# The Europeanization of national foreign policy in the Middle-East Peace Process:

The cases of France, the United Kingdom and Germany

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## Introduction

Foreign affairs have always been a sensitive issue in the European Union. Member states consider the right to have an independent foreign affairs policy as something which touches directly on their sovereignty. Therefore, foreign policy was for a long time a policy area which remained outside the official EU-framework. This changed with the introduction of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993. The CFSP has given the EU an institutional framework in which the EU could coordinate foreign policy on an intergovernmental basis. Member states retain full sovereignty over their foreign affairs as any decision on a European level is taken by unanimity. This means that the national interests of each of the 28 member states within the European Union has to be taken into account. However, member states do not always have the same national interests in their foreign policy. This is caused by the many political divisions within the European Union (EU). Examples of these political divisions are; neutral vs. non-neutral states; large states vs. small states; new members vs. old members; different threat perceptions; regional groupings like north vs. south; and member states with a seat in the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) vs. those who do not have one. These different divisions create a plethora of interests for member states which do not always converge. They can quite possibly diverge and create substantive gaps in the way member states act in foreign affairs. This seriously hampers the EU's ability to speak with one voice.

One such an example is the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). The MEPP is the term used for the efforts to come to a peace agreement between the state of Israel and various Arabian countries. The MEPP has been high on the agenda of the European Union since the start of foreign affairs cooperation in 1970. The reason why this has been such an important issue in European foreign affairs policy is that the Middle-East can be considered as Europe's 'backyard'. Europe maintains close political and cultural ties with the region. Moreover, security issues such as illegal migration and terrorism constitute a potential threat to European security. Its close proximity to Europe as well as European dependence on oil from the region makes the Middle-East a region of great importance to Europe.

However, while the MEPP has been one of the focal points of European foreign affairs, the EU has had difficulties in forming a clear and coherent stance. The reason for this was that key EU member states such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) have diverging foreign policy positions on the MEPP. These member states are of intrinsic value to

the EU and therefore have much influence in European decision making. These diverging foreign policy positions seriously hampered the EU's effectiveness and credibility as a partner in the MEPP.

Yet the foreign policies of France, Germany and the UK regarding the MEPP have recently begun to show convergence. This increases the possibility to come up with a more coherent and effective position for the EU in the negotiations. One explanation for this convergence which is being put forward is that the foreign policies of the Big Three are being 'Europeanized'. The term Europeanization has a host of meanings but for this particular topic, it refers to the gradual adoption of common European positions and ideas in foreign affairs. As such, this thesis will research if the convergence of the positions of France, Germany and the UK has been caused by Europeanization or that it was caused by domestic or geopolitical variables.

One of the main factors which could be a driver of the Europeanization of the positions of the Big Three regarding the MEPP is the introduction and subsequent expansion of the CFSP. The CFSP was introduced in the wake of the Yugoslavia Crisis with the aim to create a more coherent European foreign policy. The EU's slow and uncoordinated response during the disintegration of Yugoslavia had made it clear that the EU needed to be more effective in foreign affairs. The CFSP provides an intergovernmental framework for the EU's member states to develop and coordinate foreign policy.

Subsequent treaties have expanded the CFSP with the aim to increase its effectiveness and international visibility by introducing a high ranking envoy for foreign affairs, the High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). Additionally, the EU's own diplomatic network, the European External Action Service (EEAS), was introduced. These developments have given the EU a voice and a face in foreign affairs. While the CFSP is intergovernmental, the expansion of the EU's foreign affairs instruments mentioned above could have had a positive effect on the Europeanization of foreign policy. In this thesis, I will have special attention for the Big Three's positions after the introduction of each of these improvements. If they show convergence after these improvements, it will be very likely that this is caused by Europeanization. I will thereby closely consider if such convergence is not caused by domestic or geopolitical components instead of Europeanization. Due to the limited length of this dissertation, the focus of this dissertation will be on the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. However, as the Arab states have a significant impact on the Peace Process, occasional references to their role will be made.

France, the UK and Germany are good cases for comparison. First, they have different political and social systems. Secondly, they constitute large states within the European Union which have the capability to decisively influence decision making in the EU. Thirdly, they have different views on the Middle-East peace process. Germany is very careful in criticising Israel as it feels it has a moral debt after the atrocities committed to the Jews under the Third Reich. France and the UK, on the other hand, used to rule over areas in the Middle-East as part of the mandate system created after the First World War. France feels an obligation to help the Arab population in the region whereas the UK is generally more supportive of Israel. It is clear that France, the UK and Germany have different interests in the area. But how do the differences between these prominent European nations translate themselves into a CFSP on the MEPP?

The structure of this thesis is as follows. In the first chapter, the pros and cons of multiple case study research will be discussed. Chapter II examines the theory of Europeanization. Chapter III, IV and V relate to several components which have significant influence on policy-making of the Big Three regarding the MEPP. After this, the EU's position and those of France, the UK and Germany in five landmark events in the Israeli-Palestine conflict will be discussed. In my conclusion, I will discuss what the impact of France, Germany and the UK has been on the CFSP regarding the MEPP. Furthermore, I will discuss what the impact of Europeanization on the MEPP was and how it can influence European foreign policy elsewhere.

# I. Methodology

In order to evaluate if Europeanization of the foreign policies of France, Germany and the UK has occurred regarding the MEPP, I have conducted multiple-case study research. Yin describes case study research as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident."[1] As will be clear in the next section, Europeanization is such a phenomenon of which the boundaries between Europeanization and context are not clear. The problem with Europeanization is that:

> The EU may or may not produce domestic effects in many different ways. It is easy to compile a long list of ways in which this can theoretically happen, but it is difficult to pin down the exact conditions under which Europeanization occurs.[2]

Case study research will be especially useful when researching if and how processes have been affected by Europeanization. Can Europeanization be seen as an independent process which has affected the national foreign policies of EU member states or does it depend on one or more intervening variables? It is clear, then, that to establish causality, by isolating Europeanization from other variables, will be one of the greatest challenges of this thesis. Failing to do so could lead to unintended bias.

Case studies can be exploratory, explanatory, or descriptive and usually consist of one or a limited amount of cases.[3] Most case studies try to answer "how", "what" and sometimes "why" something has happened. Whereas case studies which answer "what" or "how-questions" are of a descriptive nature, "why-questions" are typically of explanatory nature.[4] Some researchers state that descriptive case studies are inferior to explanatory cases. However, Flyvbjerg is quick to dismiss such notions. According to him, a solely descriptive case study can help open up new avenues of information and increase the strength of other scientific research.[5] This thesis falls in the explanatory category as it aims to determine causality. It tries

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[1] Yin, Robert Kuo-zuir, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Los Angeles 1994) 18.
[2] C. Radaelli, Europeanization: The Challenge of Establishing Causality. In: T. Exadaktylos and C. Radaelli (eds) *Research Design in European Studies: Establishing Causality in Europeanization* (Basingstoke and New York 2012) 2.
[3] Hammersley, Martyn & Gomm, Roger (2008) *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts* (London 2008) 4.
[4] Yin, Robert Kuo-zuir, *Case Study Research,* 7-9.
[5] Flyvbjerg, Bent, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research', <u>Qualitative Inquiry</u> 12.2 (2006) 227.

to answer whether changes in the foreign policies of France, Germany and the UK have been caused by Europeanization.

There are some disadvantages to case studies. A common heard criticism of the case study method is that it lacks the ability to generalize conclusions due to its dependence on one or a limited amount of cases. However, the ability to generalize, better understood as 'generalizability', has a different meaning in qualitative research compared to quantitative research. In quantitative research, researchers use large samples. When statistical analysis shows that it is very unlikely that the quantitative study's results are caused by chance, it is deemed possible to generalize them. However, due to its small number of research samples, qualitative case study research is deemed unfit to generalize. Nonetheless, Yin argues that generalization from either single- or multiple-case studies is based on theory instead of large samples. By replicating cases and establishing patterns which can be linked to the overarching theory, multiple-case studies can enrich and support earlier results.[6] This increases the overall strength of the method.

The last heard criticism is that case study methods can cause a bias towards establishing causality. While this is an issue which can affect any method, it is deemed more likely to occur in qualitative methods than in quantitative methods as the former allow more room for the researchers' own subjective judgment.[7] In order to make the chance of attributing the wrong causes to the Europeanization of French, German and British foreign policy, I have divided the interfering variables in two categories: domestic and geopolitical. These variables can influence the foreign policies of France, Germany and the UK to either converge or diverge from each other. By isolating these variables, I will enable myself to determine if domestic and geopolitical developments were the cause of change in the foreign policies of France, Germany and the UK, or that it was caused by Europeanization. Already a few interfering variables can be identified; Germany's legacy from the Holocaust and its Cold War constrains; France's sizable Muslim population and its historical ties with the region; the UK's 'special relation' with the United States (US) and its historical ties with the Middle East.

I have chosen the cases of France, Germany and the UK because they are of intrinsic value to the shaping of the CFSP. Their economic weight, military capacity, demographics and diplomatic capability allows the 'Big Three' to shape policies in the EU. This is especially the case when the three act united and push for a policy. Conversely, if the three cannot agree, it is unlikely that a certain policy is adopted by the EU. The leading role of the

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[6] Yin, Robert Kuo-zuir, *Case Study Research,*
[7] Flyvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case-study research' 234.

Big Three can be seen in a wide range of policy areas but is especially prominent in the CFSP. The Big Three, which own much of the relevant assets in this policy area, play an informal leadership role within it.[8] This allows them to play a major role in the shaping of the CFSP.[9] Moreover, due to their resources and networks, the Big Three aren't limited to cooperation within the European framework. They can still be independent actors in foreign policy.

The Big Three have very different strategic cultures and priorities. The UK is a northern country which has a strong 'Atlanticist' tradition which is focussed on British ties with the US. France, on the other hand, is a Mediterranean country with an outspoken realist foreign policy tradition. Lastly, Germany is a northern European country with a strong civilian power tradition. Because of these very different backgrounds, one would expect that the foreign policies of the Big Three regarding the MEPP are incompatible. However, recent years have witnessed a convergence of their positions. This very interesting development allows me to apply the 'most different systems' case study design. In such a design, two or more cases are different on a wide range of explanatory variables except the dependent variable. This will allow me to eliminate irrelevant factors and show the relationship between dependent and independent variables.[10]

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[8] Stephan Lehne, 'The Big Three in EU foreign policy', The Carnegie Papers (July 2012) 3.
[9] Gross, E (2009) The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy. Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management
[10] Seawright, Jason and Gerring, John. Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research. A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options', Political Research Quarterly 61. 2 (2008) 304-306.

## II. Theoretical Framework

One of the earliest definitions of Europeanization was made by Robert Ladrech. According to Ladrech, Europeanization "is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the decree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making."[11] In this definition, a clear constructivist approach can be discovered. Europeanization does not only change the way actors operate but also how they think.[12] However, numerous researchers have come up with different definitions of Europeanization theory.[13] This plethora of different definitions of Europeanization has had a negative impact on the credibility of Europeanization as a viable theory.[14] Critics state that Europeanization is 'poorly and confusingly defined'.[15] This has let some researchers to question the usability of Europeanization as a research theory.[16] However, Europeanization theory should be seen as an umbrella name for many different kinds or Europeanization. Just like that no theory would be adequate for every subject area, not every Europeanization theory fits every research question. The multifaceted aspects of European integration and cooperation render it impossible to use a single theory. Muller and Alecu de Flers therefore state that Europeanization is "not a theory but rather a conceptual framework that draws on a range of theoretical and explanatory schemes".[17] Europeanization concepts have to take into account that different policy areas require different Europeanization approaches.

For the Europeanization of foreign policy, three lenses or dimensions can be identified: the uploading of national foreign policy preferences to the European level (bottom-up Europeanization); the downloading of policy concepts and ideas of the EU's CFSP and other European foreign affairs actors to the national level (top-down Europeanization); and cross-

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[11] Ladrech, Robert, 'Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France', Journal of Common Market Studies 32.1 (1994) 69.

[12] Schimmelfennig and Thomas 2009;

[13] Tsardanidis, Charalambos and Stavridis, Stelios. 'The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy: a critical appraisal', Journal of European Integration 27.2 (2005) 217-239.

[14] Olsen, Johan P. 'The Many Faces of Europeanization' Journal of Common Market Studies 40.5 (2002) 921.

