Dutch women's participation in peacekeeping operations and the adoption of policies in favour of gender mainstreaming.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CEDAW	Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAP	Defence Action Plan
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EU	European Union
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MD	Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation of the United Nations
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-based Violence
SCR 1325	Security Council Resolution 1325
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WG 1325	Workgroup 1325
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter introduces the topic of this thesis. The following sections comprehend the research question, clarification of key concepts, the relevance of this topic, the methodology and the outline of the entire thesis.

> "One of the most salient aspects of warfare is the construction of 'men as warriors and of women as worriers'"
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> (Sharoni, Welland, Steiner, & Pedersen, 2016, p. 33).

At the time of writing, António Guterres, who has only been Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) for six months, aims to increase the number of women serving in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) (Roberts, 2017). This is not a new ambition of the UN, since 2000 former UN Secretary-Generals have been trying to deconstruct the perception of warfare articulated succinctly in the quote above. Therefore, the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) prioritises the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in PKOs (United Nations, 2016a). Increasing the deployment of women in PKOs is crucial if the goals and mandates of the UN regarding gender equality, non-discrimination and human rights are to be realised (Hudson, 2000; United Nations, 2002, p. 5). Among other reasons, the UN is working on promoting and recruiting women peacekeepers to act as role models to inspire women and girls in conflict and post-conflict areas which are often men-dominated (Kirby & Shepherd, 2016; United Nations, 2016a).

Despite the efforts of the UN to promote and extol the importance of women peacekeepers in PKOs, there has been little progress and women are still under-represented in PKOs (Dharmapuri, 2013, p. 2; Gaestel & Shelley, 2015; Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016; Vermeulen, 2016). The situation of women in conflict and post-conflict situations has barely improved in the past decade, and in some

areas, it has even deteriorated (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter referred to as MFA), 2016). That is why Guterres is still compelled to prioritise this agenda after seventeen years.

It should be clarified that the responsibility of this progress in regard to the goals of the SCR 1325 is not solely for the UN, but for all the UN Member States (hereafter referred to as the Member States). In general, the UN has little influence on the personnel recruited for PKOs by the various troop-contributing countries (Hudson, 2000). Hence, the SCR 1889 (2009), supporting the SCR 1325, stressed that the Member States should develop and implement Action Plans at the national level regarding the execution of the WPS agenda (United Nations Security Council, 2009). Thus, countries should adopt a strategy to achieve the objectives of the SCR 1325, which is predominantly gender mainstreaming. To clarify, gender mainstreaming is:

"The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality" (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014, p. 56).

National governments have responded differently to this gender mainstreaming advocacy. It was a challenge for the Member States to translate the statements, principles and commitments outlined in the SCR 1325 into actual and everyday principles at the national level (Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016). To illustrate this challenge, the Dutch efforts of gender mainstreaming, such as formulating three National Action Plans (NAPs) did not show the results the Dutch government was aiming for (MFA, 2015b). The Netherlands has 2.6 percent women in their UN troops, which is below the UN average of 3.3 percent (Vermeulen, 2016).

This gap between the Dutch efforts to include women in PKOs and the little progress in expanding women peacekeepers is mystifying. There is little literature presenting why Dutch contributions to PKOs are not gender balanced. By and large, this thesis shows the gap between the reality of under-representation of Dutch women peacekeepers and the increasing number of policies in favour of the WPS agenda rather than explaining this gap. Therefore, the research question is 'To what extent does the official Dutch government discourse on the UN Security Council resolution 1325 show a gap between the little change in Dutch women's participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations and the adoption of Dutch policies in favour of gender mainstreaming?'

To clarify, the dependent variable in this study is the gap between the increasing efforts established by the Dutch government in favour of the WPS agenda and the reality of vast under-representation of Dutch women peacekeepers in PKOs. In general, this thesis refers to women peacekeepers as civil, police and military, unless this is stated differently. This gap is illustrated by the official Dutch government discourse. Investigating this discourse is of high importance, since the Dutch government acknowledges these difficulties, by stating that "the political ambitions of the Security Council are in stark contrast with reality" (MFA, 2016, p. 5). At the same time, the Dutch government does not find further research on the exclusion of Dutch women in PKOs necessary (MFA, 2014b, p. 3). The Dutch ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence argue that quality of a troop is more important than gender equality (MFA, 2014b, p. 3). This thesis proofs that gender is important to reach higher quality in PKOs.

1.1 'Peaceful' women and 'violent' men

This thesis illustrates rather than explains how textual processes of the Dutch government shape or fail to shape the way Dutch act towards women's deployment in PKOs. To illustrate this, a critical discourse analysis is adopted in this qualitative research thesis. A critical discourse analysis is a

multidisciplinary approach to the study of discourse that views language as a structure of social practice (Fairclough, 2013). The discourse analysis will take a discursive approach, which enables an exploration of the construction of meaning in human interaction. A poststructuralist feminist approach is suitable, since poststructuralist feminists define gender as a set of socially constructed characteristics describing what a 'man' and a 'woman' ought to be (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2010; Skjelsbaek, 2001, p. 47; United Nations, 2002).

Thus, next to biological differences in sex our culture assigns a discourse that not only shapes the way people experience and understands themselves as 'men' and 'women' but also interweaves with other discourses and shapes them (Cohn, 1993, pp. 228-229; Whitworth, 2004). Regarding gender, this thesis accepts that gender roles vary according to socio-economic, political and cultural contexts, and are affected by multiple factors, including age, race, class and ethnicity (United Nations, 2002; Weedon, 1987). Thus, gender is always influenced by external factors and at the same time, gender influences its surroundings, like textual processes.

Mainly, this methodology supports the idea that the world is created, maintained and reproduced through our own linguistic practices (Weedon, 1987; Whitworth, 2004, p. 15). Hence, it is important to understand the connections between language, subjectivity, power and social organisation (Weedon, 1987). Language constructs subjectivity, a person could not simply make sense of something without attaching a subjective meaning to it (Weedon, 1987).

Those existing social constructions empower the masculine over the feminine (Dunne et al., 2010). Hence, the current UN discourse has the notion of violent men and peaceful women, and this might dominate the process of gender mainstreaming. It is important to look at the language used by in the WPS agenda, knowing that language can be learned and be changed over time (United Nations, 2002). This will be done by a case study on the WPS discourse of the Dutch government.

1.2 Outline

Having set forth the relevance, the research question and the methodology of this thesis, the following chapters provide more insights on the role of women in war, the role of women peacekeepers in PKOs, the SCR 1325, the WPS agenda and how the Netherlands takes responsibility towards the implementation of the SCR 1325.

To be specific, the second chapter of this thesis gives a literature overview of the advantages and disadvantages of women peacekeepers in PKOs, the role of women in conflict and post-conflict societies and the inclusion of gender mainstreaming in the multidimensional approach of PKOs. This chapter develops the theoretical framework of this thesis. Subsequently, the third chapter explains the efforts taking on the realisation of gender mainstreaming at the international level. The SCR 1325 is crucial for this realisation; therefore, this chapter provides a brief history and detailed content of the SCR 1325. Also, the global WPS framework is explained. The fourth chapter shows the Dutch response towards the SCR 1325. Accordingly, the fourth chapter clarifies the three Dutch NAPs and the Defence Action Plan (DAP). Moreover, to the fifth chapter bridges the information provided in the preceding chapters into interpretation. Finally, the sixth chapter provides a summary of the thesis, further recommendations and limitations. This thesis hypothesises that there is a gap between the increasing policies established by the Dutch government in favour of gender mainstreaming and the reality of vast under-representation of Dutch women peacekeepers in PKOs.

Chapter 2: Women in war

This chapter reviews the literature on women in war and PKOs. The first two sections look at two opposite views on the involvement of women peacekeepers in PKOs based on literature written by academics as well as practitioners working as peacekeepers in missions. The third section explains the different types of roles local women in conflict and post-conflict could have. Altogether, the first three sections form the basis for the final section of this chapter, since the latter section elaborates on how the UN takes a multidimensional approach for its PKOs including gender mainstreaming.

