European Union: Defence Integration

Acknowledgement

Writing this thesis gave me the chance to read interesting materials about a sensitive matter. The most interesting gain of this thesis for me is the people I spoke with. Furthermore, the sector of defence integration is relatively young, therefore, the possibilities to write more on this subject are endless. I liked writing this thesis because, being a soldier in the reserve of the Netherlands, it is close to my heart. Getting the opportunity, to think about the future and trying to add something important to this sector is a great honour.

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Executive Summary:

After years of integration in other sectors, the member states decided to include foreign and defence policy to EU cooperation. Therefore, it is now, after a few decades, a good moment to look critically at what has been achieved in this sector of EU defence cooperation. With this reason, this thesis will approach the question, why do the member states want defence integration to happen in smaller groups? This question can be split in multiple sub-questions. Firstly, could reaction of the member states be out of discontent of how cooperation is functioning on a EU-level? Secondly, does the EU allow the member states to continue in smaller groups, instead of moving forward as a Union? These question will be approached by using a variety of documents. For example, not only the EU perspective but also the national interests of member states and the vision of experts on defence integration should be taken into consideration as well as useful sources for this thesis.

Furthermore by looking at theories of defence integration in the EU, such as, Institutionalism, constructivism and realist theory, this thesis will try to find the motives for defence integration. Using the patterns of the theory will make it easier to analyse and compare the cases that will be included in this thesis. The three selected cases are from a different scale. From cooperation on a Union-level to bilateral cooperation and integration. As a result, this thesis has to add additional information and perspectives on the integration of defence within the EU.

Keywords:

Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP), Defence integration, German defence, Dutch defence, European Defence Agency (EDA), Multi-speed Europe.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction to the topic

> *"Europe is usually more willing to define itself as a soft power, which we are, and a very successful one. But getting at least some integrated defence capacities is something we cannot do without. The choice here is not between hard and soft power. It is between being a global power or a powerless spectator of regional and global events that concern us Europeans in any case. Like it or not"* (Mogherini, 29-04-2015).

This is what the European Union (EU) High Representative Mogherini stated in her speech in April 2015. This statement indicates that external policies, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, are not functioning properly.

Therefore, this is a good introduction of the subject of this master thesis. With so much unrest in the world and to be more specific at the borders of the EU, security and defence is a very important topic for the EU and its member states. In addition to this, not only the unrest at the borders but also inside the EU have a big influence on the policymaking process in Brussel. With budget cuts due to the financial crisis, the member states are now looking towards each other for help more than ever.

With defence integration becoming an important development in the EU, it could also become a solution for keeping the armed forces up-to-date and create a bigger role for the EU in the world. However, over the last decades no real progress has been made and member states are starting to exploit other options. Therefore, the question that this thesis wants to approach will be: why do the member states want defence integration to happen in smaller groups? This question can be split up in multiple sub-questions. First, could the response of the member states be out of discontent of how cooperation is functioning on a EU-level? Secondly, does the EU allow the member states to continue in smaller groups, instead of moving forward as a Union? These questions will be approached by using a variety of documents. Not only for the perspective of Mogherini's statement and that of the EU because this is not the only way to zoom in on the subject of this master thesis. For example, not only the EU perspective but also

the national interests of member states and the vision of experts on defence integration should be taken into consideration as well as useful sources for this thesis.

To make this subject better to access, this thesis will have the following structure. Firstly, in chapter 2, a small historic overview will be given. This could give a good background on EU defence integration over the last decades. This is important, because not every action or decision is always rational, it could also be symbolical. Therefore, a small historical overview could give some insight in decisions made in the past and in the present time. Secondly, in chapter 3, a small overview of theories behind integration will be given. Thirdly, in chapter 4, cases will be presented. These cases are selected because of their different nature and scale. Fourthly in chapter 5, the current situation will be explained. This will include the achievements and problems the member states face and the possible solutions that are available to overcome this. This is of importance because theories can provide this thesis with the motivations behind integration. And finally, the thesis will end with an conclusion about the research.

The cases, as mentioned above will be about the integration of defence between one or more countries. Case 1, will be about the Dutch 11 '*Luchtmobiele Brigade'* and the German '*Division Schnelle Kräfte'*. Case 2, will be about BeNeSam, Belgian-Dutch cooperation and integration that takes place in the navy of both countries. And the third and final case will be about the sharing and pooling of Air-to-Air refuelling (AAR) capabilities under the influence of the European Defence Agency (EDA). In addition to this, researching these cases could explain why this integration is taking place in these sectors of defence and why on this level. Finding out what the main motivators are, could give better insight and future prospect in defence integration. Furthermore, this could motivate EU member states to go even further. This difference in willingness of the member states to integrate in this policy area could very well force the EU to approach this policy area in different 'ways'.

1.2 Introduction to the selected methods

This thesis will try to approach 'forms' of defence integration. Therefore, it would be wise to start looking into cases of integration of defence between two or more countries and EU-wide integration in defence. However, create a well-structured thesis, focusing on relevant information is important. In other words, the question of this thesis has to act as a guideline to create an understanding of how the methods will be used and what the positive and negative sides are when we use methods to approach this subject. The positive aspects, in the case of

methods, is the information a method can deliver when being used. However, the negative aspects of using a method are that the method fails to consider and include important information. Therefore, using multiple cases and methods could create a solid foundation for this thesis.

Selecting methods based on 'case studies' for this thesis is the next step to take. According to some researchers using case studies as a method is not commendable because these cases are seen as a mere outcome of a question that has been asked (Phare, 2005, p.114). In other words, the researcher would only test if the outcome of his hypotheses is right or wrong. However, according to others, case studies can provide us with a lot of information on the 'social' side of research. They state that "social scientific research proceeds through a more interactive process between theory and evidence in which case-study methods excel" (Phare, 2005, p.114). In other words, case studies would allow us to look at the process and the how and why one situation lead to another.

Another rather 'negative' term that is used a lot for case study methods is that it is a qualitative method and not a quantitative method (Barkin, 2009, p.211). In other words, in case studies each case is most likely to be unique. In a quantitative research an experiment can be exactly replicated and then it should have the same results. However, this is not the case with qualitative research. For example, currently the Dutch Minister of Defence decided to partly integrate with German defence units. Then again, because the Minister is a person and every person is unique, the outcome of the decision to integrate or not to integrate could be very different. Therefore, it would be hard to recreate the environment to test if a theory is right or wrong. This is one of the things that needs to be kept in mind when doing the research for this thesis based on case studies.

Another problem that is mentioned in combination with qualitative research is the matter of subjectivity. When gathering all necessary data to approach the case of defence integration, a selection bias, errors made by the researcher and interpretation of the researcher, can happen (Cooper and Schindler, 2006, p.196). Therefore, to approach this subject we have to use a strict framework that would make this research easily accessible for others, this way other researchers can still approach the subject and fill-in additional data or falsify theories that are made.