[15] Mair, Peter, 'The Europeanization dimension', Journal of European Public Policy 11.2 (2004) 338-339.

[16] Moumoutzis, Kyriakos, 'Still Fashionable Yet Useless? Addressing Problems with Research on the Europeanization of Foreign Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies 49.3 (2011) 607-629.

[17] Nicole Alecu de Flers and Patrick Müller, 'Dimensions and Mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues', Journal of European Integration 34.1 (2014) 6.

loading in which member states influence each other's national foreign policies (or horizontal Europeanization).[18]

The uploading of member states' national preferences to the European level has several important advantages for member states. First of all, by operating through the CFSP, member states gain some influence over other member states' foreign policies. In addition to this, influence on the CFSP can increase their influence in the world as they can operate through the EU. Last of all, member states can use the CFSP as a cover to assert influence in foreign policy areas which are deemed too sensitive.[19] Germany, for example, uses European channels to condemn the construction of Israeli settlements in Palestine territory. Another incentive for member states is that by uploading their national preferences to the European level, they align European foreign policy more with their national preferences. This minimizes the costs of downloading these European preferences to the national level.[20]

The downloading dimension of Europeanization relates to the influence EU policy and institutions exert on member states' national policies. For the area of foreign policy, the downloading dimension has different consequences. In most policy areas, member states are forced to Europeanize through binding mechanisms and hard law. An example of this is the internal market in which the EU has exclusive competences. In this area, the EU can compel member states to adopt policies. Nonetheless, foreign affairs constitute a very different case then economic politics in terms of downloading policy. The CFSP is one of the few remaining policy areas which has largely remained intergovernmental. Decisions are taken by consensus. Coordination of foreign policy is done through non-binding instruments like the open method of coordination (OMC). This causes the influence of the EU in the field of foreign policy to be very weak. There is no way that the EU can coerce member states to change their foreign policy. This weak influence is compounded by strategic and historical variables which continue to carry great weight. The weak coercive power of the EU was reflected in the EU's failure to come up with a common position on the war in Yugoslavia or the American invasion of Iraq.

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[18] Patrick Müller, 'The Europeanization of France's foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict: from leadership to accommodation', European Security 22.1 (2013) 115. And Bulmer, Simon J. and Radaelli, Claudio M. 'The Europeanisation of National Policy?' Queen's Papers on Europeanisation (No 1/2004) and Alister Miskimmon, *Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, between Europeanisation and national adaptation* (Houndmills 2007) 192-196.
[19] Reuben Wong, 'The Europeanization of Foreign policy' in: Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.) *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford 2005) 147-148.
[20] Börzel, T. 'Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization', Journal of Common Market Studies, 40.2 (2002) 193.

However, this does not mean that Europeanization doesn't take place in foreign policy. This is not so much the downloading dimension of Europeanization but the cross-loading dimension of Europeanization.[21] Since the inception of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970, member states have had a forum on which they could exchange and coordinate foreign policy. Member states learn from each other and this practice can lead to cross-fertilization by which shared positions can gradually develop. The intergovernmental character of the CFSP doesn't mean that there is no top-down influence. Such has been evident with states which have recently joined the EU who had to adjust their foreign policies to the existing positions of the CFSP.[22]

It should be noted that the uploading, downloading and cross-loading dimensions are all intrinsically linked to each other. Member states constitute the building blocks of the EU and the EU has become an integral part of the member states. Therefore, change of domestic policies brought about by the EU can feedback to the European level and vice versa. This circular movement of Europeanization complicates research of Europeanization, in particular the study of causality; has a member state Europeanized or has it made EU policy align more closely to its national policies? To solve this issue, Müller argues that Europeanization is best researched over long periods of time. In this way, the dynamics of Europeanization are the most pronounced. In addition to this, it makes it easier to discern the influences of internal and external factors on the Europeanization.[23] Another issue which can complicate the research of Europeanization is the fact that Europeanization is not a linear process. There will be moments that national foreign policies convergence but there will also be instances of resistance or divergence. Divergence and resistance may be especially likely in the domain of foreign policy. Historically, member states have refused to let the EU impose extensive constraints on their foreign policy. This can result in a situation that a member state falls back on its national resources or other channels of foreign policy when it opposes decisions or the lack of decisions in the CFSP. This re-nationalization of foreign policy is easier for larger member states as they have the resources to act independent.[24]

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[21] Bulmer and Radaelli, 'The Europeanisation of National Policy?' 8-9.
[22] Nicole Alecu de Flers and Patrick Müller, 'Dimensions and Mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member State Foreign Policy: State of the Art and New Research Avenues', Journal of European Integration 34.1 (2014) 12.
[23] Patrick Müller, 'The Europeanization of France's foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict: from leadership to accommodation', European Security 22.1 (2013) 114.
[24] Müller, 'The Europeanization of France's foreign policy', 116-117.

## Europeanization in international relations theory

I have already mentioned that Europeanization borrows heavily from constructivism. However, it should be noted that there are also other theories that explain member states' foreign policies. First of all, according to realists, behaviour of member states is influenced by their desire to protect themselves in an anarchic world. There is no over-arching organization which protects them. Therefore, states have to take care of themselves. This need for self-help explains several attributes of states; states act in their own interests; they want to maintain their autonomy and sovereignty; they want to enlarge their capabilities vis-à-vis other states and they strive to maintain a balance of power between states.[25] This desire for autonomy and sovereignty collides with international institutions like the European Union in which states have delegated some autonomy and sovereignty. Waltz resolves this issue by stating that international institutions are instruments for states – institutions only exert as much power as is given to them by states. This power is only delegated to them when states feel that there is something to gain from cooperation. Therefore the CFSP can be seen as an instrument for member states to achieve common goals.[26]

In the case of cooperation on foreign policy, the member states of the EU have gradually delegated more power to the CFSP. Pilegaard and Kluth state that the main reason why France, the UK and Germany have agreed to expand the CFSP is that they were faced with continuing decline of their relative power. With relative greater capabilities than smaller member states, common foreign policy set by the CFSP would be greatly influenced by them. However, Pilegaard and Kluth forego on the idea that the European Union itself is a multi-polar institution. A state with great capabilities has to take into account the interests of other states with big capabilities.[27] In their concluding remarks, Pilegaard and Kluth argue that it is increasingly more difficult to apply neo-realist theory on the European integration process as member states move away from policy measures which can be identified with international anarchy. Wagner continues this line of thought to show the limits of neo-realism in the context of European integration. He argues that the reunification of Germany should have caused Germany to lose interest in the strengthening of foreign policy cooperation because its relative power vis-à-vis France and the UK had increased. However, this has not been the

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[25] Baylis, Smith & Owens (Ed.), *The globalization of world politics* (Oxford 2008), 102-103

[26] Wolfgang Wagner, *Unilateral Foreign Policy Capacities and State Preferences on CFSP, Rationalism´s Contribution to Explaining German, French and British Policies Towards CFSP*, (Geneva 2002) 13-14..

[27] Jess Pilegaard & Michael Kluth, 'To Be or Not to Be, A Neorealist Interpretation of the EU's External Action Service', paper presented at the 12th biennial conference of the European Union studies association, Boston (Roskilde 2011) 9-10.

case.[28] It is therefore getting increasingly difficult to explain European cooperation in foreign affairs through a neo-realist lens as it can only explain a very limited area of the development of the CFSP.

Neo-liberal institutionalism is more suitable when researching European cooperation in foreign affairs. Neo-liberal institutionalism corresponds with quite some points of neo-realism. However, it attributes more importance to international institutions. Neo-liberal institutionalism argues that states are willing to give up some sovereignty to international institutions as international institutions can help control anarchy. This provides states with more security. Keohane and Nye argue that in this way, a close interdependence of states and non-state actors has been developed in international relations. This interdependence is also present in common foreign affairs.[29] Musu states that this interdependence is strengthened due to internal and external factors. These factors cause member states' foreign polices to converge.[30] However, some national preferences continue to be of great importance for individual member states. These can act as a counterweight of greater cohesion. This doesn't necessarily mean that European foreign policy becomes less or more effective. Koutrakos argues that the widening membership and the accompanying interests create a more flexible EU. An example of this were the negotiations of France, the UK and Germany with Iran. These negotiations were outside the scope of the CFSP but the parties later invited the High Representative (HR) to join the negotiations.[31] This flexibility reflects the real nature of the CFSP in my opinion. The main causes of this flexibility are the *sui generis* character of the CFSP and of the EU as a whole, and the fact that both the CFSP and EU are still developing.

Neo-realism does only explain why states created the EU in the first place, it doesn't give a satisfying answer why we *maintain* it. Neo-liberalism only emphasizes the influence of institutions but not the reinforcing interplay between the member states and the EU. Constructivism on the other hand, focuses too much on the influence from social factors on foreign policy whereas I think the main interaction is between the member states and the EU. As I want to narrow my research down to the interaction between the EU's CFSP and France, the UK and Germany, the concept of Europeanization would fit the best. It will be used to

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[28] Wagner, Unilateral Foreign Policy Capacities and State Preferences, 24-25.
[29] Baylis, Smith & Owens (Ed.), *The globalization of world politics* (Oxford 2008) 132.
[30] Costanza Musu, 'European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of 'Converging Parallels'?', European Foreign Affairs Review 8 (2003) 35–49.
[31] Panos Koutrakos, 'Common Foreign and Security Policy: Looking back, Thinking forward', in: 50 Years of the European Treaties : Looking back and Thinking forward, ed. Michael Dougan and Samantha Currie (Oxford 2009) 177-178.

study the influence of member states' foreign policy on the CFSP, its ultimate effects and its probable feedback on the member states.

## III. France

In this chapter I will discuss the variables which influence French policy towards the MEPP. The current French foreign policy has its roots in a period long before the inception of the CFSP and they still have considerable influence on French foreign policy. First, the legacy of General De Gaulle on French foreign policy will be discussed. His ideas of how France should act on the world stage still resonate in French foreign policy today. After that, the extensive powers of the French President in French foreign affairs will be examined. The third issue which will be discussed is the French concept of secularism called *laïcité*. It is one of the cornerstones of French society and has repercussions for French policy towards the MEPP. Finally, France's economic ties with the Middle East will be covered.

**The foreign policy tradition of the Fifth Republic: in search of *grandeur***

One man who has had a huge impact on the French state and French foreign policy in particular was general Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970). De Gaulle saw France as an exceptional country. Not so much because of its long history of greatness or its existence as one of the first nation-states in the world, but more because of its special role in the world. Since the French Revolution, France had been a carrier of universal values. It considered itself destined to spread the universal values of *liberté*, *égalité* and *fraternité* to the rest of the world.[32] However, when De Gaulle took office in the Elysée in 1958, France was only a shadow of its former self. Two World Wars and several failed attempts to reassert French power in North Africa and South-East Asia had reduced France to a middle class power. Moreover, the on-going Algerian war of Independence had isolated France internationally.

Advocating French exceptionalism, De Gaulle looked for ways to restore France as a great-power. In order to achieve this, he considered it essential for France to regain its *grandeur*, which "involves the self-conscious defence of the independence, honour and rank of the nation".[33] According to De Gaulle, France had failed to reach its full potential due to its social and political divisions. These rifts in French society had led to the fall of the Third and Fourth Republic.[34] The only way to strengthen the moral and political unity of France was

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[32] Marcel H. van Herpen, 'Chirac's Gaullism', The Romanian Journal of European Affairs 4:1 (2004) 68.

[33] Daniel J. Mahoney , *De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur, and Modern Democracy* (Westport 1996) 16-17.

[34] Timo Behr, 'Enduring Differences? France, Germany and Europe's Middle East Dilemma', Journal of European Integration 30:1 (2008) 84.

through the pursuit of *grandeur*.[35] In international relations, he envisaged France to be an independent great-power free from constraints.[36] However, by the time De Gaulle came to power, the Cold War was in full swing, dividing the world in two power-blocs. De Gaulle saw this as a threat to the world. The world would either be engulfed into a destructive war between the two superpowers or it would be carved up between them.[37] Only by a proper balance of power between rival states would international peace be maintained.[38] As a true realist, De Gaulle did not believe that international organizations like the UN could maintain international peace. Only nation-states could influence international relations. Therefore, De Gaulle sought to manoeuvre France between the two superpowers as a third power. This would not only undermine the bipolar world by providing an alternative pole of power, it would also allow France to regain great-power status. This in turn would provide France with *grandeur*. In sum, De Gaulle combined typical realist perceptions with the idea of French exceptionalism and *grandeur* into his own distinct foreign policy vision called Gaullism.

