THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN DUTCH COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY

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

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INTRODUCTION

The important role of civil society in counter-terrorism strategies was demonstrated by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 2006 (Aly 2013, p.3). The implementation of counter-terrorism activities calls for the collective and comprehensive effort of a wide range of actors, including civil society (Bakker and Kessels 2012, p.89; Rosand et al. 2008, p.3). It is for this reason that the UNGA in 2015 drafted the present 'Plan of Action' that pursues a practical approach to prevent violent extremism on both the global and national levels (UNGA 2015, p.12).

The actions of civil society appears to be the most effective tool for preventing and countering homegrown terrorism, respectively preventing radicalisation and encouraging de-radicalisation (Bakker and Kessels 2012, pp.92-89; Rineheart 2010, p.39). The Western phenomenon of so-called 'homegrown' terrorism can be traced back to 1995 and refers to terrorists who are either born in the West or have been Westernized (Roy 2017). Homegrown terrorists are motivated by disconnected feeling of disconnection and alienation from the society in which they reside, and is exacerbated by the cutting off of ties with family and their respective countries of origin (Roy 2017, p.17). For the purpose of this thesis, the following working definition of homegrown terrorism will be used, offered by Manni Crone and Martin Harrow (2011): "The notion of 'homegrown' is the idea of radicalized youth who were born and raised in the West" (p. 522).

However, a general issue of debate in the field of counter-terrorism concerning the role of civil society is the utility and efficacy of a soft power approach (Jervis 2005). By examining the use of preventive measures to counter violent extremism and radicalisation by civil society, it is possible to evince a general picture of its role in countering homegrown terrorism. For example, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in 2006 recognized the imperative for civil society to prevent and counter "the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes" (Ministerial Council 2006, p.3). More recently in 2015, UN member states of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy drafted the present 'Plan of Action' to violent extremism[1] focused on strengthening the capacity of civil society, the private sector, regional and sub-regional actors to collectively prevent terrorism (Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force 2006; UNGA 2015, pp.1-2; Aly 2013, pp.3-4). This approach was

[1] "In its resolution 2178 (2014), the Security Council makes explicit the link between violent extremism and terrorism, underscores the importance of measures being in line with international norms and recognizes the need for prevention: violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, requires collective efforts, including preventing radicalization, recruitment and mobilization of individuals into terrorist groups and becoming foreign terrorist fighters" (UNGA 2015, p.2).

adopted and enshrined in the following pieces of national legislature: The United Kingdom's 'Prevent' strategy, in which civil society played a significant role to develop and deliver online counter-narratives (The Secretary of State for the Home Department 2016, p.18; 2011b, p.52); Australia's concept of 'resilience, focused on the empowerment of civil society voices to counter terrorist ideologies' (Council of Australian Governments 2015, p.8); and The United States principle of 'Building a Culture of Resilience' among the society against recruitment and mobilization to violence by terrorist organizations (United States of America Government 2010, pp.8,11). As evidenced from the above national initiatives, the role of civil society in the Netherlands has also become more important from 2001 onwards.

However, although civil society's engagement in counter-terrorism strategies has been demonstrated by UN member states, little attention has been paid to the extent to which civil society has actually played a role. One way to investigate, is to compare the role of civil society described in the relevant academic literature with the designated role of civil society according to the annual reports of the Dutch Security Services. To address this issue, the following research question is proposed:

> *'to what extent has civil society played a role in countering terrorism according to the annual reports of the AIDV[2], since the attacks of 9/11 (2001-2017)?'*

This paper will make an original contribution to the existing discourse on this topic by performing an empirical study of annual reports by the Internal Security Services in the case of the Netherlands, and the connection made between theories of resilience and civil society in the context of counter-terrorism measures. This research is organised as follows: The first section will describe who or what is meant by 'civil society', the three operational challenges the concept of civil society faces (definition, measurement and application); before finally explaining the concept of civil society in the context of the Netherlands. The second section of this paper will discuss the 'soft-power' approach to counter-terrorism, defined as:

> "population-centric methods, [that] contain features such as capacity building, economic development, and counter-radicalization focusing on the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive" (Rineheart 2010, p.38).

In order to support this debate with empirical evidence, this section provides an overview of soft power approaches employed by the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. Consequently, a re-conceptualisation of soft-power approaches to counter-terrorism will be presented that pays close

[2] the Internal Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD)

attention to the concept of resilience and the role of the fear of terrorism in civil society. Before this framework can be applied to the Netherlands, it is necessary to look at the similarities and differences between Dutch historical context and the respective contexts of the aforementioned states. Based on this background information, a theoretical framework to the case of the Netherlands can therefore be applied.

This paper will employ the research methods of process tracing and documentary analysis of reports from the AIVD (2001-2017) and additional reports of the NCTV to measure the extent to which civil society has played a role in the counter-terrorism strategy of the Netherlands. These documents are available in the public domain and are freely accessible on the internet[3]. Documentary analysis is an effective method for qualitative research, as it requires thorough examination; involves evaluation and interpretation of data; and finally gives meaning to the obtained data (Bowen 2009, pp.27-32). The results of empirical data and interpretation of the data find both contradictions and correspondences with the expectations derived from the literature. Some findings find that the overall role of civil society in the annual reports of the AIVD is limited and others show, as was expected, that civil society played a preventive role in the preliminary stage (radicalisation and deradicalization) of terrorism. The additional reports and reports from the NCTV, however, pay more attention to a possible role civil society and local governments to counter-terrorism. This study therefore concludes that, the constrained role civil society has played in countering terrorism according to the annual reports of the AIVD, since the attacks of 9/11 (2001-2017), may result from a different set of priorities from the AIVD in informing society of a general image of existing threats, instead of an added-value of civil society in countering home-grown terrorism as has been predicted from prior studies.

[3] https://english.aivd.nl/publications

1. CONCEPTUALIZING CIVIL SOCIETY

Over the past two decades, an impressive body of literature has been produced defining the concept of civil society, how it should be understood and how it is developed (Malena and Heinrich 2007; Pevcin 2012). Although civil society is a concept which has frequently been the object of academic focus, there is still no universally shared definition of what constitutes a civil society. It is seen as a phenomenon with unclear boundaries which is constantly subject to change under different conditions, rendering its definition especially elusive(Malena and Heinrich 2007; Fioramonti and Kononykhina 2015). Based on civil society's changeable character, is it even possible for such a universally shared definition to exist? Or might it be more valuable to define and understand the concept of civil society in its specific context and time as a social construct? In order to answer these questions, this section describes who or what is meant by civil society, then describes three operational challenges the concept of civil society faces (definition, measurement and application), before finaly presenting a workable definition for this research and explaining the concept of civil society in the context of the Netherlands.

As mentioned above, civil society is not a new phenomenon: according to Malena and Heinrich (2007), "since Aristotle, political thinkers have debated, disputed, and failed to reach consensus regarding the nature and meaning of civil society" (p.338). However, some attempts have been very meaningful, particularly the work of three influential philosophers: G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), John Locke (1632-1704), and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Their work, developed in the 18th and 19th centuries, enshrined thinking about civil society from within the discipline of sociology, political theory, and philosophy (Dalton 2014). The 'Hegelian' conception of civil society involves "a specific set of institutions or organisations that are held to 'mediate' between public and private life" (Dalton 2014, p.44). The second influential conception of civil society derives from the work of John Locke. From Locke's perspective, civil society is a crucial counterweight to the power of the government, in which strong institutions help to keep society 'civil' and avoid the state to develop tendencies towards authoritarianism (Dalton 2014; Locke 1965, p.29). Finally, Hobbes' contends that "civil society institutions do not make the state civil, but rather, it is the state which civilises society" (Dalton 2014, pp.44-45). According to the Hobbesian tradition, an absolute sovereign authority is necessary to civilise society because human beings are driven by passions and therefore unable to achieve something like self-government (Hampton 1986, p.208). The beliefs of Hegel and Locke are in comparison with each

other in terms of assigning a particular role to civil society, as mediator or as counterweight to the government. In contradiction to these two philosophers, Hobbes' belief is that the state is responsible for civilizing society, rather than civil society institutions. Notwithstanding this contradiction, the work of these three scholars provide context for today's study and development of civil society. Particularly for this research, these philosophical schools of thought contextualise the approach to what particular role civil society can play.

Another example is Bronwen Dalton's (2014) constructed framework built on the work of other scholars (Putnam 1993; Portes 1998; Verba et al. 1995; Warren 2001), showing the different faces of civil society. Within this framework, Dalton outlines a continuum of five (positive and negative) ideal types to illustrate his contentions regarding civil society. First of all, civil society is perceived as 'supporter of democratic states' (Dalton 2014, p.46). This argument is based on the notion that organisations in civil society are able to build trust, social capital and shared value, and facilitate feelings of interconnectedness within society. The second positive ideal type states that civil society can function as a counterweight to the state and as key driver of democratisation (Dalton 2014, p.47).

On the contrary, Dalton (2014) also describes the 'ugly side' of civil society (p.48). According to this third type, civil society, is defined by exclusivity, inequality and even violence. Groups within civil society can form closed communities, leading to conflicts of interests and disproportionate sharing of power or resources (Porte 1998, pp.13-14). In line with this approach the fourth type of civil society, states that civil society can undermine the democratic process within associations themselves. For instance, "inequalities of membership tend to mirror other inequalities" (Dalton 2014, p.49). In other words, associations themselves are likely to increase the influence of those already in possession of important resources, and decrease the power of those who already had less. In the end, this further undermines values of a democratic society (Dalton 2014, p.49). Finally, Dalton (2014) mentions that "civil society has too much asked of it" (p.49). With this, she implies that civil society does not function independently, and instead relies on additional factors such as economics and politics that are essential for a functioning democracy. Moreover,

> "Activists in weak or failed states face enormous challenges promoting democratic other kind of civic minded values in the absence of any rules of the game" (Whitehead 1997 *in* Dalton 2014, p.50).

The current situation in South Sudan, Syria and Yemen and their high score on the Fragile States Index 2018[4], are cases supporting this statement.

Dalton's framework presents how civil society can function in practice, how it can be both inclusive and exclusive, and how it both can support and undermine democracy. However, there are certain aspects of her theory ofcivil society that are missing. The concept of civil society still faces operational problems in defining what is actually is; how to measure it; and how to find global consensus (mainly outside the West) in the sense of its application.

Operational challenges

First is the issue of defining the concept of civil society, as Dalton (2014) contends "being vague or avoiding defining civil society is a popular route" (p.54). Helmut Anheier (2007) for instance, asserts that it is necessary to focus on the empirical approach itself instead of the issue of definition. As such, it is important to investigate the values of civil society instead of what civil society is (Dalton 2014). The research centre CIVICUS (World Alliance for Citizen Participation), in line with this approach, list various civic organisations as key units of analysis, rather than providing a clear definition of civil society[5]. They may not have provided a definition on their website, as Dalton (2014) argued, nevertheless CIVICUS provided a working definition in a report entitled 'The State of Civil Society' (2013). CIVICUS defines civil society as:

> "the arena outside the family, state and the market, which is created by individual and collective actions, organisations and institutions to advance shared interests" (CIVICUS 2013, p.10).

