

Translating the Subtle Powers of English

A Study of Ideological Triggers in English Syntactic Structures
and Their Translations to Dutch

MA Thesis Linguistics – Translation in Theory and Practice

W.I.Heezen

Supervisor: P.H. Dol

Second reader: K.L. Zeven

30 May 2016

To Isabel and Fabio

Abstract

This thesis aims to compile a collection of descriptive guidelines for the translation of ideological syntactic structures in texts from English to Dutch. The notion that there "is not (...) any possibility that any discourse is free of ideas, and thus of ideology" (Jeffries 8) has prompted the ambition to choose texts that demonstrate the subtle powers of English and Dutch. These hidden forces are manifested in conscious or unconscious linguistic choices which lead to implicit ideological conveyance. There are numerous studies on ideology in texts, and many cultural or socio-political linguistic, or purely linguistic models of analysis have been developed over the past decades. However, little research has been done on the actual translation of implicit ideology in texts and its potential, yet concealed, manipulation of the reader. On the basis of Jeffries' Critical Stylistics model a set of linguistic tools will be applied on a corpus of English op-ed articles and analysed to identify their ideological influence on the text, only including socio-political or contextual analysis to a small extent. This largely linguistic approach enables subsequent analysis of the techniques that have been used to translate the ideological structures in these articles. By means of Vinay and Darbelnet's model of direct and oblique translation (Munday 86), and the translation procedures they comprise, this thesis ultimately intends to serve as a stimulus to set guidelines for the translation of ideological syntactic structures from English to Dutch.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	1
List of Abbreviations	2
Chapter 1 Introduction	3
1.1 Ideology and Language	3
1.2 Ideology and Translation	4
1.3 The Aim and Structure of this Work	5
1.4 Methodology and Corpus	7
Chapter 2 Justification	10
2.1 Critical Stylistics	10
2.2 Vinay and Darbelnet's Taxonomy	11
Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework for Text Analysis and Dutch Checklist	12
3.1 Critical Stylistics - Lesley Jeffries' Linguistic Model	12
3.2 Critical Stylistics and the Aim of this Thesis.	13
3.3 Checklist Nederlandse Stijlmiddelen	14
Chapter 4 Theoretical Framework for Translation Analysis	15
4.1 Literal versus Free translation	15
4.2 Vinay and Darbelet's Taxonomy	16
4.3 The Translation Procedures and the Aim of this Thesis	17
4.3.1 Direct Translation Procedures	18
4.3.2 Oblique Translation	19
4.3.3 The Role of the Procedures in the Analysis	21
Chapter 5 Naming and Describing	22
5.1 Noun Modification	23
5.2 Translating Noun Modification	26
5.3 Nominalization	28

5.4	Translating Nominalization	30
5.5	Conclusion	33
Chapter 6 Equating and Contrasting		34
6.1	Equating	35
6.2	Translating Equation	36
6.3	Contrasting	39
6.4	Negated Opposition	40
6.5	Translating Negated Opposition	40
6.6	Replacive Opposition	41
6.7	Translating Replacive Opposition	41
6.8	Concessive Opposition	43
6.9	Translating Concessive Opposition	44
6.10	Contrastives	45
6.11	Translating Contrastives	46
6.12	Conclusion	47
Chapter 7 Prioritizing		48
7.1	Typical Information Structure (Final -Focus)	49
7.2	Translating Typical Information Structure (Final- Focus)	50
7.3	The Option to Use Fronting or Cleft Constructions	53
7.4	Translating Cleft Constructions	54
7.5	The Possibility to Transfer a Sentence from Active to Passive	56
7.6	Translating the Passive	56
7.7	The potential for Subordination	57
7.8	Translating Subordination	59
7.9	Conclusion	61
Chapter 8 Negating		62
8.1	Syntactic Negation	63
8.2	Translating Syntactic Negation	64
8.3	Conclusion	66
Chapter 9 Jeffries' other Linguistic Practices		67

Translating the Subtle Powers of English	Heezen
9.1 Representing Actions/Events/States	67
9.2 Exemplifying and Enumerating	68
9.3 Implying and Assuming	69
9.4 Hypothesizing	69
9.5 Presenting the Speech and Thoughts of other Participants	70
9.6 Representing Time, Space and Society	70
Chapter 10 Conclusion	71
Bibliography	74
Appendix 1 Corpus	78
Appendix 2 Source Texts	95
Appendix 3 Target Texts	106

Acknowledgements

Thank you,

Christien de Leeuw, mama	For being the example in my life: <i>Never ever give up.</i>
Marten Heezen, papa †	<i>You were given brains, use them.</i>
Jacques and Ineke Noordhuizen	For your continuous practical support, and faith in me.
Rick Noordhuizen	For your implicit faith and heartening matter-of-course intention to read this work.
Philomeen Dol	For your encouraging support and useful feedback.
Katinka Zeven	For academic teaching and second reading.
Dittie Bakker	For continuously expressing absolute belief in my capacity to complete this.
Juliette van de Quast-Groen	For being my ideological sparring partner at all times.
Jan Kalter	For being there in the background, also for my mother.
Cies Pierot	Just what I needed for the final sprint.
Hans Steketee	For help in my search for suitable articles and their translations.
Isabel and Fabio	For being my dedicatees.

List of Abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CE	Common Era
SL	Source language (English)
ST	Source Text (English)
OV	Object Verb
VO	Verb Object
TL	Target Language (Dutch)
TT	Target Text (Dutch)

Italicised in this work (except for titles) are:

- Jeffries linguistic practices
- Translation strategies
- Translation procedures
- Names of sources other than those quoted or rephrased.
- Names of theoretical Frameworks

Capitalised (the first letter) in this work are:

- The Names for the syntactic tools used to identify ideological triggers

Chapter 1 Introduction

- 1.1 Ideology and Language
- 1.2 Ideology and Translation
- 1.3 The Aim and Structure of this Work
- 1.4 Methodology and Corpus

1.1 Ideology and Language

Before expanding on ideological triggers in syntactic structures it may be good to attempt a definition of *ideology*. Introducing ideology in a universal sense, however, is a challenge to which I have not been able to rise. In my search for reference works on ideology, with which I hoped to create a concise and general description on the concept, I was led to the farthest corners of politics, social sciences, philosophy, linguistics, and other scientific and unscientific studies. And though this experience in itself may typify the ambiguous definition of ideology, I confined myself to the field of linguistics for reasons that may be apparent. For the practical purpose of this thesis it should suffice to assume that, in general, ideology is a set of political, cultural, and social values and beliefs (Carter, Nash 21). If we take this theory to the familiar surroundings of language we can also assume that language can carry ideology (Jeffries 5). In fact, we may even assume that language always carries ideology. This idea is confirmed largely in linguistic literature. Boogaarts asserts that language is never neutral (18) while Blommaerts argues that our language performance is always rooted in social and cultural assumptions about what we do and try to achieve with it (42). He illustrates this by refuting the claim that language use in science is naturally objective. He states that even scientific language use is based on definitions and conventions that are socially and culturally entrenched, and that continuously shift according to the character of an era (43). Lakoff and Johnson have devoted a chapter to what they call “the myths” of objectivism and, hence, subjectivism:

In Western culture as a whole, objectivism is by far the greater potentate, claiming to rule, at least nominally, the realms of science, law, government, journalism, morality, business, economics, and scholarship. But, as we have argued, objectivism is a myth (189).

If we assume that language use is always a reflection of subjective perspectives, then we may equally consider all texts to reflect “the writer’s attitudes, beliefs and viewpoints or more generally, the values and taken-for-granted assumptions of a social group or culture” (Puurтинен 53). This implies that a writer has a most powerful tool at hand in conveying ideology, all the more since the communication with his readership is one-way. He can lead the ignorant reader in any ideological direction. The awareness of the power of language has existed since Aristotle, or maybe even longer, and much has been published on its analysis from all possible angles in the linguistic field. Recently, there has been an increasing trend in the publication of language books for less linguistically versed readers (e.g. Boogaart, Leith, Pinker, Blommaert, Steenmeijer). Their aim includes the rise of awareness of the reversed influence of ideology in language, in other words, how language is able to not just express but also subtly manipulate our values and beliefs. That tendency has inspired me to initiate my own scrutiny of the subtle powers of language, which has eventually led to this thesis. Of particular interest to me then is the relationship between ideology and translation. The next section (1.2) is concerned with how these two relate.

1.2 Ideology and Translation

If we assume that a writer has powerful tools at hand in the conveyance of ideology we may assume that a translator’s instruments are just as powerful. Puurтинен affirms that both writer and translator have the possibility to create certain perspectives by making certain linguistic choices. These choices reflect or even reinforce the writer’s opinions and attitude, and may be used to influence those of the reader (2). She distinguishes between explicit (I think X must do Y) and implicit ideology which is subconscious and generally accepted. The latter category is more difficult to unveil, and hence for the reader more difficult to become aware of. In translation, the ideologically motivated linguistic choices may be manipulated unintentionally

or intentionally as well. Unintentional manipulation may be caused “by inadequate language and/or translation skills or insufficient knowledge of the relationship between the language and ideology” while intentional manipulation may be swayed by various impulses such as “translation norms, requirements of the translation commission or the translator’s own attitudes towards the source text subject” (Puurтинен 55). To avoid unintentional discrepancies between ideological encoding in the ST and TT, the translator may wish to use a model of analysis to decode it. Linguistic models that have gradually made their way into text analysis as well as into translation in the last few decades include those of Critical Discourse Analysis (Munday Chapter 8.5). Chapter 2 of this work briefly discusses this discipline as it is the breeding ground for the Critical Stylistics model that is the starting point for my thesis and that serves as a framework in which my ST and TT analysis is conducted.

1.3 The Aim and Structure of this Work

The aim of this work is to uncover ideological triggers in syntactic structures in English texts, to compare their effects to those in the Dutch translations, and to describe the translation procedures that have been or may be applied. The basic principle is that the textual triggers in the ST should be of syntactic and ‘covert’ nature, and be challenging from a translator’s point of view. In order to draw conclusions my analysis is conducted on a corpus of five English op-ed articles. The corpus and the methodological procedure I followed are elucidated in the next section 1.4. The theoretical framework for text analysis on syntactic structures and their ideological character is based on Lesley Jeffries’ model of *Critical Stylistics*. The framework used for translation analysis is based on *Vinay and Darbelnet’s taxonomy*. The choice for these frameworks is upheld in chapter 2 while a description of both is given in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The description of the theoretical reference used for TT analysis in Dutch is included in chapter 3, where Critical Stylistics as a theoretical framework is discussed, as it is merely used as an inventory of acknowledged syntactic structures in Dutch and as such not a framework for analysis. For the purpose of a clear outline of this work I will give a foretaste here of Jeffries’ *Critical Stylistics* model:

To uncover ideological structures in texts, Jeffries provides a set of ten linguistic fields whose names suggest possible answers to the question of what a text is ‘doing’ (Jeffries 15). I have selected four of Jeffries’ linguistic fields that are relevant within the scope of this work:

- *Naming and Describing*
- *Equating and Contrasting*
- *Prioritizing*
- *Negating*

Chapter 3.2 elaborates on why these four seem most relevant. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 cover the detailed analysis of each of these linguistic practices linked to syntactic structures and translation procedures, while chapter 9 very briefly describes each of Jeffries' remaining linguistic fields that have not been used in this work but may nonetheless be interesting for future studies. Chapter 10 takes up the conclusion drawn in reference to the theory and the analyses.

In view of the preliminary explanation, this work will be structured as follows:

Chapter 1	Introduction
Chapter 2	Justification
Chapter 3	Theoretical Framework for Text Analysis and Dutch Checklist
Chapter 4	Theoretical Framework for Translation Analysis
Chapter 5	Naming and Describing
Chapter 6	Equating and Contrasting
Chapter 7	Prioritizing
Chapter 8	Negating
Chapter 9	Jeffries' other Linguistic Practices
Chapter 10	Conclusion

The subsequent section (1.4) explains in more detail how the corpus and the frameworks have been used for analysis in this work, and how the analysis is structured in the chapters.

1.4 Methodology and Corpus

Methodology

To analyse texts and their linguistic practices Jeffries model of *Critical Stylistics* distinguishes ten different fields of textual behaviour, which are outlined in chapter 3 and expounded on further in chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. In order to be able to decode these linguistic practices Jeffries relates several syntactic tools for linguistic analysis to these fields. In chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8, I start with an overview of the function, form and effect of the respective syntactic tools linked to each of the four selected linguistic fields from Jeffries' model (see chapter 1.3). Each tool is illustrated by examples from the corpus. I then consider the use of the structure as an ideological device in Dutch, compare the English examples to their translations in Dutch, and identify possible deviations between ST and TT that may lead to a different effect in the conveyance of ideology. If it comes to that, I may also provide a reverse translation or an alternative translation to illustrate different impact. Lastly I comment on the translation procedure that has been used, to define whether it was obligatory or optional, and to consider its general usability for the translation of the respective syntactic structure. The analysis should reveal the employability of the selected practices and their corresponding syntactic triggers for text analysis on ideology in both ST and TT and may consequently lead to conclusions about the translator's influence in the transference of ideology in the TT by using certain translation procedures.

Corpus

To build a corpus for my research I initially wanted to collect English news articles that had been translated to Dutch. The idea was that these would be useful to scrutinize on hidden ideology. However, during my search for left-wing or right-wing newspaper articles I learned that hardly any newspaper articles are literally translated before being published. Newspapers normally republish news from the *Associated Press* in their own words and for their own target readers. As the aim of this thesis is to look at ideology in source texts and their pure translations, the use of news articles was therefore no longer an option. Instead, my corpus is a collection of op-ed articles initially published on the website *Project Syndicate*, with one exception of text 4 (Je suis Charlie? It's a bit late) which was published on the website of the particular article's author. All articles were translated for the Dutch left-wing newspaper *De Volkskrant* by four different translators. On the next page I have listed in order of appearance

the titles of the original article, their writers, the Dutch title, the translator's name (if known) and the date of publication.

1. After Paris	Richard Haass	16 Nov. 2015
Na Parijs	Melle Trap	16 Nov. 2015
2. Executing Foreign Policy	Richard Haass	29 Dec. 2015
Niet akkoorden zelf, maar uitvoering is cruciaal	Menno Grootveld	5 Jan. 2016
3. Life after Schengen	Bill Emmott	1 Oct. 2015
Het leven na Schengen wordt grenzeloos beter	Unknown	8 Oct. 2015
4. Je suis Charlie? It's a bit late	Kenan Malik	8 Jan. 2015
Met zelfcensuur help je minderheden juist niet	Leo Reijnen	10 Jan. 2015
5. David Cameron's Europe	Carl Bildt	9 May 2015
Camerons zege kan EU nieuwe impuls geven.	Menno Grootveld	12 May 2015

All writers are native users of English with the exception of Carl Bildt whose mother tongue is Swedish. The translators are all native users of Dutch. The translator whose name is not known prefers to have his translations published anonymously.

The original text by Kenan Malik (text 4) does not entirely equate with the translation that was published in the *Volkskrant*. I contacted the translator, Leo Reijnen, who said that it was exactly this article that he had been sent to translate, and that modifications are always on account of the writer. He referred me to the editor of the particular section, Kustaw Bessems, who explained that in that very hectic week, shortly after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the writer Kenan Malik was asked by several media to submit an op-ed article. He did so, but under great time pressure. He may afterwards have altered and added text to the initial version before he eventually published it on his own blog. This explains the differences between the ST and TT. The original version that was sent to the *Volkskrant* could unfortunately not be retrieved. For completeness and accuracy I have listed the differences on the next page:

List of the differences in ST 4 and TT 4

Sentences 15 – 28 ST	are not in the TT (italicised in the ST)
Sentences 29 – 36 ST	are 60 – 71 TT
Sentences 37 – 44 ST	are 97 – 107 TT
Sentences 45 – 54 ST	are 73 – 85 TT
Sentences 55 – 62 ST	are 107 – 116 TT
Sentences 22 – 60 TT	are not in the ST (italicised in TT)
Sentences 87 – 97 TT	are not in the ST (italicised in TT)

The examples that I have used from this text are all numbered according to this order.

Chapter 2 Justification

2.1 Critical Stylistics

2.2 Vinay and Darbelnet's taxonomy

2.1 Critical Stylistics

To conduct my ST analysis I have used part of Lesley Jeffries' model of *Critical Stylistics*. In this chapter I will explain why I have chosen for this model, how it is related to, and, at the same time, a clear step away from CDA. This chapter is also concerned with the explanation of the framework's name *Critical Stylistics*.

Over the past few decades theories of text analysis and translation have developed from a linguistic to a more functional approach. This change was related to the growth of discourse analysis in applied linguistics (Munday). Linguistic models that have been employed in translation since then include those from *critical discourse analysis*. Fairclough (26) distinguishes three stages of CDA:

- Description is the stage which is concerned with formal properties of the text.
- Interpretation is concerned with the relationship between text and interaction.
- Explanation is concerned with the relationship between interaction and social context.

According to Jeffries it is the stage of 'explanation' that has been the predominant area of interest in CDA literature so far, while he is more interested in a combination of the first two stages, connecting textual properties to interaction. He does, however, deny that his model is a return to "an outdated view on how meanings arise from texts" (8) and hastens to mention that he does, in fact, agree with Fairclough who states that "while it is true that the forms and content of texts do bear the imprint of (...) ideological processes and structures, it is not possible to 'read off' ideologies from texts" (qt in Jeffries 8). Jeffries' model of *Critical Stylistics*, however, is based on the assumption that it is "possible to separate out some of the ideologies that a text *constructs* (or reinforces) and the assimilation of those ideologies (or their rebuttal) by readers" (Jeffries 8). With this the first part of the name for his model

Critical Stylistics seems justified as the word *Critical* represents the ideological focus. The second component *Stylistics* is claimed appropriate because it indicates that his model is of a more linguistic nature while CDA has seen a shift away from textual analysis. The term *Stylistics* should cover the focal point on the choices of a text producer (Jeffries 2).

My discovery of Jeffries' book was a moment of sheer happiness. At the time I was walking around in circles trying to find a model of analysis that would fit my stylistic and 'text analytic' preference, yet respecting the 'ideological beyond'. The multidisciplinary nature of CDA does not allow for analysis on micro-level and does not provide a framework of univocal syntactic triggers. The syntactic framework that Jeffries' model displays, on the other hand, seems a solid foundation for text analysis on concealed ideological ideas in syntactic structures, as is illustrated in detail in the chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.

2.2 Vinay and Darbelnet's Taxonomy

The model for translation analysis that Vinay and Darbelnet developed in the 1950s ties in with the syntactic approach of this work. Although it was based on comparative stylistics of French and English its "influence has been much wider" (Munday 86). Like Jeffries' model it can serve as a technical framework for analysis. It is based on the assumption that "with a better understanding of the rules governing the transfer from one language to another, we would arrive at an ever-increasing number of unique solutions" (Vinay, Darbelnet 8). Based on the identification of actual techniques that a translator uses, they defined a set of linguistic procedures that are commonly used in translation. These procedures are all related to certain structural or semantic changes, forming a framework for linguistic analysis. An outline of the most common procedures is given in chapter 4. 3. My hypothesis is that each unique syntactic structure in the ST can be coupled with one or more particular translation procedures so as to create a similar structure in the TT. By observing these connections the translator may be more likely to recognise certain ideological triggers and by applying the most plausible procedure more likely to construct a syntactic structure with an equivalent ideological trigger in the TT. For the purpose of this work it seemed a very suitable model as it allows for micro-level analysis. It distinguishes between several syntactic and semantic procedures rather than adopting an overall translation approach and with that it meets the same stylistic and text analytic principles as Jeffries' *Critical Stylistics* model (chapter 2.1) used in this work.

Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework for Text Analysis and Dutch Checklist

- 3.1 Critical Stylistics - Lesley Jeffries' linguistic model
- 3.2 Critical Stylistics and the aim of this thesis.
- 3.3 Checklist Nederlandse stijlmiddelen

3.1 Critical Stylistics - Lesley Jeffries' Linguistic Model

This chapter describes the general principles of *Critical Stylistics* (3.1) while the subsequent section (3.2) is concerned with how *Critical Stylistics* is related to the aim of this work.

As explained in chapter 1.3, Jeffries' model to uncover ideological structures in texts is based on ten linguistic fields whose names suggest possible answers to the question of what a text is 'doing' (Jeffries 15). While in chapter 1.3 I only outlined the four relevant fields for this work, I have included the exhaustive list in this chapter. Jeffries suggests that the following linguistic practices may be found texts:

1. *Naming and Describing*
2. *Representing Actions/Events/States*
3. *Equating and Contrasting*
4. *Exemplifying and Enumerating*
5. *Prioritizing*
6. *Assuming and Implying*
7. *Negating*
8. *Hypothesizing*
9. *Presenting the Speech and Thoughts of other Participants*
10. *Representing Time, Space and Society*

To this relatively "untechnical" labelling Jeffries links certain lexical or grammatical features. However, he asserts that with this rather conceptual approach readers get an immediate idea of the kind of information they contend with, and can relate technical aspects accordingly.

Besides that, he maintains that the lack of what he calls ‘form-function mapping’ (16) leaves room for any particular lexical or grammatical feature to fit in the category. He exemplifies by pointing out that modality in English for example is typically associated with modal verbs (may, might, should, etc), but that it may equally be achieved in other lexical ways (modal adjectives, modal main verbs), or even by certain intonation patterns, or body language for that matter. By categorising his tools according to text behaviour rather than to form and function he acknowledges that they differ in formal range, but nonetheless balance between formal and functional facets of language. He refers to Simpson to sustain his intention:

Like Simpson, then, I am concerned with stylistic choices, and the textual analysis which can illuminate the choices that a text producer has made whether consciously or not. This is not a recipe for understanding the full impact of a text on a reader, because the background and experience of the reader will inform that impact. However, it is worth repeating that texts do indeed have some ideological content which may influence the reader (or not) in a range of ways, and the tools in this book are provided to help the reader discover that ideological content. (Jeffries 16)

As we proceed our journey through the model, we will find that it offers us a set of “constraints and pressures on textual choices” (87) rather than separate categories according to which we can analyse an utterance independently.

3.2 Critical Stylistics and the Aim of this Thesis.

In chapter 1.3 I argued that not all of the linguistic practices and tools that Jeffries’ model offers are equally useful for the purpose of this thesis, to analyse features in texts that may or may not have an ideological effect. The eventual intention of this work is to collect a set of tools for the translation of linguistic structures that implicitly convey ideology, and prior analysis of the source text on ideological features specifically. Some of these features appear to be more common than others in the TL, and have close equivalents. In order to make this work feasible for both reader and writer I will confine my analysis of the ST to syntactic structures rather than semantic or pragmatic elements. Some of Jeffries’ linguistic practices

are therefore less relevant for my research as they overlap considerably with one of these or both disciplines. As stated in chapter 1.3 the basic principle for my research is that the textual triggers for ideology should be of syntactic and ‘covert’ nature, and challenging from a translator’s point of view. I have examined each tool with this principle in mind, and reflected on them accordingly in chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 with the last chapter covering all linguistic practices that have not been used including a brief description and an explanation as to why they have not been included in this work.

3.3 Checklist Nederlandse Stijlmiddelen

As Dutch stylistic analysis has only recently begun to develop, models of Jeffries’ type do not yet exist in the TL. To compare the syntactic triggers to those in Dutch I used Verhagen’s *Checklist Nederlandse Stijlmiddelen*. He has based his list on Leech and Short’s checklist in their linguistic introduction to prose *Style and Fiction* (61). I only used this checklist to compare Jeffries’ linguistic tools to Dutch counterparts if relevant. Along with Verhagen’s checklist I have used Aarts and Wekker’s *A contrastive grammar of English and Dutch* and Renkema’s *Schrijfwijzer* as a reference for Dutch syntactic structures.

Chapter 4 Theoretical Framework for Translation Analysis

4.1 Literal versus Free translation

4.2 Vinay and Darbelet's taxonomy

4.3 The translation procedures and the aim of this thesis

4.3.1 Direct Translation procedures

4.3.2 Oblique Translation

4.1 Literal versus Free Translation

Until the second half of the twentieth century debates on translation were centred around two general approaches of translation: literal versus free translation. While literal translation follows the ST as closely as possible in terms of form, the free approach takes over the sense of the ST (Munday). This distinction between capturing and reproducing the sense of a text as opposed to the literal method of staying close to the original words, syntax and ideas of the ST was introduced by St. Jerome in 395 CE. He coined the terms word-for-word and sense-for-sense translation, creating two poles around which most theories about translation have been based ever since. In 1680 John Dryden divided translation approaches into three categories: metaphrasing (word-for-word), paraphrasing (words less strictly followed), and imitating (very free). These approaches were still based on St. Jerome's theories (Munday 41). Almost three centuries later Eugene Nida developed the orientations of formal equivalence and dynamic or functional equivalence. The first orients on keeping the message in form while the second is concerned with maintaining the relationship between message and receptor (Munday 66). Although Nida's concepts were less sterile than the earlier ideas, they could still be reduced to literal versus free translation. Later theories were increasingly concerned with functional approaches, elaborating on Nida's equivalence theory, until gradually the scope was widened to discourse, text, and register analysis approaches. For my contrastive analysis of syntactic triggers of ideology the more literal approach is most interesting as that starts from the idea that a translator should look at micro-level (word and sentence) first. This factor makes Vinay and Darbelet's significant model for the analysis of translation particularly suitable for this work as it is based on the notion that literal translation should be aspired at all times, and solely be forsaken if grammatical, syntactic, or pragmatic

reasons require so (Munday 87). Their description of the several approaches and techniques are explained in chapter 4.2 following this section.

4.2 Vinay and Darbelet's Taxonomy

In the 1960s Jean-Paul Vinay and Jean Darbelnet carried out a comparative stylistic analysis of French and English. Their analysis led to a distinction between translation strategies and translation procedures. While a strategy characterizes the overall orientation of a translator towards the ST or the TT (e.g. free versus literal), a procedure is the actual technique that a translator uses. Based on their analysis Vinay and Darbelnet classified two strategies which they called *direct* and *oblique* translation (Vinay, Darbelnet 31). Like most strategies these evolved from the literal and free approaches respectively. Subsequently, they claimed that there were seven most commonly used procedures that a translator adopts. These procedures were categorized according to their *direct* or *oblique* translation orientation and have been listed in the subsequent section 4.3.

