

Patrimonial Legacies and Social Organization

The Constraining Effect of Embedded Norms on Institutional and
Economic Development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia



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ABSTRACT

This thesis contributes to the body of literature that attempts to identify the reasons behind the long-standing inability of various Middle Eastern and African states to implement the international guidelines of sustainable economic development. By integrating the findings of historical sociology, rentier state theory, and political economy within the New Institutional Economics framework, it opens a path towards explaining the relative resilience of some developing autocratic regimes to social change and consolidation of impersonal markets. For this purpose, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been selected for a case study as, more clearly than others, it demonstrates the remarkable ways in which traditional social norms can be appropriated by the leadership and constrain institutional development. At the center of the historical narrative, the work puts the concept of patrimonialism as an informal system of embedded customary rules that fundamentally enhanced the chances for survival of the pre-state Arabian communities. In order to assess the extent to which it shaped the subsequent evolution of institutional matrix and its particular societal incentives until the most recent form, the author traces its institutional, organizational, and economic manifestations over a century of state building process from its tribal origins. Based on the analysis of historical sources it firstly argues that the centralized hierarchic distribution has characterized the social organization long before the discovery of oil, though it heavily depended on secondary elites due to the material shortage at that time. While the oil-related fiscal surpluses enabled expansion of the allocation state and diminished the influence of elites on policymaking, the pre-state governance structures were instrumentalized for personal interests of the autocratic ruler and gradually emerged as the cornerstone of modern institutional environment. This allowed for neopatrimonial strategies of co-option and domination that helped to enlarge the social hierarchy during the fiscal surplus and sustain it over crises. Accordingly, the following process tracing analysis demonstrates this correlation by analyzing the significant legislative decisions and personnel shifts of the Council of Ministers between 1953-2018, and compares them to the macroeconomic developments. Although there are occasional disruptions caused by exceptional external or internal events on one side and, increasingly, authoritarian learning on the other, an apparent pro-cyclical pattern stands out throughout the study, in which the weakness of distributional networks leads to greater institutional and organizational concessions that in turn facilitate decentralization and socio-economic development. Thereby, the author urges for an alternative approach to economic reforms in the Gulf, pointing out the significance of institutional reform for an actual change towards an effective, market-based and sustainable development, and warning from socio-economic impacts of further centralization.

*To the loving memory of my grandfather, Captain Jiří Materna, whose voyages
around the world sparked my curiosity for the unknown*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BoECoM	Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers
BoG	Board of Grievances (<i>Diwan al-Mazalim</i>)
CCCIA	Confederation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
CEDA	Council of Economic and Development Affairs
CIMG	Council for Islamic Mission and Guidance
CMA	Capital Markets Authority
CoM	Council of Ministers
CoSU	Council of Senior Ulema
CPO	Central Planning Office
CPSA	Council of Political and Security Affairs
CPVPV	Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice
CSB	Civil Service Bureau
DCP	Deputy Crown Prince
DZIT	Department of Zakat and Income Tax
FCRC	Finance Committee at the Royal Court
FDPM	First Deputy Prime Minister
GaStat	General Authority for Statistics
GATNH	General Authority for Tourism and National Heritage
GEA	General Authority for Entertainment
GIP	General Intelligence Presidency
GOSI	General Organization for Social Insurance
GPGE	General Presidency for Girls' Education
GSFMO	Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organization
IPA	Institute of Public Administration
KACND	King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue
KAISAIA	King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment Abroad
KAUST	King Abdullah University of Science and Technology
KFUPM	King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
LCGPC	Local Content and Government Procurement Commission
MBC	Middle East Broadcasting Center
MoA	Minister/y of Agriculture
MoAW	Minister/y of Agriculture and Water
MoC	Minister/y of Commerce
MoCI	Minister/y of Commerce and Industry
MoCInv	Minister/y of Commerce and Investment
MoCIT	Minister/y of Communications and Information Technology
MoCom	Minister/y of Communications

MoCS	Minister/y of Civil Service
MoCu	Minister/y of Culture
MoCuI	Minister/y of Culture and Information
MoD	Minister/y of Defense
MoDA	Minister/y of Defense and Aviation
MODON	Saudi Authority for Industrial Cities and Technology Zones
MoE	Minister/y of Education
MoEIMR	Minister/y of Energy, Industry and Mineral Resources
MoEP	Minister/y of Economy and Planning
MoEWA	Minister/y of Environment, Water and Agriculture
MoF	Minister/y of Finance
MoFNE	Minister/y of Finance and National Economy
MoFA	Minister/y of Foreign Affairs
MoH	Minister/y of Health
MoHE	Minister/y of Higher Education
MoHo	Minister/y of Housing
MoHU	Minister/y of Hajj and Umrah
MoI	Minister/y of Interior
MoIADG	Minister/y of Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance
MoIE	Minister/y of Industry and Electricity
MoInf	Minister/y of Information
MoJ	Minister/y of Justice
MoL	Minister/y of Labour
MoLSA	Minister/y of Labour and Social Affairs
MoLSD	Minister/y of Labour and Social Development
MoM	Minister/y of Media
MoMRA	Minister/y of Municipal and Rural Affairs
MoNG	Minister/y of National Guard
MoPIE	Minister/y of Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments
MoPMR	Minister/y of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
MoPTT	Minister/y of Post, Telephone And Telegraph
MoPWH	Minister/y of Public Works and Housing
MoS	Minister/y of State
MoSFNE	Minister/y of State for Finance and National Economy
MoT	Minister/y of Transport
MoWE	Minister/y of Water and Electricity
MWL	Muslim World League
NCP	National Center for Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships
NDF	National Development Fund
PIF	Public Investment Fund
PM	Prime Minister
PSS	Presidency of State Security
RCJY	Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu
RPC	Railways Public Corporation
SAAB	Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank
SABIC	Saudi Basic Industries Corporation
SAC	Supreme Anti-Corruption Committee
SAGIA	Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority
SAMA	Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority
SAMBA	Saudi American Bank
SCAIAP	Saudi Company for Agricultural Investment and Animal Production
SCIA	Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs
SDPM	Second Deputy Prime Minister
SEC	Supreme Economic Council
SIDF	Saudi Industrial Development Fund
SJC	Supreme Judicial Council
SMEA	General Authority for Small and Medium Enterprises

Introduction

In 2011, a series of uprisings turned the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region upside down and with it the ‘exceptional’ stability of the Arab state. Rather than challenging the political dimension of centralized state-led development, the protesters contested their leaders’ inability to compensate for growing insecurity, inequality, and injustice, as superficial liberalization failed to provide the majority with desired opportunities, distinctly favoring interests of narrow elite circles instead.¹ Regimes that were unable to meet the obligations of the ‘social contract’ were increasingly forced to defend these interests with violence. By contrast, the Gulf monarchies immediately co-opted their fragmented, state-dependent populations with excessive welfare benefits, and consequently maintained the *status quo* with strategic repressions only.² Since then, sustainable development became a mantra in the MENA, but while fraction of the promises was achieved, much of it lapsed into more aggressive authoritarianism. Searching for explanations of this ‘exceptional’ resilience, scholars returned to traditional emphasis on specific local curiosities, such as the monarchist nature,³ rentier politics,⁴ repressiveness of coercive apparatuses,⁵ strong foreign involvement,⁶ or historical reliance on tribal, religious and distributional legacies for legitimacy.⁷ However, few seriously considered these symptoms of a broader societal phenomenon,⁸ let alone studied in-depth the complex longitudinal processes that link the pre-state norms and hierarchies to modern institutional and organizational settings.

Generalizing about the Arab states is problematic due to their immense diversity stemming from distinct historical experiences, opportunities, influences, and beliefs, which formed their unique identities. Nevertheless, they have all originated from personalized, hierarchic societies, where legitimacy derived from elite consensus, and stability from leader’s ability to satisfy the socio-economic interests of the strongest agents. Occasionally, these societies were further centralized and homogenized under the influence of largely external factors, such as colonialism, various ideologies, modern institutions or, most recently, oil revenues – powerful tools of control that temporarily freed the ruler from pressure of domestic interest groups. Individually, these fail to explain the cornerstones and weaknesses of current regimes as they only amplify the existing economic incentives, disguise their shortcomings, and delay necessary reforms. However, as the thesis argues, an integrated approach that overcomes the limits of social and political-economic theories by incorporating institutional analysis has the potential to map the evolution of these comprehensive incentive structures and assess the combined impact of historically embedded norms and elite interests. In exchange, this discourse allows for reconsidering the factors underlying regimes’ resilience to social change and uncover systemic pitfalls of their current developmental policies.

¹ Hanieh 2013; Diwan 2014; Luciani 2016

² Seikaly and Mattar 2015

³ Makdisi and Elbadawi 2011; Ottaway and Muasher 2011

⁴ Luciani 2013; Okruhlik 2016

⁵ Bellin 2012

⁶ Yom and Gause III 2012

⁷ Schlumberger 2010

⁸ Bank et al. 2014; Lucas 2014

For this purpose, Saudi Arabia has been selected as a country with arguably one of the least favorable conditions for such a change. Geographic isolation, resource scarcity and persistent violence within the Peninsula's hinterlands made strong centralized rule highly attractive, enabling strict cultural and religious homogenization. Although these processes began centuries ago, the last one is of the utmost importance, since the emergence of modern institutions enabled the Al-Saud family to embed its patrimonial discourse into the political, economic, and social structures. Fueled by the oil booms, welfare strategies subdued the whole population and undermined traditional checks and balances. Contrarily, fiscal strains unveiled the systemic deficiencies of the allocation state and tilted the power-balance back towards interest groups. Nevertheless, they also provided patrimonial leaders with lessons on how to reinforce their hierarchies and ensure greater continuity of income in the long term. Understanding these basic dynamics is especially important nowadays, as globalization further blurred their lines while offering sophisticated opportunities for authoritarian rulers to strengthen their grip on power. Unconstrained autocrats of resource-rich countries raise hopes of swifter economic progress and protection of societal welfare, especially when difficult challenges threaten them. Instead, the absence of fiscal and societal pressures makes them abandon developmental initiatives, further centralize common assets, neglect provision of public goods, and exploit their citizens.⁹ The envisioned transformation of Saudi Arabia towards a sustainable, diversified, high-value and internationally competitive market economy¹⁰ increasingly confirms this trend. Its success would primarily necessitate fundamental alterations of the incentive framework along international guidelines¹¹ towards equal rules and opportunities that encourage innovative productivity while impeding favoritism and rent-seeking; in other words, eliminating the cornerstone of regime's longitudinal stability.

After delimiting the conceptual approach and complementing it with relevant literature, a three-chapter process-tracing case study of Saudi Arabia attempts to determine the historical role of patrimonial norms in social organization, and their influence on the institutional development since tribal times. Accordingly, the first chapter establishes a baseline by identifying pre-state manifestations of these dynamics. Studying the power-consolidation strategies employed during Ibn Saud's era of conquest and early institution building, the chapter emphasizes frequent instrumentalization of pre-oil co-option mechanisms in pursuit of control over secondary elites. By its end, Al-Saud confirm their superiority by establishing the cornerstone of the centralized bureaucracy – the Council of Ministers (hereafter CoM). Despite its original intent to resolve power rivalries, the organization soon became a centerpiece of Saudi patrimonial politics, and as such, its evolution is thoroughly analyzed in the following chapters alongside the overall institutional framework. Chapter Two chronologically examines their transformations throughout the oil era, as deepening neopatrimonialism had to adjust to the shifting periods of fiscal shortage and abundance. While the booms allowed for subordination of secondary elites and society-wide expansion of distributional networks, busts necessitated institutional and organizational compromises. Nonetheless, as the final chapter argues, the traditional mode of social organization persevered and, with varying success, started to adapt the economically unreliable, oil-based system to

⁹ Eibl and Hertog 2017

¹⁰ Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2016b; 2016a

¹¹ ILO 2012; Schiffbauer et al. 2015; UN 2015

globalization, translating its advantages into greater robustness. Reforms of the early 21st century revealed difficulties of this synchronization as traditional, family-related conglomerates captured most benefits and increased their influence amidst the second boom. Currently, the over-centralized, unconstrained regime commands the power to rebuild the incentive structures and shift the developmental trajectory away from patrimonial legacies towards greater prosperity, equitability and social justice. The subsequent study explains why this is unlikely to happen under current societal setting.

Conceptual Framework and Methodology

Patrimonialism is perceived here as a social norm distinctive of pre-state communities that, similarly to religion and in varying combination with it, historically determined human choice sets and, with time, led to a specific hierarchic type of social organization.¹² Developed from the bottom through common understanding and broad public acceptance, these customary rules emerged from the necessity to administer scarce economic resources and find consensus among the numerous tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. Although Islam became the uniting ideology throughout the region, it had to incorporate tribal norms to ensure continuity and popular appeal.¹³ Accordingly, *Shari'ah* formed the elemental basis for modern legal principles of Gulf monarchies, while tribal values and origins proved essential to secure legitimacy and authority,¹⁴ retaining significance “in relation to the country’s political and governmental structure as well as private and personal law areas.”¹⁵ Moreover, their combination with Wahhabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia severely restricted options for codified rule of law, which underlined the importance of informal customary features, as for instance *baya* (allegiance) or *shura* (consensus).¹⁶ Unlike some of its neighbors though, tribal consent played little role in the Kingdom’s founding due to the Saudi-Wahhabi pact that managed to restore its prominence through profit-motivated conquests, strategic co-option, and monopolization of the ideological narrative. Despite following attempts to discredit the autonomous, consensus-oriented tribal system and co-opt interest groups into institutionalized autocracy, the defining factors of historical social organization kept periodically and dialectically resurfacing throughout the last century and, likewise in other Gulf states, continue to determine national and biological identities until nowadays.¹⁷ Mapping these longitudinal dynamics on a country-level through the lens of institutional analysis can enhance our understanding of the resilience and social change of authoritarian regimes and enable more comprehensive, comparative studies of MENA states.

The perspective of NIE exceeds the neoclassical model of flawless, static and ergodic market, where unbounded rationality, fair competition, perfect access to information, and impersonal interactions without transaction costs inevitably lead to productivity, and permits studying societal dynamics outside the few developed economies with well-established institutions. In a dynamic world of continuous

¹² Weber 2013

¹³ Maisel 2009

¹⁴ Biygautane et al. 2016, 12

¹⁵ Esmaeili 2009, 18

¹⁶ Ibid., 23–26

¹⁷ Cooke 2014, 40

change, it acknowledges individual experiences that vary across time and space, their accumulation into sets of habits, beliefs, and norms (often described as culture), and the constraining influence this inherited incentive structure has on the perception of the present, and subsequent choices that shape the future.¹⁸ In turn, these structures help to reduce uncertainty and allow for repeated personal interaction.¹⁹ This might arguably secure cooperation in enclosed, homogenous collectives like tribes and chiefdoms, where common knowledge, trust, reputation, shared heritage, and social enforcement suffice to constrain opportunistic behavior.²⁰ However, when the market expands and becomes more complex, specialized and impersonal, society needs to be adequately structured to support its effective functioning and ensure long-term sustainability in the face of “dynamic changes in the world economy brought on by technology, demographic expansion, and expanding trade.”²¹ Otherwise, dysfunctional institutional framework results in suboptimal solutions of resource allocation and non-cooperative games between agents, raising uncertainty while undermining incentives for trust, productivity and exchange.²²

Throughout this work, institutions are understood as path-dependent, exogenously given constraints of behavior, which, despite being once endogenously created in response to certain social or economic factors, increasingly deviate from their original welfare function and burden the state.²³ According to North, the institutional environment consists of formal rules (constitutions, laws, regulations) and informal constraints (traditional norms of behavior, conventions, codes of conduct), and derives its overall effectiveness from their congruence and enforcement (executive, judiciary).²⁴ In order to fully comprehend the choice sets of both individuals and organizations alike, it is therefore essential to expand our focus beyond the formal, relatively flexible political arrangements and consider the role of the ‘slow-moving’, culturally embedded beliefs and norms that are passed down through generations.²⁵ According to Williamson’s scheme of social analysis, they dominate and determine the rest of the four-level hierarchy through institutional environment and governance structures down to marginal economic incentives, and despite their inherent rigidity, can be altered by persistent transformation of incentives at the two central levels.²⁶

Pre-capitalist societies without formal structures deduce their distributional choices directly from informal institutions. As economically dominant groups expand to include greater numbers and diminishing returns on predation necessitate clearer market principles, “the accumulation of informal rules of interaction or social capital would then form the basis for formal institutional development.”²⁷ Nonetheless, in the absence of self-enforcing mechanisms, ruling elites with legislative power tend to conveniently (albeit often irrationally) instrumentalize formal institutions for co-

¹⁸ North 2005

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 81–85

²⁰ Nye 2008, 75

²¹ *Ibid.*, 73

²² Chakravarti 2012, 174

²³ Bates 2014, 60

²⁴ North 2005, 6

²⁵ Roland 2004

²⁶ Beckmann and Padmanabhan 2009, 348

²⁷ Chakravarti 2012, 199

option, instead of constraining themselves and maximizing their social efficiency.²⁸ In personalized, resource-rich regimes, “nonbinding legislature serves as a mechanism for the dictator to bribe and split the opposition when he faces credible challenges” and, unlike the binding type, negatively impacts economic growth.²⁹ Even after his fall, “democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization.”³⁰ Therefore, the relationship between the central levels of social analysis seems more complex than Williamson suggests and in strong neopatrimonial regimes, where governors simultaneously determine the rules, rather inverted. Together with allocations of resources and senior bureaucratic positions, these strategic initiatives establish long-term guarantees and curb bottom-up pressure, limiting endogenous institutional change in the process. According to Chakravarti, this is the reason why “societies with larger middle classes have more stable institutional structure, achieve a greater consensus on rules and systems for the enforcement of rules, display higher levels of per-capita income, and achieve higher rates of economic growth.”³¹

Until nowadays, most developing countries, and certainly the Arab world, consist of personalized regimes, also called ‘natural states’ due to their function as a natural solution to the potential of violence.³² Although their indicators of governance are generally low and institutions do not provide sufficient incentives for competition and productivity to emerge, natural states persevere as long as their monopoly on rent creation and distribution along the principle of proportionality yields higher benefits than fighting.³³ In order to protect interests vested in the existing institutional framework, the natural state embeds itself in direct personal ties to all significant organizations, limits access of new political and economic entrants to the market, and consequently makes the transformation towards impersonal exchange extremely difficult. While the absence of an inclusive market is the reason why natural states mostly remain poor, uprooting the system for neoliberal reforms without firstly consolidating an adequate institutional environment can undermine stability and in extreme cases lead to a ‘violence trap’.³⁴ Despite various developmental pressures and fiscal crises, some natural states avoided transformation and even expanded their personalized systems by selective adaptation of modern institutions and market principles, as their leaders managed to secure the trust of dominant interest groups and legitimize the traditional social order. According to North, Wallis and Weingast, “legal systems initially develop to enforce unique and personal elite privileges.”³⁵ Therefore, studying the distribution of power within dominant coalitions throughout the period of state-building and maturing can advance understanding why and how these informal privileges transformed into formal rights and eventually produced nuanced institutional settings such as that of Saudi Arabia.

²⁸ Chakravarti 2012, 200

²⁹ Wright 2008, 322

³⁰ Albertus and Menaldo 2017

³¹ Chakravarti 2012, 200

³² North et al. 2009

³³ North et al. 2013

³⁴ Cox et al. 2014

³⁵ North et al. 2009, 49

In order to match the fragmented evidence from numerous, theoretically diverse studies of social networks, political economy, or rentier state with institutional development, they must be understood as the dimensions impacted by social norms and their formal materialization. Inspired by Schlumberger's 'integrated approach', this thesis argues for:

“...integrating theoretical findings of NIE theory that transgress the structural deficiencies of neoclassical assumptions with approaches that political science, economic sociology, and anthropology have developed in order to explain political and social structures, and which, in turn, strongly impact on economic performance, developmental prospects, and the formation of new economic orders.”³⁶

His ten-point framework that defines key characteristics of 'patrimonial capitalism' in many aspects resembles the arguments of NIE. Seeking continuity between pre-capitalist community relationships and capitalist market relationships, which most disciplines render strictly disparate, it explains the capitalist but nonmarket nature of Arab economies.³⁷ Nonetheless, Schlumberger tempers optimism about their progress after considering the strong variable of power constellations, captured by neither NIE nor neoclassical theory. Regarding “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally”³⁸ captured by the Hofstede Insights, they in fact overshadow the rest of the world. While patrimonialism is often confused with 'crony capitalism', the latter lacks historical, political and analytical depth reflecting genesis of these hierarchic structures and underrates the actual robustness of asymmetric patron-client relations permeating the society.³⁹

Deeper analysis is especially important for unraveling the sophisticated modern forms of patrimonialism, which pervade legal-rational institutions and blend in with globalization dynamics.⁴⁰ Apart from the obvious means of economic familism such as land, credit, procurement or bureaucratic positions, the 'neopatrimonial' system is notorious for instrumentalization of formal institutions and regulatory capacities.⁴¹ Similarly, access to information – a key determinant of market exchange – is subject to one's status within the secretive environment specific to oil-rich autocracies⁴² and accentuated by the Gulf's extremely low scores on voice and accountability, freedom of press or fiscal transparency.⁴³ Overused in the African context, the concept of neopatrimonialism is often downplayed to mechanisms of simple corruption.⁴⁴ Unlike the dyadic patron-client relations that govern bribes however, the Gulf's networks are characteristic for their multilateral, cascaded, and

³⁶ Schlumberger 2008, 627

³⁷ Ibid., 633

³⁸ Hofstede Insights. 2018. “Country Comparison Tool.” <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/kuwait,saudi-arabia,the-united-arab-emirates/> (accessed May 22, 2019).

³⁹ Schlumberger 2008, 643

⁴⁰ Bach and Gazibo 2012; Evin et al. 2014

⁴¹ For a critical discussion on neopatrimonialism see Erdmann and Engel 2007

⁴² Ross 2012, 80

⁴³ See World Governance Indicators (<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home>), World Press Freedom Index (<https://rsf.org/en/ranking>), Open Budget Index (<https://www.internationalbudget.org/>), respectively.

⁴⁴ Khan 2018

frequently legal form.⁴⁵ In fact, current regimes “contain elements that offset or sedate corruption rather than inciting or motivating it,”⁴⁶ tolerate only its discreet, high-profile, or socially acceptable forms to maintain a strong public image, and reinforce systemic efficiency by further centralization and autonomy from secondary elites. This corresponds with their relative success in containing corruption compared to regional average. (Figure 1)

Figure 1: Gulf countries’ ranking in international corruption indexes

CPI Rank (100 to 1)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	5-year AVG		10-year AVG
											2007-11	2012-16	
SAU	44	44	35	28	31	38	36	31	29	35	36	34	35
ARE	19	19	17	16	15	15	15	14	14	14	17	14	16
QAT	18	16	12	11	12	15	16	15	13	18	14	15	15
KWT	33	36	37	30	30	38	39	38	33	43	33	38	36
OMN	29	23	22	23	27	35	34	37	36	36	25	36	30
BHR	26	24	26	27	25	30	32	31	30	40	26	33	29
GCC	28	27	25	22	23	28	29	28	26	31	25	28	27
MENA	50	50	52	50	51	55	56	55	54	58	51	56	53

Source: Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)

Note: Re-adjusted to scale of 100 to control for changing number of studied countries between individual years

CoC Percentile Rank (0 to 100)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	5-year AVG		10-year AVG
											2007-11	2012-16	
SAU	53	59	59	59	49	58	59	59	59	63	56	60	58
ARE	81	83	79	79	82	84	87	83	83	88	81	85	83
QAT	74	79	91	89	80	82	82	80	78	80	83	80	82
KWT	69	69	67	65	60	52	53	51	51	50	66	51	59
OMN	68	72	68	66	62	63	63	65	65	66	67	64	66
BHR	61	62	64	63	64	68	69	64	61	56	63	64	63
GCC	68	71	71	70	66	68	69	67	66	67	69	67	68
MENA	47	47	47	46	44	45	46	44	44	44	46	45	45

Source: World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, Control of Corruption (CoC)

Nonetheless, the decisive role of connections, political affiliations, or status of one’s tribe and family in obtaining governmental benefits is captured by opinion surveys in both clusters.⁴⁷ Undeniably, nowhere else in the world does *wasta*-induced lack of corruption control so strongly correlate with reduction of total factor productivity (TFP) than in Arab countries, translating into an estimate of almost 40% output gap for republics in particular.⁴⁸ The somewhat milder impact on Gulf monarchies presumably owes to persistently low levels of TFP and its little influence on potential growth compared to foreign labor or physical capital,⁴⁹ as well as higher trust of citizens in the long-term nature of interpersonal relationships.⁵⁰ Unfortunately, the indirect implications of culturally embedded patterns of allocation for the political economy of state-building and long-term institutional development are seemingly understudied in the Gulf context and often simplistically labeled as ‘rentier mentality’.⁵¹ Nevertheless, they are key for stability of personalized regimes and their

⁴⁵ Hertog 2010b, 117

⁴⁶ Gray 2018a, 65

⁴⁷ See Gallup, Inc., *Gallup World Poll 2013* (<http://www.gallup.com/home.aspx>) and Arab Reform Initiative, *Arab Barometer Waves I-III* (<http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/online-data-analysis>).

⁴⁸ Ramady 2016, 94

⁴⁹ Mitra et al. 2015, 11–12

⁵⁰ See JD Systems Institute, *World Value Survey, Round Four* (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>).

⁵¹ Beblawi 1990

inability to cultivate independent market-based economic activity founded in equal opportunities, low transaction costs and enforceable property rights.