In the same passage, CIVICUS asserts that "citizens' actions should be voluntary, rather than through compulsion" (CIVICUS 2013, p.10). However, with regard to this research, the definition provided by CIVICUS fails to provide a clear definition of what aspects comprise civil society along with justifications for these aspects. The following definition of civil society, which has been used by the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on United Nations–Civil Society Relations (2004), tries to fill this gap.

> "[Civil society] includes associations of citizens (outside their families, friends, and businesses) entered into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas, and ideologies and organizations

[4] Retrieved from: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2018/04/19/fragile-states-index-2018-issues-of-fragility-touch-the-worlds-richest-and-most-developed-countries-in-2018/ 24 May 2018

[5] "Our definition of civil society is broad and covers non-governmental organisations, activists, civil society coalitions and networks, protest and social movements, voluntary bodies, campaigning organisations, charities, faith-based groups, trade unions and philanthropic foundations." Retrieved from: https://www.civicus.org/index.php/who-we-are/about-civicus 23 May 2018.

> such as professional associations, social movements, indigenous people's organizations, religious and spiritual organizations, academe, and public benefit nongovernmental organizations. The term does not include profit-making activity (the private sector) or governance (the public sector)"[6].

This definition will be used to support ideas within this paper, as the concept is clearly described with boundaries supported by detailed examples. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that conceptual definitions, such as civil society, must be fluid enough to keep up with the constant changes within society (Dalton 2014, p.64).

Despite the variety of interpretations, civil society is broadly understood as "the space in society where collective citizen action take place" (Malena and Heinrich 2007, p.338), while the British Library offers the following definition:

> "all observers agree that civil society refers to voluntary participation by average citizens and thus does not include behaviour imposed or even coerced by the state" (British Library 2003).

Here some common ground is found. Nonetheless, there is still no agreement on many other questions. For instance, "when has civil society emerged; what it is understood to represent; who and what is seen to include; where [do] the conceptual boundaries lie and which version of civil society should prevail?" (Dalton 2014, p.61). This research is mostly interested in the question when civil society emerged in the context of Dutch counter-terrorism.

Furthermore, these unanswered questions influence the second operational problem of civil society: how to measure its functionality. According to Malena and Heinrich (2007), the underdevelopment of appropriate operational concepts of civil society cause a lack of empirical knowledge of how civil society can be observed, measured, and shaped (p.339). Nevertheless, several attempts have been made to measure the size and development of the civil society sector. Helmut Anheier for instance, developed the Civil Society Index (CSI) as a new method to map the size and development of civil society (Biekart 2008, p.1172; Pevcin 2012, p.633). The index is coordinated by CIVICUS and built on four central dimensions: "the *structure* of civil society, […] the external *environment* in which civil society exists and functions, […] the *values* held and advocated in the civil society arena, and […] the *impact* of activities pursued by civil society actors" (Malena 2003, pp.2-3). The CSI is an honourable achievement of CIVICUS, however, several obstacles on the political, methodological, conceptual and theoretical level precludes the CSI from becoming a universal standard (Biekart 2008, p.1179). A second methodology known as the Global Civil Society Index (GCSI)

[6] the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on United Nations–Civil Society Relations (2004)

is presented by Glasius et al. (2002 *in* Pevcin 2012, p.633). This approach analyses civil society based on three dimensions: "organisational infrastructure, civility of individuals and participation of individuals (Pevcin 2012, p.633). In addition to the methodologies mentioned above, another study undertaken by the Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP) (2004) organized data based on the size of the non-profit sector (Pevcin 2012, p.633). These methods have been limited in their execution however, and do not offer comprehensive international comparisons since these studies have only been performed on select groups of countries (Pevcin 2012, pp.634-635). To avoid such limitations, this study employs instead process tracing and documentary analysis based on the case study of the Netherlands. This methodology will be further discussed in the following section.

Finally, the third operational challenge is to find consensus on the application of civil society. Although the term civil society has its roots in Western philosophy, nevertheless it has often been used outside European countries, such as Latin America, East Asia, and Africa (Malena and Heinrich 2007). This, according to Dalton (2014), "raises questions whether the term 'fits' outside of the west; [and] about the term's applicability and usefulness" (p.50). Blaney and Pasha (1993) question civil society's applicability in the 'Third World'. They argue that the claim of civil society as something universal is problematic, as this ignores civil society's theoretical and historical specificity. On the contrary, Malena and Heinrich (2007) argue that

> "collective citizen action to engage in public life is a feature of any non-totalitarian society, and that there is enough commonality among these various forms of citizen action to render cross-country comparisons possible" (2007, p.341).

The value of cross-country comparisons appears to be limited due to fact that civil society is a phenomenon with unclear boundaries which is always fluid because the world is in a state of constant change and is influenced by theoretical and historical contexts (Dalton 2014; Fioramonti and Kononykhina 2015). Therefore, this study disagrees with the claim of Malena and Heinrich and argues that a careful application of the concept to its specific cultural and historical context is required.

Dutch Civil Society

For this study, a brief overview of Dutch civil society is crucial. Understanding the development of the sector in a Dutch context is inextricably linked to the process of pillarization, defined as, "the vertical segregation of various population groups along religious or political lines." (van der Lans 2002; Burger et al. 1997, p.3). Within this context, the broadest and oldest term for the Dutch non-profit sector was developed, '*het particulier initatief*' (translated: the private (non-governmental) initiative). This term refers to "groups of citizens rallied in voluntary associations in pursuing issues that supersede

individual interest" (Burger et al. 1997, p.1). Later, when the welfare state was developed, the term '*het maatschappelijk middenveld*'(translated: the societal midfield) was introduced to represent the variety of organizations between the state and the individual citizen with the focus on the 'vertical' mediating functions between them. As Burger et al. (1997) contends, "on the one hand, the organizations in the societal midfield represent the interest of their specific group at government level and try to influence public policymaking. On the other hand, many of the organizations are of service to the government, for instance by implementing and monitoring policies" (p.2). The interplay of the societal midfield and the government is interesting for this study because here the role of 'civil society' becomes clear.

In the first half of the nineties, the term 'civil society' (not translated) was introduced in the Netherlands and has become popular as an alternative for 'societal midfield' (Burger et al. 1997). Jos van der Lans (2002) opposes the fact that the term 'societal midfield' is being replaced by civil society without any thought. According to Lans (2002), the term 'civil society' in Dutch context, is better described as voluntary work, as it excludes professional service oriented organizations, which is recognized as being part of the 'societal midfield'. Nonetheless, the English term civil society today has become more popular in a Dutch context in the sense that it is ideologically neutral and less associated with a particular political party, whereas the term 'societal midfield' has always been strongly linked to the Christian Democrats political party (CDA) (Burger et al. 1997). Therefore, while the public interest in a Dutch context has shifted from 'societal midfield' to use the term civil society, its influence is still present in the reports of the AIVD.

This chapter aimed to conceptualize civil society. It started by giving a brief description of where the term originates from and how different scholars gave meaning to civil society. In this study, Dalton's (2014) framework will be used to show how civil society's different faces can cause inclusivity and exclusivity and can support and undermine the democratic legal order. This was followed by an illustration of three operational challenges the concept of civil society faces. Defining the concept appears to be the first challenge. Despite conceptual definitions of civil society constantly changing, working definition provided by the UN Secretary General has been chosen for the purpose of this study. The challenge of defining the concept resulted in a second challenge of how to measure the concept. Few possible measurements have been presented for which documentary analysis and process tracing seem to be reliable methods. To minimize the third challenge of application of civil society, this study analyses civil society in its historical context, with a concluding paragraph providing a brief overview and understanding of civil society in the Netherlands.

2. ‘SOFT POWER’ APPROACH TO COUNTER-TERRORISM

“As terrorism is caused by a multitude of factors, it is common wisdom that any approach to counter-terrorism requires a wide or comprehensive approach” (Bakker and Kessels 2012, p.89). According to Bakker and Kessels (2012) this comprehensive approach to terrorism and processes of violent extremism primarily require a focus on civil society and the individuals within in order to protect them from becoming radicalized (pp.92, 99, 89). Rineheart (2010), in his attempt to restructure the debate on current counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency doctrines, points out that “if counter-terrorism is indeed an all-encompassing approach” it is important to understand all aspects of a nation’s power, including both “hard and soft power option of counter-terrorism” (p.31,37). Hard power in this debate is perceived as a direct approach and is defined as “the struggle against terrorism in military terms of an enemy-centric war where the armed forces of a state are primarily in charge of developing counterterrorism strategy” (Rineheart 2010, p.37). When looking at history, it appears that the majority of liberal democracies have countered terrorism with “paramilitary and ‘hard power’ responses” (Pickering et al. 1998, p.91). Such ‘hard power’ approaches carry significant consequences, such as intensifying tensions which generate and sustain terrorism (Pickering et al. 1998, p.91).

On the other hand, the indirect and soft power approach involves:

> “population-centric methods, and would contain features such as capacity building, economic development, and counter-radicalization focusing on the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive” (Rineheart 2010, p.38).

Jervis (2005) questions the effectiveness and usefulness of soft power alternatives, as it is difficult to prove a causal link between the two. While it may be a complex process to determine the effectiveness of soft power approaches to counter-terrorism, Pickering et al. (1998) nevertheless argues that within counter-terrorism strategies, social cohesion in society is identified as an important soft power element (p.102). Community engagement actively influences the development of social cohesion and “undermines the conditions which locally generate terrorism” by building trust (Pickering et al. 1998, p.106, 102). Community engagement in counter-terrorism strategies is based on the importance of sharing information (Pickering et al. 1998, p.102). Due to its relevance to the topic of civil society, this

study will focus on the importance of 'soft power' approaches to counter-terrorism instead of 'hard power'.

Another debate in de field of counter-terrorism is "the issue of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization" (Rineheart 2010, p.38). Some argue that processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation trigger events that motivate people "into and out of terrorism" (Rineheart 2010, pp.38-39; Horgan 2009). Nevertheless, theories of radicalization have encountered problems in providing an explanation for individuals who take the decision to adopt or leave terrorism behind (Rineheart 2010, p.39). The main reason behind this is that there exists no single terrorist phenotype. In the absence of such an individual terrorist profile, de-radicalization is still a crucial part of counter-terrorism, as Rineheart (2010) argues, soft power approaches to counter-terrorism can offer particular "individuals and groups some sort of pathway out of terrorism" (p.39). In addition, much of the literature on violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism is devoted to contributing internal and external factors, such as polarization, stigmatization, Western military interventions, and the role of cyber space (Bakker and Kessels 2012, p.90). This study, on the other hand, is interested in the extent to which civil society plays a role in decreasing these contributing factors.