Additionally, Vinay and Darbelnet described two more influential factors that play a role in a translator's decision. They referred to these features as *servitude* and *option* (15). The concept of *servitude* corresponds to obligatory changes in a text due to incompatibilities in the ST and TT. The second factor *option* refers to the possibility for a translator to deviate from a *literal translation*, even when this is not necessary. They considered this freedom to be the translator's main concern as according to them the option to choose from an array of possibilities to express the nuances of the message, was the "realm of stylistics" (Munday 91). In my analysis of translation procedures in my corpus I have also included these strategies if relevant, as the translator's decision to change text may indeed lead to different ideological conveyance as can be seen in the next section 4.3 as well as in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.

4.3 The Translation Procedures and the Aim of this Thesis

Like Vinay and Darbelnet I have divided the seven procedures according to their *direct* or *oblique* character. The lists as exemplified in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 contain the most important techniques that Vinay and Darbelnet describe. There are a number of other less common techniques that could be added to this model. However, for the purpose of my analysis they are less relevant and have not been added here. One technique that is not grouped under Vinay and Darbelnet's seven most common procedures, but should be mentioned is *amplification*, the use of more words in the TL, often because of syntactic expansion (Vinay, Darbelnet 192). An example of this technique is:

the charge against him → the charge brought against him (Munday 89)

I mention it here for completeness and accuracy as it is a technique that is referred to in chapter 6.2, 6.6 and 7.4 as a procedure that was applied to translate Equation, Replacive Opposition and Cleft Structure respectively.

The procedures I expect to be used most often for the translation of syntactic triggers of ideology in my corpus are: *literal translation*, *transposition* and *modulation*. The *literal translation procedure* is the literal rendering of a structure and may be essential to analyse when, due to this procedure, (part of) the ideological conveyance is lost. *Transposition* refers to a change in word class, or *part of speech* as Vinay and Darbelnet call it (36) while *modulation* is a translation procedure that causes semantic or pragmatic change. These two are especially interesting to analyse as they may involve an intentional decision of the translator. While I expect to find that many syntactic structures are translated by applying *literal translation*, I anticipate that when a *transposition* or *modulation* has taken place in the TT there will be more reason for close scrutiny, as deviations in structure or semantics between the ST and the TT may influence the ideological undertone. Since semantic changes are beyond the scope of this work my focal point is *transposition* only identifying *modulations* if they influence objectivity. Although Vinay and Darbelnet have listed several specific categories for transposition and modulation (Munday 88), I have decided not to include the lists in this chapter, and only refer to explicit techniques if relevant. It must be

noted that when literal translation is referred to in this paper it applies to the syntactic structure as a tool only and not to the separate constituents in the syntactic feature.

4.3.1 Direct Translation Procedures

Vinay and Darbelnet make a distinction between *direct* and *oblique* translation procedures which “hark back to the ‘literal vs free’ division” (Munday 86), which was discussed in chapter 4.1. The three procedures that they group under *direct translation* are:

Borrowing

The SL word is not translated but directly transferred to the TL usually because there is no translation for it in the TL (e.g. perestroika, sushi). Often the word becomes fully integrated in the TL.

Calque

The expression or structure in the SL is literally translated to the TL (e.g. ‘meesterstuk’ in Dutch became ‘masterpiece’ in English, or ‘blue blood’ from ‘sangre azul’ in Spanish). Calques often become fully integrated in the TT, albeit sometimes with semantic change (‘handy’ in German, for ‘cell phone’)

Literal translation

This word-for-word translation should be the basic principle for a translator according to Vinay and Darbelnet. They describe it as the most common translation procedure between languages of the same family (like English and Dutch). Below an invented example:

He	bought	the books	and	left	the shop
Hij	kocht	de boeken	en	verliet	de winkel.

4.3.2 Oblique Translation

When literal translation is not possible Vinay and Darbelnet suggest another four procedures that may be applied, which they classify as *oblique translation* procedures (Munday 87). They are listed in this chapter and, when possible, illustrated by examples from the corpus.

Transposition

Vinay and Darbelnet see this as the most common procedure that translators apply in case of a grammatical, syntactic, or pragmatic incorrectness of a *literal translation*. *Transposition* involves a structural change of one part of speech for another without changing the sense:

A) But any successor government must be able to maintain order and not permit the Islamic State to exploit a power vacuum, as it has done in Libya.	Lines 26-28	Text 1	Maar welke regering hier ook op volgt , deze moet in staat zijn om de orde te bewaren en de Islamitische Staat niet zoals in Libië toestaan een machtsvacuüm te benutten.	Lines 36-37
---	----------------	-----------	--	----------------

B) British withdrawal would likely inspire similar moves in other countries, with the risk that the EU, already weakened, might begin to fragment	Lines 42-44	Text 5	Integendeel, een Brits vertrek zou vermoedelijk de inspiratiebron zijn voor soortgelijke bewegingen in andere landen, met het risico dat de EU, die toch al verzwakt is, uit elkaar zou kunnen vallen.	Lines 66-68
---	----------------	-----------	---	----------------

As shown in the examples the *transposition* may include a change from adjective to verb (A) or a verb changing into a noun phrase (B). Vinay and Darbelnet classify at least ten different categories of *transposition* (Vinay, Darbelnet 36).

This is one of the two most interesting procedures for my analysis as shifts in translation on this level may sometimes interfere with the author's ideological intentions behind syntactic choices. As my analysis is based on the assumption that syntactic structures may trigger ideological ideas, it is an important procedure to identify in my comparative analysis. To illustrate this we may want to consider example B again after we have discussed the tool of Noun Modification in chapter 5.3 and 5.4.

Modulation

Vinay and Darbelnet group all changes regarding semantics and point of view under this procedure. They claim that modulation is justified if a translation that results in a grammatically correct utterance is considered “unsuitable, unidiomatic or awkward in the TL” (Vinay, Darbelnet 36). As with *transposition*, they discern between obligatory (example A) and optional (example B) *modulation*. In the following examples the *modulations* are in bold:

A) It is the free movement of people, not border-free travel, that forms an essential component of the EU.	45-46	3	Het vrije verkeer van personen, niet reizen zonder grenzen, is de essentiële component in de EU.	57-58
--	-------	---	---	-------

In example A, the verb has been changed because a *literal translation* of the English ‘forms’ to the Dutch word ‘vormt’ would in this context not collocate with the word ‘component’ in Dutch. Therefore, the translator must apply obligatory *modulation*, changing the point of view by replacing a lexical verb with a copula. Conversely, the following example (B) is one in which the *modulation* was not necessarily obligatory:

B) A diplomatic component is no less essential to any response	25	1	Een diplomatieke component is voor elke respons net zo van belang	34
--	----	---	--	----

The *modulation* that the translator has applied here is called ‘negation of opposite’ by Vinay and Darbelnet (Munday 88). By changing ‘no less’ into a more positive ‘net zo’ (equally as) a shift in point of view has been created. The translator has chosen not to translate ‘no less’ with the literal ‘niet minder’. We will see in our analysis of Jeffries’ tools that it is exactly in these situations that the translator may intentionally or unintentionally ignore or alter possible deliberate choices. Interestingly, Jeffries ranges this particular procedure under syntactic triggers to convey ideology, while Vinay and Darbelnet group it under ‘semantics’. In my comparative analysis in chapter 8.2 I explain why this may nonetheless be a relevant procedure in this work.

Equivalence (as a procedure, not a strategy or orientation)

This procedure is mostly used for the translation of idioms and proverbs which are often impossible to translate literally:

There's no place like home.
Zoals het klokje thuis tikt, tikt het nergens.

Adaptation

This procedure involves the change of cultural reference. Vinay and Darbelnet use the example of a game of cricket in England which will most likely not have the same connotation as in the Netherlands and had therefore better be translated by football, or hockey.

4.3.3 The Role of the Procedures in the Analysis

In the next chapters (5-8) the four linguistic practices that I have selected from Jeffries' *Critical Stylistics* model are discussed by analysing the corresponding syntactic structures that Jeffries classifies as possible ideological triggers. First, the forms, functions and effects of the syntactic structures are illustrated by means of the examples from the English texts in the corpus. Then these structures are compared to their Dutch counterparts. Finally, the translation procedure that has led to the translation is analysed in relation to *direct* or *oblique* strategy, *option* and *servitude*, and the translation technique used. Based on these analyses I hope to comment on the role of the translator in the ideological transfer from the SL to the TL.

Chapter 5 Naming and Describing

- 5.1 Noun modification
- 5.2 Translating Noun Modification
- 5.3 Nominalization
- 5.4 Translating Nominalization
- 5.5 Conclusion

This chapter analyses two of the linguistic tools associated with Jeffries' first practice *Naming and Describing* which roughly covers three linguistic tools (Jeffries 20):

- The choice of a noun to refer to an object (Connotation)
- The construction of a noun phrase or noun group that gives more details on the referent's nature. (Noun Modification)
- The act of nominalising a process or action which is otherwise typically represented by a verb. (Nominalization)

The first tool looks into the connotation a particular word choice may bring to mind. To a certain extent this is an arbitrary affair as what we perceive as the meaning of a word largely depends on conventions and our capability to interpret beyond those conventions. At first I intended to use this tool for analysis only when the choice of a noun clearly deviated from our frame of reference. Yet, after detailed analysis of all texts and their translations it appears that there is no such divergence. For this reason I have only included Noun Modification and Nominalization in my analysis, which are discussed in the subsequent sections 5.1 - 5.5.

5.1 Noun Modification

The second of Jeffries' tools distinguishes between modifications and propositions in a sentence. By constructing a noun group in which the head noun is embedded in a number of modifiers the embedding parts are often taken for granted by the reader whereas, in fact, they may still be open to debate. Jeffries calls this elaborate modification of nouns 'packaging up' (Jeffries 22), and claims they are not as susceptible to questioning as propositions are.

According to him the proposition in a sentence is conveyed by the syntactic structure: subject-predicator-object, in which the predicate is the verbalization process that defines the relationship between the participants in a sentence (Jeffries 23). Consider the following sentence:

If the accord enters into force, **it will** expand world trade, boost economic growth, and **strengthen the United States' ties with regional allies who would otherwise be tempted to move closer to China.** (Text 2, lines 12-14)

In this sentence I have highlighted the second proposition (S-P-O) which is: 'it (the accord) will strengthen the United States' ties with regional allies'. The reader is given the option to disagree with this statement or at least question it: 'Will it really strengthen ties with regional allies?'. Conversely, the post modifier of 'regional allies' which has been added as extra information about the allies is hardly arguable because it is not a clear proposition:

regional allies who would otherwise be tempted to move closer to China

While embedding 'regional allies', the post modifier (who...China) is itself an embedded assumption that is not up for discussion. Compare:

If the accord enters into force, **it will** expand world trade, boost economic growth, and **strengthen the United States' ties with regional allies. These allies would otherwise be tempted to move closer to China.**

I have altered the post modifier of the 'regional allies' into a proposition of its own. There is now a clear relation between subject, predicator, and subject attribute. The verbalization process is quite intensive, represented by 'would be', but nonetheless the reader is allowed some room to disagree with this assertion: 'I don't think the regional allies would necessarily be tempted to move closer to China' or 'what if they did, would that be a problem?'. The

effect of the packaging in the original sentence is that the reader takes for granted that if the US' ties with regional allies are not strengthened, they will move closer to China. Additionally, the reader is led to believe that this effect is undesirable.

Jeffries claims that a proposition is susceptible to debate because the reader is made aware of the relation between the participants (21). We have seen this to some extent in the example above. In order to thoroughly understand his claim I will strip another sentence from one of the texts all the way to the proposition:

The attacks in Paris by individuals associated with the Islamic State, coming on the heels of bombings in Beirut and the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula, reinforce the reality that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase. (Text1, lines 1-3)

The bold part in the example above is the subject of the sentence. It is realised by a noun phrase. The head noun of this noun phrase is: attacks. It is pre-modified by the definite article 'the' and post modified by a prepositional phrase (in Paris), another prepositional phrase (by individuals... State), and a relative clause containing more noun and prepositional phrases. Before we look at these constructions on phrase level I would like to continue with our sentence analysis first.

The **attacks** in Paris by individuals associated with the Islamic State, coming on the heels of bombings in Beirut and the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula, **reinforce** the reality that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase.

The predicator in the sentence is realised by the verb phrase 'reinforce'. It indicates the process or action that is taking place between the subject and possible objects. The direct object of this sentence is in bold face in the part below.

The attacks in Paris by individuals associated with the Islamic State, coming on the heels of bombings in Beirut and the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula, reinforce **the reality that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase.**

The direct object of the sentence is realised by another noun phrase with 'reality' as the head noun. Like the subject, the object's head noun is premodified and post modified by a number

of other constructions. Before we look at these, let us consider to what proposition we have actually stripped the sentence:

Attacks reinforce reality.

According to Jeffries' practice of *Naming* it is this proposition that leaves room for discussion. These three constituents convey the obvious message of the sentence. The modifiers that have been used to identify the subject and direct object function on a different level. As they are embedded within the structure of the noun phrase they are less easily arguable, and assumed to be facts. Chapter 7 of this work illustrates how this aspect of Noun Modification ties in with Subordination, a tool related to *Prioritizing*.

As for the subject in the example sentence, its post-modifier gives us some factual information about the suspects and about the circumstances (following two other attacks). We might not think it necessary to argue these facts (although I think the Paris attacks preceded the other two). The modifiers in the direct object, however, are a potential package with ideological ideas:

the **reality** that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase.
(text 1 line 3)

The head noun 'reality' is post modified by an appositive finite clause containing its own subject, predicator and direct object. If we look at the direct object of this clause we see that it is realised by a noun phrase with 'phase' as the head noun modified by the pre-modifiers 'new' and 'even more dangerous'. Where the first pre-modifier may not be up for discussion (as they were indeed an unprecedented form of attack in Europe), the second one is – though instinctively one might agree – not merely factual. Unconsciously it provokes anxiety with the reader, and because it is embedded in all these syntactic layers it is very difficult to question this subtly imposed feeling of uneasiness.

In chapter 7.7 and 7.8 we see that Noun Modification as a tool of *Naming and Describing* overlaps with Subordination, one of the tools of *Prioritizing*.

5.2 Translating Noun Modification

While much has been written on form and function of noun phrases in Dutch (Aarts; Broekhuis; Renkema), as well as on processing relative clauses (Mak), there is no literature on Noun Modification in Dutch as a means to express ideology. Even Verhagen does not identify Noun Modification as a stylistic device in his long *Checklist Nederlandse Stijlmiddelen*. The idea that “packaging” of information may potentially conceal ideology only floats to the surface in Dutch literature when embedded sentence structures are discussed (Aarts, Renkema, van Leeuwen), a tool that Jeffries classifies as *Prioritizing* by means of Subordination (chapter 7.7 and 7.8).

Looking at the instances of Noun Modification in my corpus, we will see that in most cases the translation of the post modifier in the TT is similar to that in the ST:

The attacks in Paris by individuals associated with the Islamic State, coming on the heels of bombings in Beirut and the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula , reinforce the reality that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase.	Lines 1-3	Text 1	De aanslagen in Parijs door individuen geassocieerd met de Islamitische Staat, vlak na bomaanslagen in Beirut en het neerhalen van een Russisch verkeersvliegtuig boven de Sinäi , versterken nog eens de realiteit dat de terrorismedreiging in een nieuwe en zelfs nog gevaarlijker fase terecht is gekomen.	Lines 2-5
---	--------------	-----------	---	--------------

A *literal translation* here has resulted in a similar effect in both ST and TT, as the modifier construction prevents the reader from querying the statement. The same applies to the next example:

If the accord enters into force, it will expand world trade, boost economic growth, and strengthen the United States' ties with regional allies who would otherwise be tempted to move closer to China .	Lines 12-14	Text 2	Als het akkoord van kracht wordt, zal het de wereldhandel doen groeien en de banden van de Verenigde Staten versterken met regionale bondgenoten die anders in de verleiding zouden komen dichter tegen China aan te kruipen	Lines 12-14
---	----------------	-----------	---	----------------

In both ST and TT ‘the allies’ is modified by a relative clause creating an embedded assumption that the reader is unlikely to question. The effect of a literal translation

To illustrate the difference in ideological conveyance I have included an example from my corpus of a post-modifier that was not translated as a post-modifier:

But Schengen makes this very difficult to enforce – a reality that plays further into the hands of the nationalists, who are keen to portray the EU as a burdensome obligation, rather than as a source of solutions or opportunities.	Lines 40-43	Text 3	Maar vanwege Schengen is dit bijzonder moeilijk uit te voeren - wat alweer door nationalisten kan worden misbruikt om de EU als een lastige verplichting af te schilderen in plaats van als bron voor oplossingen.	Lines 52-54	Reverse Translation But because of Schengen this is very difficult to enforce, which can again be misused by nationalists to portray the EU as a burdensome obligation instead of a source of solutions.
---	----------------	-----------	---	----------------	---

In the ST the description of ‘the nationalists’ is embedded in the noun phrase and hence less susceptible to debate (as shown below),

the nationalists, **who are keen** to portray the EU as a burdensome obligation,

The translator has applied a *transposition* changing the post modifier into a sub clause in the TT and with that transforming the sentence in the TT into a proposition, using the modal auxiliary ‘can’ which seems to leave even more room to argue the assertion:

which can again be misused by nationalists to portray the EU as a burdensome obligation instead of a source of solutions.

The strategy of *oblique translation* that the translator has used in the form of a *transposition* seems *optional*. An attempt to use a *literal translation procedure* shows that there may be an acceptable alternative:

But Schengen makes this very difficult to enforce – a reality that plays further into the hands of the nationalists, who are keen to portray the EU as a burdensome obligation, rather than as a source of solutions or opportunities.	Lines 40-43	Text 3	Maar vanwege Schengen is dit bijzonder moeilijk uit te voeren – een realiteit die de nationalisten, die erop gespitst zijn om de EU als een lastige verplichting af te schilderen in plaats van als bron voor oplossingen, in de hand speelt.	Lines 52-54
---	----------------	-----------	--	----------------

Although one might want to argue about the elegance of this sentence in Dutch, the ideological conveyance is kept intact more than in the original translation, as the "keenness of the nationalists" is no longer a proposition, and up for discussion, but rather an embedded assumption, no longer in dispute. Whether the translator has intentionally decided to flout the ideological trigger or unintentionally changed it for stylistic reasons we do not know. We might conclude, though, that a *literal* translation would have been more appropriate in terms of ideological equivalence.

5.3 Nominalization

Jeffries calls the third, and last, linguistic tool to detect deviant naming Nominalization. By nominalising a process, action, or event the actor can be left out. "Providing a name for an action or an event obscures agency, and hence the perpetrators' rationale and responsibility" (Richardson 203). This "obscuring of agency" can be used not only to shirk responsibility, but also to imply who is responsible. We can find an example in the following sentence:

The attacks in Paris by individuals associated with the Islamic State, coming on the heels of bombings in Beirut and **the downing** of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula, reinforce the reality that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase. (Text 1, line 3)

In the example above the actor that caused "the downing" has been left out. The reason may be that, at the time of writing, it was still not known who was responsible. Apart from the conciseness that this structure enhances, there may have been another, more ideological reason for the writer to leave it out. If we consider the preceding part in the sentence, we see that "the downing" is last in a list of three horrific incidents. The first incident is associated

with IS (the terrorist threat). By leaving out the agent with the other two incidents, it is implied that the same actor (IS) is responsible. In this way the writer has been able to substantiate his claim that the “terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase” enhancing the effect that the sentence seems to have: generating anxiety.

Another reason why a nominal is sometimes preferred to a process is that it can denote a certain state of permanence to a situation. By nominalising a verb, the reader is no longer entitled to “question, debate or comment upon the process” (Jeffries 25):

The agreement’s **entry into force**, though, is subject to ratification by most of the 12 signatories’ legislatures.

By nominalising the process of “entering into force” the dynamic element is left out. This creates a static, and less arguable unit. Compare the following sentence that appeared earlier in the same text:

If the accord **enters into force**, it will expand world trade, boost economic growth, and strengthen the United States’ ties with regional allies who would otherwise be tempted to move closer to China.

In this sentence the ‘entering’ is a process, which makes the situation less definite and still up for discussion or change. It seems that a same sort of mechanism is at work here as the one we noticed in effect earlier in Jeffries’ second linguistic practice of *naming*: Noun Modification. The effect of this type of Nominalisation is similar to that of “packaging”: it does not leave room to debate or reconsider the actual process.

Nominalisation may also be used when the mention of the actor is not necessary because he/she is referred to earlier in the text:

They, like the Schengen countries, cannot credibly say how many migrants are in their country, who these people are, or when they arrived. This **loss of control** matters, for two main reasons. (text 3 lines 32-33)

In this case, however, the use of Nominalization does not necessarily conceal ideology, but is used merely for stylistic reasons.

In my analysis I have only looked at Nominalisation if a process or event is covered because it is supposedly “embarrassing or ideologically uncomfortable” (Richardson 241) like the first two examples I gave. The effect of Nominalisation can be compared to that of the Passive voice, a tool that Jeffries has grouped under the practice of *prioritizing*. This tool is discussed in chapters 7.5 and 7.6.

5.4 Translating Nominalization

Like in English there are many productive processes in Dutch for the derivation of what Broekhuis calls deverbal nouns (Broekhuis 49). He distinguishes five most common processes which include infinitival Nominalization and morphological Nominalization. Yet, he observes that his list is by no means exhaustive (49). The effect that Nominalization may have in Dutch appears to be similar to that in English, judging from the amount of Dutch literature devoted to writing advices on the (non) use of Nominalization (van Leeuwen 60). Frequent use of nominalisation is assumed to contribute to abstraction and vagueness (Onrust 20). Compared to the use of verbalization, the action, when nominalised, is presented as a state or phenomenon rather than a process. As we saw in the first part of this section this leaves little room for debate. Hence we might expect the same effects from the use of nominalization in Dutch as we do in English.

If we look at the first example below we see that the translator has kept the nominalised form which in Dutch is created by a determiner and the infinitive of the verb (*neerhalen*). By doing so he has applied a *literal translation procedure*. He has maintained the same syntactic structure in the sentence and with that the same ideological intention:

The attacks in Paris by individuals associated with the Islamic State, coming on the heels of bombings in Beirut and the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula, reinforce the reality that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase.	Lines 1-3	Text 1	De aanslagen in Parijs door individuen geassocieerd met de Islamitische Staat, vlak na bomaanslagen in Beirut en het neerhalen van een Russisch verkeersvliegtuig boven de Sinaï, versterken nog eens de realiteit dat de terrorismedreiging in een nieuwe en zelfs nog gevaarlijker fase terecht is gekomen.	Lines 2-5
--	--------------	-----------	--	--------------

Both author and translator have nominalised the second and third incident listed while they mention an alleged agent (IS) in the beginning of the sentence, carrying an implication in both texts that the same actor is responsible for all incidents. Apart from the fact that this eventually appeared to be true, it may have been an intentional choice to use Nominalization here to enforce the sense of anxiety the author seems to want to create. In my next example we see that the translator has kept the nominalised construction, again by adding a determiner to the verbal expression:

The agreement's entry into force , though, is subject to ratification by most of the 12 signatories' legislatures.	Lines 15-16	Text 2	Het van kracht worden van de overeenkomst is echter afhankelijk van de ratificatie door de parlementen van de ondertekenende landen.	Lines 14-16
--	----------------	-----------	--	----------------

The translator has applied the *literal translation procedure* and with that maintained a similar effect. Earlier we concluded that the static effect of the nominalization in this example is quite dominant. Note that I have indicated in bold another instance of Nominalization which creates an even more static, less arguable effect. To illustrate the difference with the verbalized alternative I have rewritten both ST and TT. The actions expressed by means of verbs not only create a livelier text, but also one that we may want to ask questions about:

The agreement's entry into force , though, is subject to ratification by most of the 12 signatories' legislatures. Verbalized Alternative: However, most of the 12 signatories' legislatures have to ratify the agreement before it can enter into force .	Lines 15-16	Text 2	Het van kracht worden van de overeenkomst is echter afhankelijk van de ratificatie door de parlementen van de ondertekenende landen. Verbalized Alternative: De parlementen van de ondertekende landen moeten de overeenkomst echter ratificeren voordat ze van kracht kan gaan .	Lines 14-16
---	----------------	-----------	---	----------------

In both languages the consequence of the more dynamic construction is apparent. The reader is enabled to visualize what the claim entails and is left some liberty to consider other options. The choice to nominalise the processes in the original sentence then may have been an intentional one as the author may not have wanted to leave open the options for questioning.

In chapter 4.3.2 I suggested we might want to take another look at example B used to illustrate the translation procedure *transposition*:

B) British withdrawal would likely inspire similar moves in other countries, with the risk that the EU, already weakened, might begin to fragment	Lines 42-44	Text 5	Integendeel, een Brits vertrek zou vermoedelijk de inspiratiebron zijn voor soortgelijke bewegingen in andere landen, met het risico dat de EU, die toch al verzwakt is, uit elkaar zou kunnen vallen.	Lines 66-68
---	----------------	-----------	---	----------------

The process in the ST (would inspire) has been nominalised by the translator (de inspiratiebron). The effect of this *optional transposition* from verb to noun is that the Dutch reader is left with less room to question the possibility of “British withdrawal inspiring moves in other countries” as it is presented as an inactive abstract entity. Why the translator has taken the liberty to reduce the options of challenging the author’s assertions remains a mystery. It does, however, illustrate the powerful properties of Nominalization, and it confirms the importance of a translator’s awareness of the ability of this or any of the discussed syntactic structures to become ideological triggers (note the not intended number of nominalizations in this sentence).

5.5 Conclusion

Though Noun Modification may not yet have been discovered as a vehicle for conveying ideology by Dutch critics and scholars, the examples in my corpus show that they do have potential to do so in both English and Dutch. A translator may want to reproduce this syntactic structure in the translation, using a *literal translation procedure* with only minor (obligatory) modulations. For more on Noun Modification and relative clauses in Dutch I would like to refer to Broekhuis (2012). The analysis also reveals that the practice of nominalising verbal actions has been acknowledged in both languages as a tool that influences the effect on a reader (Jeffries, Richards, Verhagen, Aarts). The potential ideological nature of this effect has, however, not been addressed in Dutch literature to a large extent. It may be essential for a translator to analyse the ST on ideological Nominalizations and respect them in the translation, if the aim is to exert the same subtle effect on the reader. The most likely procedure then to employ is *literal translation*.