French aspirations for a bigger role for France on the global stage had repercussions for French regional policy in the Middle East. In order to become an alternative pole of power, France had to become a champion of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). The NAM was a group of states who were not formally aligned with one of the superpowers. Many of the NAM's members were former colonies which had recently gained their independence. Their struggle for independence had resulted in high levels of nationalism. However, French efforts to align itself with the NAM were ineffective as long as France remained a colonial power. To make France attractive for Third World nationalism, De Gaulle sought an honourable end to the Algerian War. In the Middle East, France sought to counter Soviet and US influence and to promote its own influence by developing the *politique arabe*. This policy sought to develop close contacts with Arab states and promote Arab nationalism.[39] Arab nationalism was strongly represented in the NAM and fiercely opposed Anglo-Saxon hegemony. It was therefore seen as a natural ally to France. However, in order to attain closer ties with such countries, France had to downgrade its relations with Israel. Many Arab states were distrustful of France. During the existence of the Fourth Republic, France had been a close ally of Israel. It had assisted Israel during the Suez Crisis and was the only country to deliver high tech

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[35] Reed Davis, 'A Once and Future Greatness: Raymond Aron, Charles de Gaulle and the Politics of Grandeur', The International History Review 33:1 (2011) 28.

[36] Edward Kolodziej, *French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou. The politics of Grandeur* (Ithaca 1974) 28.

[37] Behr, 'Enduring Differences?' 84.

[38] Kolodziej, *French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou,*31.

[39] Patrick Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict. The Europeanization of national foreign policy* (New York 2012) 90.

offensive weaponry to Israel.[40] This had been a major source of discontent under the Arab states.

The realignment of French foreign policy was accomplished in a very short timeframe. In 1962, the Evian accords were signed, bringing an end to the Algerian War. This greatly improved the relations between France and the Arab world. French realignment was completed during the 1967 Six-Day War when France refused to support Israel. From that moment on, France was the main European partner of the Arab world. The *politique arabe* would become the main pillar of French foreign policy in the region and had a profound impact on France's position in the MEPP. France became one of the main proponents of the advancement of Palestinian national rights. In addition to this, France stressed that all involved parties should adhere to international law and UN resolutions.[41] In this framework, it also recognized the Israeli's right of a secure homeland.

The *politique arabe* should be seen as a tool for France to increase its international standing by ensuring a special role in the region. In addition to this, the *politique arabe* provided France with a new mission in the region following the period of decolonization. This new international role following the time of decolonization, continued to play a big role in French foreign policy during the Cold War. French opposition to the domination of the two superpowers meant that it often competed with US policies. This was reflected in French policy towards the MEPP which was often pro-Arab and critical of Israel. France advocated the resolution of the conflict through multilateral negotiations, thereby envisaging a prominent role for the UN. As a permanent member of the UNSC, France could exert considerable influence in the negotiations.[42]

France also tried to exert influence through Europe by uploading its national preferences to the European level. In this way, Europe would act as a power multiplier. However, in true Gaullist fashion, successive French governments remained strong opponents of any delegation of sovereignty to the European level as this could impede an independent French foreign policy. Instead, they advocated a strictly intergovernmental approach to European cooperation in foreign affairs. Up until the end of the Cold War, France had considerable success in uploading its national preferences regarding the MEPP to the European level. The main reason for this was that France was able to claim a leadership position within the European Community. None of the other member states were able to

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[40] Timo Behr, 'De Gaulle and the Middle East Conflict' in: Benjamin M. Rowland (ed.), *Charles de Gaulle, legacy of ideas* (Washington 2011) 88.
[41] Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict,* 91.
[42] Francois d'Alancon, 'The EC Looks to a New Middle East', <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u> 23:2 (1994) 43.

assume this role. The UK was often indecisive because it had to choose between commitments to the US and to Europe. Germany on the other hand failed to assume a leading role because of its historic constraints. Notable examples of France's success are the French insistence to include the PLO as a party in the negotiations and the Palestinians right of self-determination.[43] However, in instances that developing a common European position failed, France did not hesitate to 'renationalize' foreign policy and use other channels such as the UNSC, its well-developed diplomatic network and the personal relations with Arab leaders of the French President.[44]


**Foreign policy mechanics**

The mechanics of foreign policy-making in France are very different from those in Germany and the UK. Unlike his German colleague, the French President enjoys tremendous influence in the domain of foreign and defence policy. The strong position of the French President has its origins in the creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. The Fourth Republic, which was based on the dominance of political parties, had suffered from political instability since its inception after the Second World War. Successive governments rose and fell in quick succession. As Prime Ministers often lacked a majority in the Assemblée Nationale, they were unable to press for unpopular but much needed reforms. In order to prevent this from happening again, De Gaulle and his supporters advocated a new political system which put much more emphasis on strong presidents. Only such a system would have enough authority to pursue a policy of *grandeur*.[45] De Gaulle's appointment on 1 June 1958 as President of the Fifth Republic led to the development of a new constitution in which the powers of the President were greatly expanded at the expense of the Assemblée Nationale. Under the 1958 constitution, the responsibilities in the domains of foreign affairs and defence reside with the President of the Republic. He is the head of state and the guarantor of national independence, of respect for the treaties and of territorial integrity of France. Furthermore, he is the commander of the French military and is the only person responsible for the launch of nuclear

43 Philippe Rondot, 'France and Palestine: From Charles de Gaulle to Francois Mitterand', Journal of Palestine Studies 16:3 (1987) 94.
[44] Mireia Delgado (2011) France and the Union for the Mediterranean: Individualism versus Co-operation, Mediterranean Politics, 16:01, 39-57 42 and Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict,* 93.
[45] Kolodziej, *French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou,*31.

missiles.[46] In addition to this, the President can dispatch regular French troops abroad without the consent of the Assemblée Nationale.[47]

In short, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic has given the French President extensive powers in the area of foreign affairs and defence policy. These are so extensive that these policy areas are now considered to be an almost exclusive policy area for the French President, or *domaine réservé*.[48] However, there are limited checks to balance the executive power in foreign affairs. International treaties have to be signed by the Prime Minister and they have to be ratified by the Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat. Furthermore, the Assemblée Nationale can assert influence on foreign and defence policy as it has to approve the budget.[49]

The pre-eminence of the French President in foreign affairs has led to a highly personalized French foreign policy. While this had the possibility to lead to significant changes in French foreign policy every time a new President was elected, policy lines have remained quite consistent. The main reason for this was that the pursuit of *grandeur* and the *politique arabe* continued to play a central role in French foreign policy.

The pre-eminence of the French President had several important implications for the functioning of French foreign policy. First of all, because of the extensive powers of the French President, France was able to respond fast to international developments as the president can take initiative without approval of the French parliament. In addition to this, he does not need to take sensitivities of coalition partners into account. Furthermore, because of their pre-eminence and activity in foreign policy, French Presidents could to develop personal relationships with leaders from other states. On the other hand, the pre-eminence of the French President ensures that French diplomats are given relatively little freedom to act as representatives of France. In addition to this, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is overshadowed by the President.[50]

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[46] Pia Christina Wood, 'France' in: David S. Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood (eds.) *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-cold War Era* (Abingdon 2005) 73.

[47] Ian Taylor, *The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa* (New York 2010).

[48] Stephanie C. Hofmann, *European Security in NATO's Shadow: Party Ideologies and Institution Building* (Cambridge 2013) 43.

[49] Hofmann, *European Security in NATO's Shadow,* 44.

[50] Mireia Delgado, 'France and the Union for the Mediterranean: Individualism versus Co-operation', Mediterranean Politics 16:1 (2011) 42.

### *Laïcité* and the integration of immigrants

French foreign policy towards the MEPP has an influential domestic dimension. The presence of large Muslim and Jewish populations has transformed France into a proxy of the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Tensions between Israel and Palestine are imported into France, putting considerable strain on French society. An example of this were the violent protests which erupted in Paris after hostilities between Israel and Palestine flared up in June 2014.[51] These violent clashes between two religious groups are in direct opposition to the French concept of secularism, or *laïcité*. *Laïcité* is one of the cornerstones of the Fifth Republic and its origins date back to the French Revolution of 1789. That year, the French National Constituent Assembly passed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. This declaration proclaimed that "no one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law".[52] From that moment, all authority was located in the state. However, the Catholic Church had retained significant power and continued to exert influence on the French state. In order to weaken the power of the Catholic Church in France, Church and state were officially separated with the Separation of Churches and State Act of 1905, firmly establishing *laïcité*.[53] Additionally, it proclaimed the state's neutral position towards any religion and the state's guarantee to defend the individual's freedom of religion.

This social contract between the state and the individual is one of the central aspects of French identity. An identity in which the Republic itself "is understood as one and indivisible, as, in the same way, the French people is conceived as being one, without regard to origin".[54] This ideology prescribed specific requirements for the integration of immigrants into French society. These can be laid out in four interconnected policy principles.[55] First, the integration of immigrants must be in line with *laïcité*. The French state respects the religious rights of the immigrants but does not give them special support, thus maintaining neutrality. Second, not an ethnic or religious group but the individual is integrated in French society. This also entails that during and after integration, there can be no form of communitarianism. Third, immigrants must respect the French law and culture. In return, the French law will protect their culture and traditions. Last, immigrants and Frenchmen alike are treated on a strictly equal basis, the possibility of positive discrimination is unthinkable. In short, the Fifth

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[51] France 24 (2014), Banned Gaza protest in Paris suburb turns violent, again.
[52] French National Assembly (1789), Declaration of the Rights of Man.
[53] French National Assembly (1905), The 1905 French law on the Separation of the Churches and State.
[54] Jeremy Jennings, 'Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France', <u>British Journal of Political Science</u> 30:4 (2000) 584.
[55] Ibid, 583.

Republic requires immigrants to assimilate into French society. Citizens of the Fifth Republic are identical in their Frenchness. The Republic, therefore, does not allow religious and ethnic groups to enjoy special rights because of their minority status but because they are French. By doing this, France strongly rejects multiculturalism. The concept of multiculturalism, closely connected to the Anglo-Saxon world, was seen as a direct threat to the stability of the French state.[56]

Laïcité requires the French state to maintain a neutral attitude in religious affairs. Therefore, the French state refused to involve itself in religious matters except for ensuring freedom of religion. This led to a laissez faire approach towards Muslim minorities in France. France tolerated international Muslim organizations and friendly secular Arab states on its territory to administer the religious practices of Muslim minorities in France.[57] This dependence on foreign governments and organizations limited integration as it promoted foreign influence over Muslim populations in France.[58] This became more and more a problem as many Muslim immigrants congregated in French suburbs. The poor living conditions in the banlieues and the lack of work created ideal conditions for radicalization of young Muslims. While this increased concerns over intra-communal strive between Muslims and Jews and over social unrest in general, it is overall of marginal influence on French policy towards the Peace Process. The main reason for this is that France's politique arabe is still the main guide for French foreign policy. This has resulted in a foreign policy which is already critical of Israel and favourable to Palestinian statehood.[59] Muslim influence through political channels is also quite weak. There is no large Muslim political party which represents the French Muslims. Additionally, out of France's five million Muslims, only a quarter participate in the political process. Either because they are not eligible to vote or out of disinterest.[60]

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[56] Fernando Mayanthi, 'The Republic's 'Second Religion': recognizing Islam in France', Middle East Report 235 (2005).

[57] Jonathan Lauence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam. Political and religious challenges in contemporary France (Washington 2006) 137.

[58] Ibid, 138.

[59] Ibid, 221.

[60] Ibid, 196.

**Economic Variables**

France maintains extensive economic ties with the Middle East. In 2012, the total trade between France and the Middle East amounted to 57 billion euro.[61] A considerable part of this trade consist of oil and arms. As the MENA region is France's principle supplier of oil, France is quite vulnerable to supply disruption in the event of instability. For the past decade, French exports to Israel have been between 1 billion and 1.3 billion euros. Imports from Israel have hovered around 1 billion yearly.[62]

France sees weapon exports as a way to boost its ailing economy. The Middle East has been an especially important market for this. Between 2010 and 2014, 38% of French weapon exports went to the Middle East.[63] The demand for sophisticated weaponry has grown significantly since the spread of popular revolts in the MENA region in 2011. However, several states are reputed violators of human rights. Important customers of French weaponry are Saudi Arabia and Egypt, states with a bad human rights record. Often, the prospect of a lucrative deal wins over human rights concerns. One example is France's decision to sell Rafale jets to Egypt after the US suspended the sale of arms on the grounds of human right violations.[64]

Overall, France can be regarded as an important actor in the MEPP. In this process, France has become an key champion of the Palestinian cause. France's favourable position towards the Palestinians stems not so much because of pressures from its large Muslim community but rather from the need to pursue an independent political course to attain *grandeur*. This position has been strengthened by France's extensive economical ties with the Arab world.