Within the context of policy response to home-grown terrorism[7], the use of soft counter-terrorism measures is an essential and important element of comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies both on the international and the national level (Aly, 2013). In December 2001, for instance, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) Ministerial Council adopted the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This document was one of the first to recognize the importance of preventive efforts, next to repressive actions, in order to combat the spread of violent extremism (Bakker 2012, p.93). OSCE Participating States decided to investigate the possibility of actively engaging civil society institutions in "preventing and countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes" (MC.DEC/7/06 *in* Bakker 2012, p.96). UN Member States decided to elaborate on this point by means of adopting the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 8 September 2006 by focussing on collective counter-terrorism, which involves civil society, the private sector, regional and sub-regional actors (Counter-terrorism Implementation Task Force, 2006). Member states that adopted the counter-terrorism strategy agreed on strengthening the collective capacity to prevent terrorism (Aly 2013, pp.3-4). Among those were The United Kingdom, Australia and The United States. These three countries have incorporated soft power approaches in their counter-terrorism strategies and acknowledge the role communities and civil

[7] For the purpose of this thesis the following working definition of homegrown terrorism will be used, offered by Manni Crone and Martin Harrow (2011), "The notion of 'homegrown' is the idea of radicalized youth who were born and raised in the West" (p. 522).

society play in a comprehensive counter-terrorism approach. The role of the community is often expressed in terms of "building community resilience[8] to violent extremism and terrorism" (Aly, 2013, p.5). Moreover, the overview of this selection of states, and how they have incorporated soft power approaches in their counter-terrorism strategies is necessary in order to place the case study of the Netherlands in the correct context.

United Kingdom's 'Prevent' strategy

The United Kingdom's approach is outlined in 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Counter-Terrorism' (Aly, 2013, p.5). This strategy is based on four elements: 'Pursue (to stop terrorist attacks); Prevent (to stop people becoming terrorist or supporting terrorism); Protect (to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack); and Prepare (to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack).'[9] The prevent strategy is mainly focused on the underlying causes of terrorism, such as "stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism" (Aly 2013, p.6). Therefore, the UK's 'Prevent' clearly displays tenets of a soft power approach to counter-terrorism. As part of the 'Prevent' strategy, forming partnerships with a wide range of sectors, including civil society, is a central element. The RICU (Research, Information and Communications Unit[10]) for instance, is working together with experts from the private sector. Regarding the challenge of countering terrorist propaganda online, the primarily focus is on increasing the confidence and capacity of civil society groups to challenge and confront online terrorism and extremist content by means of counter-ideological work (The Secretary of State for the Home Department 2016, p.18; 2011b, p.52). In 2015, the *Prevent* program was strengthened, including the support for civil society groups to deliver more online counter-narrative campaigns (The Secretary of State for the Home Department 2016, p.15). In addition, the UK government continues to advise civil society groups "how best to use the internet to communicate, project their messages and challenge terrorist ideology" (The Secretary of State for the Home Department 2011a, p.67). According to Dalton's (2014) framework of civil society, it appears that civil society in this case can be perceived as a 'supporter of democratic states', as the ability of civil society to challenge and confront online terrorism and extremist content is emphasized, which can be done by building trust, understanding, and a shared system of value (Dalton 2014, p.46). As a result of the

[8] The concept of 'resilience' in this research is understood as followed: "The definition of social resilience as society's ability to endure continuing adversity, includes both a cognitive component and a behavioral component. On a cognitive level, social resilience reflects the society's morale, or its belief that it has the ability to overcome difficulties and continue onwards – for example, a culture based on the narrative of heroism and a sense of pride. The behavioral component refers to the actual behavior of individuals in various areas of their daily life, where the emphasis is on the ability to cope and adapt." (Shamoa, 2014, pp.280)

[9] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-counter-terrorism/2010-to-2015-government-policy-counter-terrorism accessed on 23 November 2017

[10] Established in 2007 and is responsible for delivering on counter-terrorism priorities under the CONTEST strategy (The Secretary of State for the Home Department 2016, p.18)

United Kingdom's attempt to counter terrorist propaganda online, civil society has begun to play a significant role in developing and delivering counter-narratives (The Secretary of State for the Home Department 2011a, p.76; Aly 2013).

Australia and the concept of 'resilience'

The 'Counter-Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting our Community' (2010) describes Australia's counter-terrorism approach as comprised of four principles: Analysis, Protection, Response and Resilience. Resilience in this research is perceived as a soft power approach to counter-terrorism and is defined as "building a strong and resilient Australian community to resist the development of any form of violent extremism and terrorism on the home front" (Australian Government 2010, p. iii). In 2011, the Australian government implemented the 'Building Community Resilience Grants Program (BCRGP)' to support vulnerable people against 'disengagement and marginalisation'; to promote participation in the community; and to build resilience in communities against violent extremism.[11] Australia's counter-terrorism strategy has, over time, developed into a more preventive and soft power approach built on five core elements, among which are challenging violent extremist ideologies and stopping people from becoming terrorists (Council of Australian Governments 2015, p. vi). In the context of these two elements, the Australian government has recognized that civil society and the private sector play a constructive role in limiting and undermining propaganda encouraging violent extremism and terrorism. In addition, strategies have been developed to "empower the community and civil society voices that combat terrorist ideology" (Council of Australian Governments 2015, p.8). Family, friends (not considered as civil society) and communities are identified as the frontline in stopping people from becoming terrorists and are therefore actively working together with the Australian government to counteract the drivers of radicalisation The government in return provides training and resources and commits funds that enable them to work to the best of their ability (Council of Australian Governments 2015, pp.10-11). It can be concluded that Australia's approach to counter-terrorism and focus on civil society, is in line with and provides support for the soft power approach presented in this study.

The United States and 'Building a Culture of Resilience'

In June 2011 the United States mentioned four core principles in Obama's 'National Strategy for Counter-terrorism' that guides US counter-terrorism efforts. One of the principles is 'Building a Culture of Resilience' in order to "respond to and recover successfully from any potential act of terror directed

[11] http://cvemonitor.cpakgulf.org/index.php/2016/07/19/building-community-resilience-grants-program-bcrgp/ accessed on 22 November 2017.

at our nation" (United States of America Government 2010, p.8). This strategy focuses on the homeland and building resilience among communities against "al-Qaida inspired radicalization, recruitments, and mobilization to violence" (United States of America Government 2010, p.11). Obama's counter-terrorism strategy was built on hard power principles as well as soft power options, however, this has changed under the Trump adminstration. Regarding America's Homeland security policy of counter-terrorism, a hard power approach is clearly favoured over soft power options. Promotion of American Resilience is briefly mentioned, however, implementation is a one-way street in which the Administration provides information and empowers communities (United States of America Government 2017, p.14). Civil society is not perceived as a partner to cooperate with counter-terrorism initiatives, while programs to counter violent extremism (CVE) appear highly sceptical according to Trump's Administration Officials (Jervis et al. 2017, p.7). According to Jervis et al (2017) this creates a weak institutional basis for counter-terrorism that lacks societal resilience, which is reflected in the fact that fear of terrorism remains high (p.8).

This section illustrated three counter-terrorism strategies carried out by The United Kingdom, Australia and The United States. These three countries adopted the UN's counter-terrorism strategy, agreeing to strengthen their collective capacity to prevent terrorism (Aly 2013, pp.3-4). In its *Prevent* strategy, The United Kingdom assigned civil society the role of developing and delivering counter-narratives in order to counter online terrorist propaganda, seemingly following the agreements (The Secretary of State for the Home Department 2016, p.15). It appears that the role Australia assigned to civil society in their counter-terrorism strategy is in line with The United Kingdom's *Prevent* strategy, however, this role has been expanded by means of resilience and empowering of communities and civil society (Council of Australian Governments 2015, p.8). Contrary to the other countries, The United States is less supportive of assigning a specific role to civil society in its counter-terrorism strategy. Rather, "Trump's first budget submission coupled a largely symbolic elevation of US hard power – a proposed 3% increase in military spending – with a painfully tangible denigration of US soft power – roughly 30% cuts for the State Department and US Agency for International Development" (Brands 2017, p.27). It appears that the election of President Trump changed the focus on hard rather than soft power approaches to counter-terrorism. Moreover, this section points to the likelihood that all three countries define the role of community and civil society in terms of building community resilience. Resilience in this context is understood as "the ability to absorb the impact of, and then recover from, a shock or disturbance"[12] (Hardy, 2014, p.79). Therefore, focus should be on how society anticipates

[12] See footnote 3 for further information.

emergency situations and the disruptions these events are likely to cause (Chmutina and Bosher 2017, p.275). However, those implementing resilience argue that

> "it is impossible to always predict the event and/or the level of disruption it [emergency situations] will cause, and this uncertainty leads to a lack of interest or appreciation of the benefits of taking preventive measures" (Chmutina and Bosher 2017, p.275).

In addition, countering-terrorism in all three countries was concentrated on the home front by means of policies that promote democratic values and social harmony (Aly, 2013). The next section will take a closer look at the case study of the Netherlands and will provide historical context on the development of counter-terrorism in the Netherlands.

Historical context of Dutch counter-terrorism

The first time the Netherlands has been confronted with 'modern terrorism' took place on March 31 1970. On this day, the 'Free South Moluccan Youths' (*Vrije Zuidmolukse Jongeren*) occupied the residence of the Indonesian Ambassador. During the attempt to rescue the Ambassador, a senior police officer was shot by the Free South Moluccan youths. This situation is perceived to be the first attack of modern terrorism in the Netherlands (Abels 2007, p.121). This tragic event also appears to have triggered discussion around the Netherlands' counter-terrorism policy, even though some time elapsed before these terms were first used. For a long time, terrorism in the Netherlands was considered as a non-Dutch phenomenon (Abels 2007). From this perspective, the Dutch government in the 1970s was acting reservedly in labelling the South Moluccan activists as 'terrorists,' trying to solve hostage situations such as this through negotiation (Abels 2007, p.121; De Graaf and De Graaff 2008, p.185).

> "In the case of the Moluccans, the government especially tried to address the political, social and economic grievances of the distressed Moluccan minority, thereby introducing the comprehensive 'Dutch approach" (De Graaf and De Graaff 2008, p.184).

The originality and the existence of the "Dutch approach[13]" is questioned (De Graaf 2010, p.27). However, it is important to mention at this point that Dutch counter-terrorism strategies are characterized by looking for liberal and non-violent solutions to terrorism. This reserved attitude has been reflected in the first policy documents on counter-terrorism in which the government was obliged

[13] "Methods of talking to terrorists were first developed systematically in the New York Police Department by Frank Bolz and Harvey Schlossberg. These experts were brought to the Netherlands were a domestic negotiator, the psychiatrist Dr Dick Mulder, adapted their approach to political terrorist [...]. Mulder, who worked for the Ministry of Justice [...] has been credited with the 'Dutch approach' which is, in fact, a New York approach" (Schmid 1992, pp.80).

to be cautious in using countermeasures for combating terrorist phenomena, as this could have been damaging to the image of openness core to the identity of Dutch society (Abels 2007, p.121).