Gulf citizens generally perceive *wasta*, the basic unit of informal networks, as an obligation and right bound to identity and social status that opens traditional channels between public institutions and local communities, rather than an anachronism in the Western sense.⁵² While its various parallels worldwide prove that Arab countries are not an exception but rather one of the more obvious examples of this phenomenon,⁵³ in most developed countries it has fallen into disrepute, been banned, or yielded to more efficiency-enhancing institutional arrangements.⁵⁴ Within isolated, hierarchic communities, the networks simulate processes of state-business and business-to-business relations, partially substituting their developmental role.⁵⁵ According to Williamson's equilibrium model of marginal costs and benefits, "high within-tribe specialization can be so beneficial that favoring the tribe (*wasta*) more than offsets any gains from market contracting."⁵⁶ Indeed, many large businesses of the Gulf expanded and internationalized thanks to their special relationship with the royal family, government officials, and other prominent figures. However, if the specialization degenerates and the market supply becomes more accessible due to new technologies or greater economies of scale, the costs of using *wasta* are predisposed to exceed the benefits and eventually undermine the community's wealth.⁵⁷ Since the organization of such a network is naturally centralized and unequal, non-elite agents pay for the weak, unreliable state through burdensome transaction costs in various spheres of private and public life, which elites simply bypass. Simultaneously, the disproportionate long-term accumulation of economic privileges gradually increases elites' autonomy from state funds and influence on policy-making.⁵⁸ In order to prevent large clients from moving their assets abroad when fiscal strain warrants austerity and transformation of business environment, the leadership tends to reflect their vested interests in the new *status quo* and thereby jeopardize own reforms.⁵⁹

If NIE helps us identify the fundamental evolutionary dynamics of (neo)patrimonial societies, rentierism and state capitalism are crucial concepts for explaining their long-term endurance. Hereby, rentierism is narrowed down from the simplistic structural explanation of the state itself, suggested by the rentier state theory, to a politically strategic redistribution of externally generated assets that enables the existence of a 'social contract'.⁶⁰ Rentierism extends beyond hydrocarbons (as an unexpected windfall of any commodity within the context of traditionally poor economy can lead to identical symptoms)⁶¹ and even resource-rich countries in general (as its negative effects get exported via foreign trade, investment, aid or remittances).⁶² Generally, the larger the external revenue the greater the independence of the government from society, and the broader the potential coalition

⁵² Ramady 2016, 33–46

⁵³ Aliyev 2017, 35–38

⁵⁴ Barnett et al. 2013, 42

⁵⁵ Hertog et al. 2013; Hvidt 2007

⁵⁶ Barnett et al. 2013, 45

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Hodson 2013

⁵⁹ Khemani 2017


⁶⁰ Gray 2018b

⁶¹ Mazaheri 2016, 100

⁶² Malik 2016

of loyal supporters it can secure. In this respect, Herb divides Gulf into ‘extreme rentiers’ (Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE), which generally command high per-capita rents and fiscal break-even bellow the actual price of oil, and the ‘middling rentiers’ (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain), where the impact of fiscal pressures on the social contract is more severe.⁶³ Hence, extensive reserves can also influence autocrat’s short-term political calculus and need to be reflected in the analysis. (Figure 2)

Figure 2: Total reserves, including gold (% of GDP)



Source: Author's calculations based on International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics), World Bank and OECD (National Accounts) data

According to Ross, the comfort of fiscal abundance assures the sovereign of his strong position and facilitates investments in the long-term economic development.⁶⁴ However, once the subversive threat of civil society and elite coalitions weakens, the oil-rich autocrats tend to abandon wealth-sharing and institution-building efforts characteristic to their role of ‘stationary bandits’ for personal rent-seeking interests,⁶⁵ and consequently “govern over much worse economic outcomes than their constrained peers.”⁶⁶

Inequality in resource influx and allocation is therefore crucial for studying (neo)patrimonial societies, since their political control depends primarily on the varied capabilities to co-opt the subjects with welfare and privileges adequate to their expectations.⁶⁷ When direct instruments fail, the benevolent autocrat can still contain dissatisfaction by conveniently adjusting the institutional framework or organizational leadership – domains otherwise largely external to the public. Significantly, the

⁶³ Herb 2014

⁶⁴ Ross 2012, 216

⁶⁵ Eibl and Hertog 2017

⁶⁶ Nyrup 2018, 3

⁶⁷ Elbadawi 2016

outcomes of such political balancing are often temporary and, while fundamentally preventing larger conflicts, can be accompanied by strategic repression of aggrieved groups. Due to the long-term guarantees provided by oil-fueled patrimonialism, Gulf monarchies settled for co-option as the preferred solution. ‘Late rentierism’ theory calls for acknowledging the unprecedented expansion in living standards achieved over the 1970-80s, when elites turned the isolated circles of privileged few into society-wide welfare systems.⁶⁸ In particular, scholars emphasize large investments in education, healthcare and public services,⁶⁹ the related improvements in child mortality and life expectancy that substantially contributed to the leap in the Human Development Index,⁷⁰ or oil-related downstream infrastructural development in transport, telecommunications and finance.⁷¹ In fact, there are reasons to doubt the conventional ‘resource curse’ argument of direct linkage between oil and slower economic growth too.⁷² However, transforming tough challenges of extreme inflow and volatility of revenues, centralized hierarchic allocation, demographic expansion, and state-led development into durable, above-average economic performance, requires outstanding institutional quality.⁷³

According to various indicators, their longitudinal effectiveness in the Gulf’s personalized societies remained generally average, further impaired by social norms and insufficient enforcement. Although distributional strains or other special circumstances necessitated occasional neoliberal adjustments, they usually confirmed the state’s primary role in the economy.⁷⁴ Due to their special type of state capitalism, government consumption became the driver of growth since the first boom, while the steadfast predominance of current expenditures significantly restricted options for counter-cyclical or developmental policies during busts.⁷⁵ Despite certain developments, the impact of excessive investments on the quality of public services and local human capital was disproportionate to other high-income countries.⁷⁶ Administrations grew into oversized, rigid and largely inefficient instruments of allocation,⁷⁷ and much of their entrepreneurial potential was wasted by labor and distributional policies primarily concerned with control.⁷⁸ The inability of society to rely on strong formal institutions inevitably led to greater significance of the informal ones, which amplified the negative effects of oil windfall, delayed further development of market-based principles, and indirectly caused the symptoms often attributed to the ‘resource curse’.⁷⁹ Consequently, the private sector outside state-controlled petrochemicals and non-tradables remained underdeveloped, lacking dynamism, diversity, horizontal linkages or innovative capacity,⁸⁰ while fixed exchange-rate system partially mitigated the effects of Dutch disease.⁸¹

⁶⁸ Gray 2011, 23

⁶⁹ Tétreault 2011

⁷⁰ Cammett et al. 2015, 160–74

⁷¹ El-Katiri 2014

⁷² Ross 2012, 189; for the latest review of the “resource curse” literature see: Papyrakis 2017

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 215; also Chakravarti 2012, 195

⁷⁴ Gray 2018b, 39–42

⁷⁵ Qasem 2016

⁷⁶ Salehi-Isfahani 2013

⁷⁷ Biygautane et al. 2016

⁷⁸ Hertog 2014b

⁷⁹ Elgin and Oztunali 2014; Farhadi et al. 2015; Menaldo 2016; Sarmidi et al. 2014; Selim and Zaki 2016

⁸⁰ Ennis 2015; Hertog 2014b; Mazaheri 2016

⁸¹ Luciani 2011

Attempting to maintain the unsustainable environment, the regimes artificially isolated selected projects from the distorted incentives of non-market capitalism through generous subsidies, cheap foreign labor, preferential treatment and regulation, or capital- and energy-intensive public assets. Successful ‘pockets’ of concentrated efficiency⁸² include development of competitive SOEs, strategic sectors and economic cities, privatization of various services and assets that became unsustainable, or establishment of extensive and professionally managed public wealth funds responsible for the diversification and expansion of regimes’ income streams.⁸³ Nonetheless, without institutions ensuring level-playing-field conditions, the related opportunities are also distributed hierarchically, thus only contributing to severe income inequality, symptomatic to highly oil-dependent economies.⁸⁴ Furthermore, some shortsighted strategies are rather harmful. For instance, the dualization of labor market rendered the state an overloaded national employer, left foreign workers vulnerable, blocked localization efforts, deepened social inequalities, and further encouraged illicit practices including rent-seeking, brokerage or ‘phantom employment’.⁸⁵ Such outcomes are irreversible without altering basic incentive structures, and especially critical for those socially or economically marginalized. It is therefore difficult to perceive any of these expensive and largely inefficient developmental steps as a genuine effort to promote sustainability, productivity, competitiveness, employment and social empowerment, instead of an attempt to ensure the continuity of the established (neo)patrimonial order, as proponents of late rentierism would argue.

It is impossible to analyze institutional development of Saudi Arabia without acknowledging the unprecedented work of Stephen Hertog. His most comprehensive account maps the evolution of Saudi bureaucracy, shaped by power-politics of the royal family and its clientelist networks, and the various ways this affected the Kingdom’s political economy.⁸⁶ Nonetheless, this in-depth focus on state-business and state-society dynamics during the oil period leads him to underestimate the role of institutions and impute the organizational inefficiency and market distortions to attributes of rentier state and clientelism on lower levels of social analysis. Despite including numerous agencies and even several legislative measures, the assessment consequently suffers from inconsistency (institutions) and particularism (governance structures). Furthermore, he doesn’t explicitly work with prominent families and tribes beyond Al-Saud as secondary elite, examine their shifting influence within dominant coalition, or acknowledge the significance of genealogical favoritism more generally. Finally, his chronological assessment deals overwhelmingly with decades of unprecedented volatility up to the 1990s, which complicates potential conclusions for authoritarian resilience in the globalized era and provides limited understanding of the correlation between the fiscal and institutional development of (neo)patrimonial societies.

By enriching the historical, anthropologic, and political-economic narratives with detailed evolution of all institutional structures, decision-making organizations,

⁸² Hertog 2010a

⁸³ Clark et al. 2013; Luciani et al. 2012; OECD 2013

⁸⁴ Parcero and Papyrakis 2016

⁸⁵ Barnett et al. 2015; Ewers 2016; Hertog 2014a; 2016b; Khalaf et al. 2015

⁸⁶ Hertog 2010b

influential agents, and their mutual relations, one obtains a detailed institutional matrix in its entire complexity. Following general methodological guidelines,⁸⁷ the ensuing qualitative process-tracing case study represents the first humble steps on the challenging path towards full application of the ‘integrated approach’ and certainly has its limits. It builds on thorough research into the history of pre-state norms that determined social organization and access to resources, as well as families and tribes that formed their disproportionate beneficiaries. Utilizing historical sources and secondary literature, it firstly provides a baseline for studying the embodiment of these customs into the institutional and governance structures of the Saudi state. Rather than its founding (1932), the milestone for neopatrimonial expansion is set in the early 1950s, emphasizing the emergence of first complex organizations towards the end of Ibn Saud’s life. In particular, the thorough evolutionary mapping of the CoM’s composition in terms of portfolios, ministers, and their affiliation to prominent families and tribes of the preceding era (if possibly determinable through official sources and secondary literature) lies at the core of this year-by-year investigation. Summarized in Annexes 1-3 and associated figures, the resulting datasets provide a detailed 66-year long insight into the shifting power within the dominant coalition, expressed by allocation of ministerial portfolios to representatives of various socio-economic backgrounds. Within-year variations are captured by equal division of the given year between all ensuing ministers. Elites are organized into four groups based on their genealogical origins (Al-Saud, Al-Wahhab, elites from the central Najdi region, elites from other regions) and hereby distinguished from the unspecified fifth group of ‘Commoners’. Basic assessment already shows strong bias against the latter. (Figure 3)

Figure 3: Statistical overview of the CoM (1953-2018)

	Ministers in office (#)	Out of the Total (%)	Office length (years)	Out of the Total (%)	Excluding current officials	Out of the Total (%)	Average office length (years)	Difference to the Total (%)	Excluding current officials	Difference to the Total (%)
Al-Saud	76	28,3	519 1/3	31,2	501 1/3	32,4	6,8	9,4	7,5	10,6
Al-Wahhab	19	7,1	132 4/7	8,0	126 4/7	8,2	7,0	11,3	8,4	20,7
Subtotal	95	35,3	652	39,2	628	40,6	6,9	20,8	8,0	31,3
Najdi Elites	65	24,2	401 2/3	24,1	369 5/6	23,9	6,2	-0,1	6,3	-6,8
Other Elites	40	14,9	251 1/3	15,1	216 1/3	14,0	6,3	1,5	6,4	-5,2
Subtotal	105	39,0	653	39,2	586 1/6	37,9	6,2	1,4	6,3	-12,0
Common	69	25,7	359 4/7	21,6	332	21,5	5,2	-18,7	5,9	-12,9
Total	269	100,00	1664 1/2	100,0	1546	100,0	6,2	3,4	6,7	6,4

Source: Author’s calculations

Drawing heavily on the BoECoM legislative archives and multiple explanatory sources and dissertations, Annex 4 simultaneously complements it with an overview of relevant Decrees, Orders and CoM Resolutions, mostly immediate authoritative reactions to specific situations. Both investigations are primarily concerned with the causal effect of patrimonial norms (i.e. independent variable) on the central levels of social analysis (formal institutions and governance structures, i.e. dependent variables) and, in combination with oil, religion, modern institutions or external pressures (i.e. contributing causes), on economic development more generally. Since the (neo)patrimonial regime depends on a stable inflow of resources, its persistence and causal weight are tested against periods of bust-induced fiscal

⁸⁷ Bennett and Checkel 2015; Collier 2011; George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2017

strain and other ‘defining moments’ of institutional development.⁸⁸ A pattern emerges through the case study, in which the executive and legislative actions promoting decentralization and socio-economic development concentrate almost exclusively within the periods of fiscal and/or organizational pressure. Finally, a set of longitudinal data from disaggregated indexes illustrates selective adjustment to globalization, the subject of the last chapter. While building the historical narrative, special attention is paid to the issues of generalizability, equifinality, alternative explanations, and instrumental motives, which all threaten to undermine the intervening causal mechanism. Similarly, care is taken to avoid the orientalist arguments symptomatic to the employment of historical sources, the NIE approach and developmental theories.⁸⁹

1. Social Norms and Political Economic Dominance in the Pre-state Era

1.1 Historical and spatial determinants of social organization in the Gulf

For centuries, tribes have been basic units of society on the Arabian Peninsula, providing “values now called participation, accountability, predictability, justice, the rule of law, and transparency.”⁹⁰ As Field points out, pre-oil central Arabia was a harsh place, desperately poor, riven by famine, diseases, natural disasters, and internal strife, that made many since the 15th Century leave the periphery for the coast.⁹¹ While their frontier settlements later developed into the first formal political administrations, incessant conflict motivated by tribal hegemony and control over resources was twice as prevalent in the inhospitable, fragmented and sparsely populated inland, which lacked the commercial possibilities of the cosmopolitan coastal centers. Since “climate and bio-geography were unfavorable to settled agriculture and instead conduced to pastoral nomadism and a strong tribal social structure,”⁹² politically centralized forms of leadership emerged to reduce uncertainty. Further amplifying this trend were the concentration of means of production in a handful of oases and their dependence on coastal merchants for imports of essential resources and tools.⁹³ The patriarchal elder usually represented the sole source of justice, public order, protection, and economic opportunities, and as such exercised almost unlimited power over the lives of his tribe.⁹⁴

Externally, the long persistence of tribal societies in the inland regions is explained by the limited interest of imperial powers in these isolated and scarcely populated communities until WWI. For both the Ottoman and British Empires, the coast represented a strategically important gateway to the extensive opportunities of the Indian Ocean. By the end of the 19th Century, it became firmly embedded in Britain’s ‘pericentric’ colonial networks as they successfully empowered, fragmented and economically subordinated local elites in a patron-client manner.⁹⁵ However,

⁸⁸ Williamson 2000, 598

⁸⁹ Zouache 2017

⁹⁰ Brixi et al. 2015, 147

⁹¹ Field 1984, 178–82

⁹² Menaldo 2016, 328

⁹³ Field 1984, 182–83

⁹⁴ Herb 1999, 24

⁹⁵ Peterson 2016, 129, 146

difficult accessibility, lack of resources, and constantly changing balance of power between the rivaling tribes disincentivized any domination of the hinterlands, providing they did not pose a direct threat to control over the coast. Disregarding a brief period of a rather calculated alliance between 1915-27, “neither Najd nor Hejaz held a treaty with Britain and their status alternated between a somewhat loose Ottoman suzerainty and the claims of rival tribes originating from within the Najd interior.”⁹⁶ Consequently, while British control affected the formation of social order in the coastal chiefdoms and accelerated their administrative development, the Saudi state was founded primarily on the traditional norms and beliefs characteristic of the pre-state era.⁹⁷

Both the first and second Saudi chiefdoms, formed in the 18th and 19th Centuries respectively, succeeded thanks to a combination of military conquest, religious ideology, and control of strategic resources in the violent power vacuum of Najd. Since conquered territories were obliged to share their surplus in form of Islamic tax or tribute, both economies were based on the flow of rent “from the periphery of the emirate to the center where it was redistributed to gain loyalty and allegiance.”⁹⁸ Distinguished from the rest of the Peninsula by their ideological strictness and tighter centralization, they retained the traditional patterns of social organization even without foreign support.⁹⁹ On the other hand, their isolation from the cosmopolitan maritime culture and its vast competition- and accumulation-enhancing opportunities that empowered a class of elite merchants elsewhere, resulted in weaker, fragmented interest groups and relatively lower importance of elite consensus.¹⁰⁰ Despite its significance in the establishment and expansion of the Saudi-Wahhabi influence, religious ideology further contributed to the disintegration of the original norms due to its dogmatic, centralizing tendencies and “inherently destabilizing nature of the tribal ethos.”¹⁰¹ Historically, tribal confederations had little recognition for the religious establishment and its dominating attempts, despite themselves being descendants of prophet Mohammed’s tribe.¹⁰² Consequently, tribal customs retained their autonomy and institutional influence, and in certain areas provided the basis for multiple religious principles. As shall become evident, the varying weights of these frequently conflicting discourses provided cornerstones for the initial institutional framework and continued to shape it throughout modern history.

1.2 Patrimonial politics in the era of Ibn Saud (1902-53)

In terms of its origins and expansion, Ibn Saud’s dominion significantly benefited from the tribal organization of the preceding emirates.¹⁰³ Besides a tool for conquest, the tribes became “building blocks of the modern state” since they embodied generally respected institutions of punishment, reward, recruitment, or

⁹⁶ Hanieh 2011, 5

⁹⁷ Peterson 2016, 147

⁹⁸ Al-Rasheed 2010, 7

⁹⁹ Ibid., 6

¹⁰⁰ Field 1984, 74

¹⁰¹ Samin 2017, 202

¹⁰² Al-Rasheed 2010, 21

¹⁰³ Ibid., 36

legitimacy.¹⁰⁴ Notwithstanding, state formation was defined by the disintegration of traditional power centers and their gradual subjugation by monocratic authority. Three decades of territorial expansion, during which various strategies of personal cooption and domination were employed, centralized the governance structures and produced a new class of elites around the ruler based on their influence and loyalty. Eventually, he managed to detribalize and urbanize nomadic populations, bureaucratize and subordinate the religious establishment, and replace the economic significance of the two traditional power centers with capital of the merchant class, laying the foundations of an institutional and administrative framework in the process. Since there were barely any external dynamics involved, the authoritative form of patrimonialism stabilized as means of social organization and, after withholding a period of crisis, was only reinforced by the post-WWII expansion of oil income.

Traditionally, it was the division of booty on the basis of individual loyalty that motivated the elites to participate in war campaigns of their leaders. However, since Ibn Saud aspired for more than a plundering raid, his prominent supporters often sought more strategic arrangements, exchanging political consolidation for significant positions within the close circle of privileged individuals. In times of resource scarcity, limited social mobility, and non-existent bureaucratic or contractual organization, marriages represented crucial means of cementing these alliances as well as exercising authority over the conquered territory.¹⁰⁵ Although their usual motive was to express domination over defeated tribe and subordination of relatives or most loyal allies, they implied public respect and various financial benefits.¹⁰⁶ Simultaneously, the desirable reputation and social status accumulated through significant battles, marriages or special place at the royal court (*majlis*) entailed inescapable commitments. For this reason, the excessive number of wives that Ibn Saud married was seen as a reflection of strategic thinking, since over time he was able to transform the complex network of blood ties into a “numerically substantial ruling caste which was anchored in tribal values of genealogy and kinship and which provided the bedrock for the Saudi state even as it modernized in the 1960s and 1970s.”¹⁰⁷ Nonetheless, the lack of formal rules clarifying and legally enacting the procedures around bonds, promotions or handouts, gave the King an ultimate right to reverse them and thus the fortunes and reputation of their beneficiaries. Consequently, the new class of elites became much less independent in both economic and political terms than any of their predecessors.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, these families were the first to receive powerful privileges such as representing the country abroad, participating as subcontracting agencies on the first oil deals, getting foreign education for their children and, with the following administrative expansion, becoming “the nucleus of the Saudi civil service.”¹⁰⁹

Additionally, the superiority of the ruler was regularly demonstrated by ostentatious largesse, characteristic of elaborate feasts and handouts at the *majlis*, commonly practiced by tribal sheiks and emirs even before Ibn Saud. The ceremonies of the royal tent represented a public gathering on the highest level with strict rules,

¹⁰⁴ Bixi et al. 2015, 113

¹⁰⁵ Al-Rasheed 2010, 76

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Cronin 2013, 8–9

¹⁰⁸ Meulen 2000, 255

¹⁰⁹ Al-Rasheed 2010, 86

ritualized acts, and a special place for each of the subjects based on their wealth, loyalty and social influence. Their intention was to build an image of immense wealth, influence, generosity, and progressiveness in the minds of powerful representatives from various military, religious, merchant or tribal backgrounds.¹¹⁰ This was especially effective in the more isolated provinces, frequently visited by the conqueror and his entourage during spectacular tours from one tribe to another.¹¹¹ While all subjects were expected to remain silent during the *majlis* and listen to the ruler, the privileged ones were occasionally invited to express their views. Giving an impression of accessibility, this sophisticated ritual actually represented an effective mechanism of maintaining and enhancing existing social hierarchies and helped to reassert what had been achieved politically or militarily, while the real state affairs were eventually conducted behind closed doors.¹¹² Royal hospitality became especially important once the raids ended and “neither national mythologies, nor a common sense of history and destiny, nor a well-developed welfare programme tied subjects to rulers.”¹¹³ However, since Ibn Saud tended to invest the vast majority of his expenses in securing allegiance, other sources of revenues besides booty were needed to cover the rapid territorial expansion.¹¹⁴

Until the conquest of Hejaz and adoption of local commercial practices, the economy lacked any capitalistic features and the income of the treasury was closer to a feudal tribute than a tax on entrepreneurial activities, common along the coastal areas.¹¹⁵ Tributes were symbolic of political submission, in exchange for which the tribes were entitled to protection, justice and various subsidies.¹¹⁶ In both Najd and Hasa, the capital was “deeply articulated with the indigenous productive cycle of local groups, especially big land owners,”¹¹⁷ and any surplus accumulated at the expense of peasants reinvested back in the agricultural sector. Therefore, the ruler relied either on donations of such landowners, tributes from tribal leaders, or collection of Islamic tax from Bedouins and non-Muslims. Theoretically, the literal interpretations of Islamic principles favored commerce, as it secured enforceable guidelines for the rule of law, ‘sanctified’ property rights, and limited the imposition of taxes to *zakat*.¹¹⁸ In practice, however, they were frequently in contradiction, as religious authorities misused their position and persistently obstructed loans, interests or technological and legislative innovations.¹¹⁹ According to direct observers, “heavy agricultural taxes, arbitrarily-imposed contributions... uneasiness towards trading with ‘infidels’... and restrictions of personal freedoms made the inhabitants’ relationship with their Wahhabi masters less than candid.”¹²⁰ Most importantly, the system disproportionately burdened its productive segments as the ruler simply “appropriated surplus produced from certain sections of society and redistributed it among others in the pursuit of allegiance and loyalty.”¹²¹ In order to continue his conquest and sustain the expanding social

¹¹⁰ Al-Rasheed 2010, 77–80

¹¹¹ Commins 2010, 455

¹¹² Al-Rasheed 2010, 83

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Wahba 1964, 131

¹¹⁵ Hanieh 2011, 6

¹¹⁶ Onley and Khalaf 2006, 195

¹¹⁷ Al-Nuaim 1987, 346

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 220

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 223–24

¹²⁰ Palgrave 1871, Vol. 2, pp. 156–57, 165–68

¹²¹ Al-Rasheed 2010, 9

contract, Ibn Saud had to strategically balance between the power centers with respect to their potential of contributing to the treasury rather than causing violence.

Traditionally, the power of Najdi rulers was grounded in their strategic cooption of *ulema* and tribal leaders. The gratitude of Ibn Saud to the former for their ideological support of the conquest was reflected by many concessions in its aftermath, for instance facilitating passages to Mecca, adjusting the regulation to better protect pilgrims, improving public hygiene, or placing certain areas under Wahhabi religious supervision.¹²² Apart from legitimacy and revenues, they were also essential as a homogenizing platform for consolidation of the tribal army (*Ikhwan*). Contrary to his vision, the indigenous population perceived the territorial layout through “ever-shifting tribal influence rather than artificially imposed fixed boundaries.”¹²³ Since the early 20th Century, Bedouins were detribalized and militarized under the pretext of religious doctrine, with the intention of “substituting the brotherhood of common faith for that of a common ancestry.”¹²⁴ Around two hundred *Ikhwan* settlements (*hujjar*) were established for the purpose of bringing them to settled community life and instructing them in Wahhabi tenets that pronounced all alternative believers as “infidels and thus legitimate targets for jihad.”¹²⁵ Notably, until their establishment the “campaigns had no special ideological/religious coloring,”¹²⁶ which strengthens the presumption that both the *Ikhwan* and *ulema* were repeatedly instrumentalized in pursuance of royal interests. During the conquest, the *Ikhwan* were granted strong material benefits, including premium enhancements of their commercial opportunities. However, having served their purpose, Ibn Saud forced them to sedentarize and abandon the pastoral mode of production, as they threatened his intentions to develop borderlines, trade routes, and urban agriculture.¹²⁷

Soon after capturing Hejaz in 1925, notables from among Najdi *ulema*, the royal family and even Hejazi merchants received influential positions of judges, governors and local officers in the first basic provincial administration overseen by Prince Faisal.¹²⁸ Contrarily, the *Ikhwan* chiefs were merely paid a share of the plundered commodities and sent back to *hujjar* to “prevent confrontations with pilgrims whose religious practices the *Ikhwan* would find objectionable.”¹²⁹ Furthermore, a legislative measure soon outlawed the practice of raiding, “abolishing the rights of Bedouin tribes on their traditional territories”¹³⁰ and providing the nomadic groups, then constituting about half the population, with incentives for loyalty and urban domestication. Never since revoked, the Decree provided each Bedouin willing to leave his traditional tribal territory and settle down with access to resources and importantly, land. *Ikhwan* chiefs, who perceived themselves as equals in lineage to Al-Saud, ignored this dismissive treatment and escalated their aversion to the introduction of modern inventions, higher taxes, and economically-motivated

¹²² Commins 2010, 454

¹²³ Hanieh 2011, 5

¹²⁴ Philby 1922, Vol. 1, 297

¹²⁵ Commins 2010, 454

¹²⁶ Cronin 2013, 6

¹²⁷ Lorimer 1908, Vol. 1, Part 1B, 973-79

¹²⁸ Philby 1952, 90

¹²⁹ Commins 2010, 454

¹³⁰ Fabietti 2006, 579

bans on pursuing foreign disbelievers into an open rebellion.¹³¹ Due to reluctance to surrender their new belief for the sake of royal politics, the ruler exacted an approval to wage *jihad* against the movement, affirming “his willingness to compromise Wahhabi principles if it might jeopardize his power.”¹³² Despite successfully undermining tribes as a traditional unit of society in charge of common resources, the redistribution nonetheless continued to follow the tribal logic.¹³³ From the 1930s onwards, the strategic co-option of tribal elites gained significance as an “instrument of political domination on a grand scale, or even an essential element in the make-up of the Saudi state.”¹³⁴

