Leiden University

Faculty of Humanities


Universiteit Leiden

Master Thesis:

# On the path towards a stronger Europe: Tracing the development of strategic culture in EU external action

Brussels, 29 August 2019

**Name**: Sarah van Luijk (s.c.van.luijk@leidenuniv.nl)

**Student Number**: s1888188

**Word Count**: 16,120 words

**Programme**: MA International Relations: European Union studies

**Thesis Supervisor**: Dr. M.E.L. David

**Second Reader**: Dr. J.S. Oster

# Abstract[1]

In the 2016 EU Global Strategy, High Representative/Vice-President Mogherini called for a "stronger Europe" in response to the continuous string of crises and challenges the EU faced in the past decade. Since the institutionalization of Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Common Security and Defence Policy and with the gradual emergence of the EU as a foreign policy actor, scholars have tried to craft appropriate concepts, frameworks and approaches which would allow them to define and study the EU's characteristics, role and ability in the realm of external action. Strategic culture is one of these concepts which tries to answer core questions about what influences and drives strategic behaviour in foreign policy, like a "compass" which can help an actor navigate and pursue its strategic priorities. In an effort to contribute to the under-researched body of literature on this concept, this paper studies the development of EU strategic culture by comparing the 2003 European Security Strategy with the 2016 Global Strategy. These documents codify strategic culture by providing written accounts of the EU's shared values, interests and the means it defines as appropriate to pursue these interests. The findings confirm that an EU strategic culture has developed between 2003 and 2016, notably by defining a set of shared values and interests for the first time, through its ability to identify and update its threat assessments based on recent changes in its environment, as well as thanks to a range of concrete tool-building proposals guided by these norms and interests, notably in the field of military capabilities.


[1] This publication is in line with Article 17a of the Staff Regulations of the European Commission (applicable by analogy pursuant to Art. 11 CEOS) as the matter is not liable seriously to prejudice the legitimate interests of the Union. Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author, expressed on her own behalf, not representing the Commission or the official opinion of the European Commission. Any information about the EU mentioned here below has been made public or is accessible to the public (Art. 17 of the Staff Regulations).

# Table of Contents

# Chapter 1: Introduction

> We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects. We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. (Mogherini, 2016, p. 13)

These opening sentences of the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) openly bear the weight and consequences of the continuous string of crises and challenges the European Union (EU) has faced in the past decade. What has been called "existential crisis" started when the financial, economic and debt crisis hit in 2008 and continued with a crisis of solidarity between the member states both on emergency bailouts and more recently the refugee crisis, with episodes of Russian expansionism in Ukraine and Crimea bringing conflict back to the EU's fringes, with flare-ups of old and new tensions in the Middle East alongside the so-called "Arab Spring" uprisings, with a large increase of refugee arrivals from peripheral conflict zones and surrounding regions, with a series of deadly terrorist attacks on European soil, all alongside a rise of populist, Eurosceptic parties in EU member states which culminated in Britain voting to leave the EU in June 2016 (ECFR, 2016). The conclusion to be taken away from all this is clear from the opening words – the need to build a "stronger Europe" in matters related to external action.

The idea of strengthening Europe was also what drove decision-makers in the 1990s to formally institutionalize Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Defence and Security Policy, renamed Common Security and Defence Policy by the Treaty of Lisbon (CDSP), in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties after the end of the Cold War (Keukeleire, 2014). Since then and with the gradual emergence of the EU as a foreign policy actor, scholars have tried to craft appropriate concepts, frameworks and approaches which would allow them to define and study the EU's characteristics, role and ability in the realm of external action.

Born out of the Cold War era, strategic culture is one of these concepts which tries to answer core questions about what influences and drives strategic behaviour in foreign policy. Strategic culture is defined as "*a set of shared ideas, visions, expectations, and common patterns of habitual behaviour concerning the use of military and civilian instruments for reaching the political objectives in the field of security"* (Biava, 2011, p. 42). It is like a "compass" which can help an actor define and pursue its strategic priorities, especially in

uncertain crisis-situations, and navigate the long-term outlook (Meyer, 2006, p. 2). Experts have written about several aspects of EU strategic culture – questioning its existence, citing reasons which may prevent or constrain the development of such a strategic culture within the EU more generally and EU foreign policy specifically, or trying to define its characteristics, but the topic remains under-researched. Notably, there have only been a few attempts to construct an empirical framework to study its evolution. This is the part of the academic literature this thesis wants to contribute to by using one of the few existing relevant empirical approaches to EU strategic culture by Biava et al (2011) and feeding it with new and more recent data.

The publication of the EUGS in June 2016 provides an excellent opportunity to trace the development of EU strategic culture up to that point. Its processor, the European Security Strategy (ESS), dates back to 2003 and was the first ever strategy which tried to provide an analysis of the EU's security environment and to identify key threats and objectives (Tocci, 2017). Strategic documents such as the ESS and EUGS have been used by several studies because they provide a written account of the EU's shared values, interests and the means it defines as appropriate to pursue these interests. They have notably been described as autobiographies which codify the existing strategic culture and therefore provide useful data for those wanting to study the development of strategic culture (Biava, 2011; Biscop, 2007, p. 2007; Gray, 1999). Considering that CFSP and CSDP really came off the ground at the turn of the century when many of the necessary puzzle pieces had fallen into place, comparing the EUGS with its predecessor allows me to cover almost the whole period during which these policies have been active. This approach can therefore provide a comprehensive picture of the development of EU strategic culture since the beginnings of CFSP and CSFP up to 2016.

Studying the development of this strategic culture will help understand how and why the motives behind the EU's actions have evolved and provide explanatory background to its decisions to take action or not in certain situations, which could even ultimately allow for predictions of how the EU reacts to certain challenges. Its development is also an important indicator of how the EU has grown as an external actor because the evolution of such a culture has been described as the element which could determine the success or failure of the EU's external policies (Cornish & Edwards, 2001). Indeed, this is likely why the ESS (Solana, 2003,

p. 11) emphasised: “We need to develop strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.”

As no research so far has traced the evolution from the ESS to the EUGS through the lens of EU strategic culture, this paper would like to contribute to the academic literature by attempting to fill this gap. The overarching research question guiding the analysis will be: *Can we see a development of EU strategic culture in EU external action?* Based on the definition of strategic culture, the dataset and the empirical framework, I will specifically look for evidence that the EU has developed a set of shared valued and interests underpinning its external action, assess how it has identified and adapted key threats to its security, and analyse how it has defined ways, capabilities and instruments to address these threats in the 2016 EUGS in comparison to the 2003 ESS. The underlying argument is that an EU strategic culture has indeed developed between 2003 and 2016 and that the Global Strategy provides evidence to support this.

To begin, the paper will give a short overview of the emergence of EU external action, extensively review the literature on strategic culture while also focusing on a few related concepts relevant to the argument. Next, the methodology and indicators used to analyse the ESS and EUGS will be explained in depth. In the subsequent section, a few explanations will be provided to contextualise the EUGS. With the backdrop in place, the analysis of the documents according to the previously defined framework and indicators can follow. The paper closes with concluding remarks and recommendations for future research. The findings confirm that an EU strategic culture has developed, notably by defining a set of shared values and of shared interests for the first time, and through its ability to identify, re-prioritise and update its threat assessments based on recent crises it has faced and changes in its environment. The EUGS also includes a range of concrete tool-building proposals guided by these norms and interests, notably in the field of military capabilities, which also provide proof of the development of this strategic culture between 2003 and 2016.

# Chapter 2: Literature Review

The following section will set out how the EU's foreign, security and defence policy was created and developed, and point out the place and role of the two strategic documents, the ESS and the EUGS, which are at the core of the method. In addition, we will explain why certain strands of the literature on the contested concept of strategic culture have lost the purpose of the concept in oversimplification, and why it is essential to include behaviour in the concept's definition. Finally, the rather small body of literature on EU strategic culture will be reviewed, and some important conceptual ground rules when studying EU strategic culture will be set out to make sure the method and results generated by the analysis to follow are as relevant to the EU and its context as possible.

## A. A short history of EU external relations

The question of what drives the EU's decisions and actions is at the heart of strategic culture and therefore this paper. Hence understanding the EU's external approach and activities, its origin, evolution and conduct on the global stage are key in this respect. The EU is also unlike any other actor thanks to its history, particular institutional setup, strengths and shortcomings which is why we need to study it based on its own merits and specificities (Biava, 2011; Biava et al., 2011; Chebakova, 2008).

The idea as well as a sense of responsibility that the EU would and should develop some form of foreign and defence policy cooperation was already indicated in the early stages of EU history, for instance in the 1969 The Hague Declaration, and it continued to grow with its increasing global trade power. Nevertheless, cooperation in this area only made real progress once the Cold War ended. The fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a re-definition of the world order, as well as of the EU's approach towards the rest of the world and its place in this new order. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty thus became the first instance where foreign and security policy were formally recognised as areas of cooperation between EU member states, and formally institutionalised in the shape of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). A few years later, the Amsterdam Treaty launched the European Security and Defence Policy (now Common Security and Defence Policy or CSDP). These treaties kicked off a plethora of agreements, decisions and developments in the field

of external action which would overcome obstacles to and advance cooperation in these fields of foreign and defence policy step-by-step, such as the St. Malo Agreement, the Berlin Plus Agreement or the Lisbon Treaty (Bindi, 2010).

Moreover, the first decade following the fall of the Iron Curtain taught the EU some painful lessons about its incapacity, shortcomings and failure to deal with crises on its fringes, namely through the Yugoslav and Kosovar wars during 1990s (Bindi, 2010; Meyer, 2005). In a way, these conflicts acted as a wake-up call which made the need for significant advances in the fields of EU security and defence policy even more pressing and evident. The reality of a changed global post-Cold War environment and the existence of new, multiple and hybrid threats, which called for the adaptation of existing and the creation of new appropriate approaches and tools, was once again confirmed with the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (for a detailed account and analysis of how European foreign, security and defence cooperation has developed over time, refer to Bindi, 2010; Bulut, Giovanni, Helly, & Keohane, 2009; Keukeleire, 2014; Tardy, 2009).

On the operational side, the CSDP has less than 20 years under its belt and the EU has still managed to deploy a remarkable number and variety of missions across three continents in the two decades since its institutionalisation began (Biava et al., 2011). The first missions were deployed to the Western Balkan states, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, as well as the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 (Biava et al., 2011, p. 1238). One can observe a clear preference for civilian-type over exclusively military missions, and many operations were conducted in the framework of a larger UN or NATO mandate, the majority targeting the wider European neighbourhood as well as Africa more broadly (Biava, 2011).

