Incompatible foes? Political participation and development goals in developmental states

A case study on the relationship between political participation and developmental state characteristics in Botswana

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Table of contents

Chapter 1. Introduction and method

In the second half of the twentieth century some developing states have experienced an enormous economic growth comparable to, or exceeding that of higher income countries. These states include several states from East Asia as well as Africa, such as South Korea, Singapore, Mauritius and Botswana, showing an average annual growth rate of over 4% from 1954 to 1997 (Leftwich, 2000, p.154). What distinguishes these developmental states from others is an important question and has many possible answers. However what seems typical of these developmental states is that the structures are often undemocratic, leading to an autonomous state that is able to implement development policy without intervention from its people (Leftwich, 2000, p.165). In this sense, political participation is suggested to be undesirable in attaining development goals. Yet, some developmental states do have a democratic state structure, which evokes the question whether in some cases political participation might be beneficial for development. The current study therefore aims to examine to what extent political participation influences the capacity of the developmental state to attain development goals by conducting a case study of a democratic state: Botswana.

First, before analyzing the situation in Botswana, literature on developmental states and political participation will be discussed. Then, the economic development and the extent of political participation in Botswana during the time of its highest economic growth from its independence in 1966 to 1990 will be described. The next chapter relates the political participation in Botswana to the six characteristics of developmental states as described by Leftwich (2000, p.160). These include: the forming of a determined developmental elite, the relative autonomy of the state, a powerful bureaucracy, a weak civil society, the effective management of non-state economic interest and the legitimacy of the state in combination with weak human rights. The final chapter will cover a final analysis and conclusion.

Method

In the current research the method of case study will be used, consisting of a deep, qualitative investigation of one example of a phenomenon. In this case the example is the developmental state Botswana, of which the democratic state structure suggests a certain degree of political participation. The phenomenon of political participation will be evaluated in the specific context of this state, taking into account the six core characteristics of a developmental state described by Leftwich (2000, p.160).

By examining the influence of political participation on the developmental state characteristics, the study will either strengthen or weaken Leftwich' theory on developmental states. Implicit in his model is the suggestion that political participation is not beneficial for development in a developmental state. Hence, Leftwich' model will be weakened if political participation has positively influenced Leftwich' six characteristics in Botswana. This may be the case when political participation creates support for government, so that policy will be implemented more effectively. Leftwich' theory will be

strengthened if political participation has negatively influenced these characteristics. However, the researcher should be careful with generalizing the results of a case study as the variables are considered in the specific context of one state. Contribution to Leftwich' developmental states theory is relevant considering the global phenomenon of developmental states, and for policy purposes to add knowledge to what factors cause states to develop better or worse.

A developmental state is operationalized as a state that has had a strong economic growth in a short amount of time, usually twenty to thirty years. At the end of this growth the economy has caught up with that of the western developed states. Economic growth will be evaluated in this study by assessing Botswana's annual GDP growth rate from 1965 to 1990.

Political participation is operationalized as activities that private citizens conduct in order to influence government selection and decisions (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1971, p.13). These activities may differ in kind, intensity and effect, and include any political behavior, ranging from voting in an election to actually working for a political party (Kalaycioglu & Turan, 1981, p.124). Persson and Solevid (2014) include contact with politicians, civil servants and mass media, participating in action groups, signing petitions, demonstrating, boycotting or raising money as political activities (Persson & Solevid, 2014, p.100). In order to thoroughly investigate the effects of political participation on the core characteristics of the developmental state, the current research will focus on a broad range of political activities in which people attempt to influence government policy,

It is useful to emphasize that political participation differs in form as well as intensity and that the consequence of these different types of political behavior may vary. For example, autonomous and critical participation is a very different behavior than controlled participation, and may differ in effect (Pretty, 1995, p.1252). Whereas autonomous participation could result in actual influence, controlled participation might be less influential. Therefore, the aim of this research is not to determine a definite 'yes or no' answer as to whether political participation is beneficial for development, but rather to explore in what way different forms of political participation influence the developmental state.

Chapter 2. Theoretical framework

Leftwich' developmental state

The current research will use Leftwich' theory on developmental states as an explanatory model. Leftwich (2000, p.108) argues that the notion of good governance as currently used is not a determining factor in the degree of development. Rather, the capacity of the state to sustain and protect development is essential. This certain type of state is named the developmental state. Fritz and Menocal (2007, p.531) also point out the importance of the developmental state in development. Because states failed to deliver results when they received financial aid from donors, the international debate has shifted from what is the right role of the state, to the commitment and capacity of states. The main question therefore is, how the functioning of the state can influence development.

The role of democracy in development

Whilst much of the international aid has focused on good governance, specifically on democratic governance, Leftwich argues that the early introduction of democracy may actually hinder development in the first stages. Indeed, the first steps to development consist of radical implementation of policies that enhance economic growth. Democratic procedures could then slow down government effectiveness in making decisions and providing directions. The priority needs to be investing in economic growth, instead of investing in e.g. welfare systems, which is often favoured by democratic systems (Leftwich, 2000, p.131). Similarly, Fritz and Menocal (2007, p.537) argue that democratic governance and development are not an ideal combination. Development requires leadership that prioritizes development above short-term goals. It is aimed at state capacity and achieving outcomes, whilst democratic governance is aimed at rules and processes in institutions. This tension between development and democratic governance leads the authors to conclude that democracy is no favourable characteristic for developmental states.

