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Operational Coherence in Integrated Peacekeeping: The Post-Earthquake Experiences of the United Nations in Haiti

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List of Abbreviations

CAO - Civil Affairs Officer
CNDDR - Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démantèlement et Reinsertion
DDR - Disarmament, Development and Reintegration
DSRSG - Deputy Senior Representative of the Secretary General
EU - European Union
FAO - Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
GOH - Government of Haiti
HC - Humanitarian Coordinator
IGO - Inter-governmental Organisation
IM - Integrated Missions
IMPP - Integrated Missions Planning Process
IMTF - Integrated Mission Task Force
IO - International Organisation
IOM - International Organisation for Migration
ISF - Integrated Strategic Framework
ISPG - Integrated Strategic Planning Group
JOTC - Joint Operations Tasking Centre
MINUSTAH - United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PALM - Peacebuilding Assembly Line Model
RBB - Results Based Budgeting
RC - Resident Coordinator
SSR - Security Sector Reform
UN - United Nations
UNASUR - Union of South American Nations
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO - United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNDSS - United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNICEF - United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
WFP - World Food Programme
WHO - World Health Organisation

Introduction

The end of the Cold War spawned a series of systemic changes that re-defined global governance. One such change was the evolution of conflict: post-Cold War era conflicts have been characterized by the shift towards intra-state clashes and away from the inter-state ideological warfare of the preceding thirty years.[1] The act of enforcing peace has thus taken on a new dimension, one that has seen the United Nations (UN) adopt a primary position as an advocate, enforcer and builder of peace within states.[2] What we have seen is a shift in methodology and practice within UN peacekeeping missions; the lines between the differing practices of peacekeeping[3] and peacebuilding have been blurred. Hybridisation and integration have become the necessary evolutionary developments by which the UN peacekeeping diaspora have facilitated the re-building and stabilisation of conflict affected states.[4] In short, peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions have developed to encompass a multi-dimensional character, responsible for providing the interwoven elements of security, development and humanitarian aid.[5] Coherence and coordination[6] within these missions has been the driving mechanism behind facilitating this integration.

The increased complexity of the situations peacekeeping agents are involved in has created a network structure of unprecedented size and scope.[7] Peacekeeping missions now encapsulate a variety of actors operating under both competing and complementary mandates to achieve a diverse array of goals that go beyond the simple enforcement of peace. Peace enforcement itself has also changed, given that peacebuilding missions are not universally deployed in post-conflict zones: Haiti serves as an example of a mission conducted within a

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[1] Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, "Intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War Era." *International Journal on World Peace* (2007): 11-13.

[2] Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas G. Weiss, *UN ideas that changed the world* (Indiana University Press, 2009), 163-167.

[3] Given the nature of modern peacekeeping/peacebuilding processes, and the blending of what were once distinct practices, this paper will use "peacekeeping" and "peacebuilding" as interchangeable terms. Historically, peacekeeping is defined as "the deployment of military or police personnel to oversee the implementation of a peace agreement", and peacebuilding defined as "action on the far side of conflict aimed at identifying and supporting structures that could prevent the recurrence of violence." Louise Riis Andersen and Peter Emil Engedal, *Blue helmets and grey zones: Do UN multidimensional peace operations work?* 2013: 29. DIIS Reports, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2013; 15.

[4] Cedric De Coning, "Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions." *Security in Practice* 5 (2007): 2.

[5] Peter Uvin, "The development/peacebuilding nexus: a typology and history of changing paradigms." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 1, no. 1 (2002): 5.

[6] Coherence among the international actors can be viewed as the goal, with coordination being the method to achieve coherence. Coherence can thus be described as the how various entities and agents coordinate their goals, priorities and methods in peacekeeping endeavors.

[7] Yeshi Choedon, "The United Nations Peacebuilding in Kosovo: The Issue of Coordination." *International Studies* 47, no. 1 (2010): 41-43.

state that is not or has not been at war but requires security operations to enforce political stability.[8] The inter-subjective dimensions of the peacebuilding processes require different standards and different practices relevant to each individual case. As such, the mechanisms that have been created to facilitate peacekeeping/peacebuilding practices have evolved to reflect the constant need for coherence in an arena that is itself inherently chaotic. The development of these mechanisms has been at the heart of debates within the UN and outside of it since the perceived failures of peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Rwanda in the 1990s.[9] Recently, eyes have re-focused towards the issue of mission coherence and co-ordination as conflict zones become ever-more nuanced.

In light of this recent turn towards inter and intra-organisational coherence within the UN and other international agents, it is important to situate these developments within the context of current peacekeeping missions. Therefore, this work is designed to situate UN peacekeeping developments within the context of the security-development nexus within Haiti. In doing so, this paper will serve a didactic purpose by describing and explaining organisational developments in practice. Haiti and the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) represent a litmus test for modern peacekeeping co-ordination practices. It is a state that is tragically characterized by the apparent long running inability of its own government and the international community to solve its interwoven elements of poverty and violence, manifested in endless economic, social and political instability. Not only this, Haiti has been ravaged by a series of natural disasters, most notable of which is the 2010 earthquake that killed some 200,000 people and left over one million people homeless.[10] The challenges posed by Haiti's economic, social and political developmental conundrums represent one of the largest challenges to the UN peacebuilding apparatus in the current era.[11] Despite the apparent significance of Haiti's issues and the 30-year occupation of the Haitian state by the international community[12], current developments relevant to the evolution of the integrated

[8] Marie Pace and Ketty Luzincourt, "Haiti's Fragile Peace: A Case Study of the Cumulative Impacts of Peace Practice." CDA Collaborative Learning Center (2009): 24.
[9] Thorsten Benner, Stephan Mergenthaler, and Philipp Rotmann, *The new world of UN peace operations: Learning to build peace?* (Oxford University Press on Demand, 2011), 11-16.
[10] Martin Hartberg, Aurelie Proust, and Michael Bailey, *From Relief to Recovery: Supporting good governance in post-earthquake Haiti*. Vol. 142. Oxfam, 2011: 2.
[11] Reginald Dumas, "Haiti and the Regional and International Communities since January 12, 2010." In *Politics and Power in Haiti*, 161-183. (New York: Palgrave, 2013), 175-178.
[12] To indicate the scale of this involvement, within the humanitarian arena alone there are 10 UN entities and 195 NGOs conducting disaster relief efforts; OCHA. Accessed March 10, 2017. http://www.unocha.org/ochain/2012-13/haiti.

peacebuilding process in Haiti remain somewhat unexplored within the academic world - this paper will aim to go some way in filling this void.

The purpose of this thesis is therefore to explore the issue of coordination and coherence in UN peacebuilding based upon the immediate post-2010 earthquake experiences of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. The main question this paper will answer is as follows: *What effective mechanisms of integration and coordination have been developed to solve the interwoven problems of security, development and humanitarian relief within post-earthquake Haiti?* This essay will thus have two main components: firstly, to explain the evolution of the MINUSTAH mission, and secondly, to identify the architecture developed by the UN as a means of harmonizing their peacekeeping efforts. It will begin by outlining the contextual situation in which the UN carries out peacekeeping, and will continue by addressing the formal structure of the inter-organisational network in which international actors conduct peacebuilding. Through an analysis of operational coherence and strategic alignment within the UN humanitarian system and within the integrated state-building process, this essay will divulge the various co-ordination practices that have been developed and explains how, through the operation of these mechanisms, MINUSTAH and the UN attempts to reach their goals. Finally, this paper will highlight the major challenges faced by the UN mission as a result of co-ordination problems. The primary finding of this project is that MINUSTAH and the UN do not struggle from a lack of coordination mechanisms. Rather, the degree to which integration and coherence is present, and the emphasis on horizontal coordination practices over vertical integration mechanisms, creates a compartmentalised peacebuilding environment that lacks operational coherence.