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[61] Barah Mikail, 'France's shifting Middle Eastern alliances', FRIDE policy paper #188 (November 2014).
[62] France Diplomatie (2013), 'France and Israel: economic relations'.
[63] Mikail, France's shifting Middle Eastern alliances.
[64] France24 (2015), Arms sales becoming France's new El Dorado, but at what cost?

## The United Kingdom

Whereas France has tried to steer an independent course in foreign affairs, the UK has focused on aligning its foreign policy with that of the USA. This has had significant consequences for its policy towards the MEPP. This chapter starts with UK's foreign policy tradition, thereby focusing on the tensions in British commitments. After that, the tensions within the British government will be discussed. It continues with the influence of immigrants on British foreign policy. Lastly, the economic interests and ties of the UK with the Middle East will be discussed.

### The United Kingdom and its balancing act

Like France, Great Britain has extensive historical ties with the Middle East. For much of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the British played a leading role in the Middle East. British interests in the region were both strategic and commercial of nature. For strategic reasons, the survival of the Ottoman Empire was essential for containing Russian expansionism. Moreover, the Suez Canal, which was opened in 1869, had become a crucial link between Great Britain and its colonies in the Far East. Furthermore, the Royal Navy's switch from coal to oil on the eve of the First World War made the unimpeded flow of oil, which was abundant in the region, of vital importance to Great Britain.[65] Finally, stability in the Middle East was deemed of great importance for the extensive commercial interests of Great Britain in region.

Following the end of the Second World War, Great Britain was unable to maintain its extensive presence in the Middle East. The Second World War had taken a heavy toll on the British economy. In addition to this, Britain was heavily indebted to the US, its colonies and protectorates.[66] This posed severe problems to British commitments in the Middle East. First of all, the British were unable to maintain order in the British Mandate of Palestine. Harried by Zionist rebels and unable to stop clashes between Zionists and Arab nationalists, the British asked the UN to resolve the conflict.[67] This led to the Partition Resolution of 1947 which proposed a 'two-state solution'. The Zionists accepted but the Arabs did not, resulting

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[65] Osamah F. Khalil, 'The Crossroads of the World: U.S. and British Foreign Policy Doctrines and the Construct of the Middle East, 1902–2007', Diplomatic History 38:2 (2014) 307.

[66] Toby Greene, *Blair, Labour, and Palestine: Conflicting Views on Middle East Peace After 9/11* (London 2013) 14.

[67] Jonathan Spyer, 'An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy Toward Israel', Middle East Review of International Affairs 8:2 (2004) 6.

in more violence. In the end, the British pulled out. Another concern was the rise of Arab nationalism in the region. In 1952, a group of Egyptian officers had staged a military coup in Egypt and thus ended Britain's influence in Egypt.[68] However, while Britain's influence in the region was diminishing, strategic and commercial interests in the region continued to exist. The British sought to contain the influence of the Soviet Union, ensure freedom of navigation and commerce and secure unimpeded access to Gulf Oil.

In order to pursue these interests, the British aligned their foreign policy closely to that of the US. After the Second World War, it had become clear that the US would become the new dominant power in the region. Close alignment with US foreign policy would enable the UK to maximize its influence by using the US as a power multiplier. Alignment was fairly easy as US and UK interest were quite congruent. Moreover, their close economic, cultural and political ties and intense cooperation during the two World Wars had led to the development of a 'special relationship'.[69] When Great Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, it was not so much seen as a political project but more as a means to improve the British economy. In matters of security and foreign policy, the UK continued to rely strongly on its special relationship with the US. This was also evident in voting in the UNSC where the British, unlike France, did not feel the need to assert themselves. Instead, the British saw themselves more and more as a bridge in the transatlantic alliance.[70]

According to Spyer, two strategies to secure British interests competed for dominance within the British government. The 'strategic approach', which has been more prevalent at 10 Downing Street, saw the rise of aggressive anti-Western movements such as Pan-Arabic nationalism and radical Islamism as a threat to regional stability. It was therefore imperative that these forces were countered. Israel, a democratic and Western oriented state with a strong military apparatus was seen as a useful tool to promote British influence and keep the Soviets out.[71] Moreover, supporting Israeli military superiority by selling arms to Israel would act as a deterrent to Arab aggression.[72] The other strategy, the 'diplomatic approach', has been more prevalent in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The diplomatic approach views Israel as the main source of regional instability, complicating British relations with Arab nations. Criticizing and Distancing itself from Israel is regarded as a way to improve British

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[68] Rosemary Hollis, *Britain and the Middle East in the 9/11 era* (London 2010) 17.

[69] Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, 'Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?' The International History Review 36:4 (2014) 683.

[70] Jonathan Rynhold and Jonathan Spyer, 'British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena 1973-2004', British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 34:2 (2007) 146.

[71] Spyer, 'An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy Toward Israel', 1-2.

[72] Ibid, 9.

relations with the Arab world.[73] Broadly speaking, the strategic approach has been the dominant strategy in the 1950s and 1960s. An example of the strategic approach is the Suez Crisis during which Great Britain cooperated with Israel to remove the Egyptian president Abdel Nasser from power and secure the Suez Canal. The diplomatic approach gained the upper hand by the late 1960s when the Heath government came to power. This was most notable during the Yum Kippur War when the British government declared neutrality.[74]

**Foreign policy mechanics in Great Britain**

Traditionally, British foreign policy is formulated by 10 Downing Street in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). However, there have been periods of 'prime ministerial dominance' such as the term of Tony Blair (1997-2007).[75] During Blair's term, there had been a tendency to centralize and streamline foreign policy-making. In order to do this, a semi-official 'Department of the Prime Minister' was created.[76] Several key-decisions in British foreign policy such as the Kosovo Intervention in 1999 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were made through private meetings with special advisors from the 'Department of the Prime Minister' instead of the traditional way of including the Cabinet and consulting the FCO. Blair used his ministerial powers to advance his own vision on the MEPP and curb the pro-Arab visions in the FCO. One example of this was the removal of Ben Bradshaw from the office of the under-secretary for Middle East Affairs. Bradshaw was known for his critical stance towards Israel.[77]

In matters of foreign policy, there is little or no democratic oversight. Under the 'royal prerogative', a remnant from feudal times, far-reaching executive powers in the domain of foreign affairs and security policy are vested in the British monarch. The exercise of these powers are in the hands of the Prime Minister and other Ministers. The result is that the British government is not required to seek the approval from the British Parliament for any foreign policy decisions. Actions such as declaring war, signing treaties or any other form of conducting diplomacy are thus put outside democratic control.[78] This gives a dominant Prime

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[73] Ibid, 6.
[74] Rynhold and Spyer, 'British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena 1973-2004', 147-148.
[75] House Of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *The Role of the FCO in UK Government: Seventh Report of Session 2010-2012* (London 2011) 43.
[76] Andrew Blick and George Jones, 'The power of the Prime Minister', History & Policy (7 June 2010).
[77] Spyer, 'An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy Toward Israel', 18.
[78] Andrew Blick et al., 'A world of difference. Parliamentary oversight of British foreign policy', Democratic Audit and Federal Trust (2014) 7.

Minister almost as much power as a president. Critics have stated that Blair had extended his powers that he was accused of 'presidentialism'.[79]

The 2010 parliamentary elections necessitated the creation of a coalition government of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, the highly centralized decision-making structure of the previous years was watered down. The main reason for this was that the two political parties had to work together. This situation necessitated collective discussion and decision making between both parties.[80] This was reaffirmed in the 2010 Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform which called for "an appropriate degree of consultation and discussion among Ministers to provide the opportunity for them to express their views frankly as decisions are reached."[81]

## The legacy of the British Empire and its impact on voting behaviour

The legacy of the British Empire has left a significant mark on British society. In the British Empire, all people living in the empire were deemed subject to the British Crown. As British subjects had full rights of citizenship, they had the right of abode. After the Second World, there was considerable migration from the British Empire, Dominions and its former colonies as Great Britain was faced with labor shortages. The majority of these immigrants came from the former colony of British India. However, immigration of 'colored people' from the Empire, Dominions and former colonies continued throughout the 1950s. This resulted in growing tensions within British society and popular opposition against immigration grew. By the time the British government took the first steps to limit immigration from the Commonwealth in 1962, approximately 500.000 Commonwealth immigrants had arrived in the UK. They were later followed by their spouses and dependents, significantly adding up to their numbers.[82]

The liberal British immigration and citizenship policies had attracted large numbers of immigrants of which a considerable amount was Muslim. These numbers increased through birth and by the arrival of Somali refugees in the 1990s and 2000s. By 2011, the number of

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[79] BBC News (1998) Blair accused of presidential leadership.
[80] Stephen Barber' 'Stretched but not snapped: constitutional lessons from the 2010 coalition government in Britain', Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 52:4 (2014) 483.
[81] Government of the United Kingdom (2010). Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform.
[82] Randal Hansen, 'The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act' Twentieth Century British History 10:1 (1999) 95.

Muslims living in the UK had increased to 2.7 million.[83] Most of them had British citizenship and were born in Britain.[84] As British citizens, they could participate in the political process. The sizeable British Muslim community began to organize itself politically with the creation of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997. The MCB, an umbrella organization of around 250 British Muslim institutions, quickly became the main organization to represent Muslims politically in the UK.[85] The MCB did not only focus on domestic issues but also had a foreign policy agenda which focused on Muslim issues such as the situation in Palestine and Iraq. Consequently, the MCB encouraged Muslims to vote on Muslim issues.[86] However, Rynhold and Spyer argue that Muslims failed to influence British policy towards the Peace Process. The main reason for this is that British elections are based on the single-winner system. In this system, the winner of a district-election receives all the votes. It is therefore difficult for minorities to exert political influence. The only situation in which minorities could exert influence was in a situation in which no party is sure that it has enough popular support to secure the votes.[87] The influence of the Jewish community living in the UK was even more marginal as it was far smaller. Moreover, the Jewish community voted primarily on domestic issues.[88]

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[83] The Muslim Council of Britain, 'British Muslims in numbers. A demographic, socio-economic and health profile of Muslims in Britain drawing on the 2011 census' (2011).
[84] Imène Ajala, 'Muslims in France and Great Britain: Issues of Securitization, Identities and Loyalties Post 9/11', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 34:2 (2014) 127.
[85] Steven Vertovec, 'Islampohpbia and Muslim recognition in Britain' in: Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, *Muslims in the West. From sojourners to citizens* (Oxford 2002) 22.
[86] Greene, *Blair, Labour, and Palestine,* 161.
[87] Rynhold and Spyer, 'British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena 1973-2004', 144.
[88] Ibid, 144.

**Economic factors**

British foreign policy towards the MEPP has always been significantly influenced by economic considerations. The British economy has been very dependent on trade. It therefore had a lot to gain from a stable business climate in the Middle East. The vulnerability of the British economy to repercussions of incidents in the Middle East became apparent after the Six-Day War. In retaliation for British support to Israel during the war, the Egyptians closed the Suez Canal for Western shipping, raising transport costs by 20 million pounds per month.[89] Moreover, the Arabs imposed an oil embargo on Great Britain and withdrew their money from British banks. The economic shock resulted in a severe deficit in Britain's balance of payments, compelling the government to devalue the pound. The adverse economic consequences of Great Britain's support to Israel forced Great Britain to adopt a position towards the conflict which was more accommodating towards the Arab world.[90] According to Rynhold and Spyer, this caused an increased emphasis on trade relations with the Arab states at the expense of high politics from the 1970s onward.[91]

The threat of an oil embargo has lost considerable power due to the development of Britain's own oil sources in the 1970s. However, stability in the region is still important as unrest could negatively influence world oil prices, thereby affecting the British economy. Additionally, a stable environment is essential for the British petrol companies active in the region.[92] Furthermore, ensuring stability in the region would help promote trade. Trade with the region had been very lucrative, especially the trade in military equipment. The sale of arms to the region has been of substantial economic importance as it provided employment and helped to improve Britain's trade balance with the region. The 1985 al-Yamana arms deal alone totaled more than 40 billion pounds.[93] Such sales had considerable influence on British policy towards the MEPP. One example being an arms deal with Saudi Arabia in exchange for British efforts for pressing for a more pro-Palestinian stance in the 1980 Venice Declaration.[94] Even today, the Middle East remains a key market for British arms exports. In 2013, it represented more than two-thirds of new British arms export contracts.[95]

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[89] Moshe Gat, 'Britain and Israel Before and After the Six Day War, June 1967: From Support to Hostility', Contemporary British History 18:1 (2004) 61.