Chapter 6 Equating and Contrasting

- 6.1 Equating
- 6.2 Translating Equation
- 6.3 Contrasting
- 6.4 Negated Opposition
- 6.5 Translating Negated Opposition
- 6.6 Replacive Opposition
- 6.7 Translating Replacive Opposition
- 6.8 Concessive Opposition
- 6.9 Translating Concessive Opposition
- 6.10 Contrastives
- 6.11 Translating Contrastives
- 6.12 Conclusion

The practice of *equating* and *contrasting* is the practice in which the author uses equivalence and opposition to convey ideology. The statement *X is Y* may appear to be a general truth, but if we aim to be aware of all ideology in the text, we ought to question whether X is really Y. By opposing negatively (*X is not Y*) the author creates a pair of words that may or may not be conventionally recognised as opposites. This automatically denies (non-) properties in X which we tend to take for granted, but maybe should not. Jeffries' contention is that "texts have the capacity, frequently used, to set up new synonymies and oppositions, sometimes between words that we would never relate to each other out of context, and sometimes between phrases and clauses..." (52). Hence, in *equating* and *contrasting* there is a close relation between syntactic triggers and the semantic features of the words in that syntactic structure (Jeffries 53). As semantic elements are often based on conventional concepts, this tool may have a large overlap with Critical Discourse analysis. Jeffries acknowledges that despite several possibilities to recognise the physical form of opposition and equivalence triggers, "there remains a conceptual coherence to the whole which is that texts are able to promote semantic equivalence (synonymy) or contrast (antonymy) by such variety of means" and that "this function of texts is hugely powerful." (59). Still, he provides us with the most common syntactic features for equation and *contrasting*. In this chapter I aim to illustrate

some of the almost infinite possibilities by analysing the most relevant tools that Jeffries links to *equating* and *contrasting* including the ideological effects that each trait may exert.

6.1 Equating

The syntactic trigger that Jeffries claims to be most common for equating is the use of the copular clause structure, as shown above (X is Y). The following examples show their commonness as well as the inevitable relation with semantic properties of both subject and complement.

that time **is** now (text 3 line 11)

Here the subject and complement are equivalences for a time span. The subject ‘that time’ refers to an earlier proposition and by equalling it to ‘now’ a certain urgency is conveyed.

This is more evident if we look at the context:

But sometimes even sacred cows need to be slaughtered. With the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat to the credibility of the EU as a collective entity and of its national governments’ ability to maintain order and the rule of law, that time **is** now.

The reader is meant to deduce that ‘the time has come to slaughter sacred cows’. This proposition refers back to an earlier part in the text about eliminating border-free travel. As we can see from this example the interpretation of a seemingly simple equivalence can often not be made without interpreting context. However, the urgency, and with that some ideology, is conveyed nonetheless. In the next example we will look at an equivalence which may well be interpreted without context.

To accept that certain things cannot be said **is** to accept that certain forms of power cannot be challenged. (Text 4 line 32-33)

In the example above the statement is that ‘(accepting) certain things cannot be said’ equals ‘(accepting) certain forms of power cannot be challenged’. Note that the parallel clause structure creates an emphatic effect. Although here the context may be of importance for referential purposes, we are able to interpret the equivalence without it. By equating the two

clauses, an unusual synonymy is created requiring interpretative effort from the reader, but at the same time leaving an ideological mark.

6.2 Translating Equation

The translation of the structure *X is Y* should not pose many difficulties for a translator, as the translation for the structure is exactly the same: *X is Y*. While analyzing my findings in both ST and TT, however, I surprisingly discovered that four out of the twelve instances of equating that I had selected in the ST were not translated with an equation in the TT. Two of these I unintentionally used as examples to show the effect *equating* can exert. The first one is illustrated below:

With the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat to the credibility of the EU as a collective entity and of its national governments' ability to maintain order and the rule of law, that time is now	Lines 11	Text 3	En die tijd is aangebroken , nu de vluchtelingencrisis Schengen tot bedreiging heeft gemaakt van de geloofwaardigheid van de Europese Unie als collectieve entiteit - en van het vermogen van nationale regeringen om orde en de rechtsstaat te handhaven.	Lines 10-11
--	-------------	-----------	---	----------------

The translator has used the word 'is' in the translation as an auxiliary of the verb 'aangebroken', while in the ST the word 'is' is a copula. By using the copula 'to be' in a sentence, an author can equate anything to anything, causing the reader to, at least for a moment, visualize the proposed equivalence. In the translation above this effect is lost. Apart from the obscuring effect of the considerably long subordinating clause (chapter 7. 7 and 7.8) preceding or following the main clause respectively, the main message in the main clause seems to be much more powerful in English than it is in Dutch. In Dutch the translator has applied a technique of amplification (Vinay, Darbelnet 192), causing syntactic expansion and with that a less ideological statement. The reader of the TT is more likely to question the translation while the firmness of the ST makes the proposition less vulnerable. In this case the translator followed the strategy of *servitude* because a literal translation 'die tijd is nu' would not be a grammatically correct sentence in the TT. The 'is' in that sentence requires a lexical verb to make sense. Nevertheless, he could have chosen for equivalent effect here by repositioning the main clause as illustrated on the next page:

	Lines	Text	Alternative, more literal, translation :	Lines
With the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat to the credibility of the EU as a collective entity and of its national governments' ability to maintain order and the rule of law, that time is now	11	3	Nu de vluchtelingencrisis Schengen tot bedreiging heeft gemaakt van de geloofwaardigheid van de Europese Unie als collectieve entiteit - en van het vermogen van nationale regeringen om orde en de rechtsstaat te handhaven, is die tijd nu aangebroken .	10-11

The reason why the impact in this translation may be considered comparable to that in the ST has to do with the position of the main clause, as at the end of the sentence it appears to have more effect. This 'end focus' principle is a feature that Jeffries groups under the concept of *Prioritizing* (Chapter 7.1 and 7.2). The example shows that if a literal translation of a linguistic feature is not possible, a translator might want to employ another linguistic feature to create a similar effect. Consider the example below:

To accept that certain things cannot be said is to accept that certain forms of power cannot be challenged.	Lines 32-33	Text 4	Wie eenmaal accepteert dat bepaalde dingen niet mogen worden gezegd, accepteert dat bepaalde vormen van macht niet in twijfel mogen worden getrokken.	Lines 66-68
---	----------------	-----------	---	----------------

Here the translator has replaced the equation, in which both subject and complement start with the same words, by a similar alliterative or parallel structure. Jeffries does not include a entirely corresponding structure in his model. The effect that this parallel structure creates is comparable to that of the equivalence structure in the ST: it is forceful. The difference is that by *equating* the writer has also created a firm statement that is less likely to be discussed than the proposition in the TT. However, the translator has used an *oblique* transposition (from 'to infinitive' to subject + finite). Let us consider the option of *literal translation* of the linguistic tool of *equating* in the following example:

To accept that certain things cannot be said is to accept that certain forms of power cannot be challenged.	Lines 32-33	Text 4	Alternative Translation Accepteren dat bepaalde dingen niet mogen worden gezegd is accepteren dat bepaalde vormen van macht niet in twijfel mogen worden getrokken.	Lines 66-68
---	----------------	-----------	---	----------------

The reasons for the translator not to choose *literal translation* in the original translation may be plentiful. Maybe it leads to a lack of cohesion in the text or maybe it causes repetition of lexical items. What is clear, though, is the different effect it causes. In the original the reader may challenge the suggestion because it is proposed in the form of a subject and a process, whereas in the ST the subject **is** the process equated to another subject in the form of a process by the copula *is*. In my alternative translation this structure is kept intact by using the *literal translation* technique.

We might conclude that equating can be a useful stylistic device for the conveyance of ideology in both languages. The other examples in my corpus indicate that generally the equivalence structure has a similar impact in Dutch, as shown in the example below:

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a recruiting tool for the Islamic State and must go.	Lines 25-26	Text 1	De Syrische president Bashar al-Assad is wervingsmateriaal voor IS en moet het veld ruimen.	Lines 34-35
---	----------------	-----------	--	----------------

Though the example exposes an unusual synonymy, in context we tend not to question the fact that the Syrian President is a recruiting tool. Similarly, the readers of the TT are likely to believe that the Syrian president is ‘wervingsmateriaal’. The *literal translation* of the structure expressing the equivalence has resulted in a comparable effect on the ST and TT reader.

6.3 Contrasting

Jeffries distinguishes eight most typical syntactic features for *contrasting* but emphasizes that in his book “there is no scope to cover all the potential worth noting, however, that for both *equating* and *contrasting*, there is a typical structure which is perhaps most common” (54). He does not elaborate extensively on the use of the separate tools, but suggests the most common syntactic structures that may be used for *contrasting* in a list on page 55. This inventory may serve as a checklist for the translator in his search for ideological triggers represented by syntactic structures. However, I have selected four of Jeffries’ listed tools, based on their syntactic calibre, and left out the others because of strong overlap with either CDA or the tool of End Focus grouped under *prioritizing* (chapter 7). The tools used in this work are:

- Negated opposition
- Replacive opposition
- Concessive opposition
- Contrastives

We will see that in all cases the contrast only becomes clear once we have assigned meaning to the constituents involved. However, the tools that are used to identify opposition are of syntactic nature, as they are based on syntactic structures. It should be observed that the illustration of the tool by means of a formula (e.g. Despite X, Y) merely functions as a sample structure in which the indicator of the opposition may be replaced by any word that generalises an equivalent structure (e.g. Though X, Y). Jeffries acknowledges the inevitable link between meaning and context (53). In order to interpret the effect of contrasting structures then, it is necessary to analyse the (temporary) meaning of the words, phrases, or clauses that are being related. This may sometimes require more of a semantic or sometimes pragmatic approach.

6.4 Negated Opposition

X not Y

By using a positive/negative pair of structures “to set up an opposition the reader will instinctively start to search for a likely context in which these activities might be seen as opposites” Jeffries 52). In the following example the opposites may be related, but the author nonetheless appeals to the reader to place them in context:

It is the free movement of people, **not** border-free travel, that forms an essential component of the EU. (text 3 line 45-46)

The effect of this opposition is that reader is made aware that free movement of people does not automatically mean border-free travel. In fact, the author wants to warn the reader to the idea that stricter border controls are justified despite the Schengen agreements that were once made.

6.5 Translating Negated Opposition

By negating the opposition the author provides the reader with two contrasting images. By negating the one, the other is emphasised. This phenomenon applies to both Dutch and English as we can see in the translated example:

It is the free movement of people, not border-free travel, that forms an essential component of the EU.	45-46	3	Het vrije verkeer van personen, niet reizen zonder grenzen, is de essentiële component in de EU.	57-58
--	-------	---	---	-------

The *literal translation* of the syntactic structure that the translator has used secures a similar appeal to the TT reader who is forced to interpret the opposites in context, and by comparing the two contrasting images is left with an ideological imprint (on stricter border control in this case).

6.6 Replacive Opposition X instead of Y

Jeffries does not give any examples involving Replacive Opposition, nor does he explain the ideological effect it may create. Nevertheless, I have tried to analyse one of the examples of the corpus without his help to illustrate that many of the tools for contrasting have semantic features that can easily be recognised and have literal equivalents in Dutch. I am aware that the intention of this work was to avoid semantics as much as possible, but I could not resist it here.

Had journalists and artists and political activists taken a more robust view on free speech over the past 20 years then we may never have come to this.

Instead, they have helped create a new culture of self-censorship. (text 4 line 4-7)

In this example the contrast is created by the word ‘instead’. Let me rephrase the main message:

Instead of taking a more robust view on free speech, journalists, etc. have created a culture of self-censorship.

The prominent position of the word ‘instead’ at the beginning of the sentence unfolding the contrast, emphasizes the fact that journalists, who we expect to be missionaries of free speech, have themselves generated (self-)censorship. The ideological effect of this contrast is that the reader tends to blame journalists for “the blue pencil” that has allegedly been created.

6.7 Translating Replacive Opposition

The common translation for ‘instead’ in Dutch is ‘in plaats van’. The handicap in Dutch, however, is that it cannot be used in a similar concise way as in English. Consider the example on the next page:

Had journalists and artists and political activists taken a more robust view on free speech over the past 20 years then we may never have come to this. Instead , they have helped create a new culture of self-censorship.	4-7	4	Als journalisten, kunstenaars en politiek activisten in de afgelopen twintig jaar een steviger standpunt hadden ingenomen over vrije meningsuiting, was het misschien nooit zover gekomen. In plaats daarvan hebben ze een nieuwe cultuur van censuur helpen ontstaan.	8-11
---	-----	---	---	------

The construction in Dutch ‘in plaats van’ requires a complement. If the complement is the previous sentence, as is the case in the example, it suffices to replace ‘van’ with ‘daarvan’. Though the effect on the reader in both ST and TT is emphasis on the role of journalists in creating censorship, the translator has to use *amplification* to create a similar construction. This sometimes involves a reorganization of syntactic structures. There are no further particulars on this tool other than that I found only three examples of it in my corpus.

6.8 Concessive Opposition Despite X, Y

I have not been able to find an example of this type of opposition with the word ‘despite’ in any of the articles used for this research. There are a few sentences in which an alternative for ‘despite’ has been used, and they are always in a sub clause following the main clause, as in the next example. Despite (not intended) this, I have included the tool because it illustrates the translator’s role in directing the reader in a certain direction. This becomes clear in the next section 6.9. Let us first consider the tool in the ST :

Whether there is an anti-Muslim backlash after the *Charlie Hebdo* killings remains to be seen, **though** there are reports of attacks on mosques and community centres. (text 4 lines 66-68)

The effect here is different from the effect Jeffries’ structure (Despite X, Y) is supposed to create. Compare:

Though there are reports of attacks on mosques and community centres, whether there is an anti-Muslim backlash after the *Charlie Hebdo* killings remains to be seen.

Here I have put the Concessive Contrast in a sub clause preceding the main clause. Apart from the slightly awkward grammatical shift, the effect is that the main clause, getting the end focus (chapter 7 Prioritizing), is emphasized more than in the original sentence. The ideological effect now is that the possibility of repercussions against Muslims is presented as a side issue and the reader swiftly passes it, on their way to the main clause. In contrast, in the first sentence the reader is alerted to the risk because it has Final Focus, a tool that is explained in chapter 7.1 and 7.2. In my corpus the Concessive Contrast is very often in mid position in the sentence (as in the first example) being more of an example for Jeffries’ practice of *Prioritizing* rather than *Contrasting*.

6.9 Translating Concessive Opposition

In my explanation of this tool I have tried to illustrate that the position of the conjunction that introduces the Concessive Opposition is of considerable importance. When we consider the translation we notice that the same applies to Dutch, but that the translator cannot just use a *literal translation* as that results in a different effect in the TL. Compare:

Muslim backlash after the Charlie Hebdo killings remains to be seen, though there are reports of attacks on mosques and community centres.	67-68	4	We moeten afwachten of er na de moorden bij Charlie Hebdo een anti-islamreactie op gang komt, maar er zijn al berichten over aanslagen op moskeeën en buurtcentra.	123-125
--	-------	---	---	---------

The translation here shows that ‘though’ in this position when translated with ‘but’ is stronger in the TT than in the ST. Compare the reverse translation:

Muslim backlash after the Charlie Hebdo killings remains to be seen, though there are reports of attacks on mosques and community centres.	67-68	4	We moeten afwachten of er na de moorden bij Charlie Hebdo een anti-islamreactie op gang komt, maar er zijn al berichten over aanslagen op moskeeën en buurtcentra.	123-125	Reverse Translation: We have to wait and see if a Muslim backlash will be provoked after the Charlie Hebdo killings, but there have already been reports of attacks on mosques and community centres.
--	-------	---	---	---------	--

In the original ST the message is that there is a chance of a backlash whereas in the Reverse translation of the TT it seems to convey that ‘although we still have to wait and see, a backlash is very likely to happen as there have been reports of attacks already. The translator seems to caution the reader while the author of the ST casually mentions the ‘reports’.

Although the translator may have used the same position for the word ‘though’, he has deliberately or not, created a much stronger sense of anxiety than the writer seems to have intended. An alternative translation is given on the next page:

Muslim backlash after the <i>Charlie Hebdo</i> killings remains to be seen, though there are reports of attacks on mosques and community centres.	67-68	4	We moeten afwachten of er na de moorden bij Charlie Hebdo een anti-islamreactie op gang komt, maar er zijn al berichten over aanslagen op moskeeën en buurtcentra.	123-125	Alternative Translation: We moeten afwachten of er na de moorden bij Charlie Hebdo een anti-islamreactie op gang komt, al zijn er al wel berichten over aanslagen op moskeeën en buurtcentra.
--	-------	---	---	---------	--

I must admit that the alternative was suggested by my supervisor whom I am very grateful. By using the *transposition procedure* (from ‘conjunction’ to ‘finite clause’) a milder message in the TT is created which causes not as much anxiety as the original translation does.

6.12 Contrastives

X, but Y She was young, but ugly

The last tool of *Contrasting* that I would like to discuss is very often realised by the most common of conjunctions: *but*. Jeffries does not suggest any other form for this syntactic tool nor does he comment on it other than in his list of possible realizations (58). As it illustrates a similar ideological effect as we saw in chapter 6.4 and 6.5 (Negated Opposition) I have, nonetheless, included an example:

But now that his own authority has been strengthened significantly by his victory, with the UKIP emerging as the election’s biggest loser, he can now step forward as the pragmatic **but** committed European that he truly is. (text 5 lines 9-11)

This sentence is itself a Contrastive to an earlier sentence. However, it is the second ‘but’ that I would like to explicate. The ‘he’ that is referred to in this sentence is David Cameron, the British Prime Minister. The writer claims that he now has a chance to show that he is a

pragmatic **but** committed European

By linking the two adjectives with the conjunction ‘but’, the writer creates a contrast between two words that are not normally seen as opposites. We saw a comparable effect in chapter 6.4

and 6.5 when I discussed Negated Opposition. An antonym for pragmatic may be ‘inefficient’ or ‘impractical’. Or if ‘pragmatic’ is used in a sense of ‘down-to-earth’, it may be ‘excited’. None of these antonyms have a meaning anywhere near the denotational meaning of ‘committed’. Likewise, if we look at possible antonyms for ‘committed’ we may find ‘disloyal’ or ‘unfaithful’. According to Jeffries it is very likely that readers will notice unusual contrasts and that conventional pairings will not only be less noticeable, but also less challenging to their “view of the world” (65).

6.13 Translating Contrastives

Before I analyse the translation procedure for Contrastives, I would like to observe that Contrastives of this kind occur very frequently in texts. The corpus shows that a *literal translation* of ‘but’ by ‘maar’ or occasionally ‘echter’ is the technique most opted for as is exemplified in the following example:

But now that his own authority has been strengthened significantly by his victory, with the UKIP emerging as the election’s biggest loser, he can now step forward as the pragmatic but committed European that he truly is.	9-11	5	Maar nu zijn eigen gezag aanzienlijk is versterkt, terwijl de UKIP bij de recente algemene verkiezingen als grootste verliezer uit de bus is gekomen, kan Cameron naar voren treden als de pragmatische maar toegewijde Europeaan die hij werkelijk is.	12-15
--	------	---	---	-------

Literal translation seems the most common technique to translate Contrastives, leaving the ideological message unharmed. In the ST the reader is not likely to question the Prime Minister’s merits due to that they are quite an unusual antonymous pair. In the TT we see that the translator has used a similar unusual antonymous pair, which may result in a similarly meek TT reader who is only happy that the British Prime Minister possesses such fine qualities.

6.12 Conclusion

This slightly fragmented analysis of *Equating* and *Contrasting* leads me to conclude that awareness of deliberate use of the linguistic practices attributed to this practice seems fundamental for the conveyance of an equivalent undertone. The tools that Jeffries provides to discover ideology in texts through *equating* and *contrasting* are all rather explicit in their appearance. Their effect, however, is subtle as we saw in chapter 6.9 where the literal translation of ‘though’ by ‘but’ generated a different undercurrent. *Equating* presents the reader with a relatively settled proposition that he is unlikely to meddle with. In *Contrasting* the syntactic devices create visual oppositions for the reader who after finally processing the opposing thought may be more likely to accept the writer’s ideas. Both practices draw on the concept that texts can create infinite synonymous and antonymous pairs which tend to lead the reader to accept the proposals that they express. These effects apply to both SL and TL. Because the tools’ realizations are quite explicit, they will generally not be overlooked by the translator who, provided he has sufficient command of the TL, will be able in most cases to use a *literal translation procedure* to convey the same ideology. However, the translator may want to confirm that *literal translation* of a structure is equally ideological as that in the ST, using Jeffries’ model for assessment. I have not been able to find any mentioning of the tool as a stylistic device in Dutch or of its ability to convey ideological information.

Chapter 7 **Prioritizing**

- 7.1 Typical Information Structure (Final Focus)
- 7.2 Translating Typical Information Structure (Final Focus)
- 7.3 The Option to use Fronting or Cleft Constructions
- 7.4 Translating Cleft Constructions
- 7.5 The Possibility to Transfer a Sentence from Active to Passive
- 7.6 Translating the Passive
- 7.7 The Potential for Subordination
- 7.8 Translating Subordination
- 7.9 Conclusion

Jeffries distinguishes three typical English syntactic devices that form the base for the tool of *Prioritizing* (77). As can be seen from the list, I have created a fourth syntactic trait by splitting his first tool in two:

- Typical Information Structure (Final Focus)
- The Option to Use Fronting(Cleft Constructions)
- The Possibility to Transfer a Sentence from Active to Passive
- The Potential for Subordination

Jeffries' Typical Information Structure includes the second feature on my list Cleft Construction (84). I have created a separate section for this syntactic possibility as they occur less frequently in Dutch (Aarts 298) and “often sound less natural than their English counterparts” (Aarts 299). It is therefore an interesting tool to look at separately in my comparative research.

7.1 Typical Information Structure (Final Focus)

English clauses are typically structured according to the known-new principle (Gray 87). Jeffries refers to this as the usual ‘information structure’ (77) where the new and most important information takes the final position in a clause. Compare the following examples:

This means providing intelligence, arms, and being willing to send more soldiers – more than the 3,500 Americans already there, and possibly on the order of 10,000 – to train, advise, and help direct a military response. **Such an effort must be collective.**
(text 1 line 20)

In this example the known-new contract has been applied almost literally. ‘Such an effort’ at the beginning of the sentence refers to the previous sentence and the new information (collective) is placed at the end of the sentence. This position creates emphasis on the word ‘collective’. The reader is swiftly guided through a number of propositions, and by this time no longer allowed room to question the proposition made in the previous sentence (more war), as the ‘collective aspect’ has become the focal point. From here on the reader is taken further down the path of a collective approach, to the war in Syria in this case:

It can be informal – a “coalition of the willing” that would include the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Arab states, and even Russia under the right circumstances – or carried out under NATO or United Nations auspices. **The packaging matters less than the results.** Symbolic declarations of war, though, ought to be considered with caution, lest the Islamic State appear to be winning every day it does not lose. **A diplomatic component is no less essential to any response.**
(text 1 lines 20-23)

I have highlighted two sentences in the extract above. The first one is another example of the importance of the final position.

The packaging matters less than the results.

‘The packaging’ referring to the previous sentence is not important (is it not?), what counts is the ‘results’ prominently visible in end position for emphatic effect. The second example, on the other hand, has a reverse effect:

It can be informal – a “coalition of the willing” that would include the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Arab states, and even Russia under the right circumstances – or carried out under NATO or United Nations auspices. The packaging matters less than the results. Symbolic declarations of war, though, ought to be considered with caution, lest the Islamic State appear to be winning every day it does not lose. **A diplomatic component is no less essential to any response.**

Here the final position is taken by a relatively insignificant adverbial ‘to any response’. It seems that the most important information has been put in front position (diplomatic component) where the essence is somewhat lost, despite the semantic power of both subject and subject attribute (essential). Besides that, the subject in front position does not clearly refer to the previous sentence, and requires quite some semantic interpretation of the preceding information in order for the reader to be able to connect it. This in combination with the double negation (no + less) makes the sentence very hard to interpret without delay. Whether the author has intentionally made the sentence this enigmatic is up for discussion, yet he has managed to exemplify the impact that word order and negation (Chapter 8) can have. I could continue some more on similar ineffectiveness of the sentences that follow (text 1), but that should not be my main concern here.

7.2 Translating Typical Information Structure (Final Focus)

To a large extent, the principle of Final Focus has an equivalent effect in Dutch. In general the most essential thought is placed at the end of a sentence, while the second most important idea is put at the beginning. If a thought is not very significant, it is generally embedded in the middle of a sentence (Courtland 118). There are ample possibilities for a writer (and a translator) to play with word or clause order in order for the reader’s attention to be drawn to the most important elements (Boogaart 58). When examining the corpus on the phenomenon of Final Focus, I found that generally the translator seems to adopt this principle. There are, however, two considerable differences between the English and Dutch word order that may influence the effect in the TT. Where English is a so called VO language, generally placing the objects (or complements) after the verb as in the example below,

We bought *a new car*

Dutch, by contrast, is only a VO language in a neutral main clause with only one verb.

We kochten *een auto*

As soon as there is a second verb involved in the Dutch clause, or a clause is subordinate, Dutch becomes an OV language (Sybesma) as illustrated below:

We hebben een auto gekocht

We kochten *een fiets* omdat we *geen auto* wilden.

Fundamentally this does not make a huge difference if we assume that it is the entire clause that conveys an idea. However, sometimes a writer creates emphasis on one particular constituent in a clause. It is then that in Dutch the clause may become fragmented as the verbal constituent is interrupted by an object or a complement as in the example below:

This means providing intelligence, arms, and being willing to send more soldiers – more than the 3,500 Americans already there, and possibly on the order of 10,000 – to train, advise, and help direct a military response. Such an effort must be collective.	20	1	Dit betekent het voorzien van inlichtingen en wapens, en de bereidheid meer soldaten te sturen – meer dan de 3.500 Amerikanen die er al zitten, en wellicht tot wel 10.000 – om op te leiden, te adviseren, en om een militaire respons te helpen regisseren. Dit zou een collectieve inspanning moeten zijn.	23-27
--	----	---	---	-------

In this sentence the translator has not been able to keep the lexical Final Focus because the difference in language system requires a change in word order. It may not be a vital issue here as it concerns a very concise main clause. In the other example I used to illustrate Final Focus the translator was, in fact, able to use the *literal translation procedure*:

The packaging matters less than the results .	22-23	1	De verpakking telt minder dan de uitkomst .	30-31
--	-------	---	--	-------

The similar structure of one-verb main clauses in both languages allows for the translator to apply a *literal translation procedure*, including the final (lexical) focus.

