A comparative analysis of the buildup of post-colonial countries and the effects of military regimes on the level of legitimacy

An analysis of Nigeria and Uganda

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Abstract

This paper evaluates why some military regimes are considered more legitimate than others. More specifically, it tries to explain how military regimes develop in different ways in countries which have a similar precolonial conqueror and how this affects the legitimacy of a rulership. To address this question; this paper focuses on the military regimes of Nigeria and Uganda, which both were installed in the years after independence. Whereas Nigeria's military regime could be considered 'corrective', or trying to address previous political mistakes and committed to paving the way to democracy, Uganda's military rule could be considered predatory and ruthless. Both states shared important characteristics, however, such as British colonial rule and high ethnic diversity. I posit that the institution of the army plays a major role in the type of military regime that emerges following a historical-institutionalist approach. More specifically, I find that the ethnic quotas in the institutions of the military at the moment of independent rulership play an important role. These quotas are a key factor in determining the military regime type that will come to existence.

Content

Introduction

Many African countries experienced in the mid-twentieth century a transition from a colonial rulership, to a sovereign government system. In some cases, these governments converted to a government with a military nature. However, looking at the levels of legitimacy, some military regimes enjoy more legitimacy than others. Nowadays, some countries have a less negative attitude towards military rule compared with twenty years ago. Analyzing countries through time, some of these countries are getting more openminded towards a military rulership.

In a survey, performed by the Afrobarometer, a research group, which analyzes Africa, the attitude of civilians towards a military rule, has been investigated. Round one and seven will be discussed for the sub-Saharan countries that know a military regime as government form.

Table 1:

Round one Afrobarometer

In table one the results of the first survey round are shown. This was taken in the period 1999-2001 and twelve countries participated, with a total of 21,444 respondents answering the survey. As shown in the table, most countries have strongly disapproved a military regime. Every country has a total disapproval rate of at least 59%. This is the lowest number when "strongly disagree/disapprove" and disapprove/disagree" are taken together. Five of these states had a successful military coup according to Mcgowan (2003, p. 367). I have found my information about military rule in the article of Mcgowan (2003), in which he evaluates the countries in sub-Saharan Africa that experienced a military coup.

Table 2:
Round seven Afrobarometer

In table two, the results of the seventh survey are shown. Thirty-four countries participated in the period 2016-2018 with a total of 45,699 respondents answering the survey. Thirty-two countries are sub-Saharan countries. Seventeen of these countries were sub-Saharan states

which had a successful military coup according to McGowan (2012, p. 367). In table 7, the lowest rating of disapproval is 41%. This is a significant lower percentage than given in the first round.

Looking at Nigeria and Uganda, I find it interesting to see that Nigeria is more openminded towards a military regime if I look over the time period which is explained above, and that Uganda however, is getting more reluctant. There is a variation in how military regimes are remembered across these countries. These cases have different levels of citizens' perceiving them as legitimate. For this reason, Nigeria and Uganda are selected as the study cases. I think that these countries are good to compare because they share important characteristics, and as shown over time, there inhabitants differ from their perception on military rulership.

Nigeria and Uganda are two countries which were both colonized by the United Kingdom and gained independence shortly after each other. Both states developed new government systems in which the army does not lead anymore. However, both countries do not know a full functioning democracy at the moment. According to Freedom house Nigeria nowadays is partly free. In terms of freedom, Uganda is not free, due to the attempts of the current government to restrict free expression ("Uganda", 2019)

As can be seen, the citizens of Nigeria and Uganda have developed a different attitude towards a military rule. As Beetham is cited in the article of O'kane (1993, p. 485) : "the ideal military regime established by a coup d'état is one which takes power where democratic institutions are failing and the military claims the legitimacy to intervene on the basis of promises to rectify wrongs in the name of the people." Olorunsola and Wasko (1978) wrote an article on how African military regimes in Nigeria tried to gain legitimacy, however, this case only aims on Nigeria. They gave no answer on how other countries earned their legitimacy and what the influence of the type of regime has on the degree of legitimacy. Beetham discusses in Nash and Scott (2001, p. 111-112) the terms of legitimacy and states that: "such legitimacy as military regimes have is based entirely on their purpose or mission to save society from chaos and is typically defined as transitional, to promote the restoration of a normal legitimate order." This does not explain why some military regimes have more legitimacy than others. In

addition, it makes no distinction in regime types, whereas some lead to a restoration of legitimate civilian government and others do not.

Therefore, the question discussed in this paper will be: 'Why do military rulership's act different from one another and therefore, earn more legitimacy, given that both states have the same colonial history?'

This is an important question because nowadays, there are still democratic systems in which there is a desire to convert to a military regime. To explain how military regimes differ and have a different level of legitimacy towards their military regime, the colonial history of Nigeria and Uganda and their institution of the army shall be discussed. To understand why a military regime is more accepted in Nigeria than in Uganda – thus knows more legitimacy- the institution of the military is analyzed. This paper will examine how both armies are constructed and what the influence is of the British colonizer in their buildup.