On the other hand, Leftwich shows that there are arguments that favour the compatibility of democracy and development. In those arguments it is often assumed that a slightly lower rate of growth is an acceptable offer for a democratic state with civil liberties and sufficient human rights (Leftwich, 2000, p.131). While Leftwich admits that development may indeed occur in democratic states, he insists that it is not the regime type that is the determining factor. Rather, the interaction between democratic politics and economic liberalism is (Leftwich, 2000, p.134). Though it is possible to establish democracy in almost any state, it is much harder to consolidate it. Many states cannot meet the conditions of democratic survival, including legitimacy and adherence to rules (Leftwich, 2000, p.136). They lack broader characteristics that are needed for this, such as a functioning economy and moderate or declining income inequalities. Therefore, non-democratic measures may be essential in these stages

of development in which conditions for consolidating democracy cannot yet be met (Leftwich, 2000, p.149).

Capacity of the state instead of regime type

Leftwich emphasizes his argument that the capacity of the state is determining for the outcome of development by describing different types of developmental states. Leftwich differentiates between developmental democratic and non-developmental democratic states (Leftwich, 2000, p.172). While the developmental democratic states have adhered to limited democratic governance, they have performed well in development. These states include Singapore, Malaysia and Mauritius. The non-developmental democratic states on the other hand, have had less development. These states include Venezuela and Costa Rica. The capacity of the state could explain the difference in success, as most features of developmental states are found in the non-democratic variant. Thus, whether it is possible that democracy consolidates very much depends on the properties of the state (Leftwich, 2000, p.190). Fritz and Menocal (2007, p.536) also acknowledge that sometimes, democratisation and an increase in developmental orientation occur simultaneously, as it did in Botswana.

Thus, Leftwich does not agree with democratic governance as a prerequisite of development. Rather, democratic processes may hinder development. Democratic and non-democratic states have developed well, excluding the possibility that regime type is the determining factor of development. Rather, the ability of the state to carry development, is determining (Leftwich, 2000, p.153). States that have this ability are developmental states. However, the question arises how different aspects of democracy affect the capacity of the developmental state.

Political participation in the developmental state

Leftwich (2000) defines developmental states as those whose politics have the capacity to achieve development. They have to be capable of organizing and promoting economic growth (Leftwich, 2000, p.155). An important factor in these governments is that the political and bureaucratic elites are relatively autonomous from socio-political forces in society. This way, they are able to implement economic policies faster and with less consensus needed (Leftwich, 2000, p.168). Thus, in this transitional form of the state, there seems to be little room for political participation.

Leftwich describes a weak civil society and relative autonomy of the state as important conditions of the emergence of a developmental state (Leftwich, 2000, p.165). Implicit in his argument therefore, is the suggestion that political participation is not a suitable characteristic. Other authors also doubt the compatibility of democracy and development (Fritz & Menocal, 2007; Gridle, 2004). As the literature shows consensus on the possible negative effect of democratic governance on development, this research aims to explore how this effect works in practice by conducting a case study of a developmental state in which political participation is possible.

Forms of political participation

As described in the method section, many quantitative researchers operationalize political participation by creating exhaustive list of specific political behaviors, such as voting, signing petitions, demonstrating or working for a political party. As this research is qualitative, it will focus on a broad range of political activities in which citizens attempt to influence politics. This broad perspective is necessary in exploring the dynamic relationship between development and political participation.

Different forms of political participation are discussed in the literature. Arnstein (1969) describes a ladder-patterned typology of citizen participation, ranging from less citizen power to more citizen power. The ladder consists of eight types of participation, starting on the bottom with 'manipulation', followed by 'therapy', 'informing', 'consultation', 'placation', 'partnership', 'delegated power' and on top of the ladder: 'citizen control' (Arnstein, 1969, p.217). 'Manipulation' and 'therapy' are described as types of participation that only pretend to include citizens while actually affecting them. The next three steps, 'informing', 'consultation' and 'placation' do not provide enough power to citizens to assure change but do create possibilities for them to be heard. The final three forms of citizen participation; 'partnership', 'delegated power' and 'citizen control' do enable them to actually influence decision-making (Arnstein, 1969, p.217). Arnstein's typology clarifies that different types of political participation vary in their effect on the status quo.

Choguill (1996) proposes an alternative classification of participation in the context of local community projects. Her ladder consists of steps that vary in the degree of government involvement in facilitating 'community mutual-help projects' which often consist of building infrastructure and houses (Choguill, 1996, p.431). In the bottom forms of political participation, there is no government support at all. 'Self-management' leaves community members to execute the projects together with NGOs or other independent institutions. The upper step of Choguill's ladder is 'empowerment', in which community members possess the majority of seats in 'genuine decision-making bodies' (Choguill, 1996, p.435). Choguill's typology confirms the finding that different forms of political participation vary in their effect.

Further, Pretty (1995) describes a typology ranging from e.g. 'manipulative' and 'passive', participation to 'functional' and 'interactive' participation and ultimately 'self-mobilization'. The less intense form of 'manipulative participation' consists of participation in powerless official boards, whereas the most intense form of 'self-mobilization' has people initiate change in systems, independently from external institutions (Pretty, 1995, p.1252). White (1996) describes four forms of political participation that may be useful in different stages of a certain process; 'nominal', 'instrumental', 'representative' and 'transformative' participation (White, 1996, p.7-9).