Once the clause becomes longer or more complex, and the Final Focus is not literally translated due to either *servitude* or *option*, it seems to lose some of its strength. This is illustrated in a different part of the first example:

This means providing intelligence, arms, and being willing to send more soldiers – more than the 3,500 Americans already there, and possibly on the order of 10,000 – to train, advise, and help direct a military response.	20	1	Dit betekent het voorzien van inlichtingen en wapens, en de bereidheid meer soldaten te sturen – meer dan de 3.500 Amerikanen die er al zitten, en wellicht tot wel 10.000 – om op te leiden, te adviseren, en om een militaire respons te helpen regisseren.	23-27
---	----	---	--	-------

Besides the tediously long subject complement in both ST and TT, the TT also seems to have some trouble conveying the ST's Final Focus vigour. Let us have a look at an alternative translation:

This means providing intelligence, arms, and being willing to send more soldiers – more than the 3,500 Americans already there, and possibly on the order of 10,000 – to train, advise, and help direct a military response.	20	1	Alternative Translation: Dit betekent het voorzien van inlichtingen en wapens, en de bereidheid meer soldaten te sturen – meer dan de 3.500 Amerikanen die er al zitten, en wellicht tot wel 10.000 – om op te leiden, te adviseren, en om te helpen bij het regisseren van een militaire respons.	23-27
---	----	---	---	-------

The translator's choice to alter the word order in the TT was optional. If he had kept the noun phrase in final position by nominalising 'regisseren' the final stress would have been kept intact.

7.3 The Option to Use Fronting or Cleft Constructions

Jeffries observes that a shift in priority in a sentence can sometimes simply be established by using intonation. I have decided not to include this aspect in my analysis as it is not relevant for my study of written texts and their translations. His explanation, though, of the structural focus change by using a phenomenon called ‘fronting’ or the ‘cleft sentence’, does relate to intonation in that a change of the structural focal point obliges the reader to change intonation, albeit only in his mind.

Those who claim that it is ‘racist’ or ‘Islamophobic’ to mock the Prophet Mohammad, appear to imagine, with the racists, that all Muslims are reactionaries. **It is here that leftwing ‘anti-racism’ joins hands with rightwing anti-Muslim bigotry.**

(Text 4 line 41-44)

In this example a cleft construction has been used to emphasise the writer’s supposition that anti-racism and anti-Muslim join hands where it concerns bias to Muslims. By adding an extra ‘it is’ an emphasis is created. Compare:

Those who claim that it is ‘racist’ or ‘Islamophobic’ to mock the Prophet Mohammad, appear to imagine, with the racists, that all Muslims are reactionaries. **Here leftwing ‘anti-racism’ joins hands with rightwing anti-Muslim bigotry.**

In my altered version there is less emphasis, and the writer’s supposition has turned from a rather critical remark into a more ‘matter of fact’, or informative message. As this structure is not common in Dutch, I thought it to be interesting to see if and how the translator has been able to create similar weight in these sentences and comparable textual situations.

7.4 Translating Cleft Constructions

Although the cleft construction is not as common in Dutch as it is in English (Aarts 298), the corpus shows quite a few instances in which the translator has used a similar structure. The discussion of the phenomenon in consulted Dutch literature is not wide ranging and it seems a changeling in the debate on stylistic devices. Aarts discusses the Cleft sentence briefly and indicates the grammatical restrictions in its use. Both Renkema and Verhagen do not pay attention to cleft constructions in their ‘Schrijfwijzer’ and ‘Checklist’ respectively. Yet, if we consider the frequency of use in the SL and the emphasis it is able to give to certain ideas, it may be sensible not to overlook this syntactic device. As illustrated in the examples below the weight is lost if the translator does not translate the Cleft construction:

It is here that leftwing ‘anti-racism’ joins hands with rightwing anti-Muslim bigotry.	43-44	4	Hier vinden links ‘antiracisme’ en rechtse antimoslimvooroordelen elkaar.	106-107
---	-------	---	--	---------

Where the ST emphasises the cause of the “problem”, the TT transmits a relatively neutral informative message. By applying a *transposition* (from clause to part of a clause) the translator has not transferred a similar emphasis in the TT. In the next two examples in which the translator has literally translated the cleft construction, it becomes clear, why stylistically it may not always be the best option to *literally translate* the cleft construction:

What is also required is a dose of realism.	50	1	Wat ook vereist is is een dosis gezond realisme.	65
--	----	---	---	----

What is really racist is the idea that only nice white liberals want to challenge religion or demolish its pretensions or can handle satire and ridicule.	40-41	4	Wat echt racistisch is, is de gedachte dat alleen aardige blanke liberalen zich tegen religie keren of de pretenties ervan willen ontmaskeren, of tegen satire en spot kunnen.	102-104
--	-------	---	---	---------

The repetition of the word ‘is’ in the TT in both examples on the previous page may be considered stylistic flaws. In the second example the stylistic bottleneck may, however, be solved by a change in sentence order as illustrated below:

What is really racist is the idea that only nice white liberals want to challenge religion or demolish its pretensions or can handle satire and ridicule.	40-41	4	Alternative translation: Pas echt racistisch is de gedachte dat alleen aardige blanke liberalen zich tegen religie keren of de pretenties ervan willen ontmaskeren, of tegen satire en spot kunnen.	102-104
--	-------	---	--	---------

Although the construction is not a ‘cleft’ the same weight is given to the racist character of the ‘idea that...’. The alternative does have the same effect as the Cleft construction in the ST. The addition of the word ‘pas’ is a lexical move (*optional amplification*) which adds even more emphasis to the idea, competing quite well, with the Cleft tool in the ST. From this analysis we may draw the conclusion that the translation of the Cleft sentence as a syntactic device to convey ideology deserves a closer examination.

In trying to identify the translation procedure used for the alternative translation I found that there is a gap in Vinay and Darbelnet’s methods of translation (30). Putting the complement ‘Pas echt racistisch’ in front position is a syntactic step that they do not label as a separate procedure. This is an interesting finding in itself, which may turn out to be a syntactic as well as an ideological deficiency, as not being able to label the technique of “changing word - order” seems to undermine the importance of the translation of this syntactic tool as a possible ideological trigger. Vinay and Darbelnet do comment on word order but consider it irrelevant to their “stylistic comparisons, were it not for the fact that this order is not absolutely rigid and that it permits writers and translators a limited freedom of ordering the elements of a sentence” (Vinay, Darbelnet 211). This leaves me a little concerned as thus far change in word order has proven to be of great importance in conveying ideology, and as such appears to be very relevant indeed (chapter 6.7, 6.9, 7.1, 7.2, 7.4).

7.5 The Possibility to Transfer a Sentence from Active to Passive

Like clauses in many other languages English clauses have the capability of transforming from active to passive. Writers can use this asset for several different ideological reasons. As with nominalization (*Naming and Describing*) one of the most common motives is the possibility to leave out the agent in a clause and hence conceal who is to blame. Additionally, “it allows the writer to direct the reader’s gaze” (Pinker 55) on parts that need more priority. Let us have a look at the following example:

Unfortunately, there is no time to build a partner force on the ground from scratch. This **has been tried and failed**, and Arab states are unable or unwilling to constitute one. The Iraqi army has also come up short. Iran-backed militias only make matters worse. (text 1 lines 13-15)

According to the writer of the extract above, building up a partner force has been tried and failed. He does not state who have tried and failed. He does, however, mention some states by name who were also unsuccessful for one reason or another. These states are agents in active clauses and as such are given focus and priority. A possible effect of not specifying the agent in the first clause is that the reader tends to blame the states mentioned by name for the failing while other possibly involved parties are stealthily cleared from any responsibility.

7.6 Translating the Passive

The effect that the use of the passive creates is identical in both English and Dutch. Jeffries states that there the possibility for English sentence structures to transform from active to passive overlaps to a certain extent with the typical information structure (84), which was discussed in chapter 7.1 and 7.2. In Dutch the passive voice is considered a stylistic device (Verhagen), often used to impersonalize a statement (Boogaart). Vinay and Darbelnet acknowledge that “whereas French makes full use of pronominal constructions, English has a fully developed system of passive forms” and that “consequently many English passives require transposition for their translation into French” (Vinay, Darbelnet 138). This is usually not the case in translations to Dutch as can be concluded from the examples below and from

many instances of translated passive constructions in my corpus. The overall procedure used by all translators is *literal translation*, using the auxiliary ‘zijn’ of ‘worden’ to create a similar structure, as shown below:

Unfortunately, there is no time to build a partner force on the ground from scratch. This has been tried and failed , and Arab states are unable or unwilling to constitute one. The Iraqi army has also come up short. Iran-backed militias only make matters worse.	13-15	1	Helaas is er geen tijd om vanuit het niets een gezamenlijke troepenmacht op te bouwen. Dit is al geprobeerd en is mislukt , en de Arabische staten zijn niet in staat of van zins er een samen te stellen.	18-20
--	-------	---	---	-------

There are a few lessons to be learned from all of this.	46	2	Uit dit alles kunnen enkele lessen worden getrokken .	49
--	----	---	--	----

The examples above illustrate the relatively easy task for the translator when identifying a Passive construction. The procedure of *literal translation* will suffice in most cases. When an active sentence in the SL is rendered into a Passive structure in the TL, Vinay and Darbelnet consider that a technique of *modulation* (Vinay, Darbelnet 36). For more on English and Dutch passive structures I would like to refer to Aarts who has included a large section in his contrastive grammar.

7.7 The Potential for Subordination

English syntax has a great potential for subordination as we have seen in chapter 5.1 Noun Modification, one of the tools of *Naming* and *Describing*. Both tools may indeed have some overlap in how they are realised. The main principle of subordination is that the act of placing a phrase at a higher syntactic level may give it more importance while, at the same time, “it is likely to make it more susceptible to questioning” (Jeffries 86).

By placing information in a subordinate clause, a writer may consciously employ presuppositions which are unlikely to be questioned. Consider this example:

With the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat to the credibility of the EU as a collective entity and of its national governments' ability to maintain order and the rule of law, that time is now. (text 3 lines 9-11)

The clause 'the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat' is a subordinate clause functioning as an adverbial. The main clause, and main message of the sentence, is at the end: 'that time is now'. In that respect the sentence does remain faithful to what linguists describe as a "common rhythm pattern" known as "end focus" (Kolln 102) discussed in chapter 7.1 and 7.2. However, the extremely long adverbial that precedes the main clause does convey an important message which we are still able to distil despite the huge frontal overload of information. The reason why we can has to do with the physical position of the proposition, at the beginning of the sentence. We write and "speak in linear order" (Johnson 126). The phrases that occupy the first position link the sentence to the previous one, but also serve as a bridge to new information. How all this relates to subordination I have yet to explain.

The proposition 'the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat' is on a lower syntactic level in the sentence. It is part of an adverbial starting with the preposition 'with'. We are less likely to question the proposition because we want to read on to the main message, so we assume it to be true. This also applies to how we perceive the post modifiers of 'threat' as they occur on an even lower syntactic level in the clause:

...a threat **to the credibility of the EU as a collective entity and of its national governments' ability to maintain order and the rule of law**,...

By the time we have reached the main clause of the sentence we will have remembered 'refugee crisis', 'Schengen', and 'threat'. We might link it to 'Europe', but we do not exactly know how Schengen is threatening Europe because of the refugee crisis. If we zoom in we will see that it is a threat to abstract aspects (all nominalizations) of the union rather than to us Europeans, but we do not zoom in. We assume it is true and continue to the main message. The effect of the words that we memorize, however, is powerful while the main message 'that

time is now’ is a relatively harmless proposition for which questioning by the reader would not have serious consequences (Is that time really now? I don’t think so). Jeffries confirms that

“putting something at a higher syntactic level may mean that it is more important, but it also is likely to make it more susceptible to questioning, so that text producers who wish their ideas not to be questioned too closely may well make something quite uncontentious the main proposition of their sentences” (86)

In chapter 6.1 I attached quite some importance to the main message ‘that time is now’ as I concluded that the equation created a strong synonymous pair (time is now) and with that a sense of urgency. Although in this chapter it seems as if the opposite is stated, I defend both analyses by indicating that the powerful effect of the combination of *equating* and *subordination* in this example. As stated earlier we remember a few words on our way to the main message (refugee crisis, Schengen, and threat). We tend to link these words to the main message ‘time is now’ and so that we are certain to feel an even greater sense of urgency (something must happen now, we’re being threatened). We are then more likely to accept whatever the writer continues to suggest (stricter border control).

7.8 Translating Subordination

The potential for Subordination in English adds substantial weight to the ideological scale. In general the more embedded a clause the less it will be questioned (Jeffries 85). The examples in the corpus illustrate that this holds true for both languages. Verhagen’s Checklist also mentions subordination as a stylistic tool. Let us consider the impact of subordination in Dutch by means of the example on the next page:

With the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat to the credibility of the EU as a collective entity and of its national governments' ability to maintain order and the rule of law , that time is now.	9-11	3	En die tijd is aangebroken, nu de vluchtelingen-crisis Schengen tot bedreiging heeft gemaakt van de geloofwaardigheid van de Europese Unie als collectieve entiteit - en van het vermogen van nationale regeringen om orde en de rechtsstaat te handhaven.	10-13
--	------	---	---	-------

The seemingly insignificant adverbial ‘with the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat’ is actually a presupposition that the reader is unlikely to question due to embedding as we saw in the earlier analysis. The Dutch equivalent is also a subordinated adverbial and implies a similar ideology. Although the translator has used a *literal translation procedure* to translate the tool of Subordination we concluded in chapter 6.2 that the effect of urgency is somewhat lost in the ST because the equation is not translated literally but by means of *amplification* (that time is now → en die tijd is aangebroken). Harking back to chapter 7.1 and 7.2 (Final Focus) we may also observe that the position of the main clause at the end of the sentence in the ST conveys more urgency than its Dutch counterpart at the beginning of the sentence and that the translator has not taken this syntactic tool at heart either. This leads me to conclude that the ideological conveyance in the ST is much stronger than that in the TT despite Subordination being respected by the translator. It is another example of the weight of these subtle syntactic structures as ideological triggers.

As the previous example has been used quite often in this research I would like to add one more to illustrate the ideological power of Subordination:

And, given his current efforts to divide Europe , one can be sure that Russian President Vladimir Putin would do all that he can to encourage, and finance, such a split.	44-46	5	En gezien zijn huidige pogingen om verdeeldheid te zaaien in Europa kunnen we er zeker van zijn dat de Russische president Vladimir Poetin alles zou doen wat in zijn vermogen ligt om zo'n uiteenvallen aan te moedigen en te financieren.	68-71
--	-------	---	--	-------

The translation is rendered by applying a *literal translation procedure* to translate the tool of *subordination*. Whether or not we agree with the author that president Poetin is trying to pit nations against each other, we cannot but identify the subordinated clause in bold as a presupposition. It is used to reinforce the reader's negative opinion about Mr. Poetin both in the ST and TT.

7.9 Conclusion

The four systems discussed in this chapter often overlap as the use of one may result in a change in the other. The passive structure, for example, is often used as a cohesive device for the first principle discussed in this chapter, typical information structure. As “English syntax demands subject before object” and “human memory demands light before heavy”, human comprehension demands “given before new”(Pinker 131). Sometimes a writer may therefore use a passive construction to work around the somewhat rigid syntax of English, and with that create a different (end) focus in the sentence. The passive as a device to change perspectives in a text is elaborately covered in both SL and TL, and for the translator a relatively uncomplicated structure to translate by employing a literal translation. The cleft construction is an interesting feature from the translator’s point of view as it may pose most difficulties to translate. The structure remains rather underexamined in terms of its ideological potency. The tool of subordination is a challenging one to look at in the ST and for the translator it may be essential to attempt to equal the number of syntactic layers in order to convey the same presuppositions. As far as the corpus is concerned the translators applied literal translation of the subordinate clauses in all cases.

Chapter 8 Negating

- 8.1 Syntactic Negation
- 8.2 Translating Syntactic Negation
- 8.3 Conclusion

In the section *Implying and Assuming* which has not been included in this analysis, Jeffries discusses ideological tools based on implicatures informed mainly by background. In this chapter where we discuss the tool of negating I will describe another type of implicature Jeffries introduces. He states that by negating, in the broadest sense of the word, the writer is able to produce “a hypothetical version of reality”, and that “even though it is marked as being ‘unreal’ in the case of negation, there is at least the potential for a hearer/ reader to conceptualize this hypothetical situation”(Jeffries 107).

According to Jeffries, the tool of *negating* has three types of realization (108) I have listed them below and included an example from the corpus to illustrate its form:

- Syntactic Realization: either by adding the particle ‘not’ to a verb or by replacing noun phrases with pronouns like *none, no one, nobody, nothing, etc*:

e.g. And, because **the agreement is not legally binding** on its signatories, the only sanction it permits is to “name and shame” countries that fail to deliver. (text 2 lines 37-38)
- Lexical Realization: words that encode absence or lack. This is an unlimited list.

e.g. And, because the agreement is not legally binding on its signatories, the only sanction it permits is to “name and shame” **countries that fail to deliver**. (text 2 lines 37-38)
- Morphological Realization: usually a prefix like *in,- un,- de,- dis,-* expressing negation.
e.g. Unfortunately, there is no time to build a partner force on the ground from scratch. This has been tried and failed, and Arab states are **unable** or **unwilling** to constitute one. (text 1 lines 13-14)

To remain as much as possible within the syntactic field of ideological triggers I have decided to leave out both lexical and morphological realizations. I do, however, think, that they are of great potential interest for translators to examine and may be interesting to look at in subsequent studies.

We will see that the syntactic realization of *negating* often works together with Negated Opposition (Chapter 6.4) as with that tool the reader is explicitly informed about the positive counterpart of the negation as we saw in the example in chapter 6.4:

It is the free movement of people, not border-free travel, that forms an essential component of the EU. (text 3 lines 45-46)

While the reader is presented with an alternative for ‘what is not ’ in the syntactic structure of Negated Opposition, the tools of *negating* do not offer an antonym. As will become clear in the next chapter 8.1 they only present the negation and as a result the attention is drawn to it even more.

8.1 Syntactic Negation

In order to explain why this tool may be very suitable to convey ideology, Jeffries links it to Grice’s maxims (107). Grice described the expectations of conversational partners in a conversation by means of four axioms:

- The quantity maxim: Make your contribution as informative as is required, but not more, or less, than is required.
- The Quality maxim: Do not say that which you believe to be false or for which you lack adequate evidence.
- The Relation maxim: Be relevant
- The Manner maxim: Be clear, brief and orderly (Yule 145)

With the practice of negating a writer actually flouts two of Grice’s maxims. Let me illustrate this by means of the example on the next page:

Of course, the EU **is not powerless to influence the outcome** (text 5 line 33)

By saying that the EU is not powerless to influence the outcome, an image of a powerless EU immediately comes to life. An implicature of another reality is created (a powerless EU) and with that the sentence is giving more information than strictly necessary, flouting the quantity maxim. Besides that, we may also argue that it is the maxim of relation that produces the same implicature, as telling the reader about something that is not the case, appears to be irrelevant information. The reader will automatically try to find some explanation as to why it is relevant, which will result in a negative implicature (that the EU is powerless).

8.2 Translating Syntactic Negation

In Section 4.3.2 I explained the translation procedure *modulation*. I showed an example of the translation procedure modulation; negating the opposite. Although the example is not solely a case of *negating*, I feel the explanation I promised to give belongs in this section:

A diplomatic component is no less essential to any response	25	1	Een diplomatieke component is voor elke respons net zo van belang	34
--	----	---	--	----

The image that first appears when reading the ST's words 'no less' is 'less'. It's the principle of the pink elephant: as soon as people are told not to think about the pink elephant it is exactly a pink elephant what they think about. In this sentence it may not be meant as an ideological message. The translator, therefore, may be forgiven for using an *optional modulation procedure*. His translation of 'no less' to "equally as" does not evoke the opposite as the opposite is simply not present in the syntactic and, I must admit, semantic structure.

The example I used in section 8.1 illustrates the same effect of negation in Dutch:

Of course, the EU is not powerless to influence the outcome	33	5	De EU staat uiteraard niet machteloos als het gaat om het beïnvloeden van de uitkomst.	49-50
--	----	---	--	-------

As we saw in the analysis of the tool the effect of the syntactic negation by 'not' is that, albeit

it a split second, we visualize a powerless Europe. With this trigger the reader is presented with the undesirable possibility of an immobilized Europe, causing more readiness to agree with the author. The translator has applied the *literal translation procedure* to translate the structure represented by ‘not’. This leaves the ideological message unaltered.

8.3 Conclusion

The practice of negation covers a broad linguistic field. I have only described a tiny part of the iceberg. Yet, my analysis does illustrate the importance of identifying the negation as a (syntactic) tool for the conveyance of ideology. In my humble opinion, the reverse effect of negation, which is that the negated thought is exactly emphasised merits great attention. Relatively little has been written about the use of negation in discourse, specifically of the ideological effects of using it. Boogaart describes the effect of negation in questions and he praises Johan Cruijf who claimed that negating is admitting. Verhagen included Negation as a stylistic device on his checklist. For more on the place of the participle ‘niet’ in Dutch, another interesting subject I refer to Renkema and Aarts. As for the translation procedure that a translator may want to apply for the translation of syntactic negating the technique used most often to translate the particle ‘not’ is *literal translation* (niet). Vinay and Darbelnet refer to negation as a subdivision of *modulation* (Vinay, Darbelnet 252).

Chapter 9 Jeffries' other Linguistic Practices

- 9.1 Representing Actions/Events/States
- 9.2 Exemplifying and Enumerating
- 9.3 Assuming and Implying
- 9.4 Hypothesizing
- 9.5 Presenting the Speech and Thoughts of other Participants
- 9.6 Representing Time, Space and Society

The remaining tools that Jeffries distinguishes in his model for Critical Stylistics may be very interesting for future research. Each of the tools “deserves a career” in text analysis, in English as well as in other languages. They all have potential to become reliable instruments for translators for the analysis of any text on ideological conveyance. Analysing them here, however, would really go beyond the scope of this MA thesis. For possible future purposes I have included a brief outline of each of them in this Chapter.

9.1 Representing Actions/Events/States

The notion that actions, events, and states are typically represented by the verbal element in a clause, also known as the predicator, is the base for Jeffries' descriptive analysis of processes in a sentence. He uses the traditional grammatical approach that categorises verbs according to its transitive properties. A very simple outline of what is meant by transitivity is illustrated in *Table 1*

• Intransitive	<i>Jack laughed</i>	(S+P)
• Monotransitive	<i>Jack kicked his dog</i>	(S + P + DO)
• Ditransitive	<i>She wrote me a letter</i>	(S + P + IO/BO + DO)
• Complex transitive	<i>You make me happy</i>	(S + P + DO + OA)
• Copula	<i>You sound happy</i>	(S + P + SA)

Table 1: simple outline of transitivity of verbs

This plain approach considers the number of objects a verb requires in order to decide its transitivity. The model of transitivity Jeffries uses is slightly more complicated as he states that a purely structural analysis of transitivity is not sufficient to uncover textual ideologies, and that aspects of meaning should also be considered.

While the overall idea of this analytical tool for text analysis is obvious, I found it difficult to unveil ideology with it in most of my examples. In his explanation of this tool, Jeffries uses quite simple, and mostly invented examples which may not be entirely representative of real texts. In his analysis of sentences taken from real newspaper articles he seems to be unable to use the tool independently of other analytic devices, and complements it with the tools in *Naming* and *Prioritizing*. He admits that ideological effects of *Representing actions/ events/ states* may be revealed best by combining these three linguistic practices. (Jeffries 48).

9.2 Exemplifying and Enumerating

In my comparative analysis I have not included this practice because from a translational point of view it does not comprise structures that have deviating counterparts in Dutch.

The practices of exemplifying and enumerating are closely related in terms of ideological conveyance, and their structures are not easily distinguished syntactically or lexically. Where exemplification may be introduced explicitly by phrases like ‘for example’, ‘for instance’, or ‘to exemplify’, there is often no syntactic or clear lexical indication that precedes enumeration. Yet, exemplification and enumeration have one common divisor which is that there is always a list involved in both practices. If the list is visibly introduced as exemplification, it will be clear for the reader that the list may not be complete. However, if there is no clear indication of whether an ensuing list is exemplifying or enumerating reader may falsely suppose that the list is exhaustive, even if it is not. It is this thin boundary between the two that makes enumeration a suitable tool to mislead the reader.

Jeffries’ observations with regard to the pragmatic effects of the number of items in a list is interesting. He states that lists with two items often coincide with the practice of contrasting, discussed in 4.5, and that “three-part lists are very frequently symbolic of completeness” (70). His reference to Beard endorses the idea that the three-part list gives “a sense of unity and completeness” (Beard 38) to readers. The following example purely serves to exemplify this

tool:

Smart plans, good intentions, and strong negotiating skills are essential, but they are never enough – not even close. (text 2 line 6-7)

9.3 Implying and Assuming

Although I agree with Jeffries that “one of the powers of language in general and English in particular is the ability to use assumption and implication to make ideologies appear to be common sense” (93), I have decided not to include this tool in my comparative research. In my opinion they are incredibly fascinating concepts but they also cover a large part of the field of pragmatics, an area that is beyond the scope of this thesis. The linguistic model that Jeffries proposes to recognise both tools is based on the linguistic terms for the two major kinds of assumption: existential and logical presuppositions. Jeffries acknowledges that, although semantic elements do sometimes play a role in the analysis of both, most assumptions “remain rather elusive as they are not encoded directly by the text, but are the background upon which it is built” (94). A comparative analysis of this background in English and Dutch from a translator’s point of view may therefore be an interesting sequel of this work, but at the moment reaches beyond the realm of this study.

9.4 Hypothesizing

In the next few sections I will very briefly describe Jeffries three remaining tools, and the reason why I have chosen not to include them in my analysis.

Jeffries’ tool of hypothesizing is based on modality. Apart from the fact that modals quite explicitly “express the speaker’s opinion or attitude” (Aarts 171), they are also capable of introducing hypothetical situations. This ability could contribute substantially to the expression of ideology in texts, as we saw in the previous section (Negating). Yet, I will not study the use and translation of this tool as it is linguistically “less hidden” (Jeffries 123).