This is the backdrop against which one needs to see the European Security Strategy which was presented in 2003. First of its kind, the ESS was the first document that attempted to analyse the Union's security environment and tried to identify the EU’s strategic threats, challenges and objectives (Tocci, 2017). When its successor, the EU Global Strategy, was being drafted 13 years later, the circumstances were radically different – the EU was facing new, multiple and hybrid challenges from within and without such as cyberthreats, the refugee crisis, manifold crises and conflicts on its fringes among which attempts of Russian expansionism or terrorist attacks. We will return to a more detailed analysis of the context from which both documents emerged later on.

Let us now move on to a review of the literature of one of the most important concepts in the study of an actor in foreign and defence policy – strategic culture.

### B. Strategic culture: a contested concept

Commentators started emphasising the need for the emergence of a strategic culture in the framework of the newly created ESDP and CFSP relatively early. According to Cornish and Edwards (2001), the development of such a culture would decide if these policies and capabilities would ever succeed.[2]

The concept of strategic culture first emerged as part of an effort to better understand the behaviour of one of the two Cold War powers (A. Toje, 2009). Since then, different conceptualisations of strategic culture have emerged, a debate which Johnston (1995) artificially divided into three generations. Strategic culture remains a contested concept to this day. The dividing question – the so-called Johnston-Gray debate – is how behaviour and (strategic) culture are interrelated, in other words if strategic culture is considered to indicate or determine strategic behaviour (A. Toje, 2010).

The first generation was spearheaded by Snyder's (1977) work which focused on understanding the behaviour of the Soviet Union as a nuclear power by looking at its politics, organisation and history. In other words, it tried to trace the reasoning behind certain decisions and actions of the Soviet political elite concerning its nuclear power by studying its specific context. Gray (1981, 1986) later refined this idea and widened the scope, arguing that each actor has a distinctive style influencing his behaviour, shaped by his specific experience and past, by geography, political ideology, religion and preference for certain types of military assets. The first generation thus saw strategic culture as context which can help us understand, though not fully explain the behaviour of a state actor. There is no reliable causality between strategic culture and behaviour, with many other factors susceptible of influencing a decision or action – it cannot be a perfect guide to future behaviour. However, studying strategic culture can contribute to a better understanding of the motives, values and interests – the reasons – behind exhibited behaviour and decisions as well as pointing out the

[2] It should be noted that "strategy" and "strategic" have become "fashionable" and chronically over-used terms in contemporary policy-making, leaving the impression that any roadmap or policy paper often receives the label "strategic" to buffer up its importance regardless of the fact if it deserves this label from a conceptual standpoint (A. Toje, 2010).

most likely (future) actions and trends (Meyer, 2005; Schmidt & Zyla, 2011). Modern constructivists support this approach which, instead of claiming predictive powers, allows for estimations of how likely or unlikely future actions are based on what is accepted as "beliefs for legitimate intervention" (Checkel, 1998; Finnemore, 2003, p. 15; Meyer, 2005).

A second and third generation of scholars tried improve the concept, wanting to develop a theory that could be tested scientifically – wanting to explain rather than understand. By creating a falsifiable methodology, they wanted to collect as much data as possible to ultimately be able to predict future behaviour. Hence they separated behaviour and strategic culture, treating the former as an independent variable (Schmidt & Zyla, 2011; A. Toje, 2009). Gray (1999) criticised this approach for being more focused on building a solid theory than one fit for purpose which actually improves the concept, and Johnston (1999) indeed later recognised that the approach had been "overly atomistic" (Meyer, 2005, p. 527).

Firstly, in separating behaviour and culture, and in trying to establish a causal link between them to be able to predict an actor's future behaviour, these scholars simplified matters too much. There are many other influences at work when an actor takes an action or a decision, of which strategic culture is an important one (Meyer, 2005). However, an actor may still sometimes take decisions that contradict their strategic values, fully aware of them but being compelled by other elements to pursue a certain course of action (Gray, 1986).

Secondly, the second and third generation's premise was flawed in its failure to understand the nature of culture. One cannot surgically separate an actor from their culture, as they belong to a coherent whole, and the actor has been created and is acting within their specific culture at all times – they cannot take off this culture like a pair of glasses (Meyer, 2005). As Gray (1999, p. 59) states: "All strategic behaviour is effected by humans who cannot help but be cultural agents." Additionally, the continuous interplay between the actor and his environment is both shaped by and affects strategic culture (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; A. Toje, 2009). In a multi-layered, values-based context such as the EU, there is a continuous interaction between strategic behaviour and culture. Culture is context. It permeates and is inseparable from behaviour, and must therefore be part of any definition of strategic culture (Meyer, 2005; Rynning, 2003).

With this in mind, this thesis builds on Biava's (2011, p. 42) definition of strategic culture: "a set of shared ideas, visions, expectations, and common patterns of habitual behaviour

concerning the use of military and civilian instruments for reaching the political objectives in the field of security." Biava's (2011) definition builds on work by Meyer (2006, p. 156) who adds that strategic culture does not only originate from the "existence" of these values, beliefs or behavioural patterns but also from their "hierarchy and interpretation". The ability to rank strategic preferences is thus also part of the characteristics of strategic culture.

A fourth generation emerged after 2000 as a response to the changed world order and global shifts, introducing new important players such as the EU and China into the mix (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; A. Toje, 2009). However, researchers continue to apply very different conceptualisations of strategic culture, and the Johnston-Gray debate is thus far from being settled. We now turn to the literature on EU strategic culture which can be seen as part of this generation.

### C. EU strategic culture

While the term European strategic culture has established itself in the literature, the term EU strategic culture is more precise and accurate to refer to a strategic culture within the framework of the EU. Indeed a European strategic culture in the literal sense of the word is likely to differ from the EU's version (Meyer, 2006).[3] For the purposes of this thesis, the term "strategic culture" refers to EU strategic culture whenever it is used in the following chapters.

The concept of EU strategic culture has not been around for long, the first articles only having been published 17 years ago. This pre-empts one of its main problems – the fact that the research has many gaps, unanswered questions and cannot build on a common conceptualisation or analytical framework. Of course this is also related to the fact that key parts of EU external action were only institutionalised in the 1990s. Conversely, this also leaves many opportunities and angles to study, and this thesis wants to close one of the gaps in this debate.

Rather than asking about its nature, much of the existing literature on the concept either asks whether and to what extent the EU could develop a strategic culture, or contends that the EU has not and is unlikely to develop a strategic culture, highlighting the many obstacles that more or less permanently hamper the development of a strategic culture (For these strands

[3] It is also important to distinguish between the EU, including all EU member states and a supranational cluster of institutions, and Europe, the continent that encompasses more countries than the EU and refers to a different geographical, broader context.

of literature, refer to, amongst others: Baun, 2005; Cornish & Edwards, 2001; Heiselberg, 2003; Meyer, 2005; Rynning, 2003; Tardy, 2007). The constraints and obstacles listed actually often overlap, even if the conclusions are slightly different. An argument advanced by Lindley-French (2002), Rynning (2003) and Tardy (2007) for instance is the fact that the EU does not and might never possess any significant military power which, for them, is a precondition for the emergence of a strategic culture. Rynning (2005, p. 46) even goes as far as to say that the EU as a peace project should not try to be anything that contradicts its nature, and thus to "leave strategic affairs to those who have the capacity to think and act strategically".

Hence a rather limited amount of research aims at defining EU strategic culture and narrowing down its characteristics. There are also two fundamental differences in conceptualisation among the attempts at conceptualising the concept.

The first conceptual difference is how authors see the nature and origin of EU strategic culture. It is seen as the result of agglomeration and convergence of national strategic cultures towards common goals and interests over time by scholars who have conducted comparative studies between member states (Giegerich, 2006; Howorth, 2002; Meyer, 2006). Conversely, others see strategic culture as a completely new culture, which is of course influenced by member states but also by the EU's institutional structures, agents and its environment (Meyer, 2005; Schmidt & Zyla, 2011). Therefore, it is more than a mere agglomeration of national strategic cultures and needs to be seen as something in its own right.

This leads us to the second conceptual difference. Several authors define EU strategic culture solely based on military terms, along the lines of those who deny its emergence for this reason, and the origins of strategic culture and even the strategy concept (Hyde-Price, 2004; Meyer, 2011). However, this narrow view bears witness to an important shortcoming in the literature on strategic culture: a number of researchers do not take into account the radically changed, post-Cold War environment with its new and hybrid challenges, nor do they account for the fact that the EU is not just another state actor. The concept of strategic culture, when applied to the EU, therefore needs to be adapted accordingly to yield appropriate results in applied research (Biava, 2011; Biava et al., 2011). Indeed the scope of EU external action goes beyond the use of force and its toolbox contains a variety of tools that are not categorised as military. The EU's unique approach to foreign and security policy is distinct from that of a state actor, which is why the strategic culture needs to account for the fact that one cannot

fit the EU into a pre-defined framework built around state actors and must respect the specificities and particular workings of the EU, including all its levels, characteristics, its unique institutional and intergovernmental cooperative framework as well as the values it is based on (Biava et al., 2011; Biscop, 2007; Chebakova, 2008; Kammel, 2011; Meyer, 2006). This is why an accurate definition of strategic culture also needs to include the scope of the EU's foreign policy toolbox, i.e. military and civilian tools.

Based on this reasoning, Biava (2011) designed a multi-level empirical framework to analyse strategic culture in a way that includes the operational (missions, field practice), the top-down institutional (common ideas, values, interests) and the bottom-up institutional level (socialisation processes, expectations) levels, using a wide range of available data. With it, Biava (2011, pp. 57–58) identified a number of markers of EU strategic culture and was therefore able to provide the most comprehensive and concrete definition based on empirical research to date, which fulfils all of the afore-mentioned criteria:

> [EU strategic culture is] based on the principle of the projection of forces within a multilateral framework, which implies constructive cooperation and complementarity with International Community efforts and with EU long-term approach on the field relying on Communitarian instruments (…) [and] focused on the principle of international legitimacy and implementation of local ownership. It relies on a flexible, comprehensive, dynamic, and long-term approach, based on an ad hoc and integrated (including civil-military) use of multidimensional instruments, according to the circumstances on the field, on the development of local capacities, implying a coherent follow-up of the field intervention. (…) [It] is based on a restricted use of military means, deployed on the basis of a mandate limited in time and space, foreseeing an exit strategy.

As previously mentioned, the question of how to empirically observe and measure strategic culture or its evolution has caused many headaches for those studying EU strategic culture, and a generally accepted analytical framework is still not in sight. Still, a few attempts have been made to unpack it among which Biava's (2011) and Biava et al's (2011) are the most relevant to date. I take this opportunity to note that Herd (2009), which contributed to Biava et al's (2011) analysis, as well as Biava et al (2011) lack rigour in the sense that they do not present their dataset nor methodology in a clear way that would make it easy to replicate and reuse their work, while Biava et al (2011) specifically state their intention of putting forward an analytical framework that could be used in other studies. There is notably no description of how the data has been collected, analysed or been extracted, nor do Biava et al (2011)

explain exactly how and why they have decided to use Herd's (2009) table and improve it in the way they have. We will come back to the implications this has for this paper in the next chapter.