However costly, the victory over *Ikhwan* marked “the destruction of the military-ideological dominance of the pastoral mode of production over the tributary mode of production.”¹³⁵ Replacing their significance for the treasury was an alliance with the Hejazi merchant class, which provided an external alternative to the dependency on traditional sources of income and enabled bureaucratic consolidation. Furthermore, their defensive role was substituted for American guarantees following the first oil concessions.¹³⁶ Similarly, the 1932 Depression, which eliminated three quarters of revenues from pilgrimage and indebted the newly emerged Kingdom both domestically and internationally, initiated systematic bureaucratization of the clergy and gradual installation of large non-Islamic customs in prominent ports of the region.¹³⁷ Many officials did not receive salary for months.¹³⁸ Contrarily, Hejazi merchants profited from higher security of overland commercial paths resulting from enforced indoctrination and urbanization. In exchange for much-needed donations, the ruler was ready to exempt them from certain fees such as the income-based war tax in 1937, and relax or even shelve some religiously-motivated restrictions (i.e. on usury or tobacco).¹³⁹ Since their sole obligation was the customs duties, covered by higher prices of consumer goods, “the merchants seemed to have gotten away with an exemption from a public tax.”¹⁴⁰ Despite their growing influence on individual commercial practices, they were restricted from emerging as an interest group and institutionally isolated from virtually any control over distribution of the regional surplus. While the 1926 establishment of the *Majlis al-Shura*, a consultative assembly with jurisdiction over Hejaz, gave the impression of preserving their traditional influence, they unanimously voted for loyalty to the monarchy. Furthermore, with the council symbolically placed in Mecca and staffed by the King, they quickly lost their financial autonomy too, as the expansion of their budget for ‘royal protection’ from 20% to 58% of total revenues (excluding forced private loans) between 1926-29 indicates.¹⁴¹ Since the emerging normative construction followed the interests of the ruling class to which it ultimately served, the “Saudi state was structurally established

¹³¹ Wahba 1964, 133

¹³² Commins 2010, 454

¹³³ Fabietti 2006, 592–93

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 577

¹³⁵ Al-Nuaim 1987, 346

¹³⁶ Commins 2010, 455

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 454

¹³⁸ Philby 1952, 175–76

¹³⁹ Al-Nuaim 1987, 223–24

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 273

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 278

on relatively stable grounds before the infiltration of the capitalist mode of production into the country.”¹⁴²

Although the Hejazi administration later developed into the first ministries, all provinces had to accept the Najdi judicial system, governance of royal clients, and Wahhabism as the official religion, “leaving little temporal authority that limited the will of the King by law.”¹⁴³ Due to little further formalization, the autonomy and distributional control of the ruling elite increased exponentially between 1946-50, when oil revenues more than doubled annually to steadily account for around 75% of government income.¹⁴⁴ Despite rapid expansion of the state and its expenses, distribution remained limited to narrow inner circles with negligible impact on social development. Under these circumstances, American-owned Aramco provided the majority of new infrastructure and public services including healthcare, education and quasi-state administration, essential for the oil industry in strategic regions. Although it stimulated the private sector by engaging domestic agencies in subcontracting, most of them were owned by elites.¹⁴⁵ Various appeals of royal advisors for rationalization, such as the 1947 attempt to introduce budgeting, were consistently resisted. Nonetheless, the inflows far outstripped the ‘primitive’ accounting of MoF Al-Suleyman, who personally handled both fiscal and monetary matters since the Kingdom’s establishment.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, his efforts were increasingly constrained by young competitive princes, who for years carefully exploited royal status in order to build fiefdoms of their own. Since 1949, development projects started to be postponed due to rising public debt, which amounted to $\frac{2}{3}$ of annual budget by the end of Ibn Saud’s rule.¹⁴⁷ Eventually, excessive royal spending, inefficient fiscal policy and monetary dependency on a volatile, easily manipulated bimetallic standard, foretold the crisis of the early 1950s. Persuaded by trusted US advisors, the King launched a strategy in 1952 that led to interim stabilization of the currency and establishment of the central bank (SAMA). Instead of a wider institutional reform, however, the bimetallic standard was cemented and control over financial affairs left almost exclusively in the hands of the powerful MoF.¹⁴⁸ Similarly, the CoM was founded in 1953 shortly before Ibn Saud’s death to reinforce the centralized hierarchy, resolve intra-family rivalry and direct the unregulated expansion of princely fiefdoms, rather than deliver change. Although the number of ministries almost doubled, the public sector was still very small and inaccessible to the majority of the population, with only around 5,000 employees profiting from the formalized distribution of benefits.¹⁴⁹ Significantly, its first composition clearly reflected the *status quo* with 9/11 portfolios dominated by the competing family branches. (Annex 1) While these were the first important steps towards institutionalization, they established a precedent for decades to come that in state-building matters “form follows family.”¹⁵⁰

¹⁴² Al-Nuaim 1987, 347

¹⁴³ Kostiner 1993, 104–6

¹⁴⁴ Hertog 2010b, 44

¹⁴⁵ Al-Rasheed 2010, 93

¹⁴⁶ Banafe and Macleod 2017, 18–20

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 32–33

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 29

¹⁴⁹ Al-Rasheed 2010, 92

¹⁵⁰ Hertog 2010b, 45

In conclusion, the era of Ibn Saud was characterized by instrumentalization of pre-state norms for power politics within his quest to unite and subdue the populations of Arabia. His success owed primarily to strategic employment of traditional allocation mechanisms that allowed the social contract to manifest itself in ways reflecting the power hierarchies under material shortage. Consequently, traditional elites often compromised on their principles in exchange for access to the core benefits of the system. These primarily constituted direct favors (i.e. booty, land, or status), but the centralization of provinces and elite interests made the opportunistic adjustment of rules all the more lucrative. In turn, the King relied on mediation of revenues appropriated from their subjects. If the co-option was insufficient to eliminate political threat, strategic repression would be employed even against whole interest groups. Despite the adjustment of certain norms to the new reality, the traditional socio-economic and governance structures mainly persevered and, following the rise of oil revenues, provided grounds for the first state organizations.¹⁵¹ Effectively, the Kingdom resembled a ‘third emirate’, as its consolidation “was not dependent on ‘institutions’, ‘bureaucracies’ and ‘administration’ (as there were none), but was a function of informal social and cultural mechanisms, specific to the Arabian Peninsula.”¹⁵² Even after subtle formalization of the 1930s “all executive, military, legislative, judicial and religious powers were vested in Ibn Saud,”¹⁵³ who would only listen to few trusted advisors. Although the first concessions provided a certain relief to the treasury, oil was not discovered until 1938, produced in significant quantities until WWII, and fully realized as an instrument of socio-economic development until the 1960-70s. However, by that time the pattern was deeply embedded in the social order, and every traditional power-center capable of challenging it reduced to prominent clients of the regime.

2. Institutionalization of Patrimonialism throughout the Oil Era

2.1 Popular movements and dynastic rivalry: the volatile foundations of society-wide brokerage (1954-61)

Although Saud resembled his father in many ways, the strong monocratic governance ceased with Ibn Saud’s reign. In a bid for continuity, he partnered with his father’s old clients while giving preferential treatment to his own sons over his brothers. After his enthronement, he persistently strived to sideline the CoM and centralize the power around his court in Riyadh, where his networks were traditionally based. Still, he frequently travelled around the Kingdom winning allegiance of tribal elites with generous handouts and numerous marriages.¹⁵⁴ Unlike his father, however, Saud would not follow the advice of experts on economic matters and instead further burdened the indebted treasury with excessive spending and irresponsible monetary policy. Meanwhile, his brother Faisal, long-time MoFA and governor of Hejaz who became PM in 1954, took on an administrative role in lieu of the King and was increasingly considered the real ruler abroad.¹⁵⁵ Senior royals and

¹⁵¹ Peterson 2016, 187

¹⁵² Al-Rasheed 2010, 9

¹⁵³ Cronin 2013, 8–9

¹⁵⁴ Hertog 2010b, 45–53

¹⁵⁵ Herb 1999, 92

Jeddah-based merchants grew to favor Faisal over Saud, as the latter lacked the authority of his father to legitimize his reckless policies. Due to lack of consensus between the two coalitions, a dynastic monarchy of the Kuwaiti type was unfeasible. Moreover, there was no constitutional framework at that time to provide rules for that rivalry and no societal groups strong enough to contest the fiefdoms of senior princes. Consequently, state-building was primarily motivated by elite competition over bureaucratic means of distribution and institutions openly employed as weapons in their battle for influence.

The first splits occurred in 1954 when Al-Suleyman's fiefdom was dissembled and carved out between the two brothers. In an attempt to curtail the dominance of the MoF, newly led by Saud's client Al-Sabhan, the MoC was created under the leadership of a prominent Jeddah merchant Alireza. (Annex 1) Conversely, Saud gradually weakened his brother Mishaal by successively separating the Royal and National Guards from the MoDA and granting them to his own sons Musa'd and Khalid.¹⁵⁶ Eventually the whole ministry was handed over to another son Fahad and Mishaal compensated with a secondary post of MoS. In 1956, when loans from merchants and American companies were insufficient to cover for Saud's opulent projects, he ordered the MoF to abandon the collapsing bimetallic standard incompatible with international markets for paper currency.¹⁵⁷ Since SAMA was perceived as an unnecessary restriction of his power and ordinarily ignored, the unregulated printing of money covered by inexistent reserves instantly launched a spiral of inflation and black market practices. In yet another case of clientelist institutional layering, Saud promoted his former bodyguard Al-Adwan to the position of MoSFNE despite lacking any former education or corresponding experience to deal with the painful financial issues.¹⁵⁸ At the height of the crisis when oil prices stagnated and royal expenses amounted to the majority of the budget, the unexpected costs of the Suez affair underlined the need for reforms. These were yet unenforceable because the institutions that could initiate them, such as the MoC, SAMA or Chambers of Commerce, were peripheral to the power politics and repeatedly blocked by senior stakeholders. Moreover, those that passed through the court often had opposite effect, including SAMA's failed system of exchange controls that benefited mainly commercial bank owners.¹⁵⁹ Only after Saud's failed assassination attempt of president Nasser in 1958 and its dire economic consequences did the support of senior royals shift decisively in favor of Faisal and provide him with the mandate to initiate reforms and restore stability.¹⁶⁰

Although Faisal is often depicted as a liberal alternative to Saud, the means of their rivalry were virtually identical, employing all instruments available at their disposal, including modern institutions, to curtail each other's influence. While both employed traditional methods, Faisal's approach was clearly more dynastic, systematic, and long-sighted. Firstly, reformative measures were quite promising, as SAMA was granted more autonomy and a new governor, Anwar Ali, with appropriate experience from developing countries.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, the 1958 Decree extended

¹⁵⁶ Hertog 2010b, 46–47

¹⁵⁷ Banafe and Macleod 2017, 34

¹⁵⁸ Hertog 2010b, 53

¹⁵⁹ Banafe and Macleod 2017, 37

¹⁶⁰ Hertog 2010b, 33

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 57

Faisal's ministerial powers and enabled him to redesign the institutional framework, organize the segmented ministries and balance the monarch's dominance. (Annex 4) Under the IMF's supervision, significant improvements in planning, budgeting and monetary control were achieved. However, Faisal soon began emulating the tactics of his brother and replacing Saud's clients (MoS Al-Adwan) for those of his own (MoS Jamjoom, another Jeddah merchant who later succeeded Alireza as MoC). (Annex 1) His austerity measures mainly targeted the court and Saud's allies, while his own budgets were preserved or even enlarged.¹⁶² Significantly, the CoM's adjustment led to its stronger centralization, with power accumulating in the PM's hands. By 1959, Faisal himself controlled 1/3 of all ministerial posts (including MoF and MoI), restoring Al-Saud's share to over 60%. (Annex 2) In 1960, he had already installed his own son Musa'id as head of the MoI.

Meanwhile, Saud rebranded himself as a liberal modernist in a strategic response that wagered on fear from the contemporary regional wave of leftist and nationalistic movements.¹⁶³ Crucially, he co-opted a group of his progressive brothers with promises of a constitution and governmental posts, while relying on the reformulated alliance with Wahhabi conservatives for legitimacy. Threatened by these calculative maneuvers, Faisal dramatically resigned from all posts in response to the King's veto of proposed restrictions on the royal budget.¹⁶⁴ Consequently, Saud successfully reclaimed the premiership and merged it with kingship within unprecedented changes of the whole Council, which clearly targeted Faisal's coalition and promoted his own. (Annex 1) By 1961, Commoners briefly seized 29% of the CoM in an ever-faster expansion. (Annex 2) Nonetheless, immediately after securing his hold on power, the idea of a constitution was abandoned and the majority of 'Free Princes' dismissed or exiled after their leader Talal resigned in protest to Saud's power politics. Similar fate met his leftist advisors (i.e. Ibn Muammar) who were expelled or 'rewarded' with irrelevant posts at foreign embassies.¹⁶⁵ In contrast, the support of the *ulema* resulted in granting the prominent Al-Sheikh family leadership of their first ministry (Annex 1), initiating their discreet bureaucratic subordination.

Altogether, elite competition contributed to the creation of a distributional state that, by the end of Saud's rule, penetrated every strategic sector and interest group, providing a basis for society-wide brokerage. Originally, the state was created above society with Commoners generally fragmented and only taken seriously after popularized ideological movements threatened to unite them in several public protests of the 1950-60s.¹⁶⁶ Instead of delivering its developmental promises, the regime responded with repressions and stricter rules, which since 1956 essentially prevented workers from assembling and asserting their common interest. (Annex 4) Personalized agencies became cornerstones for the diffusion of elite networks through their 'gatekeepers' and other middlemen to the numerous groups of new clients, putting the bureaucracy at the core of distribution.¹⁶⁷ Alongside this uncoordinated sprawl, businesses of princes and elites often dominated whole sectors due to exclusive concessions, and greatly profited from satisfying the state-led demand and

¹⁶² Hertog 2010b, 62–63

¹⁶³ Hertog 2018, 77

¹⁶⁴ Bsheer 2018, 269

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 275–76

¹⁶⁶ Hertog 2018, 76–79


¹⁶⁷ Hertog 2010b, 64

facilitating private sector growth through investments into land, companies, and other assets. While these expansionist trends eased somewhat throughout the next decade, the neopatrimonial institutionalization was only beginning.

2.2 Formalization of the centralized hierarchy (1962-70)

Faisal regained the premiership in 1962 and, unlike his 1958 empowerment limited in changes to the MoF, engaged in historical ministerial reshuffles. (Figure 4) Predictably, a large proportion of appointments reflected the return of his brothers and their sons, fixing their dynastic share at 40% of portfolios throughout the 1960s. (Annex 2) However, the early years of Faisal’s reign also document an effort to subjugate Saud’s traditional and latest allies. Building on the kinship with Al-Sheikh from his mother’s side, Faisal systematically strengthened the relationship by enlarging the bureaucratic influence of Grand Mufti (i.e. presidency of the judiciary, GPGE, and MWL). Following the establishment of the MoPIE in 1962, Al-Sheikh gradually relinquished their autonomy for greater participation in the CoM, reaching 19% by 1967. (Annex 2) In particular, this manifested by increased issuance of *fatwas* upon demand, one of which legitimized Saud’s forced abdication from the throne in 1964.¹⁶⁸

Figure 4: Structural and ministerial changes in the CoM (1953-2018)



Source: Author’s calculations

Secondly, he co-opted several prominent Najdis with less significant ministries. Nonetheless, their short-lived dominance subsided after 1964 when the favor began shifting towards the historically closer Hejazi commercial elites. Accordingly, the share of Commoners in the CoM quickly returned to its initial negligible levels. (Annex 2) Regarding the military, Faisal had it systematically fragmented, co-opted,

¹⁶⁸ Permuy 2016, 37–38

regionally dispersed, and ultimately allocated under direct control of his brothers, transferring the National Guard to Abdullah in 1962 and merging the Royal Guard with Sultan's MoD upon Saud's abdication.¹⁶⁹ The regular army represented a feared source of opposition for both the preceding monarchs and was recruited exclusively from among loyal Najdi clansmen.¹⁷⁰ Although much of the new personnel had other tribal background, military played a crucial role in a series of coup attempts in the mid-to-late 1960s. Contrarily, tribes generally lost autonomy due to bureaucratization, inflow of imported goods, and increasingly formalized subsidies. Since 1963, provincial elections were abolished and authority over local administration transferred from tribal leaders to standardized government officials, appointed by the King. (Annex 4)

In order to appease the modernists and contain the intensifying liberal ideas, Faisal adopted their arguments and portrayed himself as a progressive leader. Shortly after regaining office, he publicly announced a ten-point program introducing a set of developmental policies centered on readjustment and enforcement of the legislative system, economic and commercial regulations or society-wide provision of public services. (Annex 4) Except for the immediate abolition of slavery, none of the vague and non-binding promises were fully accomplished and their inauguration was 'postponed' once securing control.¹⁷¹ Instead of a constitution separating the powers, Faisal soon stressed the fundamentality of the Quran and effectively delayed the issuance of the Basic Law by three decades. Contrarily, the slump in members, meetings, and resolutions of *Majlis al-Shura* during his reign documents further centralization of power in the CoM.¹⁷² A Decree of 1964 abolished the role of PM, formally assigning the CoM's presidency to the King ever since. (Annex 4) Finally, a post of SDPM was created in 1967 for the DCP Fahd to establish a clear line of succession and reassure the dynastic control over the Council. (Annex 1) Otherwise, the combination of steadily growing oil industry, emerging broad-based consumerism, and discouraged aggregation of political interests prevented further legislative progress, and while only the most visible wastes and forms of corruption were curtailed, the King turned a blind eye to deepening informal structures.¹⁷³

On the other hand, an extensive welfare program took off with provision of free healthcare and education, while formalization of social security virtually replaced informal charity and occasional royalties. Consistently around $\frac{1}{3}$ of total revenues went on salaries for civil service, which quadrupled over the 1960s.¹⁷⁴ Much of it owed to intensified public enforcement, as the US guarantees allowed to allocate 70-80% of total military spending to the MoI and its new repression agencies.¹⁷⁵ With most of the curriculum dominated by the religious establishment and the authority personalized in higher ranks controlled by loyalists, the administration became overstaffed with under-qualified, demotivated and frequently absent personnel that was almost impossible to fire.¹⁷⁶ This was compensated by state-sponsored Western

¹⁶⁹ Hertog 2010b, 47, 64, 82

¹⁷⁰ Cronin 2013

¹⁷¹ Niblock and Malik 2007, 39–41

¹⁷² Official Website of the Saudi Shura Council. <https://www.shura.gov.sa/> (accessed May 22, 2019).

¹⁷³ Hertog 2010b, 75–76

¹⁷⁴ Qasem 2016, 50

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 53

¹⁷⁶ Hertog 2010b, 72

education and experts, growing numbers of foreign workers or several pockets of efficiency in vital sectors with external guidance and under Faisal's direct influence (i.e. the KFUPM, IPA or CSB). However, their impact was dwarfed by the bloated bureaucracy controlled by senior princes, who persistently blocked attempts at its rationalization, instead encouraging spread of rent seeking and illicit practices towards its lower levels.¹⁷⁷

In an environment that either formally favored large players or enabled informal bypassing, the intensified involvement of the state in the private sector made it completely dependent on government spending. Backed by generous subsidies, state-controlled organizations such as the CPO or regional Chambers of Commerce were established in the 1960s along the first sector-specific SOEs (i.e. Petromin, Saudi Airlines or RPC) to facilitate the centralized redistribution of lucrative state contracts.¹⁷⁸ Although the regulatory capacities remained generally weak, suffering from institutional fragmentation, bureaucratic incapacity, and inaccessible information, royal measures up to 1967 only formalized the state's control over the domestic business elite. (Annex 4) Moreover, their expansion was fueled by subsidized imports of goods and laborers. Easier to contain or dispose of, the latter's share of the total workforce reached 40% by the early 1970s.¹⁷⁹ While large developmental projects constituted about half of total government expenditures, private industrial activity was atomized among small-scale craftsmen and virtually non-existent until the first downstream projects (i.e. Petrolube or SAFCO) appeared in 1969.¹⁸⁰ Therefore, most of the beneficiaries of state-created demand were commercial retailers dominated by Hejazi merchant elites who, due to their apolitical individualism, either became royal clientele or faced losing significance. Furthermore, many of the 88 companies with hundred-plus employees registered before 1971 were (co-)owned by royals themselves.¹⁸¹ Besides oil-, defense-, or infrastructure-related contracts, elites began to dominate traditional agriculture. As part of the strategy to reduce the costs of subsidized imports, the 1968 Decree ordered nationalization, redistribution, and cultivation of unregistered land as well as sedentarization of the remaining pastoral communities. (Annex 4) Together with SAAB's system of subsidies and interest-free loans, the Ordinance launched a spiral of land grabbing and capital accumulation that over the forthcoming decades rendered royals and associated businessmen champions of subsistence agriculture while "small farmers faced neglect."¹⁸²

Underlining the hypothesis, the bulk of reformative acts coincided with a fiscal crisis in the late 1960s, which emerged due to the unsustainably expanding distribution, unexpected wartime expenditures, and steadily neglected reserves. In the first tentative response, the size and diversity of import subsidies started to shrink. Following the burdening 1967 War, cross-sectoral developments such as basic procurement and employment standards, scientific and technological progress, or institutionalized developmental planning were initiated. (Annex 4) Together with increasing numbers of innovations, foreign teachers or Commoner technocrats in the

¹⁷⁷ Hertog 2010b, 73–74

¹⁷⁸ Qasem 2016, 51

¹⁷⁹ Niblock and Malik 2007, 51

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 41–44

¹⁸¹ Hertog 2010b, 74–75

¹⁸² Woertz 2013, 74–77

CoM (Annex 2), this interfered with the interests of traditional elites, particularly the *ulema*. Within the limits of the fiscal strain, they were co-opted by concessions such as guaranteed prevalence of Islamic channels on television and radio or extended jurisdiction over the areas concerned.¹⁸³ Nevertheless, the royal effort to create a parallel judicial structure for administrative, commercial, and labor matters succeeded only formally as the BoG and various specialized committees, isolated from the *Shari'ah* court system between 1967-69, were soon reclaimed by a majority of conservative scholars, freezing developments in these areas for decades.¹⁸⁴ Similarly, the long-resisted establishment of the MoJ, envisioned by the Ten-Point Program in 1962, was only realized in 1970 after the death of Grand Mufti Al-Sheikh and rising oil revenues undermined the relative autonomy of *ulema*, permitting its advanced bureaucratization. Consequently, the post was abandoned and his powers divided among numerous institutions (MoJ, *Dar al-Ifta*, CoSU, morality police or first quasi-judicial bodies in technocratic ministries) directly responsible to the King.¹⁸⁵ Additionally, more open-minded clerics received several ministries previously controlled by Al-Sheikh (Annex 1), who in turn experienced the fastest-ever decline in influence. (Annex 2) In summary, promises of institutional and economic development quickly turned into tendencies to validate royal authority, as the patrimonial norms were increasingly embedded into the legal and judicial framework with an emphasis on the private sphere, thereby providing a solid basis for consolidation of the state and its slow penetration into the wider society. Despite a brief fiscal strain, which shifted the course towards more sustainable and liberal institution building, the original policy soon resumed with reinforced dependence of both secondary elites and commoners.

2.3 Expansion of the allocation state and its secondary elite (1971-82)

Some complex reforms were still in progress when revenues alleviated their urgency and distorted their final form. For instance, while the 1971 Public Personnel Law introduced the first systematization of the bureaucracy, it simultaneously doubled senior posts in expectation of further expansion. (Annex 4) Rapid growth of government consumption together with its limited capabilities of market analysis, investment, and implementation prevented the First Developmental Plan (1970-75) from achieving its targets and downgraded central planning into a mere list of projects.¹⁸⁶ Despite the general bureaucratic sprawl, the extractive agencies (i.e. DZIT or the Customs Department), the fastest growing bodies of the protectionist 1960s, lost significance after a series of Decrees between 1973-76 abolished the vast majority of tariffs and taxes (including *zakat* in commerce). (Annex 4) Subsequently, numerous DZIT branches were closed and their responsibilities transferred to SAMA, undermining the *ulema's* financial autonomy.¹⁸⁷ Their dependency was further amplified by bureaucratization of their traditional domains, particularly Islamic affairs, education and judiciary. (Annex 4) Similar dynamics affected Jeddah's business community following the expansion of commercial chambers and industrial cities, newly centralized in Riyadh under the CCCIA and RCJY respectively.

¹⁸³ Nolan 2011, 105-6

¹⁸⁴ Hertog 2010b, 78

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 79

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 107-8

¹⁸⁷ Chaudhry 1997, 143-55

Notably, most of the institutions (and organizations) of the 1970s were designed to make the centralized distributional system publicly accessible and attract foreign companies, consultants, and laborers to build the modern infrastructure for the neopatrimonial welfare state. These included laws introducing society-wide pension systems and social insurance nationalized under the GOSI, or five development funds in expanding sectors, redistributing oil wealth via loans, subsidies, gifts and tenders. (Annex 4) Additionally, SOEs monopolized strategic industries under the pretext of national security and, in their own way, contributed to privileging large importers and producers (i.e. GSFMO).¹⁸⁸ Occasional attempts for privatization inevitably became unprofitable and consequently state dependent. Employment, housing and public services, that served to co-opt relatively narrow group of social elites in the 1950s, were readapted as formal nationwide tools of control. Accordingly, the public sector tripled, reaching 300,000 employees by the early 1980s (despite about 1/3 remaining illiterate), while salaries rose annually by up to 70%.¹⁸⁹ Ultimately, the whole market was closely linked to the distributional state that represented the engine of both supply and demand.¹⁹⁰

Despite the disorganized bureaucratic layering after 1970, no more ministries emerged under Faisal's reign, except for four MoS created between 1971-72 for prominent royal clients, gatekeepers and technocrats, causing a 15% rise in their joint CoM share. (Annex 2) In 1974, one of them (Al-Quraishi) further enlarged the Hejazi influence by becoming the first Saudi governing SAMA. Following Faisal's assassination in 1975, senior princes had to deal with a challenge to their authority and serious monetary issues. Accordingly, the immediate CoM reshuffle reflected their endeavor to restore the disrupted balance. While Khalid's careful conservatism and reunification with Al-Sheikh manifested his disassociation from Faisal's centralizing tendencies, Fahd's increasing engagement in developmental projects aimed to preserve the stagnating inflow of governmental revenues. Although the CoM grew by six technocratic portfolios, these were largely divided among Al-Saud, Al-Sheikh and Elites. (Annex 1) Gradually, each group also began to delimit its own sphere of influence within the CoM, dominating strategic segments while leaving the peripheral portfolios to Commoners. (Annex 3) Resembling Faisal's tactics, the revival of the legitimacy-strengthening bond with the conservative *ulema* was exchanged for bureaucratic influence (i.e. MoHE, MoAW or MoJ). Furthermore, the 'religious endowments' section of the budget expanded substantially over the next years, along those of *ulema*-controlled educational organizations (i.e. GPGE or Islamic universities), multiplying nearly fiftyfold between 1969-81.¹⁹¹ Their position strengthened further following the Iranian revolution, siege of Mecca, and Eastern Province protests between 1979-80. To counter the growing religious fundamentalism and reinforce their image as 'guardians' of the Kingdom's Wahhabi character, Al-Saud formalized the morality police (CPVPV) under Al-Sheikh's leadership (Annex 4), and embarking on time-tested politics of touring unsettled provincial towns with socio-economic promises.¹⁹² By the end of the 1970s, Al-Saud and Al-Sheikh dominated almost half of the CoM. (Annex 2)

¹⁸⁸ Woertz 2013, 76–77

¹⁸⁹ Hertog 2010b, 106

¹⁹⁰ Chaudhry 1997, 152

¹⁹¹ Hertog 2010b, 92

¹⁹² Al-Rasheed 2010, 139–42

Despite maintaining their commercial prominence, Other elites lost political significance due to Fahd's preference of young educated Najdis (often 'Commoners'), co-opted from an early age and better equipped to deal with increasingly technical issues, over Faisal's traditional Hejazi clientele. As part of this transformation, SAMA was relocated from Jeddah to Riyadh in 1978 and re-staffed with local Najdis in the following years.¹⁹³ Accordingly, most of the Council's newcomers consisted of Fahd's traditional or adopted clients (i.e. Nazer or Abalkhail), powerful within their own hierarchy but easily dismissed if conflict with Al-Saud arose, as in the cases of SAMA's governor Al-Quraishi (1983), MoH Al-Gosaibi (1984) or MoPMR Yamani (1986).¹⁹⁴ Unlike the majority of Commoners, younger elites from prominent families quickly became influential figures themselves and joined the ubiquitous rivalry for distributed wealth. Attempts to curtail the costly abuse of public functions largely failed as princely ministries maintained a "high degree of internal autonomy."¹⁹⁵ Therefore, the MoI, MoDA and National Guard expanded even faster than in the early 1970s, multiplying budgets and building their own military cities with separate housing, education or health programs to maintain independence from other fiefdoms. Since formal mechanisms of coordination and enforcement remained weak, mistrusted or disrespected, the rivalry often took place in informal settings through preferential budgeting, legal interpretation and enforcement, or unnecessary and largely unavoidable paperwork. Numerous 'problem-solving' agencies with overlapping scopes and jurisdictions emerged along the vertical and exclusive lines, penetrated by royal offspring and clients.¹⁹⁶ Consequently, the uncontrolled growth of anonymous bureaucracy together with the doubling of salaries across all grades between 1976-81 (Annex 4) expanded rent-seeking opportunities, making the large-scale distribution machinery accessible even to small civil servants and their relatives. By the 1980s, the system became impossible to avoid but too complex to be maneuvered through by anyone apart from the most powerful players.

