M. A. I. S. THESIS

FOSTERING DISENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM ITALY & SOUTH-EAST ASIA



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………2

Abstract …………………………………………………………………….3

Introduction ………………………………………………………………..4

Theoretical Framework & Hypothesis ………………...……………..……..5

Methodology & Sources ……………………………………………………6

Literature Review ……………………………………………………………9

Italy………….. ………………………………………………………………..12

South-East Asia ……..…………………………………………………………18

Analysis ……………………………………………………………………… 23

Conclusion & Policy Advice …………………… …………...……………….25

References ………………………………………………………………….28

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On the cover: Aldo Moro during his kidnapping by the Brigate Rosse and the monument dedicated to the victims of the 2002 Bali bombings carried out by Jemaah Islamiya.

Abstract

The conventional wisdom holds that ‘once a terrorist always a terrorist’. This paper will examine, on the contrary, how very different groups and individuals have abandoned political violence. The paper will provide a review of the literature on terrorism, particularly since 9/11 and on disengagement more specifically. Subsequently the paper will assess disengagement in Italy and South-East Asia in two ways: by looking both at the factors leading to disengagement reported by the former ‘terrorists’ and at the policies implemented by different states to foster disengagement. The author aims to show that, contrary to much of the literature on ‘new terrorism’, though violent groups, and target states differ vastly similar conclusions can be drawn on why disengagement occurs and how it can be fostered. Finally concluding remarks will be made along with policy recommendations in particular on the issue of disengaging and reintegrating returning foreign fighters.



La soluzione politica per una «generazione»

Il documento dei 51

il manifesto, 30.9.82

Il testo del documento. «Una generazione politica è detenuta»

Premessa.

Oggi, nelle carceri italiane, all'interno di quella ampia fascia di compagni che si colloca tra le due rumorose polarità costituite da «combattenti» e «pentiti», esistono diverse posizioni o tendenze che spesso preferiscono la sordina, il pianissimo, — insomman forme di comunicazione sottovoce.

Tutti coloro che esprimono queste posizioni, tuttavia, sanno con certezza qual è il problema centrale: è la ricerca di una *soluzione politica* alla questione delle migliaia di compagni oggi detenuti, latitanti, esiliati o in libertà provvisoria.

Essa si dà a partire da una pratica politica di netto rifiuto di posizioni e comportamenti «combattenti» o terroristici, come primo passaggio per sollecitare e stimolare un rapporto dialettico, attivo e propositivo con quelle forze sociali e politiche che intendono superare la politica delle leggi speciali e del terrore ed aprire una fase di trasformazione.

Tutto ciò oggi fa parte di un dibattito che rompe e attraversa ogni schieramento fondato sul passato; togliere ad esso la sordina è utile, necessario, irrinunciabile, Le «maggioranze si-

The *Documento dei 51:* one of the first documents of collective disengagement from ‘terrorism’ in Italy. Available online via ilmanifesto.info/archivio

Introduction

The vast increase in acts of terror in the last twenty years has been matched by a similar rise in academic work on the subject. Particularly since 9/11 there has been a substantial increase in publications on the subject of 'terrorism'. In 2006 one new book on terrorism was published every 6 hours (Silke 2008, p. 28), and with the rise of ISIL, Jemaah Islamiyah and the more recent attacks in Beirut, Anakra, Paris and Brussels the relevance of the subject is unlikely to decrease. In the aftermath of acts of terror, both in 2001 and more recently the rhetoric of politicians has seemed to be one of a hard militaristic approach, aimed at fighting 'until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated (Bush 2001)'.

The discourse in these times is one of dehumanization of the enemy and its 'evil ideology', calling for nations to be 'merciless against the barbarians [of Daesh]' (Hollande 2015). How can further polarization and conflict be avoided? While security forces are essential to neutralize imminent threats, and contrasting further radicalization may prevent the materialization of future 'terrorists' there also a need for policies aimed at fostering disengagement and defection of current violent non state actors.



Fig. 1: GTD (2015) The chart shows the dramatic increase in acts of terror globally since the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Disengagement is 'a process through which a member of a terror group, radical movement, gang, or cult chooses to cease participation in acts of violence' (Hwang 2015, p. 2) it is therefore the process through which a member of a violent group may

either move to a non-violent role within the organization or abandon it. It differs from deradicalization insofar as the former indicates a behavioral change while the latter ‘denotes a change in values and attitudes’ (*ibid*). An individual can be deradicalized but still engaged in violent political activity for various reasons, in other words: ‘not all individuals who engage in terrorism are radical and not all individuals who disengage are ‘deradicalized’ upon their departure’ (Altier *et al.* 2014, p. 648).
Most research within ‘terrorism studies’ has been focused on why people engage in political violence, leaving the study of disengagement ‘conceptually and theoretically underdeveloped’ (*ibid*, p. 647). However, researching and fostering disengagement may have multiple positive outcomes.
In the short term disengaged individuals may provide valuable information for counter-terrorism operations. In the medium term negotiating with individual members can lead to fear of infiltrators which undermines in group cohesion, by breeding ‘mistrust and resentment among members’ (Abrahms 2008, p. 105). Undermining internal cohesion is a key element of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. In the long term seeing individuals that have renounced the armed struggle and cooperated with the justice system may be an incentive and example for others to abandon violent non-state organizations; furthermore the example of these individuals may help prevent the radicalization of others.

Theoretical Framework & Hypothesis

Modern ‘terrorism’ can be said to have originated with what Rapoport has called the ‘Anarchist wave’ between the 19th and 20th century. The American scholar has theorized that modern violent non-state actors can be divided into four temporally and ideologically different ‘waves’ (2006). The ‘Anti-colonial wave’ followed the Anarchist one as many groups in territories under colonial rule fought for self determination and independence. This wave was followed by the ‘New Left’ wave, in which ‘terrorist’ groups, mostly in Europe carried out attacks with the purpose of initiating a Marxist-Leninist revolution. The Italian groups *Brigate Rosse* (BR) and *Prima Linea* (PL) were a part of this wave. The fourth ‘Religious wave’ overlaps with the third one and continues to the present day and is composed mostly of Islamist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI).
Recently many scholars have noted that this fourth wave constitutes a new kind of ‘terrorism’. Groups of this ‘New Terrorism’ are said to be less rational and more

lethal than previous waves. The novel features of this wave will be outlined in the literature review. Regarding this wave as a new phenomenon implies that historical antecedents are deemed irrelevant (Laqueur 2001, p. 5) and are therefore understudied.

