Understanding Cultural Paradigms

— Being and Knowledge —

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General Thesis Questions:

What are cultural paradigms?

What makes cultural paradigms an indeterminate form of knowledge?

How does taste influence cultural paradigms?

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Thesis Statement

This dissertation seeks to further our understanding of cultural paradigms and to begin a dialogue regarding how cultural paradigms not only influence our daily lives as human beings, but also to instate a dialogue which references our lives' mutual relationship with our culture's paradigms. At the base of our daily lives as human beings, as cultural animals, we create our concepts of self and of self in relation to others— cultural paradigms. We develop cultural paradigms in order to create a sense of unity indicative of culture, which motivates the ongoing development of different methods of group cooperation. Cultural paradigms provide us with cultivated concepts of what it means to be and how to be human. Once learned, they provide guidance for our lives in the form of knowledge of the customs of our peers.

So that we may come to a better understanding of cultural paradigms the primary question of this dissertation is '*what are cultural paradigms?'* This question is aimed at establishing a much deeper conception of cultural paradigms than currently exists.

Prior to Chapter One I will summarize the etymology of 'culture' and 'paradigms' and provide a basic preliminary definition of cultural paradigms. Then, in Part I of my thesis we will begin to further answer the question '*what are cultural paradigms*?' by looking at the only publication which utilizes this distinct terminology, Jorge Arditi's brief paper titled *Geertz, Kuhn and the Idea of a Cultural Paradigm*. In which, as we will see in Chapter One of this dissertation, Arditi provides his own introductory definition of cultural paradigm as "role-concept" (Arditi 598). In addition to accepting his definition as a starting point, I argue that we learn cultural role-concepts through our exposure to models of cultural roles; whether through firsthand experience in our daily lives or secondhand experience through either oral, textual, or other artistic mediums. Essentially, experience through exposure is how we gather knowledge of cultural paradigms. The experience of human and cultural expose provides examples, or models, of cultural role-concepts.

In Chapter Two, I argue that Arditi's contributions allude to an intrinsic plurality of cultural paradigms, which he states are effectively "many possible modern selves" (Arditi 599). It is obvious that different cultures hold different cultural role-concepts as a result of cross-cultural variation. What is less obvious, is what is shown in a study conducted by researcher's Bettina Lamm and Heidi Keller. This study discloses statistical evidence of intracultural variance. Intracultural variance means that each 'role' within a culture is appealed to by different 'role-

concepts' which are formulated off interpretations of different 'examples' and 'models of that role'. The ensuing plurality of options for cultural role-playing arises not only from cross- but also intracultural role variance. These two components of Arditi's paper, cultural paradigms as 'role-concepts', and a plurality of 'possible modern selves' form an important basis for understanding cultural paradigms.

In Chapter Three, I will explain how the plurality of cultural roles is exponentially expanded by individual's personal interpretations of the plurality of cultural role-concepts which they have been exposed to. We will see how an individual's own unique personal interpretation of a cultural paradigm can be termed their program of truth. I argue that programs of truth are what individuals use to model their own play, or enactment, of a cultural role on the stage of everyday life.

Part II of this dissertation will be concerned with important aspects upon which Arditi is less articulate. In its first expose, Chapter Four will deal with cultural paradigms as an indeterminate form of knowledge. Cultural paradigms are concepts which merely suggest how models of cultural roles should be appealed to in the course of everyday living. The ideal model, example, or pattern of customs of interaction prescribed by a cultural paradigm does not necessarily dictate how an individual will make use of them in playing out the cultural roles which are required of them in their everyday life. This indeterminacy is possible firstly because of the plurality of possible cultural role-concepts, and secondly because each individual interprets cultural paradigms differently as they operate off their own program of truth. Furthermore, when we enact our play of cultural roles off our own program of truth, we do so in a unique fashion which deviates, at least slightly, from the example expressed in the model of the cultural role which we have firstly been exposed to, and secondly interpreted so that, thirdly, we can use our program of truth (our understanding of the cultural paradigm) to base our play or enactment of the cultural role.

As a result of the influence individuals have over interpreting and enacting role-concepts by performing cultural roles based off their program of truth, the type of knowledge which cultural paradigms are is not a matter of a fixed and determinate epistemology. *Knowledge and Being* in this sense are not fully determined by one another. Rather, as you will see in Chapter Four, the indeterminacy of cultural paradigms is more similar to Michel Foucault's concept of discursive

knowledge. This consideration is effectively a more in-depth version of what Arditi means when he says that cultural paradigms are not purely an epistemic concept. The epistemological current of cultural paradigms as cultural role-concepts does not run unilaterally in one direction from being to knowledge of being and its natural attributes. Cultural paradigms are, moreover, cultural role-concepts which are formulated through a continuous discursive relationship between knowledge and being. In a sense, the epistemological currents of a discursive form of knowledge flow both ways, because neither aspect in such a discursive dialogue is entirely fixed or determined by the other.

In Part II of this dissertation, the terms 'discursive form of knowledge' and 'mutual influence' become largely synonymous. In that, the discursive is the relationship between the two sides of cultural paradigms which mutually influence each other— *Knowledge and Being*. Though there are some similar aspects of cultural and scientific paradigms which will be explored in this paper, I understand Arditi's own self-treatment of his theory as an 'alternative approach' as intended to mean alternative to Kuhnian scientific paradigms. This is important because philosophic treatment of the term 'paradigm', before Arditi's coinage, has been primarily focused on Kuhnian scientific paradigms.

As we will see in Chapter Five, in '*the Idea of a Cultural Paradigm*' as an alternative approach, Arditi argues that "the difference between a scientific and a cultural paradigm is crucial, however: a scientific paradigm is a purely epistemological construct; a cultural paradigm is both an epistemological and an ontological construct" (Arditi 604). I ultimately agree with his position on cultural paradigms requiring an alternative approach. Yet, I am dissatisfied that he does so little to extrapolate upon what that difference means. It means that for cultural paradigms being and knowledge share a mutual influence. This is what Arditi intends when he says that cultural paradigms, as an alternative understanding of paradigms, are not purely an epistemological construct but which I understand to be a construct which is indeterminate, because of the mutual relationship between its epistemological and ontological components. This relationship of mutual influence is the discursive form of knowledge which best describes cultural paradigms, and which creates the best apology for Arditi's brief yet critical distinction of cultural paradigms in requisite of an alternative approach to Kuhnian scientific paradigms.

The chapters of this dissertation detailed above will establish cultural paradigms, in Part I, as cultural role-concepts, which are moreover, comprised of a plurality of examples and models of many possible modern selves, and, through Part II we will gain an understanding of the indeterminacy and mutual influence of the epistemological and ontological components of cultural paradigms as a discursive form of knowledge, and we will understand how the discursive process involves a relationship of mutual influence between knowledge and being.

In Part III, we will use the terms which arise in the first two parts of this dissertation to expand upon the relationships that these terms hold with each other so that we can better understand cultural paradigms. In Chapter Six, we will review the discursive relationship between knowledge and being. We will then use that model to understand another discursive aspect of cultural paradigms, in which a relationship of mutual influence occurs between collective and individual concepts. That second discursive aspect will then be used to understand a third discursive dialogue, which occurs between cultural tastes and preferences and individual tastes and preferences.

Taste and preference perform an interesting modificatory function that guides both individual's interpretations and enactments of cultural roles. Taste exerts a force of influence upon the discursive dialogues between knowledge and being, and, collective and individual concepts. It is one's own sense of taste and preference which helps them to make the choices that their cultural existential conditions require of them and which allows them the freedom of creating and enacting plays of cultural roles based off their own program of truth and preference. Subsequently, Chapter Seven discusses the influence of desirability, or the ability for taste and preference to become modificatory functions of the enunciative aspects of cultural paradigms which arises from the possibility of choice that individuals hold amidst a plurality of models and examples of possible modern selves.

The indeterminacy of cultural paradigms offers individuals a certain degree of freedom within which they can play out their understanding of what a cultural role comes to mean for them in any given instance. The fact that our cultural existences require us to play out cultural roles, and thus to cultural role-concepts, requires that we interpret and modify our understanding of those concepts based off our interpretations and through our unique enactments of cultural roles. This

process creates both a need to make a choice and at the same time opens up the freedom and possibility of choice.

Our choices attempt to meet our needs in life. To meet those needs, we chose what example or model of a cultural role to interpret and determine how we modify it relative to the situation at hand through the function of negotiation that is influenced by our own cultivated personal tastes and preferences. Taste has an interesting play on the enunciative interpretations and enactments which occur between cultural paradigms discursive aspects of knowing and being.

On one side of the discursive dialogue, taste and preference influence how individual's interpret cultural role-concepts and models of roles, and on the other of the dialogue taste and preference help to dictate one's own personal style of role playing. In this way, taste and preference, understood as bias and style, influence enunciations of the discursive process that ties together the variance of individual's interpretations of cultural paradigms and modifications performed by individual's unique plays of cultural roles. By the end of this dissertation, my reader will have a better understanding of what cultural paradigms are, how they are indeterminate forms of knowledge, and how they are affected by the function of one's own programs of taste and preference which influence both one's interpretations and enactments of cultural roles.

Etymology and Basic Definition of Cultural Paradigms

Etymologically, the bases of the terms 'culture' and 'paradigm' come from the Latin word *cultura*, and the Greek/ Latin words *paradeigma/ paradigma. Cultura* originally referred to agricultural cultivation and became applicable in a "figurative sense of 'cultivation through education'" by the sixteenth century. Though it was not commonly used in this sense until the nineteenth century when it became recognized first as "meaning 'learning and taste, the intellectual side of civilization'", and later, the definition was expanded to mean "collective customs and achievements of a people, a particular form of collective intellectual development". The Greek form of paradigm, *paradeigma* means "pattern, model; precedent, example", and in its Latin form of *paradigma* means simply "pattern, example"[1].

In reflection of the etymology of cultural paradigms, one gather's the sense that cultural paradigms are precedent setting models of a group of people's customs. As precedent setting

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[1] These definitions come from *Online Etymology Dictionary- (*https://www.etymonline.com)

models of a group of people's customs, cultural paradigms help govern how people relate to themselves and to those around them. These models are cultivated over time and represent the customs of interaction that a culture's members use in determining the thoughts and actions involved in their day to day cultural existences. Being enculturated into a culture means learning its paradigms and the sets of preference and taste which are developed by a culture. Cultural paradigms are concepts because they reside in the world of ideas. They do not exist as physical entities but are an understanding of traditions and customs which our cultures have cultivated, and which are involved with the occupation of being human. Through our utilization of cultural paradigms, these concepts both enter and alter the physical world.