Since the whole capital-intensive environment became extremely dependent on steadily expanding imports and governmental spending, the stagnation of revenues necessitated reliance on reserves. Between 1975-78, total reserves in months of imports dropped by $\frac{3}{4}$, causing a current account deficit that was only briefly averted by hiking oil prices after the Iranian embargo. (Annex 5) Consequently, much of Fahd's progressive intents embodied in the Second Plan (1975-80) remained on paper only, including the envisaged expansion of oil sector, industrialization outside petrochemicals, or higher expenditure on social and human resource development.¹⁹⁷ Crucially, achievable targets were difficult to design with hardly any information about the market due to neglected regulatory and extractive capacities. Commercially fruitful state-led projects owed their success to sectoral protection in highly subsidized capital- and energy-intensive industries, large isolated budgets and recruitment structures or premium employment conditions, which made them viable only during times of fiscal abundance. These cautious attempts to create quasi-autonomous drivers of development were characteristic of the state-led, distributive and project-oriented policies of the 1970-80s, preoccupied with taming the growing business class. Little was expected from the private sector in turn, and the Third Plan

¹⁹³ Banafe and Macleod 2017, 85

¹⁹⁴ Hertog 2010b, 92-95

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 91

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Niblock and Malik 2007, 60-77

envisioned SOE-dominated industrial cities with special legal status leading development instead.¹⁹⁸ Much of the economic incentives favored time-consuming mega-projects in non-tradable sectors inaccessible to small, unconnected entrepreneurs, where implementation and day-to-day provision of services relied heavily on Western managers and cheap foreign labor.

Due to the attractiveness of boom-related opportunities abroad and unsatisfied demand for high-quality services, the state could afford to address the fiscal deterioration by transferring part of the distributive burden to foreign subjects. In essence, the new set of rules codified between 1977-79 rewrote the principles governing foreign entry so that every Saudi could become a broker and benefit from the privileged status of his citizenship. (Annex 4) Hereafter, access to the market and foreign participation in wide-ranging commercial activities was conditional to linkage with a local agent. Similarly, the sponsorship system transformed the unregulated labor market into yet another source of external rent, as “well-connected individuals were able to import thousands of laborers at a time without specifying the projects for which they would be employed.”¹⁹⁹ Apart from a few stipulations in the 1969 Labor Law that defined the privileged status of Saudi nationals and promulgated the fair treatment of migrant workers, they had no protection from the various kinds of exploitation arising from complete dependency on locals. (Annex 4) Unsurprisingly, organizations regulating business and immigration (especially the MoI) reaped the main benefits and grew extensive networks of brokers around themselves.²⁰⁰ Despite their universalistic essence, welfare policies, consumer subsidies, sector-oriented projects, state lending, regulation of foreign subjects, ambiguous labor and property rights or even their enforcement, all in a way fundamentally favored rich, influential and well-connected individuals.²⁰¹ In 1982, the leadership still felt confident enough to further expand centralized bureaucratic hierarchies, tighten press control or extricate the BoG from the *Shari’ah* court system under direct authority of the King. (Annex 4) Nonetheless, the *ulema* began to manifest their growing influence too, for instance by disallowing loans and mortgages or disregarding international contracts.²⁰² Until the bust, the combination of rent-seeking opportunities and social segmentation enabled rapid mobility. Historically, this was the last time that ‘great numbers’ of young educated Commoners “were tasked with building new programs and institutions,” and “big new names entered the business arena.”²⁰³

2.4 Disintegration of social contract and the resistance to change (1983-94)

Rather than being a catalyst for change, the bust fortified the *status quo* while undermining social mobility. Despite his relative reform-mindedness, Fahd’s options became significantly limited as oil income fell by 90% during his first five years as King together with much of the state-dependent non-oil economy.²⁰⁴ Since public sector reform necessarily implied breeching the social contract, he concentrated cuts elsewhere and sought alternative sources of revenues. Accordingly, organizational

¹⁹⁸ Niblock and Malik 2007, 240–49

¹⁹⁹ Chaudhry 1997, 155

²⁰⁰ Hertog 2010b, 90

²⁰¹ Chaudhry 1997, 155

²⁰² Hertog 2010b, 127

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 117

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 118

changes in the 1980-90s comprised of details within individual agencies, while their horizontal relationships or power distribution remained intact. Besides the most immediate responses, which revived mild protectionist measures (i.e. limiting arbitration to local courts, the 30% Rule or the reinstated 'Buy Saudi' Regulations), the majority of budget-enhancing decisions shifted the burden towards the private sector. (Annex 4) Between 1983-85, the effective ones mainly emerged as direct fees on bureaucratic paperwork, infrastructure, and international trade, whereas the broader ones such as anti-fraud and labor market regulations generally lacked enforcement, since the systematization of basic procedures (i.e. civil and commercial registers or obligatory bookkeeping) only began.²⁰⁵ By close association, the dismissal of extractive policies during the boom proved to be almost impossible to reverse, which is exemplified by a series of failed legislative attempts to reintroduce taxes. (Annex 4) The last one in 1987 was withdrawn within three days in reaction to pressure of the strengthening business class, lobbying through informal channels and the Chambers of Commerce.²⁰⁶ Similarly, cuts on subsidized utilities, particularly electricity (1984) and water (1985), were rescinded within a year.²⁰⁷ By purposely appointing several Commoner experts to the CoM between 1981-85, Fahd enlarged their overall share by 8% to the detriment of Al-Saud and Other elites. (Annex 2) Remarkably, the acquisition of the MoPMR portfolio in 1986 by the MoP Nazer made him the only ministerial representative of the latter. (Annex 1)

Without disrupting the distributional apparatus, the government successfully halved its expenses by aggressive reductions of capital expenditures. In particular, while capital subsidies between 1985-99 dropped to $\frac{1}{3}$ of their 1970-84 size, non-capital subsidies generally remained the same.²⁰⁸ Therefore, the harshest cuts were concentrated in productive sectors such as industry and agriculture, which saw at least some positive outcomes. Contrarily, the housing and social security expenses plateaued while education and health grew continuously over the 1980s at a pace comparable only to defense which amounted to 42% of total budget by the end of the century.²⁰⁹ Primarily, this resulted from an effort to maintain the social contract by enlarging governmental salaries and consumer subsidies. In a sole attempt to curb these expenditures, the 1985 Resolution curtailed numerous employment benefits, effectively restricting an important instrument of bureaucratic manipulation and mobility as these frequently represented more than the actual wage. (Annex 4) Consequently, the bureaucratic passivity, obstructions, and superfluous business costs spread alongside commercialized *wasta*, facilitated by the ineffectiveness and fiscal weakness of the state, to normalize brokerage in day-to-day transactions while simultaneously restricting its most lucrative benefits to the highest echelons.²¹⁰ By 1985, bankruptcy affected about $\frac{1}{3}$ of Saudi businesses and even up to 80% in Najdi strongholds like Riyadh, where governmental project-spending was historically concentrated.²¹¹ Simultaneously, others left for regional hubs like Beirut or Manama, where they had expanded during the boom. In contrast, the well-established elites prevailed by retracting into their traditional niches such as petrochemicals and finance

²⁰⁵ Chaudhry 1997, 275

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 274

²⁰⁷ Hertog 2010b, 120

²⁰⁸ Qasem 2016, 135–37

²⁰⁹ Hertog 2010b, 121

²¹⁰ Ibid., 111–15

²¹¹ Chaudhry 1997, 273

in the case of princes and their clients, or education and judiciary regarding the *ulema*.²¹² While the former expanded their fiefdoms in close cooperation with SOEs (i.e. SABIC or SAMBA), the latter increasingly struggled to justify their religious conservatism considering its significant opportunity costs.

Vital to the prosperity of business elites was the reform of the financial sector, which stood at the core of state's strategy to expand the distributional hierarchy since the late 1970s. The traditional restrictiveness of the banking sector to large domestic agents firstly forced the newcomers into retail and diversification abroad and, after their boom-related expansion, enabled their Saudization under SAMA's fresh protectionist policies, effectively transferring part of state's distributional responsibilities to its clients.²¹³ Subsequently, the bust-related shortage of services facilitated the growth of informal actors. Although the formalization of the mid-1980s significantly tamed this black market, it virtually centralized the sector in the hands of the few largest banking groups, directly regulated and sanctioned by SAMA under the enhanced Banking Control Regulation. (Annex 4) Eventually, few well-established business families (Al-Rajhi, Mahfouz, Sharbatly, and Al-Kaki) dominated the financial sector, often through co-chairmanship or co-ownership with the royals and their SOEs.²¹⁴ Hence, Najdi elites successfully retained their influence within the CoM and even expand it to control more than ¼ by 1988. (Annex 2) Their symbiotic relationship manifested by rapid accumulation of internal debt over the 1990s. Importantly, legislative adjustments gradually opened these state-business relations to elites from other Gulf countries, extending beyond finance into fields such as real estate or government procurement. (Annex 4)

Meanwhile, tensions between the *ulema* and the state intensified after 1985, when implementing regulations specifying the procedural and jurisdictional organization either limited, bent or even bypassed *Shari'ah* courts, thus strengthening the position of businesses in commercial disputes. (Annex 4) Furthermore, some of their privileged domains such as the establishment of charitable associations and private foundations were bureaucratized and opened to the general public under the King's patronage. (Annex 4) Accordingly, Al-Sheikh's participation in the CoM halved between 1986-90 due to their loss of the MoHE and MoJ, while that of Commoners grew to nearly ⅓ by 1991. (Annex 2) These tendencies were reversed over the course of the Gulf War, as Western military presence, deteriorating economic conditions and failed employment policies provoked popular outrage. In an immediate reaction, enabled by a short peak of oil prices, subsidies were raised to the boom-time levels, whereas the absolute majority of both budget and off-budget spending was allocated to large Najdi businesses, royal elites and key ministries.²¹⁵ Nonetheless, these costly policies drained reserves to a historical low, nearing a mere month of total imports. (Annex 5) While pre-War austerity measures were gradual, targeted and carefully compensated by distribution of reserves, the following abrupt cuts of consumption subsidies and development projects together with imposition of fees on public services had a devastating effect on the whole society. Even prominent contractors suffered financial difficulties, as the government owed \$5 billion in

²¹² Hertog 2010b, 126–27

²¹³ Chaudhry 1997, 234

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 296–97

delayed payments by 1994.²¹⁶ Significantly, Islamic organizations, banks, and businesses, enticed to Najd during the boom to benefit disproportionately from the court's proximity, presently experienced the greatest losses.

Accordingly, they comprised the core of varying opposition groups with causes ranging from anti-Westernization to liberal constitutionalism. Due to the *ulema's* disagreement with demands of the first 'secular' petition published in 1991, the dissent started to split. However, while the *ulema* could leverage their institutionalized relationship with the royals and maneuver popular movements to their advantage, businessmen sought far-reaching changes without having any mechanism besides the debt to impel their claims. In order to contain the pressure and demonstrate his willingness to embark on extensive reforms, the King issued three Orders in 1992. (Annex 4) Although the laws did not separate powers, they codified the existing domains and provided them with basic procedural mechanisms. Altogether, they confirmed the authoritarian nature of the dynastic monarchy and its legitimizing alliance with Al-Sheikh under the constitutional principles of *Shari'ah*. Importantly, the norms of *shura* and *baya* that traditionally consolidated tribal loyalty and kinship were also formalized.²¹⁷ While the executive remained vested in the CoM and the King, the legislative also included the renewed *Majlis al-Shura*. Nonetheless, it was revived in an advisory role with lesser competencies than in the 1920s, lawmaking virtually outlawed by *Shari'ah*, members appointed by the King, and resolutions susceptible to alteration or annulation by his Orders, as he was granted ultimate authority over 'matters of public interest'.²¹⁸ His power was further enhanced by the CoM Law (1993), which emphasized the central importance of the organization under the King's presidency. (Annex 4) Regarding the judiciary, the King and the CoSU were reconfirmed as the only legal interpreters of the Quran, while the absence of checks and balances compromised potential settlement of 'constitutional' disputes against the government. Finally, the pattern of centralized governance was formally replicated across the whole organizational landscape, including the provincial system, with "persisting confusion of jurisdictions."²¹⁹ With hindsight, critics dismissed these laws as "symbolic steps that ultimately changed little."²²⁰

Additionally, the concessions to the *ulema* included the restoration of Grand Mufti as the head of the CoSU, enlarged outreach to Muslims abroad (i.e. MBC), and doubling of Al-Sheikh's share in the CoM to 11,5%. (Annex 2) Soon afterwards, however, their persisting criticism and support for radicals led the regime to curtail their powers in favor of more loyal clergy, further polarizing Islamist movements. Although some were co-opted by posts in organizations supposed to bypass the inconvenient religious interpretations (i.e. the reorganized CoSU or newly established MoIADG, SCIA and CIMG), the role of coercion visibly increased.²²¹ Backed up by pro-regime *fatwas*, the second religious memorandum was oppressed and half of its signatories arrested. By 1995, Al-Sheikh was once again left only with two ministers (MoJ and MoS) after losing both the MoAW and MoMRA. (Annex 1) Otherwise,

²¹⁶ Chaudhry 1997, 297

²¹⁷ Kechichian 2013, 21

²¹⁸ Ibid., 26–27

²¹⁹ Hertog 2010b, 129

²²⁰ Kechichian 2013, 169

²²¹ Ibid., 24–25

post-War laws generally reinforced the weak business regulation to progressively allow for careful competition, a potential source of governmental revenues, domestic productivity, and employment. (Annex 4) Despite the rhetoric, very few (i.e. the Law of Professional Companies) explicitly focused on the development of SMEs and their ineffectual enforcement had to be compensated by pledging rewards for public cooperation (i.e. the Anti-Bribery Law). By 1995, elites of Hejaz and Eastern Province, forced to evolve towards greater self-sufficiency due to royal preference for Najdis, started to equalize their economic significance. Despite their political temperance, they dominated wholesale, banking, and manufacturing, owing 12/17 major trading houses and approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ of the largest overall businesses.²²² Accordingly, this uptrend was clearly reflected within the CoM (Annex 1), as well as the first *Majlis Al-Shura* (1993-97), where the two rival regional groupings had even representation.²²³

3. Adjusting the Neopatrimonial Regime to the Post-oil Era

3.1 Preservation through transformation: enforcing neoliberal reforms to escape institutional change (1995-05)

Relying on elites for financial and ideological legitimacy, Fahd could barely guarantee the continuity of their vested interests in the event of deeper structural changes. His last attempt to restore fiscal balance, before *de facto* stepping aside for health reasons in favor of his brother Abdullah in late 1995, consisted of the biggest CoM reshuffle since 1975. (Figure 4) Although key ministries controlled by Al-Saud remained intact, Elites experienced an ever-higher year-on-year rise (12%) that made them control half of the augmented, 32-member Council (Annex 2), and all Commoners were replaced by new ones. (Annex 1) Alongside the globalizing tendencies and American withdrawal, Abdullah ceased most of the Najd-centered development subsidies and agricultural incentives to maintain current spending growth and allow for unprecedented expenses in human capital, military self-sufficiency, and regional development programs heavily concentrated within Hejaz and Eastern Province.²²⁴ Accordingly, the disagreements between Najdi elites and the new regent resulted in reversal of the former's fortunes in the CoM to the benefit of 'Others', equalizing their shares (25%) for the first time since 1961. (Annex 2) Consequently, a more flexible, competitive and export-oriented business class took over the technocratic posts in an attempt to compensate the sinking per-capita income, severe unemployment, and downgrading absorption of the public sector, while Najdi elites were left with less significant portfolios. (Annex 1)

The Asian crisis renewed fiscal deterioration, and by 1999 government salaries were consuming 92% of oil revenues, hindering growth in capital spending required to kick-start industrialization.²²⁵ Moreover, the bust changed the bureaucracy "from a driver of state-led development to a retarding factor."²²⁶ Although the *ulema*-controlled education and Al-Saud-dominated defense received the largest budgetary

²²² Niblock and Malik 2007, 135–36

²²³ Dekmejian 1994, 640

²²⁴ Chaudhry 1997, 298–99

²²⁵ Hertog 2010b, 124

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 125

shares during this period, the former did not experience any quality-enhancing curricular reform,²²⁷ while the latter, traditionally the worst in terms of transparency, accountability and overspending, continued to face overcentralization, insufficient regulation, and ‘very high’ risk of corruption even two decades later.²²⁸ Regardless of the declared emphasis on non-oil industrial development, FDI inflow, job creation and WTO accession, most of the progress until 2003 centered on restricted industries (mainly petrochemicals), traditionally dominated by SOEs and large businesses.²²⁹ Despite a gradual increase of SMEs since the War, the average number of workers per non-oil industrial unit in 1999 still notably exceeded the Kingdom’s definition of large corporations (>100 employees).²³⁰ Moreover, while receiving 75% of all bank loans, large corporations comprise only 1/5 of total firms, which signals the highest atomization of businesses and, simultaneously, concentration of labor and capital within the MENA region.²³¹

Under severe fiscal conditions, status and connections proved essential. Since royals generally evaded austerity measures, they managed to retain their status and expand business activities into strategic sectors and governorates where project spending remained, broadening the Kingdom’s productive base while entrenching social divisions.²³² Nonetheless, even they succumbed to hierarchic inequalities, as Ibn Saud’s direct descendants controlled 98% of all commercial assets despite representing only half of family members involved.²³³ In exchange for access to economic privileges, the business elite supplied ever-higher public debt (surpassing 100% of GDP by 1999), which enabled uninterrupted distribution and shielding from international pressure. (Figure 5) Contrarily, the underdevelopment of legal and financial structures, ambiguous property rights, poor enforcement, and omnipresent transaction costs discouraged ordinary micro-entrepreneurs from expanding into SMEs and often forced them into informality instead.²³⁴ Eventually, this model failed to materialize in longed-for revenues and required institutional change. The Seventh Plan already expected the private sector to instigate development and assume roles that the state could no longer fulfill, including nearly 3/4 of all investment.²³⁵ In order to diversify revenues and reduce unemployment, the regime initiated a series of regulatory reforms including FDI liberalization, large-scale privatization, Saudization, modernization of the stock market (*Tadawul*), and WTO accession. Since 2002, it also strived to reinforce the property rights by modernizing trademark, patent, copyright, or cadastral registration systems. (Annex 4) By that time, however, most of the market and land was taken over by the commercial elite.

²²⁷ Nolan 2011, 158–62

²²⁸ Transparency International, Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index. <http://government.defenceindex.org/countries/saudi-arabia/> (accessed May 22, 2019).

²²⁹ SIDF, Industrial Development in Saudi Arabia. <https://www.sidf.gov.sa/en/IndustryinSaudiArabia/Pages/IndustrialDevelopmentinSaudiArabia.aspx> (accessed May 22, 2019).

²³⁰ Mazaheri 2016, 136–37

²³¹ Nasr and Pearce 2012, 7


²³² Niblock and Malik 2007, 137

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid., 143–72

²³⁵ Ibid., 183

Figure 5: Evolution of debt accounts in Saudi Arabia (1991-2017)



Source: International Monetary Fund, WB's World Development Indicators, and author's calculations
 Note: Figures for total external debt between 1991-99 rely on Islamic Development Bank aggregates

Underpinning Al-Saud's policy-making influence was the SEC, established in 1999 as a mini-cabinet of ministers to supervise economic change under Abdullah's chairmanship. Following the 1999 reshuffle, Commoners caught up with Najdis and Others to control nearly $\frac{1}{4}$ of the CoM each, while the appeasing allocation of the MoIADG to Al-Sheikh left Al-Saud for the first time with less than 25%. (Annex 2) However, realization fell short of the grand expectations as royals lacked consistency, linkages between numerous vertically oriented agencies were missing, Commoner newcomers lacked authority, and even Western-educated technocrats were "scattered, tied up in institutional hierarchies, and hence not organized as a political force."²³⁶ Accordingly, the greatest achievements occurred under newly-established authorities, chaired by a business-minded royal (SAGIA) or well-respected elite (CMA), as opposed to those of the crosscutting nature, managed by technocratic ministers historically interwoven with the dysfunctional bureaucracy (MoLSA, MoC). In the latter case, overlapping jurisdictions (especially with the MoI), organizational inefficiency, unclear or unrealistic agendas, and low credibility further complicated the sluggish negotiations. Contrarily, privatization lacked a central authority altogether and instead was organized by a bureaucratic inter-ministerial committee under the SEC. Despite years of studies and institutional arrangements, privatization projects were persistently resisted and arguably bore the least fruit, as neither bureaucrats nor businessmen were willing to surrender their fiefs.²³⁷ Similarly, a CoSU's *fatwa* blocked royal attempts to strengthen the rule of law, "rejecting codification of *Shari'ah* as un-Islamic"²³⁸ and allowing formalization of procedural mechanisms only. Being a relatively new domain, *Tadawul's* modernization stands out in terms of progressiveness. However, even such a sector-specific program

²³⁶ Hertog 2010b, 227

²³⁷ Niblock and Malik 2007, 113

²³⁸ Esmaeili 2009, 31

awaited the founding of its core legislation and authority for years due to regulatory disputes with the MoC.²³⁹ Similarly, the extreme length of the 2001 ‘negative list’ of FDI-restricted industries exposed how little ministers on SAGIA’s board (and by proxy their clients) were willing to sacrifice. Despite its unmatched efficiency and royal support, two years of negotiations brought only limited success in terms of economic opening.²⁴⁰ Notably, Abdullah’s encouragement of private consultations failed to materialize into any integrative or at least informative public forum. With a few exceptions, business elite therefore remained a policy-taker, whose disunited lobbying was limited to requests of postponement or flexible enforcement.²⁴¹ Instead, many resorted to individual, informal, and even illegal strategies to cope with bureaucratic demands, further undermining implementation of reforms.

Unlike the 1970s, the second boom saw the protracted reforms accelerate under Abdullah’s renewed pressure, fueled by political unrests, international criticism after 9/11 and, above all, the realization that in a globalized world the existing authoritarian model is fragile and unsustainable.²⁴² From late 2002, he restructured the majority of technocratic portfolios, staffed leading agencies (i.e. the CoM, SAGIA, or CMA) with loyal members of renowned families (i.e. Al-Dabbagh, Al-Gosaibi, Al-Manie or Alireza), and returned the MoMRA to Prince Mutaib who controlled it until the bust, while retiring Fahd’s last reigning clients. (Annex 1) Increasingly, Najdis also restored their position within the CoM under Abdullah’s control. This new trend towards more universal elitization carried on from the resurgence of tribalism over the 1990s, fluidly filling the void between the necessity for self-identification against growing anti-Western sentiment and religious skepticism after 9/11. Its popularization owed to the symbolic contrast between the ‘nomadic autonomy’ and the bust-related public awakening over “complete dependence of the Saudi population on state largesse.”²⁴³ Commanding the National Guard for more than forty years, Abdullah repeatedly glorified Bedouin culture (i.e. by establishing the Al-Jenadriyah festival of tribal heritage) to reinstate the socio-economic importance of genealogical rule. However, patrimonial power-politics and economic scarcity transformed it into an “aggressive hierarchical ordering of the modern social sphere,” compelling hundreds of undistinguished Saudis to buy off well-known historians to elevate their status through falsified genealogies.²⁴⁴ In turn, this provided a platform for wider and more interconnected interest groups, which soon joined multiple petitioners demanding greater voice and consensus. Although suppressed, their demands were appropriated by the King, and in 2003 materialized in the augmented influence of the *Majlis Al-Shura* or state-orchestrated KACND, enabling dialog within the bounds of regime’s discourse. (Annex 4)

Top-down pressure induced significant progress in all areas, including issuance of several long-anticipated regulatory frameworks such as the Capital Markets, Competition and Labor Laws (Annex 4), conditioning governmental support by meeting mandatory Saudization quotas, selective reduction of SAGIA’s ‘negative list’, part-privatization of public services, or adoption of extended WTO

²³⁹ Hertog 2010b, 255

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 156–67

²⁴¹ Ibid., 146–49

²⁴² Niblock and Malik 2007, 175

²⁴³ Samin 2017, 202

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 200

requirements.²⁴⁵ However, despite the positive influence of the WTO accession process on other reforms and its successful climax in 2005, regulation in key areas remained weighted against foreign agents while the general conviction that business can only succeed by circumventing the law actually grew since 2003, according to surveys.²⁴⁶ Besides low monitoring capacity and relaxed implementation, which enabled disregard and evasion, passive resistance to change of the lower-level clientelist bureaucracy and particularly the court system opened a number of channels for exercising privileged influence. Despite its efficiency, much of the FDI that SAGIA subsequently attracted was confined to the ‘segmented clientelist framework’ with the authority “acting as an *ad hoc*, case-by-case broker,” while reserving strategic industries (i.e. retail or wholesale) to large domestic players.²⁴⁷ Likewise, only public agencies in strategic sectors could effectively bypass the system and reach Saudization quotas. Finally, the majority of privatized assets were concentrated in network industries characteristic of high entry barriers and other intricacies of natural monopoly – issues also applicable to the renewed development of mega-projects and industrial cities in cooperation with the largest GCC conglomerates. In conclusion, the lessons demonstrate that with a strong fiscal situation, royal will to enforce change, and loyal bureaucrats to administer it, vested interests quickly align, and repeatedly postponed policies are suddenly implemented. Nevertheless, limited success was only achieved when institutional fragmentation decreased and the implementation process centralized, illustrating the persisting significance of institutionalized patrimonial norms in determining policy outcomes.