2.1 More women peacekeepers, less violence?

The impact of women peacekeepers in PKOs is a central theme in scholarly literature written by scholars such as Bridges and Horsfall, Hudson, Ivanovic, Simić and Skjelsbaek. These scholars recognise the conventional masculinity in PKOs as well as propose alternative ways of thinking about women in PKOs. The existing literature offers rather multifarious viewpoints on the impact of women peacekeepers on peacekeeping processes. This section offers arguments challenging the significance of women's contributors in PKOs.

Firstly, Simić (2010) and Skjelsbaek (2001) argue that women peacekeepers could help women victims in conflict societies and post-conflict societies, but only in the short-term. To illustrate, women in war are merely harmed by sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and women peacekeepers tend to deal better with women victims of violence (Allison, 2015; Hynes, 2004, p. 431; Ivanovic, 2014; Simić, 2010, p. 194). However, one should realise that adding more women to peacekeeping troops will not stop the root causes of SGBV in the long-run. Regarding the root causes of sexual violence, Simić (2010) states that countering sexual abuses in conflict societies and post-conflict societies should not become a substitute for the more encompassing goal of improving gender balance and equality in PKOs (p. 188). He points out that there is indeed a need to combat

SGBV in PKOs, however, it is not solely the responsibility of women to address this problem or to eliminate causes (Simić, 2010, p. 188). To stop SGBV and its root causes, the UN needs to radically introduce justice systems that will end impunity of the perpetrators instead of eagerly hoping for women peacekeepers to make a change (Simić, 2010, p. 196; McCarrel, 2016).

Moreover, women seem to have been invited to join PKOs as moral elites to humanise men and to act as role models to set 'good' examples (Bouta et al., 2005, p. 13; Simić, 2010, p. 196). It is assumed that when adding 'a few kind women' to the militarised masculine settings in PKOs, the dominant muscular attitude of men in the missions will become less. Yet there has been little evidence that the presence of women in PKOs changes attitudes of men towards their comrades or local women (Vermeulen, 2016). Significantly, research has shown that women in PKOs tend to fit into the hyper military masculine setting rather than change this (Bouta et al., 2005, p. 16; Simić, 2010, p. 189). It appears that the 'boys will be boys' attitude is internalised and accepted by not just 'the boys' (Simić, 2010, p. 192). Therefore, the mere presence of women peacekeepers will not necessarily transform military gender hierarchies and the macho culture within PKOs. Subsequently, Skjelsbaek (2001) concludes that femininity is not naturally peaceful (p. 64). According to Skjelsbaek (2001), women can be equally war-prone as men (p. 64). Thus, increasing the deployment of women peacekeepers will not necessarily increase sensitivity towards gender issues (Simić, 2010, p. 194). Nonetheless, the next section will consider a different perspective on women's deployment in PKOs as well.

2.2 More women peacekeepers, less violence!

"She's just been raped by soldiers.

The same soldiers murdered her husband.

The last thing she wants to see is another soldier.

Unless that soldier is a woman" (Simić, 2010, p. 192).

Regardless of the arguments provided in the previous section, Hudson (2011) states that women peacekeepers will play a crucial role in PKOs in the long-run on two interrelated dimensions. First, the internal dimension where women can beneficially influence social relations within peacekeeping troops (Hudson, 2000). Second, the external dimension which relates to their contact with the local population (Hudson, 2000). Scholars advocating for an increased presence of women in PKOs will, therefore, support the quote stated above. To illustrate the two dimensions, four beneficial aspects for women as peacekeepers mentioned in scholarly literature are listed.

First, women's presence, especially in decision-making roles, sends a clear message in favour of equality and non-discrimination against women (Hudson, 2000). Hence, women's presence puts new items on the agenda as well, such as SGBV conducted by men peacekeepers (Bouta, Frerks & Bannon, 2005, p. 49). According to Bridges and Horsfall (2009) and Roberts (2017), a force with an adequate representation of women service personnel in PKOs will mitigate against possible sexual misconduct perpetrated by men soldiers. Simić (2010) says that the "presence of more women can actually help dilute a macho approach to peacekeeping" (pp. 193-194). Women are perceived as being more empathic, which enriches their reconciliatory and political work as negotiators (Hudson, 2000). Overall, the presence of women generally has a positive influence on social relations within the local communities, the broader organisation and among the peacekeeping troops (Hudson, 2000; Simić, 2010).

Furthermore, the main objective of PKOs is to protect civilians, and to do so, comprehensive intelligence-gathering capabilities are necessary (Ivanovic, 2014). This is vital, for instance, intelligence-gathering could help with the establishment of an information system and warning system to protect civilians. Accurate intelligence is best gathered from the local population.

Therefore, more women peacekeepers are needed, since they have better access to local women, especially in cases where culture and religion are deeply intertwined, could positively contribute to access information and thus to the effectiveness of PKOs (Roberts, 2017; Simić, 2010). Women in conflict societies and post-conflict societies do not always feel comfortable with men soldiers, therefore women will probably share less information with them (Ivanovic, 2014). According to Lamptey, a gender adviser in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, women peacekeepers are portrayed as caring and empathic and thus 'different' from their men colleagues (Gizelis, 2009, p. 509; Simić, 2010, p. 195). In addition, Bacha (2011) and Simić (2010) argue that women peacekeepers are role models for women in conflict resolution. Women peacekeepers are perceived to foster confidence and trust with local communities, which is an important factor because losing the trust of the local population may result in the increased vulnerability of peacekeepers (Bridges & Horsfall, 2009; Hudson, 2000). According to Ivanovic (2014) "this is where women peacekeepers can fill a gap by providing women and children with a greater sense of security, but also by being able to foster their trust and in the process of gathering valuable information for the mission" (p. 1). Women peacekeepers do not only have easier access to local women, but also to local men. To reiterate Major General Lund, "being a female, from my recent deployment in Afghanistan, I had access to 100 percent of the population, not only 50 percent" (Ivanovic, 2014, p. 1). This is strengthened by studies conducted by PKOs in Cambodia, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which show that women

peacekeepers face fewer restrictions in the contact with local men and women compared to men peacekeepers (Ivanovic, 2014).

To point out, Bridges and Horsfall (2009), Hudson (2000) and Whitworth (2004) claim that when at least 30 percent of peacekeeping troops are women, local women become more involved in the peace process, such as promoting women's participation in elections and human rights programmes. Acting as inspiring role models may have the effect of mobilising women in conflict societies and post-conflict societies to become involved in peacebuilding, democratisation, development and the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants (Roberts, 2017; Whitworth, 2004). Therefore, the inclusion of women peacekeepers could help the position of women in conflict and post-conflict areas as well.

Finally, the presence of women peacekeepers may reinforce the traditional notion that peacekeepers only use force in self-defence (Hudson, 2000). Women are perceived as a defusing tension rather than trying to control events. Women are particularly successful in the diffusion of violence, moreover, they are perceived to be compassionate, willing to listen, and sometimes employ unconventional methods to diffuse potentially violent situations (Whitworth, 2004, p. 126). According to January-Bardill, a South African women special adviser on the role of women in the UN, women tend to be less aggressive, they opt for life and make greater efforts to prevent unnecessary deaths (Allison, 2015; Simić, 2010). Simply, by gender mainstreaming, the UN increases its pool of talented peacekeepers to make PKOs live up to their fullest potential (Stiehm, 2001, p. 44).

This thesis will take the perspective explored in this section, however, it is relevant to elaborate on this topic to understand how women peacekeepers could help local women in conflict and post-conflict. Therefore, the next section will address how local women are affected by and contributing to war.

2.3 Local women in war

To understand the beneficial role of women peacekeepers in PKOs to local women, the role of local women in conflict and post-conflict is explained. This section discusses the two most common roles, namely victims and contributors.

Regarding local women being victims, it must be stated that bombs and weapons, undoubtedly, kill equal amounts of women and men during the modern armed conflict (Majoor & Brown, 2009, p. 19; MFA, 2014b, p. 13; Hynes, 2004, p. 431). However, a point often overlooked, is that women in conflict are disproportionately affected by war, particularly when it comes to SGBV (Hodgson, 2016; Hynes, 2004, p. 431). For instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo rape of local women described as a weapon of war (Sharoni et al., 2016, p. 12). Additionally, women widowers, who lost their husbands who fought the war as combatants, encounter more problems in local communities across many cultures than men widowers (Hynes, 2004, p. 440).