Literature Review

This thesis has been informed by a wide body of literature pertaining to the various disciplines inherently incorporated into any text regarding development and peacekeeping. United Nations peacekeeping and Haitian development are by themselves individual disciplines worthy of considerable discussion, and the combination of these fields into a singular work therefore provides a broad array of sources from which to draw. As such, this author has prioritised the sources utilised as a building block for the bulk of this essay simply as a result of feasibility and space. Therefore, the literature utilised as a starting point for this project follows a distinct focus. The following section will trace the evolution of the peacekeeping literature in relation

to the questions of coherence and coordination within peacekeeping projects; it will indicate how and why the questions of coordination have become important, and will indicate the specific departure point from which this project has taken off.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are now integrated or hybridised; they are mandated and designed to tackle the interwoven elements of security, development and humanitarian relief. The growingly complex arena of peacekeeping has facilitated considerable discussion in regard to mission coherence and coordination, and as a result, a number of authors have focused their efforts on the evolution of the development and success of peacekeeping practices. Michael Lipson for example, has conducted a systematic review of the UN's performance assessment mechanism - the results based budgeting (RBB) system. Lipson's analysis concludes that given the heterogeneity of peacekeeping missions, the UN's RBB system is insufficient. In his own words: "RBB served the symbolic purpose of demonstrating conformity with NPM-influenced standards for management practices in pubic bureaucracies such as the UN"… "but is unsuited to the operational requirements of peacekeeping."[13] However, a universally applicable assessment mechanism is non-existent; Lipson asserts that ambiguity within the UN system in relation to mandates and objectives renders the possibility of such a mechanism impossible.[14] Since assessing a peacekeeping mission is a virtually impossible task, the literature and this thesis has orientated itself towards identifying methods that the UN has taken to tackle the heterogeneity evident within the peacekeeping system.

Much of this burgeoning field of literature has concentrated on coordination practices within traditionally war torn states. This particular body of work has focused on coordination practices within the security arena. Powles et. all for example, have written extensively on the "importance of the integrated approach" in peacekeeping, however, their efforts are concentrated on multi-lateral cooperation within the arena of troop contributions in war torn states.[15] Likewise, Stedman's work[16] on the necessities of "strategic coordination" in the implementation of peace agreements is noteworthy for its contribution to security operations in civil war terrains. But, based upon its analysis of coordination within the implementation of peace agreements in civil wars, it is not directly relevant to the non-traditional[17] post conflict

[13] Michael Lipson, "Performance under ambiguity: international organization performance in UN peacekeeping." *The Review of International Organizations* 5, no. 3 (2010): 274.
[14] *Ibid.,* 275.
[15] Anna Powles, Negar Partow, and Nick Nelson, *United Nations Peacekeeping Challenge: The Importance of the Integrated Approach*, (Ashgate Publishing, 2015).
[16] Stephen John Stedman, *Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreements*. (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 89-117.
[17] As will be made evident later, Haiti is not traditionally post-conflict, given it has not or is not at war.

environment of Haiti. A number of additional authors have concentrated their efforts on developing methods for improving the efficiency of multi-lateral peacekeeping operations in relation to the organisational ambiguity identified by Lipson, among others.

Roland Paris has devoted considerable attention to collaboration between international organisations (IOs) in post-conflict environments.[18] However, like additional studies[19] of this kind, their analyses are limited to traditional post-conflict societies, have an over emphasis on assessment mechanisms, and are restricted to studying cooperation between (and not within) multilateral institutions such as the UN, NATO and the EU. In addition, the incorporation of theory into the field has led to an over-emphasis on modelling international cooperation in peacekeeping missions. This approach has emphasised the use of administrative theories as a means of analysing the structural relationship between entities in peacekeeping operations in order to suggest bureaucratic improvements. Oya Dursun-Ozkanca has developed the "Peace Building Assembly Line Model" (PALM), utilised as a framework for understanding the division of labor between IOs in peacekeeping missions.[20] Likewise, Anna Herrhausen has written extensively on the theorization of peace operations. In her analysis of peace operations in the 20th century, Herrhausen utilizes "organisation theory" as an analytical tool to model the "network structures" present in multi-lateral peace operations.[21] While these theories are useful as analytical tools, this thesis's methodology has adopted a more descriptive, rather than theory-based conceptual approach. As such, the most relevant body of work utilised in this final section relates to practical and descriptive work that has taken on an explanatory focus. The primary focus of this scholarship has been to examine why and how the United Nations has addressed the issue of coordination and coherence within this arena on a practical level. The capacity of the UN to learn from its past mistakes has been analysed, to suggest that modern peacekeeping practices are indeed a reflection of the growingly complicated arena of peacekeeping.

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[18] Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, "Confronting the contradictions." In *The dilemmas of Statebuilding. Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations* (2009): 57-78.

[19] Sarjoh A. Bah and Bruce D. Jones, "Peace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements." *Paper, Center on International Cooperation, New York University* (2008); Ho-Won Jeong, *Peacebuilding in postconflict societies: Strategy and Proces*s, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

[20] Oya Dursun-Ozkanca, "The Peacebuilding Assembly-Line Model: Towards a Theory of International Collaboration in Multidimensional Peacebuilding Operations." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 21, no. 2 (2016): 41-57.

[21] Anna Herrhausen, "Coordination in United Nations peacebuilding: A theory-guided approach", No. SP IV 2007-301. WZB Discussion Paper, 2007.

The UN's greater organisational capacity gave way to the introduction of a new concept for peacekeeping operations: The Integrated Missions (IM) concept. Cedric De Coning's famed report on *Coherence and Coordination in UN Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions* is the often cited hallmark study on the creation of the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP). De Coning's work utilises a chronological method to detail how the UN developed a more coherent approach to the peacebuilding process. As he notes, "the nexus between development, peace and security have become the central focus of the international conflict management debate."[22] In order to reform the peacekeeping/peacebuilding mechanisms, the UN developed the Integrated Missions concept as a means of facilitating system-wide coherence across the UN system to combat these interconnected challenges.[23] As a result, De Coning suggests that the complexity of the peacebuilding process could be overcome through the harmonisation of security, development and humanitarian efforts between internal and external actors. As De Coning continued, "delivering as one" became the primary goal of the peacebuilding process, and only through this process could the international community successfully facilitate actual peace and development.

However, the success of the integrated process is not as simple or as practical as it appears on paper. In fact, the shear nature of the many processes that take place on the ground create an environment not conducive to cooperation. As De Coning also highlighted, although linkages between various entities exist within and without the UN system, "agents are independent in that they are each legally constituted in their own right, have their own organisational goals and objectives, have their own access to resources, and are in control of those resources."[24] Despite then, that each UN agency is part of the UN system as a whole, they continue to maintain a degree of autonomy from the peacekeeping mission structure and from the established UN country office. Peacebuilding success is thus reliant upon the interdependency between the actors, and how this interdependence is brought about is vital to achieving sustainable and efficient peacekeeping/peacebuilding practices.

Likewise addressing the reformation process[25] within the UN peacekeeping system, Susanna Campbell has noted that integration reforms are reflective of a broader problem within

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[22] De Coning, 2007, 2.
[23] *Ibid.,* 5.
[24] *Ibid.,* 9-10.
[25] The UN commissioned a series of panels and working groups in the early 2000s designed to investigate the issue of coordination and integration in peacekeeping/peacebuilding, such as the Brahimi Report (2000); the Panel on Peace operations in 2000; the working group on Transition issues in 2004; the Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2005 and the Panel on System-Wide Coherence in 2006; the culmination of these efforts resulted in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005.

the UN as a whole. Through analysing the development of the IM process and its subsequent implementation, Campbell asserts that "the (dis)integration of the UN system at the country level is also a corollary of the incoherence and competition within the home governments of member states."[26] For Campbell, achieving true integration and coherence is a function of both member state incentives as well as bureaucratic uniformity. As she continues, "the UN comprises two conceptually separate, but operationally interdependent, components."[27] Functionally, the UN is an IO designed to reflect the interest of its member states, but is also a bureaucracy "responsible for promoting socially valued goals such as protecting human rights, providing development assistance, and brokering peace agreements."[28] The tensions between these elements, as Campbell concludes, reflects a tension between the partiality involved in supporting apolitical state-building and protecting humanitarian space.[29] Finally, Campbell's conclusion is significant in its observation that coherence within the UN system is a function of the UN's internal governance structure as well as operational integration and coherence on the ground. Given that a number of years have passed since the initial IM processes have been rolled out, looking at whether the inconsistencies noted by Campbell have been addressed both structurally and operationally is fundamentally important to analysing peacekeeping missions operating nearly a decade after the IM concept was developed.

Benner et. all's *The New World of Peace Operations* is one such work which has traced the development of structural and systemic evolutions in relation to the peacekeeping system. Through a comprehensive and multiple case-study approach, Benner et. all's work reveals that the UN has at least partially learned from the deficiencies of past operations. More specifically, Benner et. all assert that the UN's peacekeeping apparatus is now more inclusive of peace operations not limited by singular and narrow mandates.[30] Rather, through internal reassessments of the UN's institutional weaknesses, Benner et. all conclude that the UN peacekeeping network has facilitated greater organisational learning within their own bureaucracy and within peacekeeping missions.[31] However, as Benner et. all also note, while integration between peace missions and other UN agents on the ground has strengthened, barriers still exist at the institutional level.