3.2 New problems, old solutions: dealing with the challenges of the second boom (2006-14)

Driven by the second boom, both current and capital expenditures grew exponentially and with them the inequalities of the patrimonial system. Accordingly, the Saudi middle-class contracted, displacing its marginal section downwards along the concentration of wealth at the top and unemployment at the bottom.²⁴⁸ A study of national income distribution estimates Saudi Arabia to be among the world’s most unequal countries in 2008 with the bottom 50% as opposed to top 10% and 1% controlling 8%, 62% and 20% respectively.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, the East-West axis dominates other provinces in terms of employment benefits, bureaucratic seniority, developmental expenditures, loans or the strength of businesses in key sectors.²⁵⁰ Accordingly, Abdullah’s post-2005 developmental policies complemented his earlier reforms by centering on secular education, peripheral infrastructure, or judiciary effectiveness. Nonetheless, a series of crises upset the momentum, hindered a systemic approach, reinforced the bargaining position of business elites, and consolidated the dualist nature of the personalized order. In 2006, *Tadawul* collapsed due to excessive state involvement, discretionary practices, insider trading, and other structural deficiencies.²⁵¹ This erased any relative progress together with its tenfold appreciation since 2004 and inflicted huge losses on “hundreds of thousands of

²⁴⁵ Hertog 2010b, 186, 254

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 251

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 144, 155

²⁴⁸ Al-Nuaim 2013, 53–54

²⁴⁹ Alvaredo et al. 2018, 22

²⁵⁰ Hertog 2015, 110–20

²⁵¹ Niblock and Malik 2007, 217–19

unsophisticated local retail investors”²⁵² across the Gulf. In particular, the sharp reversal in the gradually-increasing ratio of smaller-to-larger businesses reveals the fatal consequences for those unable to capitalize on privileged access to information.²⁵³ Immediately, Abdullah announced social security reform, an anti-corruption strategy, and long-awaited judicial restructuring. (Annex 4) For years though, much remained on paper only as hiking oil prices evened out the brief fiscal slump. By contrast, laws legitimizing royal succession (Allegiance Council) or formalizing distributional channels to encourage expansion and popular justification of state involvement with business elite (i.e. Contractor Classification, Government Procurement, or Anti-Commercial Fraud Laws) quickly came into force. (Annex 4) Eventually, *Tadawul* became a government-owned joint stock company with adjudication over all related disputes exempted from the court system and entrusted to the CMA, accountable directly to the King.

Secondly, the 2009 crisis presented the regime with a harsher challenge, as it primarily affected finance and overseas investments, paralyzing credit markets and private sector growth. Despite the formal improvements of credit market regulation (Annex 4) captured by multiple international indicators (Annex 6), several large conglomerates went bankrupt due to rampant ‘name lending’ (i.e. Saad or Al-Gosaibi Groups), and banks renewed their calls for accountable family-business management.²⁵⁴ Nonetheless, the crisis brought little change in this respect. Except for deeper penetration of the credit market by commercial banks, three of which now concentrated half of the total assets and deposits, the IMF found the banking system in 2010 identical to that of the 1980s.²⁵⁵ Instead, elites employed temporary counter-cyclical, capital-intensive measures inspired by lessons of the volatile decades and span the economic downturn in their favor. Furthermore, the state partnered with large businesses to diversify its assets abroad and cushion the impact of future global crises in first careful internationalization projects such as food security under the KAISAIA and SCAIAP.²⁵⁶ Although the allocation trend of this period was to deepen business dependency on current expenditures and government-infused private demand, the government still surpassed the private sector in non-oil gross capital formation for the first time in two decades.²⁵⁷

Besides assuring their financial centrality, elites also strengthened the political one. Following the 2009 reshuffle, Al-Saud’s control over the CoM reached a 30-year high (33%), as the King proclaimed a junior prince MoE and two of his own sons MoS. (Annex 2) Meanwhile, newcomer Elites (i.e. Alireza, Al-Issa or Fakeih) restored their joint shares to 50%, replacing Commoners or economically discredited tycoons such as Al-Gosaibi. Contrarily, conservative clerics critical of the regime, including feared leaders of the SJC (Al-Luhaydan) and CPVPV (Al-Ghaith), were systematically substituted for docile servants such as Al-Humayn under the pretext of obstructed liberalization.²⁵⁸ Most significantly, MoJ Al-Sheikh was dismissed and his fraction reduced to mere 3% of the CoM, unparalleled since the 1950s. (Annex 2)

²⁵² Hertog 2012, 5

²⁵³ Mazaheri 2016, 136

²⁵⁴ Hertog 2012, 8

²⁵⁵ Banafe and Macleod 2017, 153

²⁵⁶ Woertz 2013, 196–226


²⁵⁷ Hertog 2016a, 83–84

²⁵⁸ Kechichian 2013, 59–60

Finally, Abdullah limited issuance of *fatwas* to approved scholars of the reorganized CoSU, opened its membership to representatives of all schools of Sunni jurisprudence (Annex 4), and invested heavily in training qualified cadres that would support his reformist ideas.²⁵⁹ This unprecedented intervention followed difficulties in implementing the 2007 Judiciary law, which promised to augment the independence of the judicial system, consolidate its dualist nature, and promote higher certainty and efficiency in commercial or administrative matters by enlarging the jurisdiction of the BoG.²⁶⁰ Nonetheless, gradual degradation of religious-legal institutions (i.e. the CoSU or Grand Mufti) and their staffing with scholars willing to compromise on Islamic principles, met with universal clerical disapproval.²⁶¹ Consequently, Abdullah’s success in ‘humanizing the law’ was only partial, restricted to the highest levels, while the overall system remained virtually unchanged and open to brokerage.

For similar reasons, liberalization of education was limited to mild clientelist privatization and peripheral institution building. Even dramatic steps of 2009 such as the appointment of the first female deputy MoE, inauguration of the KAUST or firing cleric Al-Shathri for criticism of its gender-mixing policy, only happened when the incumbents’ economic stakes were endangered.²⁶² Therefore, the overall qualitative impact was marginal and short-term, which is illustrated by the underperformance of young Saudis in international studies of mathematics, science and literacy at the end of Abdullah’s rule. (Figure 6)

Figure 6: Educational achievements of Saudi boys (left) and girls (right) of 4th and 8th grades in international comparison (2003-16)



Source: TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement)

Although the education budget proportionally surpassed much of the developed world, only few African countries report worse results. Moreover, much of the short-term success owes to the increased participation of women who steadily evince significantly higher achievements, as incentives for merit among boys are evidently lacking. Unfortunately, the effects on inequality were modest as the unemployment

²⁵⁹ Kechichian 2013, 20


²⁶⁰ Abdullah F. Ansary, “Saudi Judicial Reform and the Principle of Independence,” *Carnegie Endowment*, May 5, 2009, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/23059>.

²⁶¹ Kechichian 2013, 217

²⁶² Nolan 2011, 183–86

gender gap continued expanding despite no significant change in the workforce ratio. (Figure 7)

Figure 7: Unemployment gender gap in Saudi Arabia (modeled ILO estimate)



Source: International Labour Organization (ILOSTAT database) and World Bank population estimates

Such deficiencies also impaired the ease and equal opportunity of doing business. Although SAGIA’s calculated initiative of formally adjusting selected rules to improve the Kingdom’s standing in the globally-renowned World Bank index succeeded in attracting FDI, ordinary entrepreneurs in reality suffered from injustice and obstruction.²⁶³ In multiple MENA countries, these unheeded issues triggered the 2011 uprisings. However, due to the deep-seated neopatrimonial regime and its ever-higher ability to guarantee stable benefits, this crisis had only peripheral manifestations and negligible fiscal consequences, as violence-fueled oil prices facilitated large surpluses and attracted regional investors to the Gulf.²⁶⁴ Besides the intervention in Bahrain, which simultaneously intimidated Saudi dissenters, the regime chose conventional responses, reversing much of the cautious market-oriented progress attained since the bust. These clustered around a \$130-billion-worth package of welfare benefits (23% of 2011 GDP), which included 300,000 new governmental jobs, large-scale housing program or *Hafiz* system of unemployment bonuses nearing 150% of the average private sector wage.²⁶⁵ Furthermore, the *Nitaqat* quota system began indirectly jeopardizing productivity and cost-efficiency of businesses by effectively forcing them to employ unmotivated and unskilled nationals at a newly-set minimal wage. (Annex 4) Meanwhile, conspicuous provincial tours promoting royal visions of local economic cities anticipated peripheral development.²⁶⁶ Paradoxically,

²⁶³ Hertog 2010b, 176–78

²⁶⁴ Hertog 2012, 7


²⁶⁵ Hertog 2016a, 80–81

²⁶⁶ Hertog 2015, 112

young Saudis required the regime with one of the highest approvals among MENA countries, despite being those most disadvantaged by the allocation state.²⁶⁷

Nevertheless, cautious pro-business policies such as the 2012 housing finance and arbitration laws or the 2013 reform of procedural regulations failed to outweigh the uncertainty created by Decrees suppressing transparency and public critique (Annex 4), undermining FDI inflows between 2008-14 by 80%. (Figure 8)

Figure 8: Foreign direct investment in Saudi Arabia, net inflows



Source: International Monetary Fund (International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases), World Bank (International Debt Statistics), and OECD (GDP estimates).

Consequently, economic familism restored its prominence as the informal source of guarantees and trust. In 2013, “up to 90% of all companies in Saudi Arabia are family owned” (generating approx. ¼ of GDP) while the hundred largest of them controlled the majority of trade agencies and franchises, letting “very few big newcomers” emerge since the 1980s.²⁶⁸ Until then, changes in the CoM were limited to individual technocrats, insignificant swaps within factions, and quick ascendance of Prince Salman to power after Sultan and Nayef deceased successively between 2011-12. Decrees elevating the National Guard under Abdullah’s son Mutaib II to full ministerial status equal to Salman’s MoD or attempting to ensure succession of Prince Muqrin, indicated growing intra-family rivalry. (Annex 4) By late 2014, the allocation state reached its historical maxima with current expenditures three times and capital five times higher than a decade ago, depending from 88% on oil revenues. (Annex 5) Nevertheless, the next year brought a radical change as the average annual OPEC crude oil price dropped to less than half of the fiscal breakeven.


²⁶⁷ Hertog 2016a, 70, 77–80

²⁶⁸ Mazaheri 2016, 139

3.3 Institutional change at last? Economic stabilization, political consolidation and concentration of power (2015-18)

Since the difficulties were deemed temporary, the first adjustments of 2015 imposed the burden on business elite, slashing capital expenditures by 42% and delaying contractual payments. (Figure 9) Contrarily, the current spending decreased by 4% only, bolstered by generous consumption-stimulating packages and the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen. While revenues shrank by half, government consumption relative to GDP became globally unparalleled, with 60% comprised of public salaries and allowances alone.²⁶⁹ In 2016, the gap between current and capital expenditures further widened, despite rising international debt, diminishing reserves and foreign assets. (Annex 5)

Figure 9: Current and capital expenditures in Saudi Arabia



Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (Annual Statistics 2017), author's calculations

Regarding the CoM, the crisis initiated the longest-ever period of instability, with substantial changes comparable to those of 2003 occurring annually for five consecutive years. (Figure 4) Once Commoners had assumed the first portfolios and began to prepare tentative technocratic measures including judicial codifications (Annex 4), Abdullah's death in early 2015 left the regime in chaos and open for takeover by Salman's faction. Subsequently, nearly all ministers were replaced at least once in the most extensive annual reshuffles since the Saud-Faisal rivalry. (Annex 1) With all veto players gone, Salman exploited the unprecedented autonomy to break free from the traditional consensus, increasingly targeting Abdullah's allies and other family branches at the highest executive posts. A Decree abolished twelve supreme councils and compressed their powers into the CPSA and CEDA presided by MoI Muhammad bin Nayef (MbN) and new MoD Muhammad bin Salman (MbS),

²⁶⁹ Hertog 2018, 73, 85

demonstratively separating technocratic matters from politics. (Annex 4) Soon, Crown Prince Muqrin lost his recently-acquired status to MbN while MbS began to concentrate power, becoming the DCP, SDPM and chief of the expanded royal court. Significantly, the previous trend of decentralizing power among multiple technocratic portfolios was interrupted by integration of ten key ones into several large fiefs under influential, carefully selected supervisors (MoE, MoLSD, MoEIMR, MoEWA). For instance, the new MoEIMR Al-Faleh, who simultaneously controlled leading positions at the SIDF, MODON, PIF Board, and Aramco, played “a major role in channeling wealth to the large Saudi business groups, and, in this sense, directly [mediated] the relationship between state and private capital.”²⁷⁰

After the leadership realized the severity of crisis, it initiated society-wide austerity measures, including 25% budget cuts, strict spending controls or gradual rise in taxes and utility tariffs to decelerate the rapid burn rate on reserves.²⁷¹ This climaxed in Vision 2030 and its accompanying programs, which prioritized development in traditionally vulnerable areas, including youth, women, or small business owners. Primarily, the campaign hoped to attract foreign investors, diversify state revenues, and cultivate the private sector in order to enlarge its distributional burden.²⁷² Significantly, the reassessment of ideological foundations was evident from individual institutional concessions both before and after the Vision’s adoption. Between 2015-16, the King decreed stronger protection of entrepreneurs and their employees, taxed large landowners, and legally enshrined civil associations and foundations. (Annex 4) Furthermore, he significantly restricted executive powers of the CPVPV, staffed the CoSU with moderate clerics, and fundamentally transformed the entertainment sector by endorsing cinemas, international concerts and mixed gender public events. Several Commoner experts replaced Al-Saud and Elites, even in posts historically exclusive to prominent figures such as the MoFA. (Annex 1) Intensifying restrictions on immigrant workers made hundreds of thousands leave, aggravating the situation of large business groups dependent on cheap labor (i.e. Bin Laden or Saudi Oger).²⁷³ Eventually, a Decree suddenly broadcasted on a state-owned television annulled much of public sector allowances, bonuses and financial benefits in cuts roughly amounting to 20% of salaries.²⁷⁴ Although these policies tempered fiscal deterioration, they undermined consumer confidence, non-oil private sector growth (only 0,1% in 2016) and per-capita income, while triggering capital flight. Moreover, the stark contrast with virtually untouched allowances of royals and their lavish spending raised social criticism.²⁷⁵ Occasionally, this resulted in withdrawal of the policy and resignation of the responsible authority (i.e. unpopular water tariffs). In general, however, it was contained by a combination of nationalism and state capitalism as a counterweight to the present regional insecurity, painting the regime as the protector of integrity, technocratic champion of efficient, transparent and

²⁷⁰ Hanieh 2018, 211–12

²⁷¹ Peter Waldman, “The \$2 Trillion Project to Get Saudi Arabia’s Economy Off Oil,” *Bloomberg*, April 21, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-04-21/the-2-trillion-project-to-get-saudi-arabia-s-economy-off-oil>.

²⁷² See Kinninmont 2017 for detailed analysis.

²⁷³ Hanieh 2018, 221–22

²⁷⁴ Hertog 2018, 90

²⁷⁵ Nicholas Kulish and Mark Mazzetti, "Saudi Royal Family Is Still Spending in an Age of Austerity," *New York Times*, December 27, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/world/middleeast/saudi-royal-family-money.html>.

uncorrupted economic development, or promoter of moderate Islam and social modernization.

Once oil prices started to recover alongside rapidly growing non-oil revenues, the trend of society-wide liberalization and cautious budgeting was substituted for ever-higher centralization of power, aggressive fragmentation of potential opposition and occasional bursts of liberal populism. In a classic pro-cyclical manner, austerity measures contained in the Fiscal Balance Program were reversed in April 2017 after public outcry and impact reassessment.²⁷⁶ Moreover, public employees were retroactively refunded in June following a controversial royal decision to deprive MbN of all functions in favor of his younger inexperienced cousin (MoI) and MbS (Crown Prince and CPSA chairman), place him under house arrest, and overhaul his security forces.²⁷⁷ The position of DCP (SDPM) remains vacant until nowadays. Contrasting with the open debate around Vision 2030, the following crackdown on dissent targeted every source of criticism or even insufficiently expressed support.²⁷⁸ Online influencers were dubbed as radicals and jailed for voicing disapproval of policies such as Aramco privatization, antagonism towards Qatar or socio-religious matters. Notably, detainees ranged from respected Wahhabi clerics condemning ties with Israel (Al-Hawali) and mixed gathering (Al-Talib), to constitutionalists praising Arab uprisings (Al-Odah) or even legal defenders questioning arbitrariness and brutality of these arrests (Al-Mudaimeegh, Al-Nukheifi, Al-Fawzan).²⁷⁹ While the leadership progressively extended women's rights and freedoms (i.e. the Traffic Act), female activism was also harshly repressed. Frequently the accusations lacked substantial basis and appealed to the ambiguous Anti-Terror Law (amended in November 2017), which provided MbS with even broader and more convenient law enforcement via restructured, subordinate agencies (i.e. the PSS), carving away extensive powers from the MoI.²⁸⁰

Another crucial agenda appealing to Saudi youth was the anti-corruption campaign under the SAC (chaired by MbS), established in November 2017 outside the regular institutional framework. Hundreds of prominent individuals including princes, technocrats and businessmen were detained at the Ritz-Carlton in Riyadh until they pledged loyalty and financial settlements for their alleged crimes. Those who cooperated like Gen. Huwairini and MoF Assaf were later reintroduced to the highest ranks (the PSS and MoFA respectively). Recently, the investigations ended recovering assets worth \$106 billion.²⁸¹ While repressing dissent made clear that opposition to royal decisions won't be tolerated, the Ritz-Carlton affair represented a loud message to the numerous royals and their clients that "the old, consensus-based order and previous power-sharing arrangements amongst the various branches of the ruling family is effectively over," and certainty is only guaranteed by loyalty to the

²⁷⁶ Hertog 2018, 91

²⁷⁷ Hanieh 2018, 223

²⁷⁸ U.S. Department of State 2018

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ David Kirkpatrick, "Saudis End Purge That Began With Hundreds Locked in the Ritz-Carlton," *New York Times*, January 31, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-corruption-purge.html>.

new leadership.²⁸² Several other purges followed in 2018, deliberately targeting selected groups such as judges or military officers. Indeed, anti-corruption and anti-terrorist legislations were abused even during preceding era, but in a far more isolated and discreet manner.

A closer look at the series of events reveals a pattern of targeting Abdullah's relatives and clients while reinstating those he previously dismissed, including the aforementioned clerics Al-Shathri and Al-Luhaydan, but most significantly members of the Al-Sheikh clan, who reestablished themselves under MbS. In exchange, they pledged to support his 'return to moderate Islam' and frequently issued *fatwas* praising the legitimate ruler and warning against disobedience.²⁸³ Similarly, tribal leaders were repeatedly forced to prove their allegiance in intra-Gulf political games despite marginalizing their consensus-oriented principles.²⁸⁴ Most indicative of this trend, however, was the change in treatment of the traditional business families; exemplary is the case of Bin Laden, who greatly profited from Abdullah's favor throughout his rule. Afterwards, the slowdown in government spending forced construction tycoons to diversify into the state-promoted PPP markets – a highly complex, strategic and intimate cooperation – despite the severe risks posed by their inadequate regulatory environment.²⁸⁵ Since Bin Laden resisted pressure to release their shares in the state-controlled *Tadawul*, MbS systematically undermined their business conditions and public image. According to a detailed investigation, their members were among those held the longest at the Ritz-Carlton and “eventually transferred their combined 36,2% stake in the family firm to the state.”²⁸⁶

These political actions helped to consolidate the leadership, popular support and immediate fiscal needs, but simultaneously imposed high economic costs in exchange for little short-term gain. Significantly, recent centralization of areas key for private sector development under multiple agencies staffed by MbS's close associates (i.e. NDF, NCP, SMEA or GEA) resembles mistakes of earlier reforms. Although 2018 saw commercial legislation adopt certain international standards (Annex 4), the uncertainty among businesses intensified capital flight.²⁸⁷ This trend escalated especially after the frightening events of Khashoggi's homicide. In contrary to the first bust however, the regime could rely on comfortable reserves inherited from

²⁸² Adel Ghafar, “Muhammed bin Salman and the Push to Establish a New Saudi Political Order,” *Brookings*, November 9, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/11/09/muhammed-bin-salman-and-the-push-to-establish-a-new-saudi-political-order/>.

²⁸³ Abdullah Alaoudh, “State-Sponsored Fatwas in Saudi Arabia,” *Carnegie Endowment*, April 3, 2018, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75971>.

²⁸⁴ Madawi Al-Rasheed, “Xenophobia, tribalism and imagined enemies,” *Middle East Eye*, September 5, 2018, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/xenophobia-tribalism-and-imagined-enemies-mohammed-bin-salmans-brand-saudi-nationalism>.

²⁸⁵ Biygautane et al. 2018, 341-43

²⁸⁶ Katie Paul et al., “Special Report: As a Saudi Prince Rose, the Bin Laden Business Empire Crumbled,” *Reuters*, September 27, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-binladin-fall-special-report/special-report-as-a-saudi-prince-rose-the-bin-laden-business-empire-crumbled-idUSKCN1M714W>.

²⁸⁷ Karen Young, “Saudi Arabia's Problem Isn't the Canada Fight, It's Capital Flight,” *Bloomberg*, August 17, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-17/saudi-arabia-s-problem-not-the-canada-fight-but-capital-flight>.

Abdullah's era (Figure 2), large blue-chip assets in stable economies,²⁸⁸ revenues from invigorated non-oil sectors such as tourism, networks of global enablers,²⁸⁹ and an external debt significantly exceeding the public one. (Figure 5) This diversification of income decreased reliance on elites and enabled transformation of the traditionally dualist market into a more coherent system freed from virtually any informal checks and balances. Altogether, complete dependence on royal goodwill seems to be the price for economic stabilization.

3.4 Towards the New Saudi Order: uncertainty and inequality in the globalized neopatrimonial autocracy


Following the latest set of Decrees from 27th December 2018, Al-Saud holds nearly ¼ of the 38-member Council, despite the vacant SDPM and marginalized 'Sudairi' factions beyond Salman. (Annex 1) Appointments like that of the 32-years old, untrained, and inexperienced Prince Bandar to the MoNG suggest prioritization of politics over expertise.²⁹⁰ Furthermore, the predominantly younger, loyal and moderate Al-Sheikh control the largest ministerial share since 1993 (Annex 2) besides influential positions such as Grand Mufti or *Majlis Al-Shura* chairman. By contrast, Najdi elites lost half of their portfolios since 2013 and govern the lowest share in 50 years (16%), equal in size to that of Others. Although Commoners reached an all-time high (34%), they are fragmented and easily controlled as they (yet) lack the social status or networks of traditional families and only serve two years on average. Nonetheless, many emanated from an extensive corporate background, closely linked to the current leadership (i.e. MoM Al-Shabana, MoEWA Al-Fadhli, MoEIMR Al-Faleh, MoHo Al-Hogail, MoF Al-Jadaan or MoS Al-Mubarak). Crucially, these changes reflected the structure and composition of the CEDA and CPSA relative to their establishment in 2015. While the former was founded as a domain of MbS staffed with technocrats and increasingly his clients, the CPSA was originally intended to isolate the royal agendas from critically debated affairs of economic development. Currently, MbS chairs both without any significant competitors, introducing a new pattern of stronger royal control with fewer Al-Saud ministers. (Figure 10)

²⁸⁸ Karen Young, "After Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia's economic future is uncertain," *Washington Post*, October 23, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/23/after-khashoggi-saudi-arabias-economic-future-is-uncertain/>.

²⁸⁹ Nesrine Malik, "The Saudi Regime Doesn't Reign Alone – a Global Network Enables It," *Guardian*, October 25, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/25/saudi-regime-mohammed-bin-salman-global-network-enablers>.

²⁹⁰ Tamara C. Wittes and Bruce Riedel, "Shuffling the deck chairs in Saudi Arabia," *Brookings*, December 28, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/28/shuffling-the-deck-chairs-in-saudi-arabia/>.

Figure 10: Structure and composition of the CEDA & CPSA (2015/2018)



Source: Annex 1; the Saudi Official Gazette (*Umm al-Qura*) and the Saudi Press Agency (multiple issues); author's calculations.

Consequently, the ideas outlined in Vision 2030 are increasingly forced out by a reality where few highly-diversified conglomerates controlled by a handful of prominent families (i.e. Olayan, Alireza, Al-Rajhi, Al-Zamil, Al-Gosaibi, or Al-Rashed) and closely interlaced with reorganized state institutions via shareholdings, joint ventures or board of directors, dominate core circuits of accumulation.²⁹¹ Similar dynamics apply to agribusiness, where the recent food security strategy enabled expansion of large family groups (i.e. Al-Moudi, Bin Laden, Kamel, Al-Muhaidib, Al-Muhanna, Al-Issa, Fayeze or Al-Rabiah) “across the whole agro-commodity circuit, including the provision of agricultural inputs, storage, processing, trade and logistics.”²⁹² Cemented by the Gulf’s internationalized banking sector, which by 2014 controlled 70% of Arab banks’ total profits (from 57% in 2007/8),²⁹³ these circuits

²⁹¹ Hanieh 2018, 110

²⁹² Ibid., 115

²⁹³ Ibid., 196–98

accelerate cross-border accumulation, integration, and expansion of the GCC capital into the wider region. In global terms, the “Saudi-UAE axis now holds the fourth largest number of billionaires.”²⁹⁴ Under the pretext of sustainability and efficiency of public services, virtually all the substantial privatization and PPP projects since 2015 were allocated to the largest Gulf conglomerates, enabling them to infiltrate traditionally restricted sectors and endure the crisis.²⁹⁵ The mild decline (-2%) in profits of the ‘Top 10%’ of publicly listed Saudi companies in 2015/16 and their extraordinary expansion (55%) in 2016/17 stood in stark contrast to the ‘Bottom 90%’ (-18% and 1% respectively), enlarging the former’s share in total market capitalization from 66% to 70% between 2013-16.²⁹⁶

Meanwhile, ordinary and socially disadvantaged residents disproportionately suffer the side effects of neopatrimonial politics. The official unemployment rate for nationals in early 2018 was the highest since 1999, with values for both the total (12,9%) and youth between 15-24 (44,5%) significantly below set targets.²⁹⁷ Furthermore, Saudis compare unfavorably with high-income countries or even GCC peers regarding both saving and borrowing through official channels and more often rely on personal relations instead despite high account concentration. (Figure 11)

Figure 11: Saudi finance market statistic (2011-17), disaggregated and internationally compared

		Overall						Gender		Age		Education		Income	
		Saudi Arabia	High Income C.	World	Bahrain	Kuwait	UAE	Male	Female	15-24	25+	Primary or Less	Secondary or More	Poorest 40%	Richest 60%
Financial institution account (% age 15+)	2011	46%	88%	51%	65%	87%	60%	73%	15%	27%	57%	39%	50%	33%	55%
	2014	69%	93%	61%	82%	73%	83%	75%	61%	65%	71%	64%	71%	65%	73%
	2017	72%	94%	67%	83%	80%	87%	81%	58%	54%	76%	65%	73%	65%	76%
Saved at a financial institution in the past year (% age 15+)	2011	17%	44%	22%	16%	40%	19%	27%	6%	12%	20%	11%	20%	11%	21%
	2014	16%	50%	27%	35%	26%	32%	20%	9%	16%	15%	5%	19%	8%	21%
	2017	14%	55%	27%	31%	27%	29%	18%	9%	11%	15%	5%	16%	10%	17%
Saved any money in the past year (% age 15+)	2011	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2014	45%	70%	56%	65%	62%	67%	52%	36%	52%	43%	23%	52%	36%	53%
	2017	44%	71%	48%	55%	47%	57%	47%	41%	53%	42%	18%	48%	35%	50%
Saved for old age in the past year (% age 15+)	2011	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2014	9%	38%	24%	25%	18%	25%	12%	5%	7%	10%	5%	10%	6%	11%
	2017	13%	44%	21%	23%	16%	24%	15%	10%	7%	14%	9%	13%	10%	14%
Borrowed from a financial institution or used a credit card in the past year (% age 15+)	2011	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2014	17%	52%	22%	39%	30%	39%	24%	8%	11%	19%	12%	19%	12%	21%
	2017	21%	55%	23%	36%	28%	46%	28%	10%	13%	23%	14%	22%	18%	23%
Borrowed from family or friends in the past year (% age 15+)	2011	26%	12%	23%	21%	18%	24%	25%	28%	23%	28%	25%	27%	26%	26%
	2014	37%	15%	26%	36%	30%	29%	38%	36%	39%	37%	43%	35%	42%	34%
	2017	33%	13%	26%	33%	21%	26%	35%	32%	36%	33%	30%	34%	39%	30%
Borrowed any money in the past year (% age 15+)	2011	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2014	56%	64%	50%	68%	64%	64%	65%	45%	55%	57%	52%	58%	59%	55%
	2017	54%	64%	47%	60%	46%	64%	59%	47%	57%	54%	48%	55%	58%	52%
Coming up with emergency funds: not possible (% age 15+)	2011	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2014	48%	28%	37%	39%	43%	31%	44%	55%	45%	50%	66%	42%	60%	39%
	2017	51%	25%	42%	43%	54%	46%	48%	56%	44%	53%	74%	48%	64%	43%
Main source of emergency funds: family or friends (% able to raise funds, age 15+)	2011	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2014	39%	16%	30%	32%	32%	31%	27%	61%	51%	35%	70%	34%	43%	37%
	2017	37%	15%	28%	35%	39%	25%	25%	59%	62%	30%	53%	36%	42%	36%

Source: World Bank (The Global Findex Database 2017)

For half, coming up with emergency funds would be impossible. Across all measurements, richer, older and better-educated males are significantly better off.