Next to women being victims, it should be recognised that women are part of various aspects of war, either forced or willing (MFA, 2014b, p. 13). Women and girls provide military and non-military support for the war. Regarding the latter, women non-militarily directly support combatants through cooking and cleaning for soldiers, acting as porters, spies, administrators and messengers (Bouta et al., 2005, p.9; United Nations, 2002). Women could indirectly support war as well by broadcasting hate speech, voting for regimes that launch military campaigns, fomenting distrust and encouraging their husbands and sons to participate in war (Skjelsbaek, 2001; United Nations, 2002, p. 3). Regarding the latter point, many women in conflict societies and post-conflict societies appear to be disappointed and even embarrassed when their husbands and sons do not fight in the war (Skjelsbaek, 2001, p. 62).

When describing these roles, it is easy to distinguish between victims and contributors, however, in practice, these different roles are difficult to separate (Bouta et al., 2005, p. 14). Thus,

local women in conflict societies and post-conflict societies could be victims, contributors or possibly both. Even bystanders often take one of these roles. Having this clarified, the next section addresses how the PKOs deal with the notion of gender mainstreaming.

2.4 UN peacekeeping operations and gender

From the previous sections and related literature, it could be drawn that women peacekeepers are positively contributing to the issues of local women in conflict and post-conflict societies. Also, it is explained that local women are part of the conflict, either as a victim, contributor or both. This section clarifies how the UN deals with these notions discussed in the previous sections.

To start, at the time of writing, sixteen PKOs over four continents are deployed by the UN (United Nations, 2016b). These PKOs have the main objective to provide security and to help countries in conflict areas in the transition to peace (United Nations, 2016b). In response to the increasing complexity of crises, PKOs deployed since the early 1990s are multifaceted (United Nations, 2016b). Tasks assigned to UN peacekeepers are no longer limited to military activities and peacekeeping efforts are not solely directed at conflicting parties. "Though post-Cold War peacekeeping missions have become increasingly complex and include civilian police, de-miners, volunteers, electoral observers, human rights monitors, civil administrators, and a public information capacity, military personnel and structure remain the backbone of most operations" (Whitworth, 2004, p. 33). However, it should be acknowledged that often the non-military qualities of soldiers leave the largest impact on the local population and their security (Whitworth, 2004). According to the military analyst Moskos, who already wrote in 1976, "peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it" (Whitworth, 2004, p. 185).

This multidimensional approach also devotes more attention to women and gender issues (Whitworth, 2004). PKOs could live up to their full potential if more women soldiers would be

participating in missions to cope with women victims of war and women contributors to war (Whitworth, 2004, p. 122). Hence, since 2000 the UN is coping this imbalanced gender issue with a gender mainstreaming approach (Whitworth, 2004, p. 120). Therefore, 'gender awareness' is a phrase being used by UN officials to describe an attitude, a way of seeing which supports gender mainstreaming (Enloe, 2004). Advocates of doing research about 'gender awareness' argue, that paying close attention to how ideas about womanhood and manhood shape individuals' behaviour and institutions' policies will produce a much more realistic understanding of how today's world operates (Enloe, 2004). With the purpose to acknowledge the importance of gender mainstreaming within PKOs, the UN, for instance, introduced gender units and gender advisers (Whitworth, 2004). These units and advisers typically involve monitoring the gender balance of a PKO but also focus on education on gender awareness to both mission staff and local politicians, police, military, and civilian personnel, as well as local women's groups (Whitworth, 2004, p. 130). As Whitworth argues a danger about this approach is that the critical term 'gender' turns into a problem-solving tool (p. 120).

Despite this shift in focus of PKOs and the gender mainstreaming approach, the UN is facing problems in their missions and missions are not living up to their fullest potential. The shift of a multidimensional approach to PKOs included human and social dimensions, this should have made peacekeeping more accessible for women peacekeepers (Hudson, 2000). In peacekeeping troops, women are still seriously under-represented (MFA, 2014b; Vermeulen, 2016). As of 2002, women compromised only 24 percent of staffing in PKOs (Whitworth, 2004). Out of the twenty-eight PKOs in 2002, women accounted for 30 to 50 percent of the staff in six missions, whereas in the other twenty-two missions, there were no women present at all (Whitworth, 2004). The current presence of peacekeeping troops has enlarged some civilians' insecurity in the field (Mazurana, 2006, p. 415). The UN has been openly concerned about this imbalanced gender reputation at UN missions (Simić, 2010, p. 196).

For now, it must be clear, that peacekeeping is a task of great consequence and is best served by troops that represent both sexes (Bridges & Horsfall, 2009; Hudson, 2000). The UN has made efforts to include women in PKOs to make PKOs more successful. The next chapter discusses the main attempts of the UN to increase women's participation in PKOs as enunciated in the SCR 1325.

Chapter 3: The SCR 1325

The existing literature on women participation in PKOs and women in war is discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter addresses the efforts taken by the UN to realise gender mainstreaming. The first section of this chapter explains the brief history of how the SCR 1325 came about. The second section elaborates the content of the SCR 1325 which passed by the UNSC in October 2000. The third section clarifies the seven UNSCRs that followed the SCR 1325 to support gender mainstreaming. Together, all sections demonstrate the foundation of the international WPS agenda established by the UN.

3.1 Expanding women's rights

Two centuries ago the Western world could be characterised as women's emancipation regarding the struggle for women's right to vote (Miller et al., 2014, p. 5). The contemporary period could be characterised by the fight for and implementation of women's rights as enunciated in the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the SCR 1325, and other UN, regional and national policies (Miller et al., 2014, p. 5). The CEDAW adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly provided a precise definition of discrimination against women and established an agenda for the Member States to put an end to the discrimination (MFA, 2007). This was the first Convention in which women's sexual and reproductive rights, as well as the role of culture, played a significant role in the shaping of gender relations (MFA, 2007). The implementation of the Convention, however, was poor. Therefore, the lobbying for expanding women's rights continued. Through lobbying, the impact of violent conflict on women has been put on the international agenda again at the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995 (MFA, 2007).

Successively, the lobbying extensively continued for the adoption of the SCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (MFA, 2016, p. 8). Gender mainstreaming was publically articulated in this SCR,

which passed by the UNSC in October 2000 (MFA, 2007, p. 8). The SCR 1325 accentuates gender awareness in the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, the SCR 1325 highlights the essential part women peacekeepers could take in conflict prevention, peace processes and rebuilding practices (Whitworth, 2004). Accordingly, it calls for the increased representation of women at all levels of PKOs. Consequently, extra resources must be devoted to gender-sensitivity in PKOs (Whitworth, 2004, p. 122). "While the SCR 1325 was not the first articulation of gender mainstreaming within the UN system, it was the clearest statement of the standard expected for integrating a gender perspective into peace operations" (Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016, p. 271). The SCR 1325 should, therefore, not be considered the foundation of global gender politics, but rather a marker at the highest administrative level (Kirby & Shepherd, 2016, p. 252).

3.2 The resolution on gender mainstreaming

The SCR 1325, of which a completed version is included in Appendix A, is like all SCRs legally binding to the Member States. Hence, its clauses should be thoroughly integrated into all the UN entities and the administrative institutions of the Members States dealing with the maintenance of peace and security (Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law, MFA, & WO=MEN, 2015, p. 4). The SCR 1325 constitutes of eighteen operative clauses that appeal for the increased participation of women in peace talks and peace processes, larger involvement of local women in politics, increased gender perspective in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs, adoption of gender perspective in legal and judicial reforms to combat SGBV, protection of internally displaced women and women refugees, and lastly inclusion of women peacekeepers in the security sector (Kirby & Shepherd, 2016, p. 249; United Nations, 2010, pp. 9-10).

The focus of this thesis is on the latter appeal, the inclusion of women peacekeepers. This gender mainstreaming strategy, which is key in the SCR 1325, requires reform in the international security sector, and therefore, all peacekeeping staff must recognise and address gender

perspectives in the diverse activities encountered in PKOs (Hudson, 2000). Accordingly, the SCR 1325 desires to draw more attention to the deployment of women as civil servants, police officers and soldiers in PKOs. As an illustration, the following two perambulatory clauses of the SCR 1325 demonstrate this.