This paper will attempt to assess the hypothesis that Islamic ‘terrorism’ is new and that lessons from the past are irrelevant. In particular the paper will attempt to assess if there are similarities in the process of disengagement, the factors reported as conducive to it, and state policies aimed at fostering it. To do so the paper will examine two very different cases of the third and fourth wave.

Firstly the paper will assess disengagement from Italian domestic left wing organizations *Brigate Rosse* (BR), and *Prima Linea* (PL) as well as the success of the Italian state’s policies aimed at fostering disengagement and defection. Secondly disengagement from transnational Islamic group *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) will be analyzed as well as the policies implemented by Singapore and Indonesia to foster it. Finally, the two cases will be compared to assess similarities.

It may seem counterintuitive to assess disengagement from a group like JI, which is still active today, however it is important to keep I mind that this paper will assess disengagement and the policies aimed at fostering it on an individual level, and not on a group level. Individual disengagement from the group or political violence will be assessed, not the group’s abandonment of violent means. Furthermore, while JI does remain active a vast part of its membership, even many leaders, have either been killed, imprisoned or disengaged, leaving the group forced to scale back activities considerably (Hwang 2015, p. 281).

Sources & Methodology

The cases have been chosen both for their difference and because their selection addresses many of the critiques mentioned in the literature review. The methodological approach will be one of a least similar case study. In this design ‘the researcher selects cases that are dissimilar in all but one independent variable but that share the same dependent variable’ (Bennett, Elman 2007, p. 175).

The Italian and South-East Asian case differ in many variables. Firstly they occupy very different historical moments and geographical settings, the Red Brigades (BR), Prima Linea (PL) and the Italian state existed in the context of the cold war in Europe and the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism, and are a part of

what Rapoport describes as the third or 'New Left' wave of terror (2006); while JI operates in South-East Asia in the context of what Barber has described as Jihad vs Mcworld (1995), a religious resistance to globalization and a group of the fourth religious wave (2006);). By comparing a group of the third wave to one contemporary one the paper aims to show that lessons can be learnt from historical antecedents which apply to what is being described as 'new terrorism', thus addressing the critiques of acontextuality and ahistoricity and undermining the 'New Terrorism paradigm'.

Secondly, the groups differ in their scope of action: the BR and PL were strictly national organizations, while JI is transnational, as it has cells in Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. The reason that a comparison is made between the Italian state on one hand and multiple South-East Asian states on the other, lies in this transnational element; because JI is a transnational group, unlike the BR or PL, the group and state responses to it also need to be assessed transnationally.

Thirdly, the attacks and targets of these two groups also differ vastly. The BR focused mainly on kidnappings, targeted assassinations and 'kneecapping', while JI has carried out large-scale bombings on western and symbolic economic targets, such as the Marriot Hotel and the Jakarta Stock Exchange. The paper aims to show that though the groups are different in almost everything but their designation as 'terrorists', an approach aimed at fostering disengagement, social reintegration and individual concessions can be a crucial part of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy in both cases, even when dealing with alleged 'new terrorists'. The table below outlines the differences and the common variable.

Italy	South East Asia
Communist Groups of 3rd Wave	Religious Group 4th Wave
Historical Context: Cold War	Historical Context: Religious reaction to globalization
Targeted Assassinations and Kidnappings	Symbolic and Civilian targets
National	Transnational
Common Variable: implementation of policies to foster disengagement	

The critique of lack of primary research (Jackson, 2005, pp. 66) in terrorism studies will be tackled by assessing two cases in which interviews with former terrorists are available. In the Italian case as there is an 'extraordinary number of autobiographies published by the former terrorists' (Cento Bull & Cooke 2013, p. xiii), here sources in Italian may also be consulted by the mother tongue author. *Storie di Lotta Armata* (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995) and Satta's history of the *Anni di Piombo* (2016) were only available in Italian and were acquired in Italy. For the South-East Asian case the interviews conducted by J. Chernov Hwang (2015) with 50 jihadis will be essential, as well as work on disengagement in the region by Abuza (2009). Initiatives like the Religious Rehabilitation Group[1] in Singapore will also be useful to assess the effectiveness of disengagement programs in the region. The case of JI presents fewer resources than the Italian one, as the group's activity is more recent.

In interviews of this type scholars have identified certain 'push' and 'pull' factors, which increase the likelihood of disengagement (*ibid.*). The former identify aspects which might lead an individual away from the organization and range form disillusionment with leaders or tactics to loss of faith in the ideology to adaptation to clandestine lifestyle. The latter outline elements which may 'pull' individuals back closer to civil society, such as the will to create a family, financial or judiciary incentives, employment or educational opportunities.

From a methodological standpoint measuring disengagement is made difficult by the secretive nature of 'terrorist' organizations, which results in a difficulty in obtaining a representative sample (Altier *et al.* 2014, p. 648). This paper will assess if disengagement is similar in both cases in two ways. The essay will ascertain if the reasons reported for disengagement are similar, and if the policies aimed at incentivizing were also alike. By doing so the author hopes to show that Islamic terrorism is not fundamentally different from its predecessors and therefore that lessons can be learnt from past experiences.

[1] Link: http://rrg.sg/

Literature Review

The field of terrorism studies has grown drastically in the last 25 years; along with its growth, the field has drawn much criticism. From an ontological perspective, the field has yet to develop one commonly accepted definition of 'terrorism', one study in fact found 109 different definitions (Schmidt & Jongman, 1988. pp. 5).

From an epistemological perspective the field has been criticized for inadequacy in primary research (Jackson, 2005, pp. 66) and for having a pro-state bias involving moral condemnation of the 'terrorists' (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996, pp. 149-150), and for being limited to addressing government agendas (Silke 2004, p. 58).

This moral condemnation often involves an 'othering' and dehumanization of the enemy and hinders understanding of how and why individuals commit acts of terror, as well as of why and how individuals might leave organizations which adopt 'terrorism' as a tool. Throughout the paper the author will attempt to avoid referring to actors as 'terrorists' and only do so in brackets, and speak instead of armed non-state actors and acts of terror.