As mentioned earlier, interaction between theory and process is made possible by using case studies as a method. This is interesting for this paper because the question is about defence

integration, a well-used case study method could give us not only data on what lead to defence integration, but also give insight on how and why. Furthermore, different cases of integration on multiple levels within the EU or between countries could provide us with interesting results on reasons of integration. We must not forget that after the failing of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954, it took until the Maastricht treaty in 1992 to bring defence integration up again. The problem with the idea of defence integration in the late 1940s is the idea of giving-up sovereignty in a very delicate policy area that touches the core of a state (Dinan, 2014, p.65-66). Therefore, recognizing prime reasons for integration in defence could be highly interesting because this is an indication of a 'window of opportunity' that could be of use to policy and decision makers in the future.

Because we need case study methods, we want to take a closer look at the following two forms of case studies. The first one to be explained is 'congruence' and the second one is 'process tracing'. After that a small section will be devoted to the methods of interviews as a way to support the case study methods.

1.2.1 Case studies: Congruence

The first method that will be used in this thesis is the congruence method. The congruence method is of importance to this thesis because it allows the user to have "a single case or a small number of cases for theory development" (George and Bennett, 2005, p.181). Because, in comparison to other policy areas, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is rather young, there are not that many cases available yet. In addition to this, this method does not depend on a large amount of cases, one could even argue that one case is enough to use this method.

However, researchers state that using the congruence method for research could create weaknesses as well. For example, a larger amount of cases would strengthen the theory more because it can be tested more often and with repeatedly the same outcome the theory becomes stronger. Then again, the question of this paper could very well lead to researching a small amount of cases. With that in mind, the chance of a variable being excluded while it is of influence on the 'outcome' becomes bigger (George and Bennett, 2005, p.183). To further explain, when we do not include these variables, it could lead to a fragile and inconclusive theory.

Beach & Pedersen make the same observation, they state that even though you have the best resources it would still be impossible to gain information on all the variables (Beach & Pedersen,

2013, p.68). With this in mind, it could be possible that not every variable can be included. Then again, when this is the case it should be made clear which variables are included and which are left out. This could then make it easier to see what fields could add something to the subject.

In addition to the weaknesses already mention, George and Bennett point us to three other 'problems' that come with using the method of congruence. These problems are Spuriousness, Causal Priority and Casual Depth (George and Bennett, 2005, p.185). This is of high importance to consider when we approach the subject of this thesis. Because these points could fail a research when they are not addressed or kept in mind properly.

1.2.2 Case studies: Process tracing

The case study has to confirm what the cause of integration is. However, integration is also about decision making by people and people that have to work with these decisions. Therefore, this paper will also include interviews to gain unique information that could support us in approaching the question of this paper.

While the congruence method is more about identifying key variables, process tracing could give us another way of approaching the subject of this essay. This method "attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett, 2005, p.206). To further explain, the focus of 'process tracing' will be more on the 'process', from cause to outcome. Therefore, it could give a lot more information on extra variables that the congruence method could have missed. Therefore, 'process tracing' could compliment the congruence method by further zooming in at the case at hand.

Another front that process tracing can complement in is the question of "when is there enough data" (Checkel, 2009, 121). As mentioned earlier, the 'trap' of this kind of research is that researcher need to provide a lot of data to counter the negative view on qualitative research. However, when is it enough? Therefore, a clear statement must be made on what is included and excluded and what kind of sources were used to fill the gaps at hand or that there are still gaps in the research.

1.2.3 Method for Interviews:

Another way to fill the gaps in information in this thesis about defence integration is for example, conducting interviews. We have multiple variations of interviewing, however, this thesis will only use semi-structured variations of interviews.

Semi-structured interviews, in comparison with structured interviews, leave the interviewer some room to collect comparable data. However, the interview also leaves room for some additional questions if the situation allows it (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006, np.). In addition to this, semi-structured interviews could give the interviewer some other perspectives and variables to look at the subject (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006, np.). As mentioned before, a structured interview leaves no room for additional questions other than the ones on the list. However, a semi-structured interview can leave some room for the person answering the questions to create a 'side track'.

There are, like in other ways of conducting an interview, disadvantages to using a semi-structured interview. This because, the interviewer has to steer the conversation. Then again, if the interviewer is not capable to control the interview, it could become useless. Also, some state that it is difficult to find useable data in the unstructured part of the interview because there is nothing to compare it with and in addition to this, selecting the data leaves the researcher room to leave things out (McLeod, 2014, np.). In other words, the researcher could have the possibility to be bias. This is something that should be countered with supporting the data with additional methods such as the methods mentioned earlier in this chapter.

Chapter 2: History of Defence integration and Cooperation in the EU

2.1 Introduction to European Defence history

For the purpose of creating a historical background for this thesis, this chapter will be about the steps made in the sector of defence integration in the period after the Second World War. This is of importance because progress and mistakes of the past could give an insight in how and why some decisions are made in the present and possibly in the future. This because defence integration or cooperation is not only of this time but also part of negotiations in the early days of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Therefore, this section of history will be dedicated to the period from the moment the ECSC was created until the Lisbon treaty.

2.2 EU and defence: 1948-1990

The signing of the treaty of the ECSC was only a solution to one part of a question that was keeping the allies, especially France, occupied in the 1950s. The overall question during that period was, what should be done with Germany? The ECSC was only a solution for the economic part to restore Germany politically and economically (Topan, 2001, p.37). However, German remilitarization was another part of this problem. The US wanted a good and strong West-Germany because it needed a strong ally in Europe that would be able to stand up against the threat from the east, the Soviet Union (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p.40). On the other hand, the Soviet Union shared this discontent, German remilitarization after the World Wars that took place, with France and did not even have to convince France to act against this idea (Rosenberg, 2005, p.54). Therefore, even though the ECSC was created, the First and Second World Wars left their scars and fear on the European continent.

Being pressured by the US and the UK, France constructed a proposal that was in the line of thinking with the creation of the ECSC. They proposed a European Defence Community (EDC) that is in other words, a European army (Dinan, 2014, p.65). This way the futures of both Germany and France would be connected and would share the burdens and benefits together. This would then solve the problem of a Germany that becomes too strong again. However, in the end the French themselves could not go through with this and it was therefore voted down by the French parliament, leaving a scar on French credibility (Dinan, 2014, p.65-68).

After the failed French proposal, the German question of remilitarization still needed to be solved rather quickly because the threat from the east still remained. Therefore, the UK proposed the creation of the Western European Union (WEU), a version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), only with European countries (Western European Union, n.d.). The structure of the WEU was not something new because a large portion of the structure was already agreed upon in 1948 in the Brussels treaty between the UK, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Rosenberg, 2005, 54). In addition to this, instead of creating a supranational army, as proposed by the EDC, the WEU focused on using national armies (Rosenberg, 2005, 54). In other words, this was a solution that was acceptable for all parties and resulted in the opportunity for Germany to rearm.

Some researchers state that the failure of the plan for the EDC was the reason for a taboo on defence integration and losing fifty years filled with opportunities to further integrate and cooperate in defence (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p.41). Other researchers say that after the creation of the WEU there was no need for talks about enhanced cooperation or integration in the defence sector because there was no reason to do so until the late 1980s early 1990s (Dinan, 2014, 239). However, this all changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This brought forward two things: the loss of purpose of NATO and the fact that the US declared its decreasing interest in the European region. With this reason, the EU was forced into this position to take action in this policy area by the US (Dover, 2013, 242).