> "*Reaffirming* the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and *stressing* the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution" (United Nations Security Council, 2000, p. 1).

> "*Recognising* the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard *noting* the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations" (United Nations Security Council, 2000, p. 2).

Aside from the perambulatory clauses, the following two operative clauses also stress the importance of women participation in PKOs in the SCR 1325.

> "4. *Further urges*, the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel; (United Nations Security Council, 2000, p. 2).

> 6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures..." (United Nations Security Council, 2000, p. 2).

After the establishment of the SCR 1325, seven additional resolutions on gender mainstreaming were adopted by the UNSC. These seven resolutions will be addressed in the following section.

3.3 The women, peace and security framework

Over the past decades, the UNSC passed eight resolutions supporting the promotion of women's participation and the protection of women's rights in conflict and post-conflict societies (Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016). These resolutions established international standards and built upon the universal human rights framework. Taken together, these resolutions constitute the all-encompassing global WPS policy framework, also known as the WPS agenda (Kirby & Shepherd, 2016).

Briefly, these resolutions are explained, also a clear overview of the resolutions is provided in Appendix B. In 2008, the SCR 1820, was passed to support the SCR 1325. The SCR 1820 stresses the awareness of, prevention of, protection from and punishment of rape and other forms sexual abuse against women and girls in conflict (Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016). A responsibility of 'zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse' was placed upon PKOs (Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016, pp. 271-273). The SCR 1889 (2009) encourages the Member States to develop and adopt a NAP to implement the principles of the SCR 1325. A NAP articulates the ways in which an individual Member State is expected to secure gender equality in their national contexts (Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016; Kirby & Shepherd, 2016). Therefore, the adoption of a NAP by the Member States created a new dimension to the WPS advocacy. Besides the Member States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) have incorporated elements of the SCR 1325 in their defence and security policies as well (Kirby & Shepherd, 2016).

Then, the SCR 1888 (2009), the SCR 1960 (2010) and the SCR 2106 (2013) expand efforts of the WPS agenda by developing an institutional system within the UN to address the issue of SGBV in conflict societies. However, the SCR 2106 (2013) stresses the concern that the WPS agenda was becoming dominated and overshadowed by the prevention of SGBV in conflict societies and post-conflict societies. The fear was that a focus on the prevention of SGBV could detract from the

fundamental principles of the SCR 1325 (Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016). In this regard, the SCR 2122 (2013) was adopted to put emphasises upon overcoming the difficulties of the implementation of the nature of the SCR 1325 (Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016, pp. 271-273). Lastly, the SCR 2242 (2015) reiterates the principal points of the WPS agenda and recalls for further development of NAPs. Moreover, it stresses that gender should be integrated into countering terrorism (Kirby & Shepherd, 2016).

The SCR 1325 and the seven supporting SCRs are of high importance, since the experiences of conflict differ between men and women as explained in the previous chapter. Therefore, the security needs and priorities of the local men and women should be addressed in different manners (Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law et al., 2015, p. 7). In addition, by involving women and integrating a gender perspective the effectiveness of PKOs could be of better quality (Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law et al., 2015, p. 7). Moreover, the SCRs are needed to successfully address issues of SGBV. Lastly, the WPS agenda adds value to supporting women's participation in societies (Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law et al., 2015, p. 7). These are just a few arguments in of the WPS agenda, to show the importance of the SCR 1325.

This thesis narrows its focus from the international level of the WPS agenda to the discourse of a Member State regarding the SCR 1325. The following chapter of this thesis scrutinises the Netherlands as a case study for gender mainstreaming. It is interesting to realise that the Dutch society is often perceived as a progressive and liberal society regarding the empowerment of women, especially in the administration and business sector (PeaceWomen, n.d.). In fact, in 2016 the Netherlands ranked number 16 out of 144 countries listed on the Global Gender Gap Index (PeaceWomen, n.d.). This indicates the high level of gender equality in the Netherlands. It is puzzling why the empowerment of women is high in many sectors in the Netherlands but not in the in PKOs.

Chapter 4: The Dutch response

This chapter clarifies the response of the Dutch government to the SCR 1325. The first section particularly explains the overall responsibility taken by Netherlands towards the SCR 1325. The following four subsections provide an overview of the Dutch decisions, policies and actions taken to implement the SCR 1325. The Dutch response is captured by the three NAPs and the DAP.

4.1 The Dutch response to the SCR 1325

"NAP is not just about paper, it's about people. It's people who carry the NAP 1325 forward"

(WO=MEN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ICCO, Oxfam Novib, & Cordaid, 2015, p. 7).

The previous chapter explained the SCR 1325 and the supporting SCRs and how they serve as a guideline to all Member States. As stated in the quote above, the Member States are responsible for increasing the number of women in PKOs (Bridges & Horsefall, 2009; Geastel & Shelley, 2015). It seems, however, that the execution by the Member States has not been as successful as was the UN hoped for. A key factor for this poor implementation by the Member States is the lack of a uniform theory or practice on the implementation of the WPS agenda. The fact that there is no clear consensus on the desired direction, makes it a challenge to reach for progress on the WPS agenda within the Member States. The adoption of new policies is difficult, since a diversity of strategies may be required to assure the desired implementation (Stiehm, 2001, p. 45). These strategies could, for instance, include demanding and monitoring enforcement of policies, educating and agitating to create pressure for implementation (Stiehm, 2001, p. 45). According to Hudson (2000), the strategies to support the SCR 1325 are built upon three pillars, namely individual awareness, ad hoc initiatives in terms of research and reporting and the policies of troop-contributing Member States. Those pillars are assimilated into the NAPs of Member States.

This chapter investigates the national and international efforts of the Netherlands on the implementation of the SCR 1325 and especially on the deployment of women in PKOs. It is worth stressing that there was international peer pressure for the Netherlands to develop their national WPS strategy formulated in a NAP (Miller et al., 2014, p. 17). To demonstrate, Denmark adopted its NAP in 2005, followed by Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom in 2006 (Rahmanpanah & Trojanowska, 2016). Then, Switzerland, Spain and Austria developed action plans in 2007 (Rahmanpanah & Trojanowska, 2016). Finally, the Netherlands, together with Finland, Iceland, Ivory Coast and Uganda, adopted its first NAP in 2008 (Rahmanpanah & Trojanowska, 2016).

To briefly explain, the Dutch NAP is a relevant tool for implementation of the SCR 1325 and a NAP is an entry point for targeted financing, monitoring and evaluating, which is crucial to accountability and improving as well (WO=MEN et al., 2015, p. 39). Lastly, there is also the involvement of civil society advocacy, since many civil society organisations (CSOs) are part of the operationalisation of the Dutch NAP. This cooperation of government and CSOs is unique compared to other the Member States that adopted NAPs (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (hereafter referred to as EPLO), 2013, p. 45). It is important to realise that the Dutch NAP is implemented on two levels. Firstly, on the policy level, or in other words the political level. The NAP results into more attention paid towards the integration of gender policies in the ministries in charge of the WPS advocacy, such as the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Dutch Ministry of Defence (MD) (EPLO, 2013, pp. 43-44). Secondly, there is the practical level, were CSOs work in groups to attain the goals of the SCR 1325 (EPLO, 2013, pp. 43-44).

In general, the development and adoption of the Dutch policies show that there are political will and accountability taken by the Dutch government regarding the SCR 1325 (MFA, 2015b, p. 9; Miller et al., 2014, p. 17). The policies are the NAP I, NAP II and NAP III adopted by the MFA and the DAP, as part of the NAP III adopted by the MD. The next sections discuss the NAPs and the DAP in

greater detail. Therefore, it is essential to dive into the formation of the previous Dutch parliaments and particularly into the policies and decisions of the MFA and the MD of the past years.