The field has also been criticized for ahistoricity and acontextuality (Jackson et al. 2007, pp. 5). Violent Islamic fundamentalism has been described as a 'new type of terrorism [that] threatens the world' (Sageman 2004, pp. Vii). Hoffman, a leading scholar in the field wrote that, on 9/11, Bin Laden 'wiped the slate clean of conventional wisdom on terrorism' (2004, pp. Xviii). 'New Terrorism' is described as novel for a variety of factors. The actors are said to be religiously inspired by Wahhabi-Salafism, as well as by notions of martyrdom inherent in Islam (Atran, 2006) and by eternal sexual reward in paradise (Jurgensmeyer, 2000, 201). These actors are also said to not have limits on their use of violence (Simon & Benjamin 2000, p.59) (Martin 2010, p. 251) and transcendental aims (Fettweis 2009, p. 283). In contrast, nationalist violent non-state actors are said to be constrained in their use of violence by public support (Fettweis 2009, p. 281). The implication here is that 'new terrorists' are not rational and therefore any negotiation or concession would be useless, the only solution being total military victory (*ibid,* p. 283). Scholars have concluded that 'Terrorists kill and accept death for a cause with which no accommodation is possible, political Islam' (Frum & Perle 2003, p.34). The 'New Terrorism' paradigm also implies that since current 'terrorists' are fundamentally different from their predecessors the lessons from these examples are not studied (Duyvesteyn & Malkki 2012), as they are deemed irrelevant.

Recently the ‘new terrorism’ paradigm has been criticized heavily. Pape (2005) and Duyvesteyn (2004, p. 446) hold that the goals for ‘New Terrorists’ are more territorial and less transcendental than previously thought (2005), therefore have more in common with earlier examples. Spencer and Duyvesteyn have noted that the organization of groups in networks or cells is also not new (2011; 2004, p. 444).

In recent years, while an increase in literature on radicalization and deradicalization has been seen in the field (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009, p. 1) there has been little focus on how and why people leave ‘terrorist’ organizations (Hwang 2015, p.2). As noted in the introduction, disengagement refers to a change in behavior, an abandonment of political violence, a process which might occur separately from deradicalization, a change in thought (Reinares 2011, p. 780).

While it is often assumed that individuals need to be deradicalized in order to disengage insights from psychology have shown that attitude and behavior rarely correlate (Horgan & Altier 2012, p. 88). However some authors have noted that these terms have been used ambiguously and inconsistently in the literature (Altier, Thoroughgood & Horgan 2014, p. 647).

The lack of research into disengagement contrasts with the increasing availability of former ‘terrorists’ to speak to researchers, particularly in European countries such as Italy, Spain and Northern Ireland (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009, p. 15). In addition many of these individuals have written autobiographies, which can provide first hand accounts on the process of individual disengagement. In assessing first hand accounts of former violent non-state actors it is important to keep in mind their limitations: the authors may attempt to sensationalize events, justify the behavior of the group or their own (Cordes 1987).

Even with these difficulties disengagement factors seem consistent throughout different organizations. Bjørgo & Horgan write that: ‘many of the factors involved in leaving ‘terrorist’ organizations appear similar in spite of great differences in ideological content’ (2009, p. 5). Furthermore, it has been noted that similar factors leading to disengagement have been reported by individuals leaving new religious movements (Altier, Thoroughgood & Horgan 2014, p. 648) and by those leaving criminal youth gangs as well as far right organizations (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009, p. 5).

Disengagement literature has adopted an interdisciplinary approach, using theories and models from various areas of study. Scholars have appropriated from psychology Rusbult’s investment model (1983) to better understand when and why individuals

leave underground organizations (Altier, Thoroughgood & Horgan 2014, p. 648). To understand how this process occurs insights from sociology have proven fruitful, such as Ebaugh's theory of voluntary role exit (1988). Furthermore studies on leaving new religious movements (Bromley 2006) (Wright 1983) and criminal gangs (Decker & Lauritsen 1996) (Greene & Pravis 2007) have proven insightful, as they demand that their members 'break all ties with their family and friends and leave the conventional world behind' (Bovenkerk, 2011: 264). This break with non-group members also makes leaving these organizations difficult in a very similar way (Altier, Thoroughgood & Horgan 2014, p. 652).

Insights from the fields mentioned above have helped enrich the literature on individual and collective disengagement form 'terrorist' organizations. While it has been noted that the way in which 'terrorist' campaigns decline is has been 'insufficiently studied' (Cronin 2009, p. 49) we do find a body of literature both in general and on specific case studies. On disengagement in general, individual and collective, the literature is informed by works by Horgan (2003; 2006), Bjørgo & Horgan (2009), Crenshaw (1991) Some scholars have hypothesized a link between the causes of 'terrorism' and the causes of its demise (Crenshaw 1991, p. 73) (Ross & Gurr 1989, p. 407-8) while others hold that this link is an oversimplification (Cronin 2009, p. 51).

Works on disengagement from specific 'terrorist' groups have focused on both Europe and Islamic countries. In Europe, disengaged combatants from the BR, ETA, and the IRA have proven to be useful sources to study the process of abandonment of the armed struggle. On the Irish case we find studies by Clubb (2014), and Ferguson & Burgess (2015) among others. In Italy disengagement from violent groups has been studied by della Porta (2009; 1992), Jamieson (1990) and Cento Bull & Cooke (2013); similarly multiple studies on abandonment of ETA can be found in the literature (Reinares 2011), (Alonso 2011). These groups and their processes of disengagement have also been studied comparatively (Alonso 2004; 2009), (Muro 2010), (Cento Bull & Cooke 2013, pp: 208-223).

Studies of disengagement from more recent Islamic groups have focused on Egypt (Gunaratna 2009),(Rashwan 2009), Yemen (Boucek, Beg & Horgan 2009) and Saudi Arabia (Buocek 2008; 2009). While the programs in these countries have been studied comparatively we find no extensive comparison of disengagement processes and

programs between European left-wing groups and Islamist ones. This paper will attempt to address this gap in the literature.

Italy

After World War II Italy saw a vast array of armed groups surfacing with very diverse demands. The first armed groups in the ‘fifties and ‘sixties were separatists in Südtirol and Sardinia, while in the ‘seventies and ‘eighties we see the birth and decline of political violence from both the far left and far right. Acts of terror aimed at gaining political concessions continued in the ‘ninties by the mafia association Cosa Nostra. This chapter will focus on disengagement from the two main groups of the ‘New-Left wave’, the *Brigate Rosse* (BR) and *Prima Linea* (PL). Firstly the policies adopted by the Italian state to foster disengagement will be assessed, secondly, the factors reported by former ‘terrorists’ as conducive to disengagement will be analyzed.