Part I

Arditi and *The Idea of Cultural Paradigms*

Introduction to Part I

It should be hard not to be perplexed by the fact that something so mundane, yet, so crucial to our human existences has been overlooked for so long. Cultural paradigms are at the basis of human thought, action and interaction. In short, cultural paradigms are the cultural role-concepts which we use to negotiate our notion of self and our relationships with others in our everyday lives. As such a crucial and mundane facet of our human, and thus, of our cultural existences, cultural paradigms are an unavoidable aspect of every human life. We all, whether we have ever noticed or not, make use of our understandings of cultural paradigms constantly. Our cultural existences require us to play cultural roles, thus human action requires that our thought processes make constant appeals to our understanding of cultural paradigms. This process of appeal is mundane, so mundane in fact, that we manage to use them constantly and yet no one really knows what they are.

What are cultural paradigms? In order to begin to answer this question, the first part of this dissertation will survey Arditi's instantiation of the term cultural paradigm. This question arises when it is taken for granted that cultures develop traditions, customs and roles to simplify interactions between its members. As we will see in Chapter One, Arditi's response to this question was to define cultural paradigms as role-concepts. Since our starting point assumes that we are in

fact required to play cultural roles in order to participate in a cultural existence, his definition unfolds into two more subsequent questions. How are cultural role-concepts formed? And, how are cultural role-concepts learned? The answers to these two questions provide the first key in understanding the plurality of cultural roles which Arditi's paper inexplicitly hints towards. In Chapter Two, I will explain how the plurality and variance of role-concepts and models of roles is not only an occurrence from one culture to another, cross-culturally, but also within one culture, intraculturally. Lastly, in Chapter Three, these personal understandings of cultural role-concepts become accounted for as individual's programs of truth. We will see how individual's interpretations of cultural paradigms, or programs of truth, as personal understandings of cultural role-concepts, provide for the existence of 'many possible modern selves'.

Chapter One: Cultural Paradigms as Cultural Role-Concepts

The nature of our existences makes it such that humans always exist within a social and cultural context. We manage our individual lives and social relationships by way of our connection to ourselves and our connection to those around us during our everyday lives. Our languages and cultures make communication and cooperation possible. Through our linguistic and cultural development, we create concepts which help us to navigate our personal and interpersonal lives. These concepts give us a sense of self and of self in relation to others. The mundane necessity of concepts of cultural roles in order to live our cultural existences are what I believe inspires Arditi's definition of cultural paradigm as a "role-concept" (Arditi 598). Though cultural role-concepts exist only in the world of ideas, they influence how individuals participate in their substantial physical existences. Arditi denotes that these concepts require their own special mode of treatment when he states that, "the concept of roles has to be viewed as part of a larger, historically grounded interpretive system that is not a mere reflection of 'the real' but grows together with it" (Arditi 598). By providing these statements in supplement to his definition of cultural paradigms, he also sets the stage for the type of indeterminacy which we will explore in Part II of this dissertation.

Cultural role-concepts are formulated models and examples of cultural roles. For example, when we think of the role of mother, something which I assume we all have, we not only have a concept in mind, but that concept is the conglomeration of examples and models of the role mother which we have in our experiential knowledge banks. For a culture, a role-concept regarding mothers is not only a matter of one individual's concept, but of a culture with a history of

cultivation of that concept through the accumulation of different examples and models of the role of mother. As Gadamer states in his book *On Truth and Method*, "by constantly following models and developing them, a tradition is formed" (Gadamer 117). Our cultural paradigms are the tradition that is formed by the history of the cultural role-concept as it has been cultivated through the manifestations of examples and models of the cultural role which occurred in the physical world. Since the world of ideas spills out into the physical world through cultural paradigms guidance over human interactions, we must, as Arditi says, "theorize the connection between concept and society" (Arditi 598) in order to better understand cultural paradigms.

As cultural animals, we must formulate these cultural role-concepts because they are the guiding force that helps us work together as groups of people for long enough to cultivate a culture. For this reason, Arditi is correct in choosing to focus his definition of cultural paradigms as being first and foremost cultural role-concepts. Given the etymological components of the term cultural paradigm, cultural paradigm is an appropriate terminology for any explanation regarding how individuals participate in a culture through appealing to cultural role-concepts in order to play cultural roles. These role-concepts guide a culture's individuals in what to do, how and when to do it, in instances in which they are required to interact with others as a result of their cultural existential conditions.

Forming Cultural Role-Concepts

In forming cultural role-concepts through examples and models of cultural roles, we draw from our experiences in order to formulate the structure of our concepts. For Foucault, this process of using our experience of our environment to add structure to our understanding of the world around us is indicative of concepts as a mode of information through which "every living being takes from its environment and by which conversely it structures its environment" (Foucault 1998, 475). As we formulate these concepts, we are taking our experience of being, and consciously constructing its epistemological structure as 'knowledge'. We are in a sense reflecting the perceived nature of the physical world into the world of ideas. Foucault continues that, "The fact that man lives in a conceptually structured environment does not prove that he has turned away from life, or that a historical drama has separated him from it—just that he lives in a certain way" (Foucault 1998, 475).

The way in which man lives is, in a sense, with one foot in the world of ideas and the other foot in the physical world. Human existence is the bridge that unites these two worlds which both exist for us and which we exist within. Foucault states that, "Forming concepts is a way of living and not a way of killing life" (Foucault 1998, 475). The formation of concepts is something that we simply cannot avoid in life— and by that, I mean both forming concepts and living under the influence of their conceptual guidance.

We form these concepts by gathering knowledge of cultural role-concepts through experience in the form of exposure to examples and models of cultural roles. We select our actions in life based off the cultural paradigms which, through our exposure to them, have instructed us, by way of modeling, both, what it is to be and how to be human. Once these concepts are formed, they must be transmitted to others for them to be cultural role-concepts rather than personal role-concepts.

Learning Cultural Role-Concepts

For a role-concept to become a cultural role-concept and not merely a personal role-concept, it must be shared by members of the culture. The way that role-concepts, once formed, are transmitted is through exposure. Exposure to a role-concept requires exposure to examples and models of the role. An individual learns, or becomes enculturated into, a culture through exposure to its cultural role-concepts. In order to 'theorize the connection between concept and society' we need to understand how we become encultured— how we learn cultural paradigms. Personal subjective experience through exposure is how we gather examples and models of roles which help us to formulate our personal understandings of cultural role-concepts. There are two distinct modes of exposure through which individuals become enculturated into their culture through exposure. The first of which is incredibly straightforward, we primarily learn through our firsthand experiences. Exposure from firsthand experience involves information gathered from sensory information of a phenomenon as it is experienced by the individual subject.

Through firsthand experience, we, for example, witness both the actions of our own mother, and of other mothers which become examples and models of the cultural 'role' mother. These examples and models of the cultural role are what develop our understanding of a cultural role-concept. To understand cultural role-concepts, we must undoubtedly create our own personal conception of the cultural role-concept. In this example, a woman being a mother is appealing to

and enacting her play as an example or a model of the cultural role, her play of the role 'mother' is based on her understanding the cultural paradigm which instructs her on what it is to be and how to be a mother. And we, by experiencing her play, or enactment, of that cultural role are experiencing a manifestation of the cultural role-concept in its active form. Through firsthand experience we gather an example and a model of the cultural role which helps us to understand the cultural role-concept for the cultural role at hand.

The second mode of exposure of cultural paradigms is secondhand experience, in which we experience an example or model of a cultural role through exposure to a representation, or account, of another's firsthand experience. Secondhand experience can arise from a multitude of different mediums, be it in an oral, textual or any other form of artistic medium, we experience examples and models related to that cultural role-concept. We can hear a story of a mother and our experience of hearing that story grants us an example and model of the cultural role which contributes to our personal conception of the cultural role-concept.

In a later developmental stage of oral traditions, as a means and medium of transmitting cultural paradigms, we can also come to have secondhand experiences of examples and models of cultural roles through textual experiences; in which, we read accounts of another's experience that provides exposure to an example and model of a cultural role. In the modern world, through other artistic mediums which include, but are not limited to, visual art, theatre, music, social media, movies and videos, we also come to have secondhand experiences of examples and models of cultural roles which help us to formulate our personal understandings of cultural role-concepts.

Ultimately, learning by these two modes of exposure is not different from how Thomas Kuhn in his book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* theorizes that scientists learn scientific paradigms. He expresses that scientific paradigms are "revealed in textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises. By studying them and by practicing with them, the members of the corresponding community learn their trade" (Kuhn 43). In terms of culture, we are in the trade of being human—being a cultural animal. The scientist has firsthand experiences through laboratory experiments and personal observations which help them to gain examples and models which they formulate into concepts. In a similar cultural process, we experience examples and models of cultural roles in our everyday lives which we formulate into cultural role-concepts and personal understandings of cultural role-concepts. Kuhn also mentions the importance of secondhand

experience in learning scientific paradigms through oral means, lectures, as well as through textual means to synthesize examples and models into scientific concepts— scientific paradigms.

In reference to secondhand modes of exposure, Arditi highlights "The extent to which literature, popular mythologies, or notions of etiquette from the beginning of the century express the same perceptions as the role-concept" (Arditi 598-599). They express the same perceptions because each of these methods entails the transmission of examples and models of cultural roles which cultural role-concepts rely upon to be formulated. The act of learning cultural paradigms and the act of forming cultural paradigms are inextricably linked to each other, in that, both involve experience and exposure to examples and models of a cultural role for a cultural role-concept to be formed or learned. It is important to note that as we learn cultural paradigms, we also form our own personal conception of them, a topic which we will explore in greater length in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

Chapter Two: Cultural Roles and Variance

Before we begin to explore the concept of programs of truth, which Chapter Three is focused on, I would like to discuss its foundational aspect, which is highly important to understanding cultural paradigms. Though the term 'plurality' does not explicitly arise in Arditi's paper, it is implied as a theme when he asks "Why, indeed, do people develop concepts of self, of society, of anything, that are so different from one another? How are ideas, world-views, ideologies generated? And what, if any, is the relation between these and society? What is, in short, the relation between a system of meanings and the social structure in which it comes into being, and how does that relationship develop?" (Arditi 598). Throughout our lives, we notice that people are different, not just because of substantial differences from one bodily human organism to another in the physically objective sense, but because we hold differing subjective concepts— different intimate histories and concepts of self, society, and the world. People think the way that they do because their thoughts are governed by their intimate conceptual knowledge. These concepts, however, are not entirely their own unique creations, they stem from a cultural backdrop in which their language and history provides them with examples of knowledge, which they then, in turn, interpret into their own intimate conceptual knowledge.