4.1.1 National Action Plan I

The NAP I covers the period 2008 to 2011. This was released during the cabinet of Balkenende IV, which started in 2007. This cabinet focused on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which includes the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women (MFA, 2007). The focus on the MDGs shows dedication and willingness to understand and contribute to the SCR 1325 of the Dutch government. The first response to the SCR 1325 of the Dutch government was an independent Women, Security and Peace Task Force. This Task Force was established for the period 2003 to 2006 and consisted of experts from the public sector, politics and civil society to make a policy recommendation on gender sensitive policy-making to the Dutch government (MFA, 2007, p. 9). To illustrate, the Task Force articulated that the Netherlands should integrate aspects of the SRC 1325 in all their policies concerning conflict and post-conflict countries (MFA, 2007, p. 65). This implied as enunciated in the SRC 1325, that the Netherlands planned to formulate a NAP (MFA, 2007, pp. 67-68). The Pact of Schokland succeeded this Task Force in 2007 and specified the commitment to the MDGs, and particularly the need of support from the CSOs to the Dutch government to implement a gender mainstreaming approach (MFA, 2007, p. 67).

With the help of CSOs, the Dutch government of Balkenende IV welcomed the NAP I. The aim of the NAP I was "to gain systematic recognition and support for women's role in conflict and post-conflict situations, and to identify different stakeholders' responsibility in the process" (Majoor & Brown, 2009, p. 4; MFA, 2007, p. 12). A study on twenty European countries and the execution of the SCR 1325 stressed the uniqueness of the Dutch NAP. Especially as the Netherlands is the only European country that has a NAP with partnerships between the government and CSOs, such as

international organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (EPLO, 2013, p. 42). There are various participants of which some are more active and committed than other parties (Majoor & Brown, 2009). In total, the NAP I has 19 signatories of CSOs (WO=MEN et al., 2015, p. 39). The structure of the partnerships has been established in a working group. This working group is called WG 1325, and Majoor and Brown (2009) describe this platform as "a living institute, and therefore, its tasks and roles are in continuous change process" (p. 28). Most of the members of WG 1325 belong to the Dutch gender platform WO=MEN (Majoor & Brown, 2009, p. 28). WO=MEN functions as the engine of the WG 1325, among other things this organisation connects, coordinates and supports the partnerships on the WPS agenda (WO=MEN, 2017). A schematic overview of this relationship is found in Appendix C.

Regarding the content of the NAP I, it extensively introduces the SCR 1325. Moreover, the NAP I explains thoroughly the role of women before, during and after a conflict (MFA, 2007, p. 13). The content of the NAP I also includes the status of the Netherlands in 2008 regarding the WPS agenda. The NAP I tries to be specific with an Action Point Matrix, nonetheless who needs to take responsibility for the action points is rather vague (MFA, 2007, p. 47). In addition, there is no budget allocated to execute these action points (EPLO, 2013, p. 43). Feedback on this NAP I included that the NAP should have a higher priority in the executing organs of the Dutch government to sufficiently internalise the WPS principles (Majoor & Brown, 2008, p. 20).

Overall, this NAP has a clear structure including relevant background information on the SCR 1325. However, there is a lack of detail for proper execution. This long and extensive NAP I acknowledged that the enhancement of the position of women is a long-term project. This NAP, therefore, will not solely implement the principles of the SCR 1325 (MFA, 2007, p. 12). Further, a few countries that adopted a NAP have revised their NAPs and released new versions (Miller et al., 2014).

This also happened in the Netherlands, hence the NAP II, clarified in the next section, is a logical succession of the NAP I.

4.1.2 National Action Plan II

In 2012, the NAP II was launched for the period 2012 to 2015. Awareness about the SCR 1325 stayed a priority in the Dutch foreign policy (MFA, 2014b, p. 4). Looking at the Dutch politics at the time the NAP II was established, the government of Prime Minister Rutte I (2010-2012) was depended on parliamentary support from the right-wing PVV party (Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014). The PVV opposes Dutch contributions to international missions. Subsequently, the liberal party of Rutte, VVD, rather contributed to NATO operations than to UN missions (Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014). The Dutch parliament, especially the MFA and the MD, identify NATO missions as more efficient than PKOs (Koops & Tercovich, 2016, p. 597; Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014). In addition, the Dutch ministries feel more familiar to other EU countries with whom they partner (Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014). The Dutch government believes that this collaboration would increase the chance for a successful mission.

This could be clarified by the fact that the UN has not always had a positive image to some of the Dutch political parties and the Dutch public. This UN image 'problem' partly originates from critique on Dutch UN deployments like Srebrenica. According to Van der Lijn and Ros (2014), the UN failures are deeply rooted in the minds of the Dutch. The shock was mostly seen in the reserved attitude among Dutch political parties to get involved in new PKOs. For instance, the Dutch contributions to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (2003-2004) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (2006-2008) solely consisted of maritime support (Koops & Tercovich, 2016, p. 598; Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014). In addition, there is scepticism towards the UN. As the scholar Doty argues "being democratic, freedom-loving, and humanitarian have been important constitutive elements in the construction of the Western 'self'" (Whitworth, 2004, p. 25). This implies that PKOs are imposing

Western values and beliefs on non-Western locals in conflict and post-conflict. The WPS advocacy fits perfectly into this western narrative. The West thinks this agenda should be a priority in each part of the world, however, it is questionable whether this agenda is also truly beneficial for others (Whitworth, 2004, p. 25). Specifically, this thought goes through the Dutch minds and influences the way the Dutch support UN missions as well. Therefore, the reputation of the UN, lack of trust and the idea of opposing our thoughts on others remain major barriers to the Dutch contribution to PKOs.

In the case of actual deployment, Rutte I preferred to contribute to regions where national interests were at stake (Koops & Tercovich, 2016, p. 603; Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014). This implies that the Netherlands would preferably not operate in Africa, where most PKOs are deployed. Therefore, during Rutte I, the Netherlands had consistently deployed troops to PKOs, principally in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan (Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014).

More recently, the political trend shifted when the Rutte II government (2013-2017), consisting of a coalition of the VVD and the social democrats, PvdA, governed. The PvdA is more favourable of contributing to UN missions in Africa (Broer & Alberts, 2013). Accordingly, this government seemed less focused on the national and economic interests of a PKO but is more concerned with their international obligation (Broer & Alberts, 2013). Hence, the Rutte II government has shown more willingness to contribute to PKOs in Africa than previous governments, reflected in the contribution to MINUSMA, the PKO in Mali (Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014). Though, some critics argue that the Dutch involvement of MINUSMA was part of the strategy of the Netherlands to become a UNSC member in 2018 (Koops & Tercovich, 2016, pp. 603-604; A. Kwakkenbos, personal communication, June 22, 2017). Nonetheless, it could be stated that the Rutte II government was more outward looking than Rutte I.

This broader interest in PKOs is also reflected in the NAP II. In addition to the support of the government, the NAP II had 57 signatories of the different CSOs working together towards one

collective goal: gender mainstreaming to achieve global peace and security (WO=MEN et al., 2015, p. 10). Similar to the NAP I, the NAP II includes extensive context information on the SCR 1325 and the role of women in conflict. Even though the NAP II is more concrete, there is also a relatively large focus on women and leadership. Further, in comparison to the NAP I, the NAP II is more specific. There is a strong focus on themes and countries where the Netherlands operates on gender mainstreaming (WO=MEN et al., 2015, p. 39). There are specific country groups working on action points (EPLO, 2013, p. 43). In addition, unlike most European NAPs, the Dutch NAP II includes a gender-responsive budget allocation (Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law et al., 2015, pp. 12-14). The Netherlands allocates a budget of four million euros a year which triggers the implementation of country-specific projects (WO=MEN et al., 2015, p. 10).

Also on the positive side, the NAP II seems more informal and approachable. It appears to be addressing the broader public. For example, the NAP II provides information on the SCR 1325 and how the Netherlands is acting on the resolution in a nutshell (MFA, 2007, pp. 7-9). In addition, the NAP III includes a title such as "Let's keep going" (MFA, 2007, p. 20). Hence, the context becomes more easily understandable to the broader public. Furthermore, the NAP II offers additional informative websites on the topic for curious readers, again, to make it more accessible to the broader public. Lastly, a section on 'Lessons Learned' is added to this NAP II as well, indicating challenges and points of improvements of the NAP I in order to increase the effectiveness of the NAP II (MFA, 2007, p. 19).