In the 1980s the main task of the BVD (Dutch secret service), the predecessor of the AIVD, was to prevent international terrorists as well as 'homegrown' terrorist groups from disrupting Dutch society and importing political conflict into the Netherlands (De Graaf and De Graaff 2008, p.187). Dutch counter-terrorism approaches in this period:

> "favoured a moderate discourse, avoided special anti-terrorism legislation, tried to keep the military in their barracks, differed between 'political violent activism' […] and terrorism […] and, on the whole, applied a differentiated and proportional CT strategy within the existing security framework" (De Graaf and De Graaff 2008, p.187).

The differentiation between 'political violent activism' and 'terrorism' was quite controversial because "terrorist groups were defined as 'political radical violence' as long as they were not aimed at killing people" (De Graaf and De Graaff 2008, p.187). This demonstrates that the liberal and non-violent 'soft power' approach of the 1970s continued to be dominant in Dutch counter-terrorism policy.

After a turbulent period in the seventies and eighties, Dutch counter-terrorism initiatives in the 1990s fell into the background of policymakers' attentions (Abels 2012, pp.1-2). Despite the fact that the terrorism threat level in the Netherlands was moderate, attention for the terrorism issue almost completely disappeared until the end of the 1990s (van Nimwegen 2006, p.119).

At the end of 2001, the Dutch counter-terrorism landscape transformed due to the 9/11 attacks and the emergence of Pim Fortuyn as new right-wing politician on the Dutch national platform (De Graaf and De Graaff 2008, p.190). International terrorism was now on top of the Dutch political agenda. However, when two boys originating from Eindhoven were killed in a confrontation with Indian troops during a Jihadist mission to Kashmir, homegrown terrorism suddenly returned to the forefront of Dutch citizens and Dutch policymakers (Abels 2012, pp.1-2). The realization that Dutch youngsters also could be vulnerable to radicalization to being recruited by terrorist organizations reverberated throughout Dutch society. This resulted in a conscious effort to identify and prevent radicalization processes in their early stages, becoming the essential matter in Dutch counter-terrorism policy. Despite the fact that the AIVD already laid the foundation of what is now known as the 'broad approach' in the late 90's, the incident with the two boys from Eindhoven was the first time the term 'broad approach' (*brede benadering*) appeared in response to parliamentary questions (Abels 2012, p.2). The 'broad approach' aims to prevent the possibility of radicalisation processes resulting in the

most extreme form of radicalism, terrorism[14]. The method referred to as the 'Dutch approach' appears again in the beginning of the 21st century to explain this 'broad approach' (*brede benadering*) to terrorism (Kervel 2017, p.2; Abels, 2007). De Graaff (2007), however, argues that the 'Dutch approach' mentioned in current counter-terrorism policy is not similar to the one stated in the policy of the 1970s and 1980s. The 'Dutch approach' of that time appeared to be more "a tactical than a strategic approach" (De Graaff 2007, p.2). This is questionable since both repressive and preventive measures are both part of the 'broad approach', however, preventive measures, such as the importance of integration, are prioritised (Abels 2012, p.3).

The Madrid bombings in March 2004 followed by the assassination of Theo van Gogh in November 2004 gave rise to a new phase in Dutch counter-terrorism policy. With the assassination a prime example of homegrown terrorism, the fight against radicalisation as an elementary part of Dutch counter-terrorism policy became even more important than before (Abels 2012, p.3). At this point, the NCTb (National Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding) decided that within the framework of the 'broad approach,' radicalization and terrorism are interconnected (Abels 2012, p.5).

Despite the fact that the term 'Dutch approach' raises confusion and discussion amongst scholars, the term is still being used to explain the 'broad approach' of the Netherlands' contemporary counter-terrorism policy. The 'broad approach' appears to cover both repressive and preventive strategies: Repressive measures include the adjustment of laws and organizations; Preventive measures on the other are mainly focused on integration, pluralisation and prevention of radicalisation and extremism in Dutch society (Abels 2012, pp.2-3). In the context of a 'soft power' approach to counter-terrorism, this research focusses on the preventive character of the 'broad approach'. The central idea underlying the 'broad approach', presumes that nobody is born as a terrorist and strives to identify radicalisation processes amongst individuals and groups at an early stage (Abels 2012, p.1). Therefore, the main focus is on the principal factors that underpin radicalisation: "failed integration, intensified segregation, increasing polarisation and violent confrontations." (BVD 2001, p. 32) These features of the 'broad approach' are aligned with the definition of a 'soft power' approach:

> "population-centric methods, and would contain features such as capacity building, economic development, and counter-radicalization focusing on the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive" (Rineheart 2010, p.38).

In this research the 'broad approach' is therefore considered as 'soft power' approach to counter-terrorism.

[14] TK 27 925 nr. 49: Lijst van vragen en antwoorden, vastgesteld op 18 maart 2002. Quote is translated from Dutch.

Fear of terrorism and the case of the Netherlands

From the aforementioned historical context, it appears that The Netherlands prefers a soft power approaches over hard power in its counter-terrorism strategy. Within this context this research attempts to shed light on an alternative perspective through which current Dutch counter-terrorism policies and the role of civil society within it can be understood. This alternative perspective strongly agrees with Bakker's (2012) statement that a high level of fear can result in distrust and stereotyping of certain groups in society, and so fear of terrorism can lead to dogmatic thinking and a lack of nuance and discrimination (Bakker 2012, p. 6). In addition, fear of terrorism can lead to more terrorism, because the anxious overreaction of the government and society can make terrorism seem even more attractive (Bakker, 2012). Or in the words of an important socialist and scholar of terrorism, Frank Furedi: "we produce an invitation to terror" (Furedi 2007, p.12). Based on the high percentage of people who fear terrorist attacks in the Netherlands (Kloosterman and Moonen 2017, p.11), the impact of fear as an emotion, and the dominant objective of terrorist organizations to cause fear and psychological damage, this section argues that the level of fear present in society can also play an essential element in Dutch counter-terrorism policies.

First of all, the 'Central Office for Statistics' (*Centraal Bureau voor Statistieken, CBS*) shows that the majority (70 per cent) of Dutch adults are worried and concerned about a possible terrorist attack in the Netherlands (Kloosterman and Moonen 2017, p.11). This high percentage of Dutch adults that presents an initial and concrete indication of why counter-terrorism policies in the Netherlands should put more focus on the fear for terrorism.

The second indication concerns the concept of 'fear' itself and the effects this emotion can have on society. As Bar-Tal (2001) defines,

> "the emotion of fear is a specific subjective aversive feeling that arises when one perceives a threat or danger to oneself and/or one's society, and enables an adaptive response" (p.603).

In the context of this research, threats and dangers refer to the social experienced threat of terrorist attacks. The prolonged experience of this fear results in several observed effects of which the following is relevant for this study. According to Bar-Tal (2001), fear

> "sensitizes attention to threatening cues; causes overestimation of danger and threats; increases expectations of threat and danger; [and] facilitates the selective retrieval of information related to fear" (p. 604).

It is hard to verify these effects are present among Dutch citizens, nevertheless when looking at the numbers from the CBS (Kloosterman and Moonen 2017), it appears that fear of terrorist attacks certainly has an effect on people's behaviour. For instance, in 2005, 68% of the Dutch citizens said they are conscious of terrorism and pay more attention to it in daily life. 24% of Dutch citizens actively looked for more information. Citizens even changed their behaviour because they feared a possible attack (Ferichs and Schildmeijer 2005, p.3). As a commonly experienced emotion, fear can have a major impact on society and people's behaviour towards terrorists attacks.

Finally, the third indication can be found in one of the major goals of terrorist organizations, which is to cause fear and unrest. Throughout history, terrorist organizations purposefully made use of violence to destabilize society and to frighten people in order to eventually reach their goal of influencing policy decision-making (NCTV 2011, p.17). In 2014, attention was mainly focused on the 'world's most terrifying [terrorist] group' the Islamic State and its feared militant leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Khan 2014). What is interesting is that while the Islamic State turned into a global threat, they have not yet committed anything similar to the equivalent of the attacks on 11 September in America (Roy 2017, p.75). According to Oliver Roy (2017) the Islamic State's measurable ability to kill and destroy is not so much what frightens us. What frightens us is "its extraordinary talent for theatricalizing terror; [and] to sow fear" (Roy 2017, p.75). Roy adds to this "the strength of ISIS is to play on our fears. And the principal fear is the fear of Islam" (Roy 2017, p.91). By focusing on Islam rather than the terrorist action itself, civil society is blinded from something even more important, the psychological effect caused by the strategic impact of their attacks. This psychological effect is amongst other things, translated into fear that (our) Western societies are in danger of imploding (Roy 2017, p.91).

3.METHODOLOGY

In previous sections, academic research on the concepts of civil society, resilience and their prospective role in soft power approaches to counter-terrorism were investigated. The literature suggests that civil society to some extent can play a role in processes of radicalisation which eventually lead to terrorism. This section elaborates the methodology implemented to answer the central research question: 'To what extent has civil society played a role in countering terrorism according to the annual reports of the AIVD, since the attacks of 9/11 (2001-2017)?'

This study uses process tracing and documentary analysing of annual reports from the AIVD (2001-2017) to measure the development in the extent to which civil society has played a role in countering radicalisation and terrorism in the Netherlands. This study solely relied on a wide array of annual reports of the AIVD in order to effectively complete the research. This is supported by related documents of the AIVD and additional reports of the NCTV, which have shed light on the particular issues investigated to fill gaps in the obtained data (Bowen 2009, p.33). The annual reports record facts and ideas on existing threats in the national and international arena; actions that have been taken to counter these threats; several partnerships with international, national and local agencies; and reveal the social and historical context in which these documents are produced.

The annual reports were selected from the website of the AIVD, which is the largest Internal Security Service in the Netherlands, and these documents are freely accessible because they are part of the public domain. A total of sixteen annual reports were collected and then analysed for the elements mentioned earlier. In all cases, the following definition of civil society has been applied as a framework to analyse the documents:

> "[Civil society] includes associations of citizens (outside their families, friends, and businesses) entered into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas, and ideologies and organizations such as professional associations, social movements, indigenous people's organizations, religious and spiritual organizations, academe, and public benefit nongovernmental organizations. The term does not include profit-making activity (the private sector) or governance (the public sector)"[15].

[15] the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on United Nations–Civil Society Relations (2004)

In the annual reports of the AIVD civil society is mostly expressed in terms of *het Maatschappelijk Middenveld,* alternated with the more universal term 'civil society'.