9.5 Presenting Others' Speech and Thoughts

When the viewpoint of people who are discussed in a text are expressed by means of a narrating voice, it may seem neutral reporting. The power, however, “to represent the words and thoughts of others is potentially very manipulative of their ideologies as well as those of the reader” (Jeffries 130). The tool of Presenting Other’s speech and thoughts is therefore especially useful for the analysis of literary fiction, speeches and news reports. In the articles for my research there is hardly any presentation of someone else’s speech and thoughts, hence my decision not to incorporate this tool in my analysis. Jeffries has based his linguistic model of this practice on the model of speech and thought presentation from Short, and refers to further developments of the model in more recent publications, for example Semino and Short 2004 (131).

9.6 Representing Time, Space and Society.

Jeffries’ final tool is based on the deictic system of English. It is mainly concerned “the textual processes by which the fundamental features of time and space are constructed for a text world and some of the parameters of the social world in which human participants act are set up” (Jeffries 146). Although, ideologically this may be an interesting aspect to analyse, it is not a tool that poses particular challenges for the translators of the articles used for this study, as they have been written from a general perspective. The deictic items in both source and target texts refer to a similar time, place, and social circumstance and hence may be rendered word-for-word.

Chapter 10 Conclusion

Applicability of the Tools

The four practices and the corresponding ideological syntactic triggers that I have used for my analysis are easy to apply to both ST and TT. Some are easily detectable, such as the devices for Contrasting (chapter 6) and the Cleft constructions (chapter 7.4). Others, like Noun Modification (chapter 5.1) and Subordination (chapter 7.7), are not as obvious and involve quite some syntactic scrutiny before they can be identified. The analysis of each syntactic structure yields interesting insight in their (subtle) ideological power in both SL and TL.

Ideological effects of the tools

A writer's intentional or unintentional choice for the use of a syntactic device can create a different perspective for the reader. While some syntactic structures create a presupposition of which the reader is not aware (Noun Modification, Subordination), others put forward a fixed proposition that the reader is unlikely to question (Nominalization, Equating). Both generate assumptions that may influence the reader's idea about a topic. By choosing a certain syntactic device the writer may change the focal point (Final Focus, Cleft, Subordination) in a sentence or leave out information that may not be advantageous (Passive, Nominalization). Other possible effects of syntactic triggers include the emphasis on an idea that is negated (Contrasting, Negation). There seem to be degrees in the influential power of the ideological triggers. While Noun Modification and Subordination are able to obscure an ideological thought, Equating openly states the idea, albeit in a rather inaccessible form that is not open to much debate (chapter 6.1). Some triggers cause the effect of another or only work in combination with devices of other tools (Final- Focus and Passive). It should be noted that some triggers may be effective only or in a different way if combined with tools that have not been used for this analysis (chapter 9). A few devices inevitably overlap with the field of semantics as their relevance is only evident once meaning is denoted to the words involved (pragmatic but committed, chapter 6.10) as is often the case with Equating and Contrasting.

The tools as a base for text analysis

The use of Critical Stylistics for the analysis of the ST does not only provide ideological subtleties on micro-(sentence) level but also helps to create an idea about the tone of the text and the ideological potency of the text as a whole. By first analysing the text on ideological

syntactic devices, it is given a framework and shape. Texts one, two and three, for instance, show an abundance of Nominalizations and Passive structures which could be exemplifying for the inaccessible nature of the text. Text five, on the other hand, displays a considerable quantity of Equations which may be an indication of ideological outlook, or at least an attempt to set up unusual synonymy as we saw in chapter 6.2 (Translating Equation). Remarkably, text four refrains from profuse use of ideological triggers from the model. An explanation for this may be that the text is very explicit in its ideological delivery. The writer openly expresses his views, and the reader is constantly aware of the direction in which he is taken. A relatively large number of Cleft constructions was found in the text which seems to tie in with the explicit ideological character of the text seeing that Cleft structures are readily recognizable, and thus less implicit.

The tools and translation procedures

Vinay and Darbelnet's translation procedures serve as a backup for alternative techniques if the literal translation is impossible. The extent to which syntactic triggers are hidden within a structure in the ST, or observable due to their plain form makes some devices more translatable than others. The more explicit a trigger is in the text the more literal the translation seems to be. We saw this in chapter 6 where the syntactic structures of Equating and Contrasting appear to be easily recognisable and hence can mostly be literally translated choosing from a consistent range of options (but, not, despite, etc.). The need for the translator to verify ideological similarities in these literal renderings, however, remains essential as was illustrated in chapter 6.9 ('though' versus 'maar'). Cleft constructions are an exception to the rule that 'explicit, easily recognisable structures are mostly translated using the *literal translation procedure*' as they are not as common in the TL as they are in the SL. A procedure that seems to compensate for the absence of the cleft structure in the TL and which is frequently employed in rendering the ideological effect of Final Focus is one that has not been listed in Vinay and Darbelnet's taxonomy and not grouped under any of their other procedures either. I have called this procedure '*re-ordering*' as it involves rearrangement of word order to reproduce an ideological effect into the TT (chapters 7.2, 7.4). This might be an interesting aspect for future scholarly study. The translator's intentional or unintentional choice for *transposition* or *modulation* procedures often results in a deviation from the ST's ideological message, effect, or tone, which may either weaken (chapter 8.2), reinforce (chapter 6.13) or omit (chapter 6.2) an effect. The translator's influence on the rendering of the ideological effect is considerable. Jeffries' model of critical stylistics in combination with

Vinay and Darbelnet's taxonomy may serve as a base for ST analysis and translation. Its use leads the translator to recognise syntactic ideological triggers, alongside other significant linguistic aspects at the same time, and eventually guides him to other levels of analysis for ideology.

Although this work is far from exhaustive, it has revealed more insight into the influence of syntactic structures on ideological text behaviour. It has also raised issues that may be interesting for future studies on ideology in texts, such as Noun Modification, Negating, and Cleft (in Dutch). In addition, it may serve as a spur for translators to apply *Critical Stylistics* in their analyses in order to unveil and translate ideological effects, thereby making use of the appropriate translation procedures from *Vinay and Darbelnet's Taxonomy*. Finally, I hope that this work will increase the translator's awareness of the power of ideological triggers in syntactic structures and hence positively affect translational decisions in the future.

Bibliography

- Aarts F.G.A.M, Wekker H.Chr. *A contrastive grammar of English and Dutch*. Dordrecht: Springer- Science + Business Media, 1991. Print.
- Aitchison Jean, Lewis Diana M. *New Media Language*. London: Routledge, 2003. Print.
- Beard, Adrian. *The language of Politics*. London: Routledge, 2000. Print.
- Bell, Allan. *The language of News Media*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1991. Print.
- Bell Allan, Garrett Peter. *Approaches to Media Discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998. Print.
- Bellos, David. *Is That a Fish in Your Ear?* London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2011. Print.
- Blommaert, Jan. *Let op je woorden*. Berchem: EPO, 2016. Print.
- Bloor Meriel, Bloor Thomas. *The Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Hodder Education, 2007. Print.
- Boogaart, Ronny. *Een sprinter is een stoptrein zonder wc*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press B.V., 2015. Print.
- Bovee Courtland L, Thill John V. *Zakelijk Communiceren*. Amsterdam: Pearson Education, 2004. Print.
- Broekhuis Hans, Keizer Evelien. *Syntax of Dutch: Nouns and Noun phrases Volume 1*. Amsterdam University Press, 2012. PDF file.
- Burton-Roberts, Noel. *Analysing Sentences, An introduction to English syntax*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2011. Print.
- Carter Ronald, Nash Walter. *Seeing Through Language*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. Print.
- Conboy, Martin. *The language of the news*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007. Print.
- Conde-Silvestre Juan Camilo, Hernández-Campoy Juan Manuel. *The Handbook of Historical Sociolinguistics*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2014. Print.
- Cormier Monique C., Delisle Jean, Lee-Jahnke Hannelore. *Translation Terminology*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1999. Print.
- Darbelnet Jean, Vinay Jean-Paul. *Stylistique comparée du français et de l'anglais*. Paris: Didier, 1958. Print.
- Deutscher, Guy. *Through the Language Glass*. London: Arrow Books, 2011. Print.
- Dirven René, Hawkins Bruce, Sandikcioglu Esra. *Language and Ideology* Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001. Print.

- Fairclough, Norman. *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. New York: Longman Publishing, 1995. Print.
- Fairclough, Norman. *Language and Power*. London: Longman, 1989. Print.
- Gray Loretta, Kolln Martha. *Rhetorical Grammar; Grammatical Choices, Rhetorical Effects*. New Jersey: Pearson, 2014. Print.
- Halliday Michael, Matthiessen Christian. *Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2014. Print.
- Jeffries, Lesley. *Critical Stylistics: The Power of English*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Print.
- Johnson Mark, Lakoff George. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003. Print.
- Kramarae Cheri, Schulz Muriel, O'Barr William M. *Language and Power*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984. Print.
- Langeveld, Arthur. *Vertalen wat er staat*. Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Atlas, 2012. Print.
- Leech Geoffrey, Short Mick. *Style in Fiction*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007. Print.
- Leith, Sam. *You talkin' to me?* London: Profile Books Ltd, 2012. Print.
- Leeuwen van, Maarten. *Stijl en Politiek, Een taalkundig-stilistische benadering van Nederlandse parlementaire toespraken*. Diss. Universiteit Leiden, 2015. PDF file.
- Mak, Pim. *Processing relative clauses: effects of pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic variables*. Diss. Radboud University, 2001. PDF file.
- Munday, Jeremy. *Introducing Translation Studies*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012. Print.
- Newmark, Peter. *A Textbook of Translation*. New York: Prentice Hall, 1988. Print.
- Onrust, Margreet. *Vermijd de naamwoordstijl!: Een onderzoek naar de houdbaarheid van een schrijfadvice*. Diss. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2013. PDF file.
- Pinker, Steven. *The Sense of Style*. London: Penguin Books, 2015. Print.
- Puurtinen, Tiina. "Explicitating and Implicitating Source Text Ideology". *Across Languages and Cultures*. 4.1 (2003) : 53-62. PDF file.
- Renkema, Jan. *Schrijfwijzer*. Amsterdam: Boom, 2012. Print.
- Richardson, John E. *Analysing Newspapers: An approach from Critical Discourse Analysis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Print.
- Sauter Kim, Verspoor Marjolijn. *English Sentence Analysis*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000. Print.

Sidiropoulou, Maria. *Linguistic Identities Through Translation*. New York: Rodopi, 2004.

Print.

Simpson, Paul. *Language, Ideology and Point of View*. London: Routledge, 1993. Print.

Steenmeijer, Maarten. *Schrijven als een ander*. Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2015. Print.

Sybesma, Rint. *Het Chinees en het Nederlands zijn eigenlijk hetzelfde*. Houten: Uniboek/ Het Spectrum bv, 2009. Print.

Trudgill, Peter. *Sociolinguistics, An introduction to Language and Society*. London: Penguin Books, 2000. Print.

Verhagen, Arie. *Checklist Nederlandse stijlmiddelen*. Interne publicatie Opleiding Nederlandse Taal en Cultuur, Universiteit Leiden, [z.j.]. PDF file.

Vinay Jean-Paul, Darbelnet Jean. *Comparative Stylistics of French and English*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1995. Print.

Yule, George. *The study of language*. Cambridge: University Printing House, 2014. Print.

Zwart, Jan-Wouter. *The syntax of Dutch*. Cambridge University Press, 2011. PDF file.

Web Publications

Bildt, Carl. “Camerons zege kan EU nieuwe impuls geven”. *Volkskrant*. De Persgroep Nederland, 12 May. 2015. Web. 3 May 2016.

Bildt, Carl. “David Cameron’s Europe”. *Project Syndicate*. Project Syndicate, 9 May. 2015. Web. 3 May 2016.

Emmott, Bill. “Het leven na Schengen”. *Volkskrant*. De Persgroep Nederland, 8 Oct. 2015. Web. 3 May 2016.

Emmott, Bill. “Life after Schengen”. *Project Syndicate*. Project Syndicate, 1 Oct. 2015. Web. 3 May 2016.

Haass, Richard N. “Executing Foreign Policy”. *Project Syndicate*. Project Syndicate, 29 Dec. 2015. Web. 3 May 2016.

Haass, Richard N. “After Paris”. *Project Syndicate*. Project Syndicate, 16 Nov. 2015. Web. 3 May 2016.

Haass, Richard N. “Na Parijs”. *Project Syndicate*. Project Syndicate, 16 Nov. 2015. Web. 3 May 2016.

Haass, Richard N. “Niet akkoorden zelf maar uitvoering is cruciaal”. *Volkskrant*. De Persgroep Nederland, 5 Jan. 2016. Web. 3 May 2016.

Malik, Kenan. "Je suis Charlie? It's a bit late". *Pandaemonium*. Wordpress. 8 Jan. 2015. Web. 3 May 2016.

Malik, Kenan. "Met zelfcensuur help je minderheden juist niet". *Volkskrant*. De Persgroep Nederland. 10 Jan. 2015. Web. 3 May 2016.

Overbeeke van, Dennis. "Principe / Wat gebeurt er?" *Beeld zegt meer*. Beeld zegt meer, 2012. Web. 5 May 2016

"Ten common Dutch proverbs and sayings". *Dutch Community*. Holland at Home, 29 Jan. 2014. Web. 3 May 2016.

Appendix 1 Corpus

Naming and Describing					
Legend: NM - Noun Modification; N - Nominalization					
Type	Sentence	Line	Text	Translation	Line
NM	The attacks in Paris by individuals associated with the Islamic State, coming on the heels of bombings in Beirut and the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula , reinforce the reality that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase.	1-3	1	De aanslagen in Parijs door individuen geassocieerd met de Islamitische Staat, vlak na bomaanslagen in Beirut en het neerhalen van een Russisch verkeersvliegtuig boven de Sinai , versterken nog eens de realiteit dat de terrorismedreiging in een nieuwe en zelfs nog gevaarlijker fase terecht is gekomen.	2-5
NM	the reality that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase.	3	1	de realiteit dat de terrorismedreiging in een nieuwe en zelfs nog gevaarlijker fase terecht is gekomen.	4-5
NM	If the accord enters into force, it will expand world trade, boost economic growth, and strengthen the United States' ties with regional allies who would otherwise be tempted to move closer to China.	12-14	2	Als het akkoord van kracht wordt, zal het de wereldhandel doen groeien en de banden van de Verenigde Staten versterken met regionale bondgenoten die anders in de verleiding zouden komen dichterbij China aan te kruipen	12-14
NM	In December, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2254, which establishes a political framework for a civil war that has raged for nearly five years, claiming as many as 300,000 lives and creating millions of refugees.	24-27	2	In december nam de VN- Veiligheidsraad unaniem resolutie 2.254 aan, waarin een politiek raamwerk wordt neergelegd voor de beëindiging van de burgeroorlog die bijna vijf jaar heeft gewoed, 300 duizend levens heeft geëist en tot miljoenen vluchtelingen heeft geleid.	24-27
NM	The agreement comprises voluntary pledges by governments that amount to no more than promises to do their best.	35-36	2	Deze omvat vrijwillige beloften van regeringen, die niets anders zijn dan toezeggingen om hun best te doen.	33-35

NM	But Schengen makes this very difficult to enforce – a reality that plays further into the hands of the nationalists, who are keen to portray the EU as a burdensome obligation, rather than as a source of solutions or opportunities.	40-43	3	Maar vanwege Schengen is dit bijzonder moeilijk uit te voeren - wat alweer door nationalisten kan worden misbruikt om de EU als een lastige verplichting af te schilderen in plaats van als bron voor oplossingen.	52-54
NM	Partly, it is a question of fear, an unwillingness to take the kind of risks that the editors of Charlie Hebdo courted, and for which they have paid such a heavy price.	7-9	4	Dat is gedeeltelijk een kwestie van angst, van niet het soort risico's willen nemen waarvoor de redactie van Charlie Hebdo niet terugdeinsde en waarvoor ze nu zo'n zware tol hebben betaald.	11-13
NM	There has also developed over the past two decades a <i>moral commitment</i> to censorship, a belief that because we live in a plural society, so we must police public discourse about different cultures and beliefs, and constrain speech so as not to give offence.	9-12	4	In de afgelopen twintig jaar heeft zich ook een morele verplichting tot zelfcensuur ontwikkeld; een overtuiging dat we, omdat we in een pluralistische maatschappij leven, het publieke debat over verschillende culturen en religies onder toezicht moeten stellen en ons in onze uitingen moeten inhouden, om geen aanstoot te geven.	14-18
NM	The real problem is that their actions are given a spurious moral legitimacy by liberals who proclaim it unacceptable to give offence.	61-62	4	Het echte probleem is dat hun daden een schijnbare morele rechtvaardiging krijgen van liberalen die beweren dat het onaanvaardbaar is om anderen te beledigen.	
N	The attacks in Paris by individuals associated with the Islamic State, coming on the heels of bombings in Beirut and the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula, reinforce the reality that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase.	1-3	1	De aanslagen in Parijs door individuen geassocieerd met de Islamitische Staat, vlak na bomaanslagen in Beirut en het neerhalen van een Russisch verkeersvliegtuig boven de Sinaï, versterken nog eens de realiteit dat de terrorismedreiging in een nieuwe en zelfs nog gevaarlijker fase terecht is gekomen.	2-5
N	Actually, the challenge posed by the Islamic State calls for several responses, as there is no	7-8	1	De uitdaging die de Islamitische Staat vormt vraagt in feite om verschillende antwoorden, omdat	10-11

	single policy that promises to be sufficient			er geen politiek bestaat die op zichzelf afdoende belooft te zijn.	
N	Moreover, orderly political change can be brought about only with Russian and Iranian support .	29	1	Bovendien kan een ordelijke politieke wissel alleen maar bereikt worden met Russische en Iraanse steun .	38-39
N	The good news, though, is that the threat posed by the Islamic State to the Middle East and the rest of the world can be dramatically reduced through sustained, concerted action .	53-55	1	Het goede nieuws is echter dat de dreiging van de Islamitische Staat aan het Midden-Oosten en de rest van de wereld drastisch verminderd kan worden door middel van vasthoudende georkestreerde actie .	69-72
N	The threat and the reality of attacks will require greater social resilience and quite possibly a rebalancing of individual privacy and collective security .	47-49	1	De dreiging en realiteit van aanslagen zal een grotere sociale veerkracht vereisen en zeer wel mogelijk een herschikking van de individuele privacy en collectieve veiligheid .	62-64
N	As with business, education, and much else in life, most of what makes foreign policy work – or not – is a matter of implementation and execution .	7-8	2	Het al dan niet laten werken van buitenlands beleid is een zaak van tenuitvoerlegging .	6-7
N	The agreement's entry into force , though, is subject to ratification by most of the 12 signatories' legislatures.	15-16	2	Het van kracht worden van de overeenkomst is echter afhankelijk van de ratificatie door de parlementen van de ondertekenende landen.	14-16
N	The agreement's entry into force, though, is subject to ratification by most of the 12 signatories' legislatures .	15-16	2	Het van kracht worden van de overeenkomst is echter afhankelijk van de ratificatie door de parlementen van de ondertekenende landen .	14-16
N	But approval by the US Congress is far from certain, especially as the presidential candidates –all of the Democrats and the leading Republicans – have come out against it.	19-20	2	Goedkeuring door het Amerikaanse Congres is echter verre van zeker, vooral nu de presidentskandidaten - alle Democraten en de leidende Republikeinen - zich ertegen hebben uitgesproken.	18-20

N	The vote, if it takes place, will be close, and the stakes are high, as failure to ratify the TPP would raise fundamental questions about America's political effectiveness and ability to be a reliable partner to its allies.	20-23	2	De stemming zal, als zij al zal doorgaan, spannend zijn en de inzet hoog, omdat een eventueel onvermogen om het TPP te ratificeren fundamentele vragen zou oproepen over de politieke effectiviteit en betrouwbaarheid van Amerika .	20-22
N	At some point, the implementation challenge will include additional measures to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons once the agreement's time limits on specified programs expire.	43-44	2	Op een gegeven moment zal de implementatie-uitdaging neerkomen op extra maatregelen om te verzekeren dat Iran geen kernwapens ontwikkelt zodra de tijdslimieten uit het verdrag zijn verlopen.	45-47
N	A second reality is that there is an unavoidable trade-off between negotiations and implementation .	51-52	2	Een tweede realiteit is dat een akkoord vaak alleen mogelijk is als cruciale details onopgelost blijven. (not translated)	56-57
N	In many cases, agreement is possible only if critical details are left unresolved.	52-53	2	Een tweede realiteit is dat een akkoord vaak alleen mogelijk is als cruciale details onopgelost blijven.	56-57
N	With the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat to the credibility of the EU as a collective entity and of its national governments' ability to maintain order and the rule of law	10-11	3	nu de vluchtelingen-crisis Schengen tot bedreiging heeft gemaakt van de geloofwaardigheid van de Europese Unie als collectieve entiteit - en van het vermogen van nationale regeringen om orde en de rechtsstaat te handhaven.	11-13
N	This loss of control matters, for two main reasons.	31-32	3	Dit verlies van controle is belangrijk om twee redenen.	39
N	Partly, it is a question of fear, an unwillingness to take the kind of risks that the editors of <i>Charlie Hebdo</i> courted, and for which they have paid such a heavy price.	7-9	4	Dat is gedeeltelijk een kwestie van angst, van niet het soort risico's willen nemen waarvoor de redactie van Charlie Hebdo niet terugdeinsde en waarvoor ze nu zo'n zware tol hebben betaald.	11-13
N	There has also developed over the past two decades a moral commitment to censorship, a belief that because we live in a	9-11	4	In de afgelopen twintig jaar heeft zich ook een morele verplichting tot zelfcensuur ontwikkeld; een overtuiging dat we, omdat we in	14-18

	plural society,...			een pluralistische maatschappij leven, het publieke debat over verschillende culturen en religies onder toezicht moeten stellen en ons in onze uitingen moeten inhouden, om geen aanstoot te geven.	
N	But a UK decision to leave , should it come to that, would initiate a painful and complicated process of negotiating an exit and agreeing on some sort of new relationship.	38-39	5	Maar een Brits besluit om te vertrekken, als het zo ver zou komen, zou tot een pijnlijk en ingewikkeld proces leiden van onderhandelingen over een 'exit' en het overeenkomen van een nieuw soort relatie.	58-60
N	British withdrawal would likely inspire similar moves in other countries, with the risk that the EU, already weakened, might begin to fragment	42-44	5	Integendeel, een Brits vertrek zou vermoedelijk de inspiratiebron zijn voor soortgelijke bewegingen in andere landen, met het risico dat de EU, die toch al verzwakt is, uit elkaar zou kunnen vallen.	66-68

Equating and Contrasting					
Legend: E- Equivalence NO - Negated Opposition CO - Comparative Opposition TO- Transitional Opposition RO- Replative Opposition CnO- Concessive Opposition EO- Explicit Opposition P - Parallel C-Contrastive					
Type	Sentence	Line	Text	Translation	Line
E	Just why the Islamic State decided to stage its attacks now is a matter for conjecture	4	1	Er valt over te debatteren waarom de Islamitische Staat juist nu besloot zijn aanvallen te plaatsen;	5-7
E	One is military.	10	1	Een hiervan is militair.	14
E	The best option is to work more closely with Kurdish troops and select Sunni tribes in both Iraq and Syria.	16-17	1	De beste optie is om nauwer samen te werken met Koerdische troepen en selecte Soennitische stammen in zowel Irak als Syrië.	22-23
E	Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a recruiting tool for the Islamic State and must go.	25-26	1	De Syrische president Bashar al-Assad is wervingsmateriaal voor IS en moet	34-35

				het veld ruimen.	
E	One near-term option worth exploring is a coalition government still headed by a representative of the Alawite minority, a concession that could well be the price of moving Assad out of power.	30-31	1	Een optie op de korte termijn die het waard is te onderzoeken is een coalitieregering die nog steeds geleid wordt een representant van de Alevitische minderheid, een concessie die wel eens de prijs zou kunnen zijn Assad zijn macht te ontnemen.	39-42
E	In principle, and over time, a more representative national government could come about, although talk of holding elections in 18 months is fanciful under any scenario.	32-33	1	In principe zou er met verloop van tijd een meer representatieve nationale regering kunnen komen, alhoewel berichten over verkiezingen binnen 18 maanden onder elk scenario een illusie lijken .	42-44
E	The main lesson of the attack on Paris is that we must be prepared to act over time and place alike.	55-56	1	De belangrijkste les van de aanval op Parijs is dat we ons er op voor moeten bereiden lange tijd op verschillende plaatsen in actie te komen.	72-74
E	And, because the agreement is not legally binding on its signatories, the only sanction it permits is to “name and shame” countries that fail to deliver.	37-38	2	En omdat de overeenkomst juridisch niet bindend is, is de enige toegestane sanctie het 'noemen en aan de schandpaal nagelen' van landen die hun beloften niet nakomen.	35-37
E	that time is now	11	3	En die tijd is aangebroken , nu de vluchtelingen-crisis...	10-11
E	To accept that certain things cannot be said is to accept that certain forms of power cannot be challenged.	32-33	4	Wie eenmaal accepteert dat bepaalde dingen niet mogen worden gezegd, accepteert dat bepaalde vormen van macht niet in twijfel mogen worden getrokken.	66-68
E	The right to ‘subject each others’ fundamental beliefs to criticism’ is the bedrock of an open, diverse society.	33-34	4	Het recht om ‘elkaars fundamentele overtuigingen te bekritisieren’ is het fundament van een open, gevarieerde samenleving.	68-69
E	The real problem is that their actions are given a spurious moral legitimacy by liberals who proclaim it unacceptable to give offence.	61-62	4	Het echte probleem is dat hun daden een schijnbare morele rechtvaardiging krijgen van liberalen die beweren dat het onaanvaardbaar is om anderen te beledigen.	114-116
NO	Actually, the challenge posed by the Islamic State calls for several	7-8	1	De uitdaging die de Islamitische Staat vormt vraagt in feite om verschillende	10-11

	responses, as there is no single policy that promises to be sufficient.			antwoorden, omdat er geen politiek bestaat die op zichzelf afdoende belooft te zijn.	
NO	It is the free movement of people, not border-free travel, that forms an essential component of the EU.	45-46	3	Het vrije verkeer van personen, niet reizen zonder grenzen, is de essentiële component in de EU.	57-58
TO	With the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat to the credibility of the EU as a collective entity and of its national governments' ability to maintain order and the rule of law, that time is now.	9-11	3	En die tijd is aangebroken, nu de vluchtelingen-crisis Schengen tot bedreiging heeft gemaakt van de geloofwaardigheid van de Europese Unie als collectieve entiteit - en van het vermogen van nationale regeringen om orde en de rechtsstaat te handhaven.	10-13
TO	The more that society gives licence for people to be offended, the more that people will seize the opportunity to feel offended. And the more deadly they will become in expressing their outrage.	58-60	4	Hoe meer de samenleving mensen het recht geeft zich beledigd te voelen, des te meer mensen die kans zullen grijpen en hoe dodelijker ze zullen worden in het uiten van hun woede.	111-113
CO	The packaging matters less than the results	22-23	1	De verpakking telt minder dan de uitkomst.	30-31
CO	A diplomatic component is no less essential to any response	25	1	Een diplomatieke component is voor elke respons net zo van belang	34
CO	It also raised more questions than it answered about which Syrian opposition groups would participate in negotiations.	30-31	2	Ook riep zij vragen op over de kwestie welke Syrische oppositiegroepen mogen deelnemen aan de onderhandelingen.	28-30
CO	Of course, resolving the refugee crisis will take far more than just reintroducing glass booths and uniformed immigration officials at borders.	48-49	3	Natuurlijk zal het oplossen van de vluchtelingencrisis veel meer vergen dan het herintroduceren van glazen hokjes en immigratieofficiëren aan de grenzen.	61-62
RO	But Schengen makes this very difficult to enforce – a reality that plays further into the hands of the nationalists, who are keen to portray the EU as a burdensome obligation, rather than as a source of solutions or opportunities.	40-43	3	Maar vanwege Schengen is dit bijzonder moeilijk uit te voeren - wat alweer door nationalisten kan worden misbruikt om de EU als een lastige verplichting af te schilderen in plaats van als bron voor oplossingen.	52-54