Reinforcing my interpretation that Arditi's theory in the *Idea of Cultural Paradigms* is intrinsically pluralistic, and to answer his own question, Arditi motions that 'the concept of roles'

"is nothing but an expression of the constitution of one among many possible modern selves" (Arditi 599). Use of the phrase 'one among many possible' alludes that there is not simply one correct model of a cultural role. Rather, cultural role-concepts are formed (cultivated) off many different examples and models of a cultural role which accumulate and develop over time. Any play of a cultural role creates an enactment which is effectively 'one among many possible' plays of that cultural role-concept. Each culture holds a plurality of roles, and each role has a plurality of examples and models which are components of its conceptual nature, which can be interpreted and enacted in a plurality of ways.

As per my example of cultural paradigms of motherhood, a woman who is required by her cultural existence to play the role of mother, makes an appeal to cultural role-concepts of motherhood. In doing so, she must have formulated her personal understanding of this cultural role-concept based off models and examples, which, she either witnessed in her own firsthand experiences, or which she came to have knowledge of through some form of secondhand experience. Within the horizon of notions endorsed by the cultural paradigm as a shared cultural role-concept she has a vast field of different potential plays of the cultural role which she can enact. We can easily understand that the field of potential plays of a role varies geographically and culturally in such a way that the potential examples and models of a role, and their conceptualizations as cultural role-concepts, differ, for example, between a mother in India and a mother in Germany. This type of differentiation and variance between one distinct culture and another is called cross-cultural variance[2].

Intracultural Variance

What researchers Keller and Lamm found in their study on *The Role of Intracultural Variation and Response Style*, is that the only things which were universal were that each culture had a concept of the role of mother and that each individual had their own conceptualization of both what that role means and how they should appeal to that concept when enacting their own play of the cultural role. Keller and Lamm took *cross-cultural variation* for granted, and instead chose to focus on what is less clear, *intracultural variation.* Their study shows that rather than

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[2] Though cultures by no means need be separated by political borders in order to be culturally distinct from one another.

only different cultures holding differing cultural paradigms for the role mother (cross-cultural variance), it is also common that even within one culture (intraculturally), there is a variance of personal understandings as to what that cultural role-concept entails.

Keller and Lamm used a questionnaire-based methodology of research, in which, they gauged mothers' reactions to "a list of 10 statements concerning qualities that a child should learn or develop during the first 3 years of life" (Keller and Lamm 53). The questions were focused on a mother's responsibility of raising their child and their duty to help their children develop in a healthy manner. This would inevitably involve aspects of what a mother should do in order to ensure their child's development. In this way, what Keller and Lamm were gaging was inadvertently not only about what the children should know, but also about what playing the role of mother, would require the women to do for their children and to teach their children to do.[3]

In their study "The variance of the measures in each group was used to measure intracultural variation" (Keller and Lamm 53). The results were what most sociologists and cultural theorists would assume, that "As expected, the group with an independent sociocultural orientation showed more intracultural variation" (Keller and Lamm 53). And in contrast, "the group with an interdependent sociocultural orientation showed the least variation" (Keller and Lamm 53). This shows that some cultures have more freedom for variance than others, depending on how the culture is generally structured and oriented. However, there was always some degree of intracultural variance. The findings of their study disprove any skepticism about the potential for intracultural variation. In reflection of their study, I postulate that neither absolute intracultural variation nor an absolute lack of intracultural variation can be assumed or claimed of or by a culture. Instead the degree and amount of variation, either cross- or intracultural, is always a complex relative factor of that culture's development strategies and not a universal or pre-determined absolute.

I chose motherhood as an example for this thesis because of this study and the reasonable assumption that everyone has a mother. However, not all cultural roles exist cross-culturally, but if they do, you can anticipate there being more variation between role-concepts cross-culturally, than you might expect intraculturally. Though you cannot expect that there will ever be a complete

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[3] We should note however, that this study also in some ways measured cultural paradigms of the role 'child', though I will stick to the example of motherhood for clarity.

absence of intracultural variance. In some cases, different cultures might have different cultural roles because of cross-cultural variance. There may be a role that was needed or created in one culture which simply does not exist in another. Within a culture, there are different roles which need to be played (including but by absolutely no means limited to roles such as: king, shoemaker, father, mother, friend, passerby, etc.).

Each role that a culture has developed a need for is comprised of either a cultural role-concept or, more likely, cultural role-concepts which are formulated off different examples and models of that role. Each cultural role-concept is formulated off a plurality of models and examples of cultural roles, and there are in some cases more role-concepts or less role-concepts that a culture holds intraculturally for the same cultural role. The freedom to have more role-concepts is a locally relative facet of cultural paradigms, some cultures grant more freedom than others for intracultural plurality of role-concepts, yet all cultures have at least some variance in terms of interpretations and enactments of cultural role-concepts.

The reason that these concepts differ intraculturally is in part because of different exposure ratios, and in larger part, because each individual's subjective interpretation of the examples and models of cultural roles, which their personal conceptualization of cultural role-concepts is based upon, is intrinsically differentiated by their subjective perspective's own unique facets which are not shared by others. Even within the same culture, different personal experiences or different exposure to secondhand examples and models of cultural role-concepts can accumulate and lead individuals to have different role-concepts from each other even though they belong to a common cultural group. In this way, cultural paradigms are plural for at least three reasons. Firstly, because of cross-cultural variance. Secondly, because of differing exposure ratios and thirdly because of each subjective individual's unique personal interpretation and understanding of shared cultural role-concepts. The second and third of which, result in intracultural variance between shared cultural concepts and personal understandings of those shared concepts. Each individual's interpretations and understandings of cultural role-concepts are a matter of their own personal conceptualization of the cultural-role, which, as we will see in this next section can be accounted for as 'programs of truth'.

Chapter Three: Programs of Truth

Arditi situates his theory to allow for an implicit plurality of cultural paradigms. This is necessary because there can be a plurality of role-concepts which apply to the same cultural role. Furthermore, there is a plurality of personal interpretations of cultural role-concepts which stem from the same cultural role-concept. This variance is instilled in Arditi's belief that in order to be human beings, we must be social beings, and in order to do that we must take on "an ultimately relativistic perception of the world" (Arditi 605). Our ultimately relativistic perception of the world is influenced by our unique experiences and field of exposure which are the bases of our interpretive personal understanding of cultural role-concepts.

An ultimately relativistic perception of the world addresses the type of intracultural variance that was proven in Keller and Lamm's study as the result of individuals own unique understanding of cultural role-concepts. An individual, as we stated in Chapter One, gains knowledge that forms their understanding of a cultural role-concept through experience by way of exposure to an example or model of a cultural role. In the process of this experience, the individual can only retain so much of the experience; regardless of whether it was a first or secondhand experience. In order to retain the parts of knowledge which are relatively important to them, they interpret the knowledge gained in their own unique way. This process of interpreting the knowledge gained in their own unique way is akin to how each individual creates their personal conception of a cultural role-concept. This process of personal interpretation creates a type of intimate knowledge similar to what Paul Veyne calls 'programs of truth'.

Programs of truth are conceptual programs which individual's believe in. An individual's personal understanding of a cultural paradigm can also be understood in this light, as one's program of truth— of what they believe that cultural role-concept implies or should imply. In his book, *Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths?* Veyne states that, "Contradictory truths do not reside in the same mind—only different programs, each of which encloses different truths and interests" (Veyne 85). Thus, the same individual can hold more than one program of truth, or more than one personal interpretation of a cultural role-concept for the same cultural role. We can understand different individual's must also run different programs of truth than each other.

Intrapersonal variance is expounded as a result of individual's exposure ratio to particular examples and models of cultural roles. Those experiences give each individual a different

availability of models and examples of cultural roles than their peers, which inevitably results in different personal understandings of cultural role-concepts, or as I suggest, their own programs of truth. The first matter of variance is then linked to exposure ratio's, and then that variance is exponentially increased due to individual's unique interpretations of what their exposure ratio provided them for consideration and interpretation.

In such an application of Veyne's concept of 'programs of truth' to cultural paradigms, cultural role-concepts are interpreted by individual's as their own program of truth. Veyne also argues that, "truth is a homonym that should be used only in the plural. There are only different programs of truth" (Veyne 21). 'Truth' in this sense, is comprised of varied meanings for different individuals. These different programs of truth are not only a modern occurrence, but have existed throughout the long course of human history in which "Throughout the ages a plurality of programs of truth has existed, and it is these programs, involving different distributions of knowledge, that explain the subjective degrees of intensity of beliefs, the bad faith, and the contradictions that coexist in the same individual" (Veyne 27). Different 'programs of truth', as I understand it, does not only imply that there are different cultural programs which enact different cultural role-concepts, or that there are only different programs of understandings of cultural paradigms which are run by each-individual, but also that each individual has access to multiple programs of truth.

Each firsthand and secondhand experience which we are exposed to contains examples and models of what it means to be human in a variety of roles and sets of interactions, which are interpreted by each-individual's authentic perspective and life experience, which creates, in an interpretive system, different programs of truth not only on a group level, but also on a personal plateau. Through different programs of truth, cultural paradigms influence, and are influenced by, our concepts of group and personal identities. Such instances of mutual influence will be further explored in Part II of this dissertation.

Through this application of Veyne's 'programs of truth' to our understanding of cultural paradigms, we can recognize how different people hold different cultural paradigms to be true because they believe in them. Furthermore, we can also understand the different approaches which might be taken by one and the same individual relative to differing circumstances. In an instance, a mother believes that to be a good mother, she must do this, and that is her truth. In another instance that same mother might appeal to a different program of truth. The uniqueness of her

program, as it is internally variable, is bound to vary from other mothers within her own culture. Just as, for example, one waiter believes that being a good waiter means that he or she must do this and that to be a good waiter, and that is their truth. At another moment, in another instance the waiter might need to appeal to another program of truth; or another cultural role concept, in order to fulfil the role waiter as he or she believes it should best be filled in that instance. The individualized conception of cultural paradigms, which one appeals to when formulating the justification of their unique enactment of a model of a cultural role, is then, synonymous with an individual adhering to their conceptual belief in what the true interpretation of a cultural role-concept is— in that instance.

An individual cultural role-player[4] must simply select one of the culturally available options of role-concepts, that which they place the most faith in, and run with it in their own style of playing out and enacting the cultural role with guidance from their personal understanding of the cultural role-concept. As a result of the variation which occurs internally for each individual and between one individual and another, each program of truth is just one of many. It is because of this plurality and variance of cultural paradigms that individual interpretations and enactments of cultural-role concepts occur differently internally for one individual and from one individual to another, as a plurality of programs of truth, which suggests that cultural paradigms are indeterminant. The field of interpretive and enactive variance makes cultural paradigms unable to be determined by the shared cultural role-concept alone.