The document analysis of sixteen annual reports first required superficial examination to obtain a global understanding of the information. A second reading involved thorough examination through which relevant information has been selected (Bowen 2009, pp.28, 32). The obtained data has then been evaluated, interpreted and appraised in order to reveal meaning, produce empirical knowledge and develop an understanding (Bowen 2009, p.27). During this document analysis, pertinent information was separated from information which is perceived as not pertinent (Bowen 2009, pp.32-34). The document analysis provided context and historical background information; a means of process tracing to reveal changes in the use of civil society and development over time; and information to verify or contradict evidence from other sources on the engagement of civil society (Bowen 2009, pp.29-30). The evidence is evaluated based on the content of the documents and whether this supports the concept of a soft power approach to counter-terrorism (Bowen 2009, p.33). The level of communication and engagement with civil society, when not apparent from the content, was measured by means of Dalton's (2014) conceptual framework.

Documentary analysis appears to be a constructive, efficient and applicable research method, particularly for qualitative case studies. The analysis of existing annual reports produced rich descriptions and data on the phenomena of civil society and radicalisation (Bowen 2009, pp. 29, 31). This method is useful for conducting a longitudinal process analysis to show how the role of civil society has evolved over time (Cohen, Manion and Morrison 2007, p.201). The documents were written by skilled professionals and contain exact information and valuable insights for analysis (Cohen et al. 2007, p.201; Bowen 2009, p.31). difficulty recognized difficulty of analysing documents is the possibility for bias and selectivity, as the annual reports were written purpose other than to be regarded as research data (Cohen et al. 2007, p.201; Bowen 2009, pp.31-32). The possibility of these difficulties were limited by studying the documents in their context, "in order to understand their significance at the time" (Cohen et al. 2007, p.202). Finally, the document analysis revealed that the evaluated evidence from the annual reports is inconsistent with the existing theory on civil society and countering radicalisation.

4.EMPIRICAL STUDY: ANNUAL REPORTS AIVD 2001-2016

Annual Report 2001

The context in which the annual report of 2001 was published is dominated by the attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington and discovered terrorist networks in Western Europe. For Dutch security policy, this resulted in a stronger emphasis on international terrorism, and in particular Islamic terrorism. The main concern of Islamic NGO's in the Netherlands was to develop human and social cultural activities, however, as reported in this annual report, the BVD (later became AIVD) indicated that it is likely that some of these NGO's provided support to violent activities of radicalized Muslims (BVD 2002, p.36). According to the BVD, Islamic NGO's (as part of civil society) had therefore in general a more negative character and were seen as supportive of violent extremism and terrorism. According to Dalton's (2014) framework of civil society's different faces, this negative character of Islamic NGO's can create segregation between groups and is therefore not supportive of the democratic legal order. This forms part of what Dalton (2014) describes as the 'ugly side' of civil society (p.48).

Annual Report 2002

The main concern of the AIVD in 2002 was still on Islamic terrorism on the international and national level, and recruitment activities of extremists. At the same time, the integration of ethnic minority groups, mostly Muslim, into Dutch society formed part of the debate. This debate takes place in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that created an atmosphere in which the position of minority groups became the focus of attention (AIVD 2003, p.33). With regard to the issue of Islamic Terrorism, the AIVD informed society in order to strengthen social resistance within and outside Islamic communities to counter radicalisation and recruitment (AIVD 2003, p.21). With regards to its communication policy, AVID aimed for as much openness as possible and provided information to the press and public within the limitations of the Internal Security Service (AIVD 2003, p.105). This is part of the 'broad approach', where radicalisation of small parts of society, political-societal polarisation, and terrorism were interconnected. As such, preventive measures became the AVID's highest priority and can therefore be seen as supportive of a soft power approach to counter-terrorism (AIVD 2003, p.22).

Annual Report 2003

The Madrid train bombings on March 11 2004 emphasized the continuous struggle of international terrorism, the growing polarisation in primarily Western societies, and worldwide tendencies of radicalisation and extreme violent activities for the benefit of Jihad. In this context, the annual report of 2003 specifically focussed on: Islamic terrorism in the Netherlands, and terrorist organizations like the ETA, IRA, Communist Party of the Philippines and the Mujahedin-e Khalq. This focus is entangled with radicalisation tendencies and increasing research on the relation between processes of radicalisation and Moroccan and Turkish communities in the Netherlands. In one of its policy memorandums, the AIVD asserted its important role to supply society with information in the fight against terrorism (AIVD 2004, p. 91). Theories of soft power approaches to counter-terrorism have shown the importance of sharing information to counter-terrorism strategies. Sharing information creates community engagement which subsequently influences the development of social cohesion and "undermines the condition which locally generate terrorism" by building trust (Pickering et al. 1998, p.102, 106). It could therefore be argued that the awareness and interest of the AIVD in a soft power approach to counter-terrorism (which involves civil society) appears to have become more present at this time.

Annual Report 2004

The annual report of 2004 is characterized by the terrorist attack in the Netherlands on film director Theo van Gogh. The AIVD considered the probability of a terrorist attack based on the existing threat from radical Islamic terrorism. The actual attack, however, underlines the vulnerability and lack of resilience in Dutch society (AIVD 2005, p.3; AIVD 2004b, p.50). Reducing vulnerability requires countering the process of radicalisation in its early stages within Muslim communities. The priority is to investigate radicalisation and terrorism and to improve the exchange and cooperation between the Muslim community and public authorities. The murder of Theo van Gogh not only put radicalisation on the priority list, but created a societal atmosphere in which discrepancies between diverse groups became enlarged (AIVD 2004a, p. 69). At the request of the minister of Justice at that time, the National Coordinator of Counter-Terrorism was founded, which made counter-terrorism one of the most important issues in international and national security[16].

[16] https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen_a_z/werkstuk-informatie/index.aspx accessed on 4 May 2018

> "Counteract radicalisation requires a 'broad approach' (*brede benadering*), in which civil society organizations, central and local governments and Muslim communities themselves play an important role"[17] (AIVD 2004a, p. 12).

This 'broad approach' strongly supports the theoretical concept of a soft power approach to counter-terrorism as discussed earlier, defined as a "population-centric method" and focused on "the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive" (Rineheart 2010, p.38).

In the additional report from the AIVD, 'from Dawa to Jihad' (*van Dawa tot Jihad*), the process of radicalisation and terrorism, and possibilities to counteract this phenomenon are investigated (AIVD 2004a, p.12). For an effective approach to radicalisation, a successful strategy appears to make national and local officials, as well as civil society more resilient (AIVD 2004b, p.49). This approach is defined in a schematic overview (see Appendix 1) that provides a structure in which the AIVD develops counter strategies to eight different types of threats of radical Islam (see Appendix 2), ranging from open Dawa (peaceful anti-democratic/radical Islam), secret Dawa (peaceful radical/ anti-democratic Islam), to secret Jihad (peaceful anti-democratic political Islam/violent radical Islam) and open Jihad (violent radical/anti-democratic political Islam) (AIVD 2004b, p. 39).

Threat levels one to four refer to the phenomenon of radicalisation, and threat levels four to eight refer to the phenomenon of terrorism. The counter strategies include a level of involvement from a diverse set of actors divided into three categories: civil society, engaged communities and the government. The level of involvement of these actors in the phenomenon of radicalisation and terrorism according to the AIVD is described as follows (AIVD 2004b, p.52-53).

1) First, the level of engagement of civil society and local authorities from threat level one to four, regarding the phenomenon of radicalisation, starts with a high intensity level which gradually decreases. The role of civil society is expressed in: conducting dialogue with moderate communities; encouraging positive role models; emancipating women; developing moderate competitive counter-ideologies; and identity development (AIVD 2004a, pp.50-55). The decreasing engagement of civil society and local authorities follows the rise of terrorism and stops at threat level eight in which civil society and local authorities show no engagement anymore (AIVD 2004b, pp.52-53). All actors have their own strategy in relation to the specific threat level. The involvement of civil society contains a dialogue from civil society with moderate powers and applies to all the different threat levels. Engaged communities use strategies like identity formation, the promotion of positive role models, the emancipation of

[17] All quotes are translated by the author from Dutch into English.

women, developing a counter ideology, and offering competitive and moderate perspectives. These strategies can be used for all the seven different threat levels with which these communities engage (AIVD 2004b, pp.52-53).

2) Second, the AIVD, the level of engagement of the police and judicial authorities develops in an opposite manner. Their engagement starts at the second threat level and continuously increases as the threat level becomes higher in rank (AIVD 2004b, pp.52-53).
3) Finally, the government, as a powerful and massive institution, has many more options in terms of counter strategies compared to the previous two categories. In addition, the government is involved in every stage of threat levels (AIVD 2004b, pp.52-53).

This additional report from the AIVD, 'from Dawa to Jihad' (*van Dawa tot Jihad*), illustrated a comprehensive approach to counter processes of radicalisation and terrorism, combining both soft and hard power approaches in which the role as mediator and positive role model was assigned to civil society. As Bakker and Kessels (2012) contend, the focus on civil society and individuals is necessary in order to prevent people from radicalisation which might lead to terrorism (Bakker and Kessels 2012) (pp. 92, 99, 89).

Annual Report 2005

National security was high on the (political) agenda as the year 2005 proved again that European societies are vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as illustrated by the attack in London in July 2005. Around the same time, The Netherlands experienced a real threat when some suspects of terrorist activities in October 2005 were arrested, resulting in stricter safety measures for government buildings (AIVD 2006, p.3). The AIVD pursued its contribution to the development of concrete policy initiatives on international, national and local level concerning the report 'from Dawa to Jihad'. In 2005, the AIVD provided an understanding of the phenomenon of radicalisation on the national level and concerned itself with offering counter measures. This includes cooperation with the national government, local and provincial governments, and civil society and moderate groups within Muslim communities (AIVD 2006, p.35). Furthermore, the AIVD was involved in initiatives intended for the prevention of radicalisation processes. Within this context, the AIVD provided advice to local governments on specific sources of radicalisation within their municipality and how to set up information households which focus on recognizing and pacifying radicalisation processes in their early stages (AIVD 2006, p.36). Sharing information and cooperating with a variety of local and national actors resulted in a feeling of community engagement which influenced the development of social cohesion and undermined conditions that, on the local level, could have generate terrorism (Pickering et al. 1998, p. 106, 102).

Based on Dalton's framework of civil society's different faces, it can therefore be argued that civil society in this case can be perceived as a supporter of the democratic state (Dalton 2014, p.46).