RO	Had journalists and artists and political activists taken a more robust view on free speech over the past 20 years then we may never have come to this. Instead , they have helped create a new culture of self-censorship.	4-7	4	Als journalisten, kunstenaars en politiek activisten in de afgelopen twintig jaar een steviger standpunt hadden ingenomen over vrije meningsuiting, was het misschien nooit zover gekomen. In plaats daarvan hebben ze een nieuwe cultuur van censuur helpen ontstaan.	8-11
RO	This will be a process in which the EU's 28 member states, rather than the European Commission, must be in command.	23-24	5	Dit zal een proces zijn waarin de 28 lidstaten van de Europese Unie, en niet zozeer de Europese Commissie, de leiding zullen moeten nemen.	32-33
CnO	Symbolic declarations of war, though , ought to be considered with caution, lest the Islamic State appear to be winning every day it does not lose.	23-24	1	We moeten echter voorzichtig zijn met symbolische oorlogsverklaringen, daar de Islamitische Staat elke dag dat deze niet verliest lijkt te winnen.	31-33
CnO	The agreement's entry into force, though, is subject to ratification by most of the 12 signatories' legislatures.	15-16	2	Het van kracht worden van de overeenkomst is echter afhankelijk van de ratificatie door de parlementen van de ondertekenende landen.	14-16
CnO	And though non-Schengen countries have, in some cases, been able to avoid direct obligations to participate in a common policy – the UK, for example, has remained outside the EU's scheme for the relocation of refugees – they have not been insulated from the challenges of the migration crisis.	25-28	3	En hoewel niet-Schengen-landen in sommige gevallen in staat zijn geweest zich te onttrekken aan de directe verplichtingen om deel te nemen aan gemeenschappelijk beleid (het VK bijvoorbeeld blijft buiten het EU-verdeelschema voor vluchtelingen) zijn ze niet afgeschermd van de uitdagingen van de migratiecrisis.	31-34
CnO	Muslim backlash after the <i>Charlie Hebdo</i> killings remains to be seen, though there are reports of attacks on mosques and community centres.	67-68	4	We moeten afwachten of er na de moorden bij Charlie Hebdo een anti-islamreactie op gang komt, maar er zijn al berichten over aanslagen op moskeeën en buurtcentra.	123-125
EO	To ridicule religion and to defend free expression is not to attack minority communities. On the contrary : without doing both it is impossible to defend the freedoms of Muslims or of any one else.	70-72	4	Het belachelijk maken van religie en het verdedigen van de vrije meningsuiting is niet het aanvallen van minderheden. Integendeel : als we beide niet doen, wordt het onmogelijk om de vrijheden van minderheden te verdedigen.	127-130

EO	On the contrary , British withdrawal would likely inspire similar moves in other countries, with the risk that the EU, already weakened, might begin to fragment.	42-44	5	Integendeel , een Brits vertrek zou vermoedelijk de inspiratiebron zijn voor soortgelijke bewegingen in andere landen, met het risico dat de EU, die toch al verzwakt is, uit elkaar zou kunnen vallen.	66-68
P	The expressions of solidarity with those slain in the attack on the <i>Charlie Hebdo</i> offices are impressive. They are also too late.	3-4	4	De betuigingen van solidariteit met de slachtoffers van de aanval op Charlie Hebdo maken indruk. Ze komen echter in menig opzicht te laat.	6-8
C	But whatever the rationale, what is certain is that a clear response is warranted.	5-6	1	Maar wat de motivatie ook moge zijn, zeker is dat er een duidelijke respons vereist is.	8-9
C	But no amount of air power on its own will ever get the job done.	11-12	1	Maar geen enkele mate van luchtmacht alleen zal de klus ooit klaren.	15-16
C	But any successor government must be able to maintain order and not permit the Islamic State to exploit a power vacuum, as it has done in Libya.	26-28	1	Maar welke regering hier ook op volgt, deze moet in staat zijn om de orde te bewaren en de Islamitische Staat niet zoals in Libië toestaan een machtsvacuüm te benutten.	36-37
C	But reaching a compromise along these lines could well be impossible.	34	1	Maar een compromis in die richting zou zeer wel onmogelijk kunnen zijn.	45
C	One can quibble with the percentage, but Allen's insight is important: You have to get in the game – be a player – to have any chance of obtaining your objectives.	3-4	2	Not Translated	
C	Smart plans, good intentions, and strong negotiating skills are essential, but they are never enough – not even close.	6-7	2	Slimme plannen, goede bedoelingen en sterke onderhandelingsvaardigheden zijn cruciaal, maar nooit genoeg.	5-6
C	But approval by the US Congress is far from certain, especially as the presidential candidates –all of the Democrats and the leading Republicans – have come out against it.	19-20	2	Goedkeuring door het Amerikaanse Congres is echter verre van zeker, vooral nu de presidentskandidaten - alle Democraten en de leidende Republikeinen - zich ertegen hebben uitgesproken.	18-20
C	But such “creative ambiguity” also ensures that the implementation phase will be more difficult, as tough choices	53-54	2	Maar daardoor wordt de implementatiefase lastiger: moeilijke keuzen die werden uitgesteld, moeten plotseling onder handen worden	57-58

	that were postponed suddenly must be addressed.			genomen.	
C	But , at a time of diminished confidence in the EU, would eliminating border-free travel be such a bad thing?	5-7	3	Maar zou het in een tijdperk van verminderd vertrouwen in de EU zo'n ramp zijn om het reizen zonder grenzen in de ban te doen?	6-7
C	But sometimes even sacred cows need to be slaughtered.	9	3	Maar soms moet je zelfs een heilige koe slachten.	10
C	But the refugee crisis has exposed the flipside of the Schengen Agreement – namely, the difficulty of monitoring national and EU territory without border controls.	24-25	3	Maar de vluchtelingencrisis heeft de keerzijde van Schengen belicht - namelijk hoe moeilijk het is om nationale en EU-grenzen in de gaten te houden zonder grenscontroles.	29-31
C	But Schengen makes this very difficult to enforce – a reality that plays further into the hands of the nationalists, who are keen to portray the EU as a burdensome obligation, rather than as a source of solutions or opportunities.	40-43	3	Maar vanwege Schengen is dit bijzonder moeilijk uit te voeren - wat alweer door nationalisten kan worden misbruikt om de EU als een lastige verplichting af te schilderen in plaats van als bron voor oplossingen.	52-54
C	But the issues they raise are not the same.	45	3	Maar het gaat niet om dezelfde kwesties.	57
C	But suspending or abolishing the Schengen Agreement would boost the credibility of governments' efforts to maintain order at home, and thus make ordinary citizens far more amenable to aiding more refugees.	49-51	3	Maar het opheffen of onderbreken van het Schengen Akkoord zou de geloofwaardigheid van overheidsinspanningen om de orde te bewaren vergroten, en dus het draagvlak onder burgers om meer vluchtelingen te helpen.	62-65
C	But fear is only part of the explanation.	9	4	Toch is angst maar een deel van de verklaring.	13-14
C	What happened in the <i>Charlie Hebdo</i> offices in Paris was viscerally shocking; but in the non-Western world, those who stand up for their rights face such threats every day.	52-54	4	Wat er in de Parijse redactielokalen van Charlie Hebdo is gebeurd, was misselijkmakend schokkend, maar in de niet-westerse wereld hebben degenen die opkomen voor hun rechten elke dag met zulke bedreigingen te maken.	82-85
C	But equally let us call the fake liberals to account.	73-74	4	Ja, we moeten de dubbele moraal rond de islam aanpakken en ons verzetten tegen hen die anti-moslim zijn, maar we hebben ook de grootst mogelijke vrijheid van meningsuiting nodig. Ook omwille van de vrijheden van minderheden.	130-132

C	But now that his own authority has been strengthened significantly by his victory, with the UKIP emerging as the election's biggest loser, he can now step forward as the pragmatic but committed European that he truly is.	9-11	5	Maar nu zijn eigen gezag aanzienlijk is versterkt, terwijl de UKIP bij de recente algemene verkiezingen als grootste verliezer uit de bus is gekomen, kan Cameron naar voren treden als de pragmatische maar toegewijde Europeaan die hij werkelijk is.	12-15
C	But a UK decision to leave, should it come to that, would initiate a painful and complicated process of negotiating an exit and agreeing on some sort of new relationship.	38-39	5	Maar een Brits besluit om te vertrekken, als het zo ver zou komen, zou tot een pijnlijk en ingewikkeld proces leiden van onderhandelingen over een 'exit' en het overeenkomen van een nieuw soort relatie.	58-60
C	But there is also the possibility of it all going terribly wrong. In these dangerous times, the consequences of Europe's disintegration must not be underestimated.	55-57	5	Maar het kan ook allemaal vreselijk verkeerd aflopen. In deze gevaarlijke tijden mogen de gevolgen van de desintegratie van Europa niet worden onderschat.	86-87

Prioritizing

Legend: FP- Final Position; Cleft- Cleft construction; P - Passive; Sub- Subordination

Type	Sentence	Line	Text	Translation	Line
FP	This means providing intelligence, arms, and being willing to send more soldiers – more than the 3,500 Americans already there, and possibly on the order of 10,000 – to train, advise, and help direct a military response. Such an effort must be collective.	20	1	Dit betekent het voorzien van inlichtingen en wapens, en de bereidheid meer soldaten te sturen – meer dan de 3.500 Amerikanen die er al zitten, en wellicht tot wel 10.000 – om op te leiden, te adviseren, en om een militaire respons te helpen regisseren. Dit zou een collectieve inspanning moeten zijn.	23-27
FP	Such an effort must be collective. It can be informal – a “coalition of the willing” that would include the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Arab states, and even Russia under the right circumstances – or carried out under NATO or United Nations	20-23	1	Dit zou een collectieve inspanning moeten zijn. Deze kan informeel zijn (een ‘ <i>coalition of the willing</i> ’ die zou bestaan uit de Verenigde Staten, Frankrijk, Groot-Brittannië, Arabische staten, en onder de juiste omstandigheden zelfs Rusland), of worden uitgevoerd onder toezicht	27-34

	auspices. The packaging matters less than the results. Symbolic declarations of war, though, ought to be considered with caution, lest the Islamic State appear to be winning every day it does not lose. A diplomatic component is no less essential to any response.			van de NAVO of de Verenigde Naties. De verpakking telt minder dan de uitkomst. We moeten echter voorzichtig zijn met symbolische oorlogsverklaringen, daar de Islamitische Staat elke dag dat deze niet verliest lijkt te winnen. Een diplomatieke component is voor elke respons net zo van belang.	
FP	But reaching a compromise along these lines could well be impossible.	34	1	Maar een compromis in die richting zou zeer wel onmogelijk kunnen zijn.	45
FP	There is also a domestic dimension to policy. Homeland security and law enforcement – increasing protection both at borders and within them – will have to adjust to the increased threat.	44-46	1	En er is ook nog een binnenlandse politieke dimensie. De binnenlandse veiligheid en rechtshandhaving zullen zich – door de veiligheid zowel aan de grens als erbinnen te vergroten – aan de verhoogde dreiging moeten aanpassen.	58-60
FP	The good news, though, is that the threat posed by the Islamic State to the Middle East and the rest of the world can be dramatically reduced through sustained, concerted action.	53-55	1	Het goede nieuws is echter dat de dreiging van de Islamitische Staat aan het Midden-Oosten en de rest van de wereld drastisch verminderd kan worden door middel van vasthoudende georkestreerde actie.	69-72
FP	In this case, it was less than that, because the resolution was silent about Syrian President Bashar al- Assad's political fate and the timing of his departure.	28-30	2	De resolutie spreekt zich echter niet uit over het politieke lot van de Syrische president Assad.	27-28
FP	Third, there will inevitably be moments when one or another party does not implement the pact in a manner judged to be adequate.	55-56	2	In de derde plaats zullen er onvermijdelijk momenten zijn dat een partij het akkoord ten uitvoer legt op een manier die niet adequaat wordt geacht.	59-60
FP	Of course, the idea of abolishing borders within Europe holds great symbolic importance and appeal.	8-9	3	Natuurlijk is het idee van een Europa zonder grenzen aantrekkelijk en symbolisch van groot belang.	9-10
FP	But suspending or abolishing the Schengen Agreement would boost the credibility of governments' efforts to maintain order at home, and thus make ordinary citizens far more amenable to aiding more refugees.	49-51	3	Maar het opheffen of onderbreken van het Schengen Akkoord zou de geloofwaardigheid van overheidsinspanningen om de orde te bewaren vergroten, en dus het draagvlak onder burgers om meer vluchtelingen te helpen.	62-65

FP	Instead, they have helped create a new culture of self-censorship .	7	4	In plaats daarvan hebben ze een nieuwe cultuur van censuur helpen ontstaan .	10-11
FP	The irony is that those who most suffer from a culture of censorship are minority communities themselves .	29-30	4	Het probleem van pogingen om de dubbele moraal tegen te gaan door de vrije meningsuiting verder in te perken, is dat degenen die het meest te lijden hebben van een cultuur van censuur de minderheden zelf zijn .	60-63
FP	The right to ‘subject each others’ fundamental beliefs to criticism’ is the bedrock of an open, diverse society .	33-34	4	Het recht om ‘elkaars fundamentele overtuigingen te bekritisieren’ is het fundament van een open, gevarieerde samenleving .	68-69
FP	Those who claim that it is ‘racist’ or ‘Islamophobic’ to mock the Prophet Mohammad, appear to imagine, with the racists, that all Muslims are reactionaries .	41-43	4	Degenen die beweren dat het ‘racistisch’ of ‘islamofobisch’ is om de spot te drijven met de profeet Mohammed lijken met de racisten van mening te zijn dat alle moslims reactionair zijn .	104-106
FP	If Cameron sets out such a reform agenda at the European Council in June and is prepared to listen as well as to talk, he could set in motion a process that benefits all of Europe .	18-19	5	Als Cameron tijdens de Europese Raad in juni een degelijke hervormingsagenda op de rails zal zetten en bereid is om ook naar anderen te luisteren, kan hij een proces in beweging brengen waarvan heel Europa kan profiteren .	26-28
FP	At the moment, opinion polls indicate that the UK electorate would vote for continued EU membership .	29	5	Op dit moment blijkt uit opiniepeilingen dat Groot-Brittannië voor een voortgezet EU-lidmaatschap zal stemmen .	43-44
Cleft	But whatever the rationale, what is certain is that a clear response is warranted .	6	1	Maar wat de motivatie ook moge zijn, zeker is dat er een duidelijke respons vereist is .	8-9
Cleft	What is also required is a dose of realism.	50	1	Wat ook vereist is is een dosis gezond realisme.	65
Cleft	It is the free movement of people, not border-free travel , that forms an essential component of the EU.	45-46	3	Het vrije verkeer van personen, niet reizen zonder grenzen , is de essentiële component in de EU.	57-58
Cleft	What is really racist is the idea that only nice white liberals want to challenge religion or demolish its pretensions or can handle satire and ridicule.	40-41	4	Wat echt racistisch is , is de gedachte dat alleen aardige blanke liberalen zich tegen religie keren of de pretenties ervan willen ontmaskeren, of tegen satire en spot kunnen.	102-104

Cleft	It is here that leftwing ‘anti-racism’ joins hands with rightwing anti-Muslim bigotry.	43-44	4	Hier vinden links ‘antiracisme’ en rechtse antimoslimvooroordelen elkaar.	106-107
Cleft	What nurtures the reactionaries , both within Muslim communities and outside it, is the pusillanimity of many so-called liberals, their unwillingness to stand up for basic liberal principles, their readiness to betray the progressives within minority communities.	55-57	4	Reactionaire krachten , zowel binnen moslimgemeenschappen als daarbuiten, spinnen garen bij de lafhartigheid van veel zogenaamde liberalen, die niet bereid zijn om op te komen voor fundamentele liberale principes, maar wel om de progressieven onder de minderheden in de kou te laten staan..	107-111
P	But whatever the rationale, what is certain is that a clear response is warranted	6	1	Maar wat de motivatie ook moge zijn, zeker is dat er een duidelijke respons vereist is .	8-9
P	Multiple efforts are needed in multiple domains.	8	1	Er zijn meerdere inspanningen nodig in meerdere domeinen.	11-12
P	A substantial ground component is needed if territory is to be taken and held.	12	1	Er is een substantiële component op de grond vereist als we gebied in willen nemen en vasthouden.	16-17
P	Unfortunately, there is no time to build a partner force on the ground from scratch. This has been tried and failed, and Arab states are unable or unwilling to constitute one. The Iraqi army has also come up short. Iran-backed militias only make matters worse.	13-15	1	Helaas is er geen tijd om vanuit het niets een gezamenlijke troepenmacht op te bouwen. Dit is al geprobeerd en is mislukt, en de Arabische staten zijn niet in staat of van zins er een samen te stellen.	18-20
P	Moreover, orderly political change can be brought about only with Russian and Iranian support.	29	1	Bovendien kan een ordelijke politieke wissel alleen maar bereikt worden met Russische en Iraanse steun.	38-39
P	This is why increased military effort is needed to bring about larger and more secure enclaves that could better protect civilians and take the fight to the Islamic State.	34-35	1	Daarom is er een verhoogde militaire inspanning nodig om grotere en veiligere enclaves te creëren die betere bescherming aan burgers kunnen bieden en zorgen dat het gevecht op de Islamitische Staat gericht is.	45-48
P	The good news, though, is that the threat posed by the Islamic State to the Middle East and the rest of the world can be dramatically reduced through sustained, concerted action.	53-55	1	Het goede nieuws is echter dat de dreiging van de Islamitische Staat aan het Midden-Oosten en de rest van de wereld drastisch verminderd kan worden door middel van	69-72

				vasthoudende georkestreerde actie.	
P	Perhaps most important, steps will need to be taken to reassure Iran's neighbors so that they are not tempted to proceed with their own nuclear programs.	42-43	2	Wellicht het belangrijkste is dat er stappen moeten worden gezet om de buurlanden van Iran gerust te stellen, zodat zij niet in de verleiding komen hun eigen kernprogramma's voort te zetten.	42-45
P	There are a few lessons to be learned from all of this.	46	2	Uit dit alles kunnen enkele lessen worden getrokken.	49
P	Cameron's remarkable victory should be viewed as an opportunity to launch a renewed and reformed EU in the next two years.	52-53	5	De opmerkelijke overwinning van Cameron moet worden gezien als een kans om de komende twee jaar een vernieuwde en hervormde EU te lanceren.	81-82
P	In these dangerous times, the consequences of Europe's disintegration must not be underestimated.	56-57	5	In deze gevaarlijke tijden mogen de gevolgen van de desintegratie van Europa niet worden onderschat.	86-87
Sub	The vote, if it takes place, will be close, and the stakes are high, as failure to ratify the TPP would raise fundamental questions about America's political effectiveness and ability to be a reliable partner to its allies.	20-23	2	De stemming zal, als zij al zal doorgaan, spannend zijn en de inzet hoog, omdat een eventueel onvermogen om het TPP te ratificeren fundamentele vragen zou oproepen over de politieke effectiviteit en betrouwbaarheid van Amerika.	20-22
Sub	The negotiators still must be able to deliver their governments' full backing, and this is never automatic, especially when it comes to democracies such as the US, where different branches of government are often controlled by different political parties.	47-50	2	Dat is nooit een automatisme, zeker niet in het geval van democratieën als de VS, waar verschillende takken van de overheid dikwijls worden gecontroleerd door verschillende politieke partijen.	52-54
Sub	With the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat to the credibility of the EU as a collective entity and of its national governments' ability to maintain order and the rule of law, that time is now.	9-11	3	En die tijd is aangebroken, nu de vluchtelingen-crisis Schengen tot bedreiging heeft gemaakt van de geloofwaardigheid van de Europese Unie als collectieve entiteit - en van het vermogen van nationale regeringen om orde en de rechtsstaat te handhaven.	10-13
Sub	There has also developed over the	9-12	4	In de afgelopen twintig jaar heeft zich	14-18

	past two decades a <i>moral commitment</i> to censorship, a belief that because we live in a plural society, so we must police public discourse about different cultures and beliefs, and constrain speech so as not to give offence.			ook een morele verplichting tot zelfcensuur ontwikkeld; een overtuiging dat we, omdat we in een pluralistische maatschappij leven, het publieke debat over verschillende culturen en religies onder toezicht moeten stellen en ons in onze uitingen moeten inhouden, om geen aanstoot te geven.	
Sub	In recent years, the tail has tended to wag the dog in the UK, with Cameron kowtowing to the fanatically anti-European wing of his Conservative Party , if only to hold the pro-withdrawal UK Independence Party at bay.	7-9	5	De afgelopen jaren heeft Cameron de fanatiek anti-Europese vleugel van zijn Conservatieve Partij steeds naar de mond moeten praten, al was het maar om de UK Independence Party (UKIP) , die vóór afscheiding van de Europese Unie is , de wind uit de zeilen te nemen.	9-12
Sub	On the contrary, British withdrawal would likely inspire similar moves in other countries, with the risk that the EU, already weakened , might begin to fragment.	42-44	5	Integendeel, een Brits vertrek zou vermoedelijk de inspiratiebron zijn voor soortgelijke bewegingen in andere landen, met het risico dat de EU, die toch al verzwakt is , uit elkaar zou kunnen vallen.	66-68
Sub	And, given his current efforts to divide Europe , one can be sure that Russian President Vladimir Putin would do all that he can to encourage, and finance, such a split.	44-46	5	En gezien zijn huidige pogingen om verdeeldheid te zaaien in Europa kunnen we er zeker van zijn dat de Russische president Vladimir Poetin alles zou doen wat in zijn vermogen ligt om zo'n uiteenvallen aan te moedigen en te financieren.	68-71

Negating

Legend: SN – Syntactical Negation, M N– Morphological Negation, LN- Lexical Negation

	Sentence	Line	Text	Translation	Line
SN	A diplomatic component is no less essential to any response	25	1	Een diplomatieke component is voor elke respons net zo van belang	34

SN	The struggle against the Islamic State is not a conventional war.	50-51	1	De strijd tegen de Islamitische Staat is geen conventionele oorlog.	65-66
SN	And, because the agreement is not legally binding on its signatories, the only sanction it permits is to “name and shame” countries that fail to deliver.	37-38	2	En omdat de overeenkomst juridisch niet bindend is , is de enige toegestane sanctie het 'noemen en aan de schandpaal nagelen' van landen die hun beloften niet nakomen.	35-37
SN	At some point, the implementation challenge will include additional measures to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons once the agreement’s time limits on specified programs expire.	43-45	2	Op een gegeven moment zal de implementatie-uitdaging neerkomen op extra maatregelen om te verzekeren dat Iran geen kernwapens ontwikkelt zodra de tijdslimieten uit het verdrag zijn verlopen.	45-47
SN	To ridicule religion and to defend free expression is not to attack minority communities.	70-72	4	Het belachelijk maken van religie en het verdedigen van de vrije meningsuiting is niet het aanvallen van minderheden.	127-128
SN	Of course, the EU is not powerless to influence the outcome	33	5	De EU staat uiteraard niet machteloos als het gaat om het beïnvloeden van de uitkomst.	49-50
SN	Yet, hardly had news begun filtering out about the <i>Charlie Hebdo</i> shootings, than there were those suggesting that the magazine was a ‘racist institution’ and that the cartoonists, if not deserving what they got, had nevertheless brought it on themselves through their incessant attacks on Islam.	37-40	5	Het nieuws over de slachting was amper naar buiten gekomen of er waren al mensen, voornamelijk buiten Frankrijk, die suggereerden dat het blad een ‘racistische instelling’ was en dat de cartoonisten dit lot misschien wel niet verdiend hadden, maar het toch wel over zichzelf hadden afgeroepen door voortdurend in te hakken op de islam.	97-102
MN	This has been tried and failed, and Arab states are unable or unwilling to constitute one.	13-14	1	Dit is al geprobeerd en is mislukt, en de Arabische staten zijn niet in staat of van zins er een samen te stellen	19-20
LN	And, because the agreement is not legally binding on its signatories, the only sanction it permits is to “name and shame” countries that fail to deliver.	37-38	2	En omdat de overeenkomst juridisch niet bindend is, is de enige toegestane sanctie het 'noemen en aan de schandpaal nagelen' van landen die hun beloften niet nakomen.	35-37

Appendix 2 Source texts

1 After Paris

NEW YORK – The attacks in Paris by individuals associated with the Islamic State, coming on the heels of bombings in Beirut and the downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula, reinforce the reality that the terrorist threat has entered a new and even more dangerous phase. Just why the Islamic State decided to stage its attacks now is a matter for conjecture; it may well be that it is going global to compensate for its recent loss of territory in Iraq. But whatever the rationale, what is certain is that a clear response is warranted.