Cornwall (2008) suggests that most typologies do not specify who participates. A useful model to assess who participates comes from Farrington and Bebbington (1993), who evaluate participation in depth and breadth. 'Deep' participation consist of participation in all stages of a process but this may be done by only a small group of people, which makes the process 'narrow' as well. The other way around,

participation may be 'broad', including nearly all citizens but at the same time remain 'shallow' (Farrington & Bebbington, 1993, as cited by Cornwall, 2008, p.276). This distinction of depth and breadth in addition to form and intensity may be useful when assessing political participation in Botswana.

Chapter 3. Botswana's economic development and political participation

Botswana's economic development

At the point of Botswana's independence in 1966, it was one of the poorest countries in the world. The reason for its underdeveloped position was mainly the neglect of the British colonizers. They colonized the country by request of Khama III of the Bamagwato who sought protection from external threats (Du Toit, 2005, p.197). Botswana became the Bechuanaland Protectorate, keeping its traditional authority structures of eight Tswana chiefs. Several factors kept the British colonizers from investing resources in their colony, which they governed via indirect rule. Bechuanaland was living off the rural cattle industry, which did not bring much income to the country's economy (Du Toit, 2005, p.196). Around 90 per cent of the population was living in extreme poverty at the time (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.160). There were only 25 kilometers of tarred roads, eight secondary schools and a GNP per capita of 14.18 US dollar (Du Toit, 2005, p.197).

Little did the British colonizers know that Botswana was an enormous source for diamonds and other minerals, which was discovered after its independence. This industry created large revenues for the government, forming 60 per cent of the national income in 1990 (Thomson, 2002, p.92). Other incomes came from the export of meat and income tax from the cattle industry. Botswana started to develop economically at a fast pace. From 1965 to 1980, the GDP growth was 13.9 per cent per year. From 1980 to 1990 this number was 11.3 per cent (Du Toit, 2005, p.197). The GNP per capita was less than 100 US dollars at the point of independence, exceeding 3000 US dollars in the 1990's (Thomson, 2000, p.92). In three decades Botswana had achieved one of the highest rates of economic growth in developing countries, resulting in a World Bank classification as a middle income country (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.160).

Botswana's state structure

Since its independence Botswana has been described as an electoral democracy in its constitution and throughout the literature. The first multi-party election was held in 1965 and has been repeated every five years since then. The political situation has been stable ever since (Thomson, 2000, p.92). According to its constitution Botswana is as parliamentary republic. It consists of an executive presidency, a National Assembly and the House of Chiefs. The president is the head of state and head of government and is chosen by the members of the National Assembly (Bauer & Taylor, 2005, p.88-89). The members of parliament are elected to five-year terms using the first-past-the-post electoral system. The cabinet is appointed by the president without consultation of the parliament (Bauer & Taylor, 2005, p.93). The unelected House of Chiefs is another legislative body that mainly advises the government on traditional issues (Bauer & Taylor, 2005, p.88). However the National Assembly often ignores the

advice of the House of Chiefs, therefore functioning mainly as a medium between rural society and the central legislature (Bauer & Taylor, 2005, p.96).

At the local level the Councils in the rural districts and in the urban towns are elected simultaneously with the central government every five years. The District Councils are tightly controlled and supervised by the central government (Noppen, 1982, p.15). The members of other local bodies are not elected and the main areas of their governance are local issues including primary education, collection of local taxes and licencing fees, public roads and supervision of local markets (Bauer & Taylor, 2005, p. 95).

The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has won all of the multi-party elections (Thomson, 2000, p.246), though the party has been challenged by three competitors: the Botswana National Front, the Botswana People's Party and the Botswana Independence Party (Bauer & Taylor, 2005, p.96).

Political participation in Botswana from 1965 to 1990

Although Botswana is often described as a democracy; it is not regarded as a liberal democracy. Several practices and laws are not necessarily democratic. For example, the constitution provides the president with unlimited power, authorizing him to make decisions without input (Cook & Sarkin, 2010, p.474). Further, a number of unelected representatives are operating at the local level. Yet, Freedom House (2016, p.20) described Botswana as a free state, receiving good scores on political rights and civil liberties. The freedom of the press status however, was 'partly free'. The Democracy Index from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2015, p.16) assigned an overall score of 7.87 to Botswana on a scale of 1 to 10. However, Botswana received a significantly higher score on the electoral process (9.17) than on political participation (6.11), leading to categorization as a 'flawed democracy'. These types of democracies have free and fair elections but are not yet fully developed democracies, often lacking political participation and a strong political culture (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015, p.45). In the following section several forms of political participation from 1965 to 1990 are discussed.

Political awareness and culture

The basis for political participation is to know one's rights to participate and a willingness to do so. Both of these seemed to lack in Botswana society. In an opinion poll conducted in the 1980's only 47 per cent stated that they found multi-party democracy essential, indicating that not all Batswana were convinced that the public should have a say in who will rule the country. It seemed that the majority of Batswana accepted the political elite to rule in their name (Thomson, 2000, p.229). People seemed to take the government for granted without interest in change (Van Binsbergen, 1995, p.23). This accepting attitude may stem from cultural grounds. In Botswana society public opposition to the ruling party was not appreciated as it was seen as an aggressive, confrontational style of political activism (Cook & Sarkin, 2010, p.477).