4.1.3 National Action Plan III

As stated in the previous section, the Rutte II government was focusing more on external issues than Rutte I. Within Rutte's second term of governing, more attention was also paid to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which advocate for gender equality and sustainable peace for the period

of 2015 to 2030 (WO=MEN et al., 2015, p. 39). For instance, to echo the speech of Rutte in 2015 at the China Global Leaders Meeting on Gender Equality "Equality between women and men is also a guiding principle of our foreign policy and development efforts" (MFA, 2015a). The same speech stated that the Dutch government launched the programme 'Funding Leadership and Opportunities for Women' in January 2016, which aimed to support women's participation in politics and protects them from sexual abuses in low-income and middle-income countries (MFA, 2015a). It clearly states that they aim for advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights for women globally.

However, during the government of Rutte II, the ministers of MFA and MD in 2014 said that gender is an essential aspect of military operations because it strengthens the operations of the MD. Also, they acknowledged that the total representation of Dutch women in UN PKOs is only 8 percent (MFA, 2014a). However, they argued that there was no need for more research to solve this issue of the exclusivity of Dutch women in PKOs. As a solution, they suggested that more attention should be paid to education about diversity and the benefits of diversity within the Dutch military (MFA, 2014a).

So, after the NAP I and the NAP II, the NAP III was released for the period 2016 to 2019. Again, the NAP III highlights the importance of the strong cooperation between the Dutch government and over 57 CSOs (MFA, 2016, p. 4). "As we have learned from evaluating our previous Action Plans, since gender norms are being reshaped at the local level, connections with grassroots initiatives for social change and gender equality become an absolute strategic pre-requisite when promoting gender equality objectives" (MFA, 2016, p. 6).

In addition, this NAP III is the most concise of the three Dutch NAPs and clearly states the issues regarding women in conflict zones and precisely how to deal with them. The action plan is updated and aims to reach the goal of the SCR 1325. In the plan, the following objective is stated:

"Contributing to an enabling environment for women's participation and empowerment in conflict and post-conflict environments, so they can meaningfully participate in conflict prevention, resolution, peacebuilding, protection, relief and recovery" (MFA, 2016, p. 4).

The three sub-goals to reach this objective are:

1) "Better protect women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations from violence and violations of their rights;
2) Subvert harmful underlying gender norms, which are obstacles to sustainable peace;
3) Ensure that women have equal leverage in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, relief and recovery at all levels and that their efforts are acknowledged and supported" (MFA, 2016, p. 27).

The two previous NAPs have been evaluated by the Dutch Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the MFA resulting in the following conclusions. The NAP I, adopted in 2007, was rather broad and did not prioritise specific interventions or countries (MFA, 2015). The second NAP, adopted in 2011 focused on women's political participation and women leadership in six countries. The advice of the IOB was to focus more on the strategic cooperation and, therefore, this is strongly stressed in NAP III. Subsequently, there are country-specific strategies with a gender-specific analysis. Moreover, NAP III stands out, since it aims to establish an extended monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system for each country specifically. The previous NAPs did not include a very precise functioning M&E system (MFA, 2016, pp. 46-47).

4.1.4 Defence Action Plan

As explained in the three previous sections, there has been an on-going political commitment to the SCR 1325 with the development of the three NAPs (MFA, 2015b). The commitment to the SCR 1325 receives increasing attention in the Netherlands from a defence perspective as well. This is proven

by the DAP which is established by the MD in cooperation with the NAP III to achieve the goals of the SCR 1325 for the period 2016 to 2019 (EPLO, 2013, p. 45; Ministry of Defence (hereafter referred to as MD), 2016a, p. 2). This is particularly relevant for the investigation of the deployment of Dutch women in PKOs.

It is important to realise that even though there have been cuts in the Dutch defence budget, resulting in a decrease of contributions to PKOs, in both numbers of personnel and equipment, there was still an interest for the Dutch government to work on the WPS agenda (Notten, 2015; Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014). The Dutch defence expenditures over the past decades have been downsizing since the end of the Cold War (Notten, 2015; Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014). The ending of the arms race could be an explanatory factor for this.

In addition to the decline in expenditures, a contributing factor could be that the Dutch national military service was officially suspended in 1997 (Notten, 2015). Another contributing factor to the financial decline to PKOs could be the financial crisis. After 2009, the crisis led to serious budget cuts and this required significant reductions and restructuring of the army, navy and air force (Van der Lijn & Ros, 2014). Interestingly, in 2014 the decrease of 280 million euros of the defence budget was mostly due to the decline in investments of military weapons (Notten, 2015).

However, some countries solely have a military because of UN PKOs (Whitworth, 2004). To clarify, some national militaries gain financially by contributing to PKOs (Whitworth, 2004, as the UN compensates the troop-contributing Member States through a leasing agreement, those are typically troops from lesser developed countries with relatively lower operating costs (Whitworth, 2004, p. 34). This is not the case for the Netherlands, since the Dutch military is secured of a strong military because of their cooperation's with the NATO and the EU. The Netherlands is, therefore, less dependent on the UN.

Another recent development in the Dutch security sector is the DAP, which specifically focuses on the activities of the Dutch defence towards the SCR 1325 agenda and the NAP III (MD, 2016a, p. 2). This implies that the DAP is concentrating on the integration of gender perspective in PKOs and acknowledges that women are crucial actors for change in PKOs (MD, 2016a, p. 2). To be precise, there are three focus pillars in the DAP, those are institutionalising, education and training, and lastly personnel (MD, 2016a, p. 4).

Firstly, in the light of gender in the Dutch military institution, the notion in most of the Member States' national armies remain a standard view of men still dominating the military (Welland, 2013). Welland (2013) claims that military life includes an important bond, or even love, between men soldiers. She even mentions the existence of a 'military family', which solely consists of men (Welland, 2013). Simply, there is a militarised masculine construction in this world, which is deeply embedded in the military sector (Acker, 1990). This man dominated construction in the army and in conflict is acknowledged by the Netherlands (Sharoni, et al., 2016). In the Western world, "the image of a soldier hero is a robust and highly influential form of idealised" (Sharoni, et al., 2016, p. 30). Sharoni and her colleagues (2016) even talk about 'hegemonic masculinity' as the legitimation of the unequal gender relations in cultures and institutions in today's world. The DAP focuses on changing this embedded structure in the Dutch military by adding gender units to operations. Also, the Dutch armed forces are part of the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (MD, 2016a, p. 3). This organisation works on the acknowledgement and contribution to gender expertise on the international level (MD, 2016a, p. 3). Despite these efforts, the Dutch Military Academy does not include gender training as part of their education yet (A. Kwakkenbos, personal communication, June 22, 2017). This links to the second pillar, regarding gender education and training, of the DAP.

Gender education and training have a high priority for the MD. The Dutch armed forces have progressed in operationalising a gender approach externally in its missions (EPLO, 2013, p. 44).

Noticeably, gender advisers are regularly deployed on PKOs and pre-deployment training on human rights is offered to personnel, as well as to local police (EPLO, 2013, p. 44). This training takes often place prior to the foreign PKOs, however, experiencing and learning by doing is especially relevant in this case. The best practice happens during the actual deployments (WO=MEN et al., 2015, p. 33). Moreover, together with Spain, the Netherlands organises gender training for military, police and diplomats from different European and African countries, including UN representatives (MD, 2016a, p. 3). This gender schooling includes components to raise awareness among soldiers about the different roles women in conflict and post-conflict could have (WO=MEN et al., 2015, p. 33).

Besides the external gender approach, the third pillar of the DAP addresses the internal gender issue of personnel. There is a problem of getting the 'right' gendered resources. The ability of PKOs to fully integrate gender mainstreaming at the operational level is hindered by the limited availability of human resources (United Nations, 2002, p. 77). It should be stated that the number of women in PKOs is often in direct correlation with their little involvement in the national military sector (United Nations, 2002, p. 78; Hudson, 2000). The Netherlands tries to overcome the severe imbalance between men and women in the military, and therefore actions are undertaken to encourage women with children to be deployed to PKOs (EPLO, 2013, p. 44). Additionally, in October 2016 the MD started a campaign on social media to promote women participation in the Dutch army (MD, 2016b; MD, 2016c). Another internal issue is mentioned by Karim and Beardsley (2013), who argue that the Member States could choose to which mission they deploy their peacekeepers. Hence, countries tend to deploy women in areas where there is the least risk as many women are still perceived as being weak (Karim & Beardsley, 2013). These biases need to be changed to solve this internal gender issue. Autesserre (2009) mentions that the lack of the right personnel is one of the major reasons why PKOs do not live up to their full potential.