Several other studies focus for instance on a single CSDP mission or a string of inter-linked operations (Haine, 2011; Johansen, 2017; Kammel, 2011; Pentland, 2011; Schmidt, 2011); or, as strategic culture is often said to resemble that of the UN and NATO, look into the relationship between these respective strategic cultures (Peters, 2011; Zyla, 2011).

In this chapter, we have explained how oversimplifying the strategic culture concept dilutes and distorts the concept and that we need to keep in mind that culture permeates everything, as encultured social beings act within and shape strategic culture, which is also the reason why behaviour cannot be surgically separated from strategic culture and therefore needs to be part of its definition and conceptualisation. We have established the importance of using the appropriate view of EU foreign policy, conceptualisation of EU strategic culture and a contemporary, adapted method and laid out a definition for strategic culture which takes into account the whole range of EU external action and its unique toolbox of military and civilian instruments. Moreover, the gap in the existing research that this paper aims to fill has been pointed out. Against this backdrop, we are now ready to set out the methodological framework.

# Chapter 3: Theory and Method

As per the research question set out at the beginning of the paper, the aim here is to study the development of EU strategic culture from the time that CFSP and CSDP were institutionalised in the 1990s and the EU put its first missions on the ground, to the present. This chapter will introduce the ESS and EUGS, the key elements of the method which will be used to answer the research question. It should be noted that in line with the definitions of strategic culture set forth in the previous chapter and considering the scope of the EU's foreign policy toolbox, including civilian and military instruments such as CFSP, CSDP, trade, climate, environment, energy, migration, humanitarian aid, development cooperation, enlargement, the following analysis will handle a wide view of security.

## A. Data

ESS and EUGS were chosen as the objects of research because they are generally accepted in the literature as the only comprehensive, over-arching foreign policy strategies of the EU to date and are suited to study the development of strategic culture from 2003 to 2016, which closely matches the period of evolution of CFSP and CSDP (Biava, 2011; Biava et al., 2011). These strategies are defined as successors of one another and as products of the EU, hence they come right from the source of EU strategic culture (Tocci, 2016). This implies that the content of these documents needs to be treated as subjective, as they are written from the EU's viewpoint.

The dataset does not include behavioural variables (f.ex. data on CSDP missions) or other documents (f.ex. sectoral strategies, presidency conclusions) for reasons of scope, simplicity and feasibility. Notably, the 2008 Implementation Report of the ESS is excluded from the dataset because even though it started as an ambitious undertaking, it ended up mostly taking stock of progress due to a lack of political will and a difficult internal situation at the time, with largely the same content as the ESS (Tocci, 2015, 2017). The choice to not include the much-discussed European Neighbourhood Policy review put forward in November 2015 for its part was made because its authors were involved in the drafting process and because

it already features prominently in the EUGS as well (Tocci, 2015). It is also too early for reliable behavioural data to fully assess the EUGS' implementation.[4]

Strategic roadmaps such as the ESS and EUGS have been deemed essential empirical data to study strategic culture. They have even been called autobiographies of the EU, showcasing its fundamental values, interests and defining appropriate action in the field of foreign policy and thus the development and codification of strategic culture (Biava, 2011; Biava et al., 2011; Biscop, 2007; Gray, 1999; Mälksoo, 2016; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). EU strategic culture exists independently of these documents – it does not stay frozen in time as long as the roadmap has not been updated –, but continues to evolve along with the EU, its missions, experiences, track record and the changing environment. Hence, the EUGS codified an existing strategic culture which was already being practised. Roadmaps such as the EUGS are part of the constant learning process of encultured agents acting within and shaping strategic culture (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). However, this does not mean that the crafting and publication of an updated strategic roadmap is only a static exercise of recording a strategic culture's status and evolution. It serves a number of other purposes and in doing that, can make its own contribution to the development of strategic culture. A new strategy consolidates the existing strategic culture and can for instance stimulate debate or awareness, give impetus to innovate and address new threats, to update existing or create new capabilities, for instance made possible by a recent treaty change. The reflection process leading up to it can also serve as an opportunity to form a consensus on shared values and interests, as we will see below (Biscop, 2007).

The ESS and the EUGS, both public documents, are reasonably short, structured and use only a limited amount of jargon. It is therefore fairly easy to extract the information needed for this research without any auxiliary tools or software. Guidelines for document analysis in qualitative research will be kept in mind when conducting this research (such as type of document, author, audience, purpose, drafting process, production, language, process) (Flick, 2009). The analysis will lean on the extensive amount of existing literature on the ESS in the comparative analysis, as the purpose here is not to provide an analysis of this document but

[4] The analysis of two overarching foreign policy strategies without the use of sectoral or other supporting documents have also been conducted in the case of Russian military doctrines (See for example: Dick, 1992; Fitzgerald, 1992; Sinovets & Renz, 2015).

rather of the EUGS and the evolution since the ESS. Occasional direct references to the original document will also be useful.

### B. Analytical framework

I will use one of the rare analytical frameworks to study EU strategic culture, conceptualised by Biava et al (2011) based on work by Herd (2009) and Biava (2011). It is fit to be used as a comparative tool, show the evolution of strategic culture over time and thus suits the intentions of this research.

For reasons of scope and feasibility, this thesis will not be able to collect and process the same range of data as the original scholars. However, the EUGS provides an opportunity to add new data to the model and further analyse the evolution of strategic culture. The parameters which will be introduced below have been adapted slightly from Biava et al (2011) to take into account the different dataset and follow a slightly different logic, notably taking a wider view of security than only CSDP. Adaptations are notably made to improve rigour because, as previously mentioned, Biava et al (2011) do not explain the methodological construction of their framework or method of data collection in detail, a gap which the following paragraphs will aim to fill for the purposes of this paper.

First, values are the bedrock of the EU's legitimacy to act in external relations, as they shape and help determine the EU's interests and priorities. Norms also define what constitutes appropriate action for the EU by defining its priorities and limits. As per the definition set out in the literature review, values, expectations and interests are at the heart of strategic culture. The more the EU agrees and openly commits to a set of shared values and interests, the more its strategic culture is able to develop, which is the purpose of this research. Unlike Biava et al (2011) which focus mostly on interests, the parameter "Norms" in this paper will be used to identify the shared values and interests that guide the EU's external action.[5] The elements I will look for are if and how these are clearly presented in the EUGS, analyse which norms and interests are new compared to 2003 as well as pay attention to the specific language used in this context.

[5] It should be mentioned that socialisation processes, dubbed 'Europeanisation' within the context of the EU, have been shown to play a crucial role in spreading and institutionalising these norms in the EU, but we will not include any new data on this here (Biava, 2011; Meyer, 2006).

Second, the EU's ability to assess its environment, identify the main threats to its security and adapt them over time when confronted with new challenges is a crucial part of developing a strategic culture. It allows the EU to define an order of priority among the key threats, chart a path to address each specific threat and the definition of the appropriate instruments to do so, as well as the limits within which these may be used, according to the values and interests defined. Under the parameter "Threats", I will aim to collect and compare the key threats identified and their ranking in terms of priority from ESS to EUGS.

Third, what ultimately drives a strategic culture forward is a closer link between shared norms, interests and the available capabilities – to better match ends with means. Here, Biava et al's (2011) indicators on tool-building and institutional machinery will be merged due to the different dataset which does not allow for the study of implementation of measures foreseen. With the "Tools" parameter, I will be taking a close look at the actions and instruments put forward by the EUGS from the EU's comprehensive and unique foreign policy toolbox to fulfil the EU's interests and address the key challenges that have been identified. Specifically, I will look for evidence of new or adapted instruments which are being proposed according to newly defined challenges and/or interests, but also compare more generally how concretely and usefully the ESS and the EUGS respectively went about explaining tools and actions.

Fourth, the element of learning through experiences, successes or failures over time closes the loop. The EU can look back on a solid track record in the EUGS, while it had only just put its first boots on the ground in 2003 and its legal basis for foreign and security policy had also only been created a few years prior to the ESS. Indeed, the growing number of missions undertaken, challenges and crises faced have likely shaped and lead to updates in the EU's priorities and instruments, and its ability to adapt is proof of a growing strategic culture – it is "developing by doing" (Biscop, 2007, p. 16) The parameter "Learning" will therefore look at evidence of lessons learned, through the mention of specific examples being credited to a certain crisis for instance.[6]

This gives us the following 4 parameters we can use for our applied research:

[6] As previously mentioned, this thesis does not include data on CSDP missions, which means that the scope of the last indicator will be reduced compared to Biava et al's (2011) study.

- P1: "Norms" Legitimacy for acting based on shared norms
- P2: "Threats" Identification and ranking of strategic threats against which to act
- P3: "Tools" Capacity and institutional capability to act through military and civilian tool-building
- P4: "Learning" Lessons learned from operations undertake

The following chapter will provide an overview of the context of the Global Strategy which is necessary to frame the subsequent comparative analysis of the ESS and EUGS using the 4 indicators which have just been defined.

# Chapter 4: Contextualising the Global Strategy

The following paragraphs will review some key facts about the EU Global Strategy, pointing out differences or similarities with the ESS where appropriate, to set the backdrop for the research results in the next chapter. This chapter notably wants to underline the crucial role of the HR/VP in crafting the EUGS, its different purposes and describe the efforts made to render the drafting process as inclusive as possible, in view of underbuilding it with the strongest possible basis of legitimacy.

The EUGS' 56-page length and its designation as a "Global Strategy" indicate that it has a wider scope than the ESS, which counts a mere 14 pages. The respective titles, structure, presentation and layout of the documents also point to the fact that the ESS was more of a policy document for use by policy-makers and officials. The wording of ESS' title "A secure Europe in a better world" points to the EU trying to define its place in the world, with a focus on the EU's security and trying to "better" the world, whereas the EUGS' title "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe" rather focuses on the necessity of cooperation, on providing a "shared vision" and a roadmap for "common action", which will result in Europe being "stronger". This hints that they are both a product of their circumstances, as will be explained below. The foreword by HR/VP Mogherini clearly labels this as the HR/VP's product and responsibility, while Solana's name does not appear anywhere in the ESS. It also frames the EUGS politically and therefore provides a very different introduction to the reader than the ESS. The foreword notably starts with the statement that the EU's "purpose, even existence [...] is being questioned" (Mogherini, 2016, p. 3), which stands in stark contrast to the ESS' optimistic and dynamic tone (Missiroli, 2015; Tocci, 2017). It highlights a sense of urgency and the need to act, listing all the challenges the EU has recently faced, and therein provides part of the reason why this new strategy was called for at this time.