2. Literature Review

Why do military coups occur?

According to Nugent, "an intended consequence of a coup was to narrow the political arena, thereby reducing the points of social friction" (Nugent, 2012, p. 208). "Some even regarded the military as the ideal instrument of post-colonial governance in the sense that it was supposedly a 'modern 'institution that transcended ethnicity and possessed skills which might assist the task of economic modernization." (Nugent, 2012, p. 208) This all is part of the modernization paradigm (Nugent, 2012, p. 208). Samuel Decalo asserted that "the coupe syndrome was rooted less in societal causes, and rather more in the military itself. Corporate pride, ethnic jealousies and personal aggrandizement were seen as some of the factors, which came into play" (Decalo in Nugent, 2012, p. 208).

Nugent added to his vision that there was a stimulating effect after the first military regimes were successfully installed. He speaks about the demonstration effect, because after the first military coups it became clear that organizing a coup was not that hard (Nugent, 2012, p. 208). Nugent states that a group of soldiers who were not satisfied with the status quo and had access to commandos to arrest or eliminate essential entities within the incumbent regime could easily take over strategic installations such as the media and infrastructural means such as airports (Nugent, 2012, p. 208)

Nugent also states that: "after four decades of military coups, each bearing its own unique attributes, one can conclude that the typical pattern was one in which the unpopularity of the incumbent regime provided the backdrop against which the soldiers felt empowered to act" (Nugent, 2012, p. 208).

Although this looks quite conclusive, one must look further. The reason that is used by competitors of the incumbent regime can have a deeper meaning. The contestants will always have a list of missteps taken by the incumbent and this will support their claim for power and in a way will legitimize their hostile takeover. However, Nugent (2012, p.208) tells us that there were also other factors that would drive the contesters to take action, such as corporate manners, ethnic considerations, and in some cases personal interests that were important.

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A study performed by Johnson, Slater and McGowan (1984, p.636) gave the following results. They have based their study on findings of a previous performed study by Jackman (Johnson, Slater & McGowan, 1984, p.625), in which they attempt to find critical factors for military coups in Africa in the period of 1960-1985. Their conclusion is that military coups as seen in sub-Sahara Africa are not unpredictable and random. They give a set of arguments, which are stimulating concerning military coups. They argue that there are a set of variables that can predict coup-occurrence. The first variable, just as Jackman, consists of social mobilization of the population. This has a positive effect on the uprising of military regimes. Also, they have extended this conclusion with two more variables, which play a role in the process of forming military regimes: political pluralism and domestic and international economic performance. Based on these three variables, according to Johnson, Slater and McGowan (1984) the occurrence of military regimes is partly predictable.

Jenkins and Kposowa (1990) evaluated a number of theories which are claimed to be explanatory for the causation of military coups. These theories are: the political development theory, the military centrality theory, which focuses more narrowly on "the corporate interests and resources of the military and on civil/military relations" (Welch and Smith in Jenkins & Kposowa, 1990, p. 862), several theories of ethnic antagonism, such as the modernization theory, the ethnic competition theory, the ethnic dominance theory and a final plausible cause which is investigated is the focus of economic dependency. They evaluated these theories with a cross-sectional design and equation estimation procedures available through the Linear Structural Relations Program (Jenkins and Kposowa, 1990, p. 864).

The conclusion of Jenkins and Kposowa (1990, p. 871) was that "ethnic antagonism rooted in cultural diversity and competition between the two largest ethnic groups is a key cause behind military coups" (Jenkins & Kposowa, 1990, p. 871). The emphasis here lies on the diversity and competition between groups. Furthermore, they continue their argument: "states with large hegemonic groups with strong dominance in the cabinet deterred challengers while states with extensive ethnic diversity and strong competitor groups were more prone to coups." (Jenkins & Kposowa, 1990, p. 871) "The African coup typically arises from a particular military unit or an officer clique contesting the ethnic privileges or claims of a civilian government or

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another set of officers "(Kennedy in Jenkins and Kposowa, 1990, p. 872). Jenkins and Kposowa (1990, p. 872) conclude with their findings: "political centrality of the military was rooted in an Africanized officer corps and that the fight over resources that are controlled by the government play a big role in the genesis of a military coup. Economic dependence, ethnic diversity, and political factionalism all contribute to a large extend, just as an autonomous military." These are the reasons given by them for the occurrence of a military coup.

Military regimes defined

An important concept, which will be used in this thesis, is military rulership. It is assumed that a military rulership consists of a government, which is led by the military and still maintains its hierarchical structure. As Japhet (2012, p.11) argues in his article 'military coups and military regimes in Africa', there is a broad spectrum in which a military regime can be placed. "One can label a government as a military regime if the civilian government is counting on its military forces for legitimacy or if the military staff rules the political system" (Japhet, 2012, p.11). Geddes, Franz and Wright (2012, p. 152) give three variants of the meaning of the term military regime. The first one refers to a dictatorship led by a military officer who does not take any notice of the opinion of rest of his equals. The second one is a form in which "the government is represented by somewhat collegial bodies representing the officer corps, so the legislation is executed by the military institution", and the last definition refers to "a subset of dictatorships, in which the power is concentrated in the hands of a single military officer." (Geddes, Franz & Wright, 2012, p. 152) Because this thesis tries to explain how the military regimes emerged in Nigeria and Uganda and how they have evolved in their subtypes, the concept of 'military regime' will be decomposed and the subtypes will be described.