This chapter shows how the NAPs and the DAP support the Dutch women's participation and integration of a gender perspective in PKOs. The implementation of the SCR 1325 is ambitious and challenging and requires cooperation of multiple actors (WO=MEN et al., 2015, p. 6). The NAPs and the DAP include tools for the continued advancement of the WPS agenda such as gender training, special measures to support the recruitment of women, government cooperation with CSOs, growing number of gender experts and advisers, and lastly supporting policy reforms at all levels (Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law et al., 2015, pp. 12-14). Next to a NAP and a DAP, there are countries, such as Iran that made a Local Action Plan to cope specifically with local contexts(Miller et al., 2014, p. 4). Also, Regional Action Plans exist (Miller et al., 2014, p. 4).

Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion

This chapter discusses the findings of the thesis, the main observations resulting from the previous chapters will be interpreted in the following sections. The core remarks are the lack of focus on internal matters in the NAPs, the word choice of 'women' instead of 'gender' and the question whether the NAP is the right mean to push for gender mainstreaming. Together, those sections result into the final section of this chapter, where the gap between the adoption of the Dutch NAPs and the lagging participation of Dutch women in PKOs is confirmed.

5.1 Significant observations

The three most discernible observations regarding the Dutch discourse on the WPS agenda are explained in the following sections. In the first place, all three the Dutch NAPs lack an internal focus. They are all concentrated on conflict societies and post-conflict societies, and they ignore domestic societal involvement to enhance gender mainstreaming. Not only this exclusion stood out, but also the use of 'women' instead of 'gender' within the UN system is crucial. To put it differently, there is clearly more attention paid to women than to men, whereas it should be stressed that both sexes are required to achieve a gender balance. Lastly, it can be questioned whether a NAP is a right mechanism for implementing the WPS agenda on the national level.

5.1.1 The lack of internal focus

From the information provided in the previous chapters can be concluded that there is neither a focus on internal issues in the Dutch NAPs nor on the involvement of the Dutch society. The Dutch NAPs simply ignore the changes that could be made in favour of the WPS agenda within the Dutch institutions, CSOs and society. There is a predominant focus is the Dutch NAPs on conflict or post-conflict societies. This is in contrast with the NAPs of developing countries or post-conflict countries

which have an extensive inward-looking focus in their NAPs (Miller et al., 2014, p. 12). Three possible explanations for this absence are provided.

Generally speaking, the unique cooperation between the Dutch government and the CSOs on the WPS agenda is perceived as a strength of the Dutch NAPs. Nonetheless, there are drawbacks of the fact that there are numerous of parties involved in the Dutch NAPs and the DAP. All those parties involved must be taken into consideration when composing the plan and be satisfied with the content of the actions points stated in the policies. Consequently, the language used in the NAPs and the DAP is diplomatic and sensitive. For instance, when a few signatories of the NAP do not agree on a certain issue, this issue will not be mentioned in the NAP. This might be a valid explanation for the relative lack of strong claims on domestic issues made in favour of the WPS agenda.

Furthermore, the Netherlands generally views the UN as a liberal institution and copies the institutional values of the UN. Both, the UN and the Dutch government try to present themselves as gender-neutral institutions (Vermeulen, 2016). However, the UN does not appear to be the best example for this, since the UN system is inconsistent towards the approach against of gender inequality. An example of this is that the gender sensitive language, which the UN claims to use in the entire UN institution, has not fully been implemented by all UN entities (Whitworth, 2004). For instance, the progressive Brahimi report, which passed in 2008, was developed to serve as the framework for the reform of PKOs but was largely silent on gender mainstreaming (Whitworth, 2004; Williams, 2008). Basically, the UN is not leading by example by ignoring internal issues of gender mainstreaming within their own entities. Therefore, the UN could not expect from the Member States to act differently.

Moreover, as stated in the previous chapter, the NAP III aims to reach the broader Dutch public. Yet the NAPs are not translated into the Dutch language, and this language barrier is keeping the Dutch public distanced from any involvement in the WPS agenda. It might be challenging to

translate the principles of the SCR 1325 into the local languages of all Member States, however, it could have positive effects on the execution of gender mainstreaming globally (Miller et al., 2014, p. 19). Thus, the large number of signatories, the inconsistency of gender mainstreaming of the UN and the language barrier of the Dutch NAPs is hampering both the internal focus of the NAP and the Dutch society on gender mainstreaming.

5.1.2 'Gender' instead of 'Women'

Another observation concerns the choice of the word 'women' in the 'Women, Peace and Security' agenda instead of the 'Gender, Peace and Security' agenda. By the same token, one could wonder why is the UN entity that is working on the empowerment of women is called 'UN Women' and not 'UN Gender'. Noticeably, the UN prefers the word choice of 'women' over 'gender'. According to the UN, gender mainstreaming must devote more attention to the rights and needs women since the rights and needs of men are already included into most UN policies and programmes (Stiehm, 2001, p. 42).

By preferring the use of 'women' over 'gender', the UN and its Member States, including the Netherlands, are capitulating to the social construction of gender. As argued by poststructuralist feminists, a person is never 'free' from discourse and its power. Therefore, language plays a vital role in social gender relations, since language defines and contests actual and possible forms of social organisation (Weedon, 1987). The way in which the UN currently conceptualises 'gender' in the SCR 1325 tends to contribute to this gender construction (Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016). Basically, by doing this, the UN creates a difference between women and men, which is not biological, natural or needed (Skjelsbaek, 2001, p. 47). It strengthens the dominant sexual discourse within international security in the SCR 1325 and the WPS agenda (Steans & Tepe-Belfrage, 2016, p. 277).

As mentioned in the previous section, the Netherlands copies the UN discourse. Like the SCR 1325, the Dutch government discourse does not neglect women. Yet, solely focusing on women has its shortcomings. For instance, focusing too much on women instead of gender is not beneficial when both sexes are needed to realise the WPS agenda. A growing number of women in professional positions will not necessarily increase sensitivity towards gender issues. For a successful implementation of the principles of the SCR 1325, these gender issues must be understood clearly by both sides (Stiehm, 2001, p. 42). Therefore, the exclusion of men in the UN and Dutch discourse on gender mainstreaming is not only incorrect but irresponsible as well.

5.1.3 Is a NAP the right mean?

Among the Member States, nearly one-fourth had adopted a NAP by 2013, the other Member States pursued the principles of the SCR 1325 without a NAP (Miller et al., 2014, p. 18). Therefore, it is important to realise that a NAP is only one of the multiple necessary actions for achieving gender equality (Miller et al., 2014, pp. 15-16). The adoption of a NAP, however, is often seen by the Member States as an end in itself.

Despite writing a NAP, there are numerous requirements for a successful implementation of the WPS agenda. For instance, as shown in the development of the NAPs in the fourth chapter of this thesis, various contexts need to be considered while working on the achievement of the SCR 1325 principles. To operate effectively and to make an actual difference, contexts need to be considered by taking a holistic gender approach (Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law et al., 2015, pp. 7-10). In addition, it is necessary for institutions and officials like ministers and force commanders to show commitment and leadership towards the representation and visibility of women in PKOs (Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law et al., 2015, pp. 7-10). This includes the UN and all its entities. Next to these top-down requirements, it is critical to support a bottom-up approach in

international and national settings. In both settings, local communities and their women's organisations need to be involved in the NAPs (Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law et al., 2015, pp. 7-10).

Another important point that should be stressed is the fact that the Netherlands, among the other Member States, does not hold themselves accountable for the commitments adopted in their NAPs (Miller et al., 2014). The Dutch NAPs lack a proper M&E system and therefore it is difficult to measure and improve the Dutch approach on the WPS agenda. There are opportunities to enhance measurement and accountability by mainstreaming the nature of the WPS into existing national data analysis bodies (Miller et al., 2014, p. 34). Thus, the Member States, including the Netherlands need to understand that for fulfilling the SRC 1325 standards a NAP is not a final goal and that the monitoring and reporting process of the WPS agenda is equally essential for successful gender mainstreaming.