Annual Report 2006

In the 2006 annual report of the AIVD, research on terrorism and radicalisation were still the area of attention. Out of the many counter-terrorism measures that the AIVD discussed, the repressive approach of terrorism turned out to be most successful. However, radicalisation processes can happen rapidly and, in a short amount of time, networks of radical young Muslims can develop into terrorist cells. Therefore, an effective counter-terrorism strategy includes not only a repressive but also a preventive and soft power policy (Bakker and Kessels 2012). In the long term, radicalisation processes threaten cohesion and reciprocal solidarity in society (AIVD 2007, p.31). Therefore, measures of intervention prescribed by the 'broad approach' (*brede aanpak*) concerning radicalisation primarily focus on repressive and preventive measures taking place in the proactive sphere (p. 43). The experience of the poor living situation of particular communities appears to be a breeding ground for radicalisation in the Netherlands. Poor social economic conditions can lead to accepting the victim's role, whereby Dutch society is blamed to be guilty for the misery (AIVD 2007, p.50).

Annual Report 2007

The drafting of the annual report of 2007 took place in a context in which the international orientation of the AIVD was the area for attention. Global developments had had a great influence on Dutch society and therefore could not have been ignored. This known fact requires intensive international cooperation and a strong international awareness in research. The AIVD estimated that the chance of a terrorist attack occuring in the Netherlands was relatively small but imaginable. While such attacks may have a limited scope of damage, the psychological after effects of social unrest are much more disruptive (AIVD 2008, p. 38). The intensity of the debate on radical Islamist youth culture in the Netherlands, and Islam in general, influences this societal unrest (AIVD 2008, p. 44). Several parts of the Turkish community in the Netherlands for instance, experience hostility because of their association with the Muslim faith, and feel assaulted in their freedom of religion. A predictable result of these perceived feelings of hostility is a retrenchment back into their own closed-off communities and the developing of a sense of otherness. In the long run, this can create undesirable effects, whereby the affinity with Dutch society decreases or gets lost (AIVD 2008, p. 43). Dalton (2014) identifies this as the 'ugly side' of civil society, defined by exclusivity that strengthens people with the same background and could result in closed communities (Dalton 2014, p. 48; Porter 1998, pp.13-14).

Annual Report 2008

The area for attention in this annual report is the deceptive relationship between national security and openness and transparency towards Dutch society. According to G. ter Horst (Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), the annual reports are an important instrument to increase the safety consciousness in Dutch society. Moreover, the report should increase resilience in Dutch society towards existing threats rather than encourage fear amongst the people (AIVD 2009, p.3). Theories of the fear of terrorism supports this argument, as a high level of fear can lead to dogmatic thinking, a lack of nuance and discrimination (Bakker 2012, p.6). This annual report attempts to meet the need for more openness, however the AIVD is restricted by the risks concerning its own department, civilians, companies and official authorities (AIVD 2009, p.14).

Annual Report 2009

The main focus in this report was the threat for jihadist terrorists and how they are influenced, trained, financed and inspired from the outside. This threat for jihadist terrorists has a strong international dimension which results in more cooperation with foreign intelligence services (AIVD 2010, p.3). Concerning processes of radicalisation, the AIVD is primarily focused on Salafist groups and a diverse set of other radical Islamist movements, including the Muslim brotherhood. This political Islamic movement is a threat according to the AIVD, because it is imaginable that they actively expand interpretations, which are in conflict with principles of the democratic legal order, amongst their network in politics, governments and civil society (AIVD 2010, p.22). Undermining democratic processes, following Dalton's framework, represents an 'ugly side' of civil society in which they can make things, such as exclusivity and inequality, even worse (Dalton 2014, p.49).

Annual Report 2010

The area of attention in annual report of 2010 was still on the international threat from outside the Dutch borders (exogenous), however, the AIVD noticed that these risks and threats were becoming more diffuse, and therefore required a new focus and a different way of working from the AIVD. As a result, in 2010, the AIVD moved its area of attention from endogenous to exogenous threats and with this, the information services focussed more on partners that can play a role in preventing or reducing exogenous threats (AIVD 2011, p.1). In the context of counter-terrorism on Dutch territory, the AIVD mentioned deradicalization and disengagement. The distinction between these two concepts lies in their underlying values. Disengagement on the one hand, drops out radical behaviour but maintains the underlying values of Jihadist ideology. Deradicalization on the other hand, changes both the radical behaviour as well as the underlying values. In the Netherlands, disengagement is a commonplace

activity, however, the expectation is that long term disengagement can partially influence and lead to deradicalization (AIVD 2011, p.14).

Annual Report 2011

In 2011, the AIVD conducted research on challenges of terrorism, extremism, espionage and proliferation taking place in an international dimension. In order to adequately respond to these challenges the AIVD increased international and national partnerships (AIVD 2012, p.1). The general communication objective of the NCTV, to respond after a terrorist attack is to: Organize and reserve societal and individual resilience in national and international contexts; and provide society with complete and just information about the existing risks while remaining objective and realistic (NCTV 2011, p.96). The assumption was that increasing societal resilience by providing concrete action perspectives may reduce the chance of overreaction in the aftermath of an attack (NCTV 2011, p.94). These findings are consistent with the theory on community engagement in counter-terrorism strategies, which argues that community engagement is based on sharing information and will eventually influence the development of social cohesion by building trust (Pickering et al. 1998, p. 102, 106). However, those implementing resilience argue that "it is impossible to always predict the event and/or the level of disruption it [emergency situations] will cause" (Chmutina and Bosher 2017, p. 275). Focus should therefore be on the development of local oriented frameworks responding to local needs (Chmutina and Bosher 2017, p. 276).

To effectively counter violent extremism and terrorism, the Dutch government simultaneously engaged in strengthening resilience in society, diminishing the breeding ground for radicalization and investing in deradicalization programs (NCTV 2011, p.10). For instance, the National Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC) was established in 2011 as a result of the observation by the AIVD that societal resistance towards espionage in the Netherlands was very limited (AIVD 2012, p.24). Another example was the policy of the NCTV (2011) to increase resilience amongst target groups vulnerable to Jihadist recruitment and propaganda. These aspects manifested in several measures: the development of social networks; designing programs focused on increasing critical judgement; strengthening democratic consciousness; providing resistance trainings; and working together to create positive role models (NCTV 2011, p.71).

Annual Report 2012

In 2012, three terrorists were arrested for being in possession of weapons, explosives and farewell videos. The AIVD perceived this as a result of the significant increase in the number of jihadists travelling to Syria (AIVD 2013, p.3). A second consequence might have been the rapidly changing character of existing threats, which is why the AIVD found it necessary to intensify cooperation with international and national partners (AIVD 2013, p.6). For instance, the AIVD contributed to the governmental campaign 'Alert Online' to raise awareness amongst civilians, companies and the

governments about cyberattacks and the possible risks of the internet and smartphones in general (AIVD 2013, p.20). Nevertheless, the AIVD argued that the responsibility for security lay primarily with civilians, companies and organisations themselves.

Annual Report 2013

The annual report of 2013 took place in the context of unrest and instability in the Middle-East, affecting international and the national security of the Netherlands in several ways (AIVD 2014, pp.1-3). In 2013 the AIVD indicated that, more than hundred individuals with jihadist intentions travelled from the Netherlands to Syria (p.3). Most of them joined Jihadist groups such as the Islamic state in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) (AIVD 2014, p.9). In the same year, around twenty returned to the Netherlands (p.8). These individuals traveling from Europe posed a potential threat to the national security because of their engagement with jihadist groups and involvement in committing atrocities (AIVD 2014, p.10). In addition to this, the AIVD noticed that European foreign fighters were creating new networks in Europe and sharing their experiences in order to prepare an attack on European soil. Next to the direct threat of returned foreign fighters, the AIVD was concerned about the indirect effect of radicalization and mobilization of other Muslims, as well as the development of new activist movements within radical Islam (AIVD 2014, p.11). This new movement was expressed through the emergence of groups such as “Sharia4Holland, Behind Bars, Millatu Ibrahim, [and] Islam4UK” (AIVD 2014, p.11). As a response to these developments, the AIVD collected and provides information about individuals and trends regarding this phenomenon. The Local Security Services (*De Regionale Inlichtendiensten, RID’S*) plays an important role in recognizing radicalisation in its premature stages. Since not any individual returning from Syria can be considered to be potential terrorist, this investigation requires specific measurements (AIVD 2014, p.12). According to this annual report, other local actors such as civil society or engaged communities. play no particular role

Annual Report 2014

In 2014, Europe was beset by a zone of instability ranging from North-Africa to the Middle-East (AIVD 2015, p.8). For the Netherlands, the difficulty around Jihadism and people travelling and returning from Syria or Iraq was still the central debate in politics (AIVD 2015, p.3). On 29 August 2014, Lodewijk Asscher, then Deputy Prime Minister, wrote a letter to the Parliament about the ‘Internal Approach to Jihadism’. The main objective of this program was to “protect the democratic legal order, counter and weaken Jihadist movements in the Netherlands, and remove the breeding ground for radicalization” (Asscher 2014, p.2). Therefore, cooperation with all parties, including national authorities, local authorities and civil society was seen as necessary, regardless of individual world views among these groups (Asscher 2014, p. 2). Local authorities already started exploratory research on the necessity

and feasibility of the 'broad approach'. As a result, quick scans and trainings by professionals were provided to develop societal resilience (NCTV 2014, p.13). This approach aligns with the theoretical concept of the soft power approach to counter-terrorism characterized by population-centric methods (Rineheart 2010, p.38).

The remarkable circumstances of potential foreign fighters and returned foreign fighters take a lot of the AIVD's attention. Moreover, there is no unambiguous profile of possible travellers, making it difficult for the AIVD to trace a map of these issues (AIVD 2015, p.4). It therefore appears to be important to make a Risk Assessment Report for every individual returned foreign fighter. The AIVD together with the NCTV, the Public Prosecutor, the National police and local authorities, carefully carry out such reports (AIVD 2015, p.16). In this process, these institutions have to deal with the complexity of social media. The inception of social media changed the paradigm of information and communication flow and therefore called for a different counteraction (AIVD 2015, p.17). In the Netherlands, supporters of ISIL more often openly reveal their sympathy with the terrorist groups, evoking counter-pressure and action from civil society, such as counter-demonstrations (AIVD 2015, p.20).

Annual Report 2015

While migrants choose to take refuge from the civil war in Syria and neighbouring countries, a limited group of young people still felt attracted to join the Islamic State (AIVD 2016, p.1). Nevertheless, at the end of 2015, the tendency for people to travel to Syria decreased (p.1). In the meantime, the continuing stream of refugees increased tensions within Dutch and Europeans societies.

Annual Report 2016

The National counter-terrorism strategy of 2011-2015 was characterized by the 'broad approach,' aimed to prevent extremism and terrorism. This basic assumption continues to be the core principle in the national counter-terrorism strategy of 2016-2020 (NCTV 2016b, p.7). Consequently, effective counter extremism and terrorism was identified by early identification of radicalisation processes and the protection of society by means of building resilience amongst civilians, businesses and authorities (NCTV 2016b, p.7). Building national and societal resilience as a strategy to counter the underlying causes of radicalisation and terrorism supports the idea of a population-centric method and aligns with the soft power approach to counter-terrorism as presented in the theory (Rineheart 2010, p.38).