With the fall of the Soviet Union, some state that the institutions of defence cooperation lost their sense of purpose. For example, the main reason for NATO to be there was to form an alliance to protect each other from the Soviet Union. However, now that the Soviet Union had fallen, there was no need for the NATO any longer. In addition to this, Harries is concluding the same about NATO by stating that, "It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile "East" to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy" (Harries, 1992-1993, 42). In other words, this uncertainty of whether it will stay in place or disappear left the EU with an opening to step up and take responsibility. Therefore, after a long period of silence, the talks about defence cooperation and integration the 1990s and 2000s where a complete turnaround of the last 5 decades.

2.3 From the Treaty of Maastricht to the Treaty of Nice:

With the treaty of Maastricht two 'pillars' where added, as a sign that the member states wanted to cooperate further in these sectors. The most important pillar for this thesis is the pillar of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, adding the policy areas was one thing, making it effective and functional is a completely different problem. In the light of the Yugoslavia-conflict it was made clear that the EU was all but ready to act (Dinan, 2014, p.240-241). As a result, there were heavy debates about the effectiveness of the CFSP and it was even stated that it is an empty and panicked response of the member states towards the problems of the world (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p.47). As a response for these critics, additional agreements were made in the treaty of Amsterdam. For example, the EU worked towards a more common position for the member states by adding the position of High Representative and creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p.51). In addition, this gave the EU external policies a face for the outside world and an institutional body to regulate meetings and create a common position for the EU. Furthermore, it also shows that the EU and the member states are thinking about more cooperation in the defence sector under the ESDP.

This vision of the member states of a common position was made clearer in the years that followed after the creation of the ESDP. With the wars in the Middle-East, as a reaction to the terrorist attacks on the US, the focus of the US visibly shifted away from the European continent (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p.54). To further explain, with this reasoning, the EU needed a strategy, common goals for all the member states. Therefore, in 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) was created, paving a way for future EU defence integration and common objectives (Gnesotto, 2003, p.3-4).

Chapter 3: Motivations and explanations for defence cooperation and integration

3.1 Introduction to defence integration theory

The previous chapter gave a brief insight in the EU defence integration and cooperation history. However, what this previous chapter could not answer and what this thesis wants to approach is, how and why countries want to integrate further in defence. This chapter will try to approach the different ways of looking at defence integration. However, before being able to place the motives of integration in the right context, there is a need to explain the theories that will be used to find these motives. This will be necessary to create an equal field of comparison between different cases of defence integration and cooperation. Furthermore, using these theories could help predict and tell people what would happen in some scenarios of integration.

As mentioned before, what is the reason for integration and why in this form? These are some of the questions that need to be approached in this thesis. In an article written by Möttölä, three reason for defence integration are summarized under their respective theories. According to Möttölä, the *realist* dimension, the institutionalist dimension and the constructivist dimension are the dimensions where the main drivers for defence integration can be found (Möttölä, 2007, p.2). These theories could point out the reasons for integration, therefore, it is of importance to further understand what they add and what there weakness could be.

3.2 The Realist theory

The realist theory is one of the oldest theories in European integration. According to the theory it is all about the "distribution of state power within the regime" and cooperation is acceptable, only if it is necessary for state survival (Cini, 2013, p.72). In addition to this, a prime characteristic is the "egoistic passions" as Donnelly states in his article (Donnelly, 2000, p.10). Furthermore, the fact that countries act in their self-interest also means that a group of countries will not always find a common ground. In other words, ideas and national interests of the countries conflict with one another (Cini, 2013, p.72-73). States as leading players and power and benefits as their reward of further defence integration, makes this an interesting theory to use in finding motivations for integration.

3.3 The institutionalist theory

In contrast of realists, institutionalist see the institutions as the main factor of deeper integration (Rosamond, 2013, 90). In other words, the institutions, in their search for more competences, attract more and more sectors for integration. According to Vleuten, this is largely because of the so called "principal-agent" effect. Vleuten states that because states delegate the "principals" to an institution like the EU and the receiving institutions want to "agent" these "principals" the best they can (Vleuten, 2010, p.233-234). Therefore, one could argue that because the institutions want to fulfil the roll of protecting the added competence they will stretch their "agent"-role to the maximum.

However, Rosamond mentions a disadvantage pointed out by institutionalism, institutions most of the time outlive their creators and therefore the impact of these institutions could become clear several years later (Rosamond, 2013, p.91). In other words, carelessly placing competences in the care of institutions could have a great impact later without the member states realizing it. Furthermore, with the history of the EU in mind, states will think twice of placing something under institutional control (Vleuten, 2010, p.234). Therefore, this makes clear that the states are still a large player in deeper integration.

3.4 The constructional theory

The constructionists look at European integration by looking at the created norm, use of language and the ideas of an identity (Rosamond, 2013, p.94). In other words, a constructivist looks at the norms that are in place because this forms the identity in how it acts and grows. However, Checkel mentions a downside to how constructivism is currently used. Checkel states that constructivists most of the time use process tracing, therefore, this approach neglects meta-data that could be of importance because there is no common standard of using this in constructivism (Checkel, 2007, p.60).

Chapter 4: Selected Cases

1. Case: Integration of the Dutch Airmobile Brigade in the German Division Schnell Kräfte

4.1.1 Historical Background

After the Second World War and even until a couple of decades ago, thinking about integration of defence with Germany was almost impossible. However, since 2014 the integration of the Dutch *11e luchtmobiele brigade* and the German *Division Schnelle Kräfte* was started and it will not end with integrating these divisions alone (Ministry of Defence, 30-10-2015, p.9). Currently, the integration takes place under German command and will be finished in 2019. With this form of integration. The Netherlands and Germany are one of the first EU member states to do this kind of integration (EU2016, 24-02-2016). In other words, the Netherlands and Germany are showing that they want to take a leading role in this form of integration within the EU.

4.1.2 Way of Governance

In the case of cooperation with Germany and the Netherlands, highly influential consultative bodies are created to be able to cooperate more closely with one another. This is necessary to create unity in approaches. For example, while the Dutch ground-to-air defence is arranged by the army, the Germans use the air force to facilitate this (Ministry of Defence, 30-10-2015, p.7). Both the German and the Dutch Minister of Defence want "integrated command and control structures on a permanent basis to ensure unity of command in operations and exercises. At service level, units could be placed under common operational command and be deeply integrated on a permanent basis while remaining stationed at their peace-time locations" (Dutch and German Government, 10-06-2013, p.5). In other words, units and soldiers could be placed under the command of the countries in question.