The first groups of this wave were born between 1969 and 1970 such as the *Banda 22 Ottobre* and the *Gruppi Armati Proletari*. In 1970 the *Brigate Rosse* (BR) were also created; they carried out their first attack in that year, the burning of a car of a Milanese businessman, while the first kidnapping took place in 1972, while the first victims fell in 1974 (Cento Bull & Cooke 2003, p. 6). In this year the ‘capi storici’ (historical leaders) of the BR were also arrested and in 1976 Prima Linea (PL) was born, the second largest armed group in Italy after the BR in terms of victims and acts of violence perpetrated. The last act of political violence of the *Anni di Piombo* is considered to be the assassination of *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC) senator Roberto Ruffilli in 1988. Between 1969 and 1987 ‘terrorism’ in Italy caused 491 deaths and over 1000 injuries (Fumian 2010, p. XV).

At the beginning of this wave, the Italian state did not have any laws specifically targeted at acts of terror and their perpetrators. The political violence of those years at first lead to the passing of various repressive legislative measures: in 1975 the *Legge Reale* increased police powers by allowing the use of firearms in more situations and by extending the time for which an individual could be held without charge (Cento Bull & Cooke 2003, p. 32). Specific anti-terrorism laws were passed after the Moro Kidnapping in 1978 and in 1980, the latter known as the Cossiga law, which called for more severe punishment for crimes related to ‘terrorism’ (*ibid*, p.33). The Italian

state had at first adopted a ‘hard line’ approach of increasing sentences and police powers.
The Cossiga law however marks the beginning of a more comprehensive, softer approach, by introducing reductions in sentences for those who ‘dissociated themselves…and took measures to prevent criminal activity form having further consequences’ (*ibid*). This was the first step towards a ‘soft approach’ continued through the *Legge 304* of 1982 which further specified the different incentives, in the forms of sentence reductions, to those who provided useful information to authorities and for those who dissociated themselves from the armed struggle and confessed their crimes. 1982 also saw the publication of the *Documento dei 51* deemed by some to be ‘the first document of political disengagement in Italy’ (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, p. 281).
The document outlined a third position between those willing to continue the armed struggle and the *pentiti*, the *dissociati,* i.e. those who abandoned the armed struggle but were not willing to provide useful information to the authorities. They requested ‘*aree omogenee’* (homogenous areas) where disengaged ‘terrorists’ could obtain better prison conditions and safety from any retaliation by former comrades. Homogenous areas were created in various prisons with the aim to ‘favour and develop from within processes of overcoming the experiences of terrorism’ and recuperate those who ‘demonstrated the willingness to reenter the system and accept its laws’(Amato in Satta 2016, p. 645). A further step was taken with *Legge 34* of 1987 with measures in favour of those who disengage and abandon the armed struggle but do not provide information to authorities.
Seminal scholars on the subject have noted that laws on *pentitismo* and disengagement have made the defeat of ‘terrorism’ easier by ‘breaking the associative pact’, i.e. undermining internal cohesion.(della Porta 2009, p. 69-70). This view is echoed by former ‘terrorists’ such as BR founder Prospero Gallinari: ‘many friends disappeared overnight, headed for the homogeneous areas put at their disposal by the Ministry to foster defections. This situation quickly lead to… internal contradictions’ (Gallinari 2006, p. 279). At the end of the armed struggle 389 people had benefited from laws on *pentitismo* and *dissociazione*: 78 *grandi* pentiti, 134 *pentiti* and 178 *dissociati* (della Porta 2009, p. 70).
The *aree omogenee* were instrumental in fostering disengagement not only with reduced sentences but also through increased prospects of societal reintegration.

Prison reform in Italy 'created the preconditions for reintegrating former terrorists into society, through professional training…and permission to work outside prison' (della Porta 1992, p. 167). Mario Moretti, one of the founders of the BR currently serving six life sentences, is one of the people who has taken advantage of these permits. More recently he has founded various co-ops aimed at giving opportunities to work to former 'terrorists' and detainees in general (Ordinanza 11/11/97; Tribunale di Milano, p. 440). While this initiative was not taken by the state Moretti's Cooperativa Spes is partly funded by the region of Lombardia (Zurlo 2006).

Moretti's initiative is of interest because it presents us with a former 'terrorist' involved personally in socio-economical reintegration of former combatants, with help from the state. Reintegration is crucial as a lack of opportunities upon release may lead an individual to rejoining the armed struggle. The next section will use interviews from various sources to see what factors, according to the 'terrorists' have lead to disengagement and the end of the armed struggle in Italy. Sources in both Italian and English will be consulted.

While 'soft policies' such as the homogenous areas and reductions in prison sentences are considered important counter-terrorism elements for fostering disengagement the Moro Kidnapping in 1978 and assassination of communist *pentito* Guido Rossa are believed to be important acts carried out by the BR which had the unintended consequence of fostering disengagement by undermining the cohesion of groups on the far left, both by scholars (Jamieson 1990, p. 12) (Sidoni & Zanetov 2003, p. 525) (Satta 2016, p. 656; 671) and by former terrorists themselves. Disillusionment with tactics connected to an escalation of violence, or perceived unjust violence seems to be the factor most reported for disengagement.

Many of the former 'terrorists' interviewed have cited the Moro kidnapping and the Rossa assassination as reasons for disengagement. This escalation of violence brought about a disillusionment with leaders and tactics in many. Morucci, an ex BR member involved in the Moro kidnapping holds that his crisis began with the killing of Aldo Moro and subsequently of the worker and trade unionist Guido Rossa' (della Porta 2009, p.73). This view is echoed by Piero, a former member of Autonomia Operaia who speaks of 'aversion towards the *brigatista* project'(Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, p.266). A similar event causes many members of PL to disengage: the assassination of the reformist judge Alessandrini which 'causes lacerations in PL and within the armed struggle (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, p. 313). Claudia, a former PL member reports

beginning to question the armed struggle after this assassination (*ibid*). In both cases interviewees report disillusionment with tactics, specifically the escalation of violence. Disillusionment due to escalation of violence is a factor cited by other interviewees such as Paolo Lapponi, (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, p. 203) Raffaele (*ibid,* p. 400, 406), Marco (*ibid*, p. 334).