5.2 Confirming the gap

The information provided in the previous chapters and the three significant observations addressed in this chapter prove that the official Dutch governmental discourse on the SCR 1325 exposes a gap between the lagging change in Dutch women's participation in PKOs and the adoption of the NAPs and the DAP. This thesis illustrates how textual processes of the Dutch government fail to increase the Dutch women's participation in PKOs.

It should be mentioned that a causal relationship does not exist, an increase in Dutch policies on gender mainstreaming in PKOs does not directly lead to more participation of Dutch women in the PKOs. In addition, gender is not a number, gender does respond to social, political and environmental changes (Dharmapuri, 2013, p. 1; MFA, 2014b, p. 49). Therefore, numerous factors could be contributing to this gap, such as the content, language and means of the NAP. But this might

also include, a lack of gender focus in the recruiting and retaining of women in the Dutch security

segment (Knowledge Platform Security & Rule of Law et al., 2015, pp. 10-11). Or another possible

factor could be the muscular culture in the Dutch army which does not appeal to women (Knowledge

Platform Security & Rule of Law et al., 2015, pp. 10-11). Undoubtedly, there is a correlation between

the number of women in PKOs and the existence of the NAPs and DAP (Hudson, 2000).

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This concluding chapter first summarises the findings of this thesis. The second section provides recommendations for the improvement of the WPS agenda. Then, the final section of this chapter addresses the limitations of the thesis.

6.1 Summary

This thesis explores how the UN prioritises gender equality by means of conducting a study on the SCR 1325 and the supporting SCRs that together shape the WPS agenda. The WPS agenda encompasses all aspects of gender equality, such as the protection of women's rights in conflict and post-conflict, the prevention of sexual abuse against women and the enhancement of women in PKOs. This thesis particularly studies the latter issue, gender mainstreaming in PKOs. This topic is highly relevant since the inclusion of women peacekeepers has advantages for conflict and post-conflict societies in two dimensions, internal and external. Internally, women peacekeepers improve the social relations within PKOs. Externally, women peacekeepers have more easily contact with the local population, particularly local women. Gender mainstreaming in PKO should not only be implemented on the global level but on national levels as well. Therefore, the UNSC welcomes the Member States to adopt a NAP and tries to fully support national governments implementing gender mainstreaming in their policies and guidelines. A case study on the Netherlands, a country that scores high on the Global Gender Gap Index, shows that the implementation of Dutch policies, such as the NAPs and the DAP, has been far from perfect, since they do not result in increasing involvement of Dutch women in PKOs. An analysis of the NAPs and DAP demonstrates how the official Dutch governmental discourse fails to increase the participation of Dutch women in PKOs. The three main observations coming out of this analysis are the lack of internal focus within the NAPs and the Dutch society on gender mainstreaming, the use of the word 'women' instead of 'gender' and the fact that

the Dutch government treats the implementation of the NAPs as a final goal, while these plans are merely a sub-part of a larger effort. These conclusions concerning the official Dutch government discourse on the SCR 1325 show the gap between the little change in Dutch women's participation in PKOs and the adoption of policies in favour of gender mainstreaming.

6.2 Recommendation for the Dutch government

From this study, it can be concluded that the Netherlands is been far from completing the integration of the WPS advocacy in its own PKO-efforts. The findings of this thesis illustrate that the NAP takes a top-down approach that does not have a significant impact upon everyday domestic lives of both men and women in the Netherlands. In addition, the NAPs contribute inappropriately to the social construction of gender. It is known that policies on gender mainstreaming do not directly result in having more women involved in PKOs, therefore it can be questioned whether the Member States need a NAP to promote gender mainstreaming. Understandably, change does not happen overnight. Therefore, this thesis suggests that continuous attention, patience and dedication should be paid to push the issue of gender mainstreaming n PKOs forward. The Dutch government, however, must acknowledge that it would be constructive to pay closer attention and further develop the content, language and means of the Dutch NAPs to work towards achieving the principles of the SCR 1325.

6.3 Limitations

Limitations of this thesis consist of both methodological and ethical constraints. Restrictions related to the research methodology are related to the conducted discourse analysis. The advantages of Dutch women peacekeepers assumed in the thesis are based on stereotypes and good case scenarios, rather than on statistical trends, since there have never been Dutch peacekeeping troops with an equal gender participation. In addition, for this thesis only a limited amount of literature has been reviewed, hence improvements could be made in extending the literature by the number of

studies included, as well as, making comparisons to the other Member States. A third and practical limitation is the fact that this thesis is written by one author. Hence, subjectivity in the interpretation of sources could occur while conducting textual analyses. More importantly, this subjectivity is strengthened by the fact that I am a woman and observing a gender issue. Moreover, to overcome further biases, multiple sources are used for triangulation of information.

This thesis showed how the discourse of the Dutch government shapes the gap between the vast under-representation of Dutch women in PKOs and the increasing number of Dutch policies, such as the NAPs and the DAP. There is a persistent gap, efforts to narrow this gap, such as further research on this topic are of vital importance to diminish the gender imbalance. The SCR 1325 captures more than the topic of gender equality, it strives towards the ending of conflicts, and therefore critical questions must be asked about patriarchy and the way the UN and its Member States are dealing with violent conflict and PKOs.

 António Guterres must realise how influential the UN bodies are and he must use the power of discourse by changing the nature of the current gender constructions. Hopefully, the next Secretary-General of the United Nations does not have to prioritise the gender mainstreaming agenda, since this might all be implemented on the global level after the term of Guterres.

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Appendices

Appendix A – The Security Council Resolution 1325 (United Nations Security Council, 2000).

United Nations   S/RES/1325 (2000)

Security Council   Distr.: General

                                               31 October 2000

Resolution 1325 (2000)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on
31 October 2000**

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and *recalling also* the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women's Rights and International Peace (International Women's Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816),

Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century" (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and *recognizing* the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and *stressing* the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard *noting* the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. *Urges* Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;

2. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision- making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;

3. *Urges* the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard *calls on* Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4. *Further urges* the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of wo men in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. *Expresses* its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and *urges* the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace- building measures, *invites* Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. *Urges* Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

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8. *Calls on* all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

(a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

(b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;

(c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;

9. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

10. *Calls on* all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. *Emphasizes* the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard *stresses* the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13. *Encourages* all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. *Reaffirms* its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. *Expresses* its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups;

16. *Invites* the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and *further invites* him to

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submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Appendix B – Key issues and core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions on 'Women, Peace and Security' (Kirby & Shepherd, 2016, p. 251).

Resolution (year)	Key issues and core provisions
1325 (2000)	Representation and participation of women in peace and security governance; protection of women's rights and bodies in conflict and post-conflict situations
1820 (2008)	Protection of women from sexualized violence in conflict; zero tolerance of sexualized abuse and exploitation perpetrated by UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations personnel
1888 (2009)	Creation of office of Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); creation of UN Action as an umbrella organization addressing issues related to CRSV; identification of 'team of experts'; appointment of Women's Protection Advisers (WPAs) to field missions
1889 (2009)	Need to increase participation of women in peace and security governance at all levels; creation of global indicators to map implementation of UNSCR 1325
1960 (2010)	Development of CRSV monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements; integration of WPAs to field missions alongside Gender Advisers
2106 (2013)	Challenging impunity and lack of accountability for CRSV
2122 (2013)	Identifies UN Women as key UN entity providing information and advice on participation of women in peace and security governance; whole-of-UN accountability; civil society inclusion; 2015 High-level Review of implementation of UNSCR 1325
2242 (2015)	Integrates Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS) in all UNSC country situations; establishes Informal Experts Group on WPS; adds WPS considerations to sanctions committee deliberations; links WPS to countering terrorism and extremism

Source: Adapted from table 1 in Laura J. Shepherd, 'Advancing the women, peace and security agenda: 2015 and beyond', NOREF Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 28 Aug. 2014, http://www.peacebuilding.no/Themes/Inclusivity-and-gender/Publications/Advancing-the-Women-Peace-and-Security-agenda-2015-and-beyond.

Appendix C – Schematic representation of the relationships relevant to the Dutch NAP (Majoor & Brown, 2009, p. 29).