4.1.3 Strategic Cultural Background

Looking into the strategic cultural background is of importance because this will tell a lot about the how and why countries like the Netherlands and Germany want to integrate in the part of the defence sector. As mentioned by Schaper in the questionnaire, integration in its total is

based on both practical and political motives (Schaper, 2016, See Appendix 2). This practical side of cooperation and integration is also mentioned by the lieutenant general Kasdorf. He stated that the German Army wants a "future-oriented full spectrum operational army" and the way to achieve this is finding partners, like the Netherlands, to acquire these capabilities (Kasdorf, 2014, 205). Therefore, Germany, instead of trying to reach this requirements themselves, chose to find partners to learn from and in case of the Netherlands even fill some of these requirements.

However, besides the practical side of this form of integration, there is also a political side. According to Kasdorf, with the continuous changes in this highly globalizing world and scarce budgetary resources it became essential to tightly cooperate in this sector (Kasdorf, 2014, p.201). In other words, cooperation with other partners is necessary because otherwise it would be highly unlikely that, in this case, Germany can continue this course. Therefore, if this is already a problem for a big country like Germany, it will be even harder for a medium size country, such as the Netherlands, to keep up with the modern requirements for a full operational army.

The Dutch minister of Defence has the same opinion. She stated in a speech at the ALDE seminar on defence that "cooperation achieved by smaller groups could of course also be opened up to other member states at a later stage" however, it is also clear that you cannot force countries to cooperate (Hennis-Plasschaert, 24-06-2015). This highlights the political idea because only countries with the same norms, values and ideas can cooperate with each other. However, the idea of starting small and growing bigger, something also mentioned in the chapter about the current situation in EU defence policy, is not new in the EU. Therefore, this could be the reason why cooperation on a EU level is proceeding so slowly and the focus of the member states is more on cooperation in smaller clusters.

4.1.4 Capabilities

The Netherlands and Germany, as mentioned earlier, want to form a full spectrum operational army. The capabilities of both forces can complement each other because both divisions are ideal for rapid deployment in faraway regions (Dickow, Drent, Landman, Overhaus & Zandee, 2013, p.5). It consists out of 2000 Dutch soldiers (Ministry of Defence, *11 Luchtmobiele Brigade*) and 9500 German soldiers (Bundeswehr, *Die Division Schnelle Kräfte*).

2. Case: Navy integration between Belgium and the Netherlands

4.2.1 Historical Background

While cooperation or even integration was out of the question in the case of Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands already signed a treaty of Belgian-Dutch Cooperation (BeNeSam) in 1948 (Fokkema, 2012, 579). However, over time it flourished in to even more than cooperation. A few decades later, the present BeNeSam reached a pointed of two heavily integrated naval forces.

4.2.2 Way of Governance

After more than 50 years of cooperation and integration the structure was formed as we currently know it. However, even though there is integration, the states themselves have full sovereignty over the use of their ships and only in times of war, there will be one Benelux Commander (Homan, 2012, p.15-16). Highly interesting is what Homan stated in his article is something applicable to defence cooperation in the EU and between other countries. He argues the importance of standardisation because buying the same systems makes countries want to have optimal use of the chance of cooperating with each other while using these systems (Homan, 2012, p.16).

4.2.3 Strategic Cultural Background

Looking into the strategic cultural background is of importance because this will tell a lot about the how and why countries like the Netherlands and Belgium want to cooperate or in this case even integrate. The benefit here for both countries is besides having full sovereignty over their own ships that there are no double cost because there is only one school to educate navy personnel specialised in sea-mines warfare for two nations (Homan, 2012, p.16). In other words, they achieve the same they always had at a lower cost. Therefore, both ministers of defence achieved their goals of keeping their forces up-to-date for the lowest cost. This is also something that Fokkema mentions in her article about defence cooperation and integration between Belgium and the Netherlands. She states that both the Netherlands and Belgium want to keep their forces operable and this can be achieved by reducing costs through cooperation and not by further cuts in the defence budget (Fokkema, 2012, p.583). In other words, this is an indication that even though countries cooperate this does not necessarily mean the government

can cut in the budget even more. In addition, this implicates that cooperation is a necessity for keeping the forces up-to-date in the current defence climate if the budget stays the same.

4.2.4 Capabilities

Besides close cooperating with one another due to the fact that they have a bilateral command structure, there are two other big gains. Firstly, creating one school for education and training for both countries. For example, the creation of the Belgian-Dutch École de la Geurre des Mines (Eguermin) in Belgium, which also became a NATO Naval Mine Warfare Centre of Excellence (NMW COE)(Eguermin, n.d.). In addition, this improved cooperation due to the same training and reduced costs for not having two of the same schools.

Secondly, both countries specializing in one specific part of the navy fleet for repairs and upgrades made this cooperation interesting and beneficial. For example, the Netherlands takes care of the maintenance and repair of the *M-frigates* of both countries and Belgium has the same responsibilities but then with the minesweepers of both countries (Homan, 2012, p.16). Therefore, specialization by both of the countries in their specific sector created the chance to reduce costs of having to have expertise in both vessels. Therefore, this could be a good example of the benefits of sharing and pooling resources in the defence sector.

3. Case: Air-to-Air refuelling

4.3.1 Historical Background

While AAR is a system that has been active for a long period of time, the EU and its member states noticed only recently that they need such a system for themselves. After the introduction of the Maastricht treaty, the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and the Libya conflict in 2011 made it painfully clear that the EU is not ready to do autonomous missions (Platteau, 2014, p.13). For example, the US did 80% of the AAR while the US itself was only responsible for a quarter of the sorties in the conflict with Libya because the EU could not even sustain a mid-size operation (Quintana, Heidenkamp & Codner, 2014, p.6), (Platteau, 2012, p.16). Therefore, it became a pooling and sharing priority in 2011 for the EDA (European Defence Agency, 24-03-2014). In other words, the EDA did see an opportunity to make it possible for the EU to assist the member states in defence matters.

4.3.2 Way of Governance

To understand where the AAR fits in the EU, the position of the EDA needs to be explained first. The EDA reports to the Council of the EU and the Ministers of Defence of the member states decide on the guidelines and budget of the EDA (European Defence Agency, n.d., about Governance). Currently, High Representative Federica Mogherini is the head of the EDA. This is important because this indicates that the idea of having an AAR project run by the EDA, is that it can be used EU-wide. The AAS, as can be seen in Appendix 1 table 1, capabilities, armaments and technology are one of the four tasks of the EDA.

4.3.3 Strategic Cultural Background

Looking into the strategic cultural background is of importance because this will tell a lot about the how and why the EU countries wanted to organize this on a EU-level in the EDA. The first advantage is that this project can be accessed by all the member states of the EU. In 2012 "ministers declared their willingness to support further development of air-to-air refuelling capabilities and to better coordinate them. They agreed that aerial refuelling capabilities should be developed in Europe as a matter of priority; and that these capabilities should be made available for potential use during EU, NATO, or other framework operations" (European Defence Agency, 24-03-2014). In other words, high accessibility for all the countries make it in this case interesting to cooperate on a EU-level.