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[26] Susanna P Campbell, "(Dis) integration, incoherence and complexity in UN post-conflict Interventions." *International peacekeeping* 15, no. 4 (2008): 559.
[27] *Ibid.,* 559.
[28] *Ibid.,* 559.
[29] *Ibid.,* 561.
[30] Benner et. all, 2011, 13-25.
[31] *Ibid.,* 180-203.

The ability of the UN to systematically reform integration practices is largely dependent upon the harmonisation of efforts at all levels of the peace process. Obstacles to system wide "organisational learning on integration" are abound; this is a result of every organisation creating its "own budgetary rules, standard operating procedures, and, ultimately, cultures."[32] Disintegration in these aspects can be largely traced back to the structural setup of the UN. As Benner et. all continue, "different funding sources create different channels for member states to exert power, which in turn shapes different accountability mechanisms and incentives for each organisation."[33] As such, fragmentation exists within funding sources, reporting and oversight mechanisms, and in mission planning/mandate creation. Similarly, Julian Junk has coined the phrase "heterogeneity within the sponsoring coalition" to explain this process. Like both Campbell and Benner et. all, Junk similarly concludes that "preferences among the state and organisational actors"... "lead to diffused authority in peace operation structures."[34] Success in peacekeeping is thus dependent upon coherence and integration within all layers of a multi-level system; this includes top down coherence within the UN structure alongside integration with the host government of the peacekeeping operation. The exact areas of integration and the operational mechanisms employed to achieve coherence has been further elaborated on by Ben Mills.

In an exploration designed to unravel the often used metaphor of "too many cooks in the kitchen", Mills outlines the framework in which coherence within the peacebuilding process can be analysed. Building off similar outlines created by Paris and De Coning[35], Mills asserts that through understanding four specific areas within the peacebuilding process, the complex conundrum of coordination and coherence can be fully understood.[36] In order to address issues of coherence and coordination at both a field level and at the "headquarters" level, Mills has developed a four-point methodology to explain integration. Based upon an exhaustive review of existing frameworks, Mills asserts that integration should be subdivided and evaluated based upon entity coherence, donor harmonisation, strategic alignment and operational coherence.[37] The four elements are described as follows:

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[32] *Ibid.,* 177.
[33] *Ibid.,* 178.
[34] Julian Junk, "Function follows form: The organizational design of peace operations." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 6, no. 3 (2012): 299.
[35] Paris & Sink, 2009; De Coning 2007.
[36] Ben Mills, "Too many cooks: Integrating the recipes for post-conflict development." *International Journal of Development and Conflict* 3, no. 1 (2013): 14-16.
[37] *Ibid.,* 14-15.

1. Entity coherence, where both states and IGOs such as the UN ensure that policies and operations across their disparate agencies are unified and coordinated within a given post-conflict context
2. Donor harmonisation, where donors (both state and IGO) strive towards harmonisation and integration of their various policy and development objectives
3. Strategic alignment, where at senior levels donor states, IGOs, and key NGOs align their actions against a joint strategic plan owned by host government and local civil society representatives
4. Operational coherence, where at a 'field level' relevant actors in relevant contexts ensure that their on-the-ground activities are coherent[38]

Mills' outline is a revised framework built upon existing foundational theories within the field. Therefore, this author finds the four areas discussed by Mills to be fundamental to explaining and describing any current peacebuilding mission. If integration is to be successful, coherence and coordination must exist within and between these four delineated areas. The degree to which they do is then of vital understanding to each peacekeeping mission. However, due to limitations in the scope of this paper as well as the reliability and type of evidence available at such a distance from Haiti, this paper will focus solely on an exploration into operational coherence and strategic alignment within the MINUSTAH mission and UN humanitarian system in Haiti. An explanation of the policies and operations across the UN system within Haiti will go some way to illustrating the various mechanisms in place to foster integration and coherence within the Haitian peacekeeping arena. Additionally, how these UN-wide policies are integrated into the existing state architecture is of vital importance to understanding the interplay between peacebuilding and peacekeeping, as well as determining the degree to which integration has taken place. This essay will thus have two main components: firstly, to explain the evolution of the Security-Development Nexus in the MINUSTAH mission, and secondly, to identify the architecture developed by the UN as a means of harmonizing security, development and relief efforts. As of yet, Haiti remains under-referenced within the academic world, and as such is deserved of greater attention, especially since the 2010 earthquake created additional challenges beyond existing development and

[38] *Ibid.,* 15.

security concerns. Similar studies have recently surfaced on The Congo[39], Libya[40] and Burundi[41], and this case study will hope to add to those reports in an effort to provide additional case-based evidence in the field of peacekeeping/peacebuilding integration.

Methodology

The majority of research for this essay has been conducted through desk research. An exhaustive archival research methodology has been employed to unearth both primary and secondary source data. Constraints found in accessing the relevant information from such a distance from Haiti has been that much of the accessible information is limited to formal reports issued by the UN entities themselves. Therefore, this project has utilised this information and remained cognisant of the potential bias of all source materials. All sources have been selected in order to maintain a balance between official reports from UN entities, NGOs and critical academic material. In this way the research selected for this project is as objective and conclusive as possible. Additionally, much of the literature is centred around the immediate humanitarian response to the Haitian earthquake. Therefore, the study of integration in humanitarian space in this essay will focus on coordination within the immediate aftermath (2010-2011) of the 2010 earthquake, to identify how coherence and integration practices within UN integrated missions are made evident as a result of additional strain on the peacekeeping system. Likewise, the study of integration and strategic alignment within security-development policies will relate to evolutions in this arena from 2010 onwards. Specifically, it will make reference to the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) developed in 2010-2011 as a result of the new-found needs of the Haitian community in the aftermath of the earthquake.

This project delineates between two different types of integration: vertical and horizontal. Horizontal integration refers to "the search for more effective, and more strategic coordination of effort across the broad range of international actors involved in peace-building operations."[42] Vertical integration refers to "the need for improved coherence and coordination up and down the chain of relationships that link international-level, state-level and local-level

[39] Arvid Ekengard, "Coordination and coherence in the peace operation in de Democratic Republic of Congo." Division of Defence Analysis, Swedish Defence Research Agency, (2009).
[40] Sebastian Döring and Melanie Schreiner, "Inter-agency coordination in United Nations peacebuilding: practical implications from a micro-level analysis of the United Nations family in Liberia," (2008).
[41] Felix Haas, "Coordinating to build peace? Lessons from the UN Peacebuilding Commission's engagement with Burundi," United States Institute of Peace (2012).
[42] Timothy Donais and Geoff Burt, "Peace-building in Haiti: the case for vertical integration." *Conflict, Security & Development* 15, no. 1 (2015): 4.

actors in peacebuilding contexts."[43] Given the nature of this project and its emphasis on coordination mechanisms within the UN structure, the main body of this work will focus on horizontal integration within the UN peacekeeping system in Haiti. To conclude, the degree to which vertical integration is present within the UN system will be analysed. Identified throughout has been the threefold dilemmas of security management, political and social development, and humanitarian relief. Through the utilisation of Ben Mill's concepts of Strategic Alignment and Operational Coherence, this essay will investigate how the UN system has internally constructed itself to achieve greater coherence and strategic alignment within these integrated arenas.

Using operational coherence to mean the degree to which at a field level relevant actors in relevant contexts ensure that their on-the-ground activities are coherent, and strategic alignment to mean the degree to which the UN has aligned their actions against a joint strategic plan owned by host government and local civil society representatives, this essay will subdivide its efforts to distinguish between the degrees of operational coherence and strategic alignment evident in the security/development and humanitarian relief arenas respectively. Within the relief arena, humanitarian integration will be explained in relation to the UN's Cluster Coordination model. Two elements are considered: how cluster coordination works within the Haitian relief effort, and how these humanitarian efforts are situated within the wider peacebuilding process. As a means of identifying coherence among interlinked security and development goals, the UN's Integrated Strategic Framework will be analysed to identify how development policies have been universalized across the UN system and aligned with local objectives. MINUSTAH's strategic alignment will be determined through an examination of vertical integration techniques within the peacebuilding system; the degree to which local ownership and alignment with the host government's priorities will be identified to reveal whether the UN peacebuilding apparatus is coherent with the goals and infrastructure of the Haitian government.