Indeed, the ESS and EUGS were drafted in very different circumstances. Taking note of the 13-year gap between the documents, the world quite simply looked very different in 2016 than it did in 2003. The same is true for the EU, with the changes it has undergone in terms of growing membership, the role it has and is expected to play, the challenges it faces, and the means available and needed to address these. The opening words of the ESS and EUGS express this best: The ESS (Solana, 2003, p. 1) begins full of optimism, describing a Europe

that "has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free" in an "period of [unprecedented] peace and stability" (Solana, 2003, p. 1). In contrast, continuing the tone of the EUGS' foreword, its opening words (Mogherini, 2016, p. 13) are much more urgent, sombre and an immediate call to action, heavy with the responsibility recent events amounting to an "existential crisis" have put on the Union: "We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects" (Tocci, 2017).

Of course both documents were primarily intended to give an overview of the current challenges relevant to the EU, define a common approach and the appropriate tools for external action (Grevi, 2016). However, it is important to note that despite being external strategies, both roadmaps had their own underlying, internal political purpose – to heal internal divisions and forge a common narrative for EU external action (Tocci, 2015). The ESS had been intended to help repair the rift caused by the debate on the invasion of Iraq among EU Member States, and between the EU and the U.S. (Becher, 2004; Mälksoo, 2016). As regards the EUGS, members of the foreign policy community and several member states had long called for the direly needed renewal of the 13-year-old ESS, especially after the 2008 attempt had failed to deliver a genuine, updated strategy (Andersson et al., 2011; Missiroli, 2015). By 2015, even the more sceptic member states (notably France, Germany, UK) recognised the need for a new strategy given the dramatically changed security environment and the recent thread of challenges which had demonstrated how outdated the ESS really way, for instance through the failure to launch a mission to protect civilians in Libya (Tocci, 2015). In this context, it should be noted that commentators were divided over the HR/VP's choice to go ahead with the EUGS' publication a few days after the Brexit referendum had shaken the EU to its core. One side argued that it was the right choice, showing unity and the EU continuing to look and plan ahead, and the other side criticising that it was eclipsed by the turmoil caused by the Brexit vote and proof of a detachment from reality, some even arguing it would need to be rewritten (Biscop, 2016; Kausch, 2016).

A few explanations need to be given on the EUGS' drafting process, which was designed in a way to contribute to the purpose of building bridges and mending fences, but most importantly centred on gathering the largest possible basis of support and therefore legitimacy for the new strategy, precisely in light of the difficult, crisis-heavy atmosphere in which it was conceived.

For both the ESS and the EUGS, the European Council initiated the process by tasking the High Representative to produce a strategy, which was then presented to and adopted by the leaders on 12 December 2003 and 28 June 2016, respectively. Both papers were prepared in a two-part process, but the EUGS' lasted 2.5 years, more than twice as long than in 2003 (Tocci, 2015, 2017). The specific reasoning behind the length and sequencing of the drafting process leading up to the EUGS will be unpacked below.

In this context, it should be mentioned that the person holding the post of HR/VP who is mandated to draft such the strategy – Javier Solana in 2003, Federica Mogherini in 2016 – plays an important role in driving it forward and shaping it. Mogherini's predecessor, Baroness Ashton, had for instance been sceptical about such a new overarching strategy and therefore neither suggested nor encouraged an update of the ESS (Pawlak, 2016). HR/VP Mogherini however believed the time had come for a strategic reflection which should lead to a new strategy, and already put forward this idea during her confirmation hearing in front of the European Parliament AFET Committee in October 2014 (Tocci, 2016). Once in office, her conviction, ambition and commitment to the EUGS drove her to design a process and pan-European debate to produce the best possible strategy.

First, Mogherini made sure she had the unanimous backing of the Member States to pursue such a new strategy, especially since some important member states had not been enthusiastic about the idea so far. A European Council mandate dating from December 2013, which she had on her desk when taking office, tasked her to produce an assessment of the "impact of changes in the global environment" and "challenges and opportunities" for the EU, which freely interpreted may have indicated the possibility to draft a new strategy, but did not present a clear mandate to do so and one the new HR/VP saw as too weak (Tocci, 2015, 2016). In fact, these Council conclusions had been the result of a lowest common denominator agreement, some member states still not having warmed to the idea of producing a new strategy (Tocci, 2016). According to Mogherini's Special Advisor and one of the main penholders of the EUGS Nathalie Tocci (2016), the intention from the start had been to deliver the strategic assessment to the European Council and come back with the unanimous support and a mandate from the leaders to produce a new overarching strategy on EU external action, which would be based on the findings of the first report. Knowing how central consensus is in the EU's decision-making and rationale and reminding that lack of

political will had been the cause of failure in 2008 are factors that help explain why the HR/VP chose to pursue this approach (A. Toje, 2010).

Second, Mogherini was committed to conducting a genuine "strategic rethink" exercise, involving stakeholders from all walks of life (Tocci, 2015). Organising a dialogue on shared values, interests and answers to common challenges with a range of different actors at the EU and national level – officials, diplomats, parliamentarians, experts, academics, citizens – was part of the effort for it to be perceived and accepted as the outcome of a truly common and Europe-wide strategic reflection. The aim of this approach was to produce a strategy that would benefit from the largest possible basis of support and thereby to strengthen its legitimacy through a sense of inclusiveness or even shared ownership (Sweeney, 2013). This approach was also meant to help heal divisions, unite and encourage dialogue at a time when the EU, its utility and existence were being questioned from within by its own citizens and politicians through a rise in support to populist and Eurosceptic parties (Dijkstra, 2016; Tocci, 2016), which was yet another reason why the EUGS needed to take every possible step to build the largest possible basis of legitimacy. Concretely, alongside the launch of a public consultation, over 50 events and conferences were organised all over the EU in cooperation with think tanks, as well as a several citizens' dialogues with the HR/VP. Furthermore, national contact persons were able to provide input in monthly meetings and elements of the EUGS were discussed in the Foreign Affairs Council, the Political and Security Committee and COREPER several times. However, comments on the text were only allowed to a limited extent. On the inter-institutional front, a consultative body was created with the Commission, colleagues working on relevant files such as the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy were closely associated, and European and national parliamentarians contributed to the process as well (Tocci, 2016). All these elements showcase the efforts made by the HR/VP's team and herself to make sure the process would be as inclusive as possible.[7]

In 2003, consultations only took place with member states and institutions and with a small number of experts and academics in 3 capitals, but on a much smaller scale and without a clear rationale behind it. The first draft of the ESS was written in the space of 2 short months and then complemented with contributions from the consultations, while the EUGS was written entirely during the second stage of the process, drawing on the strategic assessment

[7] A list of the entities which contributed can be found in the Acknowledgments at the end of the EUGS.

report and on the contributions received during the strategic reflection process (Missiroli, 2015; Tocci, 2017). One clear difference in the text which is clearly down to the different drafting procedure is the fact that the ESS' text includes the general, overall assessment of the global environment which is the starting point of any strategic exercise, whereas the EUGS does not, because this had already been dealt with in the previous report (Tocci, 2015, 2016).

Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty presented an important opportunity in terms of innovations in EU external affairs which positively contributed to the EUGS. This last treaty revision introduced the most radical advances in the areas of foreign, security and defence policy since the Maastricht Treaty, which include: the creation of the double-hatted HR/VP who ensures a centrally coordinated approach to external affairs, chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and is also Vice-President of the European Commission, thereby providing a link between the executive and legislative branches; the creation of a European External Action Service, an agency of European diplomats under the leadership of the new HR/VP; a stronger role for the European Parliament and the possibility of military permanent structured cooperation on security and defence (PESCO) (Keukeleire, 2014). Nothing the boost the Lisbon Treaty gave the HR/VP post, the crucial role Mogherini played in the EUGS' conception and in some of the EU's recent diplomatic successes such as the Iran deal, the absence of any mention of the role, utility and responsibilities of the HR/VP in the EUGS is striking, even if she authored the Foreword.

This chapter introduced the ESS and EUGS and explained how their circumstances influenced how they were crafted and the substantial efforts to create a pan-European strategic reflection leading up to the EUGS, all in the interest of underbuilding the roadmap with a sense of strong legitimacy. The HR/VP's crucial role, ambition and high degree of involvement in making the EUGS what it is have also been explained. With the backdrop in place, the next chapter will proceed with the analysis using to the 4 indicators defined in the methodology chapter.

# Chapter 5: Applying the parameters to the Global Strategy

This chapter will apply the 4 indicators – norms, threats, tools, learning – defined in the method chapter to the Global Strategy, trying to answer the research premise of this thesis, i.e. if a strategic culture has developed in EU foreign policy. I will look for evidence that the EU has developed a set of shared valued and interests underpinning its external action, look for data on how it has assessed and adapted its list of key threats to its security, as well as analyse how it has defined ways, capabilities and instruments to address these threats in 2016 in comparison to the 2003 ESS.[8]

## 1. Norms

Values are the bedrock of the EU's legitimacy to act in external relations, as they shape and help determine the EU's interests and priorities. Norms also define what constitutes appropriate action for the EU by defining its priorities and limits. Indeed, "interests and values go hand in hand", as the Global Strategy states. The more the EU agrees and openly commits to a set of shared values and interests, the more its strategic culture develops, which is what the "Norms" indicator is trying to show.

First and foremost, the Global Strategy is the first document which openly states and commits to shared values – or "principles" as the EUGS terms them – and "vital interests" of EU external action. The ESS did not include a clear mention or commitment to shared values or interests, even if careful reading of the strategy provides some indications (Biscop & Coelmont, 2013; A. Toje, 2005). This demonstrates that there was no consensus on the EU's shared values and interests at the time. In 2016 however, after a process of strategic reflection involving a wide range of stakeholders as described above and more than a decade of experience gathered in the realm of external action, the EU was able to put down on paper in the EUGS what the shared values and interests guiding its external action are.

In this context, it is worth noting that the EUGS puts a lot of emphasis on the fact that the values and interests mentioned are "shared" among the relevant actors in EU external action,

[8] Please note that all quotes and references in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, are taken from the EUGS' text.

with the word “shared” appearing 30 times, “common” 20 times and “together” 14 times in the text and of course very prominent in the title “Shared Vision, Common Action” too.

The EUGS thus provides evidence that the EU has made considerable progress in defining its shared values and interests and has therefore developed a stronger strategic culture. Let us review some of the norms and interests it puts forward in comparison to 2003.

The overarching principle of EU external action set out in the Global Strategy is called "principled pragmatism" and is based on 4 sub-principles – unity, engagement, responsibility and partnership. The EUGS tries to provide a realistic, more modest and more pragmatic view of the world and of the EU's global role than the ESS did, which contributes to a sense that it has acquired the necessary experience and expertise to know its strengths and weaknesses, but also a sense of confidence of the kind of actor it can and wants be. This awareness of what its assets and limits are, and to build one’s approach on that also provides proof of the development of its strategic culture.