Nugent describes four types of military regimes, namely: a caretaker regime, a corrective regime, and a regime type in which military usurpers occur and lastly, a regime type that supports Marxism. The definitions of all four regime types are given.

As Nugent states: "The first category is perhaps the simplest to grasp, representing as it does a temporary holding action on the part of the military. Caretaker regimes were those that continued to accept the premise that the military did not really belong in politics. However, as part of their obligation to defend the interests of the nation, they claimed an obligation to remove civilian politicians who were driving the country to rack and ruin" (Nugent, 2012, p. 213). Some exemplary countries that fall in this category are Togo, Benin and Ghana, according to Nugent.

For the second regime type, the corrective military regime, Nugent gives the following definition: "The second category of military regimes differed in that they were explicit about

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their intention to govern for as long as they deemed necessary. The typical rationale was that national unity could not otherwise be maintained and/or that the military alone possessed the managerial competence to put the country back on track. The corrective regimes tended to rely heavily on civil servants, and sometimes drew on the moral support of traditional rulers, whereas the politicians were relegated to the background. Moreover, soldiers tended to insist not merely on heading the various ministries, but also sitting at the head of public corporations" (Nugent, 2012, p. 216). Anugwom describes the corrective regime as "a regime that is reluctantly lured into government to help improve the civilian polity and after that hand-over the power to a civilian government" (Anugwom, 2001). As can be seen, these definitions differ from one another on the part of the willingness of the army. In this thesis, the definition of Nugent will be followed in the remainder of this study. An example of military states that knew a corrective regime are Nigeria and Ghana.

Thirdly, there is the military regime type in which Nugent states that this type of regime has as main goal to draw the source of power entirely to the army. He argues that this type of regime consisted of entities who presented themselves as a civilian organization; however, their source of power remained the possibility of using violence in case of disobedience. Instead of transferring the political power after stabilization to a civilian government, the soldiers who proclaimed power assigned themselves as the head of state, such as president, and in one case, even proclaimed himself as emperor, which was Jean-Bedel Bokassa, the former leader of the CAR. He crowned himself emperor in 1977. (Nugent, 2016, p. 229). Another well-known case of a usurper regime is Uganda, with their former leader Idi Amin.

The last regime type is the praetorian Marxism regime type. Nugent does not explicitly give a definition about this type of regime. He states the following: "By contrast, all the regimes that embraced Marxism in some form of other (Marxism-Leninism or 'Maoism') were linked to the military. In the case of regimes, which came to power through liberation war - such as FRELIMO in Mozambique – this is not too surprising because armed combat had a radicalizing effect on the political movements. What is more intriguing is why regimes that came to power through coups d'état should have been drawn towards Marxism. On the face of things, the armed forces are the least likely candidate to mount a radical platform, given its notionally apolitical and strictly hierarchical character. But in view of the permeability of the African

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military, and the frailty of its command structures, this cannot be taken for granted. Soldiers in Africa have been ideologically suggestible, and the rank-and-file especially so" (Nugent, 2016, p.246). Nugent argues that the military rulers had to justify their coup d'état and therefore, they moved toward more extreme ideologies, such as Marxism. Markakis and Waller (1986, p. 3) state that "the conversion to Marxism of professional soldiers on their way to power is not a wholly principled affair, nor is it an entirely base one either. Rather it is a mixture of idealism, naiveté and self-serving considerations. The usurpation of power requires legitimation through a credible alternative to the overthrown regimes, if it is not to prove a transient affair". This type of regime occurred in several countries: Congo, Brazzaville, Benin, Ethiopia, Somalia, and to lesser extent Ghana and Burkina Faso.

3. Methodology

The literature discussed in the above section gives us an idea of which military regimes exist. However, they do not explain how different types of military regimes come about. Most studies focus on a uniform definition of military regimes. In this study, the goal is to explain why there are subtypes of military regimes and why they occur. This will be done in a comparative study of Nigeria and Uganda. Both countries have had the same colonizer, the British, and became independent around the same time. Independence was in both countries followed by economic problems and political instability. Nigeria and Uganda are also characterized by ethnic diversity and conflicts between ethnic groups. Both experienced military takeovers in the years following independence, 1966 for Nigeria and 1971 for Uganda.

To explain why these countries experienced different military regimes, I rely on a historical-institutionalist perspective. As stated by Longstreth, Steinmo and Thelen (1992, p. 2) "historical institutionalism represents an attempt to illuminate how political struggles are mediated by the institutional setting in which [they] take place". These writers also state that "historical institutionalists work with a definition of institutions that include both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct" (Longstreth, Steinmo & Thelen, 1998, p. 2).