Further, constitutional knowledge was considerable in educated and middle-class circles but not among the general public. In a survey conducted by Parson (1977, p.643) it appeared that the Batswana had restricted knowledge of their government. Only 29.5 per cent had noticed the Accelerated Rural Development Program though there had been much attention for this policy in the media. Further, only 63 per cent of the voters had actually registered while 85 per cent expressed the intention to vote. Thus, a number of people did not know that they had to register in order to vote.

Voting in national and local elections

People in Botswana could vote for the National Assembly in the general elections on national level and for the elections of the District Council on local level. The members of parliament were elected to five-year terms using the first-past-the-post electoral system. However, voter's turnout appeared to be quite low. In the first elections of 1965 the voter turnout was 75 per cent, decreasing to 54-59 per cent in 1969. In 1994. 63.6 per cent of the respondents reported that they registered as voters while only 32 per cent of the registered voters actually voted. In the local government elections of 1969 around 53000 voted, decreasing to approximately 43000 in 1974 (Parson, 1977, p.642). Interestingly, in a survey from 1989 conducted by Van Binsbergen (1995, p.26) only 43 per cent of the respondents claimed to support the BDP. Though in the elections of the same year, the BDP claimed seven of the 11 wards in Francistown.

Direct forms of participation

Additional political participation appeared to some extent on the local level. From 1976 a system of district planning was set up in Botswana, based on consultation with the people. The national government had since its independence made five-year National Development Plans (NDP) outlining the development goals of the coming five years. When creating the third NDP the central government requested the District Councils to set up a system of bottom-up planning to create the District Development Plan with the locals involved (Noppen, 1982, p.43). The methods for consultations were different for each district, varying from Kgotla tours to District Development Conferences (Noppen, 1982, p.45). However, the people involved in these activities were participating significantly in the political process. Not only were they asked what they desire for their village but they also discussed with district officials how the information from previous consultations had been used (Noppen, 1982, p.48).

Yet, Noppen (1982, p.129) argues that the participation of the rural majority in these consultation and planning processes was limited because they were not involved in the Kgotla or other local bodies. The main participants in these institutions were the village elites. The community members with most strength and with the more formal education were mostly living outside of the village for employment purposes, resulting in minor participation in the Kgotla. As women were usually not heard either, the Kgotla mainly consisted of older men. Hence, the Kgotla was a highly legitimate but very

unrepresentative body of decision-making (Noppen, 1982, p.130-133). Apparently, participating in decision-making for the District Development Plans and any other policy was a political activity for the elites only, even when it took place at the village level (Noppen, 1982, p.146).

Similarly, Van Binsbergen (1995) argued that the Kgotla model was merely a symbolic manipulation from the elites towards the people. Kgotla stands for consultation between equals and values as sociability, respect, inclusiveness, which Batswana deem very important (Van Binsbergen, 1995, p.22; Holm, 1987, p.24). The government used a discourse of Kgotla consultation to achieve trust in people, for example in meetings between the ruling party and party rivals (Van Binsbergen, 1995, p.22). However, the Kgotla model only suggested cultural continuity, while the authorities could legitimize their position of power. Carbone (2005) confirms this analysis when he states that most people did not get the chance to join discussions in the Kgotla and that it was mainly used to 'mobilize consensus, to test public acceptance of issues already discussed by the elites, to disseminate information about government programs.' (Carbone, 2005, p.173). Thus, direct participation at the village level seemed to be symbolic rather than authentic and mainly a political activity for the elites.

Membership of political parties

Not everybody in Botswana was allowed to run for political office. First of all, government employees were not allowed to. This group included teachers and civil servants, who represented two-thirds of all people in wage-labor. Thus, most people who could afford to run for office and who were most informed on government policy were forbidden to do so, or had to bear double costs of losing their livelihood by resigning from government. In addition, chiefs could not run for political office. Becoming a parliamentary member was even harder as only people that had completed primary school could run for office, which was only 18 per cent of the voting age population. Women were culturally excluded from this job, and considering that government workers were also excluded, this only left 10000 people eligible for political office in a population of 1 million (Holm, 1987, p.23). For the rural majority it was impossible to join or be active in political parties as none of the parties operated with a grass-roots village organization (Noppen, 1982, p.129). The state seemed to have a paternalistic attitude in preventing the uneducated masses to participate politically (Holm, 1987, p.23).

Membership of interest groups

Batswana are interested in their immediate social environment, and seek to structure it through organization and participation, which led voluntary associations to be a dominant feature of social life, especially independent churches and sport associations (Van Binsbergen, 1995, p.22). However there seemed to be little room for politically motivated associations.