Probably the most important example in this regard is the fact that the EUGS has abandoned the transformative nation-building approach championed by the ESS which followed the premise that “the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” (Dannreuther, 2008; Solana, 2003, p. 10). The Arab Spring taught the EU some painful lessons about the failure of its approach centred on spreading good governance, democracy and ultimately regime change. Instead of regime change, the new EU approach to “fragile” states is coined “resilience”, which is defined as “the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises”. The EU still wants to spread democracy and its other fundamental values, notably human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law which were all already present in the ESS (A. Toje, 2005). We see proof of this in the fact that the third interest in the EUGS is democracy and it still speaks of embedding “democratic values within the international system”. However the approach has clearly changed and been updated after recent experiences. Without foregoing the value code which makes the EU what it is and which it wants to keep disseminating, it manages to craft a more realistic approach in the EUGS. This provides further evidence of how the EU’s interests have been more clearly defined and adapted over time – which is also evidence for the development of its strategic culture.

Moreover, most foreign policy strategies have an internal purpose, but the EUGS which has been called a “strategy of survival” is especially inward-looking for several reasons, and much more so than the ESS (Mälksoo, 2016; Tocci, 2015).

In this context, we need to spend some time on the issue of credibility. The ESS only mentions it once, stating that the credibility of the EU’s foreign policy hinges on maintaining stability and the European perspective for the Balkans (Solana, 2003, p. 8). An EU which fails to maintain stability and fulfil its interests in its immediate neighbourhood could not hope to be taken seriously on the global stage (Dannreuther, 2008; Smith, 2016). As early as 1999, Solana spoke about the fact that credibility would be absolutely key to advance EU foreign policy, and that credibility would need to be achieved with several audiences – in the eyes of EU citizens, of the U.S. and NATO members who are not part of the EU, in the eyes of the global community as well as the EU itself (Rogers, 2009). The EUGS takes this approach seriously in recognising that the EU will only be credible to the outside world if it establishes credibility within, stating “living up consistently to our values internally will determine our external credibility and influence”. Let us unpack how the EUGS tries to do this.

The new concept of “resilience” the EUGS puts forward is meant to be applied to external states, but the EUGS actually demands “resilience” of its own member states as well, notably by calling on them to respect its code of values – human rights, fundamental freedoms, rule of law, respect for domestic, EU and international law. The EUGS is thus calling its member states to order and makes them co-responsible for ensuring the EU can be credible abroad by making sure everyone at home abides by its own standards.

Additionally, unity is mentioned as the first norm in the EUGS which is telling in a number of ways. The atmosphere of uncertainty that characterised the period when the EUGS was drafted combined with the internal crises putting the EU in question such as the rise of Euroscepticism, populism, the refugee crisis or the Brexit referendum, starkly demonstrated the need for unity within the Union which would be the precondition for the successful implementation and conduct of EU foreign policy, and indeed put it at the top of the agenda. For instance, HR/VP Mogherini calls for "unity of purpose among our Member States, and unity in action across our policies" in the Foreword. Elsewhere, the EUGS also underlines: "Forging unity as Europeans has never been so vital nor so urgent. Never has our unity been so challenged."

The same explanation is valid for the EUGS' second and third principle, "Engagement" and "Responsibility" respectively, which at first sight seem to state the obvious – that the EU does not have a choice and actually a responsibility to engage with the world, it cannot "pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats". Indeed, the ESS already saw the EU as "inevitably a global player" and noted that it should be "ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world" (Becher, 2004; Biscop, 2007; Solana, 2003, p. 1). However, the difficult atmosphere as previously described seems to have called for a restatement of the necessity to engage with the world, with external and internal threats now inextricably linked, and of the fact that one can depend on the EU to fulfil its commitments.

Moreover, unity – or rather the lack of it – is probably the most important reason constraining EU external action, notably the fact that it primarily functions on the basis of an intergovernmental decision-making process based on the principle of unanimity, coupled with a mostly case-by-case approach to every issue. The EUGS recognises this weakness and makes an effort towards remedying this, not least by putting unity at the top of the list of its values. The text includes a number of statements that try to underline the overall rationale of the EU's foreign policy by emphasising: "There is no clash between national and European interests. Our shared interests can only be served by standing and acting together." The EUGS also addresses the reality of the EU's shrinking economic weight and the fact that it is composed of mostly small to medium-sized countries several times, which provides a strong rationale for the member states to combine their weight to achieve more on the global stage, and indeed constitutes a "shared European interest".

These elements show how the EU has updated its approach following recent experiences, crises, successes and failures to make it more relevant and fit for purpose – which demonstrates a stronger strategic culture. The same is true for the fact that unity, engagement and responsibility are put in the spotlight by the EUGS, not putting in question the EU's duty to act and emphasising the importance and interest for the EU to act together.

Furthermore, citizens are omnipresent in the EUGS. The word "citizens" is mentioned almost 30 times in the EUGS, so proportionally speaking three times as much as in the ESS.

Indeed, citizens are used as legitimacy and rationale for the EU's action, in the sense their "security" needs to be protected, that the EU needs to protect the "needs" and "interests" of its citizens. There is also the element of "expectations" and of needing to "deliver" for the

EU's citizens because this is what they "deserve". This stark difference to the ESS bears witness to the more political framing of the EUGS, with some of the strongest wording in this regard in the Foreword by the HR/VP. It notably fits into the political discourse that has become very prominent under the Juncker Commission which set out to regain citizens' trust, bring them closer to Europe and deliver results for them – recalling that citizens' trust in the EU was at an all-time low when the Juncker Commission took office in 2014 (European Commission, 2014; Juncker, 2014). This language also shows a significant change in terms of thinking. While the ESS still focused a lot on traditional conflict between countries and threats to states in line with a unipolar, post-Cold-War view, the EUGS is a clear reminder that many of today's threats faced are not threats to states as such, but are cross-border, multi-dimensional, hybrid threats where citizens are often on the frontline (A. Toje, 2010). Indeed, a survey conducted in the EUGS' year of publication show that citizens repeatedly ranked immigration and terrorism as their highest concern in the wake of the refugee crisis and several terrorist attacks on EU soil (European Commission, 2016). The EUGS is thus an exercise of reassuring its internal audience and framing of the foreseen action in terms of not only the EU's own security interests, but specifically the security and needs of its citizens, as well as conforming to their "expectations".

Prosperity, the second interest in the EUGS, is also meant primarily to the benefit of EU citizens, and is to be achieved through the promotion of "growth, jobs, equality, and a safe and healthy environment". The ESS only mentioned prosperity in passing, as something to be safeguarded but gave it no further specification or attention (Biscop, 2007). In contrast, the EUGS puts it at the forefront, right after the first interest "Peace and Security", and hereby turns the spotlight to what is and has been the EU's biggest power of attraction and success, and also the most important selling point in terms of utility among its citizens: its trade power and internal market, and the prosperity this has created within the EU. The EUGS goes on to highlight that "trade and investment" will strengthen this prosperity.

Indeed the EUGS describes the EU's credibility as hinged "on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values". These examples demonstrate the considerable effort the EUGS makes to create the broadest possible basis of legitimacy and credibility for its external action – much more so than the ESS did –, which are key ingredients for its success,

but also its awareness of needing to regain citizens' trust, respond to their concerns and fulfil their expectations considering recent crises. The different framing of the EU's values and interests as just described is therefore proof of the development of its strategic culture.

Moving on to the first interest in the EUGS, "Peace and Security", it implies promoting peace in the EU's vicinity and safeguarding the security of the EU's territory and people. The concept of peace was quite prominent in the ESS but rather in the context of wars and as a matter for international cooperation, whereas the EUGS recognises that the "necessary capabilities to defend" itself need to be developed so that in concert with its partners, the EU can follow up on its commitments of solidarity and mutual assistance, as newly enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (Cornish & Edwards, 2005; Keukeleire, 2014). Indeed the EUGS calls for the EU to acquire "strategic autonomy" in order to be able to ensure its security and promote peace beyond its borders. The key elements to promote peace named are the prevention of conflict – already present in the ESS –, the promotion of "human security" and fighting the "root causes of instability" more broadly, which brings us back to the "resilience" concept explained previously. What is new here and comes up several times throughout the EUGS is the idea of civil protection and of achieving "societal resilience" abroad, which even though the ESS emphasised the great cost conflicts impose on civilians was not at all represented among the interests put forward in 2003 (Biava et al., 2011).

The fourth and last of the EUGS' interests, "A Rules-Based Global Order", reprises the ESS' "international order based on effective multilateralism" under a new label focusing on the rule of law – the method rather than the institutions –, a strong commitment to multilateralism and international law and with the UN at its core (Ujvari, 2016). Notable differences are also the wish to "transform rather than simply preserve the existing system" and the flexibility introduced into the multilateral approach, recognising that multilateral processes may sometimes need to be designed on a case-by-case basis to be fit for purpose. The EU sees itself as a coordinator of such initiatives. Based on recent experiences of trade agreements being concluded with countries or groups of countries rather than through an organ like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), we also see the decline of the WTO's importance in that regard in the EUGS (Ujvari, 2016).

The last of the 4 principles, "Partnership", also represents a significant deviation from the ESS, because it does not categorize partners in the same way. The U.S., UN and NATO are

described as “core partners” in the EUGS. Notably the transatlantic partnership still has a very prominent place, but it is not as “irreplaceable” as it was in 2003, seeing how broadly the EU’s partnerships are now laid out. Other partners with whom the EU cooperates to a higher or lesser degree are described as “like-minded” or “strategic partner”, not restrictively based on “shared values” as in the ESS (A. Toje, 2005). The EUGS takes a much more flexible approach, based on a case-by-case, tailored approach. It also does not exclude cooperation, even if only a “selective engagement” in some areas of common interest, with more difficult partners, while the ESS only named a few key allied countries and organisations and practically excluded cooperation with reluctant isolated actors such as Iran (Solana, 2003; A. Toje, 2010). In addition, it presents much more comprehensive approaches to actors which were barely mentioned in the ESS such as China, India or Japan. It also presents a much more relevant approach to Russia than in the ESS, which is clearly shaped by events such as the annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis (A. Toje, 2009). Another very crucial change is how much emphasis the EUGS places on cooperating with non-state actors, i.e. civil society, academia, the private sector, whereas in the ESS the only non-state actors of relevance had been terrorist groups (A. Toje, 2010). This updated view of how to approach and construct tailor-made instead of one-size-fits-all partnerships with different types of actors demonstrates an evolved, more realistic approach, which is further evidence for an evolved strategic culture.