Former Italian 'terrorists' also frequently cite cost-benefit analyses as a reason for disengagement, particularly in reference to the inevitability of defeat. Paolo Lapponi speaks of the fear that 'it would end up like in Germany..they would have arrested a lot of people' (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, p. 206) and also of the 'social and historical uselessness of a certain armed attitude' (*ibid*, p. 212). Claudia also speaks of 'actions' carried out not rewarding the armed struggle in general terms (*ibid*, p.315). Raffaele also speaks of in terms of costs and benefits but in relation to the state's counter-terrorism more than the armed struggle, he reports difficulty in reorganizing activities after intensification of state counter-terrorism efforts and turns *pentito* as he sees the cost of doing so as less than the benefit of avoiding a life sentence (*ibid,* p. 404). Della Porta echoes that 'in many accounts by activists, departure from terrorism is linked to a perception of inefficiency of the armed struggle' (2009, p. 73).

The state was also effective in fostering disengagement, as previously stated through its soft policies, such as the creation of *aree omogenee* (*ibid*, p. 71)*,* general improvement in prison conditions, and laws which guaranteed reductions in sentences for those who repented or disengaged from the armed struggle (*ibid*, p. 70). Cento Bull & Cooke also write that 'the replacement of harsh prison treatment with reformist measures acted as a catalyst for spurring a process of self reflection and moral change' (2013, p. 89). Ex BR member Franco Bonisoli also cites this change from a humiliating to a better prison condition as a factor for disengagement (*ibid*, p. 86), while Cavallina, former member of Proletari Armati per il Comunismo, has stated that before these 'soft policies' were put in place the prison was a 'manufacturer of terrorism' and that dissociation was made easier by more humane conditions (*ibid,* p. 90).

Many former 'terrorists' have made the argument that more humane prison conditions 'facilitated the move towards dissociation' (*ibid*, p. 74). One PL detainee reported that more humane conditions accelerated his disengagement (*ibid*, p. 78); this view is echoed by former BR 'terrorist' Alfredo Buonavita who speaks of positive treatment

in an instance of request of transferal to an other prison (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, p. 155).

Furthermore, interviewees, have often reported changes in personal priorities and relationships as reasons to disengage. Buonavita reports altercations with his partner as a 'decisive factor' to disengage (*ibid*, p. 145) as well as the lack of personal relationships in general in the BR (*ibid,* p. 115). Baglioni, an ex member of *Lotta Continua*, also cites new relationships as a reason to disengage (*ibid*, p. 68), as does Raffaele (*ibid*, p. 403). One PL member has cited her desire for motherhood in her decision to abandon the armed struggle (Cento Bull & Cooke 2013, p. 80) while Bignami, one of the leaders of PL, interviewed by Cento Bull & Cooke stated that the will to rebuild personal lives and start a family was crucial in bringing about the collective disengagement of PL (2013, p. 75).

A further element of interest in studying the Italian case is the role of the Catholic Church in fostering disengagement and in bringing about an improvement in detention conditions. Bignami has stated that 'chaplains and nuns in the prisons established close contacts with the terrorists and helped promote a process of personal reflection' (*ibid*, p. 75). PL acknowledged the role of the church as an impartial intermediary between the state and the 'terrorists' when it surrendered its weapons to Cardinal Martini in 1984 (*ibid*, p. 65); other ex PL members have also independently acknowledged the role of the Church in fostering disengagement (*ibid,* p. 79; 80). Bonisoli, member of the BR, also acknowledged the 'fundamental' role of the Church as interlocutor (*ibid,* p. 87). The role of the church in this context is particularly relevant to this study as it shows how religious actors can be useful in fostering disengagement even if the 'terrorists' are not religiously oriented, as they can promote the process of personal reflection Bignami and others have spoken about and act as intermediaries between the 'terrorists' and the state.

Support for violent left wing organizations, such as the BR, decreased drastically after the Moro and Rossa assassinations, though a process of disengagement had started long before then. Most interviewees reported disillusionment with leaders and tactics as a factor, often in connection to an escalation of violence, such as the Moro, Rossa and Alessandrini assassinations. Cost-benefit analyses are also cited frequently; interviewees have spoken of the inevitability of defeat and the end of a certain time when the armed struggle seemed appropriate. Another factor reported consistently was a change in personal priorities and relationships, i.e. the desire to start a family

and rebuild a non-clandestine personal life. Humane treatment and improvement of prison conditions have often been claimed both by scholars and ex combatants to have played a crucial role in fostering disengagement. The creation of *aree omogenee*, safe areas for disengaged detainees, along with laws on *pentitismo* and *dissociazione* as well as professional training, have been regarded as successful tools adopted by the Italian state to foster disengagement, undermine internal cohesion of armed groups, and bring an end to the armed struggle. The role of clerics in bringing public attention to the conditions inmates lived in and in promoting, through dialogue with the 'terrorists', a process of personal reflection conducive to disengagement is also of interest, as it demonstrates religious figures can be useful regardless of the ideological background of the 'terrorists'.

There is no agreement among scholars on what caused the end of 'terrorism' in Italy, however according to both former 'terrorists' and scholars, the laws passed by the Italian state have made the defeat of armed groups easier, both by fostering dissociation and by undermining the internal cohesion of groups, and breeding mistrust among members who saw many of their former comrades turn informants or dissociate. The success of the Italian state lies in these laws. Arrested members of armed groups knew that through collaboration or mere dissociation they could receive a reduced sentence, better prison conditions and have the prospect of returning to a normal life, and almost 400 of them did.

Quotidiano / Anno LVI / N. 21

★ Giovedì 25 gennaio 1979 / L. 200

l'Unità

ORGANO DEL PARTITO COMUNISTA ITALIANO

Petroli: anche per Ferri e Valsecchi a maggioranza passa l'archiviazione

Infame delitto contro una esemplare figura di lavoratore e di rappresentante sindacale

Le Brigate rosse gettano la maschera
Operaio comunista trucidato a Genova

Impetuosa risposta. Fabbriche ferme, possenti manifestazioni

Hanno sparato al compagno Guido Rossa alle spalle, mentre saliva in auto per andare al lavoro all'Italsider - Lascia la moglie e una figlia di 16 anni - L'operaio aveva rappresentato il consiglio di fabbrica nel processo contro un « postino » dei terroristi - Tutta Genova si è subito fermata - Lavoratori in corteo manifestano a piazza De Ferrari

Un salto di qualità

Dal nostro inviato

GENOVA — Il corpo di Guido Rossa, all'interno dell'auto in cui è stato ucciso

Sciopero generale e grandi assemblee

Bloccata ogni attività dalle 9 alle 11 - Servizi pubblici fermi dalle 10,30 alle 11 - Giornata di lotta degli autoferrotranvieri revocata