Another point that has been made is about the cost of having an AAR fleet. With the economic crisis having effect on the budgets on defence it has been mentioned that most of the member states cannot afford to maintain the correct level of AAR (and Air Transportation) in multiple scenarios at the same time (Quintana, Heidenkamp & Codner, 2014, p.10). Therefore, it will be of tactical importance for the member states to cooperate on this point to make sure that every mission over the complete spectrum of situations can be undertaken. Furthermore, even though states want to act autonomous without having the means to do it, they would be better of sharing and pooling these resources then not being capable of doing anything at all.

4.3.4 Capabilities

The current capabilities are far too low. That is why the EU wants to achieve readiness in 2020. Reaching full operational autonomy is one of the key factors in this area (Platteau, 2012, p.16). In other words, the EU wants to be fully capable of doing missions of all scales, without any

help of external countries. However, because this project still needs to be finished in 2020 only the intentions are mentioned by the EDA. Then again, the EDA does not mention the quantity of aircrafts that are needed to fill these intentions and guidelines of the member states.

Chapter 5: Discussion of the Cases and the current situation in EU defence integration

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapters acted as a foundation for this chapter to form a discussion and give an overview of EU defence integration of today and for in the future. Bringing the cases in contact with the theory and history, this chapter will be about current projects, problems and solutions that are mentioned in the literature and in the questionnaire about defence integration in the EU.

This will start from the present with what the EU has obtained after the last treaty of the EU. After the Lisbon treaty, two major decisions were made in the field of security and defence. First, the creation of the position of High Representative as head of Foreign Affairs and Security policy and vice president of the European Commission. Second, the creation of the European External Action Service (EASS) (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, 57). By doing this, the EU tries to bring more efficiency and coherency inside of the EU because institutions have now the capability to cooperate more with one another.

5.2 Economical motives for defence integration and cooperation

"Pooling and sharing of resources cost less" and therefore, it is highly beneficial for the member states according to the EDA (European Defence Agency, n.d.). This idea of pooling and sharing is also mentioned in the cases in chapter four. For example, the navy cooperation and integration with Belgium, BeNeSam, is a beneficial cooperation for both nations because there are no "double-costs". However, this economic benefit can also be found in the case of the AAR-system of the EDA. As mentioned in the case, member states individually cannot bring-up the resources to create a fully functioning AAR-system. Therefore, the EDA stepped in and presented a solution on European-level.

Without further increasing the budget for defence spending, the member states need to explore other routes to keep their armies up-to-date. However, as pointed out by France and Witney, when the economic crisis hit, the member states made statements that pooling and sharing was the future (France and Witney, 2013, p.2). However, there was no increase in budget and no real effort was made leaving their defence sector to decrease in quality and quantity.

According to van Duuren, another economic reason can be found in the ideas of citizens about defence. The citizens want the most defence for their payed taxes (van Duuren, 2016, Appendix 2 Part 2). In other words, if this means integrating to keep the forces up-to-date without paying more taxes, this would be acceptable. This can be connected to a constructivist way of thinking because in this case the norms about defence and the norms of how to reach this are altered, making integration in defence possible.

5.3 Efficiency motives for defence integration and cooperation

Besides the economic benefits, other authors think that efficiency is also an important reason for cooperation. 28 member states acting on their own could have conflicting effects on external and even internal problems in defence and security. Therefore, member states decided that it was for the best to cooperate more in this policy field. However, this was not only for the member states. As mentioned before, the EU institutions adapted and they need to adapt further to be more coherent as well.

As mentioned in the introduction, the creation of the EEAS as a part of the treaty of Lisbon was the first big step to a more coherent EU. However, according to van Duuren, army reservist (Maj/ret) and part of the EPISECC advisory board, this only solves one part of the problem. According van Duuren, the institutions still struggle internally with one another to get more competences resulting in institutions doing the same thing without consulting each other (van Duuren, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2). In other words, clearer rules on who does what are still necessary to make the EU a more efficient actor.

The authors Major and Mölling make the same argument, they state that, "first, there are tight deadlines that must be met. Just as in the case of political decisions, the planning of an operation must be completed within only five days. Second, different doctrines and rules of engagement make it difficult to plan operations. The greatest challenge, however, lies in the third issue, the fragmentation of planning and command structures within the EU" (Major and Mölling, 2011, p.16). This argument shows how challenging the integration on a EU-level can be. To further explain, besides that every member state individually has to say yes, which is time absorbing, the EU institutions further increase this ineffectiveness in the planning and by the command structures in place. According to Schaper, this is not only the case on a EU-level but in every form of military cooperation. Depending on another countries parliamentary approval and

status of their armies to do missions, makes cooperation and further steps to integration a difficult step to make (Schaper, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2).

Other researchers, think that the ineffectiveness of the EU is the result of competition with NATO (Coelmont & Langlois, 2013, p.5). The member states would rather choose to cooperate within the NATO than in the EU framework. Schaper, former permanent representative in NATO and the UN for the Netherlands, also mentions this. According to Schaper, "when looking at military missions we almost automatically look at the options in NATO because they already have the expertise in this area (Schaper, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2). In addition to this, Why should states choose to lose their sovereignty in defence when there is a well-working NATO that does not touch upon the sovereignty of countries? Furthermore, because of this, member states participated in NATO missions instead of EU missions in the past (Biscop & Coelmont, 2012, 104).

However, de Vries, Strategy Director at the Hill and Knowlton strategies and former State Secretary for Defence of the Netherlands, states that EU cooperation and integration is still necessary to move forward independently from NATO. De Vries mentions that "the US will pull back to its own territory more and more and will not always come to the aid of the EU anymore. Furthermore, cooperation would lead to more efficient use of scarce resources instead of countries individually moving around" (de Vries, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2). With this, de Vries explains that the NATO will not necessarily be present forever.

The idea that countries will use each other's resources, as mentioned by de Vries, is already a reality in the case of the Netherlands. As mentioned in the cases, the Netherlands has already integrated a part of their forces with the German Army. In addition to this, this is also happening with the naval forces of Belgium and the Netherlands. Furthermore, recently a Dutch tank battalion under German supervision was created as well (Ministry of Defence, 2015, np.) and there were talks between the Dutch and Belgium Ministers of Defence about integrating their air forces (Homan & Rood, 24-06-2016, n.p.). These are all forms of cooperation to use the scarce resources the countries have more efficiently.

Another argument against the idea of some kind of competition with NATO comes from Keukenleire and Delreux. According to them, the Common Security and Defence Policy was never about territorial defence because that will be the job of NATO (Keukeleire & Delreux,

2014, p.173). In other words, NATO will take care of the protection of national defence and the Common Security and Defence Policy is more focused on problems outside of the EU borders.

5.4 Political and practical motives for defence integration and cooperation

"When looking at defence integration there are two motives: political and practical motives" according to Schaper (2006, Appendix 2 Part 2). This is both the case for the EU and the member states. For example, expanding the EU toolbox by adding military capabilities to the EU could make a big difference to its position in global affairs. For example, conflicts, even close to the EU borders, are still part of this world. Therefore, according to some researchers, the European Union should increase its military capabilities because eventually the European Union has to intervene to promote human rights and democracy (Juncos, 2005, p.97).