In this sense, cultural paradigms exist as shared concepts, but are always interpreted in unique ways because different subjective individuals have different exposure to and interpretations of them. The result of different exposure ratio's and different individual interpretations can be understood as different programs of truth. Programs of truth guide how individuals come to be motivated by faith in their interpretation of a cultural role-concept— to such a degree that the role-concept comes out of the world of ideas into the physical world through an individual subject's enactment and unique play of a cultural role. This implies that when a cultural paradigm comes to be enacted, they are enacted in ways which are not determined as much by the paradigm itself, but by the interpretation and an individual subject's unique enactment of the play of that cultural role.

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[4] This term was also introduced by Arditi in *The Idea of a cultural paradigm*, on page 597.

Part I Conclusion

Cultural paradigms are cultural role-concepts which are formulated off examples and models of cultural roles. These concepts are formed as we experience examples of roles being played out in both firsthand and secondhand modes of exposure. We learn these concepts through experiencing, through being exposed to, enactments of models of roles in everyday life, and through the transmission of examples and models of cultural roles and of cultural role-concepts displayed in secondhand mediums of exposure. Because both exposure and interpretations are relative, there is no one cultural paradigm which holds absolute dominance. Instead, there are relative levels of both cross- and intracultural variance which establish the existence of 'many possible modern selves' in any and in one culture. Each role can be addressed by a plurality of role-concepts, which are formulated upon different examples and models of roles. The different exposure ratios and interpretational factors are justified by Keller and Lamm's study on variance and are also accounted for by conceptualizing individual's personal understandings of role-concepts as programs of truth— of which there is not one correct program, but many programs. Even within one individual, there is a plurality of programs of truth, of potential role-concepts which they can appeal to as they formulate their unique play or enactment of a cultural role. These individual programs are part of a larger cultivation of shared cultural concepts, which this dissertation refers to as cultural paradigms.

Part II

Indeterminacy and Mutual Influence

Introduction to Part II

In order to better understand what cultural paradigms are, we need to understand what makes cultural paradigms an indeterminate form of knowledge. In this part of my dissertation we will be concerned with the indeterminate nature of cultural paradigms. We will do so in Chapter Four by conceptualizing that indeterminacy as a discursive dialogue between knowing and being. A plurality of role-concepts, examples and models of roles, interpretations and programs of truth mean that knowledge and being do not necessarily determine each other. Instead, the form of knowledge which cultural paradigms are operates through a discursive process, a dialogue between knowledge and being. When we consider cultural paradigms as a discursive form of knowledge, we find that they have no absolute end, but rather, they operate as an evolving conversation between knowledge and being, and vise-versa.

In Chapter Five, this understanding of cultural paradigms as a discursive form of knowledge is further explained by its alternative terminology, as a relationship of mutual influence, which knowledge and being hold over one another. The discursive dialogue and mutual influence of cultural paradigms give us a much more thorough depiction of the differentiation which Arditi makes between Kuhnian scientific paradigms and his 'alternative' cultural paradigms. In which, knowledge (epistemological aspects of the conceptual construct) is not determined directly by being (ontological aspects of the conceptual construct), nor is being directly determined by knowledge. As a discursive form of knowledge, cultural paradigms follow a process in which being influences knowledge, that knowledge then, influences being, which influences knowledge, which influences being, and so on.

Chapter 4: Indeterminacy of Cultural Paradigms as Discursive Dialogue between Knowing and Being

Placing paradigms within a discursive system of meaning suggests that cultural paradigms influence individual's role-concepts and that individual's role-concepts influence cultural paradigms. On one side of this discursive dialogue, paradigms help to shape the flow of our everyday lives, and on the other side our everyday lives help to shape the paradigmatic currents in our cultures. In this way, not only do we appeal to our interpretation of a cultural paradigm as we enact our own unique play of a role, but our own unique play of a role can go on to influence the future history of the cultural paradigm associated with that role.

Such a discursive dialogue suggests that rather than being frozen, absolute and/ or static concepts, cultural paradigms are continually growing and evolving concepts of self and of self in society. Cultural paradigms in this sense undergo constant cultivation. In our youth, our life experiences and our exposure to cultural art, literature and mythologies grants us paradigmatic baseboards which we will use in relating to, interpreting, and enacting cultural roles throughout our lives. The living culture of everyday life, as it runs into new discoveries, crises, and dilemmas, influences the emergence of new actions and new tales of models of cultural roles. New tales, which once lived and told, are added to the historical library of human concepts and approaches, expanding the availability of cultural role-concepts which will be interpreted by the following generations, either, by their exposure to them as first or secondhand experiences; or if they are truly successful cultural role-concepts, in both.

The indeterminacy of such a discursive form of knowledge is established because a plurality of cultural role-concepts, examples and models of cultural roles, individual subjective interpretations and programs of truth mean that knowledge and being do not necessarily determine each other. Instead they operate as a discursive form of knowledge and thus a dialogue between knowledge and being ensues. When an example or a model of a role is enacted and becomes manifest, it enters into existence and we can then experience it. Reflection upon that experience of a model or example of that cultural role then leads us to further conceptualize our understanding of the cultural role-concept. That understanding of a cultural role-concept is then interpreted into a program of truth which is appealed to as an individual enacts their play of that role.

An individual's play of a cultural role can either be experienced firsthand, or it can possibly work its way into someone's secondhand experience. Yet, one's interpretation of a cultural role-concept, which is expressed by an individual as their program of truth, does not necessarily perfectly replicate every aspect of the example or model it is inspired by, or influenced by, but not determined by. One's unique play of a cultural role, as an example or model, once experienced, can be interpreted into one's personal concept of that cultural role. Once we have created a concept in the world of ideas, if others are exposed to it, that concept can and will be interpreted differently by different individuals, at different times, for different reasons. Thus, any cultural role-concept itself cannot determine the actual enunciative enactment of a role. This is because there is a space for modification of the cultural paradigm both on the interpretive and enactive enunciative plateaus. That is, in both areas where subjective modification is possible; both when one formulates their own programs of truth and when one plays out or enacts cultural roles according to their programs of truth. Since cultural paradigms are not determinate, the conceptual knowledge of their existence in the world of ideas only inspires or influences, as a guide or baseboard, one's play of that role in the physical world.

Cultural Paradigms as a Discursive Form of Knowledge

To better explain Foucault's discursive form of knowledge and how it applies to cultural paradigms we will have to imagine that a discursive dialogue occurs between being and knowing—and in that dialogue, each time either being or knowledge speaks the opportunity for epistemic breaks arises. These breaks are modifications which occur either in the interpretation, and thus, in personal conceptual formulation, or during an individual's unique play or enactment of a role-concept. In *The Archeology of Knowledge* Foucault states that, "historical descriptions are necessarily ordered by the present state of knowledge, they increase with every transformation and never cease, in turn, to break with themselves" (Foucault 1989, 5). This process of breaks and discontinuities accounts for changes which occur in cultural paradigms as a collective and shared capitulation of cultural role-concepts, which are contingent upon a continual dialogue which occurs between knowledge and being in an indeterminate sense. There is not only a discursive dialogue which occurs between knowledge and being, but also a discursive dialogue which occurs between shared cultural paradigms and individual's programs of truth, in which they do not determine each other, but instead carry on a dialogue with each other.

Rather than threatening the existence of cultural paradigms, participation in this discursive process is how a cultural paradigm comes to exist and function. Our having one foot in the world of ideas and one foot in the physical world allows us to play an integral part in this dialogue between things (ideas) and stuff (physical). Each time an enunciative play of a role occurs, it has the opportunity to expand its influence upon the shared cultural role-concept, as an example and model of a cultural role. That shared role-concept is then capable of being included in the experience of another by way of exposure. If an enactive enunciation is heard, that is, if a play of a role becomes a part of the experience of another, then that play of a role can influence the audience by providing them with a unique example or model of the cultural role in action. The experience of an example or model of a cultural role does not determine an individual's program of truth, but it does influence it.

This is how discursive forms of knowledge operate. In such a form of knowledge, "This whole play of displacements and misunderstandings is perfectly coherent and necessary" (Foucault 1989, 225). Discursive forms of knowledge rely upon interpretation and reinterpretations which carry across time and which flow back and forth through the dialogue. "In short, the history of thought, of knowledge, of philosophy, of literature seems to be seeking, and discovering, more and more discontinuities" (Foucault 1989, 6). These breaks and discontinuities are natural for a discursive form of knowledge which has no end, but which rather, operates as an evolving conversation between knowledge and being— or between a culture and its individual members.

Cultural paradigms, as a discursive form of knowledge, are not universally stable and/or fixed. A cultural paradigm is like Foucault's example of 'the book' which "is not simply the object that one holds in one's hands", because the non-objective concept of the book, like a cultural paradigm's "unity is variable and relative" (Foucault 1989, p.28). The room for new orientations and breaks that this discursive form of knowledge takes on, makes it such that any particular manifestation of a cultural paradigm "cannot be regarded either as definitive or as absolutely valid" (Foucault 1989, 33). Each enunciative manifestation is but one of the many potential examples and models of cultural roles which aids in the creation of a cultural role-concept. In short, since cultural paradigms are a discursive form of knowledge, they are not determinate— nor are they either definitive no absolutely valid.

Although cultural paradigms cannot be regarded as definitive or absolutely valid, the discourse involved in the discursive itself is not entirely spontaneous, "discourse finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object – and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable" (Foucault 1989, 46). For example, each enunciative play of the role 'mother' appeals to motherhood, although it does so in differing ways, for different individuals, and even, in some cases, for the same individual at different times. The appeal to any cultural paradigm of the role 'mother' is oriented towards the same type of cultural role. Namely, in my example, what it is to be and how to be a 'mother', and thus, that signification of orientation means the field of potential manifestations is in some way limited and unified. This limitation draws the horizon of what it can and can't mean to be a mother, but within that field of variance there is room for subjective interpretation into different programs of truth and for those programs to be enacted into unique plays of the cultural role.

Since cultural paradigms are a discursive form of knowledge, they must adhere to the functionality and processes of such a form of knowledge. As Foucault describes the indeterminacy of discursive formations he states that, "A discursive formation, then, does not play the role of a figure that arrests time and freezes it for decades or centuries; it determines a regularity proper to temporal processes; it presents the principle of articulation between a series of discursive events and other series of events, transformations, mutations, and processes" (Foucault 1989, 83). Which means that cultural paradigms must by their very nature remain open dialogues (projects) of knowledge in which they hold "A status that is never definitive, but modifiable, relative, and always susceptible of being questioned" (Foucault 1989, 115).