²⁹⁴ Hanieh 2018, 233

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 217

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 231

²⁹⁷ GaStat. “Unemployment rate.” <https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/820> (accessed May 22, 2019).

Contributing are the prevailing disincentives in getting credit, starting a business or resolving insolvency, as the “difficult regulatory and bureaucratic environment has changed little since 2014 according to local lawyers and businessmen.”²⁹⁸ Alongside ‘restrictive labor regulations’ and ‘inadequately educated workforce’, ‘access to finance’ repeatedly represents the top business obstacle according to the Executive Opinion Survey.²⁹⁹ Other selected indicators reflecting governance, economic freedom or business dynamism, which historically had the most negative impact on Saudi ranking in composite indexes and were frequently prioritized by recent developmental plans, have either stagnated or, after initial improvements between 2004-11, deteriorated. (Annex 6) In particular, the worst results relate to cross-border transactions (especially high-value exports and FDI inflows), accountability and civil society, while promising exceptions of recent progress include contract enforcement or R&D expenditures. On the provincial level, economic cities admittedly failed to balance inter-regional inequalities while over-centralization, overlapping jurisdictions and rent-seeking continue to inflict large costs in terms of both lives and property, exemplified by the case of the annual Jeddah floods.³⁰⁰

Finally, the ever-higher concentration of power and capital is accompanied by increasingly restricted social mobility. Unlike the revolutionary 1950-60s, decades of institutionalized dependence left the current generation of Saudis with no realistic ideological alternative and ‘wide-spread fatalism’.³⁰¹ In light of the Khashoggi affair and a 30% decrease in oil prices since then, the ever-higher budget with intensified government spending³⁰² and FDI-inducive decisions (Annex 4) foreshadow a trend of its further deepening. Over time, these mechanisms transformed beyond recognition and repeatedly backfired to unexpectedly endanger their masters’ stability. Nevertheless, the patrimonial foundations of the Saudi order seem to function too well to be abandoned any time soon.

Conclusion

This thesis explored over a century of institutional development in Saudi Arabia and identified three fundamental stages of social change. Firstly, it emphasized the essential role of patrimonial norms for pre-state communities with historically or geographically determined concentrations of resources, opportunities, power and their centralized redistribution, as well as the interest of social elites on embedding them into the formal governance structures. Significantly, it distinguished the spontaneous bottom-up origins of commonly respected customs of social organization from their authoritative, ideologically legitimized practice by Ibn Saud following his subjugation and co-option of traditional elites. Due to the pre-oil material shortage, the treasury continued to depend heavily on their strategic balancing and alternative means of favoritism (i.e. institutional and organizational) began to occur more frequently

²⁹⁸ Hertog 2018, 92

²⁹⁹ World Economic Forum. *Global Competitiveness Index*, multiple years. <https://www.weforum.org/>.

³⁰⁰ Hadi Fathallah, “Failure of Regional Governance in Saudi Arabia,” *Carnegie Endowment*, July 26, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/76928?fbclid=IwAR0Sg60JrGfEaib_mGVEjaD4-pnOfp-UGwSyzkDvzzNWzuZRLDf3hYgaFJM.

³⁰¹ Hertog 2018, 94


³⁰² Marwa Rashad and Stephen Kalin, “Saudi 2019 Budget Boosts Spending in Bid to Spur Sluggish Economy,” *Reuters*, December 18, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-budget/saudi-2019-budget-boosts-spending-in-bid-to-spur-sluggish-economy-idUSKBN1OH14M>.

throughout the 1930-1940s. This is especially apparent in the case of merchants, whose capital slowly replaced the financial role of tribes and *ulema*. Contrarily, the defeat of Ikhwan and forced sedentarization of Bedouin communities for the purpose of abandoning pastoral mode of production reflect the traditional readiness to employ strategic repression if the royal interests were directly threatened. Therefore, primary state-building was defined by the personal interests of the dominant agents and largely independent of the wider population. Eventually, the emergence of oil rentierism after WW2 enabled rapid enlargement of the privileged caste, but also necessitated advanced institutional and organizational development.

Subsequently, Chapter Two described the formalization and society-wide expansion of the clientelist hierarchy through centralized distribution in response to elite rivalries and popular movements of the 1950-60s, uncovering several state-capitalist strategies of ‘neopatrimonial’ resilience in the process. Besides the welfare policies, the regime infiltrated the private sector through concentrated project spending, deepened its reliance on foreign labor for expertise and productivity, legitimized seizure of key industries and lands by a few large conglomerates, or developed isolated technocratic ‘pockets’ of administrative excellence to compensate for inefficiency of the overall system and attract foreign capital. Significantly, it slowly introduced this duality into the judicial system by initiating the extraction of commercial, labor and administrative jurisdictions from the influence of the *Shari’ah* courts. Nonetheless, the following fiscal strain increasingly revealed the unsustainability of uncoordinated institutional and bureaucratic layering outside oil surplus, and in the late 1990s necessitated structural changes. Accordingly, Chapter Three traced the royal attempt to streamline the regulatory capacities, incentivize neoliberal principles, and capitalize on the benefits of globalization. However, the rigid, vertically oriented public sector, with strong vested interests in the *status quo*, curtailed the success of reforms and consequently intensified developmental challenges amidst the second oil boom. Despite several manifestations of the systemic vulnerabilities, their comprehensive resolution was only triggered by the paralysis of government revenues and threat of insolvency following the second bust. While the introduction of Vision 2030 and extensive austerity measures foreshadowed society-wide transformation, the recovering oil prices together with strategically diversified sources of external income and immense reserves soon allowed the leadership to divert it towards stronger centralization, repression and misuse of institutions for personal interests.

Altogether, the data reveal several recurrent patterns of authoritarian learning and resilience. While the strategies evolved considerably since Ibn Saud, maintaining the hierarchic social organization remained the primary concern of every succeeding monarch. Furthermore, the nature of the social contract compelled them to sustain the centralized, proportional redistribution of income, external to the majority of subjects. Despite persistent fragmentation of the business elite, their expanding numbers after WW2 led to more frequent reliance on nonmaterial co-optation. Both the analyses of the CoM’s composition (Annex 1-3) and legislative documents (Annex 4) evidence the central role of key bureaucratic posts and institutional concessions in assuring their allegiance. Figure 12 illustrates the correlation between the former and fiscal balance.

Figure 12: Composition of the CoM relative to fiscal balance (1953-2018)



Source: Annex 2, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (Annual Statistics 2017), and author's calculations
 Note: Fiscal data between 1962-68 are based on Niblock and Malik, 2007: 39-43

As the CoM grew and specialized, the ministerial dominance of Al-Saud gradually declined from $\frac{3}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ of portfolios between 1953-2018, remarkably averaging 34%. (Annex 2) However, their power is not necessarily determined by the amount of ministries but rather the strength, unity, popularity, and royal backing of insubordinate notables, as the contrast between intra-family rivalries of the 1950s and unconstrained absolutist governance of the post-2014 period evinced. Contrarily, Commoners expanded from 9 to 34% over the span of 66 years as bureaucratic machinery increasingly required expertise besides loyalty. Similar to Al-Sheikh, whose CoM record moreover shows higher responsiveness to historical turning points, their peaks tend to concentrate in the bust periods as technocratic solutions to undermined income were frequently backed by ideological legitimization. Notably, the engagement of conservative *ulema* within administrative agencies and legal developments in their traditional domains often pursued their bureaucratization and weakening influence on decision-making. Finally, Elites experienced their strongest ministerial representation during the booms, with the significant exception of the period between 1995-2004, when the state owed them hundreds of billions in public debt. On average, Najdi elites exceed those of other regions by more than $\frac{1}{3}$.

Simultaneously, it seems that the late phases of fiscal strains empowered them not only in terms of greater competitiveness, as they were temporarily deprived of multiple clientelist privileges, but more importantly of the business environment. In fact, the greatest institutional achievements regarding socio-economic development almost exclusively followed fiscal deterioration. Similarly, the empowerment of security forces or *ulema* often occurred alongside strategic, ideologically justified repressions, employed in times when the demands of social change outstripped the acceptable (or affordable) limits. Significantly, the ideological legitimization gradually transformed from tribalism and religion to nationalism and sustainable

development, as the official national imagination and fears of post-oil future slowly settled, giving the establishment the advantage of more direct control. Conversely, legislative measures eliminating formal and informal constraints on autocratic power or further centralizing it largely concentrate in times of fiscal abundance. The exceptions are mostly explained by unpredictable or external events. Due to the systematic long-term application of individual strategies and their synchronized evolution along fiscal indicators, it is safe to assume that traditional norms of social organization continue to ensure the regime's stability. While neopatrimonial resilience is clearly augmented by hydrocarbon reserves, military capacities or strategic partnerships with foreign allies, it is primarily grounded in the institutional origins and their historical development. This has important policy implications for the Kingdom and MENA region more generally, as reformers will have to go beyond Western prescriptions for successful economic transformation and work with local institutional specifics to achieve continuous, durable change and understand the fullness of its impact.

Most recently, the leadership envisioned a transformation of the distributional state towards efficiency, sustainability, productivity, transparency, and accountability, grounded in globally diversified income streams and a business-oriented institutional framework that is clearly organized and strictly enforced. Significantly, this 'New Public Management' approach opens the way to a centralized Weberian state with strong regulatory capacities, enabling a level-playing-field market economy while minimizing informal transactions. Simultaneously, however, this is done in a top-down manner with no sign of imposing checks and balances on the highest echelons of the socio-economic hierarchy. Contrary to what might be assumed, informal pressure from dissatisfied elite groups seems to be historically the most influential engine of change. Since all potential bottom-up drivers of change were simultaneously suppressed, fragmented or co-opted in the process, and miscellaneous inflows of external capital maintained fiscal stability, institutional change is increasingly unlikely to occur. Moreover, it remains questionable whether the new state will be able to compensate for the informal distribution channels that guaranteed wellbeing and therefore, allegiance of the majority of citizens. Rather, a more exclusive, centralized, and gradually internationalized circle of privileged individuals with monopoly on violence directly controls much of the productive capital and selectively appropriates sophisticated formal rules against a society that increasingly lacks mechanisms to influence policies impacting its prospectively worsening conditions. This way, the regime would normalize a new form of neopatrimonialism closer to that of China, in which the Salman's family branch and its clients dominate the bottom 90% without any formal or informal constraints to their power. In this sense, MBS does not represent a visionary but rather an innovative savior of the traditional order. If the crisis were to continue, however, the new set of elite groups generated by the transformation seems to command the most powerful leverage to condemn the current trend of social development, consolidate common interests and demand wider societal change. Only the collective pressure of economic, religious and military elites might lead to gradual dissolution of royal power and its formal restriction by constitutional checks and balances.

On a theoretical level, this work contributes to studies of authoritarian resilience, learning, and resistance to social change in developing countries. By combining the findings of country-specific literature from fields of historical

sociology, rentier state, and political economy, and integrating them within the theoretical framework of NIE, it is possible to trace the dynamic evolution of the material and non-material strategies that ensured the relative constancy of social organization since its pre-state origins. In contrast to the institutional context of developed economies, where the institutional environment determines governance structure, the analyses of (neo)patrimonial societies must reflect the shifting distribution of power in the dominant coalition and individual interests in facilitating or opposing transformation towards impersonal markets. In doing so, we extend our understanding beyond mere historical descriptions of the institutional, organizational or economic structures and identify the motives behind their past (and to a certain degree, envisaged) developments in all their complexity. Apparently, these structures are only shaken during crises and other significant distortions to continual inflow or redistribution of revenues. Simultaneously, the strategies of neopatrimonial resilience persistently become more sophisticated to include economic modernization as well as varied innovative responses to both external and internal dynamics. However, while the hierarchic societies can transform high concentration of capital into short-term economic growth, their unequal nature endangers long-term sustainability of socio-economic development. Unless checked by strong institutions or interest groups, these inequalities tend to get steeper along the growing exclusivity of distributional channels.

The main limitations of this thesis reside in the complexity and theoretical underdevelopment of its topic as well as the shortage of comparable country-specific case studies that would support its main argument. Nonetheless, it simultaneously opens doors to further research in multiple areas. By employing social network analysis, we could particularize the interconnectedness between the royal family and secondary elite through business or marriage. Secondly, economic modeling would allow for precise assessment of the correlation between fiscal balance and strategies of (neo)patrimonial resilience, while comparative law could uncover its variations under different national circumstances. Furthermore, research on the political economy of rentier and authoritarian states progressively heads towards mapping the external public assets, international capital flows, and cross-border interconnectedness of neopatrimonial regimes, and determining the degree to which they are sustained by capital from personal or impersonal markets. Finally, the application of game theory could help us understand the endogenous forces between the individual levels of social analysis and therefore the alternative bottom-up opportunities for social change.

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ANNEX 1: Council of Ministers, complete overview of ministers and their genealogical/geographical origins (1953-2018)

Year	Ministerial Portfolio	Est.	Officer in Charge	Start	End	Al-Saud	Al-Wahhab	Najdi Elites	Other Elites	Common
1953	Prime Minister	1953	Saud bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1954	1	0	0	0	0
1953	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1954	1	0	0	0	0
1953	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1953	Defense and Aviation	1951	Mishaal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1956	1	0	0	0	0
1953	Interior	1951	Abdullah bin Faisal Al-Saud	1953	1959	1	0	0	0	0
1953	Finance	1932	Abdullah bin Sulaiman Al-Hamdan	1953	1954	0	0	1	0	0
1953	Health	1951	Abdullah bin Faisal Al-Saud	1953	1954	1	0	0	0	0
1953	Education	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1953	Agriculture and Water	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1955	1	0	0	0	0
1953	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1
1953	Communications	1953	Talal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1955	1	0	0	0	0
1954	Prime Minister	1953	Saud bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1954	1/2	0	0	0	0
1954	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1954	1960	1/2	0	0	0	0
1954	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1954	1	0	0	0	0
1954	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1954	Defense and Aviation	1951	Mishaal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1956	1	0	0	0	0
1954	Interior	1951	Abdullah bin Faisal Al-Saud	1953	1959	1	0	0	0	0
1954	Finance	1932	Abdullah bin Sulaiman Al-Hamdan	1953	1954	0	0	1/2	0	0
1954	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed bin Suroor Al-Sabhan	1954	1958	0	0	0	1/2	0
1954	Health	1951	Abdullah bin Faisal Al-Saud	1953	1954	1/2	0	0	0	0
1954	Health	1951	Rashad bin Mahmoud Pharaoh	1954	1960	0	0	0	1/2	0
1954	Education	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1954	Agriculture and Water	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1955	1	0	0	0	0
1954	Commerce	1954	Mohammed bin Abdullah Alireza	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1954	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1
1954	Communications	1953	Talal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1955	1	0	0	0	0
1955	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1954	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1955	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1955	Defense and Aviation	1951	Mishaal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1956	1	0	0	0	0
1955	Interior	1951	Abdullah bin Faisal Al-Saud	1953	1959	1	0	0	0	0
1955	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed bin Suroor Al-Sabhan	1954	1958	0	0	0	1	0
1955	Health	1951	Rashad bin Mahmoud Pharaoh	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1955	Education	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1955	Agriculture and Water	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1955	1/2	0	0	0	0
1955	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulaziz bin Ahmed Al-Sudairy	1955	1956	0	0	1/2	0	0
1955	Commerce	1954	Mohammed bin Abdullah Alireza	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1955	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1
1955	Communications	1953	Talal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1955	1/2	0	0	0	0
1955	Communications	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1955	1960	1/2	0	0	0	0
1956	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1954	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1956	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1956	Defense and Aviation	1951	Mishaal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1956	1/2	0	0	0	0
1956	Defense and Aviation	1951	Fahad bin Saud Al-Saud	1956	1960	1/2	0	0	0	0
1956	Interior	1951	Abdullah bin Faisal Al-Saud	1953	1959	1	0	0	0	0
1956	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed bin Suroor Al-Sabhan	1954	1958	0	0	0	1	0
1956	Health	1951	Rashad bin Mahmoud Pharaoh	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1956	Education	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1956	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulaziz bin Ahmed Al-Sudairy	1955	1956	0	0	1/2	0	0
1956	Agriculture and Water	1953	Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Sudairy	1956	1960	0	0	1/2	0	0
1956	Commerce	1954	Mohammed bin Abdullah Alireza	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1956	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1
1956	Communications	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1955	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1957	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1954	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1957	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1957	Defense and Aviation	1951	Fahad bin Saud Al-Saud	1956	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1957	Interior	1951	Abdullah bin Faisal Al-Saud	1953	1959	1	0	0	0	0
1957	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed bin Suroor Al-Sabhan	1954	1958	0	0	0	1	0
1957	Health	1951	Rashad bin Mahmoud Pharaoh	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1957	Education	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1957	Agriculture and Water	1953	Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Sudairy	1956	1960	0	0	1	0	0
1957	Commerce	1954	Mohammed bin Abdullah Alireza	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1957	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1
1957	Communications	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1955	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1957	State for Finance and Nat. Economy	1957	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Adwan	1957	1958	0	0	1	0	0
1957	State (without portfolio)	1957	Mishaal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1957	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1958	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1954	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1958	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0

1958	Defense and Aviation	1951	Fahad bin Saud Al-Saud	1956	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1958	Interior	1951	Abdullah bin Faisal Al-Saud	1953	1959	1	0	0	0	0
1958	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed bin Suroor Al-Sabhan	1954	1958	0	0	0	1/3	0
1958	Finance and National Economy	1954	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Adwan	1958	1958	0	0	1/3	0	0
1958	Finance and National Economy	1954	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1958	1960	1/3	0	0	0	0
1958	Health	1951	Rashad bin Mahmoud Pharaoh	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1958	Education	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1958	Agriculture and Water	1953	Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Sudairy	1956	1960	0	0	1	0	0
1958	Commerce	1954	Mohammed bin Abdullah Alireza	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1958	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1
1958	Communications	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1955	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1958	State for Finance and Nat. Economy	1957	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Adwan	1957	1958	0	0	1	0	0
1958	State (without portfolio)	1957	Mishaal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1957	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1958	State (without portfolio)	1958	Ahmed Mohammed Salah Jamjoom	1958	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1959	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1954	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1959	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1959	Defense and Aviation	1951	Fahad bin Saud Al-Saud	1956	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1959	Interior	1951	Abdullah bin Faisal Al-Saud	1953	1959	1/2	0	0	0	0
1959	Interior	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1959	1960	1/2	0	0	0	0
1959	Finance and National Economy	1954	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1958	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1959	Health	1951	Rashad bin Mahmoud Pharaoh	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1959	Education	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1959	Agriculture and Water	1953	Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Sudairy	1956	1960	0	0	1	0	0
1959	Commerce	1954	Mohammed bin Abdullah Alireza	1954	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1959	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1
1959	Communications	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1955	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1959	State (without portfolio)	1957	Mishaal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1957	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1959	State (without portfolio)	1958	Ahmed Mohammed Salah Jamjoom	1958	1960	0	0	0	1	0
1960	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1954	1960	1/2	0	0	0	0
1960	Prime Minister	1953	Saud bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1960	1962	1/2	0	0	0	0
1960	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1/2	0	0	0	0
1960	Foreign Affairs	1930	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Suwail	1960	1962	0	0	1/2	0	0
1960	Defense and Aviation	1951	Fahad bin Saud Al-Saud	1956	1960	1/2	0	0	0	0
1960	Defense and Aviation	1951	Mohammed bin Saud Al-Saud	1960	1962	1/2	0	0	0	0
1960	Interior	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1959	1960	1/3	0	0	0	0
1960	Interior	1951	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1960	1960	1/3	0	0	0	0
1960	Interior	1951	Abdulmuhsin bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1960	1961	1/3	0	0	0	0
1960	Finance and National Economy	1954	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1958	1960	1/2	0	0	0	0
1960	Finance and National Economy	1954	Talal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1960	1961	1/2	0	0	0	0
1960	Health	1951	Rashad bin Mahmoud Pharaoh	1954	1960	0	0	0	1/2	0
1960	Health	1951	Hassan bin Yousef Nasif	1960	1962	0	0	0	1/2	0
1960	Education	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1953	1960	1/2	0	0	0	0
1960	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1960	1962	0	1/2	0	0	0
1960	Agriculture and Water	1953	Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Sudairy	1956	1960	0	0	1/2	0	0
1960	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Issa Al-Dabbagh	1960	1962	0	0	0	1/2	0
1960	Commerce	1954	Mohammed bin Abdullah Alireza	1954	1960	0	0	0	1/3	0
1960	Commerce	1954	Ahmed Mohammed Salah Jamjoom	1960	1960	0	0	0	1/3	0
1960	Commerce	1954	Ahmed Saleh Shatta	1960	1962	0	0	0	0	1/3
1960	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Abdullah bin Hamoud Al-Tariki	1960	1962	0	0	0	0	1
1960	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1
1960	Communications	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1955	1960	1/2	0	0	0	0
1960	Communications	1953	Badr bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1960	1961	1/2	0	0	0	0
1960	State (without portfolio)	1957	Mishaal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1957	1960	1	0	0	0	0
1960	State (without portfolio)	1958	Ahmed Mohammed Salah Jamjoom	1958	1960	0	0	0	1/2	0
1960	State (without portfolio)	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1960	1962	0	0	0	1/2	0
1961	Prime Minister	1953	Saud bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1960	1962	1	0	0	0	0
1961	Foreign Affairs	1930	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Suwail	1960	1962	0	0	1	0	0
1961	Defense and Aviation	1951	Mohammed bin Saud Al-Saud	1960	1962	1	0	0	0	0
1961	Interior	1951	Abdulmuhsin bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1960	1961	1/2	0	0	0	0
1961	Interior	1951	Faisal bin Turki Al-Saud	1961	1962	1/2	0	0	0	0
1961	Finance and National Economy	1954	Talal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1960	1961	1/3	0	0	0	0
1961	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed bin Saud Al-Saud	1961	1961	1/3	0	0	0	0
1961	Finance and National Economy	1954	Nawaf bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1961	1962	1/3	0	0	0	0
1961	Health	1951	Hassan bin Yousef Nasif	1960	1962	0	0	0	1	0
1961	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1960	1962	0	1	0	0	0
1961	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Issa Al-Dabbagh	1960	1962	0	0	0	1	0
1961	Commerce	1954	Ahmed Saleh Shatta	1960	1962	0	0	0	0	1
1961	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Abdullah bin Hamoud Al-Tariki	1960	1962	0	0	0	0	1
1961	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1
1961	Communications	1953	Badr bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1960	1961	1/2	0	0	0	0
1961	Communications	1953	Abdullah Saad Al-Qublan	1961	1962	0	0	0	0	1/2
1961	Social Affairs	1961	Faisal bin Turki Al-Saud	1961	1961	1/2	0	0	0	0
1961	Social Affairs	1962	Nasser bin Hamad Al-Manqour	1961	1962	0	0	0	0	1/2
1961	State (without portfolio)	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1960	1962	0	0	0	1	0
1962	Prime Minister	1953	Saud bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1960	1962	1/2	0	0	0	0

1962	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1/2	0	0	0	0
1962	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1962	Foreign Affairs	1930	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Suwail	1960	1962	0	0	1/2	0	0
1962	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1/2	0	0	0	0
1962	Defense and Aviation	1951	Mohammed bin Saud Al-Saud	1960	1962	1/2	0	0	0	0
1962	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1/2	0	0	0	0
1962	Interior	1951	Faisal bin Turki Al-Saud	1961	1962	1/2	0	0	0	0
1962	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1/2	0	0	0	0
1962	Finance and National Economy	1954	Nawaf bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1961	1962	1/2	0	0	0	0
1962	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1/2	0	0	0	0
1962	Health	1951	Hassan bin Yousef Nasif	1960	1962	0	0	0	1/3	0
1962	Health	1951	Hamid bin Mohammed Al-Harasani	1962	1962	0	0	0	0	1/3
1962	Health	1951	Yousef bin Yaqoub Al-Hajri	1962	1966	0	0	1/3	0	0
1962	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1960	1962	0	1/2	0	0	0
1962	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1/2	0	0	0
1962	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Issa Al-Dabbagh	1960	1962	0	0	0	1/3	0
1962	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Suleiman Al-Sheikh	1962	1962	0	1/3	0	0	0
1962	Agriculture and Water	1953	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Suwail	1962	1964	0	0	1/3	0	0
1962	Commerce	1954	Ahmed Saleh Shatta	1960	1962	0	0	0	0	1/3
1962	Commerce	1954	Ahmed Mohammed Salah Jamjoom	1962	1962	0	0	0	1/3	0
1962	Commerce	1954	Aabed Mohammed Saleh Sheikh	1962	1971	0	1/3	0	0	0
1962	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Abdullah bin Hamoud Al-Tariki	1960	1962	0	0	0	0	1/2
1962	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1/2	0
1962	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1
1962	Communications	1953	Abdullah Saad Al-Qublan	1961	1962	0	0	0	0	1/3
1962	Communications	1953	Mohammed Al-Marshad Al-Zughaibi	1962	1962	0	0	0	0	1/3
1962	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1/3
1962	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Hussein bin Ali Arab	1962	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1962	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Nasser bin Hamad Al-Manqour	1961	1962	0	0	0	0	1/3
1962	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Al-Shubaily	1962	1962	0	0	1/3	0	0
1962	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1/3	0	0
1962	State (without portfolio)	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1960	1962	0	0	0	1	0
1963	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1963	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1963	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1963	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1963	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1963	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1963	Health	1951	Yousef bin Yaqoub Al-Hajri	1962	1966	0	0	1	0	0
1963	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1963	Agriculture and Water	1953	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Suwail	1962	1964	0	0	1	0	0
1963	Commerce	1954	Aabed Mohammed Saleh Sheikh	1962	1971	0	1	0	0	0
1963	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1963	Information	1952	Abdullah bin Omar Belkheir	1953	1963	0	0	0	0	1/2
1963	Information	1952	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1963	1970	0	0	1/2	0	0
1963	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1963	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Hussein bin Ali Arab	1962	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1963	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1964	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1964	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1964	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1964	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1964	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1964	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1964	Health	1951	Yousef bin Yaqoub Al-Hajri	1962	1966	0	0	1	0	0
1964	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1964	Agriculture and Water	1953	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Suwail	1962	1964	0	0	1/2	0	0
1964	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1/2
1964	Commerce	1954	Aabed Mohammed Saleh Sheikh	1962	1971	0	1	0	0	0
1964	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1964	Information	1952	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1963	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1964	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1964	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Hussein bin Ali Arab	1962	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1964	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1965	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1965	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1965	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1965	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1965	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1965	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1965	Health	1951	Yousef bin Yaqoub Al-Hajri	1962	1966	0	0	1	0	0
1965	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1965	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1965	Commerce	1954	Aabed Mohammed Saleh Sheikh	1962	1971	0	1	0	0	0
1965	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0