Then again, if political motives of the member states already differ from the start, it will be hard to cooperate, let alone finding a common position. For example, according to Ojanen, the Western European member states are focused on their global position, meanwhile the Eastern European member states are more concerned about their national defence (Ojanen, 2012, p.221). Furthermore, currently most of the member states have increased their defence budget because of the recent events in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea (The Economist, 2016). Therefore, who could blame the Eastern European members to focus more on border defence during these times of conflict?

Another example of conflicts of interest in defence integration between member states, is the Arab Spring in Libya. Ginsberg and Penksa mention in their book that, while the focus of member states may have been of self-interest because this crisis would concern a former colony, the other member states had no interests in the conflicts in Africa at all (Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012, p.67). With this reason, according to the Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, "you cannot force countries to work together" therefore, countries need to cooperate with "like-minded" partners (Hennis-Plasschaert, 24-06-2015). In other words, integration and moving as one on a EU-level could be too much in the current situation.

However, it must be said that some member states, due to the current events, are thinking differently about the security and defence of the EU. Take for example Germany, according to some researchers, Germany now realizes that even though they had no interest in a conflict at the EU border, the impact on the security of the European Union, including their own, could

become immense if left alone (Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012, p.67). In addition to this, this lack of interest fired back at Germany and the rest of the EU in the form of a migration crisis.

Matters that include giving up sovereignty are always a difficult subject for the member states. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the member states rather cooperate in a situation where they can keep their sovereignty than losing it to an institution in another set-up. In addition to this, this is not only why member states prefer NATO but also cooperation under the mandate of the UN. Keukeleire and Delreux state that there is a clear difference between the big countries that are permanent members in the Security Council and the other countries (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, 121). For example, the size of the member states, the size of their defence sector and the way member states look towards the world is totally different for each member state (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, 121). In addition to this, the UK and France would never give-up the veto they have in the Security Council and then replace it by a system where every member state is equal. This can be explained by the realist theory mentioned in chapter three. In this chapter it is mentioned that, from a realist perspective, international cooperation is all about the distribution of power. Therefore, it would be unlikely that the UK and France would give up this power without getting something more beneficial in return.

Apart from the political motives, there are also more practical motives for integration. As van Duuren stated, integration is not always a necessity but can be a result of a natural flow in the direction of integration (van Duuren, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2). In other words, the defence sector is trying to find a way with the budget they have at their disposal and could for this reason flow into integration with other countries. Furthermore, van Duuren mentions that the countries acted out of the idea to be better than the other, however, the present countries have more a "if you cannot beat them, join them" vision.

This is something that comes back in the cases mentioned in this thesis as well. To keep the forces a future-oriented full-spectrum operational army, there is besides practical needs, the political need to keep them up-to-date. In addition to this, having to say as a country that you no longer fit the requirements for a combat-ready army is disastrous for a countries position. For example, with the Netherlands reacquiring their tank capabilities working together with Germany, resulted in a readiness of the Dutch forces in more conflict scenarios than before.

5.5 Defence of Multiple Speeds

"Working together with like-minded partners" is the way to go, as hinted by the Dutch Minister of Defence earlier this chapter. This already suggests a possible solution to give defence integration in the EU momentum again. To further explain, not all the member states have the same interest, therefore, moving forward in smaller groups could be the solution. This would than create two or more speeds within the EU. However, this idea is not something new, because the idea of small clusters moving forward in integration was part of the adjustments in the Lisbon Treaty.

A big barrier for the current EU is that it has no common position, de Vries agrees with the idea that countries, like the Netherlands, need to move forward in a smaller group to secure efficient use of resources (de Vries, 2016, Appendix 2 Part 2). According to Schaper decisions made in the EU show a paradox. For example, voting to create battlegroups but then never use them, is only one of the examples of the EU being a paradox (Schaper, 2016, Appendix 2 Part 2). In other words, besides that it is hard to move forward with all the member states on a EU-level, the decisions that were made within the EU end up being empty promises.

One of these adjustments can be found in article 42(6) of the Treaty of the European Union. This article states that, "those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework" (Foster, 2014, 16). This means that with this article, it is possible for the member states to form a cluster and move forward in defence integration. In addition to this, this group will be more dedicated to defence cooperation and as result they could become more efficient when cooperating.

Furthermore, according to Article 46(1) in the Treaty of the European Union, "Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy" (Foster, 2014, p.17-18). This article makes two critical points. First, small clusters can act on an international stage with the consent of the Council and the High Representative without member states that are not in the cluster. The second point is, setting criteria also means that this group

will have no place for free-riders. In other words, where countries can now free-ride on EU missions, this not the case anymore when they are part of this cluster.

Furthermore, Article 44(1) in the Treaty of the European Union states that, "within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task" (Foster, 2014, 17). This would leave a group of willing member states the possibility to act in situations that make involvement of the European Union unlikely or not sufficiently (Nissen, 2015, 21). In other words, not all the member states have to act in such a situation. Therefore, if a conflict such as Libya would repeat itself, it would leave likeminded member states to achieve their global objectives in international affairs under a EU mandate.

However, integration in smaller clusters is not the only option that member states have. According to van Duuren, there are multiple situations, like administrative ingenuity, that could create a way forward besides only working together with like-minded countries (van Duuren, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2). This is consistent with the institutionalist theory because this shows that institutions of the EU, if the member states do not act themselves, will pick this up in return for more competences.

Furthermore, moving forward in a cluster while leaving other member states in a different "speed", has also some disadvantages. For example, Mény states that it is the most ambitious plan of the European Union ever because all the opt-ins and opt-outs in the various sectors make it really hard to make a clear European structure and call this deeper European integration (Mény, 2014, p.1347 – 1348). Furthermore, other authors, like Behr and Ojanen, state their concern that besides the creation of different camps, also a disconnection between strategies and cooperation will take place between the two camps (Behr & Ojanen, 2014, p.41). In other words, moving forward in a different speed will come with its challenges as well.

Conclusion

After all the readings and looking into a lot of sources, it is clear that the sector of EU defence cooperation has still room to grow and adjust. The decades after the EDC created a taboo, however, in the current situation member states can talk about defence integration again. Therefore, in a time where there is economic crisis and budget cuts it could be the only way forward.

The theories of integration made it clear where to look for motives of integration. From a realist perspective, it is all about securing power. However, this can also be a burden on EU defence integration. As mentioned in the thesis, member states rather cooperate in NATO and the UN because then they can keep their sovereignty, than losing it in the European way of cooperation. Leaving the EU stranded with initiatives but without any back-up from the member states. Integration in this case could only be interesting if there are benefits. For example, cost reduction, joint operation and acquiring the necessary requirements to act globally as mentioned in the discussion.

From a institutionalist perspective, the EU is progressing anyway. As mentioned by van Duuren, if the member states do not pick up the problem the EU will pull this towards itself. However, the member states could end up regretting this because the fact that it becomes a EU competence means fewer or no more influence of the member states on its content. In addition to this, even though the EU picks up a project, just like the case of the AAR, it will still not mean that it will come true. As also mentioned by Schaper, making promises is one thing, however, in practice these promises are rarely used or made a reality.