I mainly look at the institution of the military. I analyze how the national army was formed during colonial times and how the institute developed after independence. I rely on secondary data analysis of academic texts for my research.

4. A historic overview of Uganda and Nigeria

In my analysis I will look at the periods in which military regimes were present in the states of Uganda and Nigeria, but first I provide a short historical overview of each country.

History Uganda

Uganda became independent on October 9, 1962. Its first president was Kabaka Mutesa II, who also had the role of King of Buganda, a region in the South of Uganda.

Kabaka Mutesa II term of office was from 1963 until 1966. In this year, the first Prime Minister of the country, Milton Obote, who came from the region of Lango, suspended the Constitution which was formed at the time of independence of Uganda and he removed Mutesa as President. Obote instructed the army to arrest Mutesa, however, Mutesa managed to flee to London and stayed there in exile. After the removal of Kabaka Mutesa, "Obote's major preoccupation was to consolidate his position, secure his political supremacy and unite the country under his leadership" (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 78).

However, in 1961, Benedicto Kiwanuka was appointed Uganda's first Chief Minister. At the same time, two men had a promotion in the army: Shaban O. Opolot and Idi Amin. This is important because Idi Amin would seize power a few years later. He gained power in the military through a set of promotions which would lead to the position of Commander of the Army (Omara-Utunu 1987, p. 86). In 1967, anarchy and dereliction of duty continued to spread within the Army, and in January 1967 by order of Amin's companions, Lieutenant Mustafa Adrisi and Second-Lieutenant E. Anguduru, Amin created a military police force to restore order. Both of these men came, like Amin, from the West Nile District (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 79).

After this period, there a was power struggle between Obote and Amin, because Obote concluded that Amin did not act in the interest of his government and Obote attempted to secure the loyalty of the Army by sending a message to the army with new year of 1969.

However, Amin counteracted by using the same strategy as Obote, and also sent a message to the army (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 87).

In order to resolve the conflict between himself and the President, Amin staged a take-over of government by the military in a coup on 25 January 1971 (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 92). This occurred during a visit to Singapore by president Obote.

In the beginning of his reign, as stated in the Uganda Argus of 27 January 1971, President Amin made an early promise to hold 'fair and free elections' asserting that his would be 'purely a caretaker administration' (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 102). He tried to create trust with the people. One of his first deeds as President was the repatriation of the body of Kabaka Mutesa in 1969. This could be seen as remarkable, given the fact that during the struggle for power between Obote and Mutesa, Amin had led the attack on the palace of the Kabaka in 1964.

After these events, Amin destroyed the remaining state institutions, personalized his rule, and rounded himself with ethnic Kakwa and Nubians, which were groups which originated from the same area as he did. He allowed no internal opposition and the following eight years brought a series of massacres of different ethnicities in the state. A significant number of Ugandans were exiled from the country and, in 1979, "a combination of these Ugandans and Tanzanian forces put an end to his reign in 1979" (Rwengabo, 2013, p. 540).

In April 1979, a new government had to be formed, and until the elections were prepared, a civilian administration under Yusuf Lule held office. However, this administration remained in office for two months. After Lule, Godfrey Binaisa held office for almost a year. Lule and Binaisa both did not see how important the support of the army was, for the stability of their administration. "In order to hold on to power, Binaisa needed the support of a substantial portion of the Army, which he did not have and seemed little concerned to acquire" (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 151)

After a period of dissatisfaction, Binaisa was removed as president and in 1980, the military announced a new general election to be held in December. The winner of this election was

the party of Obote, the UPC, who came back in power. A noteworthy contestant who did not acknowledge the results of the election was Yoweri Museveni, and his UPM party.

The years after the election, a partnership between the government and the army emerged, because Obote saw "the urgent need for the security and stability which were essential for the reconstruction and the rehabilitation of the country" (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 158). Also, he understood why it was necessary for the survival of his administration (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 158).

However, Obote did not succeed to manage a successful collaboration between the government and the army, which led to another military coup on 27 July 1985. He fled to Kenya at this moment in history. This coup was led by Brigadier Bajilio Olara Okello. Simultaneously, Museveni had created a new political party, the NRM, which also had a fighting force, the NRA (National Resistance Army). This party did not acknowledge the current government and waged a guerilla war against Obote's regime.

Eventually, Museveni seized power in 1986. When taking power, NRM's leadership exhibited a strong ethnic bias which was in advantage of western and central Uganda. This was because Museveni's core group from Ankole in western Uganda had entered in a "Bantu alliance with the Baganda during the war (1981-1986) and was now widely perceived as the country's first southern government" (Lindemann, 2016, p. 395). However, to guarantee the people that this was not another transfer of power as they knew it, Museveni banned party activity and banned sectarianism from the political system as Uganda had known it since independence. By doing so, he wanted to create a government which was inclusive. However, "the distribution of posts at national level remained skewed in favour of ethnic groups from western and central Uganda" (Lindemann, 2016, p. 395). Nowadays, Museveni is still the head of state of Uganda.