We use cultural paradigms constantly, but they are never in their final stage of cultivation the moment that we make an appeal to them. Each time one makes reference to a cultural paradigm (as a form of knowledge, they appeal to their program of truth, to what they believe to be the correct model of that role), or, physically enacts the role that a cultural paradigm is oriented towards, there is an enunciation in this discursive dialogue between knowing and being which occurs. Neither side determines the other, but they each make a response to each other.

This kind of open discursive form of knowledge remains in a continuous discursive dialogue. Because of its ambiguity, this form of knowledge 'opens up' "a number of possible subjective positions; instead of fixing their limits, it places them in a domain of coordination and

coexistence; instead of determining their identity" (Foucault 1989, 119). This room, or space, for individuality is a form of freedom within cultural paradigms. That freedom has limits, yet there is room for freedom in both interpretation and enactment in an indeterminate discursive form of knowledge. Though, some cultures inevitably allow for either more or less freedom than others, no culture can completely deny its individuals some degree of interpretational and enactive enunciative freedom.

Foucault makes it clear that "A discursive formation is not, therefore, an ideal, continuous, smooth text that runs beneath the multiplicity of contradictions, and resolves them in the calm unity of coherent thought" (Foucault 1989, 173). Breaks and discontinuities are part of the natural ebb and flow between knowledge and being, between the world of ideas and the physical world. Cultural paradigms then, because they involve a plurality of programs of truth, which, act in dialogue with the enactment of unique plays of roles (into being) on the stage of life, are not matters of determinacy. Instead, as I have argued, they rely on a discursive, on a relationship of mutual influence between knowledge and being—between the epistemological and ontological aspects of their nature as conceptual constructs.

Chapter Five: Mutual Influence between Epistemological and Ontological Aspects

In Chapter Two, I explained Arditi's concept of 'many possible selves', however, the indeterminate aspect of cultural paradigms arises in the second half of that statement. In which he states that, "the concept of roles, which is nothing but an expression of the constitution of one among many possible modern selves, is actively construed by the people concerned, simultaneously sustaining and being sustained by a set of activities" (Arditi 599). 'Simultaneous sustaining and being sustained by a set of activities' is a reference to the discursive, relationship of mutual influence, between knowledge and being. This active construal has no end, but rather, its conceptual existence occurs as a continual play which goes back and forth between knowledge and being. This field of play spans both the conceptual and physical worlds.

The players are subjective individuals who connect both the conceptual world of ideas and the physical world of objects. These players are cultural role-players. They act as the conduit which links together these two worlds through both conceptualizing and enacting the types of customs and traditions involved in cultural paradigms as cultural role-concepts. They actively interpret their exposure to firsthand experiences and secondhand transmissions of cultural role-concepts into their

own programs of truth, which then influence their unique enactment and plays of cultural roles on the stage of life. The degree of freedom that role players have in modifying both aspects of cultural paradigms is what sets the conditions of indeterminacy. The way that any individual subject interprets being into knowledge and manifests knowledge into being is a relative factor of cultural paradigms. A factor, which is strong enough to require our understanding of cultural paradigms to recognize their indeterminacy and its source.

In this chapter I argue that, the discursive element of cultural paradigms, which was explained in Chapter Four, can also be understood as a mutual influence. In which, an experience of exposure to being is encoded into knowledge (into a cultural role-concept, and one's own personal interpretation of that shared concept— their program of truth), and that interpreted knowledge influences manifestations of being (plays and enactments of cultural roles). Those manifestations, once experienced either first or secondhandedly, go on to influence knowledge, which is then interpreted into different programs of truth and so on. This process, the play back and forth, in which cultural role-players modify cultural paradigms establishes the relationship of mutual influence which is synonymous with cultural paradigms indeterminacy.

Determinate and Indeterminate Paradigms

Although cultural paradigms are indeterminant, the epistemological and ontological aspects of cultural paradigms still share a relationship with each other. This indeterminacy can be used to further explain the relationship between epistemological and ontological aspects of cultural paradigms which Arditi introduces. It was on this basis that I found Arditi's statement that he intended his research to build "on the work of Clifford Geertz and Thomas Kuhn" and to advance "the concept of a cultural paradigm as an alternative approach" (Arditi 598) to imply that he meant 'alternative' to Kuhnian scientific paradigms of normal science.

The argument that cultural paradigms are an indeterminate makes cultural paradigms requisite of an 'alternative approach'. In the case of Kuhnian scientific paradigms of normal science, "Normal science is a highly determined activity" (Kuhn 42). Normal science is determinate because it seeks to understand the nature of being without modifying it. In the case of normal science, objective being is observed and experimented with, and the results of those observations and experiences go on to influence scientific knowledge of being. However, that knowledge can only influence what a scientist does with being. As a person who is playing a

cultural role, that of being a scientist, scientists do have room to interpret and modify different plays of the role of being a scientist. However, they do not actually modify the type of being which they study because it is objectively self-determined. Furthermore, the self-determination of objective being, which scientists doing normal science study, makes knowledge about its objective nature determined as well. In Kuhnian scientific paradigms, because knowledge flows only one way, from being to knowledge about that being, normal science's paradigms are capable of being determinate.

In the case of cultural paradigms, as cultural role-concepts, they are indeterminate because of their formulation through a discursive dialogue which goes both ways between knowledge and being. Thus, establishing both their indeterminacy and their mutual influence which flows in both directions between knowledge and being. In this indeterminate field of mutual influence, knowledge about being can influence what being becomes, its future manifestations then, through exposure ratios, influences what knowledge becomes; which in turn influences future manifestations of being. This summarizes why Arditi makes the statement that "The difference between a scientific and a cultural paradigm is crucial, however: a scientific paradigm is a purely epistemological construct; a cultural paradigm is both an epistemological and an ontological construct" (Arditi 604). Knowledge is determined by being in Kuhnian scientific paradigms of normal science, but in cultural paradigms, both aspects (epistemological + ontological) partake in a discursive dialogue with each other, in which neither determines the other, but in which, knowledge and being continually hold a mutual influence upon each other.

When a new discovery of 'being', in the sense of an object of normal science, can no longer be accounted for, and it begins to challenge knowledge of that being, Kuhn does allow for a system of change. However, his theory of scientific revolutions is intended to realign the determinacy in which scientific knowledge is accurately determined by the observations of, and experiments with, the objective being which scientists study. When scientists recognize that their current exposure to being and their scientific concepts of knowledge of that being do not align, the scientific paradigm of normal science goes into what Kuhn calls 'crisis'. Because of the determinacy of knowledge in scientific paradigms there is at once a need for scientific revolutions for changes in scientific paradigms to occur and no room for the types of epistemic breaks which occur constantly in an indeterminate discursive form of knowledge.

Instead, scientific revolutions arise as the result of scientists restructuring their paradigms, their conceptual understandings, in response to crisis. Through scientific revolutions, scientists restructure their scientific paradigms so that their knowledge of being better corresponds to what being determines its knowledge needs to reflect. Yet, In Kuhns system, he finds that, it was "crisis that had been responsible for innovation in the first place" (Kuhn 76). I argue that alternatively for cultural paradigms, it is the freedom of individual subjects to modify both knowledge and unique plays of cultural roles which is responsible for the innovations that occur over epistemic breaks; in which, enunciations modify rather than repeat the other side of the field of play between the two enunciative aspects involved in the relationship of mutual influence. Subsequently, it is a much larger and more complicated ordeal for a scientific paradigm to undergo a revolution, a change in the understanding of the determinacy of scientific knowledge, than it is for a discursive form of knowledge to go through constant, but minor changes, which only influence, not determine, the course of their conceptual formulations.

Scientific paradigms, for the reason above, are not matters of continuous mutual influence. In their case it is only by being becoming better understood, through a new discovery or observation of being, that a crisis arises; and a scientific paradigm 'needs' to undergo a revolution in order for being to accurately determine knowledge once more— under a new post-revolutionary paradigm. Cultural paradigms on the other hand, require an alternative understanding. Alternative to Kuhnian scientific paradigms, because as a matter of continuous mutual influence, not only does being influence knowledge but that knowledge influences manifestations of being. This occurs constantly and these epistemic breaks can be regarded as micro-crises which sort themselves out through the modifications that occur during both interpretational and enactive enunciations of the discursive dialogue between knowledge and being.

Epistemological Aspect of Cultural Paradigms

These two important enunciative aspects of cultural paradigms are necessary for a discursive dialogue between knowing and being to occur. The first of which, we will now explore in more depth, is the epistemological aspect. For knowledge to be knowledge, it is necessary for it to be knowledge of something. The epistemological aspect of cultural paradigms makes this form of knowledge oriented towards its object in the world of ideas. Without this orientation you would not have conceptual knowledge [no cultural paradigm]. Without cultural paradigms, you could still

have human consciousness and action. The results of those thoughts and actions though, would not be considered as being due to the influence of cultural paradigm; because these thoughts or actions would not have any designation within the horizon of customs and traditions which have been cultivated by a group of people constituting a shared form of knowledge—a cultural role-concept.

For this reason, we can label and identify different roles (such as king, mother, waiter, friend, passerby, etc.) so that we are clear about what role a cultural paradigm is oriented in reference toward. With that said, it is important to note that a cultural paradigm is more than just a label or a description. It is not just comprised of 'a' description of 'a' cultural role but occurs in its more complex form as a cultural role-concept. Presumably, in cultures which are either more diverse or oriented towards more individual freedom, there is an increased possibility of having multiple variety cultural role-concepts for each role. Regardless, each cultural role-concept is itself formulated off exposure to different examples and models of the cultural role, which, do more than merely describe the cultural role. They put the cultural role into context and into action.

The overall context of a cultural role does not only involve other persons. The context may also involve general situations (what certain cultural role-players are expected to do in certain common cultural situations) and cultural artifacts (how a cultural role-player should interact with non-human cultural objects). In fuller spectrum, cultural paradigms offer guidance and suggestions as to how an individual member of that culture (a cultural role-player) should interact with other people, within the context of certain cultural situations, and with certain cultural objects.

Within the epistemological horizon of orientation that a cultural role's definition provides for its cultural role-concepts, there is a potential for uniqueness and variance which arises when different individuals create their own programs of truth. One can display their personal understanding of a cultural role-concept, or their 'program of truth', through their words, whether oral or written, through their artistic expressions, which are not limited to visual or performative arts in the traditional sense, but also in the artistically performative sense of their playing cultural roles on the stage of everyday life within their cultural circumstances.

Through this communicative process, examples and models of cultural roles with a particular-role orientation can be transferred from one individual unto others. Arguably, because of the necessity of presentation and exposure for a role concept to be a shared cultural role-concept,

the foundational root of a cultural paradigm is an aesthetic concern. On both sides of the field of play there is an appearance which is experienced by the subjective individual; who is able to peer both into the world of ideas and at the physical world.