1965	Information	1952	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1963	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1965	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1965	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Hussein bin Ali Arab	1962	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1965	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1966	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1966	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1966	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1966	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1966	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1966	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1966	Health	1951	Yousef bin Yaqoub Al-Hajri	1962	1966	0	0	1/2	0	0
1966	Health	1951	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1966	1970	0	1/2	0	0	0
1966	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1966	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1966	Commerce	1954	Abed Mohammed Saleh Sheikh	1962	1971	0	1	0	0	0
1966	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1966	Information	1952	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1963	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1966	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1966	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Hussein bin Ali Arab	1962	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1966	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1967	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1967	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1967	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1967	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1967	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1967	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1967	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1967	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1967	Health	1951	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1966	1970	0	1	0	0	0
1967	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1967	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1967	Commerce	1954	Abed Mohammed Saleh Sheikh	1962	1971	0	1	0	0	0
1967	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1967	Information	1952	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1963	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1967	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1967	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Hussein bin Ali Arab	1962	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1967	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1968	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1968	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1968	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1967	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1968	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1968	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1968	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1968	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1968	Health	1951	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1966	1970	0	1	0	0	0
1968	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1968	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1968	Commerce	1954	Abed Mohammed Saleh Sheikh	1962	1971	0	1	0	0	0
1968	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1968	Information	1952	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1963	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1968	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1968	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Hussein bin Ali Arab	1962	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1968	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1968	State for Foreign Affairs	1968	Omar Al Saqqaf	1968	1974	0	0	0	1	0
1969	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1969	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1969	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1967	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1969	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1969	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1969	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1969	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1969	Health	1951	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1966	1970	0	1	0	0	0
1969	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1969	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1969	Commerce	1954	Abed Mohammed Saleh Sheikh	1962	1971	0	1	0	0	0
1969	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1969	Information	1952	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1963	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1969	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1969	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Hussein bin Ali Arab	1962	1970	0	0	1	0	0
1969	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1969	State for Foreign Affairs	1968	Omar Al Saqqaf	1968	1974	0	0	0	1	0
1970	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1970	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1970	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1967	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1970	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1970	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0

1970	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1970	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1970	Health	1951	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1966	1970	0	1/2	0	0	0
1970	Health	1951	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1970	1974	0	0	1/2	0	0
1970	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1970	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1970	Commerce	1954	Aabed Mohammed Saleh Sheikh	1962	1971	0	1	0	0	0
1970	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1970	Information	1952	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1963	1970	0	0	1/2	0	0
1970	Information	1952	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1970	1975	0	0	1/2	0	0
1970	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1970	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Hussein bin Ali Arab	1962	1970	0	0	1/2	0	0
1970	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Sayyid Hassan Kutbi	1970	1975	0	0	0	0	1/2
1970	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Ali Al-Harakan	1970	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1970	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1970	State for Foreign Affairs	1968	Omar Al Saqqaf	1968	1974	0	0	0	1	0
1971	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1971	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1971	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1967	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1971	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1971	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1971	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1971	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1971	Health	1951	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1970	1974	0	0	1	0	0
1971	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1971	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1971	Commerce	1954	Aabed Mohammed Saleh Sheikh	1962	1971	0	1/2	0	0	0
1971	Commerce	1954	Mohammed Al-Awadi	1971	1975	0	0	0	0	1/2
1971	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1971	Information	1952	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1970	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1971	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1971	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Sayyid Hassan Kutbi	1970	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1971	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Ali Al-Harakan	1970	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1971	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1971	State for Foreign Affairs	1968	Omar Al Saqqaf	1968	1974	0	0	0	1	0
1971	State (without portfolio)	1971	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1971	1975	0	0	0	1	0
1971	State (without portfolio)	1971	Abdulaziz Al-Quraishi	1971	1975	0	0	0	1	0
1971	State (without portfolio)	1971	Saleh bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	1971	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1972	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1972	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1972	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1967	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1972	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1972	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1972	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1972	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1972	Health	1951	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1970	1974	0	0	1	0	0
1972	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1972	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1972	Commerce	1954	Mohammed Al-Awadi	1971	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1972	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1972	Information	1952	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1970	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1972	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1972	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Sayyid Hassan Kutbi	1970	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1972	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Ali Al-Harakan	1970	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1972	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1972	State for Foreign Affairs	1968	Omar Al Saqqaf	1968	1974	0	0	0	1	0
1972	State (without portfolio)	1971	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1971	1975	0	0	0	1	0
1972	State (without portfolio)	1971	Abdulaziz Al-Quraishi	1971	1975	0	0	0	1	0
1972	State (without portfolio)	1971	Saleh bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	1971	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1972	State for Finance and Nat. Economy	1972	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1972	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1973	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1973	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1973	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1967	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1973	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1973	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1973	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1973	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1973	Health	1951	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1970	1974	0	0	1	0	0
1973	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1973	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1973	Commerce	1954	Mohammed Al-Awadi	1971	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1973	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1973	Information	1952	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1970	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1973	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1973	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Sayyid Hassan Kutbi	1970	1975	0	0	0	0	1

1973	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Ali Al-Harakan	1970	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1973	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1973	State for Foreign Affairs	1968	Omar Al Saqqaf	1968	1974	0	0	0	1	0
1973	State (without portfolio)	1971	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1971	1975	0	0	0	1	0
1973	State (without portfolio)	1971	Abdulaziz Al-Quraishi	1971	1975	0	0	0	1	0
1973	State (without portfolio)	1971	Saleh bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	1971	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1973	State for Finance and Nat. Economy	1972	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1972	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1974	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1974	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1974	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1967	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1974	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1974	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1974	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1974	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1	0	0	0	0
1974	Health	1951	Jamil bin Ibrahim Al-Hejalian	1970	1974	0	0	1/2	0	0
1974	Health	1951	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1974	1975	0	0	1/2	0	0
1974	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1	0	0	0
1974	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1974	Commerce	1954	Mohammed Al-Awadi	1971	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1974	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1974	Information	1952	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1970	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1974	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1974	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Sayyid Hassan Kutbi	1970	1975	0	0	0	0	1
1974	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Ali Al-Harakan	1970	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1974	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1974	State for Foreign Affairs	1968	Omar Al Saqqaf	1968	1974	0	0	0	1	0
1974	State (without portfolio)	1971	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1971	1975	0	0	0	1	0
1974	State (without portfolio)	1971	Abdulaziz Al-Quraishi	1971	1975	0	0	0	1	0
1974	State (without portfolio)	1971	Saleh bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	1971	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1974	State for Finance and Nat. Economy	1972	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1972	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1975	Prime Minister	1953	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1967	1975	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	Foreign Affairs	1930	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1975	Interior	1951	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	1975	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	Finance and National Economy	1954	Musa'id bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud	1962	1975	1/2	0	0	0	0
1975	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1975	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1975	Health	1951	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1974	1975	0	0	1/2	0	0
1975	Health	1951	Hussain Abd Al-Qadir Al-Jaza'iri	1975	1982	0	0	0	0	1/2
1975	Education	1953	Hassan bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh	1962	1975	0	1/2	0	0	0
1975	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1975	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1975	Agriculture and Water	1953	Hassan Al Mishari	1964	1975	0	0	0	0	1/2
1975	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1/2	0	0	0
1975	Commerce	1954	Mohammed Al-Awadi	1971	1975	0	0	0	0	1/2
1975	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1975	Industry and Electricity	1975	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1975	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1975	Information	1952	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1970	1975	0	0	1/2	0	0
1975	Information	1952	Mohammed Abdo Yamani	1975	1983	0	0	0	1/2	0
1975	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1
1975	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1975	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Sayyid Hassan Kutbi	1970	1975	0	0	0	0	1/2
1975	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1/2
1975	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Ali Al-Harakan	1970	1975	0	0	1/2	0	0
1975	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1/2	0	0	0
1975	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Abalkhail	1962	1975	0	0	1/2	0	0
1975	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1975	1983	0	0	1/2	0	0
1975	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1975	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Majid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1980	1	0	0	0	0
1975	State (without portfolio)	1971	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1971	1975	0	0	0	1/3	0
1975	State (without portfolio)	1971	Abdulaziz Al-Quraishi	1971	1975	0	0	0	1/2	0
1975	State (without portfolio)	1971	Saleh bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	1971	1975	0	0	1/2	0	0
1975	State for Finance and Nat. Economy	1972	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1972	1975	0	0	1	0	0
1975	State (without portfolio)	1975	Kamal Adham	1975	1975	0	0	0	0	1/3
1975	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1/3
1975	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1/2
1975	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullah Al-Umran	1975	1978	0	0	1/2	0	0

1976	Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1976	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1976	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1976	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1976	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1976	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1976	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1976	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1976	Health	1951	Hussain Abd Al-Qadir Al-Jaza'iri	1975	1982	0	0	0	0	1
1976	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1976	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1976	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1976	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1976	Industry and Electricity	1975	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1976	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1976	Information	1952	Mohammed Abdo Yamani	1975	1983	0	0	0	1	0
1976	Communications	1953	Mohammed bin Omar Tawfiq	1962	1976	0	0	0	0	1/2
1976	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1/2
1976	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1976	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1976	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1976	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1976	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1976	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Majid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1980	1	0	0	0	0
1976	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1976	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1976	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullah Al-Umran	1975	1978	0	0	1	0	0
1977	Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1977	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1977	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1977	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1977	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1977	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1977	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1977	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1977	Health	1951	Hussain Abd Al-Qadir Al-Jaza'iri	1975	1982	0	0	0	0	1
1977	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1977	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1977	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1977	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1977	Industry and Electricity	1975	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1977	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1977	Information	1952	Mohammed Abdo Yamani	1975	1983	0	0	0	1	0
1977	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1977	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1977	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1977	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1977	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1977	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1977	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Majid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1980	1	0	0	0	0
1977	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1977	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1977	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullah Al-Umran	1975	1978	0	0	1	0	0
1977	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1978	Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1978	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1978	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1978	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1978	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1978	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1978	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1978	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1978	Health	1951	Hussain Abd Al-Qadir Al-Jaza'iri	1975	1982	0	0	0	0	1
1978	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1978	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1978	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1978	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1978	Industry and Electricity	1975	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1978	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1978	Information	1952	Mohammed Abdo Yamani	1975	1983	0	0	0	1	0
1978	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1978	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1978	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1978	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1978	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0

1978	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1978	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Majid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1980	1	0	0	0	0
1978	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1978	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1978	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullah Al-Umran	1975	1978	0	0	1	0	0
1978	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1979	Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1979	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1979	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1979	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1979	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1979	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1979	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1979	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1979	Health	1951	Hussain Abd Al-Qadir Al-Jaza'iri	1975	1982	0	0	0	0	1
1979	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1979	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1979	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1979	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1979	Industry and Electricity	1975	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1979	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1979	Information	1952	Mohammed Abdo Yamani	1975	1983	0	0	0	1	0
1979	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1979	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1979	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1979	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1979	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1979	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1979	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Majid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1980	1	0	0	0	0
1979	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1979	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1979	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1980	Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1980	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1980	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1980	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1980	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1980	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1980	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1980	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1980	Health	1951	Hussain Abd Al-Qadir Al-Jaza'iri	1975	1982	0	0	0	0	1
1980	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1980	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1980	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1980	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1980	Industry and Electricity	1975	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1980	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1980	Information	1952	Mohammed Abdo Yamani	1975	1983	0	0	0	1	0
1980	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1980	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1980	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1980	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1980	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1980	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1980	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Majid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1980	1/2	0	0	0	0
1980	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1980	1983	1/2	0	0	0	0
1980	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1980	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1980	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1981	Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1981	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1981	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1	0	0	0	0
1981	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1981	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1981	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1981	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1981	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1981	Health	1951	Hussain Abd Al-Qadir Al-Jaza'iri	1975	1982	0	0	0	0	1
1981	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1981	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1981	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1981	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1981	Industry and Electricity	1975	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1981	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1981	Information	1952	Mohammed Abdo Yamani	1975	1983	0	0	0	1	0

1981	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1981	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1981	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1981	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1981	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1981	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1981	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1980	1983	1	0	0	0	0
1981	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1981	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1981	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1982	Prime Minister	1953	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1/2	0	0	0	0
1982	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1/2	0	0	0	0
1982	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1/2	0	0	0	0
1982	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1/2	0	0	0	0
1982	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	1982	1/2	0	0	0	0
1982	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1/2	0	0	0	0
1982	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1982	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1982	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1982	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1982	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1982	Health	1951	Hussain Abd Al-Qadir Al-Jaza'iri	1975	1982	0	0	0	0	1/2
1982	Health	1951	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1982	1984	0	0	1/2	0	0
1982	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1982	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1982	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1982	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1982	Industry and Electricity	1975	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1982	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1982	Information	1952	Mohammed Abdo Yamani	1975	1983	0	0	0	1	0
1982	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1982	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1982	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1982	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1982	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1975	1983	0	0	1	0	0
1982	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1982	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1980	1983	1	0	0	0	0
1982	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1982	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1982	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1983	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1983	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1983	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1983	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1983	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1983	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1983	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1983	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1983	Health	1951	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1982	1984	0	0	1	0	0
1983	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1983	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1983	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1983	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1983	Industry and Electricity	1975	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1975	1983	0	0	1/2	0	0
1983	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1983	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1983	Information	1952	Mohammed Abdo Yamani	1975	1983	0	0	0	1/2	0
1983	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1/2
1983	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1983	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1983	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1983	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1983	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ibrahim bin Abdallah Al-Anqari	1975	1983	0	0	1/2	0	0
1983	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1/2
1983	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1983	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1980	1983	1/2	0	0	0	0
1983	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Anqari	1983	1989	0	0	1/2	0	0
1983	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1983	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1983	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1984	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1984	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1984	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1984	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1984	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0

1984	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1984	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1984	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1984	Health	1951	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	1982	1984	0	0	1/2	0	0
1984	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalain	1984	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1984	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1984	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1984	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1984	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1984	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1984	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1984	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1984	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1984	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1984	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1984	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1984	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1984	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1984	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Anqari	1983	1989	0	0	1	0	0
1984	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1984	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1984	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1985	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1985	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1985	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1985	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1985	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1985	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1985	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1985	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1985	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalain	1984	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1985	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1985	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1985	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1985	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1985	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1985	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1	0
1985	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1985	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1985	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1985	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1985	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1985	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1985	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1985	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Anqari	1983	1989	0	0	1	0	0
1985	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1985	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1985	State (without portfolio)	1985	Abulhady Hassan Taher	1985	1986	0	0	0	0	1
1985	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1986	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1986	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1986	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1986	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1986	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1986	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1986	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1986	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1986	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalain	1984	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1986	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1986	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1	0	0	0
1986	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1986	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1986	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1986	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ahmad bin Zaki Yamani	1962	1986	0	0	0	1/2	0
1986	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1986	1995	0	0	0	1/2	0
1986	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1986	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1986	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1986	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1986	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1986	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1986	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1986	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Anqari	1983	1989	0	0	1	0	0
1986	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1986	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1

1986	State (without portfolio)	1985	Abulhady Hassan Taher	1985	1986	0	0	0	0	1
1986	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1987	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1987	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1987	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1987	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1987	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1987	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1987	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1987	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1987	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalian	1984	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1987	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1987	Higher Education	1975	Abdullah bin Hassan Al-Sheikh	1975	1987	0	1/2	0	0	0
1987	Higher Education	1975	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1987	1991	0	0	1/2	0	0
1987	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1987	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1987	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1987	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1986	1995	0	0	0	1	0
1987	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1987	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1987	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1987	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1987	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1987	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1987	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1987	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Anqari	1983	1989	0	0	1	0	0
1987	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1987	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1987	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1988	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1988	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1988	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1988	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1988	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1988	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1988	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1988	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1988	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalian	1984	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1988	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1988	Higher Education	1975	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1987	1991	0	0	1	0	0
1988	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1988	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1988	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1988	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1986	1995	0	0	0	1	0
1988	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1988	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1988	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1988	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1988	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0
1988	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1988	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1988	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Anqari	1983	1989	0	0	1	0	0
1988	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1988	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1988	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1989	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1989	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1989	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1989	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1989	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1989	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1989	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1989	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1989	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalian	1984	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1989	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1989	Higher Education	1975	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1987	1991	0	0	1	0	0
1989	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1989	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1989	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1989	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1986	1995	0	0	0	1	0
1989	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1989	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1989	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1989	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1989	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1	0	0	0

1989	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1989	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1989	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Anqari	1983	1989	0	0	1/2	0	0
1989	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1989	1991	0	0	1/2	0	0
1989	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1989	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1989	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1990	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1990	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1990	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1990	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1990	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1990	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1990	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1990	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1	0
1990	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalian	1984	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1990	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1990	Higher Education	1975	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1987	1991	0	0	1	0	0
1990	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1990	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1990	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1990	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1986	1995	0	0	0	1	0
1990	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1990	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1990	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1990	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1990	Justice	1970	Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1975	1990	0	1/2	0	0	0
1990	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Ibrahim bin Jubayr	1990	1992	0	0	0	0	1/2
1990	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1990	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1990	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1989	1991	0	0	1	0	0
1990	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1990	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1990	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1991	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1991	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1991	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1991	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1991	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1991	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1991	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1991	Planning	1975	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1975	1991	0	0	0	1/2	0
1991	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1/2	0
1991	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalian	1984	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1991	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1991	Higher Education	1975	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1987	1991	0	0	1/2	0	0
1991	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1/2	0	0
1991	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1991	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1991	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1991	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1986	1995	0	0	0	1	0
1991	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1991	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1991	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1991	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1991	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Ibrahim bin Jubayr	1990	1992	0	0	0	0	1
1991	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1991	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1991	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1989	1991	0	0	1/2	0	0
1991	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1991	1995	0	1/2	0	0	0
1991	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1991	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1991	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1992	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1992	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1992	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1992	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1992	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1992	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1992	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1992	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1	0
1992	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalian	1984	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1992	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1992	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1992	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0

1992	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1992	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1992	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1986	1995	0	0	0	1	0
1992	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1992	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1992	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1992	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1
1992	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Ibrahim bin Jubayr	1990	1992	0	0	0	0	1/2
1992	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1/2	0	0	0
1992	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1992	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1992	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1991	1995	0	1	0	0	0
1992	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1992	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1992	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1993	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1993	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1993	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1993	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1993	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1993	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1993	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1993	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1	0
1993	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalian	1984	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1993	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1993	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1993	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1	0	0	0
1993	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1993	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1993	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1986	1995	0	0	0	1	0
1993	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1993	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1993	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1993	Pilgrimage and Islamic Endowments	1962	Abdul-Wahhab Abdul Wasi	1975	1993	0	0	0	0	1/2
1993	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mahmoud bin Mohammed Al-Sufiani	1993	1999	0	0	0	1/2	0
1993	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
1993	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1993	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1993	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1991	1995	0	1	0	0	0
1993	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1993	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1993	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1994	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1994	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1994	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1994	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1994	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1994	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1994	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1994	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1	0
1994	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalian	1984	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1994	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1994	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1994	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulrahman bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1975	1994	0	1/2	0	0	0
1994	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1994	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1994	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1994	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1	0	0
1994	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1986	1995	0	0	0	1	0
1994	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1994	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1994	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1994	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mahmoud bin Mohammed Al-Sufiani	1993	1999	0	0	0	1	0
1994	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
1994	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1994	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1994	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1991	1995	0	1	0	0	0
1994	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1994	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1
1994	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1995	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1995	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1995	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1995	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1995	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1995	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0

1995	Finance and National Economy	1954	Mohammed Al-Ali Abalkhail	1975	1995	0	0	1/3	0	0
1995	Finance and National Economy	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1995	1995	0	0	1/3	0	0
1995	Finance and National Economy	1954	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	1996	0	0	1/3	0	0
1995	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1	0
1995	Health	1951	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Hejalian	1984	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1995	Health	1951	Osama bin Abdul Majid Shobokshi	1995	2003	0	0	0	1/2	0
1995	Education	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1975	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1995	Education	1953	Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Rasheed	1995	2004	0	0	0	1/2	0
1995	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1995	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1994	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1995	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz bin Muammar	1995	2002	0	0	1/2	0	0
1995	Commerce	1954	Suleiman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saleem	1975	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1995	Commerce	1954	Osama Ja'far Fakeih	1995	2003	0	0	0	1/2	0
1995	Industry and Electricity	1975	Abd-Alaziz bin Abdullah Al-Zamil	1983	1995	0	0	1/2	0	0
1995	Industry and Electricity	1975	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1/2	0
1995	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Hisham bin Mohieddin Nazer	1986	1995	0	0	0	1/2	0
1995	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1/2	0
1995	Information	1952	Ali bin Hassan Al-Shaer	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	Information	1952	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	Communications	1953	Hussein bin Ibrahim Al Mansouri	1976	1995	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	Communications	1953	Nasser bin Mohammed Al-Salloum	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Alawi Darweesh Kayyal	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Ali bin Talal Al-Juhani	1995	1999	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mahmoud bin Mohammed Al-Sufiani	1993	1999	0	0	0	1	0
1995	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsen Al-Turki	1995	1999	0	0	1	0	0
1995	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
1995	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1983	1995	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed bin Al-Senani	1995	1999	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1995	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1991	1995	0	1/2	0	0	0
1995	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Jarallah	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	State (without portfolio)	1975	Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	State (without portfolio)	1975	Abdullatif Al-Mulhim	1975	1995	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1995	State (without portfolio)	1995	Abdulaziz bin Ibrahim Al-Manie	1995	2003	0	0	1/2	0	0
1995	State (without portfolio)	1995	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1995	2003	0	1	0	0	0
1995	State (without portfolio)	1995	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
1995	State (without portfolio)	1995	Madani bin Abdul Qadir Al-Alaqi	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1/2
1995	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1995	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
1995	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
1996	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1996	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1996	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1996	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1996	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1996	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1996	Finance and National Economy	1954	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	1996	0	0	1/2	0	0
1996	Finance and National Economy	1954	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1/2	0	0
1996	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1	0
1996	Health	1951	Osama bin Abdul Majid Shobokshi	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
1996	Education	1953	Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Rasheed	1995	2004	0	0	0	1	0
1996	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1996	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz bin Muammar	1995	2002	0	0	1	0	0
1996	Commerce	1954	Osama Ja'far Fakeih	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
1996	Industry and Electricity	1975	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0
1996	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
1996	Information	1952	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1
1996	Communications	1953	Nasser bin Mohammed Al-Salloum	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1996	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Ali bin Talal Al-Juhani	1995	1999	0	0	0	0	1
1996	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mahmoud bin Mohammed Al-Sufiani	1993	1999	0	0	0	1	0
1996	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsen Al-Turki	1995	1999	0	0	1	0	0
1996	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
1996	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed bin Al-Senani	1995	1999	0	0	0	0	1
1996	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1996	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Jarallah	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1996	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1996	State (without portfolio)	1995	Abdulaziz bin Ibrahim Al-Manie	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
1996	State (without portfolio)	1995	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1995	2003	0	1	0	0	0
1996	State (without portfolio)	1995	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
1996	State (without portfolio)	1995	Madani bin Abdul Qadir Al-Alaqi	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1996	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1996	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
1996	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
1997	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0

1997	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1997	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1997	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1997	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1997	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1997	Finance and National Economy	1954	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
1997	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1	0
1997	Health	1951	Osama bin Abdul Majid Shobokshi	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
1997	Education	1953	Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Rasheed	1995	2004	0	0	0	1	0
1997	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1997	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz bin Muammar	1995	2002	0	0	1	0	0
1997	Commerce	1954	Osama Ja'far Fakeih	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
1997	Industry and Electricity	1975	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0
1997	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
1997	Information	1952	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1
1997	Communications	1953	Nasser bin Mohammed Al-Salloum	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1997	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Ali bin Talal Al-Juhani	1995	1999	0	0	0	0	1
1997	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mahmoud bin Mohammed Al-Sufiani	1993	1999	0	0	0	1	0
1997	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsen Al-Turki	1995	1999	0	0	1	0	0
1997	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
1997	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed bin Al-Senani	1995	1999	0	0	0	0	1
1997	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1997	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Jarallah	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1997	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1	0	0	0	0
1997	State (without portfolio)	1995	Abdulaziz bin Ibrahim Al-Manie	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
1997	State (without portfolio)	1995	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1995	2003	0	1	0	0	0
1997	State (without portfolio)	1995	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
1997	State (without portfolio)	1995	Madani bin Abdul Qadir Al-Alaqi	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1997	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1997	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
1997	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
1998	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1998	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1998	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1998	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1998	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1998	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1998	Finance and National Economy	1954	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
1998	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1	0
1998	Health	1951	Osama bin Abdul Majid Shobokshi	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
1998	Education	1953	Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Rasheed	1995	2004	0	0	0	1	0
1998	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1998	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz bin Muammar	1995	2002	0	0	1	0	0
1998	Commerce	1954	Osama Ja'far Fakeih	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
1998	Industry and Electricity	1975	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0
1998	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
1998	Information	1952	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1
1998	Communications	1953	Nasser bin Mohammed Al-Salloum	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1998	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Ali bin Talal Al-Juhani	1995	1999	0	0	0	0	1
1998	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mahmoud bin Mohammed Al-Sufiani	1993	1999	0	0	0	1	0
1998	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsen Al-Turki	1995	1999	0	0	1	0	0
1998	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
1998	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed bin Al-Senani	1995	1999	0	0	0	0	1
1998	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1998	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Jarallah	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1998	State (without portfolio)	1977	Faisal bin Fahd Al-Saud	1977	1998	1/2	0	0	0	0
1998	State (without portfolio)	1995	Abdulaziz bin Ibrahim Al-Manie	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
1998	State (without portfolio)	1995	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1995	2003	0	1	0	0	0
1998	State (without portfolio)	1995	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
1998	State (without portfolio)	1995	Madani bin Abdul Qadir Al-Alaqi	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1998	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1998	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1/2	0	0	0	0
1998	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
1998	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
1999	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1999	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1999	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
1999	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
1999	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1999	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
1999	Finance and National Economy	1954	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
1999	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1	0
1999	Health	1951	Osama bin Abdul Majid Shobokshi	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
1999	Education	1953	Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Rasheed	1995	2004	0	0	0	1	0
1999	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0