Nigeria became independent from Great Britain in 1960. The first republic was established in 1963, where Nmandi Azikiwe became the first president of this new independent state. Nigeria is a relatively young country. As Kew states in his article: 'First and foremost, is the understated fact that before the twentieth century, Nigeria did not exist. Nigerians have cultural pasts as individuals and subnational affiliations but they have only a century of association under one polity, of which only the last four decades are sovereign and independent' (Kew, 2016. p. 88). Kew describes in his book that Nigeria has a population of 178 million inhabitants and that there are more than 250 different types of ethnicities. However, there are three major groups that make up for around two-thirds of the whole population in Nigeria: in the north, there are the Muslim Hausa. The Yoruba have settled mainly in the south and this ethnic group mainly has followers of Christianity. However, 40 percent of the Yoruba population is Muslim. The last group mentioned by Kew is the Igbo, who live in the southeast of the country. As stated by Diamond (1983, p. 458): "the demographic distribution of ethnic groups into a "centralized" structure meant that competition tended to center around the three major groups – the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo – which together compressed some two thirds of the population" (Diamond, 1983, p. 458). Diamond (1985, p. 458-459) continues: "the organization of political parties along ethnic and regional lines, and the rapid drift to on-party rule in each region reinforced ethnicity as the fundamental cleavage in social and political life". This is a brief summary of Nigeria's composition.

In 1966, Nigeria experienced its first military coup. The Supreme Military council was formed, led by Major General Johnson T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi form the southern Igbo ethnic group. However, this led to Northern Muslim resentment, which resulted in a second coup in July of 1966. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, who later became Major General, led the Federal Military government at this moment of history. Gowon also reorganizes the structure of Nigeria. The country changed from four regions into twelve states.

From 1967 until 1970, the country encounters a civil war which costs hundreds of thousands of people's lives. The reason for this civil war was the declaration of independence of the

Republic of Biafra by Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu. However, this rebellious group surrendered in January 1970.

In 1975, another coup follows, a new military regime emerges and Brigadier Murtala Mohammed is head of state now, and he assembles a Constitution Drafting Committee to develop a new constitution with the aim of creating an "executive presidential system" (Suberu, 2001, p. xxiv). In 1976, there are seven more states created and Brigadier Mohammed is assassinated in a failed coup attempt. General Olusegun Obasanjo takes over as Supreme Military Court leader.

In 1979, the Second republic is established with a new constitution. Nigeria has a new elected president: Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Also, there was "a replacement of the First Republic's Westminster parliamentary system, with an American-style presidential model and the recognition of the country's federal character, or cultural diversity, in the procedures for electing president, the formation of political parties, and the composition and conduct of public agencies" (Suberu, 2001, p. 36). "The president required at least a quarter of the votes in each of at least two-thirds of the states in order to be elected directly. An elected president was also required to acknowledge the diversity of his government by appointing at least one person from each state into his cabinet" (Suberu, 2001, p.37). The idea was to reduce the ethnic and regional polarization with these adaptions, given that Nigeria has many different ethnicities.

In 1983, Shagari was re-elected, but because of excessive government spending and widespread corruption, there occurred yet again a military coup in December of this year. In January 1984, Major General Muhammadu Buhari lead the Military Supreme Court. A year passes and several members of the Supreme Military Court overthrow Buhari and install Major General Babangida as new leader of the newly formed Armed Forces Ruling Council. The reason for this removal was "the monopolization of his power which alarmed the other officers" (Diamond, 1985, p. 327). This regime offers more freedom for media and stimulates a more open political system. Among his government's first actions was the release of reporters who were imprisoned (Diamond, 1985, p. 331). Babangida has been described as an officer who enjoyed a lot of popularity, having "the soldier's love of action and the politician's

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populist instinct" (Diamond, 1985, p.326). In 1987, the administration of Babinga adds two new states to the Federation of Nigeria. Nigeria consists of twenty-one states at this point in time. In 1989, a new constitution is announced, this in order to realize the Third Republic. However, this did not lead yet to a civil government.

In 1991, Babinga increases this number with nine more states. In 1992, Babinga replaces the Armed Forces Ruling council with a National Defense and Security Council and also installs a Transition Council to prepare the country for civilian rule.

In 1993 M.K.O. Abiola wins the elections, however, a court injunction prevents the revelation of results (Suberu, 2001, p. xxv). Babangida names the chairman of the Transition Council, Ernest Shonekan as new front man of the Interim National Government of Nigeria. However, the Federal High Court of Nigeria rules that the Interim National Government is unconstitutional. Therefore, General Sani Abacha takes over as head of a new military government. During his administration, there are six more states added to Nigeria's Federation, which brings the total number to thirty-six. In 1998, Abacha suddenly dies, and General Abubakar follows as first choice as head of the government. He announces the Fourth Republic in 1999 with elected president Olusegun Obasanjo.