Another perspective is that of a constructivist. A good example, can be found in the selected cases for this thesis. For example, the case of Germany and the Netherlands shows that over a period of time norms of cooperation change and that countries want to talk about integration. This is also the point that van Duuren tries to make by stating that the taxpayer wants the most defence for the lowest possible amount of money. Therefore, the norm changed and the demand made integration an option to fulfil this demand.

Because integration in defence appears to be stuck at a EU-level, more and more countries move forward in smaller clusters. Projects like for example the AAR under the EDA are of course

EU-level integration, but until now it is only a project based on intentions. On the other hand, countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany wanted to move forward. Furthermore, looking at the cases, for these countries it was a necessity to move forward to be able to stay operational. As de Vries said in the questionnaire, now that the US is pulling out more of the EU sphere of influence, it has become necessary for the EU to act as a global player. Therefore, defence integration is not only about benefits for the member states and better resource management but also necessary to mean something on a global stage.

To conclude, by coming back to the thesis question. Member states do not necessarily move forward out of discontent of the EU. However, a EU of multiple speeds could function as a solution and give the EU defence integration a boost again. For the member states, complete EU-level integration is still a step too far, or will never happen at all. Therefore, this could be a solid step between not integrating or integrating completely at a EU-level. Then again, it has to be mentioned that this could be seen as breaking apart the united project of the EU. Can the motto of the EU, united we stand in diversity, still be used if member states act on different levels of integration?

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
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Appendix 1:

Table 1:

Source: EDA, about the organizational structure of the EDA

Appendix 2:

Part one: Questions asked

1. What is your opinion about the idea that defence is an area where states have to cooperate or even integrate with other European Union member states? Is there a future for member states of the European Union with this?

2. Do you agree with how the current defence cooperation and integration occurs? For example, the way how Dutch sections of the land forces are integrated with sections of another member state.

3. Do you think that cooperation between a select group of member states would be better than having a common position of all member states who are part of the Common Security and Defence Policy?

4. Do you think that states, like the Netherlands, that are going ahead with defence cooperation in a smaller set-up is out of discontent for the way defence is handled on a European Union–level? Or do you think that the European Union encourages the willingness of these member states to integrate more in defence without including every member state?

Part two: Questions answered

Questionnaire: Chris van Duuren, army reservist (Maj/ret) and in the EPISECC advisory board.

1.

Staten zijn altijd vrij om dingen samen op te zetten. Er zijn natuurlijk wel een aantal dingen waar dat dan van afhangt of dit ook lukt. Onder gelijkgestemden, bijvoorbeeld, zijn veel minder barrières die je moet overbruggen om een samenwerking te laten werken. Verder wil ik als ik uit het oogpunt van een belastingbetaler kijk de meeste beveiliging voor elke euro die ik betaal.

Naast de keuze om samen te werken, is er ook in sommige situaties van ambtelijke vindingrijkheid waardoor er meer samengewerkt moet worden. Een goed voorbeeld is de huidige vluchtelingen crisis waar sprake was van het doorgeven van een hete aardappel om het probleem op te lossen. Een groot probleem is dan ook het geld voor hulp. Ondanks het feit dat de Europese Unie de grootste donateur is van humanitaire hulp is dat in de Europese Unie zelf niet tot nauwelijks aanwezig. De commissie heeft dit probleem uiteindelijk naar zich toe getrokken onder het mom van artikel 122 (1) over de werking van de Europese Unie. Met het idee van, als we de lasten krijgen dan willen we ook de macht die daar bij komt kijken. Deze vindingrijkheid heeft er uiteindelijk voor gezorgd dat nu ook binnen de Europese Unie humanitaire hulp verleend kan worden en er iets gedaan kan worden aan het vluchtelingen probleem.

2.

Er zijn verschillende manieren en formaten om samen te werken op dit gebied. Maar er is altijd sprake van een optimaal formaat. Dit is een formaat dat de minste weerstand bied maar de uitkomst het grootst en beste past bij de gestelde doelen.

Er zijn natuurlijk ook wat problemen waar de huidige structuur van samenwerken tegenaan loopt. Binnen de Europese Unie doen de instituten vaak aan *bench marking*, hoe meer ze werk naar zich toe trekken, hoe meer ze aanspraak op iets kunnen maken. Het creëren van bijvoorbeeld de EEAS heeft wel voor meer samenwerking gezorgd maar er is nog steeds sprake van de dubbele hoed voor de hoge vertegenwoordiger. Omdat haar rang in het geheel al het hoogste is, net zoals die directe mensen onder haar, zijn er weinig problemen. Echter, de lagen daaronder die onder een commissie DG vallen en anderen die onder de EEAS vallen hebben

onderling nog vaak veel getouwtrek. Dit komt omdat beide partijen van nature proberen hun onmisbaarheid aan te tonen omdat hun positie, niet zoals bij de hoge vertegenwoordiger, al vast staat.

Naast het formaat van de samenwerking en het volgen van de weg van de minste weerstand, heeft defensie ook nog eens te maken met politieke draagkracht dat een groot probleem kan zijn in de snelheid van handelen in een periode van crisis. Bijvoorbeeld zoals in veel gevallen van de Arabische lente. Er is dus niet echt sprake van goed of slecht maar er is meer sprake van de vraag is dit de optimale manier om samen te werken.

3.

Dit hangt compleet af van de samenwerking. Een samenwerking op het niveau van lidstaten werkt alleen als er recht gedaan wordt aan de doelen en dat alle staten die mee doen er voordeel aan houden. Een andere vraag die we constant moeten blijven stellen is, worden we hier beter van? Natuurlijk moet er af en toe wel wat water bij de wijn worden gedaan, maar het moet wel functioneel blijven.

Verder is het ook niet zo zeer dat het beter is voor de lidstaten maar, als je bijvoorbeeld naar Nederlandse samenwerking kijkt met de buurlanden, een natuurlijk verloop van omstandigheden, gelijkheid van ideeën en gemeenschappelijke dreigingen ook een reden kunnen zijn om met een kleine groep verder te gaan. Daarbij, lange tijd hebben de landen er naar gestreefd om beter dan elkaar te zijn maar, nu lijkt het er meer op dat er uit een '*if you can not beat them, join them*' mentaliteit gehandeld wordt. Ook word het draagvlak voor defensie steeds kleiner omdat investeringen in defensie meestal lijden tot een spiraal van geweld. Daardoor wordt er steeds vaker gezocht naar een diplomatieke oplossing die goede resultaten geeft.

4.

Ik denk niet dat het zozeer uit onvrede is maar meer, na wat ik eerder ook heb gezegd, gaat om de weg van de minste weerstand. Minder geld zorgt wel tot de noodzaak om te kijken naar andere opties, maar zal niet de hoofd motivatie moeten zijn. Op alle gebieden binnen de Europese Unie is er wel sprake van een paradox. In het geval van veiligheid, willen we als belastingbetaler, ongeacht wie het doet, de meeste veiligheid die mogelijk is voor de laagst mogelijke prijs. Maar na een lange periode van rust in dit gebied gaan er vraagtekens ontstaan.