Some civil society groups were active in Botswana. There were three types of organizations: those that promote the welfare of the population or the welfare of its members, such as community-based organizations or churches, groups that advocate for certain goals, like trade unions and women's

groups and issue groups, such as the environmental group that emerged when the government planned to dredge the Okavango (Carbone, 2005, p.172). However, the organizations were barely funded by government, the funding was not coordinated and was dependent on the activity of the organization. It was especially hard for organizations that deal with human rights issues and democratic governance; they did not receive any funding from the government (Carbone, 2005, p.175). The Trade Unions and Employers Act had restricted groups to unionize, posing rules as to who could join a union and allowing the Minister of Home Affairs to send a representative to union meetings (Malila, 1997, p.23). Strikes were prohibited in Botswana, which means that there had never been a legal strike (Cook & Sarkin, 2010, p.487). This is a natural consequence of the restrictions imposed by the state to unionize. Thus, participation in interest groups was greatly discouraged by the Botswana government. This way, the government could easily manage how these organizations operated.

Public political discussion

Public political discussion was possible to a limited extent in the freedom squares, public places open for meetings of a political nature to all participants. However, uniformed policemen attended the meetings and taped every word that was said there. There were no political prisoners in Botswana, though people could be taken for questioning (Van Binsbergen, 1995, p.23). This was especially dangerous for opposition members, because once in a while, the BDP tended to prosecute a member of opposition for harmful statements (Holm, 1987, p.23).

Political discussion the media was also discouraged by the Botswana state. Between 1960s and 1980s there was only one newspaper, controlled by the government (Carbone, 2005, p.173; Van Binsbergen, 1995, p.23). Later, privately owned newspapers and magazines had emerged although the ruling party constantly tried to limit their freedom. The government has threatened those that criticize it (Carbone, 2005, p.173). As for the state-owned media, it rarely criticized the government. The Office of the President had direct control over the Daily News and public officials were forbidden to talk to the press. There was no freedom of information legislation and the public did not have access to government documents. The government has been known to intervene and censor the media when it covers sensitive topics (Cook & Sarkin, 2010, p.478). Thus, there was no possibility for free public discussion in newspapers. Additionally, Setswana and English were the dominating languages in the media, excluding per definition 20 per cent of the population from political public discussion.

Conclusion

Arnstein (1969) argued that all forms of political participation differ in their effect on the status quo. Taking in consideration her ladder of participation, the Kgotla model seems to be a symbolic type of political participation that only pretends to include citizens but is actually used to affect them. Even the direct consultation when it comes to certain policies seems to only create possibilities for citizens to be heard, but do not give them enough power to assure change. Higher forms of political participation like

partnership, delegated power and citizen control, are not found in Botswana. There were forms of electoral political participation as people had the possibility to vote for the national and local elections though many representatives were not elected. There was limited political awareness among the people, membership of political parties and of interest groups are greatly discouraged, as well as political discussion in public or in the media.

In terms of Cornwall (2008) the political participation in Botswana seemed to be deep (participation in creating policy as well as implementation) but rather shallow (only small elite group is allowed to truly participate). According to Carbone (2005), the less intense forms of political participation in Botswana may be explained by the passivity of the people. As a consequence of the impressive economic and social development achievements of the state, citizens had high expectations from the state as their provider. An overwhelming majority of Batswana were not members of any association, providing no basis for mobilizing people (Carbone, 2005, p.174). Noppen (1982, as cited in Malila, 1997, p.24) similarly suggested that the state has fostered passive attitudes in the population by delivering social services. This could be interpreted as patronage from the government in order to gain legitimacy for their strict development policies.

All in all, it seems that Botswana from 1965 to 1990 has known mainly electoral and symbolic forms of political participation. Although most people were eligible to vote in national elections, the symbolic forms of political participation were mainly accessible for the elites. A political culture seemed to be nearly absent, which could be the result of paternalistic measures from the government. In the next section, the influence of these forms of political participation on Leftwich's six characteristics of the developmental state will be assessed.

Chapter 4. Political participation in Botswana related to Leftwich' six characteristics of the developmental state

Dedicated developmental elite

The first of Leftwich' characteristics of the developmental state that are contributing to successful development is that the state consists of a relatively uncorrupt, determined developmental elite (Leftwich, 2000, p.160). Indeed, right after its independence, Botswana's elite started creating National Development Plans (NDPs), five-year schedules of development programs, defining priorities, targets and policies. The government has always stuck to this plan, committing to development. Hence, there has been a clear centralized tradition of development planning (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.172).

The ruling elite in Botswana used to be the cattle-owning class. They traditionally relied on their cattle as the basis of their power as this was the main economic asset (Thomson, 2000, p.92). The surplus created by their cattle provided them with relative wealth, securing their societal position as the ruling class. As the British used indirect colonial rule when governing Bechuanaland, they let the local authorities be the executives of government. Naturally, this class gained power after decolonization, mainly because of their wealth and their contribution to the nationalist movement (Thomson, 2000, p.93). The head of this nationalist movement, Sir Seretse Khama, later became the first president of Botswana. His strength was his connection to the different elites at that time. After his studies in South-Africa and Oxford University, he could relate to the European society and the colonial bureaucrats. However he also had strong links with traditional society, being a hereditary chief of the Bamangwato (Thomson, 2000, p.93). Also, the rural population and the white and black commercial cattle farmers sided with him, forming a coalition of interest (Du Toit, 2005, p.169; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.166). In the first elections of 1965, Sir Seretse Khama and his party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), won 28 of the 31 seats with 80.4 per cent of the votes. Their view was rather non-ideological and technocratic, emphasizing fiscal and growth policies and limited welfare distribution (Du Toit, 2005, p.215). Though multiple interests were brought together in government, at least 27 of the 42 members from the first three parliaments were cattle-owning class. As their income depended on the cattle sector rather than their position in the state, the goal of developing the economy was the strongest priority. Creating a strong state was compatible to their political interests (Eriksen, 2012, p.217).