Nigeria has known many military coups throughout time. For thirty years, the country has alternated between civil governments and military regimes until 1999. According to Ejiogu, Nigeria has dealt with eleven different types of government, of which eight were military regimes, one regime had a selected head of state and two others had a government which was created through elections, namely Shagari and Obasanjo (Ejiogu, 2007, p. 99). Currently, Nigeria is now in its fourth Republic. After 1999, there were yet again elections and the country tried to create a more democratic system in which the people could choose their government. "The fourth republic is, and has been Nigeria's most enduring electoral regime since independence" (Lewis & Kew, 2015, p. 95). The elections of 2015 were the first elections in which the opposition won and was recognized by the ruling party since the country is independent (Lewis & Kew, 2015, p. 94). However, during the election periods, citizens split along familiar ethnoregional lines. This meant that northerners and south westerners mainly

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would support the All Progressives Party while southeastern groups and coastal minorities supported the People's Democratic Party (Lewis and Kew, 2015, p. 94).

5. Analysis of Army Building in Uganda and Nigeria

Buildup of the Uganda Army

According to Omara-Otunnu (1987, p. 12), there are three stages for the existence of the army of Uganda since it was formed in the 1890s. The first step was the formation of a small group of soldiers who were active under the Imperial British East Africa Company. This militia had to protect the interests of the IBEA. These men were initially Swahili speaking soldiers and were assigned to help Frederik Lugard, a British soldier, with his explorative missions. Secondly, the people of Baganda were incorporated in the army. And lastly, when Uganda was integrated in the British empire, they needed an army to keep control of the area. In 1894, Uganda was officially proclaimed a protectorate of the British Empire, and in 1895, the Uganda rifles was established, a military force which consisted of Sudanese soldiers and the current troops that were stationed in Uganda. However, the Sudanese soldiers were the main force of the army at this time.

The imperial government could maintain the order in this army by employing troops which came from other countries, such as Kenya and India. These troops had no affiliation with the inhabitants of Uganda and therefore they could effectively suppress any form of rebellion. As in Nigeria, the Uganda imperial government applied a threefold principle concerning deployment of troops in a Protectorate: "a soldier should be of a different race, a different (and distant) geographical origin, and a different religious faith from the population in the area of posting." (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 24). In 1898, there was an official enlargement of the army with Indians and Swahili troops, and the army was renamed the Uganda Military Force Ordinance (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 25).

However, in the period 1900 – 1913 the army started recruiting large numbers of Africans. The Ugandan army was incorporated in the King's African Rifles Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 28). In 1913, the Indian troops that were still in the KAR were dismissed from this army because Ugandans were recruited for their posts. However, the composition of the army was not representative for the country's many ethnicities. Most men in the KAR were people from Acholi and Lango in the North. The Acholi were recruited because they were less rebellious

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and more open to British rule. The British imperial government had a history of conflict with the Lango, because they supported "Omukama Kabarega of Bunyoro when he was in flight from the British in the 1890s" (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 32). However, that matter could not exclude them any longer of recruitment. Another reason why the British imperial government preferred the Acholi above all other ethnicities was the fact that they were hardly coordinated. They entrusted this particular ethnic group with military power because they were not very active on a political level (Adekson, 1979, p. 153). Therefore, the army of Uganda consisted only of northerners and the people from the middle states in the country were excluded from the military force. This meant that there were no people that spoke Bantu in the army (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 33).

In 1939, almost 77000 men were enlisted for the army, as World War II was on its way and Uganda would deliver men for Britain. However, after the war the army reduced its numbers with almost 56000 men.

In 1957, Uganda gained full control of the military. This was the first step of independence of the country. There were certain terms which had to be fulfilled. "First, the King's African Rifles were designated the East African Land Forces. The new name was symbolic of the transfer of command. Secondly, the everyday running of the forces, the exception of control over expenditure, was to be the responsibility of a General Commanding Officer. Thirdly, an East African Land Forces Organisation was formed to assist the General Commanding Officer with financial matters" (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 41) In 1959, the army tried to improve the level of knowledge, and by doing so, it invested in the education of its troops. By 1960, the possibility of being promoted was enabled for Africans.

After independence, the proportions of the army had not changed. However, while Mutesa was president, and Obote Prime Minister, there was no further Africanization of the military. This because of the tactical thought of Mutesa, who also was a citizen of Buganda. He acknowledged that the Africanization of the military probably would deteriorate the position of his people within the army. Therefore, it was a safer situation in which the army still had British military men on the higher ranked places. A lot of dissatisfaction arose within the army

concerning their training and also the circumstances in which the soldiers were in service. This led to the mutiny of 1964.

As stated above, the influence of Idi Amin was significant in 1967, because of his formation of the military police. He had created the police force and it is clear that there was a strong bias concerning the appointment of men: "Whereas the composition of the Military Police under Amin was strongly biased in favour of West Nile District, the Army as a whole with Obote as Commander-in-Chief, was heavily weighted in favor of men from northern Uganda in general" (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 81).