The AIVD mainly contributed to policy making and treatment in the field of counter-terrorism by means of publication of report and analysis (AIVD 2017, p.4). In addition to particular governmental partners, the AIVD informs a wider audience through publications such as 'life with ISIS, the myth

detangled' (*Leven bij ISIS, the mythe ontrafeld*). This publication demonstrates that the actual life in the 'Caliphate' is not as heavenly as it has been proposed by the propaganda of ISIS and can therefore be interpreted as a counter-narrative to discourage people potentially vulnerable to recruitment by ISIS (AIVD 2017, p.4). Apart from this work by the AIVD, the NCTV mentioned its close work with civil society by means of stimulating and facilitating counter-narratives to undermine extremist and terrorist propaganda (NCTV 2016b, p.13). The added value of counter-narratives, however, is questioned in an interview with Mark Singleton, Director of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). Until there is serious evidence-based research on the effectiveness of counter-narratives, Singleton firmly believed that the use of counter-narratives is a waste of money (NCTV 2016a, p.56).

PROCESS ANALYSIS

Data obtained in previous studies (Bakker and Kessels 2012; Rosand et al. 2008; Rineheart 2010) on civil society and soft power approaches to counter-terrorism strategies indicated that civil society plays a significant role in preventive measures. Moreover, it is know from the literature that civil society is likely to be most effective in processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation in order to prevent and counter homegrown terrorism (Bakker and Kessels 2012, pp.92-89; Rineheart 2010, p.39). According to the United Kingdom's *Prevent* strategy (The Secretary of State for the Home Department 2016, p.18; 2011b, p.52), civil society is an important actor for delivering and developing online counter-narratives in the attempt to prevent terrorism. Based on the recognized engagement of civil society by the OSCE in 2001, the 'plan of action' in 2015 demonstrated by the members of Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the attempts made by the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, it was predicted in the Introduction to this research that the role of civil society in the annual reports of the AIVD would become more important from 2001 onwards (2001-2017). In this study, knowledge on the role of civil society was obtained using documentary analysis and process tracing, a constructive methodology for qualitative research (Bowen 2009). As mentioned earlier, documentary analysis was conducted by contextualizing the documents and produced rich descriptions on the issue of civil society. In order to gain knowledge of when and how often civil society was mentioned, process tracing was useful to demonstrate a longitudinal development over time.

Using the method described above, it appears that in the majority of annual reports the role of civil society is limited or appears to have a negative connotation. For instance, annual reports of 2001, 2002 and 2003 show that Islamic terrorism was the main priority at that time. In the reports of 2001, 2007 and 2009, Islamic NGO's particularly were perceived as supporters of extremism and terrorism (BVD 2002, p.36; AIVD 2008, p. 43; AIVD 2010, p.22). This indicates that civil society in these reports is explained by a more negative character, defined by Dalton as the 'ugly side' of civil society (Dalton 2014, p.48). Contrary to the report of 2001, the annual reports of 2002 and 2003 referred to the importance of the 'broad approach', in which preventive measures, awareness and strengthening of social resistance appear to be dominant principles to counter radicalisation (AIVD 2003, p.21; AIVD 2004, p.53). This broad approach appears to share a similar population-centric method as the soft power approach to counter-terrorism explained in literature review (Rineheart 2010, p.38). Civil society was not mentioned. In 2004, on Theo van Gogh's assassination underlined the lack of resilience in Dutch society and put countering radicalisation on the priority list (AIVD 2005, p.3; AIVD 2004b, p.50). Countering radicalisation included cooperation with civil society, the national and local governments and Muslim communities (AIVD 2004a, p.12). A clear illustration

of the extent to which civil society played a role according to the AIVD is demonstrated in appendix 1. This schematic overview indicates that, in the attempt to counter-terrorism in the Netherlands, civil society and local authorities played a role in the phenomenon of radicalisation, categorized by four particular types of threats to radical Islam. The role of civil society is defined as: conducting dialogue with moderate communities; encouraging positive role models; emancipating of women; developing moderate competitive counter-ideologies; and identity development (AIVD 2004a, pp.50-55). It is evident that these results are consistent with results obtained in previous studies (Bakker and Kessels 2012; Rineheart 2010). In line with the prior report, the annual reports of 2005 and 2006 illustrated the importance of cooperation with civil society and moderate groups within Muslim communities (AIVD 2006, p.35). The AVID assigned a preventive role to civil society in order to counter the development of a breeding ground for radicalisation processes (AIVD 2007, p.43). Cooperation with civil society and s focus on preventive measures strongly confirms previous predictions.

However, the obtained data from the annual reports 2007 up to and including 2013 were not consistent with the predictions of this study presented in the Introduction, nor with the findings of prior studies. Although the additional document of the NCTV in 2011 illustrated that civil society played a minor role in 'social diplomacy' (NCTV 2011, p.74) and the importance of increasing societal resistance (AIVD 2013, p. 48) were in line with the findings from previous studies, a striking difference was noted when information on civil society was lacking, while issues such as: Radical Islamist youth causing societal unrest (AIVD 2008, p. 44); decreasing the breeding ground (AIVD 2010, p.3) and deradicalization (AIVD 2011, p.14) were a central part of the debate.

In 2014, focus increased on the necessity of cooperation with civil society and local authorities to develop societal resilience and counter breeding grounds for radicalization (Asscher 2014, p.2; AIVD 2015, pp.3, 10-12). In addition to the role assigned by the government, civil society also conducted counter-demonstrations of its own volition (AIVD 2015, p.20). The considerably increased focus on civil society might be explained by the continuous threat of the Islamic State, Jihadism in general, the intensified discrepancies between Sunni and Shia, and the challenge of returned foreign fighters. Surprisingly, the role of civil society nor the importance of societal resilience were found in the annual report of 2015 and 2016, notwithstanding the tendency around returned foreign fighters combined with a continuous stream of refugees. The additional document of NCTV on the national counter-terrorism strategy of 2016-2020 (NCTV 2016b), contrary to the reports of the AIVD, described the role and cooperation with civil society in stimulating and facilitating of counter-narratives to undermine extremist and terrorist propaganda (p.13). This might be a result of civil society's neutral and diverse character through which a broad audience can be reached.

A qualitative analysis to determine the role of civil society was applied, based on a thorough examination, evaluation, interpretation and appraisal of the data, resulting in empirical results and an understanding of reality. A minor limitation of this approach, is the possibility that documents were biased and selective. To minimize this problem, all documents were studied in context to understand the importance of the culture during particular periods (Cohen et al. 2007, p.202). Nevertheless, the results of the process analysis suggest that in the majority of the annual reports published by the AIVD, the role of civil society appears to be relatively weak. Only the additional report of 2004 and the 2016-2020 national counter-terrorism strategy published by the NCTV, explicitly explained the role of civil society in relation to counter radicalisation and terrorism. These results would seem to indicate that civil society is not so much priority for the AIVD. This is reflected by the fact that the AVID in their annual reports is not giving any pointers for activities civil society could develop, rather they use the annual reports and open publications to outline an image of the existing threat. The NCTV, however, appears to add more and more additional documents on top of to the annual reports of the AIVD, including documents meant for civil society and local governments. This could be explained by the interest of the NCTV in preventive measures, for which they are frequently in contact with a variety of organization in the Netherlands to discuss these issues. Comparing these findings to the results from previous studies (Bakker and Kessels 2012; Rosand et al. 2008; Rineheart 2010), it could be suggested that there is still some work to be done for the AIVD and / or NCTV, to engage civil society in strategies to counter radicalisation and terrorism.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Prior work on counter-terrorism has acknowledged the importance of a comprehensive approach, documented the use of hard and soft power approaches to counter-terrorism, questioned the effectiveness of soft power approaches and acknowledged the significant consequences of such hard power approaches (Bakker and Kessels 2012, p.89; Pickering et al 1998, p.91; Jervis 2005). The role of civil society as part of this soft power approach to counter-terrorism, was recognized by the OSCE in 2001. In 2015, civil society was mentioned in the 'plan of action' proposed by the members of Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Subsequently, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States have made an effort to assign a role to civil society in their respective counter-terrorism strategies. In the Introduction, it was predicted that the role of civil society in the annual reports of the AIVD would become more important from 2001 onwards (2001-2017). Based on the original expectation of the study that civil society to some extent played a role in Dutch counter-terrorism policy when reviewing the annual reports of the AIVD, a soft power approach was perceived as suitable. Within the context of policy response to home-grown terrorism, previous studies confirmed that the use of soft counter-terrorism measures, such as population-centric methods focused on the underlying causes that lead to terrorism and actively engaged civil society institutions, is an essential and important element of comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies both on the international and the national level (Rineheart 2010, p.38; Bakker 2012, p.96; Aly, 2013). In support of preceding studies, Dutch history on counter-terrorism demonstrated that indeed soft power approaches, such as the 'broad approach,' were favoured (De Graaf and De Graaff 2008, p.187). Identifying radicalization processes became an essential part of Dutch counter-terrorism policy and was referred to by using the term the 'broad approach' (*brede benadering*) (Abels 2012, p.2). The 'broad approach' is defined as: "an approach to prevent that radicalisation processes lead to the most extreme form of radicalism, terrorism"[18].

However, according to the reports of security services and what this role involves, these studies do not focus on the extent to which civil society plays a role.. In this study the extent to which civil society plays a role in countering radicalisation and terrorism in the Netherlands is measured by using process tracing and documentary analysis of annual reports and additional reports of the AIVD

[18] TK 27 925 nr. 49: Lijst van vragen en antwoorden, vastgesteld op 18 maart 2002. Quote is translated from Dutch.

(2001-2017). The documentary analysis involved superficial examination, thorough examination, evaluation, interpretation, and appraisal of data in order to develop an understanding of the obtained empirical knowledge (Bowen 2009, pp.27-34). Civil society is measured and analysed with the help of Dalton's framework of civil society's different faces and the theory of soft power approaches (Dalton 2014; Rineheart 2010). The document analysis revealed that the evaluated empirical evidence obtained from the annual reports is inconsistent with the existing theory on civil society and countering radicalisation.