Actually, the challenge posed by the Islamic State calls for several responses, as there is no single policy that promises to be sufficient. Multiple efforts are needed in multiple domains.

One is military. More intense attacks from the air against Islamic State military assets, oil and gas facilities, and leaders are critical. But no amount of air power on its own will ever get the job done. A substantial ground component is needed if territory is to be taken and held.

Unfortunately, there is no time to build a partner force on the ground from scratch. This has been tried and failed, and Arab states are unable or unwilling to constitute one. The Iraqi army has also come up short. Iran-backed militias only make matters worse.

The best option is to work more closely with Kurdish troops and select Sunni tribes in both Iraq and Syria. This means providing intelligence, arms, and being willing to send more soldiers – more than the 3,500 Americans already there, and possibly on the order of 10,000 – to train, advise, and help direct a military response.

Such an effort must be collective. It can be informal – a “coalition of the willing” that would include the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Arab states, and even Russia under the right circumstances – or carried out under NATO or United Nations auspices. The packaging matters less than the results. Symbolic declarations of war, though, ought to be considered with caution, lest the Islamic State appear to be winning every day it does not lose.

A diplomatic component is no less essential to any response. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a recruiting tool for the Islamic State and must go. But any successor government must be able to maintain order and not permit the Islamic State to exploit a power vacuum, as it has

done in Libya.

Moreover, orderly political change can be brought about only with Russian and Iranian support. One near-term option worth exploring is a coalition government still headed by a representative of the Alawite minority, a concession that could well be the price of moving Assad out of power. In principle, and over time, a more representative national government could come about, although talk of holding elections in 18 months is fanciful under any scenario.

But reaching a compromise along these lines could well be impossible. This is why increased military effort is needed to bring about larger and more secure enclaves that could better protect civilians and take the fight to the Islamic State. Syria is not a normal country in any sense, and it will not be for a long time, if ever. A Syria of enclaves or cantons is a more realistic model for the foreseeable future.

Other indispensable elements of any effective strategy include expanded help for or pressure on Turkey to do much more to stem the flow of recruits to the Islamic State. And Turkey, along with Jordan and Lebanon, need more financial assistance as they shoulder the bulk of the refugee burden. Arab and Muslim leaders can do their part by speaking out to challenge the Islamic State's vision and delegitimize its behavior.

There is also a domestic dimension to policy. Homeland security and law enforcement – increasing protection both at borders and within them – will have to adjust to the increased threat. Retail terrorists – individuals or small groups carrying out armed attacks against soft targets in open societies – are extremely difficult to deal with. The threat and the reality of attacks will require greater social resilience and quite possibly a rebalancing of individual privacy and collective security.

What is also required is a dose of realism. The struggle against the Islamic State is not a conventional war. We cannot eradicate or destroy it any time soon, as it is as much a network and an idea as it is an organization and a *de facto* state that controls territory and resources.

Indeed, terrorism is and will continue to be one of the scourges of this era. The good news, though, is that the threat posed by the Islamic State to the Middle East and the rest of the world can be dramatically reduced through sustained, concerted action. The main lesson of the attack on Paris is that we must be prepared to act over time and place alike.

2 Executing Foreign Policy

NEW YORK – The filmmaker Woody Allen is often quoted as saying that “Showing up is 80% of life.” One can quibble with the percentage, but Allen’s insight is important: You have to get in the game – be a player – to have any chance of obtaining your objectives.

The same is true of world affairs. If *showing* up is 80% of life, at least 80% of foreign policy is *following* up. Smart plans, good intentions, and strong negotiating skills are essential, but they are never enough – not even close. As with business, education, and much else in life, most of what makes foreign policy work – or not – is a matter of implementation and execution.

This observation will be tested more than once in 2016 and subsequent years. One prominent example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the trade pact signed in October by 12 Pacific Rim countries in Asia and the Americas. If the accord enters into force, it will expand world trade, boost economic growth, and strengthen the United States’ ties with regional allies who would otherwise be tempted to move closer to China.

The agreement’s entry into force, though, is subject to ratification by most of the 12 signatories’ legislatures. The outcome in the US and Japan, the world’s largest and third largest economies, respectively, will be particularly consequential. Indeed, everyone is waiting to see what happens in the US.

But approval by the US Congress is far from certain, especially as the presidential candidates – all of the Democrats and the leading Republicans – have come out against it. The vote, if it takes place, will be close, and the stakes are high, as failure to ratify the TPP would raise fundamental questions about America’s political effectiveness and ability to be a reliable partner to its allies.

A second test will come in Syria, arguably the biggest international failure of recent years. In December, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2254, which establishes a political framework for a civil war that has raged for nearly five years, claiming as many as 300,000 lives and creating millions of refugees.

A framework, however, is nothing more than an outline. In this case, it was less than that, because the resolution was silent about Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s political fate and the timing of his departure. It also raised more questions than it answered about which Syrian opposition groups would participate in negotiations. Given the many divisions both within Syria and among its neighbors, getting from the resolution to a cease-fire and political settlement is

likely to take years – and even that assessment may prove to be overly optimistic.

Yet a third test for diplomats also stems from the climate agreement reached in Paris in December. The agreement comprises voluntary pledges by governments that amount to no more than promises to do their best. In many cases, there is a lack of specificity about what is to be done. And, because the agreement is not legally binding on its signatories, the only sanction it permits is to “name and shame” countries that fail to deliver.

A fourth test stems from the agreement signed over the summer by the Security Council’s five permanent members, Germany, and Iran limiting Iran’s nuclear program. There are sure to be numerous disagreements over whether the parties in general, and Iran in particular, are meeting their obligations. Perhaps most important, steps will need to be taken to reassure Iran’s neighbors so that they are not tempted to proceed with their own nuclear programs. At some point, the implementation challenge will include additional measures to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons once the agreement’s time limits on specified programs expire.

There are a few lessons to be learned from all of this. For starters, while international accords are rarely reached easily, no one should get carried away at the signing ceremony. The negotiators still must be able to deliver their governments’ full backing, and this is never automatic, especially when it comes to democracies such as the US, where different branches of government are often controlled by different political parties.

A second reality is that there is an unavoidable trade-off between negotiations and implementation. In many cases, agreement is possible only if critical details are left unresolved. But such “creative ambiguity” also ensures that the implementation phase will be more difficult, as tough choices that were postponed suddenly must be addressed.

Third, there will inevitably be moments when one or another party does not implement the pact in a manner judged to be adequate. Dealing with episodes of alleged non-compliance can prove to be every bit as demanding as the original negotiation.

Which brings us back to where we began. All four of the major international accords reached in 2015 – the TPP, the Security Council’s Syria resolution, the Paris climate agreement, and the Iran nuclear deal – required great effort to negotiate. Making them work in 2016 and beyond will prove even harder. As Woody Allen could tell you, it is akin to the difference between writing a screenplay and making a movie.

3 Life After Schengen

LONDON – Throughout Europe’s refugee crisis, which has been building for well over two years, warnings about the threat to the European Union’s precious Schengen Area of border-free travel have proliferated. Indeed, the warning was heard again recently, as EU ministers thrashed out a late-night agreement on border policing and the relocation of refugees. But, at a time of diminished confidence in the EU, would eliminating border-free travel be such a bad thing?

In short, no. Of course, the idea of abolishing borders within Europe holds great symbolic importance and appeal. But sometimes even sacred cows need to be slaughtered. With the refugee crisis turning Schengen into a threat to the credibility of the EU as a collective entity and of its national governments’ ability to maintain order and the rule of law, that time is now.

When it was first created in 1985, the Schengen Area included just five countries (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany). Membership has since ballooned to include 22 of the EU’s 28 member countries – with four of those left out (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania) due to join in the future – plus four non-EU members (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein). All have abolished controls at their shared borders and have adopted a common visa policy for citizens of non-member states.

It is certainly handy to be able to treat a flight from Zurich to Oslo as a domestic journey, with no passport controls to contend with upon departure and arrival. And it is undoubtedly convenient to be able to drive from Berlin to Barcelona without having to wait in line at each border one crosses. Indeed, that convenience is probably why only two EU countries (Ireland and the United Kingdom) have opted out of the Schengen Agreement.

But the refugee crisis has exposed the flipside of the Schengen Agreement – namely, the difficulty of monitoring national and EU territory without border controls. And though non-Schengen countries have, in some cases, been able to avoid direct obligations to participate in a common policy – the UK, for example, has remained outside the EU’s scheme for the relocation of refugees – they have not been insulated from the challenges of the migration crisis. They, like the Schengen countries, cannot credibly say how many migrants are in their country, who these people are, or when they arrived.

This loss of control matters, for two main reasons. First, if statistics about migration are open to doubt, even before taking into account illegal immigration, nationalist anti-immigration political

parties can more easily exaggerate the figures to stoke public fears. Second, if refugees who have been granted asylum can move easily to any Schengen country they choose, burden-sharing agreements lose their credibility and accepting refugees loses its practical appeal.

A country would not want to cover the up-front costs of settling a particular number of refugees, only to miss out on the eventual economic benefits that those refugees could provide when they join the workforce. To avoid this outcome, it would make sense to implement a transition period – like the seven-year transition periods faced by citizens of new member states – during which successful asylum-seekers are barred from moving to other countries for work. But Schengen makes this very difficult to enforce – a reality that plays further into the hands of the nationalists, who are keen to portray the EU as a burdensome obligation, rather than as a source of solutions or opportunities.

To be sure, the Schengen Agreement and the EU’s principle of free movement of people seem naturally to reinforce each other. But the issues they raise are not the same. It is the free movement of people, not border-free travel, that forms an essential component of the EU. And, under the current circumstances, Schengen is placing that fundamental right and benefit at risk.

Of course, resolving the refugee crisis will take far more than just reintroducing glass booths and uniformed immigration officials at borders. But suspending or abolishing the Schengen Agreement would boost the credibility of governments’ efforts to maintain order at home, and thus make ordinary citizens far more amenable to aiding more refugees.

At the same time, reversing a once-cherished policy would prove that the EU, far from being trapped by some utopian ideology, can adapt to changing circumstances in a thoughtful and pragmatic manner. *Reculer pour mieux sauter* – backing up in order to jump better – is, after all, a time-honored and very European principle.

4 Je suis Charlie? It's a bit late

Je suis Charlie'. It's a phrase in every newspaper, in every Twitter feed, on demonstrations in cities across Europe. The expressions of solidarity with those slain in the attack on the **Charlie Hebdo** offices are impressive. They are also too late. Had journalists and artists and political activists taken a more robust view on free speech over the past 20 years then we may never have come to this.

Instead, they have helped create a new culture of self-censorship. Partly, it is a question of fear, an unwillingness to take the kind of risks that the editors of **Charlie Hebdo** courted, and for which they have paid such a heavy price. But fear is only part of the explanation. There has also developed over the past two decades a **moral commitment** to censorship, a belief that because we live in a plural society, so we must police public discourse about different cultures and beliefs, and constrain speech so as not to give offence. In the words of the British sociologist Tariq Modood, 'If people are to occupy the same political space without conflict, they mutually have to limit the extent to which they subject each others' fundamental beliefs to criticism.'

So deep has this belief become embedded that even free speech activists have bought into it. Six years ago, Index on Censorship, one of the world's foremost free speech organizations, published in its journal an interview with the Danish-American academic Jytte Klausen about her book on the Danish cartoon controversy. But it refused the then editor permission to publish any of the cartoons to illustrate the interview. I was at the time a board member of Index – but the only one who publicly objected. 'In refusing to publish the cartoons', I observed, 'Index is not only helping strengthen the culture of censorship, it is also weakening its authority to challenge that culture'.

*This time round, Index on Censorship laudably insists that 'Freedom of expression is non-negotiable' and is calling 'on all those who believe in the fundamental right to freedom of expression to join in publishing the cartoons or covers of Charlie Hebdo'. But the culture of self-censorship has already become deeply entrenched. Indeed **Charlie Hebdo** itself has equivocated. All too often the defence of free speech has come with double standards attached.*

The irony is that those who most suffer from a culture of censorship are minority communities themselves. Any kind of social change or social progress necessarily means offending some deeply held sensibilities. ‘You can’t say that!’ is all too often the response of those in power to having their power challenged. To accept that certain things cannot be said is to accept that certain forms of power cannot be challenged. The right to ‘subject each others’ fundamental beliefs to criticism’ is the bedrock of an open, diverse society. Once we give up such a right in the name of ‘tolerance’ or ‘respect’, we constrain our ability to confront those in power, and therefore to challenge injustice.

Yet, hardly had news begun filtering out about the *Charlie Hebdo* shootings, than there were those suggesting that the magazine was a ‘racist institution’ and that the cartoonists, if not deserving what they got, had nevertheless brought it on themselves through their incessant attacks on Islam. What is really racist is the idea that only nice white liberals want to challenge religion or demolish its pretensions or can handle satire and ridicule. Those who claim that it is ‘racist’ or ‘Islamophobic’ to mock the Prophet Mohammad, appear to imagine, with the racists, that all Muslims are reactionaries. It is here that leftwing ‘anti-racism’ joins hands with rightwing anti-Muslim bigotry.

What is called ‘offence to a community’ is more often than not actually a struggle within communities. There are hundreds of thousands, within Muslim communities in the West, and within Muslim-majority countries across the world, challenging religious-based reactionary ideas and policies and institutions; writers, cartoonists, political activists, daily putting their lives on the line in facing down blasphemy laws, standing up for equal rights and fighting for democratic freedoms; people like Pakistani cartoonist Sabir Nazar, the Bangladeshi writer Taslima Nasreen, exiled to India after death threats, or the Iranian blogger Soheil Arabi, sentenced to death last year for ‘insulting the Prophet’. What happened in the *Charlie Hebdo* offices in Paris was viscerally shocking; but in the non-Western world, those who stand up for their rights face such threats every day.

What nurtures the reactionaries, both within Muslim communities and outside it, is the pusillanimity of many so-called liberals, their unwillingness to stand up for basic liberal principles, their readiness to betray the progressives within minority communities. On the one hand, this allows Muslim extremists the room to operate. The more that society gives licence for people to be offended, the more that people will seize the opportunity to feel offended. And the more deadly they will become in expressing their outrage. There will always be extremists who respond as the *Charlie Hebdo* killers did. The real problem is that their actions are given a spurious moral legitimacy by liberals who proclaim it unacceptable to give offence.

Liberal pusillanimity also helps nurture anti-Muslim sentiment. It feeds the racist idea that all Muslims are reactionary, that Muslims themselves are the problem, that Muslim immigration should be stemmed, and the Muslim communities should be more harshly policed. It creates the room for organizations such as the Front National to spread its poison. Whether there is an anti-Muslim backlash after the *Charlie Hebdo* killings remains to be seen, though there are reports of attacks on mosques and community centres. The fake liberals have played their role in fostering reactionary ideas about Muslims.

To ridicule religion and to defend free expression is not to attack minority communities. On the contrary: without doing both it is impossible to defend the freedoms of Muslims or of any one else. So, yes, let us challenge the Islamists and the reactionaries within Muslim communities. Let us also challenge the anti-Muslim reactionaries. But equally let us call the fake liberals to account.

5 David Cameron's Europe

STOCKHOLM – The next 18-24 months are likely to decide the shape of Europe for decades to come, and the United Kingdom has now started the clock on that process. Reelected with a resounding – and entirely unexpected – majority in the House of Commons, Prime Minister David Cameron must now use his increased mandate to set out an EU reform package that is attractive to all member states.

In recent years, the tail has tended to wag the dog in the UK, with Cameron kowtowing to the fanatically anti-European wing of his Conservative Party, if only to hold the pro-withdrawal UK Independence Party at bay. But now that his own authority has been strengthened significantly by his victory, with the UKIP emerging as the election's biggest loser, he can now step forward as the pragmatic but committed European that he truly is.

In a series of speeches over recent years, Cameron has spoken about a European reform agenda centered on increasing the EU's competitiveness and improving its institutions' transparency. In the wake of Russian revanchism and the mayhem spreading across the Middle East, were Cameron to speak today of the changes that Europe needs to make, I would hope that he would add his support for more effective common foreign and security policies.

If Cameron sets out such a reform agenda at the European Council in June and is prepared to listen as well as to talk, he could set in motion a process that benefits all of Europe. Then, it will be primarily up to EU Council President Donald Tusk, under the Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovakia, and Malta presidencies of the EU over the next two years, to move a reform package forward by early 2017.

This will be a process in which the EU's 28 member states, rather than the European Commission, must be in command. Only by appealing to and involving the EU's national political institutions can EU reform succeed. Next year should be a period of intense debate on a reform package that, when put together, will, it is hoped, be agreed by all of the EU's members, because Cameron needs to hold his promised in-or-out referendum on the EU before the UK takes over the rotating presidency on July 1, 2017.

At the moment, opinion polls indicate that the UK electorate would vote for continued EU membership. Then again, no opinion polls predicted that the general election would result in a majority Conservative government. So no one should be under any illusion about the risks inherent in any British referendum on EU membership.

Of course, the EU is not powerless to influence the outcome. The Union can do its part in the coming 18 months by demonstrating its ability to deliver not only a potent reform package, but also implement other key policies, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the United States and the Digital Single Market. Success in such areas, and the economic benefits they will bring, will make leaving the EU even more unattractive for the UK. But a UK decision to leave, should it come to that, would initiate a painful and complicated process of negotiating an exit and agreeing on some sort of new relationship. There would be no attractive options, and the result – regardless of how much goodwill both sides bring to the talks – would leave both the UK and the EU visibly diminished, not least on the world stage. Moreover, it would be naive to expect that the rest of the EU could just go on as before. On the contrary, British withdrawal would likely inspire similar moves in other countries, with the risk that the EU, already weakened, might begin to fragment. And, given his current efforts to divide Europe, one can be sure that Russian President Vladimir Putin would do all that he can to encourage, and finance, such a split. During this period, the EU would also have to address the ongoing challenges to its eastern neighbors, particularly Ukraine, posed by Putin’s revisionism, as well as the meltdown of much of its southern neighborhood in the Middle East and North Africa. In this context, a weakened and fractured Europe – unable to confront threats stemming from its immediate environment – would be a more dangerous place to live. Cameron’s remarkable victory should be viewed as an opportunity to launch a renewed and reformed EU in the next two years. The UK’s European partners expect Cameron to frame the debate that must now begin if a truly stronger EU – one that can face up to its future and its future challenges – is to emerge. But there is also the possibility of it all going terribly wrong. In these dangerous times, the consequences of Europe’s disintegration must not be underestimated.

Appendix 3 Target Texts

1 1 Na Parijs

2 NEW YORK – De aanslagen in Parijs door individuen geassocieerd met de
3 Islamitische Staat, vlak na bomaanslagen in Beirut en het neerhalen van een Russisch
4 verkeersvliegtuig boven de Sinaï, versterken nog eens de realiteit dat de
5 terrorismedreiging in een nieuwe en zelfs nog gevaarlijker fase terecht is gekomen. Er
6 valt over te debatteren waarom de Islamitische Staat juist nu besloot zijn aanvallen te
7 plaatsen; het zou goed kunnen dat ze mondiaal gaan om te compenseren voor hun
8 recente verliezen in Irak. Maar wat de motivatie ook moge zijn, zeker is dat er een
9 duidelijke respons vereist is.

10 De uitdaging die de Islamitische Staat vormt vraagt in feite om verschillende
11 antwoorden, omdat er geen politiek bestaat die op zichzelf afdoende belooft te zijn. Er
12 zijn meerdere inspanningen nodig in meerdere domeinen.

13

14 Een hiervan is militair. Intensivering van luchtaanvallen tegen militaire doelen van de
15 Islamitische Staat, zijn olie- en gasfaciliteiten en leiders is van cruciaal belang. Maar
16 geen enkele mate van luchtmacht alleen zal de klus ooit klaren. Er is een substantiële
17 component op de grond vereist als we gebied in willen nemen en vasthouden.
18 Helaas is er geen tijd om vanuit het niets een gezamenlijke troepenmacht op te
19 bouwen. Dit is al geprobeerd en is mislukt, en de Arabische staten zijn niet in staat of
20 van zins er een samen te stellen. Het Iraakse leger komt ook tekort en door Iran
21 gesteunde milities verergeren de situatie alleen maar.

22 De beste optie is om nauwer samen te werken met Koerdische troepen en selecte
23 Soennitische stammen in zowel Irak als Syrië. Dit betekent het voorzien van
24 inlichtingen en wapens, en de bereidheid meer soldaten te sturen – meer dan de 3.500
25 Amerikanen die er al zitten, en wellicht tot wel 10.000 – om op te leiden, te adviseren,
26 en om een militaire respons te helpen regisseren.

27 Dit zou een collectieve inspanning moeten zijn. Deze kan informeel zijn (een
28 *‘coalition of the willing’* die zou bestaan uit de Verenigde Staten, Frankrijk, Groot-
29 Brittannië, Arabische staten, en onder de juiste omstandigheden zelfs Rusland), of
30 worden uitgevoerd onder toezicht van de NAVO of de Verenigde Naties. De
31 verpakking telt minder dan de uitkomst. We moeten echter voorzichtig zijn met
32 symbolische oorlogsverklaringen, daar de Islamitische Staat elke dag dat deze niet
33 verliest lijkt te winnen.

34 Een diplomatieke component is voor elke respons net zo van belang. De Syrische

35 president Bashar al-Assad is wervingsmateriaal voor IS en moet het veld ruimen.
36 Maar welke regering hier ook op volgt, deze moet in staat zijn om de orde te bewaren
37 en de Islamitische Staat niet zoals in Libië toestaan een machtsvacuüm te benutten.
38 Bovendien kan een ordelijke politieke wissel alleen maar bereikt worden met
39 Russische en Iraanse steun. Een optie op de korte termijn die het waard is te
40 onderzoeken is een coalitieregering die nog steeds geleid wordt een representant van
41 de Alevitische minderheid, een concessie die wel eens de prijs zou kunnen zijn Assad
42 zijn macht te ontnemen. In principe zou er met verloop van tijd een meer
43 representatieve nationale regering kunnen komen, alhoewel berichten over
44 verkiezingen binnen 18 maanden onder elk scenario een illusie lijken.
45 Maar een compromis in die richting zou zeer wel onmogelijk kunnen zijn. Daarom is
46 er een verhoogde militaire inspanning nodig om grotere en veiligere enclaves te
47 creëren die betere bescherming aan burgers kunnen bieden en zorgen dat het gevecht
48 op de Islamitische Staat gericht is. Syrië is op geen enkele manier een normaal land en
49 het zal nog lange tijd duren voordat het dit zal worden, als dit überhaupt ooit al
50 gebeurt. Een Syrië met enclaves of kantons is voor de afzienbare toekomst een
51 realistischer model.

52 Een ander onmisbaar onderdeel van welke effectieve strategie dan ook is uitgebreide
53 hulp aan, of druk op, Turkije om veel meer te doen om de stroom rekruten richting de
54 Islamitische Staat in te dammen. En Turkije moet samen met Jordanië en Libanon
55 meer financiële ondersteuning krijgen, daar ze samen het overgrote deel van de
56 vluchtelingenlast dragen. Arabische- en moslimleiders kunnen bijdragen door de visie
57 van IS uit te dagen en zijn gedrag te delegitimeren.

58 En er is ook nog een binnenlandse politieke dimensie. De binnenlandse veiligheid en
59 rechtshandhaving zullen zich – door de veiligheid zowel aan de grens als erbinnen te
60 vergroten – aan de verhoogde dreiging moeten aanpassen. Terroristen die kleinschalig
61 opereren – individuen of kleine groepen die gewapende aanvallen uitvoeren op zachte
62 doelen in open steden – zijn extreem moeilijk aan te pakken. De dreiging en realiteit
63 van aanslagen zal een grotere sociale veerkracht vereisen en zeer wel mogelijk een
64 herschikking van de individuele privacy en collectieve veiligheid.

65 Wat ook vereist is is een dosis gezond realisme. De strijd tegen de Islamitische Staat
66 is geen conventionele oorlog. We kunnen deze niet eerdaags uitroeien of vernietigen,
67 omdat het evenzeer een netwerk en idee is als een organisatie en de facto staat die
68 gebied en hulpbronnen controleert.

69 Terrorisme is en zal dan ook een van de gesels van dit tijdperk blijven. Het goede
 70 nieuws is echter dat de dreiging van de Islamitische Staat aan het Midden-Oosten en
 71 de rest van de wereld drastisch verminderd kan worden door middel van
 72 vasthoudende georkestreerde actie. De belangrijkste les van de aanval op Parijs is dat
 73 we ons er op voor moeten bereiden lange tijd op verschillende plaatsen in actie te
 74 komen.

2 Niet akkoorden zelf, maar uitvoering is cruciaal

Een vaak gebruikt citaat van Woody Allen is dat 'komen opdagen 80 procent van het leven is'. Je moet aan het spel deelnemen om kans te maken op het verwezenlijken van je doelstellingen. Dat geldt ook voor het buitenlands beleid.

Slimme plannen, goede bedoelingen en sterke onderhandelingsvaardigheden zijn cruciaal, maar nooit genoeg. Het al dan niet laten werken van buitenlands beleid is een zaak van tenuitvoerlegging.

Deze constatering zal in 2016 meer dan eens op de proef worden gesteld. Een prominent voorbeeld is het Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), het handelsakkoord dat in oktober werd ondertekend door twaalf landen in Azië en de Amerika's die aan de Pacific grenzen. Als het akkoord van kracht wordt, zal het de wereldhandel doen groeien en de banden van de Verenigde Staten versterken met regionale bondgenoten die anders in de verleiding zouden komen dichterbij China aan te kruipen. Het van kracht worden van de overeenkomst is echter afhankelijk van de ratificatie door de parlementen van de ondertekenende landen.

Goedkeuring door het Amerikaanse Congres is echter verre van zeker, vooral nu de presidentskandidaten - alle Democraten en de leidende Republikeinen - zich ertegen hebben uitgesproken. De stemming zal, als zij al zal doorgaan, spannend zijn en de inzet hoog, omdat een eventueel onvermogen om het TPP te ratificeren fundamentele vragen zou oproepen over de politieke effectiviteit en betrouwbaarheid van Amerika. Het zal in Syrië jaren kosten om vanuit de resolutie tot een staakt-het-vuren te komen. Een tweede test zal plaatsvinden in Syrië. In december nam de VN-Veiligheidsraad unaniem resolutie 2.254 aan, waarin een politiek raamwerk wordt neergelegd voor de beëindiging van de burgeroorlog die bijna vijf jaar heeft gewoed, 300 duizend levens heeft geëist en tot miljoenen vluchtelingen heeft geleid. De resolutie spreekt zich echter niet uit over het politieke lot van de Syrische president Assad. Ook riep zij vragen op over de kwestie welke Syrische oppositiegroepen mogen deelnemen aan de onderhandelingen. Gezien de vele scheidslijnen binnen Syrië en tussen de buurlanden zal het waarschijnlijk jaren kosten om vanuit de resolutie tot een staakt-het-vuren en een politieke schikking te komen.