In this section, the “Norms” parameter has provided evidence for the development of EU strategic culture since 2003, since the EUGS is the first instance where the EU’s shared interests and values in external action have been openly stated and explained. In addition, its updated, tailored and more realistic approach has clearly been shaped by recent experiences, challenges and changes in the EU’s security environment. It is especially worth highlighting how present the internal purpose of the EUGS was in constructing unity and putting its citizens and its response to their concerns in the spotlight, in order to construct the necessary credibility and legitimacy for EU external action to be able to succeed.

## 2. Threats

The EU's ability to assess its environment, identify the main threats to its security and adapt them over time when confronted with new challenges is a crucial part of developing a strategic culture. It allows the EU to chart an order of priority, a path to address each specific threat and the definition of the appropriate instruments to do so, as well as the limits within which these may be used, according to the values and interests defined above.

Before moving to the analysis, a few remarks need to be made on the presentation of key threats in the EUGS, which is framed and structured quite differently than the ESS.

As previously explained, the Global Strategy came out of a two-phased process which included a strategic assessment report analysing the global environment and challenges for the EU. This means the EUGS could instead dive straight into the threats that are strategically relevant to the EU, without needing to spend too much time explaining the phenomena. In contrast, a third of the ESS is dedicated to “global challenges” and “key threats”, which were presented as interchangeable and identical (A. Toje, 2005, 2010). The EUGS is thus much clearer and more focused on the purpose of putting forward routes for strategic action and responses to the different threats. In fact, it foregoes a section which would, even only shortly, list or describe the key threats altogether and instead mentions the challenges in tandem with the rationale how to approach each of them, in the EUGS’ third section “Priorities of our External Action”, which puts the focus not on the threats themselves but on the responses and proposed EU action.

The first results of the "Threats" indicator when applied to the EUGS show that in addition to some new threats, it still includes all the threats the ESS put forward in 2003 – terrorism, state failure, regional crises, organised crime, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation and the environment (Cornish & Edwards, 2005). However, some have been reclassified to a higher or lesser level of priority, respectively. They are also explained in a more explicit, strategic and detailed way than in 2003. This demonstrates that strategic culture has developed over time as its analysis of different challenges has been refined, adapted and developed a broader understanding and expertise on the different issues. Moreover, the change in priority demonstrates the EU’s ability to keep assessing and adapting its priorities

when faced with changes or new challenges in its environment, taking into account that some threats may decrease or even disappear over time.

Let us review some examples which demonstrate that the list of key threats is much longer than in 2003. The EUGS ranks its priorities more consistently than its predecessor and with decreasing level of priority, starting with threats to its own security before moving on to those in its vicinity and then the rest of the world. The EUGS notably states: “We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield.” It should be underlined that the EUGS has extended the reach of what the ESS called “neighbourhood” and what the EUGS calls “surrounding regions” which it has found to be of strategic importance to its interests, now stretching into Central Asia towards the East and towards Central Africa in the South (Missiroli, 2015).

The EUGS starts and has a stronger focus on the threats to its internal security than in the ESS. The scope of internal threats has significantly broadened in light of the string of crises the EU has recently faced and that have had considerable impact at home. Under the first priority, “Security of our Union”, a whole range of different threats are mentioned, all under the premise that internal and external threats are now inextricably linked, that most of today’s threats are “hybrid” and that we “live in a world of predictably unpredictability”.

Firstly, the EUGS underlines that the EU needs to develop capabilities to guarantee its own security, when it speaks of protecting itself against “external attack”. Notably, “peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given” given recent events in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood with Russia’s blatant disregard for international law in annexing Crimea and with the Ukraine crisis. In contrast, the ESS’ assumption had been that the EU did not need to fear “invasion” anymore and instead of an aggressor, Russia was regarded as a partner the EU should develop “close relations” with (Solana, 2003; A. Toje, 2010, p. 7;13).

One should add that the less judgmental terminology in the EUGS has changed from seeing a threat in “failed states” to “fragile states”, which are also no longer primarily defined by the fact that they might harbour terrorists but rather by the fact that they are “repressive states” in which violent conflict and human suffering can occur. The ESS’ odd logic of linking the transfer of WMD by “failed states” to terrorists has also disappeared (A. Toje, 2005).

Terrorism is mentioned second – it was first in the ESS which was written not long after 9/11 had shaken the global community –, which makes perfect sense after "major attacks" have happened on EU soil, and the underlying threats of terrorist networks and radicalisation were all already mentioned in the ESS (Cornish & Edwards, 2005; Hyde-Price, 2004). New are the dimensions of foreign terrorist fighters and illegal content online (e.g. hate speech). "Politics of fear" are also described as a danger to the EU's way of life and values. So we see that terrorism has stayed at the top of the list of threats to be tackled but its analysis has also been adapted and evolved with time, which provides further evidence for a developing strategic culture.

The next category are cyberthreats and attacks, notably on critical infrastructures – this is a completely new dimension which was not yet present in 2003 but clearly ranks high on the priority list now, being third in place. In the same vein, the challenge of disinformation is also mentioned, again a completely new threat which has materialised since 2003, notably in the context of security of democratic elections.

Another new threat is the situation at the EU's external borders, raised several times with regard to illegal immigration, maritime security and smuggling networks – which is not surprising considering the refugee crisis has been at the top of the political agenda since spring 2015.

Energy insecurity and dependence are still quite present in the EUGS, noting that it was one of the threats mentioned in 2003 (Tocci, 2017). The Paris Agreement having been concluded a few months before the EUGS was presented, with the EU having played a vital role in making it happen, it is notable that climate change is however not presented as an internal threat but rather much later in the context of multilateral cooperation. Resource scarcity and environmental degradation are also only mentioned in the context of other countries, but not for the EU itself or in cooperation with partners. One might have expected this threat to be more at the forefront and more present in the EUGS considering these developments. The ESS was very silent on the topic, aside from a statement of the dangers of resource scarcity and their potential to spur conflict.

Organised crime, the ESS' fifth key threat, is only mentioned a few times in passing in the EUGS. Less of a priority, it is now only treated as embedded in other, larger threats such as migration. In contrast, WMD proliferation is still described as a "growing threat" to Europe

and the world, even though it is no longer seen as "potentially the greatest threat to our security" (Missiroli, 2015; Solana, 2003, p. 3). The EUGS also does not use the odd ESS' differentiation between "nuclear activities" in North Korea and WMD proliferation elsewhere, and sees WMD proliferation as an issue not only for the Middle East, as the ESS did (A. Toje, 2010).

Economic volatility is also named as a new threat, clearly a remnant of the recent financial and economic crisis the EU was still dealing with in 2016. A number of other threats and issues are mentioned in passing in the EUGS, but are not highlighted as key threats to the Union's security, for instance poverty, displacement, pandemics, the violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights, especially freedom of speech or association – which were all represented in some shape or form in the ESS' "global challenges" (Solana, 2003).

Using the "Threats" indicator, this section has shown that the EU has the ability to assess global security environment and has visibly adapted its list and the order of priority of the main threats to its security accordingly. It has added new threats such as cyberattacks and migration, developed its approach on several threats the ESS already mentioned in 2003, notably terrorism and energy and reclassified threats which have been addressed or which are less important compared to others. This provides evidence for the developments of the EU's strategic culture. We will now move on to the section dealing with the tools defined to address the identified key threats, according to the EU's shared values and interests.

## 3. Tools

What ultimately drives strategic culture forward is a closer link between shared norms, interests with the available capabilities and institutional capacity – in other words, to better match ends with means. Shared interests are also best served with common tools. The "Tools" indicator will now compare the actions and instruments put forward by the EUGS from the EU's comprehensive and unique foreign policy toolbox to fulfil its interests and address the key challenges it has identified, and show that the EUGS indeed represents a giant leap forward compared to the ESS in terms of developing a strategic culture.

The EUGS spends the large majority of its pages explaining its priorities, its specific approach and issues with regard to certain regions and challenges. In its last chapter "From Vision to Action, it dives into the details of how it projects to fulfil its priorities concretely and charts a clear path how its priorities can be fulfilled. This represents considerable progress since the ESS has been much criticised for not being able to present more than "platitudes and noble aspirations" in its "Policy Implications for Europe" chapter, and for not even offering the "roughest guide" as to how the EU's foreign policy toolbox could be used to produce results and fulfil its priorities (Hyde-Price, 2004; Mälksoo, 2016; A. Toje, 2005, 2010, p. 177). This provides evidence that the EUGS is witness to a much stronger strategic culture than the ESS. Let us analyse the results of the "Tools" parameter in detail to see how exactly the EUGS succeeds in doing this.

The EUGS starts by calling for a collective investment in a "credible, responsive and joined-up Union". In comparison to the ESS' call to be "more active, more capable and more coherent" (Biscop & Coelmont, 2013; Solana, 2003, p. 11), the EUGS describes an actor which has already developed capabilities and is active on the international scene in several areas, but wants to step up, improve and better coordinate what and how it does this. Building on what was previously said about credibility, this is another example where credibility comes before anything else.

The EUGS actually ties credibility directly to the development and strengthening of military capabilities – the biggest puzzle piece in its ability to develop "strategic autonomy". This is evidence of the EU's recognition that it cannot forego to develop some degree of military power to be "credible" in its role on the international scene and effectively respond to all the

challenges threatening its interests and security. In its own words: “In this fragile world, soft power is not enough.” Furthermore, “Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm” based on “real commitment”. Specifically, it calls for means covering the full spectrum of “land, air, space and maritime capabilities”. This stands in stark contrast to the ESS which demonstrated a clear preference for the use of non-military tools and did not provide clear indications as to when coercive military power should be used apart from restoring order in what it calls “failed states” (Meyer, 2005; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). The EUGS therein provides proof of a stronger strategic culture, recognising the need for hard power capabilities and committing itself to this goal based on the changed environment, long list of hybrid threats it faces and expectations from both its citizens and the “wider world”.

The 2016 strategy puts forward a number of very concrete proposals of how defence capabilities are to be build up and strengthened. For example, the first concrete action it proposes is a collective commitment of 20% defence budget spending, specifically intended for equipment procurement, research and technology, to improve interoperability and commonality. This shows that the EU is not afraid to address the elephant in the room, considering that defence spending is a very sensitive and protected issue in national contexts. Additionally, capabilities are doomed to fail without the appropriate allocation of funds. To make sure the topic is addressed and discussed in-depth, the EUGS foresees the production of a sectoral strategy based on the priorities, tasks and level of ambition it sets out for military power. The ESS for its part did not discuss budgetary issues or call for more funding beyond stating that “spending more than €160 billion on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously” (Solana, 2003, p. 11; Tocci, 2017). Beyond the national dimension, the EUGS also foresees the enhancement of financial tools at the EU level, with an ambitious funding programme for technology and defence research foreseen for the next multiannual EU budget.