To begin, this thesis will conduct a conclusive analysis of peacekeeping's evolution within the United Nations so as to provide an adequate historical narrative capable of housing the current Haitian peacebuilding debate. The MINUSTAH mission will be situated within the "generation" concept, detailing how MINUSTAH's increasingly complex and multi-faceted mandate is reflective of a larger system-wide trend towards tension between humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement. It will then trace the evolution of the MINUSTAH up until

[43] *Ibid.* 4.

the 2010 Earthquake to indicate the degree to which state-building and humanitarian relief efforts have become entwined. Lastly, this essay will continue with an analysis of the integration methods utilised by the Haitian peacekeeping diaspora to foster greater coherence and coherence within the peacebuilding system. To conclude, this essay will highlight the major challenges facing further integration and coherence in the Haitian peacebuilding system.

Generational Peacekeeping & the Security-Development Nexus

In order to fully comprehend the complex arena in which peacebuilding integration occurs, one must first understand how peacekeeping has evolved to encompass more than mere security operations. In fact, modern peacekeeping is a multi-dimensional enterprise, consisting of interlinked operations that have come about due to concerns over the capacity of the international community to provide sustainable peace. Peace operations can be situated within generational developments that are representative of both changes in global politics and in conceptions of peacekeeping effectiveness. The MINUSTAH mission in its current incarnation is considered to be a fourth generation mission; fourth generations peacekeeping missions are characterised by their emphasis on both peacekeeping through the use of force and their mandated focus on peacebuilding processes.[44] This generation of missions can be distinguished from previous generations largely due to a departure from emphasis on conflict management. Greater emphasis is placed upon institution building, facilitating elections and development goals.[45] As such, development and security are functionally different, but part of a broader more interwoven web. How this evolution has taken place is fundamentally important to understanding the development of the MINUSTAH mission up until the 2010 earthquake; the ideological and practical developments within the UN and the MINUSTAH mission will be divulged below.

United Nations peacekeeping projects can be situated within a larger ideological trend, that being the movement towards the protection of individuals as opposed to the welfare of individual states. As a result of the changing nature of global conflict, the world saw a decrease in tensions between the East and the West and observed the rising intra-state tensions that

[44] Kai Michael Kenkel, "Five generations of peace operations: from the "thin blue line" to “painting a country blue"." *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 56, no. 1 (2013): 132-33.
[45] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping." *International Relations* 11, no. 3 (1992): 201-218.

ultimately led to a number of civil wars and internal conflicts.[46] Combating this transformation in conflict required an evolution of ideas; the idea and concept of human security became the calling cry of the international community, and has since defined the manner in which international security has been sought.[47] The development of the concept of human security was "perhaps the most radical shift in thinking on peace and the avoidance of conflict since the UN was founded."[48] In regard to intervention, peacebuilding operations and their pursuit of peace and security was conceptually altered. The role of the United Nations in peacekeeping was now defined by their ability to secure human security through peace enforcement.[49] It is in the light of these ideological revelations that peacekeeping took on a new mantra, one that attempted to blend humanitarianism with conflict prevention.

The second generation of UN peacekeeping developments is grounded in this rationale; intervention through enforcing physical security was the method behind securing the rights of individuals, and subsequently, the stability of the international system. The changing dynamics in the post-Cold War society created a new framework for development politics, one where policy was dictated by a "security framework within which the modalities of underdevelopment have become dangerous."[50] In the post-Cold War era, development and international peace was seen as directly dependent upon resolving the intra-state wars in conflict affected states. Conflict resolution under the auspices of humanitarianism defined the second and third generations of peacekeeping operations, and was codified by the UN in Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report entitled *Agenda for Peace*.[51]

Development - both social and political - through security became the dominant paradigm under which numerous peacekeeping forces in the 1990s and early 2000s were mandated. The security of individuals from conflict became a banner under which social and political development could be sought; in the eyes of policy makers achieving one aim was inherently dependent upon achieving the other.[52] The interweaving of these once distinct elements became the hallmark that defined the methodological practices of UN peacekeeping

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[46] Jolly et. all, 2009, 178.
[47] For further reading on the Human Security debate and its evolution within the UN see: Edward Newman, "Critical human security studies." *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 01 (2010): 77-94; Edward Newman, "A human security peace-building agenda." *Third World Quarterly* 32, no. 10 (2011): 1737-1756; Neil S. MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, *Human security and the UN: A critical history*, (Indiana University Press, 2006).
[48] Jolly et. all, 2009, 177.
[49] Kenkel, 2013, 123.
[50] Mark R. Duffield, *Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security*. Vol. 87. (London: Zed books, 2001), 16.
[51] Kenkel, 2013, 127.
[52] Duffield, 2001, 16.

missions. In many eyes, the nascent obsession of the international community with providing development through physical security has opened up the UN to criticism from both its internal practitioners as well as within academia.[53] The human security dominated developmental agenda was flawed in its conception[54] and ultimately resulted in peacekeeping practices that were ideologically and practically insufficient for the demands of many conflict affected states.

As the UN grew in scope and mandate during this period, so had their influence in providing international security. While 13 operations were established in the first 40 years of UN peacekeeping history, 28 new security operations were launched between 1988 and 2001.[55] The mobilisation of resources to solve conflict became the customary response to internal state conflicts that took place in low-power countries.[56] The UN's so-called "liberal peace agenda" is reflective of the international community's emphasis on military intervention; wide-spread military peacekeeping has been utilised as the primary mechanism of stabilising potentially volatile states. This method creates a stable environment for "state-building", which is a top-down approach to lay the groundwork for the establishment of liberal institutions by providing physical security.[57] The development of human security thus became entwined with an institutional approach overly concerned with the UN's global agenda of democratizing fragile states. In this context, the peacebuilding processes have become preoccupied with trying to create peace through mechanisms that "transcend the interests of actors engaged in the conflict."[58] The United Nations as the main party to this process, have used force to "clear the way, or provide security, for their own actions and interventions in conflict zones."[59] As such, it is often the case that peacekeeping processes adopt an overly security-orientated approach to providing stability, and this was very much the case with second and third generation operations.[60] The military based approach to state/peacebuilding is almost contradictory in

[53] See: Eirini Lemos-Maniati, "Peace-Keeping Operations: Requirements and effectiveness; NATO's role." *Final Report NATO-EAPC Fellowship* (2001): 1-50; Kamil Shah, "The failure of state building and the promise of state failure: reinterpreting the security–development nexus in Haiti." *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (2009): 17-34; Tom Woodhouse, and Oliver Ramsbotham, "Cosmopolitan peacekeeping and the globalization of security." *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 2 (2005): 139-156; Tom Woodhouse, "Conflict resolution and peacekeeping: Critiques and responses." *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 1 (2000): 8-26.
[54] It should also be noted that a security dominated approach has had success in some arenas, particularly in Africa. However, its flaws lie in the universal application of security focused mandates.
[55] Lemos-Maniati, 2001, 2.
[56] *Ibid.,* 6.
[57] Oliver P. Richmond, "Emancipatory forms of human security and liberal peacebuilding." *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 460-461.
[58] *Ibid.,* 472.
[59] *Ibid.,* 475.
[60] Kenkel, 2013, 131-132.

nature; the establishment of peace is conceivably only viable through "humanitarian war."[61] From 1992-1996 alone, Somalia, the former state of Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Angola were recipients of international armed forces.[62] The perceived failures of these missions is well-known, and reformations of the principles of military intervention were and still are subject to considerable change. The military method, and humanitarian war, were however still largely fundamental to the methods employed by UN peacekeeping missions throughout the early 2000s. Their effectiveness and applicability - or lack thereof - has become a topic for debate.

At the heart of this debate is the criticism of the perceived failure of the UN's one-size fits all framework; as Eirini Lemos-Maniati has asserted, security orientated operations "have manifested the fact that peacekeeping is not a panacea for every case of international disorder."[63] Rather, the need for context specific mandates lies at the heart of many methodology driven critiques of UN peacekeeping. Even within conflict environments, there are a variety of variables; this includes whether the conflict is inter-state or civil, beyond that, civil violence usually incorporates more actors or opposing sides than interstate violence.[64] The conclusion here, as Diehl and Druckman have asserted, is that there is "considerable variation among the contexts of operations"; the type of conflict, the conflict phase, the disputant characteristics, the involvement of external actors, the geographic location and the various interactions among these variables serve to create unique circumstances and unique solutions to each case.[65] In addition to the characteristics of the conflict, contemporary peace operations also have multiple missions. As Diehl and Druckman continue, "different missions necessitate divergent skill sets for peacekeepers and may involve fundamentally different conditions for success."[66] Therefore, there will be "some elements of the environment that are more relevant for certain missions than others."[67] The evolution of thought away from the security dominant agenda is evidenced within the Fourth generation of UN peacekeeping operations.