Amin increasingly clashed with president Obote in 1968, and Amin continued to recruit people in the army, specifically Sudanic speaking men, the same group as he belonged to. Eventually, Amin had enough support from his own ethnic groups and more important, he had the support of the Acholi, who remained the largest group within the military. However, shortly after the military coup initiated by Amin, he started killing a lot of Acholi and Langi. He saw them as his prior enemy after he installed his administration. This was connected with the fact that Obote also was a Langi (Omaru-Otunnu, 1987, p. 104). After this period, Amin recruited 4000 men from the Sudanese Anya Nya, people of Zaire and of his own area, the West Nile District (Omara, Otunnu, 1987, p. 108)

From 1973 on, Amin started to use religion as one of the main characteristics for recruitment into his army. Amin did not only implement it for the recruitment of soldiers, but he also used it as a criterion to promote his soldiers.

After the fall of Amin in 1979, the liberation forces, which consisted of Tanzanian soldiers and men from the Uganda National Liberation Army, or UNLA acted as military force. This organ consisted of many exiled Ugandans. 66, 5% were Bantu speakers, 32% were Lwo speakers and just 1% were Nilo-Hamitic speakers, the group that Amin belonged to (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 150).

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In December 1985, the Military council reached an accord with the NRM/ NRA, and under the supervision of Britain, Canada, Kenya and Tanzania, the national army of Uganda was restructured and ethnicity was taken in consideration (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, p. 168).

However, since Museveni became president, he has always used his position to recruit soldiers in the army that were loyal to him. According to Rwengabo (2013, p. 550), The officers were mainly from south-western Uganda, as he is. "The post-1986 regime established the now-institutionalized security services which penetrate society and interpenetrate one another to effect coup-proofing" (Rwengabo, 2013, p. 550). As a result, he still is the President of Uganda.

 To summarize, as can be seen, the army in Uganda is constant influenced in order to maintain power for the ruler. This made the usurpation by Idi Amin possible and can contribute to explanation of the duration of the current administration.

According to Ejiogu, the army of Nigeria originates from British armies that were converged by a number of British entities whose activities led to the colonization of the Niger region, which would develop in the state we know as Nigeria (Ejiogu, 2007, p. 102).

In this article, Ejiogu refers to the observation of Welsch, who states: "the armed forces of contemporary Africa originated from the forces of European occupation" (Welsh in Ejiogu, 2007, p. 102). This meant that the armed forced in Africa nowadays all emerged by imperial influences. The goal of the British colonizer was not in the first place to create an army that would serve the interests of its country, but to create an army that would be loyal to the English crown. Another argument which had to justify their actions was the humanitarian mission they had to succeed. Nigeria has a history of slave trading, and Britain believed that they could improve the situation of the many Nigerians by conquering these lands, according to Ukpabi (1976, p. 64). Ukpabi (1976, p. 61) also emphasizes the political situation. The British wanted to express their power in every conquered area, which led to the establishment of constabularies for every administration that was formed. Eventually, these constabularies were merged together as the expansion of the British empire continued. This was an unknown form of warfare for the societies in Nigeria. Ukpabi states: "In all respects the Nigerian military was the creation of the British government. It was a total departure from traditional military usage whereby each town or groups of towns in Nigeria possessed a loose military organization adequate for its military needs" (Ukpabi, 1976, p.62).

As an example, Ejiogu (2007, p. 103) elaborates about Frederick Lugard, who created an army of Hausa slaves in 1903 to conquer the Hausaland. However, when he overthrew the Fulani rulership, he permitted the political system which was used by the conquered enemy as long as they pledged their loyalty to British Empire. The primary group on which they focused were people from the backland of Nigeria, and as cited in the article of Ejiogu, this was done because "these people were more remote of their homeland, which rendered them detached from the inhabitants of areas where colonial urban centres evolved and flourished in the coastal south" (Ejiogu, 2007, p.103). The logics behind this strategy was that "these types of commandos

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would be less reluctant and therefore, more effective in the suppression of anti-colonial uprisings in the urbanized areas where their detachment and lack of affinity with the locals would not constitute a hindrance to their mission when deployed" (Ejiogu, 2007, p. 103).

He then continues with his assessment, in which he explains that the more a population has a certain form of democracy, or at least, a rulership system, which has characteristics of a democracy, the more this specific population was deemed unfit for recruitment in the army. This meant that the southern people of Nigeria were seen as unfit for joining the army. A factor that plays an important role in this case is education. At the time that Lugard lived, he had certain thoughts about the way that Nigerians thought about their oppressor. This vision would be negatively influenced because of the education some of them have enjoyed in Western countries (Ejiogu, 2007, p.104). He even avoided the incorporation of indigenous people who were converted to Christianity during the colonization. Their education and religious beliefs would lead to a disgust against colonization according to Ejiogu (2007, p. 104).

However, with the beginning of World War II there was a need for an experienced workforce such as mechanics and clerks, and thus recruited the Nigerian army for the first time Southerners such as the Igbos and Yoruba's into their ranks. At the end of the Second World War, the composition of the Nigerian army had changed drastically. As Ejiogu states: "the army was transformed from an exclusive force of northern 'pagan tribes' commanded by British officers and NCOs into one that was composed of artillery units and infantry battalions. In 1949, there were only three Nigerians in the officer corps; however, these were only from the lower Niger region" (Ejiogu, 2007, p. 106).