When assessing the impact of electoral political participation on the formation of a developmental elite in Botswana, it seems that it has had some influence. The emergence of the ruling elite was mainly the consequence of the ruling party's strategy of forming a coalition of interests. However, the voting in national elections had secured and legitimized the BDP's position of single-party ruler. Without the national elections in 1965, in which the BDP won with such overwhelming majority, they might not have had the legitimacy to rule on behalf of all people of a newly independent state. This electoral form of political participation thus influenced the legitimacy of the ruling elite,

providing them with the *ability* to implement development policies. However the fact that the elite was determined to develop economically, may have had more to do with the fact that he elites were mainly cattle-owning class, who wanted to secure their income. In this sense, electoral political participation had not influenced the elite's *motivation* to develop.

Autonomy of the state

According to Leftwich, a developmental state and its institutions have relative autonomy, operating independently from the demands of special interest groups. The state has the capacity to override others' interests and regularly does so (Leftwich, 2000, p.161). Other actors serve mainly to implement developmental policies, and these actors are usually found in the private sector. Often, there is dominance of a single party (Leftwich, 2000, p.162). Indeed, Leftwich described the continuous victories of the BDP in Botswana, arguing that it can act according to its will. His statement is based on a major scandal in 1991 and 1993, in which the government was criticized on their preferential treatment of the cattle-owning class, and their military expenditures. After the critique, the preferential treatment continued (Leftwich, 2000, p.200).

It seems that indeed, the state sought to keep its autonomy from other interests. A centralizing tendency was observed, in which the central government strictly controlled the local authorities on their development. From 1979 onwards, it decided on the employment of the local staff at the Unified Local Government Service (ULGS) (Tordoff, 2002, p.161). State cooperation with the private sector in Botswana was observed as well. After its independence, multinational companies operated the state's mining industry on the state's terms. According to Tordoff (2002, p.278), this state control strengthened the desire to maintain the existing system of government.

There have been cases however, in which the Botswana government was sensitive to the needs of their people, and reformed some policies in order to please them. In the Masire period, from 1980 to 1998, the government implemented some reforms that the opposition demanded. In 1994, the state established an independent electoral body, the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18, the term of office for the president was limited to two periods of five years and there was legal reform in the areas of gender and labor. In this case, the state was not so autonomous in deciding its policy, though the reforms may be interpreted as a consequence of the party's weaker performance in the 1994 elections, in order to win back popular vote and seats (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.168).

In Botswana, it seemed that indeed the state operated quite autonomously from other interests. However political participation may have been beneficial for this autonomous position. Voting in elections creates trust in government, which makes it legitimate. This is a comfortable position for the government to act autonomously. Yet, it seems that the Botswana state had found other ways of staying autonomous as well. The regime had the traditional leaders as their support group because they subordinated them in the House of Chiefs. They had the peasants on their side, because they were dependent on good relations with the cattle-owning classes that formed the majority of government.

There were no social groups that could form a strong opposition (Eriksen, 2012, p.272). Also, policies were implemented that benefited the rural poor, such as providing schools, clinics, water and roads, which strengthened their support.

Thus, when it comes to the relative autonomy of the state, the weak political culture has influenced this position. Because there was limited political awareness among Batswana, who seemed to accept the fact that an elite rules in their name, they did not oppose the centralizing tendencies of the government, which enhanced their autonomy from the local people. It seems to be the case that the ruling elite and their autonomy of society actually formed the less intense political culture, instead of the other way around. By creating distance between the central government and the people, there had been space for paternalistic measures such as the Kgotla discourse, which kept the people content with their cultural continuity instead of questioning the democratic level of the elite's rule. By imposing strict rules, people had no possibilities of ventilating their political interests through participation in political parties or interest groups, or through political discussion in public or in the media. Thus, by creating autonomy, the state had framed political participation to its own needs.

Bureaucracy

According to Leftwich, the determined elite and the autonomy of the state lead to a strong bureaucracy, which has enough power and the authority to manage the economic and social development (Leftwich, 2000, p.162). Indeed, the bureaucratic apparatus in Botswana expanded significantly after independence, with the task of running the increasing economy. There was a need for the ruling elites to cooperate with the European bureaucrats, as they covered the majority of the positions (Thomson, 2000, p.93). Gradually, the expatriate civil servants were replaced, while they kept involved in the bureaucracy for years (Bauer & Taylor, 2005, p.92). The bureaucracy was stable, meritocratic, and consisted of stable institutions (Du Toit, 2005, p.196). Further, corruption rates were relatively low in Botswana. In comparison to other African countries, there is less concentration of power with the leader and less provision of personal favors and misuse of state resources (Eriksen, 2012, p.267).

There is no clear influence of electoral or symbolic political participation in the formation of a strong bureaucracy. However the strong bureaucracy may have influenced the lack of political participation, as the state used the secure position of government jobs to keep people from running for political office. It was forbidden for government workers to run for political office, keeping the most policy-informed people from actually criticizing and changing it. Also, the bureaucracy was practically an extension of government. As two thirds of all wage earners work as government employees, their job security ensured their loyalty to government, providing them with little incentives to oppose it.