[90] Ibid, 61.

[91] Rynhold and Spyer, 'British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena 1973-2004', 146.

[92] Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict,* 112.

[93] Greene, *Blair, Labour, and Palestine,* 27.

[94] Rynhold and Spyer, 'British Policy in the Arab-Israeli Arena 1973-2004', 146.

[95] Edward Buke, 'An awkward embrace: the UK's re-emerging role in the Middle East', FRIDE Policy brief 186 (October 2014) 2.

The sale of arms to the region provides a contrasting image of British policy in the region. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the UK imposed an arms embargo on Israel which would last until 1994 when progress in the Peace Process was made. [96] Albeit the British government did not impose a new arms embargo on Israel, it continued to put arms sales under close scrutiny. Between 2000 and 2008, of the 237 arms export licenses, 24 were revoked. Moreover, in July 2009, five weapon contracts were canceled due to disproportionate violence during the 2008-2009 Gaza War.[97] This stands in stark contrast with British arms sales to the rest of the region which usually continue despite human rights violations. A reason for this could be that arms sales to the rest of the region are significantly higher than to Israel. As the US is responsible for almost 95% of Israeli military equipment imports, there is only marginal room for British arms sales.[98]

Thus, like France, the UK has significant economical interests with the Arab world. However in contrast to the French, this has not led to a position which decidedly favors the Palestinian side. The large Muslim minority in the UK also seem to have relatively little influence on the British position towards the Peace Process. Instead, this position is influenced by the prevailing approach in the British government as well as its special relation with the US.

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[96] Rory Miller, 'Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel', Israel Affairs 12:4 (2006) 642-664, 656
[97] Gerald M. Steinberg , Anne Herzberg and Asher Fredman, 'A farewell to arms? NGO campaigns for embargoes on military exports: the case of the UK and Israel', Israel Affairs 19:3 (2013) 472.
[98] Steinberg , Herzberg & Fredman, 'A farewell to arms?', 471.

# Germany

Compared to France and Great Britain, Germany is a very different international actor. Even though France and Britain are faced with a relative decline of power, they still remain major powers. They have a large military apparatus with nuclear capability and maintain a permanent seat in the UNSC. Both have had a long imperial tradition which resulted in historical ties with many countries and an active foreign policy. Additionally, they have a strongly developed strategic culture in which the use of military force is acceptable when necessary. Germany on the other hand could not be more different. It neither has nuclear arms nor a permanent seat in the UNSC. While it does have a sizeable army, it is meant solely for defence purposes. While it is one of the largest economies in the world, it is hesitant to take a leading role in Europe or on the international stage. Moreover, it is antagonistic to the use of military force. The main cause of this attitude is Germany's dark World War Two past. What the latter meant for Germany's foreign policy tradition, foreign policy mechanics and integration policy will be discussed below.

## Civilian power Germany

Right after the Second World War, the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) foreign policy was dominated by two issues: rehabilitation and security. The end of the Second World War had left Germany ruined and divided. Fearing a resurgence of German militarism, the allies did not allow the FRG to have military forces. However, the start of the Cold War drastically changed this. West Germany was in the center of Europe and shared a long border with the Warsaw Bloc. Due to this, not only West Germany but the whole of Western Europe was dangerously exposed to a Soviet attack. The Soviet threat became even more apparent with the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949) and the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953). The FRG's first Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Konrad Adenauer, therefore sought a way to increase West German security. This was done through promoting a close alliance with the US and the militarization of West Germany. As direct militarization was highly controversial within both the West and East, Adenauer sought to integrate Germany in Western multilateral organizations to take away western concerns. This policy of *Westbindung* did not only lead to increased security, it also expedited the rehabilitation of

West Germany.[99] Examples of this are the European Coal and Steel Community and Germany's remilitarization under NATO command.

The defeat of the Third Reich had a profound influence on the FRG and its foreign policy. The war had left a strong pacifistic sentiment in West-German society. In addition to this, the Western Allies wanted to make sure that aggressive ambitions would not resurface in West Germany. This resulted in a very pacifistic constitution. This constitution, the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law), restricted the use of force to the defense of German territory and mutual collective security.[100] Moreover, the *Grundgesetz* commits Germany to the promotion of human rights, democracy and the active participation in multilateral organizations.[101] The nature of the *Grundgesetz* and the strong pacifistic character of German society has led to Germany being coined a 'civilian power'. Maull, a prominent author on civilian power, describes a civilian power as "a particular foreign-policy identity which promoted multilateralism, institution-building and supranational integration".[102] In addition to this, a civilian power puts strong stress on the use of diplomacy over force. This culture of national restraint facilitated Germany's international rehabilitation. However, it also prevented Germany to act independently in foreign affairs. Instead, it deferred leadership to the US or occasionally to the EEC. This resulted in low political engagement towards the Middle East.

However, one issue in which Germany played an active role was the security of Israel. After the Second World War, Adenauer wanted to restore German legitimacy by showing West Germany's willingness to atone for the crimes committed by the Nazi regime. Adenauer, and many Germans with him, felt that West Germany had a moral obligation to the young Jewish state to pay reparations and help provide security.[103] This would not only restore West Germany's legitimacy but also improve Germany's relationship with the US. The first step in the development of a 'special relationship' between Germany and Israel was set with the 1952 Luxembourg Restitution Agreement between the FRG and Israel.[104] This Agreement marked the start of extensive financial reparations to Israel which continued over the following decades. These reparations were later expanded to include secret arms shipments to Israel.

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[99] Philipp Schweers, 'Still a "Civilian Power"? The changing approach in German Security Policy after 1990', Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik Analyse 27 (2008) 9-10.
[100] Fabian Breuer, 'Between ambitions and financial constraints: The reform of the German armed forces', German Politics 15:2 (2006) 207.
[101] Schweers, 'Still a "Civilian Power"?' 8.
[102] H. Maull, 'Germany and the use of force: still a 'civilian power'?', Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 42:2 (2000) 56.
[103] Paul Belkin, 'Germany's Relations with Israel: Background and Implications for German Middle East Policy', CRS Report for Congress (2007) 2.
[104] Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict,* 69.

These were kept secret as there was much domestic and international opposition to such practices. When German newspapers exposed these deliveries in 1964, severe crises ensued within Germany and between Germany and the Arab world.[105]

The diplomatic crisis between the FRG and the Arab world culminated during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 when Arabian oil producing states imposed an oil embargo on the FRG. The ensuing Energy Crisis led Chancellor Willy Brandt to adopt a different policy towards the Middle East. Under the new policy of 'even-handedness', Germany sought to maintain its special relationship with Israel while improving its relations with the Arab world.[106] However, this balanced policy was at times very problematic as it could be very difficult to satisfy commitments to Israel without violating those to Arab states and vice versa.[107] The special relationship between Germany and Israel exists until this day. With the full restoration of Germany's sovereignty in 1991, extensive German commitments to Israel were no longer needed to rehabilitate Germany. Instead, the special relationship hinged solely on a moral responsibility to protect the Israeli state.[108] This was underlined in Chancellor Merkel's speech to the Knesset in 2008. In this speech, Merkel stated that the security of Israel remained a "historischen Verantwortung Deutschlands" and part of German "Staatsräson".[109]

The early 1990s marked a radical change in Germany's international position. With Germany's reunification in 1990, Germany became the third biggest economy in the world and the most populous member of the EEC. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought an end to the East-West conflict. This resulted in a fundamental change in Germany's geopolitical position and security. The German reunification raised fears over a resurgence of German nationalism and an aggressive foreign policy. To dispel these fears, the German government refrained from unilateralist moves. Instead, it continued to focus on cooperation through multilateral and supra-national frameworks such as the EU. Additionally, Germany continued to defer leadership in foreign affairs to the US.[110]

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[105] Belkin, 'Germany's Relations with Israel', 2-3.
[106] Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict* 70.
[107] Marco Overhaus, 'A "new" German foreign policy in the Middle East?' in: Marco Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch, *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue* (Trier 2002) 6.
[108] Timo Behr, 'Germany: from self-restraint to leadership?' in: Timo Behr and Teija Tiilikainen (eds.), *Northern Europe and the making of the EU's Mediterranean and Middle East policies. Normative leaders or passive bystanders?* (Dorchester 2015) 54.
[109] Angela Merkel (18 March 2008), Speech to the Knesset.
[110] Patrick Müller, 'The Europeanization of Germany's Foreign Policy toward the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: Between Adaptation to the EU and National Projection', Mediterranean Politics 16:3 (2011) 392-393.

This began to change by the end of the 1990s. The abolishment of border controls by the Schengen Treaty of 1990 had extended Germany's border to the Mediterranean. Therefore, Mediterranean security issues such as terrorism, illegal immigration and organized crime now became German security issues as well.[111] In addition to this, several EU actors had growing aspirations for the EU in the region. The European Parliament, the European Commission and individual member states such as France were pushing for more active European involvement in the MEPP. The inception of the CFSP and the creation of the post of HR had created the perfect platform for this. While German policymakers became concerned that this would lead to a European policy which would deviate too much from the German position, it also created opportunities. Through the CFSP, Germany could free itself from its traditional constraints. The CFSP could be used as a cover for German policies. By uploading its national preferences to the European level, Germany could follow policies which would otherwise face domestic or international criticism.[112]

## Foreign policy mechanics of Germany

In early 1948, the Western occupying powers instructed the Minister Presidents of the *Länder,* the federal states within Germany, to draft a constitution for the FRG. The *Grundgesetz* was initially meant to be a provisional constitution but remains up to today fundamental to Germany.[113] The *Grundgesetz* was deeply influenced by the experiences of the Weimar Republic and the Second World War. First of all, the *Länder* wanted to avoid the flaws of the Weimar Republic. The last *Reichspräsident* of the Republic, Paul von Hindenburg, had used his extensive presidential powers to undermine the democracy and establish an authoritarian regime.[114] The rise to power of Hitler in the 1930s saw the dismantlement of the Weimar Constitution and the subsequent end of democracy. In order to prevent this from happening again, the *Grundgesetz* provides the *Länder* with considerable sovereignty. This federalization would act as a horizontal division of power.[115] However, while this causes a considerable dispersion of power in the area of foreign policy, the Federal Government holds the exclusive competence.

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[111] Annette Jünemann, *German Policies in the Mediterranean.* In: Haizam Amirah Fernández and Richard Youngs (eds.) *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade* (Madrid 2005) 113.

[112] Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict,* 74-75.

[113] Magdalena Suszycka-Jasch and Hans-Christian Jasch, 'The Participation of the German Länder in Formulating German EU-policy', The German Law Journal 10:9 (2009) 1220.

[114] Mary Fulbrook, *History of Germany 1918-2000, the Divided Nation* (Oxford 2001) 38.

[115] Suszycka-Jasch and Jasch, 'The Participation of the German Länder', 1221.

Within the Federal Government, the Federal Chancellor on the other hand holds significant power. The *Grundgesetz* provides the Chancellor with so-called *Richtlinienkompetenz* (guiding competence). This enables the Chancellor to set strategic guidelines for the federal government.[116] As a result, the foreign policy competences of the Federal Chancellor bear quite some similarities with those of the French President. It could even be argued that the Federal Chancellor enjoys a '*domaine réservé*' just like his French counterpart.

While the Federal Chancellor enjoys quite some freedom in the area of foreign affairs, it should be noted that the Bundesdag is endowed with several competences which limit the power of the Chancellor. First of all, the Bundesdag has to approve the budget. Secondly, the Bundestag can subject the government to public scrutiny though plenary debates and parliamentary committees. Third, the Bundestag has to approve the foreign deployment of German military. Finally, the Bundestag has to give its consent to international treaties signed by the German government.[117] Although the Federal President is the head of state, his function is mainly symbolical and will therefore not be further discussed here.