The fourth generation of missions grew out of the failures of the security orientated approach dominant throughout the peace operations of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The fourth generation of missions included mandates that encompassed more focused security

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[61] Hugo Slim, "Military Humanitarianism and the New Peacekeeping: An Agenda for Peace?" *IDS Bulletin* 27, no. 3 (1996): 86.
[62] *Ibid.,* 88.
[63] Lemos-Maniati, 2001, 3.
[64] Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, "Dimensions of the conflict environment: implications for peace operation success." *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 1 (2009): 10.
[65] *Ibid.,* 10-19.
[66] *Ibid.,* 37.
[67] *Ibid.,* 38.

measures alongside context driven peacebuilding operations. [68] This generation of missions moved away from traditional conflict management and towards peacebuilding that focused on the root causes of conflict and development issues. Still grounded in the human security ideals of past operations, modern peacekeeping endeavors are larger and more complex in scope. The use of force is embedded alongside the locally owned processes that foster long-term peace and development. The MINUSTAH mission is reflective of this new generation of missions, and its evolution from its initial form is reminiscent of the move away from conflict management and towards robust peacebuilding measures.

MINUSTAH's Multi-Dimensional Character

The initial incarnation of the MINUSTAH mission is reflective of the UN's past security orientated agenda, however, its evolution towards hybridity and integration make it a hallmark study for the increased interconnectedness and integration between the elements of security, development and humanitarianism within the peacekeeping/peacebuilding process. The literature in this regard has thus far served to illustrate the origins and inefficiencies of the security-orientated approach, of particular attention in the context of Haiti is the observation that Haiti is not a traditional post-conflict state. Reginald Dumas, who served as Kofi Annan's special advisor on Haiti in 2004, has observed that Haiti did not represent a conflict dilemma. Haiti was not a country at civil war, but as Dumas notes, "there was civil unrest, but a massive military and police operation, with a strong, even lopsided emphasis on troops, did not seem to me the answer to the question."[69] The MINUSTAH operation, which began in 2004, was deployed to resolve civil conflict so as to aid in the transition to democratic peace processes. However, the evolution of the mission has shown it to reflect a paradigmatic shift in thought away from the security dominant agenda of the previous decade's peacekeeping missions. Its evolution has taken place within the context of the criticisms and redevelopment of ideas regarding how to create peace and development in the growingly interconnected arena of peacekeeping/peacebuilding.

The demand for a context specific mandate that addresses the root causes of Haiti's fragility is at the heart of MINUSTAH's redevelopment. Kamil Shah, a scholar who echoes this sentiment, asserts that the UN's emphasis on policing fragile states is an unnecessary pre-

[68] Kenkel, 2013, 132.
[69] Dumas, 2013, 177.

occupation of the international community. Shah has evaluated Haitian peacekeeping in relation to the UN's emphasis on the top-down approach to development in Haiti. In her eyes, a focus on providing policing and territorial security is the function of a state-driven modernisation project.[70] Within this framework, state building through the establishment of western liberal institutions is a mechanism of forcing development without addressing fundamental social problems within the state; evidently, the peacebuilding project in Haiti was being implemented with little regard for context.[71] State-building in the image of western democracies - as the UN had imagined it - leaves many areas of concern within fragile states unaddressed.

The most critical error in peacekeeping's state-building practice stems from an absence of knowledge of how to rebuild states and additional failures of state building methods.[72] As Kirsti Samuels has identified, "conflict cessation without modification of the political environment is unlikely to succeed."[73] The rebuilding aspects in the post conflict arena are as much a necessity as the need to provide security, further asserting that a "successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building mission."[74] To create stability and development, security must coincide with a functional and context driven plan that will foster socioeconomic and political development.[75] In light of these criticisms, the UN and the MINUSTAH mission itself reformed their practices; the mid to late 2000s saw a re-orientation towards more efficient and relevant peacekeeping/peacebuilding strategies. Robert Maguire, drawing on a UN report written by Oxford economist Paul Collier, has noted that "MINUSTAH's first order of business was deployment to provide immediate security."[76] However, the mission has come to reflect a growing need to move away from a military minded operation and towards a more locally owned development process. As Maguire also notes, "from a U.N. perspective, MINUSTAH's Plan A peacekeeping orientation had shown itself as a necessary, but insufficient approach for achieving enduring peace in Haiti."[77] A number of health crises, financial crises and natural disasters have clouded the terrain. Although political dialogue had been facilitated and security operations had achieved

[70] Shah, 2009, 19.
[71] *Ibid.,* 21-30.
[72] Kirsti Samuels, "Post-conflict peace-building and constitution-making." *Chi. J. Int'l L.* 6 (2005): 663.
[73] *Ibid.,* 664.
[74] *Ibid.,* 664-665.
[75] *Ibid.,* 675-680.
[76] Robert Earl Maguire, *What Role for the United Nations in Haiti?* United States Institute of Peace, (2009):1.
[77] *Ibid.,* 2.

small successes, less progress had been achieved in the area of social and economic development.[78]

As a result of the Brahimi report (2000) and a system wide evaluation of peacekeeping practices[79], the UN has shifted its focus away from security and towards the structural and systemic problems that underlie any resulting physical insecurity within the Haitian state. The "Plan B" approach adopted since the initial years of MINUSTAH built itself up within the context of a system-wide evolution of thought away from past peacekeeping and state-building ideas; a more robust approach to socio-economic development has been developed. Maguire concludes that "there is broad agreement within the U.N. and with Haitian officials on the importance of heightened emphasis on manufacturing, agriculture, job creation, education, health, disaster preparedness and poverty reduction as necessary pre-conditions for the improvement and maintenance of security."[80] A re-orientation in practice has led to the UN creating a framework which prioritises institutional rebuilding, territorial rebuilding, social rebuilding and economic rebuilding as the primary mission objectives.[81]

Gerard Le Chevallier, a former director within the MINUSTAH mission - before his untimely death in the 2010 Haitian earthquake - has likewise asserted that MINUSTAH became unparalleled in its wide scope and mandate in the years after its initial implementation. Although acknowledging the continuing shortcomings of a security dominant mandate, Le Chevallier asserts that the MINUSTAH operation grew to incorporate "more systemic and holistic efforts for rule-of-law sector reform - police, judiciary and penal."[82] In his eyes, MINUSTAH represented the only mechanism by which lasting peace and stability could be reached within Haiti. In order to achieve this, MINUSTAH would "have to address the root causes of Haiti's instability by promoting democratic governance, strengthening the capacity of state institutions and helping Haiti begin a genuine economic recovery process."[83] Evidently, there is a consensus among scholars and practitioners alike regarding what needs to be done by the international community to solve Haiti's developmental problems. However, alongside growing economic and political issues, Haiti has been further ravaged by natural disasters that have plunged the fragile state into further disrepair.

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[78] *Ibid.,* 3.
[79] See footnote 26.
[80] *Ibid.,* 2.
[81] International Organisation for Migration, MINUSTAH Logistics Base. *IOM-Haiti Strategic Plan 2013-2014*. Port-au-Prince: IOM, 2013: 9.
[82] Gerard Le Chevallier, "The MINUSTAH Experience." In *Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2011), 120.
[83] *Ibid.,* 118.

The 2010 Haitian earthquake killed over 220,000 people and left over 2.3 million homeless.[84] Adding to an already volatile situation, the earthquake facilitated greater weakening of the Haitian government and also the ability of the peacekeeping apparatus to continue existing development projects. Institutions such as the Presidential Palace, the Parliament, the Supreme Court and most public administration buildings were destroyed.[85] The peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities of the UN were stalled, and what was already a complex arena was further sunken into chaos. Previous peacebuilding efforts were damaged, and created additional humanitarian obstacles as well as exasperating existing problems.[86] To combat this, MINUSTAH and the UN agencies became peacebuilding entities and disaster relief operations simultaneously. Haiti thus faced political and financial instability as well as the immediate threats of famine, violence and additional natural disasters. What Haiti required was a triple-pronged long term strategy that incorporates security, development and humanitarian aid.[87] The incorporation of these areas into a single mission was however, no simple task; the multi-dimensional character of such a mission is inherently complicated and intricate in nature. The manner in which these different elements come together and interact is fundamental to the success of the operation. The complexity of this dysfunctional arena is thus worthy of considerable study, given its importance to operational success. As Jose Raul Perales has so eloquently summarised:

> "The magnitude of the 2010 earthquake, both in terms of the disaster and the strong international response, may yet open a new chapter for understanding the complex interplay between international cooperation and state-building, especially new ways of crafting such cooperation and how different kinds of actors can act cohesively and constructively." [88]

This essay will now turn to investigating this dynamic.