Civil society

Leftwich argues that the existence of strong civil society institutions is not possible during the emergence of a developmental state (Leftwich, 2000, p.164). He states that civil society in Botswana was negligible at the inception of the developmental state.

Indeed, civil society is described to have been historically absent in Botswana, only emerging slightly from the 1990s onwards. The government has always kept track of the growth of civil society, only allowing organizations that adhere to certain requirements. As a consequence, the civil society organizations that did exist mainly consisted of higher educated people rather than people from the rural areas. The interests of these people often overlapped with those of the government. Therefore, civil society may be described accurately as an extension of the bureaucracy rather than an independent group of people pressuring the government (Bauer & Taylor, 2005, p.99). This goes for the House of Chiefs too, sometimes considered a part of civil society as it is an advisory board of traditional leaders (Carbone, 2005, p.172). Yet, the Chiefs are often involved in implementation of state's policy, which makes them an executive body. As Taylor (2002, p.9, as cited in Eriksen, 2012, p.267) stated: 'the chiefs became agents of the government at the grass-root level'.

The level of civil society in any state strongly correlates with political participation, as civil society organizations often form the channel for political interests. Thus, as the Botswana state had taken measures to keep civil society from growing, this had influenced the weak political culture and the shallow political participation. The tight control of labor- and other organizations had secured the representation of only a small group of highly educated people, who often had similar interests to the government. The forming of civil society was also actively discouraged by the avoidance of political discussion in public life and the media. The other way around, the symbolic political participation at the Kgotla meetings also kept the civil society from developing. The meetings barely led to the mobilization of groups that could participate in civil society, as they were an (elite) individual activity within the community.

Management of non-state economic interests

Leftwich argues that developmental states are market-facilitating, in the sense that they are able to decide what happens to foreign and national capital, and that they are able to use this for their developmental goals (Leftwich, 2000, p.164).

Indeed, right after independence Botswana had been able to allocate its income to development goals. Even at this point, when the state's income was only formed by financial aid from the British government and the cattle industry, it was directly used in development goals. Resources were devoted to the social sector, building schools, health facilities and water provisions (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.164). After the emergence of democracy, foreign aid increased because of the low corruption numbers and Botswana's statements against racism (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.166). In the 1970s, the state had grown in income because of the discovery and exploitation of diamonds. With increased income, the

next steps in development were policy initiatives in rural development, land reform and education (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.166). For example, Botswana's Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP), implemented between 1973 and 1976 had been very successful (Tordoff, 2002, p. 127).

The weak political culture in Botswana seems to have influenced the capacity of the government to decide what happened to national and foreign capital in terms of development, considering the autonomous position of the state discussed earlier. The other way around, the allocation of development benefits has actually influenced the degree of political participation. Indeed, the majority of the people were content with the social services they were provided through the government, which has reduced the incentives to oppose government. The symbolic forms of political participation contributed to this sense of contentment. Thus, the allocation of development benefits and symbolic forms of political participation may have influenced the weak political culture in the sense that it kept people from creating an intrinsic drive to influence politics. Therefore, the provision of social services and the symbolic forms of political participation may be seen as formal patronage.

Legitimacy and human rights

Leftwich argues that developmental states are usually not attractive when it comes to human rights, as there is no space for opposition to serve these interests (Leftwich, 2000, p.165). At the same time, the state is highly legitimate, which Leftwich explains through the way in which government distributes developmental gains, benefiting large parts of the population. For example, Botswana was at the top sixty per cent of states with highest Human Development Index of the UNDP in 1998 (Leftwich, 2000, p.166).

The Botswana state indeed seemed quite legitimate. Gyimah-Boadi (2004) conducted an analysis in 2000, based on data from The Afrobarometer, which measures attitudes towards democracy. Three quarters of the people said that they were very or fairly satisfied with democracy in Botswana (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.68). Similar results were reported by Van Binsbergen (1995), who concluded that the average Motswana viewed the post-colonial democratic state as nurturing and protective. Further, they thought that the state should not be challenged (Van Binsbergen, 1995, p.26). The positive public opinion and support for democracy may come as no surprise given the stable political situation in Botswana.

However the issue of inequality was and is present in Botswana. The government consisted of mainly elites and political participation at the local level seemed to be an elite activity as well. There was exploitation of the majority, as the government kept wage earners and migrant laborers dependent to prevent them from developing into a proletariat which could challenge the elite's interests (Thomson, 2000, p.94). Also, there is evident marginalization of minorities (Cook & Sarkin, 2010, p.458). Their culture is discouraged from an early age (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, p.163). Especially the San tribal group has been forced to relocate multiple times for differing state goals, such as intensifying cattle-industry or promoting wild life (Good, 2003, p.15). Further, there was no income redistribution. 40 per cent of the

population shared just 10 per cent of national wealth, while the top 20 per cent owned 61.5 per cent of this sum (Thomson, 2000, p.95). This inequality among the people kept the majority of the population voiceless and poor, which contributed to a stable government because there were no forces in society that contradict it.