The two spaces for modification are aesthetic as well. We experience the firsthand presentation of a play of a role or a secondhand transmission of a cultural role-concept by way of an aesthetic experience which an individual subject is exposed to. In any case, an individual subject is either the interpreting observer or the role-playing cause of the aesthetic experience in each of the two modificatory enunciative opportunities. Through our different forms of human artistic creation, we create the aesthetic experience of cultural paradigms. This creation occurs through speaking, creating, writing, performing, or living a certain example or model of a cultural role.

The potential for exposure is an aesthetic ordeal, in which, one's modificatory play or enactment of a cultural role becomes a presentation of a model or an example of the cultural role in play. Which as an aesthetic experience becomes available, through potential for exposure, for others to experience as an example or a model of the cultural roll in action. That is, in action within a culturally situational context, from which, through one's exposure to the presentation of a model or example of that cultural role in action, a subjective individual can formulate their own program of truth and individualized conceptual understanding of the cultural paradigm.

Without role orientation, we would not be able to classify a set of traditions, customs or behaviors as a cultural paradigm. Despite knowledge requiring some form of orientation in order to be knowledge of something, and for that something to be available for exposure and thus experienceable and communicable, the epistemological aspect of cultural paradigms does not determine being. Nor does being determine the epistemological aspect because the relative interpretation of a shared cultural role-concept into one's own program of truth. Rather, the epistemological aspects play in cultural paradigms discursive dialogue of mutual influence is the limiting of a cultural paradigm's horizon of orientation and its potential ontological manifestations.

Ontological Aspect of Cultural Paradigms

The other enunciative aspect of cultural paradigms discursive dialogue of mutual influence between knowledge and being is the ontological aspect. The degree of freedom to enunciate, and to take an epistemic break, as an individual enacts a cultural role, based off their program of truth, is something which varies from culture to culture. I theorize that some more traditional cultures prefer less modification, yet more globalized cultures are more likely to both prefer and allow for more freedom. Likely, more globalized culture's need this freedom to absorb the diversity of the individuals which now influence them. Yet, no particular-culture, no matter how little room for freedom its orientation allows, can absolutely intervene and make its shared cultural role-concepts determinate of how subjective individuals enact and play out cultural roles in everyday life.

I have argued that we are creating new models and examples of cultural roles on a continual basis. Though many of them will never make it into the field of secondhand exposure, they will undoubtedly both influence the physical world and influence the world of ideas as it is constructed by those whom experience these enunciations first-handedly. The ontological field is one of the arenas in which we get to perform modifications of cultural roles. This arena, and how our play on this stage operates, is similar to the performing artist which Gadamer discusses.

Gadamer states that, "The performing artist too has a certain consciousness of this" of their freedom to play, and the limitations which limit the horizon of that field of freedom. "The way that he approaches a work or a role is always in some way related to models that approached it in the same way". Which is as much as to say that a subjective individual's play of a cultural role always appeals to cultural paradigms, which are cultural role-concepts formulated to address the cultivated history of that role. Though individuals do so through their own understanding and program of truth. "But this has nothing to do with blind imitation. Although the tradition created by a great actor, director, or musician remains effective as a model, is it not a brake on free creation" (Gadamer 117). When we play the roles that our cultural existences require us to play, we are not enacting blind imitations of roles. Instead, we modify our play of cultural roles according to the influence of our own individual tastes and preferences— which are another important factor of the discursive relationship of mutual influence in cultural paradigms, which will be discussed Part III of this thesis.

In Season 1 Episode 2 of the Netflix original series *The Kominsky Method*, renowned Hollywood acting coach Sandy Kominsky exclaims, "acting is really an extension of living, it is how we explore what it is to be human." Just like actors on a stage or in a film, we humans, as cultural animals, do much the same thing when we play our roles in the real world— we explore what it is to be human. We select our modes of action in our daily lives off the concepts held by our programs of truth. We create enunciations, manifestations of being, as we act out our unique play of cultural roles. Plays of cultural roles, which then, because of their very coming into existence, open up a potentiality of other's exposure to their aesthetic presentation, can go on to potentially influence cultural role-concepts.

The Waiter and Ontological Transcendence

We can imagine the freedom granted by our possibility of performing unique plays and enactments of roles as a form of ontological transcendence; as granting us a potential avenue through which to contribute to the future history of cultural paradigms— and the epistemological orientations fixing of the horizon of any given role keeps that freedom in check. In Jean Paul Satre's *Being and Nothingness*, he provides us with a metaphor that can help us to understand what the enunciative modification as ontological transcendence looks like. He comments of the waiter that,

> "His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid.
> He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends
> forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little
> too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns,
> trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of
> automation while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-rope-
> walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken
> equilibrium which he perpetually reestablishes by a light movement of
> the arm and hand. All his behavior seems to us a game." (Sartre 59)

The types of statements which Sartre exhibits here are all value judgements. They, by use of the word 'too', endorse the notion that there is a correct degree of being and action which is

conceptually expressed by one's own program of truth; which, pertains to their personal understanding of a cultural role-concepts standard of 'what a good waiter should' be doing. But when one is in their core, not really a waiter, but a person playing the role of the waiter as they interpret it, it is no surprise that they might, in the opinions of some, be overdoing it. In this example, we see how there is an existential crisis of cultural paradigms. One in which, we cannot at once be our authentic selves and be determined by the cultural paradigms associated with the roles our cultural existences require us to enact. This existential crisis of cultural paradigms is however, easily solved by recognizing cultural paradigms as a discursive form of knowledge. This essentially sets the ontological field of variance free in a pasture which is delineated by its opposite, the epistemological field of limitations.

Sartre was wise enough to know that the reason that this waiter seems to be playing a game is because he is, "he is playing at being a waiter in a café". In fact, in order to be a waiter at the café he must "play with his condition in order to realize it. This obligation is not different from that which is imposed on all tradesmen" (Sartre 59); or, for that matter, an obligation which is imposed on all role-players of cultural role-concepts. Without the existence of a cultural role-concept concerning what a waiter 'should be', it would be hard for a waiter to be a waiter, or for anyone to recognize them as such— let alone for one to be able to judge whether one is any good at playing the role or not.

There is an extent of freedom that the waiter can carry out within the field of ontological variance of the cultural role. A freedom which arises from the potentiality for modification and indeterminacy. A waiter can be what one's program of truth might consider to be a 'good' waiter or a 'bad' waiter, and a waiter can wait tables in different styles; yet, no matter how they enact their play of the cultural-role of 'waiter', there is a certain epistemological limitation or orientation which delineates to some extent what 'being a waiter' can mean.

As cultural animals we are unique. Humans are not mere objects, but objects which, because of their individual subjectivity, have a potential to go beyond themselves. In Sartre's example, the waiter is a person, a person playing a game, the game of being a waiter, in which one has a cultural role to play, to be a waiter. Yet, we must recognize the going beyond a mere determinate description which humans are capable of. In that "the waiter in the café cannot be immediately a café waiter in the sense that this inkwell is an inkwell, or the glass is a glass" (Sartre

59). Because inkwells are inkwells and glasses are glasses in an objectively determinant sense. There is no room for inkwells or glasses to play with their condition in order to realize it.

The ability to think and go beyond oneself, the subjectivity, of the individual playing the cultural-role of waiter, through their unique enunciative manifestation of being exceeds, and in some ways violates, the possibility of there being any descriptive determinacy of what 'being a waiter' can ultimately mean. The waiter has already gone beyond himself as an object in being a person (holding the concept of self-identity that he holds), and once more gone beyond himself as being merely 'a person' when he becomes a waiter. The waiter is a person who is playing a cultural role. We see him as a waiter, but he is a person playing the cultural role of being a waiter.

Inevitably, the waiter is using a model of a cultural role to project a concept of that cultural role, which is effectively his program of truth as to what it means to be and how to be a waiter. Furthermore, he is also enacting his own authentic, yet relative, subjective experience as a player of that cultural role to modify his enunciative manifestation of the cultural role waiter. In this sense, his play of that cultural role, as an example of an enacted enunciative manifestation of cultural-role concept formulated off an example, or a model, of that role, which does not require strict adherence to any particular-model of that cultural role. His program of truth is not determined by the cultural paradigm, and neither is his unique play or enactment of that cultural role. There is, with such abstractions, always going to be some degree of variance of subjectively enlivened objects which, by their very act of coming into being, has already placed them beyond the possibility of a mere objectively determinate description of themselves.

Anything which we could come up with to signify what 'being a waiter', means in terms of traditional cultural role-concepts, are in a sense "concepts" or "judgements" which "refer to the transcendent" (Sartre 60). Transcendent, in that, as subjects, they go beyond being the object that they are, and they are an object which is not only filled with meaning, but which fills the world with meaning. That meaning is valuable, though its value varies from culture to culture and individual to individual.

There are simply non-objectively contingent "abstract possibilities" (Sartre 60) that the human being, or person, as both an object and subject holds which merely objective objects cannot. This is what Sartre implies when he says that the waiter transcends the concepts and judgments through abstract possibilities of meaning in a way that is impossible for objective objects such as

inkwells and glasses. And likewise, this is what Arditi implies when he says that cultural paradigms are a matter not only matters of epistemic concern, as are scientific paradigms, but they are concern epistemological + ontological aspects of cultural role-concepts. Which is synonymous with saying that, it is because of these 'abstract possibilities' that individuals have freedom to modify interpretations and enactments of cultural paradigms. That freedom for modification is what makes cultural paradigms indeterminate and is why they are best understood as participating in a discursive dialogue, which, is effectively a relationship of mutual influence which knowledge and being hold upon each other.

Summary of Parts I & II

From Part I of this dissertation we have gained an understanding of Arditi's definition of cultural paradigms which are cultural 'role-concepts' from Chapter One; which also explored how we formulate and learn cultural paradigms. In Chapter Two, we established that those cultural role-concepts are plural because of variance both cross- and intraculturally. In Chapter Three, I argued that each individual's understanding of a cultural role-concept can be terminologically referred to as one's program of truth.

In Part II we became concerned with the indeterminacy of cultural paradigms, and how that can also be understood as cultural paradigms being a discursive form of knowledge in which being and knowledge do not determine each other but share in relationship of mutual influence upon each other. Chapter Four, dealt with prefacing our understanding how cultural paradigms are requisite of an alternative approach to Kuhnian scientific paradigms because of their status as a discursive form of knowledge. Furthermore, in Chapter Five, I demonstrated in what ways cultural paradigms as discursive form of knowledge can be understood as being synonymous with Arditi's statement about cultural paradigms being a matter of epistemology plus ontology, and under its alternative terminology, as a relationship of mutual influence between knowing and being.