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[84] ONU-Haiti, *Report of the United Nations in Haiti 2010: Situation, Challenges and Outlook*. New York: United Nations, 2010, 8.
[85] *Ibid.,* 16.
[86] *Ibid.,* 5-10.
[87] Robert Fatton Jr, "Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake: The politics of catastrophe." *Journal of Black Studies* 42, no. 2 (2011): 14-17.
[88] José Raúl Perales, "Haiti and the regional dynamics of international cooperation." In *Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2011), 187.

Coherence in Humanitarian Space

One of the largest challenges facing the UN peacekeeping system is coordination and integration within humanitarian space. The multidimensional character of peace operations necessitates linkages between what in theory should be independent aspects of the peacebuilding mission. Integration within the humanitarian relief sector has two relevant dynamics: coordination between humanitarian actors themselves and between humanitarian entities and the larger peacekeeping system (civil-military relations).[89] The UN system has developed organisational mechanisms to solve these dynamics within the hierarchical structure of the peacekeeping mission as well as in the cluster coordination framework developed for large scale relief operations. The division of labour within humanitarian coordination involves two main UN entities. The MINUSTAH mission and the UN country team coordinate humanitarian operations through the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), while the United Nations office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) operates parallel to the MINUSTAH mission to directly coordinate humanitarian projects between UN entities, NGOs and other donors under the supervision of the HC (See Annex 1).

The integrated nature of the MINUSTAH mission dictates that at a policy level, strategies are theoretically coordinated through liaison between the HC and OCHA, leading to coherent strategies between UN agencies and external partners.[90] Clouding this terrain is the role of civil-military relations, as through the integrated process MINUSTAH is mandated to provide military and security resources in the humanitarian context.[91] The structural layup of humanitarian activity within the peacekeeping process does provide scope for coordination between the humanitarian agents and the MINUSTAH mission. As OCHA indicates, "the implementation of seemingly similar activities by humanitarian actors and military and police actors within the same geographical terrain has necessitated various forms of civil-military coordination and engagement."[92] The operational arrangement in this terrain is reliant upon the authority of the HC. The HC serves a triple hatted role in that he/she is also the Deputy Senior Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) and the Resident Coordinator (RC).[93] In

[89] François Grünewald and Bonaventure Sokpoh, "IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, 2nd Phase Country Study." (2010): 17-19.
[90] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Civil Affairs Handbook*. New York: United Nations, 2012, 45.
[91] OCHA Haiti, *Guidelines for Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti*. Port-au-Prince: UNOCHA, 2011, 3.
[92] *Ibid.,* 4.
[93] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2012, 39.

theory, the DSRSG/RC/HC is ideally situated to coordinate civil-military relations due to his involvement in each individual sector of the peacekeeping mission. As such, the HC is responsible for coordinating all provisions of humanitarian assistance provided by the military component of the MINUSTAH operation.

The mechanism created to facilitate coherence in this regard is the Joint Operations Tasking Centre (JOTC). The JOTC brings together the MINUSTAH military component, OCHA, the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and the Logistics Cluster to facilitate system wide coherence throughout the deployment of security resources in humanitarian space.[94] As the JOTC guidelines dictate, support must be provided as needed through established humanitarian coordination mechanisms: the JOTC serves as the liaison between the DSRG/HC/RC and the MINUSTAH military and police components as well as with OCHA and humanitarian cluster coordinators (see Annex 2).[95] The success of this operation is dependent upon the pursuit of complementary and not conflicting efforts with independent humanitarian actors, and as such the JOTC mechanism serves to provide humanitarian actors with a "simple process to access military, police and mission logistics assistance."[96] In addition to civil-military coordination, the humanitarian sector has its own additional challenges to mission coherence.

The primary mechanism of coordination within humanitarian space is the cluster model; OCHA leads this process of disaster relief and facilitates coherence between UN agencies as well as NGOs and other actors. Within the UN diaspora, OCHA delineates humanitarian clusters based upon areas of concern (see Annex 3). There are, as of 2010, 12 clusters: Coordination and Camp Management (IOM); Agriculture (FAO); Education (UNICEF), Early Recovery (UNDP), Food Assistance (WFP), Health (WHO/PAHO), Logistics (WFP), Emergency Telecommunications (WFP); Nutrition (UNICEF), Protection (HDCS/OHCHR), Shelter and Non-Food Items (IOM), WASH (UNICEF).[97] The role of OCHA in coordinating these mechanism is not clearly defined, despite this, OCHA is directly responsible for coordination between the clusters (and ultimately the UN agencies responsible for each individual cluster). As the Inter-Agency Standing Committee for Haiti has noted, "effective inter-cluster coordination is necessary to ensure that multidisciplinary issues cannot

[94] OCHA Haiti, 2011, 7.
[95] *Ibid.,* 15.
[96] *Ibid.*
[97] The agencies in brackets are the lead agencies conducting activities in each sector; Grünewald & Bonaventure, 2010, 20.

be tackled by individual clusters alone."[98] If this is the case, gaps in efforts are created alongside considerable duplication of efforts.

The implication of these mechanisms on the ground is a complicated and at times dysfunctional arena. Cluster mechanisms are reported to work well at the operational level, but inter-cluster coordination in Haiti is weak.[99] OCHA were directly responsible for aiding in the coordination of NGOs, the Army, MINUSTAH and the separate clusters. A field report by OCHA themselves revealed that many humanitarian entities "had no idea about clusters or of the role of OCHA."[100] Likewise, UNDP assert that decision-making and communication lines were confused, leading to disintegration and incoherence between the relief clusters.[101] Therefore, the various entities on the ground receive little cohesive direction from either the HC (MINUSTAH) or from OCHA. Additionally, inter-cluster coordination and coherence between NGOs and OCHA is limited. The sheer number of NGOs in Haiti serves to compound this problem; providing a framework for cooperation between all NGOs and UN entities is a virtual impossibility.[102] NGOs, like UN entities, often have their own mandates, funding sources and structures, further complicating the degrees of coordination with OCHA and the cluster framework. Inter-cluster interdependency also lacked cohesion. Despite OCHA's mandate as the lead coordinator of humanitarian activities, UNICEF, WHO and WFP all took leading roles as central coordinators of aid activity.[103] Although superficially acting in unison, the degree to which agencies coordinated within the cluster framework is limited; OCHA themselves conclude that "OCHA needs to facilitate embedding of cluster coordinators by cluster lead agencies" in future practices.[104]

In regard to coordination between MINUSTAH and OCHA, the linkages are also minimal. Despite the JOTC mechanism and the HC's involvement in both humanitarian and civil operations, little coherence exists between MINUSTAH and OCHA's humanitarian objectives.[105] OCHA in Haiti have adopted the "one foot in and one foot out" approach,

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[98] *Ibid.,* 25.
[99] Abhijit Bhattacharjee and Roberta Lossio, "Evaluation of OCHA response to the Haiti earthquake." *Final Report January* (2011): 25.
[100] *Ibid.,* 27.
[101] UNDP, Evaluation Office, *Evaluation of UNDP Support to Conflict Affected Countries in the Context of UN Peace Operations*. New York: UNDP, (2013): 42.
[102] Miriam Stumpenhorst, Rolf Stumpenhorst, and Oliver Razum, "The UN OCHA cluster approach: gaps between theory and practice." *Journal of Public Health* 19, no. 6 (2011): 590.
[103] Namkyung Oh and Junghyae Lee, "Activation and variation of the United Nation's cluster coordination model: a comparative analysis of the Haiti and Japan disasters" *Journal of Risk Research* 20, no. 1 (2017): 10-11.
[104] Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011, 26.
[105] *Ibid.,* 10.

whereby a "DSRSG/RC/HC is appointed, but OCHA maintains a clearly identifiable presence outside the mission structure."[106] This approach leaves OCHA and the HC/MINUSTAH functionally separate, indicating cluster humanitarian projects are linked to MINUSTAH objectives and activities in theory, but not always in practice. As OCHA themselves conclude, OCHA's humanitarian mandate is sometimes at odds with MINUSTAH's long term role in the country; clear guidance in how OCHA's humanitarian role interfaces with that of mission is not codified and creates a mystic and inefficient interdependency between the two key areas of the peacekeeping and development process.[107]