One would expect discontent in a society with such inequalities. However, as discussed earlier, many people were quite content with Botswana's government as provider of public services. Further, Holm (1987, p.26) argues that inequality does not lead to political dissatisfaction in Botswana, because most people are part of extended households. In this situation, one member of a few rural families or neighbors earns a higher income in the formal sector, which alleviates the poverty of the extended family as well. This also kept people from feeling dissatisfied towards the government.

The state's patronage through creating a weak political culture and symbolic political participation has certainly influenced the human rights situation in Botswana. The autonomous state created little possibilities for human rights organizations to organize, to gain funds and to influence politics. The marginalization of the majority rural people had kept them voiceless, together with minority ethnic groups. Elite groups were mainly allowed to participate through symbolic Kgotla meetings. However, the state has been viewed as highly legitimate, which may have helped to reduce genuine and autonomous political participation without being criticized for it. The government's legitimization may have stemmed from electoral political participation, providing them with the majority vote. It may also have been strengthened by heir allocation of development benefits into improving social services, which derived the public's attention from human rights issues to government benefits.

Chapter 5. Final analysis - conclusion

The goal of this research was to investigate in what way different forms and intensity of political participation have influenced Leftwich' six characteristics of the developmental state in the case of Botswana from 1965 to 1990. When assessing the various forms of political participation however, it became clear that there was only genuine *electoral* political participation in Botswana. The other forms of political participation were mainly symbolic. Further, the political culture in Botswana seemed to be fairly weak. These findings turned the question of interest into assessing the effect of electoral and symbolic political participation, as well as a weak political culture, on the developmental state.

Further, it appeared that the presupposed influence of political participation onto the characteristic of the developmental state was rather a dynamic relationship of mutual influence. In order to assess the influence of an independent variable on a dependent variable, the independent variable must be an independent phenomenon. In this case, political participation appeared to be a phenomenon that was highly regulated. The state appeared to have manipulated and shaped political participation in such manner that it positively influenced the characteristics of the developmental state. Therefore political participation was not so much a factor, as it was influenced by the Botswana developmental state itself.

Starting off with representing a wide range of elite interests, the BDP formed a credible leadership as from independence onwards. Electoral political participation had not affected the state's motivation to develop economically, however it had influenced their ability to do so by gaining legitimacy in winning victoriously in democratic elections. The weak political culture had increased the possibilities for the state to operate autonomously from the people and to centralize decision-making. However the other way around, the autonomy of the state had created space for imposing paternalistic strategies, strict rules and restrictions on the people, framing political participation to the state's own needs. The safe government jobs within the strong bureaucracy also demotivated well-informed people to oppose government by trying to influence decision-making. Measures to regulate the growth of civil society, such as controlling labor organizations and public discussion of political issues, had restricted political decision-making to a small group of people with overlapping interests, leaving out people from local villages that instead participated in symbolic politics at the Kgotla meetings. This formal patronage kept people content; which did not motivate them to mobilize into civil society. The social services received from the government upon developing contributed to this contentment, resulting in a political culture in which the intrinsic drive to influence politics seems missing. This patronage has certainly influenced the human rights situation in Botswana, as the organizing capacities for human rights organizations were very limited.

Despite the doubtful democratic situation in which very little space for genuine political participation was created by the government, the Botswana government enjoyed high legitimacy

domestically as well as internationally. Domestically, most people supported the ruling party and were generally content with democracy in Botswana, mainly because of the public services they had received from the government. In this situation, it may have been accepted that the state did not put effort in improving the possibilities to involve the people in decision-making, as the state was already providing people with much more facilities and wealth than any other African state at the time, creating the international image of an 'African Miracle'. Who would oppose to a state that does all that?

It seems that the outcome of this case study has strengthened Leftwich' theory in the sense that little genuine and autonomous political participation leaves governments space to attain their developmental goals without interruption from the people. However, other forms of political participation may exist during the emergence of a developmental state that actually increase the possibilities of the government to develop. In the case of Botswana, symbolic forms of political participation enhanced feelings of inclusiveness among the population and kept them from opposing it. This contributed to the legitimacy of the state to implement development policies, which was further strengthened by electoral participation. This form of political participation may only contribute to the state's legitimacy if the ruling party receives the majority vote. In Botswana this was achieved through measures of patronage, in which the provision of social services kept the majority of the people content and in favor of the ruling party.

Yet, the forms of political participation that existed in Botswana seemed to be mainly the result of the characteristics of the developmental state, rather than an independent factor that influenced them. The autonomous state elites used strategies of patronage such as imposing restrictions and symbolic participation to create a weak political culture. They strengthened this weak political culture by allocating development benefits to large amounts of people through social services, providing them with little incentives to oppose government. The weak political culture again strengthened the autonomous position of the state. Thus, the weak political culture in Botswana both influenced the developmental state *and* was imposed by the developmental state. In this environment of a weak political culture, electoral political participation further strengthened the characteristics of the developmental state, as it contributed to the legitimacy of the state to operate autonomously.

Considering this mutual influence, one could wonder whether certain forms of political participation might be beneficial for development rather than restrictive. They might be utilized as an instrument for the state to gain legitimacy, which contributes to the implementation of development goals. In the case of Botswana, the beneficial forms of political participation are symbolic and electoral participation, as well as a weak political culture. Which additional forms of political participation could be beneficial in attaining development goals, could be considered in future research.

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