The EUGS also puts forward a regular and coordinated review process which would enhance the “positive peer pressure” on member states to deliver on their budgetary commitments by having to submit yearly plans of military spending – a model which resembles the European Semester approach. The aim is to improve coherence in planning and the development of capabilities. The lack of cooperation between EU countries in this field costs

between €25 and €100 billion every year and makes the need for smarter spending very clear (European Commission, 2019).

Herewith, more proof for the development of a strategic culture has been provided because the EU provides clear tools and avenues of how its "strategic autonomy" and priorities of addressing key security threats are to be achieved through common budgetary and military means, including follow-up processes.

Moreover, the situations in which the use of hard power is acceptable have also been more broadly defined in the 2016 strategy, beyond the ESS' preventative engagement (Biava et al., 2011): Military power will "protect Europe, respond to external crises, and assist in developing our partners' security and defence capabilities".

However, the EUGS also emphasises that "soft and hard power go hand in hand" and clearly explains that military power always will always have to embedded in a comprehensive approach, making use of its civilian instruments to complement the military effort and to ensure follow-up post-crisis without leaving "gaps along the conflict cycle". This is especially true after experiences in Afghanistan and Somalia where a vacuum was left post-conflict. The idea of an integrated approach was already present in the ESS which proposed for instance that "diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda" (Biava et al., 2011; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Solana, 2003, p. 13). However, it has now been updated and given a more relevant and complete framing in the last section "A Joined-up Union" which sets out how internal and external policies need to be more closely linked, notably regarding the multi-faceted, cross-border challenges terrorism and migration. Another example put forward is that economic policy and priorities need to take into account any potential external dimensions. The ESS did not set out any suggestions with regard to economic diplomacy.

In the same vein, the EUGS emphasises that its action has to become more rapid and more flexible in order to keep up with the often unpredictable challenges of the current global security environment. It has clearly drawn the necessary conclusions from the wide range of different and hybrid threats and crises it has faced over the past decade, which have often required fast, tailor-made and sometimes innovative responses. One action foreseen is the necessity to invest in its "knowledge base" which underpins EU external action, notably to improve "situational awareness" through tailor-made, targeted approaches to conflict

prevention, resolution and resilience. Here, the Lisbon Treaty's innovation in the shape of the EEAS comes to the forefront, with the EUGS emphasising its importance "at the heart of a coherent EU role in the world". It is notably planning to improve expertise, political sensitivity and local language proficiency among its staff in the EU's delegations around the world. It also calls for better communication, intelligence-sharing and joint reporting between the many actors in the diplomatic field, from national and EU representations abroad to CSDP missions but also academia and civil society. In 2003, the EU did not really have any diplomatic capabilities to speak of and without proposing anything concrete called for "stronger diplomatic capability" by combining EU and member state resources (Biscop, 2007; Engelbrekt & Hallenberg, 2008; Solana, 2003, p. 12).

In this context, knowing that one of the EU's greatest weaknesses in quickly responding to crises has been its intergovernmental method of decision-making which is prone to political deadlock, it is notable that the EUGS does not suggest any action to remedy this shortcoming, such as moving to more qualified majority decision-making in certain areas, as the Lisbon Treaty permits (Biscop & Andersson, 2008; A. Toje, 2010).

Furthermore, a concrete piece of homework foreseen by the EUGS is the revision of existing sectoral strategies, as well as the drafting and implementation of new thematic or geographic strategies based on the elements provided by the 2016 roadmap. This work should be "prompt", have clear procedural guidelines and timetables.

In terms of follow-up, which the ESS did not foresee or recommend, the EUGS states that it will "require periodic reviewing" in consultation with the EU's three main institutions. Indeed, it already foresees that a new strategic reflection will ultimately be necessary and sets out the basic parameters for it – that such a process would be launched when deemed necessary by the EU and its member states. Moreover, the EUGS will also be subject to a yearly state of play exercise which allows for more pressure to be build up to implement its proposals.

All these measures increase accountability and increase the pressure for the proposals made by the Global Strategy to swiftly be put into action, with regular reviewing of progress. The fact that it charts out a yearly rendez-vous to discuss the state of play as well as a future strategic reflection leading up to a new strategy represents a certain commitment, even though an indicative timetable for when a new strategic reflection should take place may have

strengthened this case. These commitments show that its strategic culture has clearly evolved since 2003.

Considering the EUGS' emphasis on fundamental freedoms and democracy, a missing piece which may have merited mentioning is the EU's work in the field of electoral observation missions around the globe. These missions deploy on average 8-10 times a year, have a long tradition in the EU and benefit from a considerable amount of credibility and public interest (EEAS, 2016).

Among the results of this indicator, I also looked for a statement similar to the ESS' (Solana, 2003, p. 11) call for a strategic culture – "we need to develop strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention." There are two interesting results here: On the one hand, the EUGS similarly calls for the development of a "political culture of acting sooner in response to the risk of violent conflict", which seems to indicate that the EU still associates such a culture closely with the use of force while this paper has defined it more broadly. It also implies that in the area of tools to address "violent conflict", i.e. military power, it does not yet possess the capabilities to say that such a culture exists. In the same vein, it wants to foster a "common cybersecurity culture". This points out that the EUGS seems to rather see different, sectoral cultural emerging rather than one overarching EU-level strategic culture. On the other hands, the EUGS underlines the strength that lies in diversity when it describes the difficulty of "joining of all our cultures to achieve our shared goals and serve our common interests". This seems to acknowledge the existence of national cultures, but does not mention the existence or development of an EU strategic culture either.

This section has found that strategic culture has indeed evolved in the EU since 2003 as there are a number of examples in the EUGS which demonstrate a closer link between the norms and interests that have been defined and concrete tools that are put forward to fulfil these. These includes budgetary commitments in the area of defence at the national and EU level, a renewed commitment to the comprehensive approach, as well as defined routes for follow-up, review and implementation of commitments and of strategic reflection more broadly.

## 4. Learning

The EU's ability to learn by doing is what the last parameter "Learning" wants to capture. With more than 30 missions undertaken or currently ongoing and more than a decade of experience in external action, one should be able to discern a process of lessons learned being incorporated into its strategic action, which in turn drives the development of a strategic culture as part of a cyclical process.

The three previous indicators have already provided numerous examples of how the EU provides an updated assessment, approach and therefore a stronger strategic culture based on its recent experiences during missions or crises which will not be listed here again but have clearly been pointed out previously.

The ESS was written shortly after the launch of CSDP and CFSP and around the time that the EU's first CSDP mission, Concordia in North Macedonia, was launched in March 2003 (Göler, 2014). This means that it could not draw on much of a track record and that there are thus practically no mentions of lessons learned. The only example which is mentioned a few times are the conflicts in the Balkans (Becher, 2004; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011).

The EUGS includes a number of examples and cases that merit specific mention. Referring to the recent crises and instability on the EU's Eastern and Southern borders, the EUGS states: "We have learnt the lesson: my neighbour's and my partner's weaknesses are my own weaknesses." Indeed, the Arab Spring taught the EU some painful lessons about the failure of its approach centred on spreading good governance, democracy and ultimately regime change. The populations in several countries demanded democratic change – the very rights and values the EU prided itself on standing for – and ultimately toppled regimes with which the EU had long entertained good relations in favour of its own (energy, security and other) interests (Mälksoo, 2016; Smith, 2016). The EUGS shows the change in approach as previously discussed, based on these lessons learned which also shaped the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Smith, 2016).

One does not find many references to ongoing or past CSDP operations, but in the context of the comprehensive approach and the necessity to provide follow-up post-conflict, the examples Somalia, Mali and Afghanistan are mentioned.

Moreover, the Iran deal is used at several moments as a positive example of what the EU can achieve through its "combined weight" in a multilateral setting and to show how the EU has been able to solve proliferation crises through diplomacy, which makes sense considering it was one of the most important diplomatic achievements (at the time).

The analysis of the "Learning" indicator has shown that we find evidence of a process of developing by doing in the EUGS, meaning that the EU's strategic culture has evolved.

Having conducted the analysis of all 4 indicators, I am now ready to draw final conclusions from this research in the next chapter.

# Chapter 6: Conclusion

The paper wants to contribute to the small body of academic literature on an updated, contemporary EU strategic culture concept and specifically to empirical research of its development over time by using the 2016 EUGS. Hence, the research question this thesis set out to answer was: *Can we see a development of EU strategic culture in EU external action?*

Using the 4 parameters defined in the method chapter, based on the empirical framework developed by Biava et al (2011) and adapted to the needs of this analysis, I find that EU strategic culture has developed in the realm of external action from 2003 to 2016. The results show that for the first time, the EU was able to agree and put on paper which shared values and interests guide its external action. The "Norms" indicator also indicated the relevance of the more realistic, more modest and more pragmatic approach the EUGS terms "principled pragmatism" instead of the former, transformative approach to "fragile states", and shows that multilateralism stays at the heart of the shared values the EU stands for and defends. The EUGS is clearly a product of its context, as the string of recent crises considerably shaped the drafting process and strategic reflection leading up to it, but also had a considerable impact on its content, particular focussed on creating credibility, unity and responding to citizens' concerns. In addition, the key threats in the Global Strategy showcase the EU's ability to adapt its priorities and update its threat assessment in response to new challenges or changes in its environment. The findings include a primary focus on matters related to internal security and on its surrounding regions where it has faced so many challenges over recent years. Moreover, EU strategic culture has benefitted from the EUGS' wide range of concrete tool-building proposals, where the EUGS foresees the enhancement and development of significant military capabilities for instance, recommits and defines the comprehensive "joined-up" approach and sets out a concrete path for implementation, follow-up and a future EUGS whenever called for. Finally, the EUGS provides evidence for lessons learned from missions and experiences. The findings of this research therefore confirm that the EU has indeed set itself up to become "stronger", as called for by the HR/VP in her Foreword.

Looking at recent developments, one gets the impression that EU external action has had a boost in ambition and activity in the years since the publication of the EUGS. A few examples of recent initiatives and achievements include 25 member states effectively launching PESCO

cooperation in 2018, the proposal to move towards qualified majority-voting in the Council on matters of foreign policy to avoid cases where one member state can run interference due to national interests (f.ex. Greece vetoing the condemnation of human rights abuses in China because of their investment deals with the Chinese), the proposal to strengthen the role of the euro as an international currency, the Defence Fund worth €13 billion currently foreseen for the next Multiannual Financial Framework, trade agreements concluded with Japan and Mercosur or the different approach to Africa with the launching of the External Action Plan and a partnership of an equal footing. However there have also been a number of new challenges such as the election of President Trump, his rejection of the Iran deal and Paris Agreement, the expansion of the disinformation threat and new terrorist attacks on European soil. We should not forget the consequence Brexit will undoubtedly have on the EU's foreign policy. Some early guesses reckon there are positive and negative effects – the removal of a country from the equation which has often slowed or blocked further integration in the field, but also the loss of one of the largest member states and its extensive, global diplomatic and defence assets (Biscop, 2016). A future study should aim to incorporate these elements along with other data on the implementation of the EUGS, to provide an even more complete picture of the development of strategic culture.