### *Jus sanguinis* and German integration

In contrast to France and the UK, German nationality law was based on *jus sanguinis*. *Jus sanguinis*, or right of blood, implies that people remain citizens of the same state as which their parents belong, regardless of the place they were born or lived. *Jus sanguinis* was first introduced in Bavaria in 1818 and gained in popularity in the subsequent years and became the cornerstone of the German Nationality Law in 1913.[118] The Third Reich manipulated the German Nationality Law to promote racial hierarchy and to justify the mass murder of Jews and other minorities.[119] After World War II, the pre-Nazi application of *jus sanguinis* was maintained in the FRG for two reasons. First of all, the Second World War had left many ethnic Germans scattered over Eastern Europe. There, they faced humiliation, ethnic cleansing and denaturalization. Providing these Germans a safe haven in the FRG was seen as a human right. Furthermore, *jus sanguinis* was used to put pressure on the German

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[116] Andreas Mauer, 'Germany: fragmented structures in a complex system' in: Wolfgang Wessels, Andreas Mauer and Jurgen Mittag, *Fifteen into one? The European Union and its member states* (Manchester 2003 ) 143.
[117] Thomas Jäger, Kai Oppermann, Alexander Höse, and Henrike Viehrig, 'The Salience of Foreign Affairs Issues in the German Bundestag', Parliamentary Affairs 62:3 (2009) 419-420.
[118] Marc Morjé Howard, 'The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law', German Politics 17:1 (2008) 42.
[119] Ibid, 42.

Democratic Republic (GDR); East German citizens who were expelled or managed to escape from the GDR were granted West German citizenship.[120]

This policy attracted huge numbers of Germans in the years after WWII. Bonn initially feared that the enormous influx of people would lead to severe unemployment. However, the rapid economic revival of West Germany drastically reduced unemployment. Instead, severe labor shortages threatened economic growth. To mitigate these shortages, the German government signed labor agreements with Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Portugal, and Yugoslavia.[121] This provided temporary work and resident permits to citizens of these states. In the subsequent years, many *Gastarbeiter* came to work in Germany. While many European guest workers returned to their country, a significant, mostly Turkish population remained.

These people were not integrated in German society. Instead, a remarkable system developed. The policy of *jus sanguinis* made it almost impossible for immigrants to attain German citizenship and therefore participate in the political process. However, at the same time immigrants were granted all the benefits of the German welfare system. Timo Behr coins this situation as one of 'civic exclusion'.[122] Instead of forcing immigrants to assimilate as was being done in France, the FRG applied a laissez-faire approach towards its immigrants. As the West German government was under the assumption that these immigrants would stay temporarily in Germany, no effort was made to integrate these immigrants into West German society. This led to a situation in which many first and second generation immigrants did not speak German and maintained their customs and habits. As they were allowed to retain their culture and were excluded from German citizenship, many immigrants primarily identified themselves with Islam or their homeland instead of Germany.[123] As a considerable portion of Germany's sizeable Muslim population was excluded from the political process, there was little domestic pressure to change German policy towards the MEPP.

However, by the mid 1990s, the German government started to realize that many Turkish immigrants had settled permanently in Germany. Germany had become an *Immigrationsland*, or immigration country, in which many of its immigrants were living in a

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[120] Ibid, 42.
[121] Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos and Karen Schönwälder, 'How the Federal Republic became an immigration country: norms, politics and the failure of West Germany's guest worker system', German Politics & Society 24:3 (2006) 7-9.
[122] Timo Behr, *France, Germany and Europe's Middle East Dilemma: the impact of national foreign policy traditions on Europe's Middle East Policy* (Baltimore 2009) 283.
[123] H. Julia Eksner, 'Muslim Youths in Germany and the Question of Israel-Directed Antisemitism: The Developmental and Discursive Context of a Phenomenon', European Forum at the Hebrew University, Working Paper 137/2014, 25.

parallel society within Germany. The existence of such a *Parallelgesellschaft* was viewed with increasing discomfort. There were fears that the exclusionist policies in Germany had facilitated Islamic fundamentalism in Germany. In order to remediate this, several reforms were undertaken. With the introduction of the Citizen Act in 1999, the *jus solis* principle was introduced, thereby granting citizenship to children born in Germany after 1 January 2000. Additionally, it was made possible to become a German citizen after residing in Germany for eight years and passing a language test.[124] Nonetheless, naturalization rates still remain very low. Of the four million Muslims, which represent about 5% of the German population (2010), only 45% have obtained German citizenship.[125] One of the reasons for this is the fact that the Citizen Act does not allow dual citizenship. In order to become naturalized, immigrants have to give up their former citizenship. However, as many immigrants feel themselves marginalized in German society but are entitled to all the benefits of the German welfare state, the incentive to become naturalized remains low.

**Economic factors**

During the 1960s and 1970s, Germany had been very dependent on Arab oil. On the eve of the 1973 Energy Crisis, Arab oil accounted for up to 80 percent of German oil supplies.[126] Since then, Germany has diversified its energy supply. Currently, Russia is Germany's main supplier of carbohydrates. Other suppliers are Norway and the UK.[127] While Arab oil still makes up a sizeable portion of the German energy supply, an Arabian oil boycott would not have such far-reaching consequences as in 1973. Nonetheless, Germany benefits just like France and the UK from stability in the Middle East since it facilitates stable oil prices.

In 2014, German exports to the Arab world were 37 billion Euro while German imports from Arab countries totalled 11 billion Euro.[128] This has resulted in Germany becoming an important trade partner for the region. These extensive trade ties outweigh Arabian reservations towards Germany on the grounds of it being too pro-Israel.[129] Germany's trade ties with Israel are also sizeable as the total trade amounted to over 6 billion

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[124] Howard, 'The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law', 53.

[125] Eksner, 'Muslim Youths in Germany', 16.

[126] Behr, *Germany: from self-restraint to leadership?* 51.

[127] International Energy Agency (2014), 'Energy Supply Security: The Emergency Response of IEA Countries' 205.

[128] Arab-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Ghorfa (2014), Die Deutschen Warenausfuhren in die Arabischen Staaten wachsen im Jahr 2014.

[129] Oliver Lembcke and Markus Kaim, 'The German role in the Middle East: high time for a checkup' in: *German Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, 19

dollar in 2013. This has made Israel one of Germany's biggest trade partners in the Middle East.[130]

Of the Big Three, Germany is the closest supporter of the Israeli cause. Maintaining its special relation with Israel is seen by the Germans as a way to redeem themselves. However, some of Germany's historical constraints are slowly eroding due to the increase in competences of the CFSP. This enables Germany to use the EU as a cover for a more assertive foreign policy. Nevertheless, strong emphasis on US leadership is maintained. It should be noted that just like in France and the UK, the influence of Germany's Muslim minority on its foreign policy is relatively small. Moreover, economic considerations seem to play a minor role. Despite its pro-Israel position, the Arab world has continued to maintain extensive economic ties with Germany.

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[130] Global Edge (2014), 'Israel: Trade Statistics'.

## Evolution of the EU position towards the Middle East Peace Process

For a considerable time, the Venice Declaration of June 12-13, 1980 issued by the European Council provided the basis for the Europe's policy towards the MEPP. The Venice Declaration was quite revolutionary as it demanded that "the Palestinian people [was to] be allowed to exercise fully its rights to self-determination"[131]. Additionally, the EC criticized Israel for its settlement policy in Palestine territory, stating that it was "deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East."[132] Furthermore, the EC stressed that it would "not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem." [133] Finally, it called for the inclusion of the Palestine Liberalization organization (PLO) in negotiations.

While European declarations underlined the necessity for "a homeland for the Palestinian people" and the legitimate right of the Palestinian people "to express a national identity", these statements did not include an explicit call for the creation of a Palestinian state. The first statement which mentioned Palestinian statehood as the preferred outcome of the MEPP was a statement issued at the Cardiff European Council meeting in 1998. In it, the Council had called upon Israel "to recognize the right of the Palestinians to exercise self-determination, without excluding the option of a State". A year later, at the European Council meeting in Berlin, the European Union reaffirmed its previous position on the Middle East. In addition to this, it stated for the first time that it was in favor of "the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State". [134] The last major change in the EU's position came during the EU Council summit of December 2009, when the EU recognized Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state.[135]

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[131] European Economic Community (1980), The Venice Declaration.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.
[134] European Council Conclusions (March, 1999).
[135] European Council Conclusions (December 2009).

# The CFSP before Lisbon, convergence of the Big Three?

On 1 November 1993, the Maastricht Treaty came into force, thereby establishing the EU. The Maastricht Treaty included a new framework for European cooperation in foreign policy: the CFSP. In the first part of this chapter, the mechanics and evolution of the CFSP up to the Lisbon Treaty will be discussed. In the second part, the actions of the Big Three regarding four key issues in the MEPP will be discussed. These are: the EU-Israel Association Agreement, the appointment of the EU Special Envoy to the Middle East, the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, and the Gaza War of 2008-2009. By focusing on the positions and actions of France, the UK and Germany, I will determine whether Europeanization has occurred.

## From the EPC to a Common Foreign Security Policy

In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty established the EU. One of the main innovations which the Maastricht Treaty brought about was the creation of the CFSP. It replaced the European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism, an informal forum for member states of the European Community to coordinate their positions on foreign affairs issues by consultation. The EPC had been strictly intergovernmental; positions were only formulated when all member states agreed to it. Additionally, while individual countries were expected to "take full account of the policies and interests of their European partners", there were no mechanisms to make member states adhere to common positions. Finally, none of the key documents regarding the functioning of the EPC, the Luxembourg, Copenhagen and London reports, had treaty status. Not only did this allow member states to renegotiate agreements, it also gave them the opportunity to change or abandon the EPC at will.[136]

The CFSP tried to augment the effectiveness of foreign policy making in the EU. The ineffectiveness of the EPC had been painfully clear during the Yugoslav Wars. While the war raged, the EU proved unable to come up with a unified position. The CFSP was intended to create a more coherent European foreign policy. However, the CFSP remained strictly intergovernmental as decisions in the Foreign Affairs Council were taken by unanimity. While this practice remained largely in place for the next 15 years, several major innovations within the CFSP have been brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty

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[136] Michael E. Smith, *Rules, transgovernmentalism, and the expansion of European political cooperation*. In: Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds.) *European integration and supranational governance* (Oxford 1998) 307.

of Nice (1999). The first innovation was the creation of the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign Security Policy. This enhanced the EU's international profile as it provided the EU with a 'face' for the outside world. The official mandate of the HR was to contribute "to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties."[137]

The other innovation was the introduction of 'constructive abstention'.[138] While unanimity in the decision-making process was maintained, member states could now abstain from voting. An abstention would not be seen as a veto. This enabled the EU to adopt decisions without the affirmative vote of all its members. In the event that a member state abstains, it is not obliged to adhere to the EU decision. However, the member state is expected to refrain from taking decisions which might interfere with the decision. During my research, I have not found a single case of a member state ignoring a decision regarding the MEPP.

Finally, the Treaty of Nice (1999) enabled the practice of 'enhanced cooperation' within the CFSP framework. Enhanced cooperation allowed cooperation between a minimum of member states on issues without other member states involved. However, enhanced cooperation must be undertaken within the EU framework of the CFSP. Additionally, any enhanced cooperation must be submitted to the European Commission who will ascertain if the proposed cooperation is consistent with other EU policies. Moreover, it has to be submitted to the Council which has to vote on it by unanimity.[139] These measures have created such high thresholds that enhanced cooperation on such a sensitive and contentious issue such as the MEPP is unthinkable.

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[137] Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts (1997), art. J.16.

[138] Consolidation version of the Treaty on European Union art. 31.

[139] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 329.

**The EU-Israel Association Agreement**

Germany is a staunch proponent of what Patrick Müller has dubbed 'economic peacemaking'.[140] Germany argues that the EU should support the peace process in the Middle East through promoting economic growth. During the German Presidency of the EU in the second half of 1994, Germany campaigned for the development of closer economic ties between the EU and Israel. It thereby received close support from Great Britain.[141] At the 1994 Essen European Council meeting, it was agreed that Israel should enjoy a "special status in its relations with the EU".[142] Consequently, the EU and Israel signed the EU-Israel Association Agreement (AA) in November 1995. However it took four more years before the AA was ratified by all relevant actors. The Bundestag quickly ratified the AA. However, despite efforts by President Chirac, the Assemblée Nationale used one of its few instruments to influence French foreign policy and refused to ratify the AA. The Assemblée Nationale mentioned the lack of progress in the Peace Process as the reason for its refusal.[143] Only after the signing of the Hebron Agreement between Israel and the PLO did the Assemblée Nationale ratify the AA.