Right before the end of the rulership of Britain in Nigeria, the British handed over the rulership to the Hausa-Fulani leaders. However, at the end of the colonial rule the power was shifted towards figures who had a Western education, which changed the structure of the army leadership. As stated before, most people who had a western education came from the South of Nigeria. In 1960, this development was clear for the Northern politicians, and they tried to secure their position within the army by stimulating their youngsters to join the army. However, another important action that was taken by the British politicians is the

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implementation of the quota system. As Ejiogu states: "and after the introduction of the quota system that pegged officer cadet enlistment at 50%, 25% and 25% in favour of the North, East and West respectively, this is indicative of the assertion that northern politicians took advantage of their assumption of power to stack the crops in favour of the North" (Ejiogu, 2007, p. 109). This is also stated by Ukpabi (1976, p. 71) in which he explains that there were made calculated steps by the British ruler to compose army units in which the enlistment of men of the North was 50%, and for the East and the West 25% each, but the rank and file was not the only level this principal applied to. The quota system was also used at the selection of officers. This took place after 1958. As stated by Ukpabi: "Orders were also given to the effect that each military unit should be 'mixed', that is each unit should contain men from several ethnic groups. In addition, each unit should not be allowed to stay too long in a place lest it fraternized with the people on the other hand there was everything to be gained from moving such a unit at regular intervals from place to place in order to make it aware of its service to the whole nation" (Ukpabi, 1976, p.71). This is a stimulating approach from the colonizer towards the recruitment of people in the army. The British tried to create a more positive image for the military before they returned the command to the first independent Nigerian ruler. The British ruler started a campaign in which it tried to attract more graduates into the army. They also raised the payrates and extended the training grounds of the army. "In order to assert the independence of Nigeria in military matters, Nigerian troops were sent for training to Canada, Pakistan, India, Australia, the United States, and Ethiopia, thereby abandoning the practice, during the colonial period, of having such soldiers sent only to Britain" (Ukpabi, 1976, p. 72). This was in 1963, right before independence. In 1965, the last British officer officially left the Nigerian army according to Ukpabi (1976, p. 71).

When Nigeria had its first civilian government, many faults such as corruption and nepotism, were visible. As summarized Ukpabi (1976, p. 74), the politicians attempted to persuade the military, however, the military still overthrew the government and installed itself as ruling entity. This was a positive event according to many Nigerians. After the civil war, the military made it its duty to improve the country. Ukpabi tells that the army has learned, aided by a bureaucratic system in which civilians served and other structures that helped to organize the country, to learn about the complexity of politics and has accustomed the knowledge to perform political tasks (Ukpabi, 1976, p. 76).

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To summarize, the army has developed itself through appropriating the knowledge of rulership and through the diversification. It would handle in the interest of the county, the moment it deemed the civilian administration unfit to perform its duties.

6. Conclusion

Despite the effort of the British imperialist to create military institutions which they still could influence, the development of Nigeria and Uganda differ. In this thesis, I tried to give an answer to the question: 'why do military rulership's act different from one another and therefore, earn more legitimacy, given that both states have the same colonial history?'. I think that the answer lies for a great part within the quotas of ethnic groups in the military at the moment of independency. More specifically, the moment the institution of the military came under native control.

Nigeria had a quota policy which led to diversification in the army, and therefore, the army could stay more 'objective' and would act in the name of the whole nation instead of a certain ethnic group. As stated by Ehwarieme (2011, p. 506) "the relatively stable civil-military relations can be explained because the internal divisions of the military reflect the ethnic, religious, and regional lines that exist in the society", and he takes this explanation for the period of 1999-2009 in Nigeria. I agree with Ehwarieme and suggest that this factor plays a direct causal role for the legitimacy of the military regime. The military regime of Nigeria acted in this manner because of the broad distribution within the army, and their actions were aimed at serving the will of the people and thus in the interests of the state. Therefore, the people are more willing to accept a military regime, and they thus earn their right for rulership.

Uganda had a same kind of military formation; however, I argue that the formation of the army took a different course compared to Nigeria because the influence from politicians soon affected the formation of the army. There was no 'objectivity' or thoughts about the well-being of the state underlying the institution. The army was used in every political action to gain more power. Even at the time that the British officers had not left it, this was still a political move to maintain the status quo, looking at the presidential period of Mutesa.

When Amin ruled the country, he had strengthened his position by primarily by selecting his own ethnic group. In the period before his rulership, he already influenced the formation of the army by bending the military to his hand. He relied entirely on the military and he based

his legitimacy on his control of this institution. This made it possible for him to establish a usurper regime and because this way of influencing the military, Uganda developed a different military regime than Nigeria.

 After his rulership, the new governments have never left this strategy. Nowadays, the military is influenced by the administration of Museveni and is always an important factor for the government in Uganda. Therefore, I believe that the politics in Uganda rely for a great deal on the military in terms of legitimacy. The military regime differs from the regime in Nigeria because of the vulnerability of the composition of the army and thus result in a lower level of legitimacy.

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