Cover of Communist paper *L'Unità* on 25/1/1979 denouncing the assassination of Guido Rossa. (Available via online archive at archivio.unita.it)

South-East Asia

This chapter will assess the disengagement policies pursued by South-East Asian states in countering violent non-state actors in the region as well as the factors reported by former terrorists as leading to disengagement. The essay will focus on Singapore and Indonesia, as unlike the Malaysian and Thai case the disengagement programs present more sources and research. Little information has been disclosed regarding Malaysia's rehabilitation efforts (Rabasa 2011, p. 105)(Abuza 2009, p. 206). However, human rights groups have reported beatings, torture and prolonged use of solitary confinement (Bon *et al.* 2005). Malaysia is difficult to assess, both because of the lack of transparency around its program and because it is impossible to assess if disengagement has been brought about by religious counseling or by coercion and torture.

JI is a transnational Islamist Salafi organization founded in 1993 in Indonesia with roots in the Darul Islam islamist and anti-colonial movement (CEP 2016, p. 2). The group seeks to create an Islamic Caliphate under Sharia law in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and parts of Thailand and the Philippines (*ibid*) and its ideology and tactics are outlined in the PUPJI manual (1996). The group has been affiliated to Al-Qaeda since its inception and more recently to ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, with many members fighting in Syria (Hwang & Ismail 2015). JI's attacks have killed more than 350 people between 2000 and 2009 with the largest attacks being the Bali bombings of 2002.

As in many other cases there is not one single profile of a JI member (Abuza 2009, p. 197); recruitment is often done through madrassas and is strongly based on kinship, which reduces the likelihood of infiltration and increases internal cohesion (*ibid*, p. 196). Since 2001 more than 400 JI members have been arrested (Abuza 2009, p. 193); like in the case of the Red Brigades counterterrorism operations have forced JI to become a more horizontal organization with autonomous cells (*ibid,* p.197), so that the group can continue its activities even if top officials are arrested.

As with other groups, Hwang notes that more work has been done on the process of radicalization than on disengagement (2015, p.2). To foster disengagement, Indonesia and Singapore use different forms of the theological dialogue model. The model is based on the one used since 2002 in Yemen (Abuza 2009, p. 197); however elements of the model adopted by Saudi Arabia, such as job training and support for the families of the detainees have also been used (*ibid*, p. 198).

The theological dialogue model involves showing detainees that they have misinterpreted sacred scriptures and have been applying the concept of Jihad in particular incorrectly. Detainees are then offered reduced sentences or amnesties in exchange for cooperation with authorities and abandonment of the armed struggle.
The Singaporean Religious Rehabilitation Group holds that 'religious counseling will assist the JI detainees to uncover misinterpretations and areas in which JI had gone wrong in its religious doctrine' (Bin Ali ,p. 8); as a Singaporean official has stated: 'no one is born a terrorist… it's indoctrination' (Abuza 2009, p. 193). These programmes, according to Abuza, have three benefits: they discredit violent non-state actors and their justification for violence, they deter others from joining and they 'immunize muslim society' (2009, p. 193).
The paper will firstly look at Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country. The country was hit by a series of attacks between 2002 and 2005 with the two Bali bombings being the most serious attacks. Since then more than 300 JI members have been arrested and more cells and weapons have been discovered (Abuza 2009, p. 198). While Indonesia lacks an institutionalized and coordinated programme like the one in Singapore authorities can claim some success in fostering disengagement. This is partly due to their unique approach of making former JI members a crucial part in the disengagement process (*ibid*).
To assess the success of the Indonesian programme interviews conducted with 50 jihadis by Hwang will be essential (2015). Hwang notes that while disengagement in Indonesia remains understudied her research found many of the drivers that foster disengagement in the Indonesian case were the same as they were in nationalist or political groups (2015, p. 5). The Indonesian programme rotates around Nasir Bin Abas, the former head of JI's Mantiqi III. Nasir has provided the police with intelligence and assisted their operations, while also using his authority as a former senior member of JI to foster disengagement (Abuza 2009, p. 198).
The former leader also exemplifies a very common pathway to disengagement. Mr. Abas firstly felt disillusionment with the group's tactics, namely, with the killing of civilians in the Bali bombings, carried out by people he had previously trained; he believed the killing of civilians to be forbidden in his philosophy of jihad (Taylor 2006). But his disengagement and cooperation didn't come until he experienced another important factor in leading to disengagement, that is the humane treatment by authorities. Abas himself stated that the police treated him in a 'very Islamic manner'

(Abuza 2009, p. 198), he was not beaten or tortured but invited to pray with officials during interrogation; this undermined JI's rhetoric that the Indonesian government was '*murtad*', apostate and anti-muslim (*ibid*, p. 199).

Disillusionment and humane treatment are connected, in what Hwang calls a reinforcement loop (2015, p. 11): in Abas's case we see feelings of guilt and disillusionment with the group, which is reinforced by the undermining of JI's rhetoric, thus further disillusionment with it, caused by his being treated with 'civility and Muslim respect' by authorities (Taylor 2006).

A similar pattern can be seen in many of Hwang's interviewees, for example Arif, a JI member who fought in Afghanistan who is currently serving a life sentence in prison started feeling guilt after carrying out an attack on civilian Christians, however he continued to be an active member of the group. His disengagement came after his arrest, when the emotional response of guilt was reinforced by conversations with Ali Imron, with whom he had been in hiding and who is collaborating with the Indonesian government (2015, p. 12); these conversation lead to the rejection of violence not due to an emotional response but as a cost-benefit analysis.

Furthermore Arif cites the former head of Densus 88, Indonesia's antiterrorism unit, as someone who showed him a different way of being a good muslim, by helping the poor and the needy (*ibid,* p.13), as in Abas's case this undermined JI's rhetoric that the government was abusive towards muslims (Abuza 2009, p. 200). The surprise at humane treatment while in custody is a common trend in JI members (*ibid*) and those who cite it as a factor for disengagement do not only migrate to a non-violent role within the organization but leave it entirely, as shown in the graph below.



(Hwang 2015, p.11)

The graph also shows the most common factors leading to disengagement. Disillusionment, with leaders or tactics, cost benefit analyses and new relationships are the factors reported most frequently, while shifts in personal priorities, parental pressure and humane treatment by authorities are also reported. These factors should not be taken independently; often an individual reports more than one of these factors, which, as we have seen, reinforce each other. These factors are very similar to the ones reported by Italian 'terrorists'.