<center>**Part III**</center>

<center>**Cultural Paradigms and Taste**</center>

Introduction to Part III

In Part III, we will use the terms defined in the previous two parts of this dissertation to explore in greater depth the relationships those terms hold with each other. Our new point of focus is aimed at better understanding what influences the discursive aspects of cultural paradigms. We will do so by investigating the forces of influence upon modifications of cultural role-concepts which occur in either the interpretive or enactive enunciations of cultural paradigms.

Chapter Six will build upon our understanding from Part II of the discursive relationship of mutual influence between being and knowledge. We will then apply that use and understanding of discursive dialogue of mutual influence to a relationship of mutual influence between collective culture and individual cultural members. These two considerations of discursive aspects of cultural paradigms also apply to a more particular consideration of how a cultural concept of taste participates in a relationship of mutual influence with individual's concepts of taste.

Taste as a force of influence is an important component of cultural paradigms which was not explored by Arditi. I argue that on a personal scale taste is a subjective force of influence which modifies how we interpret cultural role-concepts and how we enact plays of cultural roles based on our personal understandings of those cultural role-concepts. In order to understand taste as a force of influence, we must recognize that taste is always accompanied by preferences. When we think of taste in this sense, it is inextricably linked to a preference for one thing over another. By exploring the force of influence which personal taste and preference exert, we can better understand their place in influencing the modifications which occur in both interpretive and enactive enunciations of cultural paradigms.

For the reasons above, in Chapter Seven we will be concerned with personal tastes, preferences and their modificatory influence upon cultural paradigms. Cultural and personal concepts of taste and preference are forces of influence upon our programs of truth. What we are culturally exposed to is the result of cultural concepts of preference and taste. These cultural concepts of preference and taste are highly influential upon the prevalence of or lack of certain cultural role-concepts availability to cultural members for exposure. How individuals interpret

those exposures is influenced by their personal concepts of preference and taste. Through the influence of desirability, the concepts of preference and taste which individuals hold are an important contributor to how individuals both formulate cultural role-concepts and how individual's appeal to their understanding of cultural paradigms when they are required by their cultural existences to enact cultural roles.

The influence of desirability, as concepts of preference and taste, is a force of influence upon our personal cultivation of programs of truth and upon our play of cultural roles themselves; which is important because in enacting our play of cultural roles we participate in the cultivation of models and examples of cultural roles. On one hand of the of influence of desirability in this discursive dialogue, we see the influence of bias which stems from personal concepts of taste and preference upon our interpretations of the epistemologically enunciative aspect of cultural role-concepts. Bias is the term for desirability as a force of influence upon one's interpretive modification of their exposure to a cultural role-concept. One holds a bias based on what they prefer to believe, or what they prefer to accept as true when designing their program of truth.

On the other hand of the influence of desirability, we see the influence of style which stems from personal concepts of taste and preferences upon the enactive ontological enunciative aspect of cultural paradigms discursive dialogue between knowing and being. Style is the force of influence which affects how an individual uniquely enacts or plays a cultural role. One plays a cultural role in a certain style based on what they believe, or what they prefer to accept as the true way to play a cultural role which they are required by their cultural existences to play. The influence of desirability, through the influences of bias and style upon the discursive dialogue between knowing and being is capable because of the indeterminacy of cultural paradigms. If cultural paradigms were determinate, there would be no room for the epistemic breaks that occur during enunciative manifestations of the discursive dialogue between knowledge and being.

Chapter Six: Three Instances of Mutual Influence

In this chapter, we will further investigate the relationship between cultural role-concepts and individual programs of truth. This requires us to explore the relationship between cultural and individual concepts of taste. These are two relationships of mutual influence for cultural paradigms, in addition to the discursive dialogue between knowing and being, which also hold true to the discursive framework. In both these discursive elements of cultural paradigms, the collective concepts influence but do not ultimately determine individual's concepts. These relationships all qualify as discursive because in them there is no "ideal, continuous, smooth text that runs beneath the multiplicity of contradictions" (Foucault 1989, 173). Each is full of breaks and modifications which flow between knowledge and being and between shared collective conceptualizations and individual's intimate personal conceptualizations.

Knowledge and Being

As we have discussed in Part II, cultural paradigms as a discursive form of knowledge means that knowledge and being take part in a discursive dialogue which has no absolute end. Rather, a dialogue occurs as a continuously ongoing relationship of mutual influence that knowledge and being hold upon each other. Cultural paradigms classification as a discursive form of knowledge means that they are an indeterminate form of knowledge. On one hand, knowledge from a cultural paradigm cannot be perfectly manifested into being in exact accordance with a culture's cultivated cultural role-concept. On the other hand, any given enactment of a cultural role does not necessarily determine the shared cultural knowledge of that cultural role-concept. In short, knowledge of a cultural role-concept does not determine being, and any particular manifestation of being does not determine the knowledge of a cultural role-concept.

Collective Culture and Individual Cultural Members

The shared collective concepts that are cultural paradigms, also partake in a discursive dialogue of mutual influence with individual's programs of truth which are ran by members of that culture. This relationship is also indeterminate in that the shared cultural concept does not determine an individual's program of truth, though it does influence it, and one individual's program of truth does not determine shared cultural concepts; though it can possibly influence it. I do, however, speculate that the more any individual's particular unique play of a cultural role is

made available for exposure to others, the more likely it will be to influence the cultural paradigm for that cultural role. Certainly, being presented within an artistic medium which allows for prolonged recurrence of secondhand exposure will grant a higher probability of influencing a culture's shared cultivated concept of a cultural role, than will an act that comes and passes with few other members experiencing firsthand exposure to it as a unique play as an example or model of a cultural role.

Neither shared cultural role-concepts nor personal programs of truth determine each other, nor is either one a final or absolute concept which is immune to epistemic breaks and the influence of modifications both on the interpretive and enactive enunciations of cultural paradigms. Instead individuals build their personal programs of truth based off their own experiences and the shared cultural experiences which they are exposed to. While at the same time, the library of shared cultural experiences, containing all the examples and models of roles which make up a culture's set of role-concepts for that cultural role, are influenced by the acquisition of new examples and models of cultural roles which individuals create and perform.

Good Taste and Taste

Before we can get further into the influence of taste and preferences upon cultural paradigms, I would like to briefly discuss Gadamer's critique of Kantian aesthetics. Gadamer quotes Kant's proposition that 'good taste' is a universal because "the true sense of community, says Kant, is *taste*" (Gadamer 30). Gadamer calls Kant's understanding of taste 'paradoxical' because "the eighteenth century enjoyed discussing precisely diversities of human taste" (Gadamer 30). Arditi would also be likely to find Kant's proposition paradoxical. Remember it was Arditi who asked, "Why, indeed, do people develop concepts of self, of society, of anything, that are so different from one another?" (Arditi 598). Developing differing 'concepts of self, society, of anything' is impossible if those concepts are determinate. Yet, this variance is natural if we each develop our own programs of truth, which neither determine nor are determined by, but which influence and are influenced by, shared cultural role-concepts— by cultural paradigms.

I think that the confusion which Kant encountered was that he took for granted a lack of intracultural variance. Perhaps he assumed that a distinct community varied from other distinct communities, but that within that one distinct community there could only be expressions of homogeny disguised as 'unity'. Whereas, when we reconsider taste as a sense of culture and not

community, we can understand how there is no universal 'good taste', even within one culture, because there is always some degree of intracultural variance[5]. That variance exists because taste is a matter of cultivation, which is as much as to say that, taste is a discursive form of knowledge. In short, Kant's mistake here seems to have been rather simple, he assumed a lack of intracultural variance in his understanding of communities and their sense of taste.

Because of the indeterminacy of discursive forms of knowledge, taste is never predetermined, instead, "taste is able to gain the distance necessary for choosing and judging what is the most urgent necessity of life" (Gadamer 31). This explains how in a context involving 'a plurality of modern selves', both shared cultural concepts and personal programs of truth are prone to experience breaks and changes in their concept of taste. This understanding of taste as a discursive form of knowledge in its own right is justified both by an understanding of the relationship of mutual influence between a culture and its individual members and also by way of Gadamer's statement that "The concept of taste undoubtedly implies a *mode of knowing*" (Gadamer 32). Taste, as a mode of knowing, follows its own discursive process which influences how cultural paradigms are formulated, learned, and enacted.

Taste as a Discursive Dialogue

In this third relationship of mutual influence, there is a discursive dialogue which occurs between a shared cultural concept of 'taste' and individual concepts of 'taste'— which intrinsically also appeals to what an individual does or does not prefer. Gadamer states that, "taste is necessarily formed by something that indicates for what that taste is formed" (Gadamer xxvii). Which, as you recall from Chapter 5, in the section on *the Epistemological Aspects of Cultural Paradigms[6],* I argued that, for knowledge to be knowledge, it must be knowledge of 'something', it requires an orientation. The indeterminacy of cultural paradigms which allows for choice between focusing upon one example or model of a cultural role or another in formulating a cultural role-concept, or between one cultural role-concept and another when enacting a play of a cultural role, demands that we make a choice based off our preferences. These choices and our preferences 'always include' "particular, preferred types of content and excludes others." (Gadamer xxvii). That which

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[5] Note that naturally, variance also occurs within a community. However, the research of Keller and Lamm used the terminology which I am applying in critique of Kant.
[6] See page 30

is 'included' by our taste for preferred types of content is synonymous with what is desired, and what is excluded is what is not desired. Our choices then, seek to match up with our desires.

There is a discursive dialogue between cultural concepts of 'taste' and individual concepts of 'taste'. A given shared cultural concept of taste and preference does not determine an individuals' programs of taste and preference, because of subjective interpretation and modification. Nor does any particular individual's program of taste and preference determine the shared cultural concept of taste and preference; because, that shared cultural concept is cultivated over time. This cultivation occurs as a culture accumulates more examples and models of roles brought into the physical world as enactments and plays of cultural roles– as individual's unique enunciative modifications, which form the library of exposure which is utilized by a culture when formulating its cultural role-concepts.

Certain examples or models of cultural roles might appear to become more popular, preferred, desirable or 'tasteful' to a culture at different points in its evolution, for different reasons, at different times. The same possibility for epistemic breaks exists within an individual's own tastes and preferences at different points of the course of their own lives. If there are different cultural role-concepts for the same cultural role, different cultural role-concepts also may gain and wane in popularity amongst members of a culture based on what is deemed either needed or necessary at different points.

Just as an individual's preference for certain role-concepts might also undergo changes as new needs make different cultural roles, cultural role-concepts, or plays of cultural roles either requisite or more desirable in one's everyday decision-making processes. The indeterminacy of a discursive form of knowledge makes it such that both a culture's and an individual member of that culture's programs of taste and preference can change over time. Which is as much as to say that the needs and desires of both collective cultures and individuals change over time. These modifications of programs of taste and preference not only have an influential relationship with the shared content of cultural role-concepts, but also with what those concepts come to mean for cultures and individuals as the extent and context of their needs change.