Een derde test is de klimaatovereenkomst die in Parijs is gesloten. Deze omvat

34 vrijwillige beloften van regeringen, die niets anders zijn dan toezeggingen om hun
35 best te doen. In veel gevallen is totaal niet duidelijk wat er moet worden gedaan. En
36 omdat de overeenkomst juridisch niet bindend is, is de enige toegestane sanctie het
37 'noemen en aan de schandpaal nagelen' van landen die hun beloften niet nakomen.

38

39 Een vierde test vloeit voort uit het akkoord deze zomer van de vijf permanente leden
40 van de Veiligheidsraad, plus Duitsland en Iran, dat Irans nucleaire programma aan
41 banden legt. Er zullen zeker onenigheden ontstaan over de vraag of de partijen in het
42 algemeen en Iran in het bijzonder hun verplichtingen nakomen. Wellicht het
43 belangrijkste is dat er stappen moeten worden gezet om de buurlanden van Iran gerust
44 te stellen, zodat zij niet in de verleiding komen hun eigen kernprogramma's voort te
45 zetten. Op een gegeven moment zal de implementatie-uitdaging neerkomen op extra
46 maatregelen om te verzekeren dat Iran geen kernwapens ontwikkelt zodra de
47 tijdslimieten uit het verdrag zijn verlopen.

48 Niemand mag zich op een wolk van enthousiasme laten wegdrijven

49 Uit dit alles kunnen enkele lessen worden getrokken. Om te beginnen mag niemand
50 zich op een wolk van enthousiasme laten wegdrijven bij de ondertekeningsceremonie.
51 De onderhandelaars moeten nog steeds de volledige steun van hun regeringen kunnen
52 leveren. Dat is nooit een automatisme, zeker niet in het geval van democratieën als de
53 VS, waar verschillende takken van de overheid dikwijls worden gecontroleerd door
54 verschillende politieke partijen.

55

56 Een tweede realiteit is dat een akkoord vaak alleen mogelijk is als cruciale details
57 onopgelost blijven. Maar daardoor wordt de implementatiefase lastiger: moeilijke
58 keuzen die werden uitgesteld, moeten plotseling onder handen worden genomen.
59 In de derde plaats zullen er onvermijdelijk momenten zijn dat een partij het akkoord
60 ten uitvoer legt op een manier die niet adequaat wordt geacht. Hiermee omgaan kan
61 net zo veeleisend blijken als de oorspronkelijke onderhandelingen.

62

63 Dit brengt ons terug bij ons uitgangspunt. Alle vier belangrijke internationale
64 akkoorden die in 2015 werden bereikt, vergden grote inspanningen van de
65 onderhandelaars. Het laten werken van deze akkoorden in 2016 zal nog moeilijker
66 blijken te zijn.

67

3 Het leven na Schengen wordt grenzeloos beter

Vanaf het begin van de al twee jaar broeiende Europese vluchtelingencrisis horen we waarschuwingen over de bedreiging van het kostbare Schengen-gebied van vrij reizen. Toen EU-ministers er onlangs in nachtelijk beraad een akkoord uitpersten over grenscontroles en de verdeling van vluchtelingen hoorden we de waarschuwing weer. Maar zou het in een tijdperk van verminderd vertrouwen in de EU zo'n ramp zijn om het reizen zonder grenzen in de ban te doen?

Kort gezegd, nee. Natuurlijk is het idee van een Europa zonder grenzen aantrekkelijk en symbolisch van groot belang. Maar soms moet je zelfs een heilige koe slachten. En die tijd is aangebroken, nu de vluchtelingencrisis Schengen tot bedreiging heeft gemaakt van de geloofwaardigheid van de Europese Unie als collectieve entiteit - en van het vermogen van nationale regeringen om orde en de rechtsstaat te handhaven.

Toen 'Schengen' in 1985 werd gelanceerd, deden vijf landen mee (West-Duitsland, Frankrijk en de Benelux-landen). Sindsdien is de deelname gestegen tot 22 van de 28 EU-landen (met vier landen - Bulgarije, Kroatië, Cyprus en Roemenië - in de wachtkamer) plus vier niet-leden (Noorwegen, IJsland, Zwitserland en Liechtenstein). Allen hebben de controles aan hun gemeenschappelijke grenzen opgeheven en een gemeenschappelijk visumbeleid afgesproken voor burgers uit niet-EU-landen.

Het is zeker handig om een vlucht van Zürich naar Oslo als binnenlandse reis te behandelen, zonder paspoortcontroles aan het begin en eind van de reis. En het is zeker prettig om van Berlijn naar Barcelona te kunnen rijden zonder in de rij te hoeven staan bij elke grensovergang. Sterker, dat gemak is waarschijnlijk de reden waarom slechts twee EU-landen (Ierland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk) niet meedoen aan het Schengen Akkoord.

Verlies van controle

Maar de vluchtelingencrisis heeft de keerzijde van Schengen belicht - namelijk hoe moeilijk het is om nationale en EU-grenzen in de gaten te houden zonder grenscontroles. En hoewel niet-Schengen-landen in sommige gevallen in staat zijn geweest zich te onttrekken aan de directe verplichtingen om deel te nemen aan gemeenschappelijk beleid (het VK bijvoorbeeld blijft buiten het EU-verdeelschema voor vluchtelingen) zijn ze niet afgeschermd van de uitdagingen van de migratiecrisis.

35 Net als Schengen-landen hebben ze geen geloofwaardige cijfers over hoeveel
 36 migranten in hun land aanwezig zijn, wie deze mensen zijn, of wanneer ze zijn
 37 gearriveerd.

38

39 Dit verlies van controle is belangrijk om twee redenen. Ten eerste, als statistieken
 40 over migratie twijfelachtig zijn, zelfs als je illegale migratie erbuiten laat, kunnen
 41 nationalistische anti-immigratiepartijen die cijfers makkelijker opblazen om publieke
 42 angsten aan te wakkeren. Ten tweede, als vluchtelingen aan wie asiel is verleend met
 43 gemak kunnen reizen naar elk Schengenland, verliezen afspraken om de opvang te
 44 verdelen hun geloofwaardigheid en wordt het accepteren van vluchtelingen minder
 45 aantrekkelijk.

46

47 Een land wil niet voor de kosten van de eerste opvang van een bepaald aantal
 48 vluchtelingen opdraaien, zonder later de economische vruchten te kunnen plukken als
 49 deze vluchtelingen gaan werken. Om dit te voorkomen, lijkt het redelijk om een
 50 overgangstijd af te spreken (zoals de zeven jaar overgangsperiode voor burgers van
 51 nieuwe lidstaten) waarin succesvolle asielzoekers niet naar andere landen mogen
 52 verhuizen om te werken. Maar vanwege Schengen is dit bijzonder moeilijk uit te
 53 voeren - wat alweer door nationalisten kan worden misbruikt om de EU als een lastige
 54 verplichting af te schilderen in plaats van als bron voor oplossingen.

55 *Geloofwaardigheid*

56 Zeker, het Schengen Akkoord en het EU-beginsel van vrij verkeer van personen lijken
 57 elkaar te versterken. Maar het gaat niet om dezelfde kwesties. Het vrije verkeer van
 58 personen, niet reizen zonder grenzen, is de essentiële component in de EU. Onder de
 59 huidige omstandigheden is Schengen een bedreiging van dat fundamentele recht.

60

61 Natuurlijk zal het oplossen van de vluchtelingencrisis veel meer vergen dan het
 62 herintroduceren van glazen hokjes en immigratieofficieren aan de grenzen. Maar het
 63 opheffen of onderbreken van het Schengen Akkoord zou de geloofwaardigheid van
 64 overheidsinspanningen om de orde te bewaren vergroten, en dus het draagvlak onder
 65 burgers om meer vluchtelingen te helpen.

66

67 Tegelijkertijd zou het terugdraaien van een eens geliefde maatregel betekenen dat de

68 EU niet de gevangene is van een utopische ideologie, maar zich op een bedachtzame
69 en pragmatische manier kan aanpassen aan veranderende omstandigheden. Reculer
70 pour mieux sauter - een stap terug zetten om beter te kunnen springen - dat is tenslotte
71 een oud en heel Europees principe.

4 Met zelfcensuur help je minderheden juist niet

Ook onder moslims wagen schrijvers, cartoonisten en activisten elke dag hun leven bij het trotseren van wetten rond godslastering, zegt Kenan Malik. Dat alle moslims reactionair zouden zijn is een racistische gedachte.

‘Je suis Charlie.’ Overall zie en hoor je het: in alle kranten, in elk Twitterbericht, bij demonstraties in heel veel Europese steden. De betuigingen van solidariteit met de slachtoffers van de aanval op Charlie Hebdo maken indruk. Ze komen echter in menig opzicht te laat. Als journalisten, kunstenaars en politiek activisten in de afgelopen twintig jaar een steviger standpunt hadden ingenomen over vrije meningsuiting, was het misschien nooit zover gekomen. In plaats daarvan hebben ze een nieuwe cultuur van censuur helpen ontstaan. Dat is gedeeltelijk een kwestie van angst, van niet het soort risico’s willen nemen waarvoor de redactie van Charlie Hebdo niet terugdeinsde en waarvoor ze nu zo’n zware tol hebben betaald. Toch is angst maar een deel van de verklaring. In de afgelopen twintig jaar heeft zich ook een morele verplichting tot zelfcensuur ontwikkeld; een overtuiging dat we, omdat we in een pluralistische maatschappij leven, het publieke debat over verschillende culturen en religies onder toezicht moeten stellen en ons in onze uitingen moeten inhouden, om geen aanstoot te geven. Zoals de Britse socioloog Tariq Modood het verwoordde: ‘Als mensen in dezelfde politieke ruimte moeten kunnen verkeren zonder in conflict te komen, moeten ze zich wederzijds beperken bij het uiten van kritiek op elkaars fundamentele overtuigingen.’

Het land van Voltaire

In Frankrijk heeft dit tot totaal tegenovergestelde meningen over vrije meningsuiting geleid. Enerzijds is Frankrijk er trots op het land van Voltaire te zijn, een land dat geneigd is tot satire en het belachelijk maken van ideeën en overtuigingen op een manier waar andere naties, met name naties als Groot-Brittannië die zich meer bewust zijn van hun multiculturele karakter, minder toe geneigd zijn. Charlie Hebdo plaatst zichzelf duidelijk in die traditie. Anderzijds wijst Frankrijk nadrukkelijk het concept van onbeperkte vrije meningsuiting af zoals dat is vastgelegd in het Eerste Amendement op de Amerikaanse grondwet. Frankrijk heeft een zeer restrictieve smaad- en privacywetgeving, waardoor de Franse pers veel tammer is dan die in Amerika of Groot-Brittannië en veel minder geneigd is om machthebbers ter verantwoording te roepen. Frankrijk heeft ook een van de strengste wetten tegen haatzaaien van de EU, om individuen en groepen te beschermen tegen belastingen en

35 *belediging op grond van ras, etniciteit, nationaliteit, geslacht, religie of seksuele*
 36 *geaardheid. Ook het ontkennen van de Holocaust is er bij wet verboden. Beide wetten*
 37 *zijn van grote beperkende invloed geweest op het publieke debat. Je kunt in Frankrijk*
 38 *niet maar alles zeggen in het openbaar. Deze combinatie van Voltairiaanse trots en*
 39 *beperkingen van de vrije meningsuiting heeft geleid tot tegenstrijdigheden en het*
 40 *meten met twee maten geleid. De rooms-katholieke kerk wordt al heel lang door*
 41 *satirici op de korrel genomen. De meeste schrijvers en cartoonisten zijn echter heel*
 42 *omzichtig als het om antisemitisme gaat en zijn veel minder geneigd grenzen te*
 43 *overschrijden bij het maken van grappen over Joden of de joodse leer, wat ook te*
 44 *maken heeft met de Franse geschiedenis, van Dreyfus-affaire tot Vichy. De islam is*
 45 *daarentegen een algemeen aanvaard en gewettigd, zelfs noodzakelijk doelwit.*

46 *Gevoeligheden*

47 *Ook Charlie Hebdo hanteert weleens dubbele maatstaven. Vijf jaar geleden werd*
 48 *cartoonist Maurice Sinet beschuldigd van antisemitisme na een hatelijke opmerking*
 49 *over Jean Sarkozy, de zoon van de Franse oud-president, die zich had verloofd met*
 50 *een Joodse erfgename en zich aan het bekeren was tot het joodse geloof. Er brak een*
 51 *mediastorm los en Philippe Val, destijds de hoofdredacteur, eiste dat Sinet zijn*
 52 *excuses aanbod. Toen die dat weigerde, werd hij ontslagen. Als het de islam betreft,*
 53 *heeft Charlie Hebdo echter altijd geweigerd rekening te houden met gevoeligheden*
 54 *van moslims. Er zijn drie benaderingen van het meten met twee maten. Je kunt doen*
 55 *alsof er niets aan de hand is, zoals de meerderheid van links Frankrijk doet. De*
 56 *tweede benadering is eisen, zoals veel moslims en antiracisten doen, dat de islam*
 57 *wordt beschermd tegen beledigingen. De derde is de dubbele moraal aanpakken - niet*
 58 *door vrijheden nog meer in te perken, maar door vrije meningsuiting juist uit te*
 59 *breiden en ervoor te zorgen dat iedereen op gelijke wijze door vrijheden beschermd*
 60 *wordt en niet dat iedereen op gelijke wijze in die vrijheden wordt beperkt. Het*
 61 *probleem van pogingen om de dubbele moraal tegen te gaan door de vrije*
 62 *meningsuiting verder in te perken, is dat degenen die het meest te lijden hebben van*
 63 *een cultuur van censuur de minderheden zelf zijn. Alle sociale verandering of sociale*
 64 *vooruitgang gaat nu eenmaal gepaard met het bruuskeren van diep verankerde*
 65 *gevoeligheden. ‘Dat mag je niet zeggen!’ is maar al te vaak de reactie van*
 66 *machthebbers als hun macht wordt bedreigd. Wie eenmaal accepteert dat bepaalde*
 67 *dingen niet mogen worden gezegd, accepteert dat bepaalde vormen van macht niet in*
 68 *twijfel mogen worden getrokken. Het recht om ‘elkaars fundamentele overtuigingen*

69 te bekritisieren' is het fundament van een open, gevarieerde samenleving. Zodra we
 70 dat recht opgeven uit naam van 'tolerantie' of 'respect', beperken we ons vermogen
 71 om machthebbers ter verantwoording te roepen en onrecht te bestrijden.

72(37-44).....

73 Wat 'beledigen van een gemeenschap' wordt genoemd, duidt in feite vaak op een
 74 conflict binnen die gemeenschap. Er zijn miljoenen mensen in
 75 moslimgemeenschappen in het Westen en in overwegend islamitische landen over de
 76 hele wereld die zich verzetten tegen op religie gebaseerde reactionaire ideeën, beleid
 77 en instellingen; schrijvers, cartoonisten, politiek activisten die elke dag weer hun
 78 leven op het spel zetten bij het trotseren van wetten rond godslastering, die opkomen
 79 voor gelijke rechten en strijden voor democratische vrijheden. Mensen als de
 80 Pakistaanse cartoonist Sabir Nazar, de schrijfster Taslima Nasreen uit Bangladesh, die
 81 na doodsb bedreigingen naar India moest vluchten, of de Iraanse blogger Soheil Arabi,
 82 die vorig jaar ter dood is veroordeeld voor 'het beledigen van de profeet'. Wat er in de
 83 Parijse redactielokalen van Charlie Hebdo is gebeurd, was misselijkmakend
 84 schokkend, maar in de niet-westerse wereld hebben degenen die opkomen voor hun
 85 rechten elke dag met zulke bedreigingen te maken.

86

87 *Reactionair*

88 *Het probleem met de oproep van liberale zijde tot inperking van de vrije*
 89 *meningsuiting rond de islam, is dat degenen die daaronder het meest te lijden krijgen*
 90 *juist de vooruitstrevende leden van moslimgemeenschappen zijn. De Deense*
 91 *volksvertegenwoordiger Naser Khader verwijst naar een gesprek dat hij had met*
 92 *Toger Seidenfaden, redacteur van Politiken, een liberale Deense krant die bijzonder*
 93 *kritisch was over de Deense cartoons. Seidenfaden beweerde dat 'de cartoons*
 94 *beledigend waren voor alle moslims'. Khader reageerde met 'Ik voel me niet*
 95 *beledigd', waarop Seidenfaden zei: 'Maar jij bent geen echte moslim.' Waarom niet?*
 96 *Omdat je vanuit een dergelijk perspectief reactionair moet zijn om een echte moslim*
 97 *te zijn. Een soortgelijke reactie was er rond de cartoons van Charlie Hebdo. Het*
 98 *nieuws over de slachting was amper naar buiten gekomen of er waren al mensen,*
 99 *voornamelijk buiten Frankrijk, die suggereerden dat het blad een 'racistische*
 100 *instelling' was en dat de cartoonisten dit lot misschien wel niet verdiend hadden, maar*
 101 *het toch wel over zichzelf hadden afgeroepen door voortdurend in te hakken op de*
 102 *islam. Wat echt racistisch is, is de gedachte dat alleen aardige blanke liberalen zich*

103 tegen religie keren of de pretenties ervan willen ontmaskeren, of tegen satire en spot
 104 kunnen. Degenen die beweren dat het ‘racistisch’ of ‘islamofobisch’ is om de spot te
 105 drijven met de profeet Mohammed lijken met de racisten van mening te zijn dat alle
 106 moslims reactionair zijn. Hier vinden links ‘antiracisme’ en rechtse
 107 antimoslimvooroordelen elkaar. Reactionaire krachten, zowel binnen
 108 moslimgemeenschappen als daarbuiten, spinnen garen bij de lafhartigheid van veel
 109 zogenaamde liberalen, die niet bereid zijn om op te komen voor fundamentele liberale
 110 principes, maar wel om de progressieven onder de minderheden in de kou te laten
 111 staan. In zekere zin geeft dat moslimextremisten de ruimte. Hoe meer de samenleving
 112 mensen het recht geeft zich beledigd te voelen, des te meer mensen die kans zullen
 113 grijpen en hoe dodelijker ze zullen worden in het uiten van hun woede. Er zullen altijd
 114 extremisten zijn die zo reageren als de moordenaars bij Charlie Hebdo. Het echte
 115 probleem is dat hun daden een schijnbare morele rechtvaardiging krijgen van
 116 liberalen die beweren dat het onaanvaardbaar is om anderen te beledigen.

117
 118 Gif

119 Liberale lafhartigheid werkt ook anti-moslimgevoelens in de hand. Het voedt de
 120 racistische gedachte dat alle moslims reactionair zijn, dat de moslims zelf het
 121 probleem zijn, dat de immigratie van moslims moet worden beperkt en dat
 122 moslimgemeenschappen strenger door de politie moeten worden gecontroleerd. Dat
 123 schept ruimte voor organisaties als het Front National om hun gif te verspreiden. We
 124 moeten afwachten of er na de moorden bij Charlie Hebdo een anti-islamreactie op
 125 gang komt, maar er zijn al berichten over aanslagen op moskeeën en buurtcentra. In
 126 elk geval hebben de namaakliberalen een rol gespeeld in het bevorderen van
 127 reactionaire ideeën over moslims. Het belachelijk maken van religie en het verdedigen
 128 van de vrije meningsuiting is niet het aanvallen van minderheden. Integendeel: als we
 129 beide niet doen, wordt het onmogelijk om de vrijheden van minderheden te
 130 verdedigen. Ja, we moeten de dubbele moraal rond de islam aanpakken en ons
 131 verzetten tegen hen die anti-moslim zijn, maar we hebben ook de grootst mogelijke
 132 vrijheid van meningsuiting nodig. Ook omwille van de vrijheden van minderheden.

5 Camerons zege kan EU nieuwe impuls geven

De komende 18 tot 24 maanden zullen waarschijnlijk beslissend zijn voor de vorm die Europa de eerstvolgende paar decennia zal krijgen. Groot-Brittannië heeft de klok voor dat proces nu in werking gesteld. Herkozen met een klinkende - maar geheel onverwachte - meerderheid in het Lagerhuis moet premier David Cameron zijn ruimere mandaat gebruiken om een hervormingspakket voor de Europese Unie voor te stellen dat aantrekkelijk is voor alle lidstaten.

De afgelopen jaren heeft Cameron de fanatiek anti-Europese vleugel van zijn Conservatieve Partij steeds naar de mond moeten praten, al was het maar om de UK Independence Party (UKIP), die vóór afscheiding van de Europese Unie is, de wind uit de zeilen te nemen. Maar nu zijn eigen gezag aanzienlijk is versterkt, terwijl de UKIP bij de recente algemene verkiezingen als grootste verliezer uit de bus is gekomen, kan Cameron naar voren treden als de pragmatische maar toegewijde Europeaan die hij werkelijk is.

Hervormingsagenda

Cameron heeft het de afgelopen jaren in een reeks toespraken gehad over een Europese hervormingsagenda, gericht op de verbetering van de concurrentiekracht van de EU en de transparantie van haar instellingen. Als Cameron, met het oog op het Russische revanchisme en de wanorde die zich in het Midden-Oosten verspreidt, zich binnenkort uitspreekt over de veranderingen die Europa moet doorvoeren, hoop ik dat hij zijn steun geeft aan een effectiever gemeenschappelijk buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid.

Als Cameron tijdens de Europese Raad in juni een degelijke hervormingsagenda op de rails zal zetten en bereid is om ook naar anderen te luisteren, kan hij een proces in beweging brengen waarvan heel Europa kan profiteren. Daarna zal het vooral aan president Donald Tusk van de Europese Raad zijn om het hervormingspakket aan de orde te stellen.

Dit zal een proces zijn waarin de 28 lidstaten van de Europese Unie, en niet zozeer de Europese Commissie, de leiding zullen moeten nemen. Alleen door een beroep te doen op en het erbij betrekken van de nationale beleidsinstellingen van de EU kan een

hervorming van de Europese Unie slagen. Volgend jaar moet een periode zijn van intensieve debatten over een hervormingspakket waarmee, zo mag worden gehoopt, alle lidstaten van de Europese Unie zullen instemmen als het eenmaal is samengesteld. Want Cameron moet zijn beloofde referendum over het wel of niet in de Europese Unie blijven houden vóórdát Groot-Brittannië op 1 juli 2017 het roterende voorzitterschap overneemt.

Opiniepeilingen

Op dit moment blijkt uit opiniepeilingen dat Groot-Brittannië voor een voortgezet EU-lidmaatschap zal stemmen. Maar geen enkele opiniepeiling voorspelde dat de recente algemene verkiezingen zouden resulteren in een meerderheidsregering van de Conservatieven, dus niemand mag ook maar enige illusie koesteren over de risico's die zijn verbonden aan een Brits referendum over het EU-lidmaatschap.

De EU staat uiteraard niet machteloos als het gaat om het beïnvloeden van de uitkomst. De Unie kan het komende anderhalf jaar haar steentje bijdragen door haar vermogen te demonstreren om niet alleen een krachtig hervormingspakket te introduceren, maar ook andere belangrijke beleidsplannen ten uitvoer te leggen, zoals het Transatlantische Handels- en Investeringspartnerschap (TTIP) met de Verenigde Staten en de Digitale Enkelvoudige Markt. Succes op deze terreinen, en de economische voordelen die dit met zich zal meebrengen, zullen een vertrek uit de EU nóg onaantrekkelijker maken voor Groot-Brittannië.

Maar een Brits besluit om te vertrekken, als het zo ver zou komen, zou tot een pijnlijk en ingewikkeld proces leiden van onderhandelingen over een 'exit' en het overeenkomen van een nieuw soort relatie. Er zouden geen aantrekkelijke opties zijn, en het resultaat - ongeacht de hoeveelheid goodwill waarmee beide kampen de besprekingen zouden ingaan - zou zowel Groot-Brittannië als de EU zichtbaar minder sterk achterlaten, ook op het wereldtoneel.

Bovendien zou het naïef zijn te verwachten dat de rest van de EU eenvoudigweg verder zou kunnen gaan als voorheen. Integendeel, een Brits vertrek zou vermoedelijk de inspiratiebron zijn voor soortgelijke bewegingen in andere landen, met het risico dat de EU, die toch al verzwakt is, uit elkaar zou kunnen vallen. En gezien zijn

69 huidige pogingen om verdeeldheid te zaaien in Europa kunnen we er zeker van zijn
 70 dat de Russische president Vladimir Poetin alles zou doen wat in zijn vermogen ligt
 71 om zo'n uiteenvallen aan te moedigen en te financieren.

72

73 Tijdens deze periode zou de EU zich ook moeten bezighouden met de aanhoudende
 74 uitdagingen aan het adres van haar oostelijke buurstaten, met name Oekraïne, als
 75 gevolg van het revisionisme van Poetin, en met de ineenstorting van een groot deel
 76 van haar zuidelijke buurstaten in het Midden-Oosten en Noord-Afrika. In deze
 77 context zou een zwak en verdeeld Europa - dat niet in staat is het hoofd te bieden aan
 78 dreigingen die voortkomen uit zijn onmiddellijke omgeving - een gevaarlijker plek
 79 zijn om te wonen.

80

81 De opmerkelijke overwinning van Cameron moet worden gezien als een kans om de
 82 komende twee jaar een vernieuwde en hervormde EU te lanceren. De Europese
 83 partners van Groot-Brittannië verwachten dat Cameron het kader zal bepalen van het
 84 debat dat nu zal moeten beginnen als het tot een werkelijk sterkere EU - die haar
 85 toekomst en de daarmee gepaard gaande uitdagingen onder ogen kan zien - moet
 86 komen. Maar het kan ook allemaal vreselijk verkeerd aflopen. In deze gevaarlijke
 87 tijden mogen de gevolgen van de desintegratie van Europa niet worden onderschat.

88

89