Equally important in distancing disengaged individuals from the organization, and in undermining the group's rhetoric of a government abusive towards Muslims is economic support to the families of detainees. The Indonesian police began providing economic aid to these families in 2006 (*ibid*). Economic aid is essential, as it allows families of detainees to not be reliant on JI's social network to survive. When a new jihadi is arrested, the police assess their economic concerns and address them in order to earn the detainee's gratitude, thus incentivizing cooperation. A senior Indonesian officer has stated in an interview with the *International Crisis Group* that this socio-economic integration would be preferable to religious rehabilitation if one had to choose between the two (2007, p. 13).

Disengagement efforts, however, are undermined by corruption and poor oversight of prisons. State corruption 'reinforces the idea of state officials as anti-Islamic' (*ibid,* p. i); while poor oversight leads jihadis to recruit ordinary criminals to their cause while incarcerated (*ibid*, p. 8). Furthermore short prison sentences and the Indonesian policy of general amnesties undermine the negotiating power officials have with detainees (Abuza 2009, p. 200). If the detainee knows his sentence will be short and reduced in an amnesty he is less likely to collaborate, as the officials can't offer much in sentence reductions. While Indonesia's scarce resources have made its economic support limited, its richer neighbor Singapore has much more vast resources at its disposal to foster disengagement.

To this end, in 2003 the Singaporean government founded the *Religious Rehabilitation Group*, an association of religious scholars and teachers 'who volunteer their services to counsel detainees to assist them in understanding their religion correctly'.[2] It is important that Islamic scholars and leaders are involved both because it is crucial to empower moderate leaders and because as a country that does

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[2] http://rrg.sg/about-us

not have a majority of Muslim citizens, Singapore needs to do more to not appear anti-Islamic (Abuza 2009, p. 205).

The RRG focuses on 4 key elements for 'rehabilitation': family support, which allows detainee's families to visit and keep in contact, financial support to the spouse and children of JI members, and psychological and religious counseling[3]. Furthermore economic support is also provided in the form of aid in securing employment upon release (Abuza 2009, p. 205).

The Singaporean government can claim a certain degree of success in its disengagement efforts. Of the 73 people detained until before 2008 44 (60%) had been released, though most of them still under restraining orders and undergoing religious counseling. The government stressed that the individuals released were 'cooperative and responded well to religious counseling' (Abuza 2009, p. 203). The RRG has also extended counseling to detainees wives, as they 'tend to be as indoctrinated as their husbands' (*ibid*, p. 202). This is important since JI recruitment is heavily based on kinship as 'kinship bonds make defection from JI difficult… defection is tantamount to betraying one's own family' (Noor 2007, p. 8).

Singapore's success in undoubtedly due to the vast resources, in finance and personnel devoted to its disengagement program. Furthermore most of the arrested had logistical roles in JI and had families and jobs (Abuza 2009, p. 203), therefore had more to lose from a prolonged detention. However there are problems with the program. Firstly, many detainees see the clerics as coopted by a *kaffir* (non-muslim) state, therefore not real Muslims (*ibid*, p. 205); secondly Singapore's prosecution has relied on colonial era security acts, which allow for detention without trial: none of the detainees have been put on trial for involvement in JI (*ibid*, p. 206).

Overall, Singapore's program can be considered successful. It comprises 'efforts to break a radical's affective, pragmatic, and ideological commitment to an extremist group; continued support and monitoring after the individual completes the formal program; and the use of credible interlocutors to discredit radical Islamism' (Rabasa 2011, p. 103). Furthermore Singapore can claim a very low recidivism rate: only 1 of the released JI detainees has been rearrested (*ibid,* p. 104).

In conclusion, though the authoritarian nature of some SouthEast-Asian regimes and the recentness of JI attacks entail less availability of data than in the Italian case some

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[3] RRG: Coping with the threat of Jemaah Islamiyah. Available at: http://rrg.sg/our-works/countering-extremism

lessons can be learnt from Singapore and Indonesia. Both use Islamic scripture and scholars to invalidate JI's justifications for violence, however the program's effectiveness is determined by different factors. Singapore's success is due to a government led program with vast resources at its disposal in which psychologists work alongside religious leaders (Abuza 2009, p. 202). Alongside counseling detainees are aided in finding employment upon release and financial support is given to their families; economic support is essential in undermining the internal cohesion of groups like JI and in fostering disengagement. However, the exclusion of former combatants and the fact that clerics in the program are seen as coopted by a *kuffir* state undermine the effectiveness of the program. Indonesia seems to have opposite problems. The use of ex combatants and the fact that the program is not run by the government confer it legitimacy in the eyes of the detainees, however the absence of a government led program means the current one is underfunded and that little to no support can be given to detainees and their families.

Analysis

This paper has looked at factors conducive to disengagement for two groups which occupy very different geographical and temporal settings. As we have seen, PL and the BR were left wing groups active only in Italy between the 'seventies and 'eighties which did not carry out attacks on civilians or large scale bombings; while JI, a group still active to date, is a transnational Islamist violent organization which has carried out mass bombings and killed civilians.

The paper has examined disengagement in both cases in two ways. Firstly, first hand accounts by former 'terrorists' concerning their reasons to abandon the armed struggle have been assessed; in particular the reasons reported as leading to the decision to disengage have been examined. Secondly, the paper has looked at how policies implemented by the states have affected the disengagement process. Though the groups, their aims, and the type of attacks carried out differ vastly the paper has shown how former combatants have reported very similar reasons to disengage.

Both Italian and South-East Asian interviewees have reported humane treatment by authorities as a factor, while harsh prison conditions have been claimed to engender a confrontational and belligerent attitude. Even more frequently changes in personal priorities or relationships have also been reported both by left wing 'terrorists' and Islamist ones; in particular the desire to start a family is often cited as

well as pressure to quit from parents or one's partner. These reasons are often accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis, usually on the impossibility of victory against a much stronger state. However, the factors reported most frequently are disillusionment with leaders and tactics, in both cases we have seen how the escalation of violence represented by the Bali bombings, or the assassination of Aldo Moro or Guido Rossa has lead some to feel the armed struggle had 'gone too far' and that they therefore felt the need to distance themselves from it. Overall, disillusionment with leaders and tactics, a change in personal priorities and humane treatment by authorities are the factors leading to disengagement most reported by 'terrorists'.