Een goed voorbeeld is de Nobelprijs van de vrede die de Europese Unie heeft gekregen. Decennia van vrede hebben geleid tot de vraag waarom er nog een defensie nodig is.

Minder geld is dan een volgende stap voor dit gebied omdat het anders moeilijk te verklaren is waarom, in tijde van vrede, er nog zoveel geld naar defensie gaat. Echter, de politieke factor is op dit gebied ook heel strek aanwezig. Het verdedigen van de uitgaven of de noodzaak van uitgaven aanduiden is uiteindelijk hun taak. Ook voor oplossingen wordt er naar de politiek gekeken.

Questionnaire: Jack de Vries, Strategy Director Hill and Knowlton strategies and former State Secretary for Defence of the Netherlands.

1.

Ik ben daar groot voorstander van. En het is ook noodzakelijk. De VS zal zich meer en meer op haar eigen grondgebied terugtrekken en Europa niet altijd meer te hulp schieten. Bovendien leidt het tot een efficiëntere inzet van de beperkte defensiemiddelen i.p.v. dat ieder land zijn eigen afwegingen maakt.

2.

Bovenstaande wens wordt in het huidige Europa niet gerealiseerd bij gebrek aan eensgezindheid. Om het tweede doel van die samenwerking toch te bereiken: efficiënte inzet van middelen, is het verstandig dat Nederland bilaterale samenwerkingen aangaat. Het maakt het echter wel versnipperd. Beter zou een model van een Europa van 2 snelheden zijn, waarbij een kleiner aantal landen kiest voor verdere integratie.

3.

Zoals hierboven gesteld gaat het om realiteitszin. Het totaal is natuurlijk altijd krachtiger dan slechts een deel van de som, maar de werkelijkheid is dat de eenheid in Europa ver te zoeken is. In ieder geval moet goed worden afgestemd op de NAVO behoefte stelling. Een kleine groep landen kan de weg van verdere integratie kiezen.

4.

Nederland was van oudsher inderdaad meer federalistisch, daar zijn we echter ook wel van teruggekomen onder druk van het populisme en de binnenlandse weerstand. Ooit was de keuze: verdieping of verbreding. Na de val van de muur is noodgedwongen gekozen voor verbreding en is feitelijk het oorspronkelijke ideaal achter de horizon verdwenen. Het is dus niet zozeer onvrede als een consequentie van de gemaakte keuzes. Het is dus vooral kiezen voor waar het efficiënter kan.

Questionnaire: Herman Schaper, Professor at Leiden University, Senate member of the Netherlands and former permanent representative of the Netherlands for both the NATO and the VN.

1.

Samenwerken is zeker een gedachte die in opkomst is. Een goed voorbeeld is de samenwerking tussen het Nederlandse en Duitse leger. Voor een kleiner land met veel bezuinigingen, is dit een vanzelfsprekende weg die je inslaat. Bij integratie spelen er dan ook vaak twee redenen mee. De eerste is een politieke reden. Een voorbeeld hiervan is Eurocorps in Straatsburg, met Duitsland opgericht, waar verschillende landen ook lid van zijn geworden. De andere reden is meer gericht op het praktische nut van samenwerken en integreren.

Samenwerken is een ding maar integreren is iets anders. Als we van integratie uit zouden gaan binnen de EU, dan zou de EP bepalen wanneer er wel of niet overgegaan word op actie. Maar, op deze manier integreren gaat wel erg ver, zelfs voor Nederland. Het Nederlandse parlement zal daar niet mee instemmen. Het Duitse en Nederlandse leger spreekt zelf over integreren, maar het is mij niet echt duidelijk hoe. Dit zal meer zijn op deelgebieden, maar iedereen zal wel aanspraak kunnen blijven maken op het eigen onderdeel. Dit zal op EU niveau niet echt mogelijk zijn. Echter, de manier van samenwerken in de NAVO, dat vinden we allemaal prima, vooral de roterende machtsstructuur zoals we die kennen maar tot een Europees leger zal het naar mijn idee niet komen. Dit vooral omdat partijen zoals de SP, CU en SGP erg hameren op behoud van soevereiniteit.

Wanneer we kijken naar de toekomst en ons eigen voorbeeld met de Duitsers, zou ik zeggen dat er inderdaad een toekomst is in samenwerken op het gebied van defensie. De vraag is echter, is dit daadwerkelijk binnen de EU? Er zijn geen specifieke doelen vastgesteld in de EU en met

de NAVO zijn er ook mogelijkheden om op andere niveaus samen te werken. Het kan dus dat er meer samenwerking komt, maar dit is per definitie niet gekoppeld aan de EU. In de NAVO gaat het bijvoorbeeld al heel ver, maar gek genoeg wordt daar niet zo veel aandacht aan besteed. Als je serieus militair aan de slag wil gaan, dan kijk je naar de NAVO en niet naar de EU. Ondanks alle ambities die de EU op papier heeft staan.

2.

Het is een praktische noodzaak. Echter, een nadeel hieraan is de parlementaire goedkeuring. Het duurt te lang voor ieder land om deze goedkeuring te bewandelen. Je bent ook afhankelijk van hoe defensie ervoor staat in andere landen. Zelfs in het geval van Nederland meldt de Algemene Rekenkamer dat er sprake is van slecht management, verminderde efficiency, slechte ICT en geen munitie of reserveonderdelen. Met het combineren van Belgische en Nederlandse marine kun je dit op niveau houden. Er zit een krachtige logica achter samenwerken, maar er is vaak sprake van praktische bezwaren.

3.

Het verdrag van Lissabon geeft een mogelijkheid om in een kleine groep verder te gaan, maar dat is nooit gebeurd. *Centre for European Policy studies: more Union in European Defence* heeft ook een stuk geschreven over die permanente cooperation, ook op niet-militair gebied, maar het komt er nooit van. Van de EU samenwerking wordt gewoonweg geen gebruik van gemaakt.

4.

De enige weg voorwaarts is het per deelgebied van materiaal en troepen samen gaan werken. Dit kan alleen door een paar landen te verzamelen in een groep en daarna gezamenlijk materieel aanschaffen. Dit is al het geval bij de Belgisch/Nederlandse marine. Daarbij, is dit voor een belangrijk deel praktische noodzaak. Naast de praktische noodzaak is er ook politieke druk. Eurocorps is een signaal geweest dat landen verder wilden. DE landen die mee wilden doen, mochten er bij. Echter, het is in zijn geheel nooit ingezet, maar mogelijk wel alleen één onderdeel.

Dit is een van de karakteristieken van de EU, het verschil tussen retoriek en realiteit! Bijvoorbeeld, waarom stemmen we wel in met '*battlegroups*' en waarom worden ze daarna niet gebruikt? Waarom zijn zelfs de mensen die voor zijn, zo terughoudend om ze te gebruiken? Dit is bij sommigen te begrijpen, deze lidstaten willen niet militaristisch overkomen vanwege de WWII, maar desondanks hebben vele lidstaten hier wel mee ingestemd, maar zijn er niet verder mee gegaan.