# Bibliography


Andersson, J. J., Brattberg, E., Häggqvist, M., Ojanen, H., & Rhinard, M. (2011). *The European Security Strategy: Reinvigorate, Revise or Reinvent?* (No. 7). The Swedish Institute for International Affairs.

Baun, M. (2005). How Necessary is a Common Strategic Culture? *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, *2*(1), 33–38.

Becher, K. (2004). Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe's Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy. *European Security*, *13*(4), 345–359. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662830490500008

Biava, A. (2011). The Emergence of a Strategic Culture within the Common Security and Defence Policy. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *16*(1), 41–58.

Biava, A., Drent, M., & Herd, G. P. (2011). Characterizing the European Union's Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *49*(6), 1227–1248. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02195.x

Bindi, F. M. (2010). *The foreign policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's role in the world*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Biscop, S. (2007). The ABC of European Union Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture. *Egmont Paper*, *16*. Retrieved from http://aei.pitt.edu/8973/

Biscop, S. (2016). All or nothing? European and British strategic autonomy after the Brexit. *Egmont Paper*, (87), 22.

Biscop, S., & Andersson, J. J. (2008). *The EU and the European security strategy: Forging a global Europe* (Vol. 49). Routledge.

Biscop, S., & Coelmont, J. (2013). *Europe, Strategy and Armed Forces: The Making of a Distinctive Power*. Routledge.

Bulut, E., Giovanni, G., Helly, D., & Keohane, D. (2009). *European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years (1999–2009)*. Paris: Institute For Security Studies.

Chebakova, A. (2008, September 27). *Theorizing the EU as a global actor: A constructivist approach*. 16. Retrieved from http://www.ecsa-c.ca/biennial2008/Conference%20Program_files/Chebakova.pdf

Checkel, J. T. (1998). The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. *World Politics*, *50*(1), 324–348.

Cornish, P., & Edwards, G. (2001). Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, *77*(3), 587–603.

Cornish, P., & Edwards, G. (2005). The strategic culture of the European Union: A progress report. *International Affairs*, *81*(4), 801–820. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00485.x

Dannreuther, R. (2008). Chapter 4: The European Security Strategy's regional objective – the neighbourhood policy. In *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe* (pp. 62–80). Routledge.

Dick, C. J. (1992). Initial thoughts on Russia's draft military doctrine. *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies*, *5*(4), 552–566. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518049208430079

Dijkstra, H. (2016). Introduction: One-and-a-half cheers for the EU Global Strategy. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *37*(3), 369–373. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1244241

ECFR. (2016). *European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2016*. Retrieved from European Council on Foreign Relations website: https://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2016

EEAS. (2016). Election observation missions (EUEOMs). Retrieved 12 July 2019, from https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/election-observation-missions-eueoms/421/election-observation-missions-eueoms_en

Engelbrekt, K., & Hallenberg, J. (2008). *The European Union and strategy: An emerging actor*. London: Routledge.

European Commission. (2014). *Standard Eurobarometer 81. Spring 2014. First Results.* (No. 2016.5319). Retrieved from European Commission website:

https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2040

European Commission. (2016). *Standard Eurobarometer 85. Spring 2016. First Results.* (No. 2016.5319). Retrieved from European Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2130

European Commission. (2019). *Towards a European Defence Union—Factsheet*. Retrieved from European Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/euco-sibiu-towards_a_european_defence_union_0.pdf

Finnemore, M. (2003). *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force*. Cornell University Press.

Fitzgerald, M. C. (1992). Russia's new military doctrine. *The RUSI Journal*, *137*(5), 40–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071849208445638

Flick, U. (2009). Chapter 21: Using documents as data. In *An Introduction to Qualitative Research* (4th edition, pp. 254–262). London: SAGE.

Giegerich, B. (2006). *European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy*. Nomos.

Göler, D. (2014). Zwischen security provider und security consultant. Veränderungen im Leitbild der strategischen Kultur der Europäischen Union. *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, *7*(3), 323–342. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12399-014-0410-3

Gray, C. S. (1981). National Style in Strategy: The American Example. *International Security*, *6*(2), 21–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538645

Gray, C. S. (1986). *Nuclear strategy and national style*. Hamilton Press.

Gray, C. S. (1999). Strategic culture as context: The first generation of theory strikes back. *Review of International Studies*, *25*(1), 49–69.

Grevi, G. (2016). A Global Strategy for a soul-searching European Union. *European Policy Centre Discussion Paper*. Retrieved from http://www.epc.eu/pub_details?cat_id=&pub_id=6834

Haine, J. Y. (2011). The Failure of a European Strategic Culture – EUFOR CHAD: The Last of its Kind? *Contemporary Security Policy*, *32*(3), 582–603. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.623060

Heiselberg, S. (2003). *Pacifism Or Activism: Towards a Common Strategic Culture Within the European Security and Defense Policy?* Danish Inst. for Intern. Studies.

Herd, G. P. (2009). EU–Turkey Clashing Political and Strategic Cultures as Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession. In *Harmonie Paper*: *Vol. 23*. *Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and Turkey: Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession*. Groningen: CESS.

Howorth, J. (2002). The CSDP and the forging of a european security culture. *Politique Européenne*, (8), 88–109.

Hyde-Price, A. (2004). European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force. *European Security*, *13*(4), 323–343. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662830490499993

Johansen, A. I. (2017). Assessing the European Union's strategic capacity: The case of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. *European Security*, *26*(4), 507–526. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1361933

Johnston, A. I. (1995). Thinking about Strategic Culture. *International Security*, *19*(4), 32–64. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539119

Johnston, A. I. (1999). Strategic cultures revisited: Reply to Colin Gray. *Review of International Studies*, *25*(3), 519–523. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599005197

Juncker, J.-C. (2014). *A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission*. Retrieved from European Commission website: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-speech_en.pdf

Kammel, A. H. (2011). Putting Ideas into Action: EU Civilian Crisis Management in the Western Balkans. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *32*(3), 625–643. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.623064

Kausch, K. (2016). The EU Global Strategy in the Shadow of Brexit. *Carnegie Europe*. Retrieved from http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64034

Keukeleire, S. (2014). *The foreign policy of the European Union* (2nd edition). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lindley–French, J. (2002). In the shade of Locarno? Why European defence is failing. *International Affairs*, *78*(4), 789–811. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00280

Mälksoo, M. (2016). From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: External policy, internal purpose. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *37*(3), 374–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1238245

Meyer, C. O. (2005). Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms. *European Journal of International Relations*, *11*(4), 523–549. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105057899

Meyer, C. O. (2006). *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Meyer, C. O. (2011). The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the European Union's Evolution as a Military Power. *International Studies Quarterly*, *55*(3), 669–690.

Missiroli, A. (2015). *Towards an EU Global Strategy. Background, process, references*. Retrieved from EU Institute for Security Studies website: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Towards_an_EU_Global_Strategy_0_0.pdf

Mogherini, F. (2016). *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy* (p. 56). Retrieved from EEAS website: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

Norheim-Martinsen, P. M. (2011). EU Strategic Culture: When the Means Becomes the End. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *32*(3), 517–534. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.623055

Pawlak, P. (2016). *A Global Strategy on foreign and security policy for the EU* (Briefing At a Glance No. PE 580.902). Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service.

Pentland, C. C. (2011). From Words to Deeds: Strategic Culture and the European Union's Balkan Military Missions. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *32*(3), 551–566. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.623058

Peters, I. (2011). Strategic Culture and Multilateralism: The Interplay of the EU and the UN in Conflict and Crisis Management. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *32*(3), 644–666. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.623065

Rogers, J. (2009). From 'Civilian Power' to 'Global Power': Explicating the European Union's 'Grand Strategy' Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *47*(4), 831–862. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.02007.x

Rynning, S. (2003). The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture? *Security Dialogue*, *34*(4), 479–496. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010603344007

Rynning, S. (2005). Less May Be Better in EU Security and Defence Policy. *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, *2*(1), 45–50.

Schmidt, P. (2011). The EU's Military Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Security Culture, Interests and Games. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *32*(3), 567–581. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.623059

Schmidt, P., & Zyla, B. (2011). European Security Policy: Strategic Culture in Operation? *Contemporary Security Policy*, *32*(3), 484–493. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.626329

Sinovets, P., & Renz, B. (2015). Russia's 2014 Military Doctrine and beyond: Threat perceptions, capabilities and ambitions. *NATO Defense College*, *Research Paper No. 117*. Retrieved from http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=830

Smith, M. E. (2016). Implementing the Global Strategy where it matters most: The EU's credibility deficit and the European neighbourhood. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *37*(3), 446–460. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1240467

Snyder, J. L. (1977). *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations : a Project Air Force Report Prepared for the United States Air Force*. Rand.

Solana, J. (2003). *A secure Europe in a better world—European Security Strategy* (pp. 1–14). Retrieved from European Commission website: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world

Sweeney, S. (2013). *Emergent strategic culture and coexistence: Can a CSDP based on lowest common denominator agreement be strategic?* 1–22. Retrieved from https://pure.york.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/emergent-strategic-culture-and-coexistence(9ab961b4-a680-45d9-966b-5bb9fa974591).html

Tardy, T. (2007). The European Union: From Conflict Prevention to 'Preventive Engagement,' Still a Civilian Power Lacking a Strategic Culture. *International Journal*, *62*(3), 539–555.

Tardy, T. (2009). *European Security in a Global Context*. London: Routledge.

Tocci, N. (2015). Towards an EU global strategy. In *Towards an EU Global Strategy. Background, process, references* (pp. 115–122). Retrieved from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Towards_an_EU_Global_Strategy_0_0.pdf

Tocci, N. (2016). The making of the EU Global Strategy. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *37*(3), 461–472. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1232559

Tocci, N. (2017). From the European Security Strategy to the EU Global Strategy: Explaining the journey. *International Politics*, *54*(4), 487–502. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0045-9

Toje, A. (2005). The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *10*(1), 117–133.

Toje, A. (2009). Strategic Culture as an Analytical Tool. In *Western Balkans Security Observer*: *Vol. 4*. *Strategic Culture and Security Sector Reform* (Vol. 14, pp. 3–23). Retrieved from https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=23999

Toje, A. (2010). The EU Security Strategy Revised; Europe Hedging Its Bets. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, *15*(2), 171–190.

Ujvari, B. (2016). The EU Global Strategy: Going beyond effective multilateralism? *European Policy Centre & Egmont Institute*. Retrieved from http://www.epc.eu/pub_details?cat_id=&pub_id=6613

Zyla, B. (2011). Overlap or Opposition? EU and NATO's Strategic (Sub-)Culture. *Contemporary Security Policy*, *32*(3), 667–687. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.623066