Confusion is further aided by OCHA's position within the integrated mission; the HC's role as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General and Resident Coordinator creates overlap between the functions of the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA's humanitarian coordination role. Historically (pre-2009), OCHA's presence in Haiti has been weak, necessitating the adoption of humanitarian work by MINUSTAH.[108] Therefore, much of the humanitarian work in Haiti was conducted within the architecture of MINUSTAH's existing Humanitarian and Development Coordination sector. Despite OCHA's efforts at increasing their presence in Haiti prior to the 2010 earthquake, in the relief efforts immediately after the quake most international actors and local entities were confused as to who was leading the humanitarian coordination efforts - MINUSTAH or OCHA?[109] Beyond coordination problems, the integrated MINUSTAH operation and the dynamic with OCHA created significant concerns within the NGO community. The peacekeeping operation's involvement in humanitarian objectives created concerns over the role of politically sensitive operations invading impartial humanitarian space. Shifting the integration mechanisms of the MINUSTAH mission into humanitarian space has large implications for the "independence of decision-making on humanitarian priorities."[110] Opposition to such integration has been made evident by NGOs such as Oxfam, and creates further tensions between integrating humanitarian projects with those of the wider security and development objectives.

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[106] Victoria Metcalfe, Alison Giffen, and Samir Elhawary, *UN integration and humanitarian space: An independent study commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group*. London: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2011: 12.
[107] OCHA Haiti, 2011, 10.
[108] Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011, 28.
[109] *Ibid.,* 29.
[110] Oxfam. *UN Integrated Missions and Humanitarian Action*. Oxford: Oxfam GB, 2014, 2.

Integrated State-building

The peacebuilding process in Haiti is further defined by the intersubjective dimensions of security and development. Development cannot be achieved without security, and security is only sustainable through the establishment of long-term social and economic development. Therefore, security sector reform (SSR) and institutional state-building are part and parcel of the same project; managing conflict relies on solving the root systemic and structural causes within the state. Within Haiti, the root causes of political and social insecurity lie in poverty, weak or dysfunctional government institutions, environmental degradation, wide-scale unemployment, and gang and political violence.[111] To illustrate this point further: over 80% of the population live under the poverty line and 54% live in abject poverty; Haiti is among the top five in income inequality worldwide; unemployment rates lie between 40-50% and over half the population have no access to drinking water.[112] Haiti is in need of judicial reform, economic and social development and political stability; the manner in which this can be brought about is through effective state-building mechanisms that address these root concerns.

MINUSTAH is mandated to "ensure a secure and sustainable environment" through monitoring, rebuilding and assisting the Haitian state through the use of its development and security divisions.[113] Success is dependent upon the utilisation of both security and development projects, which are likewise dependent upon one another for their own individual success. As Cedric De Coning has noted, effective peacebuilding is dependent upon a "collective framework in which peace, security, humanitarian, rule of law and human rights and development dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at country level."[114] Co-operation and coherence within this country-wide strategy is a necessity for success, and the manner in which the UN and MINUSTAH forges this coherence is through an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF). What follows is an explanation of the mechanisms created to foster agency and strategy interdependence in the security and development arena. To conclude, this section will evaluate the on the ground operational coherence and degree to which strategic alignment has been maintained with national and local actors.

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[111] Pace, 2009, 16.
[112] Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: HAITI." January 12, 2017. Accessed March 11, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html.
[113] United Nations, "MINUSTAH Mandate - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti." Accessed March 12, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/mandate.shtml.
[114] De Coning, 2007, 2.

The Integrated Strategic Framework produced in 2011 sought to bring together all aspects of the MINUSTAH and UN peacekeeping enterprise into a singular over-arching framework. Not only did it prescribe the development goals in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, but it provided a benchmark against which the integrated mission could judge its success, coherence and system-wide strategy. The ISF articulated what MINUSTAH and the UN Country Team's relationship would be, and how the strategy for the UN was a "shared vision" between the UN and the GOH. Most notably for the purposes of integration, the ISF articulated the "division of responsibilities among UN entities for the delivery of mutually reinforcing tasks for peace consolidation, social and economic recovery and long-term development."[115] The ISF set in stone the long-running and growingly interconnected disciplines of security enforcement through the presence of military personnel, and the rebuilding mechanisms that create state institutions at the national and local level capable of providing policing, justice and public administration services.[116] To address coherence issues, the ISF even articulated the creation of the UN Joint Planning Team that worked to avoid overlaps between the development and security projects.[117] In addition, the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) for Haiti was established that brought together all UN agencies, including MINUSTAH and OCHA representatives to coordinate coherence in all long-term strategies.[118] Overall, MINUSTAH and 16 resident UN agencies were theoretically aligned through the ISF joint strategy, and various inter-agency mechanisms were established that addressed coordination concerns that were made evident in humanitarian activities as well as in pre-earthquake agency interactions.

The primary mechanism of coordination within the new UN structure in Haiti was the enlarged Integrated Strategic Planning Group (ISPG). The ISPG was comprised of MINUSTAH heads of sections, the GOH, and UN country Team officials.[119] Under the ISPG's supervision, a "three-level working structure" was employed to ensure the coordinated implementation of tasks funded by the UN. The three levels are: Strategic, Policy and Operational. Within the strategic and policy levels, the ISPG adopts the oversight role and is responsible for policy and strategy alignment within the UN system. However, at the operational level (on the ground), agencies within the UN structure are independently

[115] The United Nations System in Haiti, *UN Integrated Strategic Framework for Haiti*. Port-au-Prince: United Nations, 2010, 2.
[116] *Ibid.,* 9-11.
[117] *Ibid.,* 10.
[118] *Ibid.,* 12.
[119] *Ibid.,* 13.

responsible for the oversight, enforcement and outcome of the four "pillar" objectives: institutional, territorial, economic and social rebuilding.[120] As Campbell, Benner et. all and Junk have all noted, integration is dependent upon the harmonisation of efforts by all UN agents operating within the system; heterogeneity among the coalition creates opposing mandates, conflicting budgetary requirements and ultimately disparate goals, objectives and outcomes.[121] The many different agencies in the UN peacebuilding structure, as identified by the ISF, is reflective of the pitfalls made evident by the aforementioned scholars.

Within the ISF outlined structure territorial, economic, environmental and social rebuilding are further subdivided into separate specialties. The ISF distinguishes lead partners for each activity, prioritizing the oversight role of a particular UN agency to facilitate cohesion and accountability. Ultimately, MINUSTAH is the lead partner in state building and security operations, adopting the primary oversight role in all six areas[122] within the institutional rebuilding environment. Outside of institutional rebuilding efforts, fifteen UN agencies[123] operate as leads and partners (in conjunction with MINUSTAH) to achieve social, territorial and environment, and economic rebuilding objectives. Despite the creation of "Joint Programmes", created to facilitate joint resource mobilisation and greater coherence between lead and partner agencies, each UN agency and partner has "equal programmatic and financial accountability for their activities in the various pillars."[124] As such, each partner and lead agency is motivated and controlled by their own budgeting systems and financial accountability despite the creation of joint objectives.

In theory, the ISF created a framework for the coordination of objectives and mandates that would enhance the coordination of effort towards focused and parallel goals that were structurally and thematically interdependent. MINUSTAH is a partner in all institutional rebuilding activities, from police and judicial reform, to providing adequate infrastructure for sanitary conditions, clean water and educational facilities. However, the necessary interdependency is largely reliant upon the pursuant of common goals, and operational coherence on the ground is still limited as a result of the independent and autonomous character of the individual UN agencies and donors working in conjunction with one another. The question of donor coherence raises its ugly head here. A full account of integration and

[120] *Ibid.,* 13-16.
[121] Junk, 2012, 299; Benner et. all, 2011, 178; Campbell, 2008, 559.
[122] These are: Justice, Corrections, police, Public Administration, Parliament and Border Management. The UN system in Haiti, 2010, 18-20.
[123] These are: UNIFEM, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, IOM, UNAIDS, WHO, UNESCO, UNHCR, ILO, UN-Habitat, UNOPS, UNDP, OCHA and UNOSAT; *Ibid.,* 18-56.
[124] *Ibid.,* 14.

coherence across bilateral and MINUSTAH donors is beyond the scope of this paper, however, a brief glance at coherence between South American donors reveals the degree of dysfunction within donor countries. Argentina, Brazil and Chile stand as three of the largest donors to the MINUSTAH mission and to the Haitian government. However, their bilateral policies reveal limited coherence between their individual and collective efforts. The mere fact that all three countries pursue individual bilateral policies alongside their prolonged involvement in UNASUR and MINUSTAH aid to Haiti reveals the duplication of efforts and inefficiencies that are inherent in both IO and state donors.[125] Diplomatic discourse and operational coherence on the ground do not go hand in hand, and Haiti continues to be emblematic of this problem.