While the ratification of the AA agreement is an important sign of convergence, it is difficult to assign this to Europeanization. The main reason for this is the fact that it was in the interest of the Big Three to establish closer economic cooperation with Israel as it was a strong and developed economy. Closer cooperation could have a positive impact on the economies of the Big Three. However, the fact that the Big Three were willing to harm their relations with the Arab world over the AA agreement, thereby possibly harming their economic interests, seems to suggest that economic ties didn't trump political ones. Thus, the AA agreement is a sign of Europeanization in the first place.

**The Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process**

Even though France did not always manage to successfully upload its position to the EU, its considerable efforts to stake out a more prominent role for France (and thus the EU) did force the other member states to focus on the region.[144] One example of this is President Chirac's

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[140] Müller, 'The Europeanization of Germany's Foreign Policy', 393.
[141] Müller, 'EU foreign policy making', 124.
[142] European Council Conclusions (December, 1994).
[143] Pia Christina Wood, 'Chirac's 'New Arab Policy' and Middle East Challenges: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Iraq and Iran', Middle East Journal 52:4 (1998) 571.
[144] Paul-Marie de La Gorce, 'Europe and the Arab-Israel Conflict: A Survey', Journal of Palestine Studies 26 :3 (1997) 5.

speech at the Cairo University on 8 April 1996 which gained much attention worldwide. Among other things, Chirac spoke of France's dedication to the rights of peoples to self-determination, thereby indirectly referring to the Palestinians. Moreover, he stated that he did not speak for France but for the EU as a whole.[145] By doing so, Chirac forced the EU to take action. In a response, the European Council decided to appoint a special envoy to the Peace Process. After vigorous lobbying by France, Miguel Moratinos, the Spanish ambassador to Israel, was appointed as envoy. The choice for Moratinos represented a major diplomatic victory of France over more pro-Israeli member states such as Germany and the UK. The reason for this was that the position of Spain towards the Peace Process was quite close to the stance of France. Spain had always tried to follow a balanced policy towards the MEPP, favoring both the Israeli right for security and the Palestinian right for self-determination.[146] However, Germany and the UK made sure that the mandate of the EU envoy would not interfere with US diplomacy in the Middle East.[147] This reduced the envoy's room for maneuver considerably. The novelty of the position as well as the fact that the special envoy was of a member state whose position was close to that of France resembled an important diplomatic victory for France. This event is a clear instance of successful Europeanization through the uploading of national positions.

**The 2006 elections**

On 26 January 2006, the first Palestinian legislative elections in ten years were held. The next day, the EU Election Observation Mission reported that the elections had been "open and fairly-contested".[148] The elections had led to a stunning victory by the Change and Reform Party, the political branch of Hamas. This victory created a big dilemma for the EU. Just two years prior to the elections, Hamas had been put on the European terror blacklist as it had refused to renounce violence and recognize Israel. The EU now had to choose between dealing with a democratically elected government or sever all contacts.

In reaction to the victory of Hamas, the US cut off aid to the Palestine Authority while continuing to provide funds for humanitarian projects through nongovernmental

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[145] Daniel W. Kuthy, 'Old interests, new purpose' in: *Strategic Interests in the Middle East*, 29.
[146] De La Gorce, 'Europe and the Arab-Israel Conflict: A Survey', 5-6.
[147] Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict,* 123.
[148] European Union (2006). European Union election observation mission West Bank & Gaza 2006. Statement of preliminary conclusions.

organizations.[149] The British did the same before the EU could come up with a common position.[150] During EU deliberations on the Hamas victory, the UK, who was supported by Germany on this issue, successfully managed to upload its position the European level. This resulted in a boycott of the Hamas government and a suspension of EU aid to the Hamas controlled Gaza Strip until Hamas adhered to the Quartet's principles.[151] Regardless of the boycott, France and Sweden continued to have informal contacts with Hamas officials.[152] However, France closed ranks with the UK and Germany when Sweden issued Schengen visas to Hamas officials. This lead to heavy criticism from the Big Three.[153] It is not entirely clear why France adopted this position. However, one reason for this could be that continued defiance of the more punitive stance of most EU members would have isolated France too much. This could therefore be seen as an instance of more forceful influences of Europeanization.

**The 2008-2009 Gaza War**

On 4 November 2008, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) launched an operation in Gaza with the goal of destroying an illegal supply tunnel. During this operation, six Hamas members were killed. Hamas retaliated by launching Kassam rockets at Israel, ending the truce which had existed since 19 June 2008.[154] This led to an escalation of violence culminating in Operation Cast Lead. Operation Cast Lead started on 27 December 2008 with Israeli airstrikes on Gaza. The European presidency, which was held by France at that time, condemned both the rocket strikes and air raids. In addition to this, the Presidency called for an immediate end of the violence and condemned the disproportionate use of force.[155] The British had taken a similar position to this whereas Germany emphasized Israel's right to defend itself. Moreover, it stated that Hamas was to blame for the escalation of violence.[156] Still, the statement after the

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[149] Martha Finnemore, 'Legitimacy, hypocrisy, and the social structure of unipolarity', World Politics 61:01 (2009) 58-85.

[150] Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict,* 118.

[151] Richard Youngs, *Europe in the New Middle East: Opportunity Or Exclusion* (2014) 205.

[152] Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict,* 57-58.

[153] The Local (2014). Hamas visit to Sweden condemned.

[154] Gawdat Bahgat, 'The Gaza War and the Changing Strategic Landscape in the Middle East: An Assessment', Mediterranean Quarterly 20:3 (2009) 63.

[155] Presidency of the Council of the European Union (27 December 2008). Declaration by the Presidency of the Council of the European Union on the violence in Gaza.

[156]Der Spiegel International (2008). Israeli self-defense: Merkel blasts Hamas for Middle East violence.

Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 30 December showed considerable convergence as it called for an "immediate and permanent ceasefire."[157]

However, on 1 January 2009, the Czech Republic took over the EU Presidency. The Czech Republic is one of Israel's staunchest supporters and therefore took a much lighter stance on the conflict. When Israel commenced a ground offensive in Gaza, the presidency stated that the action was "defensive, not offensive".[158] This statement was much criticized by many member states. France and the UK responded quickly by stating that the statement did not bind them and that it damaged reconciliation attempts.[159] The Czechs apologized, stating that the only official standpoint of the Czech Republic is the position which was agreed on during the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 30 December, calling for "the establishment of a ceasefire".[160] Yet unlike the statement of the Foreign Affair Council, the new Czech Presidency only called for the "establishment of a ceasefire", not one that was "immediate and permanent." This statement was much more favourable to Israel than the one during the French Presidency. Only after UN Security Council Resolution 1860 was adopted did the EU presidency clearly call for "immediate cessation of military action on both sides".[161]

Resolution 1860 was largely drafted by Great Britain. During the war, Britain had coordinated its position closely with the EU. The British position closely resembled that of the EU, calling for an immediate ceasefire.[162] However, for some time, it did not come to a vote in the UNSC as the US was unfavourable to the draft Resolution, stating that Israel had the right to defend itself. In parallel with the British sponsored draft Resolution, France was conducting its own diplomacy. On 6 January 2009, President Sarkozy and the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak proposed a plan to end the crisis. It called for an immediate ceasefire, an immediate resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks to prevent a repetition of violence and it called for Palestinian reconciliation.[163] Just before Resolution 1860 would be adopted, France tried to delay the adoption to provide more time for the French-Egyptian proposal.[164] This generated considerable frustration among the Security Council members.

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[157] Presidency of the Council of the European Union (30 December 2008), 'Statement by the European Union on the situation in the Middle East'

[158] Reuters (2009). Europe at odds over Israeli land offensive in Gaza.

[159] Ceren Mutuş, 'An Overall Assessment of the French EU Presidency', USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law 2 (2009) 450.

[160] Czech Presidency of the European Union (2009). Official EU Presidency statement concerning the situation in the Middle East.

[161] Czech Presidency of the European Union (2009). EU Presidency statement on the Middle East.

[162] Müller, *EU foreign policy making and the Middle East conflict,* 118.

[163] Security Council Report, 'Israel/Palestine: Gaza', update report 3 (2009) 3.

[164] Ibid, 8.

French attempts to become a mediator did also cause considerable frustrations within the EU. During the second half of 2008, France had presented itself as a mediator in the escalating conflict. However, when the EU presidency passed to the Czech Republic in January 2009, Sarkozy refused to let the Czechs resume the mediator role. According to several French officials, the French believed that the Czech Republic was not up for the job as it lacked the resources and influence.[165] In an interview, the French finance minister, Eric Woerth, stated that president Sarkozy was "the only one capable of taking an initiative like this".[166] This resulted in much overlap as both President Sarkozy and the EU send separate diplomatic missions to a peace summit in Egypt. This form of independent diplomacy was highly typical for Sarkozy. During the Lebanon War of 2006 and the Russian-Georgian conflict over South Ossetia, Sarkozy also acted as a mediator.

The events around the Gaza War of 2008/2009 clearly indicated that France wanted to act independently. By presenting itself as being an independent and highly visible mediator, France gained *grandeur*. France's refusal to give the Czechs the leading role in the mediations and the separate French-Egyptian peace proposal show that France continues to pursue an independent, highly visible foreign policy. Moreover, it shows that the British position moved closer to that of the EU as it proposed Resolution 1860, thereby directly opposing US policy. Germany on the other hand continued to be a close supporter of Israel by defending Israeli actions.

The period from the CFSP's inception to its redefinition with the Lisbon Treaty has witnessed only limited convergence. During this period, Germany remained a staunch supporter of the Israeli case. France on the other hand remained a firm ally of the Palestinians, not in the least to maintain its independent and visible foreign policy. However, the one striking difference was the UK's during the 2008-2009 Gaza War in which the UK significantly converged on the main EU position.

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[165] Müller, 'The Europeanization of France's foreign policy', 123.
[166] EUobserver (2009). EU sends mixed message as Gaza death toll mounts.

# The Lisbon Treaty and the MEPP

The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2009, introduced significant changes to the CFSP. The first part of this chapter will describe the main innovations brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. The second part of this chapter will investigate if these innovations have helped Europeanize the foreign policies of the Big three by looking at their response towards the Palestinian bid for full UN membership in 2011.

## The Lisbon Treaty: in search of greater coherence

The introduction of the CFSP in 1993 and the position of HR in 1997 had created many different actors which represented the EU on the world stage. At the top level, the EU was either represented by the President of the Commission or the government holding the presidency. On the ministerial level, the EU was either represented by the Commissioner for External Affairs, by the Foreign Minister of the member state holding the Presidency or the HR. This complicated decision-making and undermined the EU's external representation. Especially when issues fell under shared competences. Therefore, the member states sought to increase the visibility of the EU on the world stage and make the EU's foreign policy more efficient and coherent.