This study found that the overall role of civil society in the annual reports is limited. The annual reports of 2001, 2002 and 2003, mentioned the 'broad approach' and the importance of prevention, however, civil society was not mentioned. Contrary to the previous reports, the annual report of 2004 clearly reports the requirement of civil society to counteract radicalization within the context of the 'broad approach' (AIVD 2004a, p.12). In the additional report 'from Dawa to Jihad,' the role of civil society is further elaborated, assigning civil society a role in: conducting dialogue with moderate communities; encouraging positive role models; emancipating women; developing moderate competitive counter-ideologies; and identity development (AIVD 2004a, pp.50-55). In line with the prior report, the annual reports of 2005 and 2006, stated the importance of cooperation with civil society and the preventive role it might have, yet this role is not explained. The annual reports 2007 up to and including 2013 are (unlike the other reports) limited in their information related to civil society. Except for the information on increasing societal resistance, civil society is not mentioned (AIVD 2013, p. 48). As expected, the report of 2014—based on the continuous threat of the Islamic State, Jihadism, the intensified discrepancies between Sunni and Shia, and the challenge of returned foreign fighters—returned the focus on the necessity and feasibility of the 'broad approach' in order to develop societal resilience (AIVD 2015, pp.3, 10-12; NCTV 2014, p.13). The intensified threat coming from Dutch supporters of the Islamic State resulted in counter-pressure and action from civil society in the form of counter-demonstrations (AIVD 2015, p.20). The annual reports of 2015 and 2016 surprisingly neither covered the role of civil society nor the importance of increasing societal resilience. Contrary to the documents of the AIVD, the NCTV, indeed described the cooperation with civil society in their report on the national counter-terrorism strategy from 2016-2020 (NCTV 2016b). The cooperation between the NCTV and civil society is demonstrated in the stimulation and facilitation of counter-narratives to undermine extremist and terrorist propaganda (NCTV 2016b, p.13). It can be concluded that, the role of civil society in the annual reports of the AIVD (2001-2017) is limited. Only the annual report of 2004 provided a broad overview of the possible role of civil society and in the 2016-2020 report on the national counter-terrorism strategy, this role is explicitly cited again.

On the one hand, these findings are in contradiction to the results of Rineheart (2010), Bakker (2012), and Aly (2013), proposing that the active engagement of civil society is not perceived as an essential element of counter-terrorism strategies reported in the annual reports of the AIVD (2001-2017). The results significantly differ with derived expectations from the literature, and therefore discredit results obtained in a previous study. On the other hand, these findings extend the arguments of Rineheart (2010), Bakker (2012), and Aly (2013), providing insight into the role of civil society in the Netherlands, its practical implementation and how the AIVD and NCTV provide support for civil society to develop counter-narratives. In this case, the results confirm the implications of previous studies. In addition, the preliminary findings of the 2016-2020 report on the national counter-terrorism strategy demonstrate the feasibility of engagement with Dutch civil society. These results demonstrate that the AIVD is able to assign a bigger role to civil society in their attempt to counter homegrown terrorism.

This contradiction between the findings from previous studies and the results obtained through this empirical investigation is remarkable and unexpected. There are multiple explanations for this contrast, with a lack of interest from the AIVD in civil society or different priorities the most reliable. The annual reports imply that the main concern of the AIVD is outlining a general image of the existing threats on the national and international levels. The additional reports and reports from the NCTV, however, pay more attention to a possible role civil society and local governments to counter-terrorism. The interest of the NCTV can be explained by their focus on preventive measures and population-centric methods. This study therefore concludes that, the constrained role civil society has played in countering terrorism according to the annual reports of the AIVD, since the attacks of 9/11 (2001-2017), may result from a different set of priorities from the AIVD in informing society of a general image of existing threats, instead of an added-value of civil society in countering home-grown terrorism as has been predicted from prior studies.

After to the comparison with results from previous studies, the case study of the Netherlands can be measured up to counter-terrorism strategies of The United Kingdom, Australia and The United States. With its *Prevent* Strategy, the United Kingdom assigned civil society the role of developing and delivering counter-narratives in order to counter online terrorist propaganda (The Secretary of State for the Home Department 2016, p.15). Australia's perspective on the role of civil society appeared to be in line with the United Kingdom's Prevent Strategy, and expanded this role by putting focus on resilience and empowerment of communities and civil society (Council of Australian Governments 2015, p.8). Contrary to the actions of these two previous countries, the United States is less supportive of assigning a specific role to civil society in its counter-terrorism strategy, probably due to President Trumps' focus on hard power to counter-terrorism. While demonstrating the limited role of civil society, the empirical results obtained in this research, assume that the Netherlands in this context

stays behind the other three countries. Only the additional document of NCTV on the national counter-terrorism strategy of 2016-2020 (NCTV 2016b) provides promising evidence of the role civil society might play to counter-terrorism (p.13).

The provided insight in this remarkable contrast between the obtained academic literature and the feasibility of the Security Services is an original and relevant contribution of this research to the existing work on the role of civil society in counter-terrorism policy. The results of this research provide compelling evidence on the constrained role that the AIVD assigned to civil society, while also indicating that for the Internal Security Services in the Netherlands, there is significant work to be done on building stronger relations with civil society.

However, some limitations are worth noting. First of all, it is important to mention that the AIVD is a Secret Service which implies that little evidence is available and openly accessible. An alternative approach to obtain further information could be to collect interviews with both employees from the AIVD and NCTV. Finally, the contrast of the Dutch case study and the literature are remarkable, and it would be useful to further explore the possible directions by means of an extended comparative research. An important question for future studies should therefore be to determine and compare how the role of civil society is assigned by Security Services in neighbouring countries such as Germany, Belgium and Great Britain.

Appendix 1: Tegenstrategieën bij de acht dreigingstypen van de radicale islam – schematisch

	DAWA			
Dreigingstype	Openlijke dawa tegen verticale dimensie DRO (dreigingstype 1 in 2.7.2)	Openlijke dawa tegen horizontale dimensie DRO (dreigingstype 2 in 2.7.2)	Heimelijke dawa tegen horizontale dimensie DRO* (dreigingstype 3 in 2.7.2)	Heimelijke dawa tegen verticale dimensie DRO (dreigingstype 4 in 2.7.2)
Mate van betrokkenheid van diverse actoren bij tegenstrategie	AIVD >> AIVD-Politie-Justitie>> Civil society/ maatschappelijk middenveld >>>>>>>>> >> Landelijke, provinciale, lokale overheden>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>			
Fenomeen	Radicalisering>>>			
Tegenstrategie	Overheid	Overheid	Overheid	Overheid
	Voortdurende toetsing aan strafrecht mbt mogelijke discriminatie, haatzaaien en opruiing	Voortdurende toetsing aan strafrecht mbt mogelijke discriminatie, haatzaaien en opruiing	Voortdurende toetsing aan strafrecht mbt mogelijke discriminatie, haatzaaien en opruiing	Voortdurende toetsing aan strafrecht mbt mogelijke discriminatie, haatzaaien en opruiing
	Stimuleren van gematigde krachten	Stimuleren van gematigde krachten	Stimuleren van gematigde krachten	Stimuleren van gematigde krachten
			Sensibiliseren van / bekendmaken bij publiek en overheidsorganen	Sensibiliseren van / bekendmaken bij publiek en overheidsorganen
			Transparantie eisen over financieringsstromen e.d	Transparantie eisen over financieringsstromen e.d
			Bestuurlijke maatregelen zoals ontzeggen werk- of verblijfsvergunning, stopzetten subsidies	Bestuurlijke maatregelen zoals ontzeggen werk- of verblijfsvergunning, stopzetten subsidies
				Infiltreren, verstoren, blokkeren
	Betrokken gemeenschappen	Betrokken gemeenschappen	Betrokken gemeenschappen	Betrokken gemeenschappen
	Identiteitsvorming / Bevorderen positieve rolmodellen Emancipatie vrouwen	Identiteitsvorming / Bevorderen positieve rolmodellen Emancipatie vrouwen	Identiteitsvorming / Bevorderen positieve rolmodellen Emancipatie vrouwen	Identiteitsvorming / Bevorderen positieve rolmodellen Emancipatie vrouwen
	Ontwikkelen tegenideologie Concurrerend gematigd aanbod	Ontwikkelen tegenideologie Concurrerend gematigd aanbod	Ontwikkelen tegenideologie Concurrerend gematigd aanbod	Ontwikkelen tegenideologie Concurrerend gematigd aanbod
	Samenleving	Samenleving	Samenleving	Samenleving
	Dialoog vanuit civil society met gematigde krachten	Dialoog vanuit civil society met gematigde krachten	Dialoog vanuit civil society met gematigde krachten	Dialoog vanuit civil society met gematigde krachten

Heimelijke jihad tegen verticale dimensie DRO (dreigingstype 5 in 2.7.2)	Heimelijke jihad tegen horizontale dimensie DRO (dreigingstype 6 in 2.7.2)	Openlijke jihad tegen horizontale dimensie DRO (dreigingstype 7 in 2.7.2)	Openlijke jihad tegen verticale dimensie DRO (dreigingstype 8 in 2.7.2)
>>>			
>>>			
>>>			
>>			
>>Terrorisme>>			
Overheid	Overheid	Overheid	Overheid
Voortdurende toetsing aan strafrecht mbt mogelijke discriminatie, haatzaaien en opruiing	Voortdurende toetsing aan strafrecht mbt mogelijke discriminatie, haatzaaien en opruiing		
Allianties met gematigde krachten	Allianties met gematigde krachten	Allianties met gematigde krachten	Allianties met gematigde krachten
Publiek en overheids-organen bewust maken	Publiek en overheids-organen bewust maken	Publiek en overheids-organen bewust maken	Publiek en overheidsorganen bewust maken
Doen stopzetten heimelijke financieringsstromen e.d	Doen stopzetten heimelijke financieringsstromen e.d	Doen stopzetten heimelijke financieringsstromen e.d	Doen stopzetten heimelijke financieringsstromen e.d
Bestuurlijke maatregelen zoals ontzeggen werk- of verblijfsvergunning	Bestuurlijke maatregelen zoals ontzeggen werk- of verblijfsvergunning	Bestuurlijke maatregelen zoals ontzeggen werk- of verblijfsvergunning	Bestuurlijke maatregelen zoals ontzeggen werk- of verblijfsvergunning
Infiltreren, verstoren, blokkeren	Infiltreren, verstoren, blokkeren	Infiltreren, verstoren, blokkeren	Infiltreren, verstoren, blokkeren
Justitieel ingrijpen: verbieden	Justitieel ingrijpen: verbieden	Justitieel ingrijpen: verbieden en vervolgen	Justitieel ingrijpen: verbieden en vervolgen
Betrokken gemeenschappen	Betrokken gemeenschappen	Betrokken gemeenschappen	Betrokken gemeenschappen
Identiteitsvorming / Bevor-deren positieve rolmodellen Emancipatie vrouwen	Identiteitsvorming / Bevor-deren positieve rolmodellen Emancipatie vrouwen	Identiteitsvorming / Bevor-deren positieve rolmodellen Emancipatie vrouwen	
Ontwikkelen tegenideologie Concurrerend gematigd aanbod	Ontwikkelen tegenideologie Concurrerend gematigd aanbod	Ontwikkelen tegenideologie Concurrerend gematigd aanbod	
Samenleving	Samenleving	Samenleving	Samenleving
Dialoog vanuit civil society met gematigde krachten	Dialoog vanuit civil society met gematigde krachten	Dialoog vanuit civil society met gematigde krachten	

APPENDIX 2



[19]

[19] Source: AIVD 2004b, p.39

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