The policies aimed at fostering disengagement implemented by the states analyzed show both commonalities and elements of difference; from which said states can gain invaluable insight. Both Singapore and Italy have programs for socio-economic reintegration, and religious figures who took part in the disengagement process. In Italy they acted as campaigners for better prison conditions, and were seen by some 'terrorists' as intermediaries between them and the state. In Singapore clerics are used to counter 'misunderstood theology' in particular regarding the use of violence, and though they may be seen as co-opted by the regime their work is important in showing 'terrorists' a different interpretation of Jihad and of the Quran.

Religious figures had different roles in the two countries but these examples show that they can be useful mediators. Furthermore the Italian example shows how religious figures can be effective intermediaries even when the groups do not have religious aims. In addition, both Italy and Indonesia show how former 'terrorists' such as Abas and Morucci can play an important role in the disengagement process both because of their previous roles as leading figures in the organizations and by providing a public example for those pondering disengagement.

However, differences in disengagement policies are also present. While the success of the Italian state can be attributed to changes in the legal system very different factors have lead to success in South-East Asia. Indonesia and Singapore have used different version of the theological dialogue model, in which scripture is used to confute what is seen as misunderstood theology, however different factors contribute to the success of the programs. Indonesia can claim success as the use of former JI combatants to talk with inmates in the context of the absence of an official state lead program confers legitimacy in the eyes of the detainees. Furthermore economic support is

given to detainees and their families though the economic aspect is underfunded. Economic support is a key element of Singapore's program, as support is provided to the families of detainees and training and aid in finding employment is provided to the detainees themselves. Singapore's vast resources allow for more extensive economic support as well as religious as well as psychological counseling. While Italy's success can be attributed to legal measures aimed at facilitating defection, Singapore and Indonesia owe their success to their focus on economic and social reintegration, and to the use of former combatants respectively.

Conclusion & Policy Advice

This paper has attempted to assess if, in the context of disengagement, there is such a large difference between contemporary Islamic groups and their predecessors, that lessons learnt form the former would be inapplicable to the latter, as stated in much of the 'new terrorism' literature. The paper has found the contrary to be true. Both in the Italian and South-East Asian cases strong similarities can be found in both of the aspects assessed.

Firstly, both the Islamist and Leftist 'terrorists' examined have reported similar factors as conducive to disengagement: disillusionment with leaders and tactics, changing priorities, and humane treatment were the factors cited most frequently. This implies that it is likely that policies aimed at targeting these factors would work in both cases. Reductions in prison sentences for example work for individuals from both groups, as a reduced sentence would facilitate the pursuit of a former terrorist's new priorities, for example starting a family.

Secondly, similarities have been found also in the policies implemented by the states, such as the use of former 'terrorists', reintegration programs and the use of clerics as intermediaries.

The paper has shown how with regards to disengagement Islamic violent non-state actors are not substantially different from their predecessors: similar factors leading to it have been reported by former 'terrorists' and similar policies have worked both in Italy and South-East Asia. Evidence is not found that Islamic 'terrorism' is new and that new, stronger methods are needed to contrast it, at least in relation to disengagement. Lessons learnt from the past cannot therefore be deemed irrelevant and can in fact provide a blueprint for how to foster disengagement from Islamist organization.

How can these insights inform counter-terrorism strategies around the world? It has been estimated that foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria exceed 20000 with more than 4000 coming from Europe [4]. To deal with this threat many western countries have passed more stringent anti-terrorism legislation (Lister 2015, p. 8).

The UK has passed legislation to facilitate the revocation and seizure of passports in the case of a threat to national security. These measures discourage disaffected foreign fighters from returning home and reduce the likelihood that family members would reach out to authorities for fear of incriminating their relatives (*ibid*, p. 5). There is a clear need for policies to foster disengagement, and address the factors conducive to it. As previously outlined, these factors include disillusionment with leaders and tactics, humane treatment and changing priorities or new relationships. Needless to say the countries of origin of these fighters need to arrest and prosecute any individual involved in any violent act or with any involvement in ‘terrorist’ activities. However there is also a need to reintegrate disengaged individuals into society. Countries with returning foreign fighters could learn from Singapore’s theological dialogue model: Islamic clerics from local mosques can be instrumental in refuting justifications for violence based on scripture and psychological counseling can aid both in rehabilitating those suffering violence-related disorders and in weeding out insincere candidates. Furthermore some returning foreign fighters may be already prone to disengage, or may have already disengaged due to disillusionment with unexpected violence or violence on other Muslims. These individuals require counseling and aid in social and economic reintegration as further marginalization may lead to re-engagement in violent activities.

Professor Bertelsen of the University of Aarhus holds that upon returning home disengaged individuals often remain in contact with their still engaged peers, thus providing proof that it is possible to return home (in Lister 2015, p. 9). The Indonesian case can provide an example of how disengaged individuals can be used to convince their peers to disengage. In addition, European states have a more substantial budget at their disposal than Indonesia to aid with economic and social

[4] P.R. Neumann, (2015). “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” *International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence*. Availble at: http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/.

reintegration; in fact a similar program to the South-East Asian ones can be found in Germany.

The HAYAT[5] network in Germany has a very similar approach to the one adopted by Singapore. Firstly, the jihadi narrative is delegitimized and, through counseling, the individual is encouraged to 'come to terms with his past' (Lister 2015, p. 10). Secondly, the individual is aided in finding employment, or training and housing. Finally, the individual is aided in establishing an alternative reference group and getting support from family members (*ibid*). Recently, a German IS member had his sentence halved in exchange for a full confession and intelligence on IS command structure [6].

While this is a step in the right direction such an approach needs to be institutionalized so that others might provide information and disengage in exchange for a shorter sentence, as we have seen cost-benefit analyses play a crucial part in the disengagement process. Particularly in the case of individuals who have not committed acts of violence but joined Jihadi organizations in a support or logistical role there is a need for a framework that incentivizes these individuals to come forward and provide information to authorities. This needs to be done both through networks like HAYAT or the RRG and through legal tools to provide reduced sentences in exchange for disengagement and information. Due to their experience with 'third wave terrorists' some countries, such as Italy already have these tools in place and can share their experience with others.

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[5] http://hayat-deutschland.de/english/

[6] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/15/german-isis-suspect-shorter-jail-term-information.

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