Chapter Seven: The Influence of Desirability

In this chapter, we will come to understand the influence of desirability— how taste and preference are not only a discursive form of knowing in their own right, but to also understand how taste influences cultural paradigms— how the influence of desirability modifies both enunciative plateaus of cultural paradigms discursive dialogue.

One of my primary premises was the assumption that our cultural existences require us to play cultural roles as a part of our everyday lives. As I argued in Part I, it is because of this requirement that we form cultural role-concepts, cultural paradigms, in order to facilitate our playing of cultural roles. In Chapter Six I added to that by stating that our need to play certain cultural roles, in certain ways, changes as a result of our cultural needs changing. These changes in cultural needs modify our desire (preference) for certain outcomes in which we believe certain role-concepts are more, or less, likely to achieve than others.

In this way, tastes and preferences function as a modifying force of influence for the enunciative plateaus of the larger discursive dialogue of cultural paradigms— between knowledge and being. Taste and preference, understood as desirability, influences how we interpret cultural role-concepts and enact plays of cultural roles as they become available for exposure or required to become enacted at different times in the evolution of a culture's cultivation.

Interpretative Enunciation, Taste Preference and Bias

There are, at least, three forms of interpretation which occur for cultural paradigms. The first, the interpretation of a direct firsthand presentation of being into personal conceptual knowledge. The second, the interpretation of an indirect secondhand representation of being through an artistic medium into a personal conceptual knowledge. The third, the interpretation of a statement pertaining to a shared cultural-role concept into personal conceptual knowledge. Each of these forms of interpretation are influenced by one's bias as they culminate into one's program of truth.

The exposure ratio of the first form of interpretation, is limited by one's perception of the presentation of being from which the personal knowledge is gathered as a firsthand experience or observation. The experience of a presentation of being as it enters the world of ideas is interpreted

by an individual. What they pay attention to as they interpret this experience is a matter of their bias, and their bias focuses their attention according to their tastes and preferences.

The second form of interpretation models the first. This form of interpretation deals with one's experience of a presentation of being from a secondhand transmission of the experience of being. The first form of interpretation is linked to this form, in that observing an individual's play of a role on the stage of life is a model form of what the artistic representations of such a play of a role intends to be. Whether through oral/ textual storytelling or other forms of artistic medium, representations of examples and models of cultural roles are interpreted by way of own's own personal bias into what an individual retains in their programs of truth as personal conceptualizations of representations of the enactment of cultural roles. The exposure ratio of these secondhand experiences is influenced by the content that is available for a cultural community to be exposed to. Whatever one is exposed to is ultimately uniquely interpreted and modified by each subjective individual into what it comes to mean for them; or, what they believe that presentation, or representation to mean—into their program of truth.

There is also the possibility that a cultural role-concept can be interpreted without it relating directly to a presentation of a model or an example of the role in action. There can be statements which pertain to cultural role-concepts without needing to provide a model or an example of the role. Real world presentations of being (as in the first form of interpretation) and secondhand representations of being (as in the second form of interpretation) both culminate in cultural role-concepts. Which can be transmitted without being directly linked to an example or model of the role in action. If we are exposed to a concept of a role without being provided an example of that role as an exposition of it, we can still interpret the shared cultural role-concept, or a statement pertaining to that cultural concept into our own personal understanding of the shared cultural role-concept. Once more in this instance, that which we retain from our experience of a cultural role-concept or a statement pertaining to a cultural role-concept will be filtered by the influence of our own personal subjective bias.

In this way, we can understand taste's influence upon interpretations as bias. This bias is something inextricably linked to the uniqueness of each subjective individual, in which their own unique history of experience and exposure leads them to have a unique program of taste and preference suited to meet their needs and desires, and their bias makes sure that their attention is

focused towards this end. One's unique program of taste and preference implies that when one formulates their programs of truth, they do so with bias in interpreting the presentations that they are exposed to— whether it occurs through a firsthand presentation of being, a secondhand representation of being, or the presentation of a statement of knowledge which they are interpreting into their own personal programs of truth. To answer Arditi's question more directly, an individual's own concept of 'self, society, of anything' is always formulated relative to the force of influence which is imposed by their own bias.

Enactive Enunciation, Taste, Preference and Style

Because of the plurality and variance established in Chapter Two, we have choice and options in how we play out the roles that our cultural existential conditions require us to play; to some extent we get to choose which role-concept we base our play of a cultural role upon, and we, consciously or not, make a choice as to how, our programs of truth are activated from the world of ideas into the physical world— how we modify our play of a role. These choices, though they are considered a form of freedom we have as individuals amidst our cultural existential conditions, are guided by the influence of our personal programs of preference and taste. Individual preferences, from a myriad of different contextual and relative individual needs and desires, assert their influence as 'style' upon the enactive ontological enunciations of the discursive dialogue between knowledge and being. It is because one either desires, or does not desire, something that they modify their style of enactment or play of a cultural role.

These modifications occur as the result of the influence of taste and preference upon the ontologically enunciative aspect of cultural paradigms discursive dialogue between knowledge and being; which can be manifested through either an individual's play of a role upon the stage of life, or an artist's creation of a representation of a play of a cultural role through an artistic medium. The style which an individual takes on in playing the role, the style of creation of a representation of the play of a role, or the style of play of a role carried out by an artistic representation of a play of a role, are all influenced by the individual playing, or creating the representation of someone playing the role's, unique individual program of taste and preference.

These presentations, as they make exposure possible, are ontological enunciations. They once made available for exposure create the possibility of epistemological enunciations. Being influences the possibility of knowledge, which influences the possibilities of being, and so on in a

continuous discursive dialogue. Although there exists a shared cultural knowledge of role-concepts, comprised of examples and models of a cultural role in play which exist, each individual interprets that knowledge into their own program of truth with a bias. An individual's tastes and preferences become once more influential when an individual takes that knowledge and manifests it into being, through the enactment or play of a cultural role— through the style in which they play that cultural role. Those enactments or plays of cultural roles are also modeled through artistic mediums which create representations of ontological enunciations. Each presentation and representation, as ontological enunciations, are influenced by the sense of style which is the result of one's personal programs of taste and preference.

These two discursive forces of influence, bias and style, impact the two enunciative aspects of the discursive dialogue of mutual influence between knowledge and being which cultural paradigms involve. It is ultimately the indeterminacy of subjectivity, which is responsible for holding bias and enacting style as functions of one's own program of truth that influences modifications of cultural paradigms. Modifications, that arise through the breaks and discontinuities which occur in the discursive processes between knowledge and being, and, collective culture and a culture's individual members.

Part III Conclusion

We are now prepared to understand a much more developed answer to Arditi's question. We can hold concepts which are so different from one another because we cultivate our programs of truth in unique ways.

These ways are unique because the influence of desire, in which our subjective concepts of taste and preference, as bias, prime us towards focusing upon certain aspects of our experience of exposure. The force which our needs and desires exert upon our programs of truth influences how we uniquely formulate our own conceptual knowledge based off our own intimate and personal experience of being; or likewise, off our or exposure to a secondhand account of being. And we cultivate our own sense of style in playing cultural roles. That style is influenced by our personal programs of preference and taste as well. Both our bias and our style are possible because of the indeterminate nature of cultural paradigms. Without this indeterminacy, there would be no room for variance and cultural paradigms could not participate in a discursive dialogue leaving them open ended with plenty of room for breaks and discontinuities.

Conclusion

What are cultural paradigms? Cultural paradigms are essentially at base cultural role-concepts, which are learned through either firsthand or secondhand exposure to examples and models of cultural roles. There is a potential plurality of role-concepts, examples and models of roles. There is not only cross- but also intracultural variance of these cultural role-concepts, because these cultural role-concepts are ultimately modified by each individual's understanding of a cultural role-concept. Each individual's understanding of a shared cultural role-concept is based on their interpretation of their exposure to cultural role-concepts. These conceptual interpretations become one's unique program of truth— a personal understanding of the cultural paradigm or cultural role-concept. Individuals can run off different programs of truth at different times in their life, and one individual's program of truth is bound to vary at least slightly from other members of their culture's unique programs of truth.

What makes cultural paradigms an indeterminate form of knowledge? For cultural paradigms, knowledge and being do not strictly determine one another, rather they operate in process fitting of a discursive form of knowledge. This kind of discursive process is a dialogue. A dialogue in which, being informs knowledge and knowledge informs being through a discursive process in which they continuously hold a mutual influence upon each other. This discursive mutual influence does not have an end but is always in a state of dialogue and conceptual evolution—cultivation of concepts. Because this type of knowledge is indeterminate, there is freedom amidst the choices of different models or examples that suggest approaches to playing any given cultural role, and *vice versa*. As the result of the indeterminacy of subjective variance of any given culture's individual members, our cultural paradigms are a discursive form of knowledge in which being influences knowledge and that knowledge influences being in a continual discursive process.

How does taste influence cultural paradigms? The consideration of cultural roles arises from a cultural need to play roles. The need to play a cultural role, combined with the availability of multiple possible cultural roles on an indeterminate field makes room for the influence of desire—which results in personal bias in interpretations and individual style in enactments of cultural roles as a subjectively individuated function of personal programs of taste and preference. Individual's pick the program of truth that they believe will offer them the most desirable results.

Ultimately, in a mutually influential discursive form of conceptual knowledge, such as cultural paradigms, enactments of models of cultural roles opens up a potential for other individuals to be exposed to a unique play of a cultural role. Whether this occurs through first or secondhand exposure, an ontological enunciation itself becomes an example and model of that cultural role in action.

Both bias and style are possible because of the indeterminacy of cultural paradigms. If cultural paradigms were determinate, there would be no variance in programs of truth. Instead the indeterminacy of cultural paradigms makes room for epistemic breaks in both the interpretive and enactive enunciations of cultural paradigms. The variance which accompanies such an indeterminate form of knowledge grants individual's freedom to modify both knowledge and being through participation in the discursive processes by which cultural paradigms are cultivated.

If it were that we had to argue that anything in this discussion of cultural paradigms is determinate, it would be an individual's program of truth, including their program of preference and taste which, with adjustments for the relative context of the situation at hand, determines one's enactment or play of a cultural role. Because the shared cultural concepts themselves are unfixed, individuals have the obligation of choice and a corresponding freedom to enact cultural roles according to their own individual sense of style. A sense of style which moreover is governed by one's own program of truth, that it is influenced by, but not determined by, the cultural paradigms which one is exposed to in their own enculturation and self-development as an individual member of any given culture.

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