The ISF also fails to account for the long term development goals of the Haitian state. While the ISF is created in tandem with the GOH's Action Plan for Recovery and Development, the UN's emphasis on horizontal integration within their own system largely ignores the shortcomings of the UN's strategic alignment with local-level actors. Coordination between international actors presupposes that the local government and community are fully cognisant and accepting of the objectives of the international community. Vertical integration is important here, and the ISF and MINUSTAH's current policies indicate that little room is left for cooperation along the international-national axis. While along the horizontal axis the ISF serves to conceptualise the interdependencies between the international actors, along the vertical axis, integrated work plans are non-existent.[126] In fact, local level actors (Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs)) who are part of the MINUSTAH and UN structure are separately mandated and tasked. The ISF creates the space for broad cooperation of macro scale objectives, however, at local and regional levels strategies, operation mechanisms and alignment between such operations are blurred if not non-existent.[127] As one CAO working in Haiti remarked on the lack of coordination practices in 2011: "There is a lot of reluctance and resistance from agencies, who are scared of losing their space."[128] What becomes apparent is the need for greater harmonisation in efforts beyond strategy creation; conceptual planning must occur in tandem with funding and oversight planning in order for agencies and staff to maintain their own prominent role in the peacekeeping process.

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[125] Andreas E. Feldman, Miguel Lengyel, Bernabé Malacalza, and Antonio Ramalho. "Lost in translation: ABC cooperation and reconstruction in Haiti." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 6, no. 3 (2011): 49-51.
[126] Diana Felix da Costa and John Karlsrud. "UN Local Peacebuilding and Translation in Haiti." *Security in Practice* 4 (2012): 41.
[127] *Ibid.,* 41-43.
[128] *Ibid.,* 41.

The desire for integration exists, however true operational coherence and strategic alignment with international, national and local objectives is far from the reality. The security sector in Haiti serves as a further paradigmatic example: the UN's revised strategy to counter violent threats involved a joint planning programme between MINUSTAH and UNDP. MINUSTAH would be responsible for creating capacity within the Haitian state to facilitate Disarmament, Development and Reintegration (DDR) of violent actors, while UNDP was to take a bottom up local approach to reinforcing local communities in their violence reduction efforts. Additionally, UN efforts would be aligned with those of the Commission nationale de désarmement, démantèlement et reinsertion (CNDDR); the CNDDR was the local institution established to engage national actors in the disarmament process.[129] The framework created to facilitate disarmament involved interdependency between these three actors. However, as Donais and Burt's conclusive field report on vertical integration within community violence projects indicated, "from the beginning, the UN's integrated approach suffered from limited coordination between its top-down and bottom-up components."[130] Their relationship was characterised by friction, rigidity and a lack of communication. The CNDDR, UNDP and MINUSTAH all operated along unilateral lines, ignoring potential avenues for cooperation and integration due to differences in organisational cultures, funding sources and objectives.[131] Vertical integration, like horizontal integration, has the potential to incorporate actors in a multi-dimensional capacity. However, operationally, little genuine integration and coordination exists to foster operational coherence. Rather ironically, United Nations operations, despite seemingly endless efforts to pursue coherence through integration techniques, have a particularly disintegrated quality about them.[132]

[129] Timothy Donais and Geoff Burt. "Vertically Integrated Peace Building and Community Violence Reduction in Haiti." *Centre for International Governance Innovation Papers*, February 2014, 8-10.
[130] *Ibid.,* 8.
[131] *Ibid.,* 8-9.
[132] Donais & Burt, 2015, 8.

Conclusion

In October 2016 the United Nations Security Council called for the preparation of MINUSTAH's impending exit.[133] MINUSTAH is now, seven years after the earthquake and thirteen years after its inception, once again beginning the transition process towards full sovereign independence of the Haitian state. The UN peacekeeping diaspora are entrenched into all levels of Haitian society, and their impending secession creates greater uncertainty about the capacity of the institutions MINUSTAH attempted to rebuild over the last 13 years to maintain any stability and development provided by the MINUSTAH mission. The varying interdependencies of the MINUSTAH mission have been explored in this paper to reveal the degree to which the UN has coordinated their state-building and humanitarian activities. While the findings of this work are largely pessimistic, this does not suggest that on the whole UN involvement has been a failure. In fact, the UN has made significant improvements in deteriorating humanitarian situations, securing volatile democratic elections and rebuilding weak and destroyed institutions and infrastructure. However, this paper has divulged the inefficiencies and conceptual shortcomings of the integrated mission structure and the strategies pursued through this framework.

The creation of coordination mechanisms does not seem to be the fundamental flaw in fostering coherence within the UN peacekeeping structure. Rather, the implementation of coordination mechanisms and the subsequent abundance of multiple and at times parallel imperfect mechanisms better describes the horizontal integration situation within the Haitian UN system.[134] As has been indicated, various mechanisms including cluster coordination, joint planning committees and integrated strategic frameworks were implemented, but operationally prove insufficient for their mandated tasks. If operational coherence and strategic alignment are to be two vital criteria for analysing - and potentially evaluating - levels of integration within a mission, then MINUSTAH and the UN in Haiti appear to be left wanting. However, perhaps complete integration and interdependency within an arena as complex as peacebuilding is an ultimate impossibility. Connecting what were once independent entities under the umbrella of a single mandate and coherent objectives requires adherence and compliance with varying related objectives and involves coordination between tens of IOs,

[133] United National Security Council. 2016 Resolution 2313.
[134] Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011, 16.

thousands of national actors, and thousands of NGOs. Integration on this scale is conceptually daunting, and requires the full coherence of all actors at all levels of the peacebuilding process.

As such, Ben Mill's theoretical framework proves itself sufficient as an analytical tool given its emphasis on the degrees of integration present within both top-down and bottom-up integrated peacebuilding processes that take place at both the institutional and operational levels. As international actors continue to pursue coherence despite the large hurdles that impede their path, analysing and evaluating the degrees of operational coherence, strategic alignment, donor harmonisation and entity coherence present in each individual peacebuilding case will provide further evidence of the successes and methodology behind modern integrated peacebuilding practices. While operational coherence and strategic alignment in the UN system in Haiti have been explored in this essay, this serves as only part of the whole picture. The "headquarters" level of cooperation is another equally important aspect of the peacebuilding process that can be detailed, with specific relation to entity coherence and donor harmonisation. In a system predicated upon international involvement - both financial and physical - coherence and coordination must be integrated at all levels of the peacebuilding process.

Lastly, pursuing coherence brings together elements that are inherently at odds. To clarify this, further research is needed that can evaluate the degree to which integration can negatively affect the outcome of a peacekeeping operation. This would be a 180 degree turn from the current trend within academia and in practice, and as of yet no evaluation criteria or research exists to measure this. A more appropriate conclusion, given the current state of the research, is that universal coherence with equal levels of integration between all sectors is an inappropriate end-game. Differing degrees of coherence along both vertical and horizontal axis, between security, development and humanitarian arenas and within the respective arenas themselves, would likely forge greater coherence and more practical and effective interdependencies between the large array of agents conducting modern peacekeeping/peacebuilding. For Haiti's sake, one can only hope that the flawed relationships between the existing peacebuilding actors has been sufficient enough to create the minimal conditions required for enduring peace and development. As the MINUSTAH mission draws to a conclusion, both academia and the UN must further engage with Haitian peacebuilding to evaluate and learn from the mistakes and successes of the last thirteen years.

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Annex 1*: Coordination Structure of Humanitarian Space



Source: Grünewald & Sokpoh, 2010, 40.

* In this chart MINUSTAH is represented by the "HC" (Humanitarian Coordinator), whose role was to serve as the representative of both MINUSTAH and the UN Country Team. As indicated in this chart, humanitarian operational activities on the ground took place under a strategic framework coordinated at the country level by the DSRG/HC/RC (and GOH) and implemented by a Humanitarian Country Team, which was led by OCHA.

Annex 2: JOTC Structure



Source: OCHA Haiti, 2011, 15.

Annex 3: UN Clusters Coordinated by OCHA



Source: Oh & Lee, 2017, 13.