Several important steps towards greater coherence and efficiency were taken with the Lisbon Treaty. First of all, it introduced a non-rotating President of the European Council. Furthermore, it greatly expanded the competences of the HR. The position of HR was merged with that of the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy. Moreover, the HR acts as Vice President of the Commission, creating a 'triple-hatted' role. The HR represents the EU on the world stage, chairs the European Council and coordinates the work of the Commissioners responsible for external relation portfolios. OIn this, the HR is assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS was established on 1 December 2010 and provided the EU with its own diplomatic network. It transformed the existing Commission Representations abroad into official European Union Delegations.[167]

However, the delegation of competences to the HR did not go hand in hand with a transfer of decision-making power to the supranational level. Decision-making is still based

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[167] Rosa Balfour, *Change and continuity: a decade of evolution in EU foreign policy and the creation of the European External Action Service*. In: Rosa Balfour, Caterina Carta and Kristi Raik (eds.) *The European External Action Service and national foreign ministries. Convergence or divergence?* (Surrey 2015) 35-38.

on unanimity. [168] With no mechanism to make member states comply with decisions, execution remains dependent on the political will of member states. Additionally, the creation of a full-time chair for the Foreign Affairs Council has not automatically increased the EU's ability to reach consensus on foreign policy issues. This is also very dependent on the HR's standing with the member states. According to Müller, HR Catherine Ashton (2009-2014) did not have the trust and support of important member states. This severely hampered her ability to generate consensus amongst the member states. [169]

The EEAS has a central role in the coordination of foreign policy. It has to deliver foreign policy to the supranational institutions (horizontal coordination) and has to take into account the positions of the 28 member states (vertical coordination). It therefore has the potential to play a significant role in the Europeanization of foreign policy. First of all, it can promote the convergence of national policy preferences (downloading dimension). Secondly, a third of the EEAS diplomatic corps is recruited from national member states' existing diplomatic personnel. [170] Moreover, national governments have insisted that national diplomats head European diplomatic delegations abroad. [171] This helps member states to upload their national preferences to the European level, thereby using the EEAS as an instrument of national power. [172] Thirdly, convergence may also occur through the cross-fertilization of national foreign policy ideas. Finally, convergence may happen through the process of elite socialization. Extensive coordination and cooperation between national diplomats can create a new *esprit de corps* which is European instead of national. However, as the EEAS is relatively new, it is not clear whether this is already occurring or not. [173] However, there are also limits to the EEAS' ability to coordinate national foreign policy. First of all, some national Ministries of Foreign Affairs view the EEAS as a competitor. They therefore prefer to conduct diplomacy on their own. [174] Secondly, some member states refuse to cooperate on certain foreign policy issues as they see it as a competence reserved for the member state. [175]

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[168] Patrick Müller, 'Europe's Foreign Policy and the Middle East Peace Process: The Construction of EU Actorness in Conflict Resolution', <u>Perspectives on European Politics and Society</u> 14:1 (2013) 31.
[169] Ibid, 31.
[170] Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik, 'The European External Action Service and National Foreign Ministries', European Policy Centre Issue Paper (March 2013) 3.
[171] Christian Lequesne, *At the center of coordination: staff, resources and procedures in the European External Action Sercvice and in the delegations. In: Rosa Balfour, Caterina Carta and Kristi Raik (eds.) The European External Action Service and national foreign ministries. Convergence or divergence?* (Surrey 2015) 46-47.
[172] Ibid, 47.
[173] Ibid, 47.
[174] Balfour and Raik, 'The European External Action Service', 3
[175] Lequesne, *At the center of coordination,* 51.

**The response to the Palestinian bid for UN membership**

When Hamas and Fatah formed a unity government in April 2011, the Peace Process was all but dead. The US-sponsored peace negotiations had collapsed in September and it was unlikely that is would be revived soon.[176] However, the start of popular revolts against autocratic regimes across the Middle East and Northern Africa, the Arab Spring, had given new impetus to the Palestinian's drive for an end to the conflict. In order to accomplish the latter, the Palestinians tried to force a breakthrough by declaring their intention to request full UN membership by September 2011. This would imply UN recognition of Palestine as a state. The Palestinian plan evoked a lot of commotion. While giving Palestine a full-fledged membership of the UN did not signify the de facto establishment of a Palestinian state, it would certainly give Palestine more legitimacy. Moreover, it allowed them to participate in General Assembly debates and it would allow the Palestinian's to join international agencies such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Membership of the ICC would enable the Palestinians to file charges against Israel on grounds of war crimes and crimes against humanity.[177] Israel does not acknowledge the jurisdiction of the ICC and has therefore no legal obligation to adhere to verdicts of the ICC. However, a negative verdict would further isolate Israel internationally. Therefore, Israel vigorously tried to prevent this from happening.

Israel was backed in this by the US. However, the Big Three became increasingly concerned with the lack of progress and American inaction in the Peace Process. After the US exercised its veto on the 'draft United Nations resolution on Israeli settlements' of 18 February 2011, both France and the UK signalled that they would support the Palestine bid for full UN membership if there was still no progress in the Peace Process by September 2011.[178] Germany, in turn, pressed Israel for concessions. Young attributes this remarkable convergence of positions to the Arab Spring. These popular revolts "appeared to have propelled European governments into a more proactive stance".[179] However, it can also be interpreted as a tactic to put pressure on the Israeli government to compromise and to return to the negotiating table. Any hopes of achieving this were dashed during a visit by Prime Minister Netanyahu to Berlin in April 2011. During his visit, Chancellor Merkel assured him

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[176] Youngs, *Europe in the New Middle East,* 205.
[177] Joshua Berzak, 'The Palestinian Bid for Statehood: Its Repercussions for Business and Law', Journal of International Business and Law 12:1 (2013) 20-21.
[178] Alexander Ruesche and Andreas Hackl, 'Showdown in September? The Palestinian bid for statehood at the United Nations', Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2011) 5.
[179] Youngs, *Europe in the New Middle East,* 207.

that Germany would vote against any unilateral move by the Palestinians to attain full UN membership. This ended any illusion that the Big Three were a united front.[180]

This was a serious problem for the EU. A failure to vote as a unified bloc in the vote on full Palestinian membership to the UN would not only undermine the EU's previous declarations on the issue but it would hamper the EU's wish to become a credible actor in international affairs in general and in the Peace Process in particular. Therefore, HR Ashton tried to unify the position of the 27 member states. This proved very difficult as the member states' positions on the subject diverged substantially.[181] In addition to this, her efforts were more than once undermined by the French who stuck to their own ideas about the Peace Process. In June, the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Alain Juppé, said that France was prepared to transform a planned international donor conference for Palestine in Paris into a "broader political conference involving the negotiation process".[182] By upgrading the Paris donor conference, France would put itself into the spotlight. However, both the US and Israel were negative towards this plan. In late August, France broke ranks again when President Sarkozy publicly presented his own proposal to the MEPP, thereby calling for an UN observer state status for Palestine. In addition to this, he called on the member states of the EU to "speak with a single voice".[183] This independent and uncoordinated move was not appreciated by other EU actors and damaged France's standing in the EU.

These decisions clearly reflect France's desire to maintain a leadership position in the EU. Moreover, they showed France's desire to maintain an independent foreign policy, thereby improving France's visibility on the world stage. In the face of European disunity, France decided to press for a solution without European help. This clearly shows that France sees European cooperation in foreign affairs as a tool for France. In addition to increasing France's *grandeur*, commentators have also stated that Sarkozy's latest remark served domestic goals. With Presidential elections drawing near, the statehood issue could deliver him additional votes.[184] Sarkozy's statement could not only deliver him many votes from France's Muslim population, but also from the French electorate in general. A poll conducted by the Institut français d'opinion publique just prior to the UN vote showed that 82% of the French population supported Palestinian statehood.[185]

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[180] Ruesche and Hackl, 'Showdown in September?' 5.
[181] Müller, 'The Construction of EU Actorness in Conflict Resolution', 31.
[182] Radio France Internationale (2014). France proposes Mid East peace conference in July.
[183] Eubusiness (2011). EU needs 'one voice' on Palestinian statehood: Sarkozy.
[184] France24 (2011). Sarkozy to gain most from plan for Palestinian state.
[185] Institut français d'opinion publique (2011), Palestine Poll Results.

In the end, it did not come to a vote in the UNSC. When the Palestinians submitted the resolution to the UNSC, it failed to get the required 9 out of 15 votes. In the face of an American veto, the UK and France abstained from supporting the resolution. While, the resolution was not put to a vote, the vote on Palestinian membership to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in late October 2011 indicates how divided the Big Three were on the issue. Germany voted against, France was in favour and the UK abstained.[186]

The vote in the UN General Assembly on 29 November 2012 to upgrade Palestine's status to that of 'non-observer state' however shows a remarkable change in the position of Germany. Instead of voting against, Germany abstained. This came as a big shock for Israel. Nonetheless, Germany's abstention should not be seen as a fundamental change in German policy on the MEPP. Germany's moral commitment to the state of Israel remains intact. This was clear in Germany's choice to refrain from selling submarines to Egypt. Moreover, Germany continued to support Israel's position in the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program.[187] Commentators state that Merkel had become annoyed with Israel's unwillingness to make concessions towards the Palestinians.

The issue of full UN membership for Palestine shows that there is almost no convergence in the policies of the Big Three. However, in matters which are less vital to their national foreign policies, such as Palestinian membership to UNESCO, considerable convergence has occurred. It could therefore be argued that Europeanization has only occurred in policy area's which do not endanger national interests. However, it is difficult to attribute this instance of Europeanization to the strengthening of European foreign policy tools by the Lisbon Treaty.

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[186] EUobserver (2011). UNESCO vote highlights EU split on Palestine.
[187] Der Spiegel International (2012). An affront from Berlin: Israeli-German relations strained after abstention.

**Conclusion**

This thesis has tried to determine whether the foreign policies of France, the UK and Germany towards the MEPP have been Europeanized since the inception of the CFSP. If this would be the case, their positions on the MEPP would have showed convergence. On first sight, this has not been the case. The policy decisions of France, the UK and Germany can largely be seen as a continuation of national policies. These national policies have been heavily influenced by historical factors. So much that they have become ingrained in each state's strategic culture.

For France's foreign policy, the pursuit of *grandeur* through the *politique arabe* remains central in France's foreign policy towards the MEPP. In this pursuit of *grandeur*, the EU has been of great importance. As France's power and influence in the region waned, Europe became more and more an important channel for French influence. In line with this, France has tried to claim a leadership position in the EU's conduct regarding the MEPP. A leadership position would align Europe's position towards the MEPP more with that of France. Moreover, this leadership would grant France additional *grandeur*. A clear example of this is President Chirac's Cairo Speech in which he claimed to speak on behalf of the EU. Nevertheless, in the event that France is unable to upload its national preferences to the European level, France is not afraid to fall back on her national resources. French efforts to delay Resolution 1860 in order to offer more time for its own peace proposal is clear evidence of this. It convincingly shows that France's diplomacy towards the MEPP does not differ from past policy, thereby showing almost no signs of Europeanization. While France's position did not change, it did manage to upload some of its key positions to the European level.

In contrast to France, the UK's foreign policy towards the MEPP does show considerable Europeanization. A clear indicator of this is Great Britain's divergence from American policy on several key issues in the MEPP. Initially, Great Britain coordinated its policy towards the MEPP closely with the US. Britain's efforts to water down the mandate of the EU's Special Envoy to the Middle East and the British boycott of the Hamas government before the EU could react clearly indicate this. However, in the last few years, Great Britain has shown increased willingness to align its policy towards the MEPP more closely with that of the EU. The British draft Resolution 1860, which was in opposition to US policy, shows that Great Britain is willing to stir away from US policy and align itself with the EU. This can be considered as a tentative move to align British foreign policy towards the Peace Process

more with that of Europe. Additionally, the British threat to recognize Palestine and Great Britain's abstention during the vote on UNESCO membership for Palestine show that Great Britain is not following US policy as closely as before.

Germany's foreign policy has shown signs of Europeanization as well. As the mechanisms of the CFSP are slowly maturing, Germany was confronted with opportunities and challenges. The CFSP has enabled Germany to support decisions which would be unacceptable when taken unilaterally. The call for an immediate ceasefire in the 2008-2009 Gaza War would have met considerable domestic opposition if Germany had called for it on its own. The CFSP has also forced Germany to assume a greater role within the Peace Process. To prevent the shaping of a European policy which is detrimental to Germany's policy towards the Peace Process, Germany has to act. Germany's cooperation with Great Britain to water down the mandate of the Special Envoy to the Middle East is evidence of this.

Overall, there are signs of Europeanization in all three member states. Nevertheless, there is considerable difference between that of France on the one hand and that of the UK and Germany on the other hand. It could be argued that France exhibits Europeanization which is predominantly of an uploading kind whereas that of the UK and Germany is primarily of a downloading nature.

However, while each of the Big Three are willing to cooperate in the CFSP, it should be stressed that their self-image and history play significant roles. French exceptionalism, British Transatlanticism and Germany's moral debt will continue to dominate their policies towards the Peace Process in the near future and beyond. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the EU often managed to come up with a common position which balanced the policies of the Big Three. The CFSP is still relatively young and important institutions such as the HR and EEAS still need to mature and further define themselves. A more detailed study of their influence on the Europeanization of foreign policy would be recommended. Overall, while partial Europeanization of foreign policy towards the Peace Process can be discerned, ingrained policies continue to have decisive influence.

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