1999	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz bin Muammar	1995	2002	0	0	1	0	0
1999	Commerce	1954	Osama Ja'far Fakeih	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
1999	Industry and Electricity	1975	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0
1999	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
1999	Information	1952	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1
1999	Communications	1953	Nasser bin Mohammed Al-Salloum	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1999	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Ali bin Talal Al-Juhani	1995	1999	0	0	0	0	1/2
1999	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	1999	2003	0	0	1/2	0	0
1999	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mahmoud bin Mohammed Al-Sufiani	1993	1999	0	0	0	1/2	0
1999	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Iyad bin Amin Madani	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1/2
1999	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsen Al-Turki	1995	1999	0	0	1/2	0	0
1999	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1/2	0	0	0
1999	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
1999	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
1999	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Mohammed bin Al-Senani	1995	1999	0	0	0	0	1/2
1999	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Namla	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1/2
1999	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
1999	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Jarallah	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1999	State (without portfolio)	1995	Abdulaziz bin Ibrahim Al-Manie	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
1999	State (without portfolio)	1995	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1995	2003	0	1	0	0	0
1999	State (without portfolio)	1995	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
1999	State (without portfolio)	1995	Madani bin Abdul Qadir Al-Alaqi	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1999	State (without portfolio)	1999	Ali bin Talal Al-Juhani	1999	2003	0	0	0	0	1
1999	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
1999	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
1999	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
1999	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2000	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2000	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2000	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2000	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2000	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2000	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2000	Finance and National Economy	1954	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2000	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1	0
2000	Health	1951	Osama bin Abdul Majid Shobokshi	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
2000	Education	1953	Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Rasheed	1995	2004	0	0	0	1	0
2000	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2000	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz bin Muammar	1995	2002	0	0	1	0	0
2000	Commerce	1954	Osama Ja'far Fakeih	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
2000	Industry and Electricity	1975	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2000	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2000	Information	1952	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1
2000	Communications	1953	Nasser bin Mohammed Al-Salloum	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2000	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	1999	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2000	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Iyad bin Amin Madani	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1
2000	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2000	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2000	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
2000	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Namla	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1
2000	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
2000	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Jarallah	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2000	State (without portfolio)	1995	Abdulaziz bin Ibrahim Al-Manie	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2000	State (without portfolio)	1995	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1995	2003	0	1	0	0	0
2000	State (without portfolio)	1995	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2000	State (without portfolio)	1995	Madani bin Abdul Qadir Al-Alaqi	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2000	State (without portfolio)	1999	Ali bin Talal Al-Juhani	1999	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2000	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2000	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2000	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2000	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2001	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2001	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2001	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2001	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2001	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2001	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2001	Finance and National Economy	1954	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2001	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1	0
2001	Health	1951	Osama bin Abdul Majid Shobokshi	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
2001	Education	1953	Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Rasheed	1995	2004	0	0	0	1	0
2001	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2001	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz bin Muammar	1995	2002	0	0	1	0	0
2001	Commerce	1954	Osama Ja'far Fakeih	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
2001	Industry and Electricity	1975	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0

2001	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2001	Information	1952	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1
2001	Communications	1953	Nasser bin Mohammed Al-Salloum	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2001	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	1999	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2001	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Iyad bin Amin Madani	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1
2001	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2001	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2001	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
2001	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Namla	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1
2001	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
2001	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Jarallah	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2001	State (without portfolio)	1995	Abdulaziz bin Ibrahim Al-Manie	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2001	State (without portfolio)	1995	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1995	2003	0	1	0	0	0
2001	State (without portfolio)	1995	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2001	State (without portfolio)	1995	Madani bin Abdul Qadir Al-Alaqi	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2001	State (without portfolio)	1999	Ali bin Talal Al-Juhani	1999	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2001	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2001	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2001	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2001	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2002	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2002	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2002	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2002	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2002	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2002	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2002	Finance and National Economy	1954	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2002	Planning	1975	Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Salam Al-Attar	1991	2002	0	0	0	1/2	0
2002	Planning	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	2002	2011	0	0	1/2	0	0
2002	Health	1951	Osama bin Abdul Majid Shobokshi	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
2002	Education	1953	Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Rasheed	1995	2004	0	0	0	1	0
2002	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2002	Agriculture and Water	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz bin Muammar	1995	2002	0	0	1/2	0	0
2002	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1/2	0	0
2002	Water and Electricity	2002	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	2002	2004	0	0	1	0	0
2002	Commerce	1954	Osama Ja'far Fakeih	1995	2003	0	0	0	1	0
2002	Industry and Electricity	1975	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2002	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2002	Information	1952	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1
2002	Communications	1953	Nasser bin Mohammed Al-Salloum	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2002	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	1999	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2002	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Iyad bin Amin Madani	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1
2002	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2002	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2002	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
2002	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Namla	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1
2002	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
2002	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Jarallah	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2002	State (without portfolio)	1995	Abdulaziz bin Ibrahim Al-Manie	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2002	State (without portfolio)	1995	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1995	2003	0	1	0	0	0
2002	State (without portfolio)	1995	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2002	State (without portfolio)	1995	Madani bin Abdul Qadir Al-Alaqi	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2002	State (without portfolio)	1999	Ali bin Talal Al-Juhani	1999	2003	0	0	0	0	1
2002	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2002	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2002	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2002	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2003	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2003	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2003	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2003	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2003	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2003	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2003	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2003	Economy and Planning	2003	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	2002	2011	0	0	1	0	0
2003	Health	1951	Osama bin Abdul Majid Shobokshi	1995	2003	0	0	0	1/2	0
2003	Health	1951	Hamad bin Abdullah Al-Manie	2003	2009	0	0	1/2	0	0
2003	Education	1953	Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Rasheed	1995	2004	0	0	0	1	0
2003	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2003	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2003	Water and Electricity	2002	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	2002	2004	0	0	1	0	0
2003	Commerce	1954	Osama Ja'far Fakeih	1995	2003	0	0	0	1/2	0
2003	Commerce and Industry	2003	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1/2	0
2003	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2003	Culture and Information	2003	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1

2003	Communications	1953	Nasser bin Mohammed Al-Salloum	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1/2
2003	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1/2
2003	Post, Telephone And Telegraph	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	1999	2003	0	0	1/2	0	0
2003	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1/2
2003	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Iyad bin Amin Madani	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1
2003	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2003	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2003	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
2003	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Namla	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1
2003	Public Works and Housing	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2003	1	0	0	0	0
2003	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Jarallah	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1/2
2003	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2003	2009	1/2	0	0	0	0
2003	State (without portfolio)	1995	Abdulaziz bin Ibrahim Al-Manie	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2003	State (without portfolio)	1995	Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1995	2003	0	1	0	0	0
2003	State (without portfolio)	1995	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1995	2003	0	0	1	0	0
2003	State (without portfolio)	1995	Madani bin Abdul Qadir Al-Alaqi	1995	2003	0	0	0	0	1/2
2003	State (without portfolio)	1999	Ali bin Talal Al-Juhani	1999	2003	0	0	0	0	1/2
2003	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2003	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2003	State (without portfolio)	2003	Abdullah Ahmed Yousef Zainal Alireza	2003	2008	0	0	0	1/2	0
2003	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1/2	0
2003	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2003	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2004	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2004	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2004	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2004	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2004	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2004	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2004	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2004	Economy and Planning	2003	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	2002	2011	0	0	1	0	0
2004	Health	1951	Hamad bin Abdullah Al-Manie	2003	2009	0	0	1	0	0
2004	Education	1953	Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Rasheed	1995	2004	0	0	0	1/2	0
2004	Education	1953	Abdullah bin Saleh Al-Obeid	2004	2009	0	0	0	0	1/2
2004	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2004	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2004	Water and Electricity	2002	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	2002	2004	0	0	1/2	0	0
2004	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1/2	0	0
2004	Commerce and Industry	2003	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2004	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2004	Culture and Information	2003	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1
2004	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2004	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2004	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Iyad bin Amin Madani	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1/2
2004	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	2004	2011	0	0	0	0	1/2
2004	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2004	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2004	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
2004	Labour and Social Affairs	1962	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Namla	1999	2004	0	0	0	0	1/2
2004	Labour	2004	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	2004	2010	0	0	1/2	0	0
2004	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2004	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2003	2009	1	0	0	0	0
2004	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2004	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2004	State (without portfolio)	2003	Abdullah Ahmed Yousef Zainal Alireza	2003	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2004	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2004	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2004	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2005	Prime Minister	1953	Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1/2	0	0	0	0
2005	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2005	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1/2	0	0	0	0
2005	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2011	1/2	0	0	0	0
2005	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1982	2005	1	0	0	0	0
2005	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2005	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2005	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2005	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2005	Economy and Planning	2003	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	2002	2011	0	0	1	0	0
2005	Health	1951	Hamad bin Abdullah Al-Manie	2003	2009	0	0	1	0	0
2005	Education	1953	Abdullah bin Saleh Al-Obeid	2004	2009	0	0	0	0	1
2005	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2005	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2005	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2005	Commerce and Industry	2003	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2005	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0

2005	Culture and Information	2003	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	1995	2005	0	0	0	0	1/2
2005	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2005	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2005	Culture and Information	2003	Iyad bin Amin Madani	2005	2009	0	0	0	0	1/2
2005	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	2004	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2005	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2005	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2005	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
2005	Labour	2004	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	2004	2010	0	0	1	0	0
2005	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2005	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2003	2009	1	0	0	0	0
2005	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2005	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2005	State (without portfolio)	2003	Abdullah Ahmed Yousef Zainal Alireza	2003	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2005	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2005	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2005	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2005	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2006	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2006	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2006	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2006	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2006	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2006	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2006	Economy and Planning	2003	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	2002	2011	0	0	1	0	0
2006	Health	1951	Hamad bin Abdullah Al-Manie	2003	2009	0	0	1	0	0
2006	Education	1953	Abdullah bin Saleh Al-Obeid	2004	2009	0	0	0	0	1
2006	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2006	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2006	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2006	Commerce and Industry	2003	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2006	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2006	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2006	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2006	Culture and Information	2003	Iyad bin Amin Madani	2005	2009	0	0	0	0	1
2006	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	2004	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2006	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2006	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2006	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
2006	Labour	2004	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	2004	2010	0	0	1	0	0
2006	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2006	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2003	2009	1	0	0	0	0
2006	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2006	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2006	State (without portfolio)	2003	Abdullah Ahmed Yousef Zainal Alireza	2003	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2006	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2006	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2006	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2006	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2007	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2007	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2007	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2007	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2007	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2007	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2007	Economy and Planning	2003	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	2002	2011	0	0	1	0	0
2007	Health	1951	Hamad bin Abdullah Al-Manie	2003	2009	0	0	1	0	0
2007	Education	1953	Abdullah bin Saleh Al-Obeid	2004	2009	0	0	0	0	1
2007	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2007	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2007	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2007	Commerce and Industry	2003	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2007	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2007	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2007	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2007	Culture and Information	2003	Iyad bin Amin Madani	2005	2009	0	0	0	0	1
2007	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	2004	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2007	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2007	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2007	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
2007	Labour	2004	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	2004	2010	0	0	1	0	0
2007	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2007	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2003	2009	1	0	0	0	0
2007	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2007	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0

2007	State (without portfolio)	2003	Abdullah Ahmed Yousef Zainal Alireza	2003	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2007	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2007	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2007	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2007	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2008	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2008	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2008	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2008	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2008	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2008	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2008	Economy and Planning	2003	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	2002	2011	0	0	1	0	0
2008	Health	1951	Hamad bin Abdullah Al-Manie	2003	2009	0	0	1	0	0
2008	Education	1953	Abdullah bin Saleh Al-Obeid	2004	2009	0	0	0	0	1
2008	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2008	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2008	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2008	Commerce and Industry	2003	Hashim Abdullah Yamani	1995	2008	0	0	0	1/2	0
2008	Commerce and Industry	2003	Abdullah Ahmed Yousef Zainal Alireza	2008	2011	0	0	0	1/2	0
2008	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2008	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2008	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2008	Culture and Information	2003	Iyad bin Amin Madani	2005	2009	0	0	0	0	1
2008	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	2004	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2008	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2008	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2008	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1	0	0	0
2008	Labour	2004	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	2004	2010	0	0	1	0	0
2008	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2008	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2003	2009	1	0	0	0	0
2008	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2008	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2008	State (without portfolio)	2003	Abdullah Ahmed Yousef Zainal Alireza	2003	2008	0	0	0	1	0
2008	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2008	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2008	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2008	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2009	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2009	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2009	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2009	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2009	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2009	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2009	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2009	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2009	Economy and Planning	2003	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	2002	2011	0	0	1	0	0
2009	Health	1951	Hamad bin Abdullah Al-Manie	2003	2009	0	0	1/2	0	0
2009	Health	1951	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Rabiah	2009	2014	0	0	0	1/2	0
2009	Education	1953	Abdullah bin Saleh Al-Obeid	2004	2009	0	0	0	0	1/2
2009	Education	1953	Faisal bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Saud	2009	2014	1/2	0	0	0	0
2009	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2009	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2009	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2009	Commerce and Industry	2003	Abdullah Ahmed Yousef Zainal Alireza	2008	2011	0	0	0	1	0
2009	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2009	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2009	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2009	Culture and Information	2003	Iyad bin Amin Madani	2005	2009	0	0	0	0	1/2
2009	Culture and Information	2003	Abdulaziz bin Mohieddin Khoja	2009	2014	0	0	0	0	1/2
2009	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	2004	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2009	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2009	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2009	Justice	1970	Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	1992	2009	0	1/2	0	0	0
2009	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa	2009	2015	0	0	1/2	0	0
2009	Labour	2004	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	2004	2010	0	0	1	0	0
2009	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2009	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mutaib bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2003	2009	1/2	0	0	0	0
2009	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2009	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2009	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2009	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2009	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2009	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2009	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2009	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2010	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2010	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2011	1	0	0	0	0

2010	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2009	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2010	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2010	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2010	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2010	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2010	Economy and Planning	2003	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	2002	2011	0	0	1	0	0
2010	Health	1951	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Rabiah	2009	2014	0	0	0	1	0
2010	Education	1953	Faisal bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Saud	2009	2014	1	0	0	0	0
2010	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2010	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2010	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2010	Commerce and Industry	2003	Abdullah Ahmed Yousef Zainal Alireza	2008	2011	0	0	0	1	0
2010	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2010	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2010	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2010	Culture and Information	2003	Abdulaziz bin Mohieddin Khoja	2009	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2010	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	2004	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2010	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2010	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1
2010	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa	2009	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2010	Labour	2004	Ghazi Abdulrahman Al-Gosaibi	2004	2010	0	0	1/2	0	0
2010	Labour	2004	Adel bin Mohammed Fakeih	2010	2015	0	0	0	1/2	0
2010	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimeen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2010	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2009	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2010	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2010	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2010	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2010	State (without portfolio)	2010	Mutaib II bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2010	2013	1	0	0	0	0
2010	State (without portfolio)	2010	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2010	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2010	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2010	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2010	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2011	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2011	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2011	1/2	0	0	0	0
2011	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2011	2012	1/2	0	0	0	0
2011	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2009	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2011	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2011	Defense and Aviation	1951	Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1962	2011	1/2	0	0	0	0
2011	Defense	2011	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2011	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2011	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1	0	0	0	0
2011	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2011	Economy and Planning	2003	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Gosaibi	2002	2011	0	0	1/2	0	0
2011	Economy and Planning	2003	Mohammed Sulaiman Al Jasser	2011	2015	0	0	0	0	1/2
2011	Health	1951	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Rabiah	2009	2014	0	0	0	1	0
2011	Education	1953	Faisal bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Saud	2009	2014	1	0	0	0	0
2011	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2011	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2011	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2011	Commerce and Industry	2003	Abdullah Ahmed Yousef Zainal Alireza	2008	2011	0	0	0	1/2	0
2011	Commerce and Industry	2003	Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah	2011	2016	0	0	0	1/2	0
2011	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2011	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2011	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2011	Culture and Information	2003	Abdulaziz bin Mohieddin Khoja	2009	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2011	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Fouad bin Abdulsalam Al-Farsi	2004	2011	0	0	0	0	1/2
2011	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Bandar bin Mohammed Al-Hajjar	2011	2015	0	0	0	0	1/2
2011	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2011	Civil Service	1999	Mohammed Ali bin Mohammed Al-Fayez	1999	2011	0	0	0	0	1/2
2011	Civil Service	1999	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Al-Barrak	2011	2015	0	0	1/2	0	0
2011	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa	2009	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2011	Labour	2004	Adel bin Mohammed Fakeih	2010	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2011	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimeen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2011	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2009	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2011	Housing	2011	Shawish Saud Al-Duwayhi	2011	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2011	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2011	State (without portfolio)	1998	Abdulaziz bin Fahd Al-Saud	1998	2011	1	0	0	0	0
2011	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2011	State (without portfolio)	2010	Mutaib II bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2010	2013	1	0	0	0	0
2011	State (without portfolio)	2010	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2010	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2011	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2011	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2011	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2012	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2012	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2011	2012	1/2	0	0	0	0
2012	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2012	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0

2012	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2012	Defense	2011	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2011	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2012	Interior	1951	Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	1975	2012	1/3	0	0	0	0
2012	Interior	1951	Ahmed bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2012	2012	1/3	0	0	0	0
2012	Interior	1951	Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud	2012	2017	1/3	0	0	0	0
2012	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2012	Economy and Planning	2003	Mohammed Sulaiman Al Jasser	2011	2015	0	0	0	0	1
2012	Health	1951	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Rabiah	2009	2014	0	0	0	1	0
2012	Education	1953	Faisal bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Saud	2009	2014	1	0	0	0	0
2012	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2012	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2012	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2012	Commerce and Industry	2003	Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah	2011	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2012	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2012	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2012	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2012	Culture and Information	2003	Abdulaziz bin Mohieddin Khoja	2009	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2012	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Bandar bin Mohammed Al-Hajjar	2011	2015	0	0	0	0	1
2012	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2012	Civil Service	1999	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Al-Barrak	2011	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2012	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa	2009	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2012	Labour	2004	Adel bin Mohammed Fakeih	2010	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2012	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2012	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2009	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2012	Housing	2011	Shawish Saud Al-Duwayhi	2011	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2012	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2012	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2012	State (without portfolio)	2010	Mutaib II bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2010	2013	1	0	0	0	0
2012	State (without portfolio)	2010	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2010	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2012	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2012	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2012	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2013	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2013	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2012	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2013	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2013	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2013	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2013	Defense	2011	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2011	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2013	National Guard	2013	Mutaib II bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2013	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2013	Interior	1951	Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud	2012	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2013	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2013	Economy and Planning	2003	Mohammed Sulaiman Al Jasser	2011	2015	0	0	0	0	1
2013	Health	1951	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Rabiah	2009	2014	0	0	0	1	0
2013	Education	1953	Faisal bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Saud	2009	2014	1	0	0	0	0
2013	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2013	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2013	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2013	Commerce and Industry	2003	Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah	2011	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2013	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2013	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2013	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2013	Culture and Information	2003	Abdulaziz bin Mohieddin Khoja	2009	2014	0	0	0	0	1
2013	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Bandar bin Mohammed Al-Hajjar	2011	2015	0	0	0	0	1
2013	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2013	Civil Service	1999	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Al-Barrak	2011	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2013	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa	2009	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2013	Labour	2004	Adel bin Mohammed Fakeih	2010	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2013	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2013	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2009	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2013	Housing	2011	Shawish Saud Al-Duwayhi	2011	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2013	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1	0	0
2013	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2013	State (without portfolio)	2010	Mutaib II bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2010	2013	1/2	0	0	0	0
2013	State (without portfolio)	2010	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2010	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2013	State (without portfolio)	2013	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri	2013	2015	0	0	1/2	0	0
2013	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2013	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2013	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2014	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2014	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2012	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2014	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2013	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2014	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2014	Defense	2011	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2011	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2014	National Guard	2013	Mutaib II bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2013	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2014	Interior	1951	Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud	2012	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2014	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0

2014	Economy and Planning	2003	Mohammed Sulaiman Al Jasser	2011	2015	0	0	0	0	1
2014	Health	1951	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Rabiah	2009	2014	0	0	0	1/3	0
2014	Health	1951	Adel bin Mohammed Fakeih	2014	2014	0	0	0	1/3	0
2014	Health	1951	Mohammed bin Ali Al-Hiyaz	2014	2015	0	0	0	0	1/3
2014	Education	1953	Faisal bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Saud	2009	2014	1/2	0	0	0	0
2014	Education	1953	Khalid bin Faisal Al-Saud	2014	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2014	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Anqari	1991	2014	0	0	1/2	0	0
2014	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Abdullah bin Ibrahim Al-Sabti	2014	2015	0	0	0	0	1/2
2014	Agriculture	2002	Fahad bin Abdulrahman Al-Ghanim	2002	2014	0	0	1/2	0	0
2014	Agriculture	2002	Walid bin Abdulkarim Al-Quraishi	2014	2015	0	0	0	1/2	0
2014	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2014	Commerce and Industry	2003	Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah	2011	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2014	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2014	Transport	2003	Jabara bin Eid Al-Seraisy	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1/2
2014	Transport	2003	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Muqbil	2014	2016	0	0	0	0	1/2
2014	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed Jamil bin Ahmed Mulla	2003	2014	0	0	0	0	1/2
2014	Communications and IT	2003	Fahad bin Maatad bin Shafak Al-Hamad	2014	2015	0	0	0	0	1/2
2014	Culture and Information	2003	Abdulaziz bin Mohieddin Khoja	2009	2014	0	0	0	0	1/3
2014	Culture and Information	2003	Bandar bin Mohammed Al-Hajjar	2014	2014	0	0	0	0	1/3
2014	Culture and Information	2003	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al Khudairi	2014	2015	0	0	0	0	1/3
2014	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Bandar bin Mohammed Al-Hajjar	2011	2015	0	0	0	0	1
2014	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1	0	0	0
2014	Civil Service	1999	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Al-Barrak	2011	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2014	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa	2009	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2014	Labour	2004	Adel bin Mohammed Fakeih	2010	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2014	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimeen	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2014	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2009	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2014	Housing	2011	Shawish Saud Al-Duwayhi	2011	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2014	State for Cabinet Affairs	1995	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Khuwaiter	1995	2014	0	0	1/2	0	0
2014	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1	0
2014	State (without portfolio)	2010	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2010	2015	1	0	0	0	0
2014	State (without portfolio)	2013	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri	2013	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2014	State (without portfolio)	2014	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2014	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2014	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2014	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2014	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2015	Prime Minister	1953	Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2005	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2015	Prime Minister	1953	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2015	2018	1/2	0	0	0	0
2015	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2012	2015	1/3	0	0	0	0
2015	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2015	2015	1/3	0	0	0	0
2015	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud	2015	2017	1/3	0	0	0	0
2015	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2013	2015	1/3	0	0	0	0
2015	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud	2015	2015	1/3	0	0	0	0
2015	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2015	2017	1/3	0	0	0	0
2015	Foreign Affairs	1930	Saud bin Faisal Al-Saud	1975	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2015	Foreign Affairs	1930	Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubayr	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2015	Defense	2011	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2011	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2015	Defense	2011	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2015	2018	1/2	0	0	0	0
2015	National Guard	2013	Mutaib II bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2013	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2015	Interior	1951	Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud	2012	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2015	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1	0	0
2015	Economy and Planning	2003	Mohammed Sulaiman Al Jasser	2011	2015	0	0	0	0	1/2
2015	Economy and Planning	2003	Adel bin Mohammed Fakeih	2015	2017	0	0	0	1/2	0
2015	Health	1951	Mohammed bin Ali Al-Hiyaz	2014	2015	0	0	0	0	1/4
2015	Health	1951	Ahmed bin Aqeel Al Khatib	2015	2015	0	0	0	0	1/4
2015	Health	1951	Mohammed bin Abdulmalik Al-Sheikh	2015	2015	0	1/4	0	0	0
2015	Health	1951	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Faleh	2015	2016	0	0	0	0	1/4
2015	Education	1953	Khalid bin Faisal Al-Saud	2014	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2015	Higher Education	1975	Khalid bin Abdullah bin Ibrahim Al-Sabti	2014	2015	0	0	0	0	1
2015	Education	2015	Azzam bin Mohammed Al-Dakhil	2015	2016	0	0	1/2	0	0
2015	Agriculture	2002	Walid bin Abdulkarim Al-Quraishi	2014	2015	0	0	0	1/2	0
2015	Water and Electricity	2002	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Hussain	2004	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2015	Agriculture	2002	Abdulrahman bin Abdulmohsen Al-Fadley	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2015	Commerce and Industry	2003	Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah	2011	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2015	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2015	Transport	2003	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Muqbil	2014	2016	0	0	0	0	1
2015	Communications and IT	2003	Fahad bin Maatad bin Shafak Al-Hamad	2014	2015	0	0	0	0	1/2
2015	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Suwail	2015	2017	0	0	1/2	0	0
2015	Culture and Information	2003	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al Khudairi	2014	2015	0	0	0	0	1/2
2015	Culture and Information	2003	Adel bin Zaid Al Tarifi	2015	2017	0	0	1/2	0	0
2015	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Bandar bin Mohammed Al-Hajjar	2011	2015	0	0	0	0	1/2
2015	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mohammed Saleh bin Taher Benteen	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2015	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	1999	2015	0	1/3	0	0	0
2015	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Sulaiman bin Abdullah Albalkhail	2015	2015	0	0	1/3	0	0
2015	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1/3	0	0	0

2015	Civil Service	1999	Abdulrahman bin Abdullah Al-Barrak	2011	2015	0	0	1/2	0	0
2015	Civil Service	1999	Khalid bin Abdullah Al-Arj	2015	2017	0	0	0	0	1/2
2015	Justice	1970	Mohammed bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa	2009	2015	0	0	1/2	0	0
2015	Justice	1970	Walid bin Mohammad Al-Samaani	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2015	Labour	2004	Adel bin Mohammed Fakeih	2010	2015	0	0	0	1/2	0
2015	Labour	2004	Mufrej bin Saad Al Haqbani	2015	2016	0	0	0	0	1/2
2015	Social Affairs	2004	Yousef bin Ahmad Al-Othaimen	2004	2015	0	0	1/2	0	0
2015	Social Affairs	2004	Majed bin Abdullah Al-Qasabi	2015	2016	0	0	0	1/2	0
2015	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2009	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2015	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Abdullatif bin Abdulmalek Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1/2	0	0	0
2015	Housing	2011	Shawish Saud Al-Duwayhi	2011	2015	0	0	1/3	0	0
2015	Housing	2011	Issam bin Saad bin Sayid	2015	2015	0	0	0	0	1/3
2015	Housing	2011	Majed bin Abdullah Al-Hogail	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1/3
2015	State for Shura Affairs	2003	Saud bin Saeed Al-Met'hami	2003	2015	0	0	0	1/3	0
2015	State (without portfolio)	2010	Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2010	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2015	State (without portfolio)	2013	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Tuwaijri	2013	2015	0	0	1	0	0
2015	State (without portfolio)	2014	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2014	2015	1/2	0	0	0	0
2015	State (without portfolio)	2015	Sa'ad bin Khalid bin Saadallah Al Jabri	2015	2015	0	0	0	0	1/3
2015	State (without portfolio)	2015	Khalid bin Abdulrahman Al-Issa	2015	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2015	State (without portfolio)	2015	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2015	2018	1/2	0	0	0	0
2015	State (without portfolio)	2015	Issam bin Saad bin Sayid	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1/3
2015	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2015	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2015	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2015	State for Shura Affairs	2015	Mohammed bin Faisal bin Jaber Abusaq	2015	2018	0	0	0	1/2	0
2015	State (without portfolio)	2015	Mohammed bin Abdulmalik Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1	0	0	0
2016	Prime Minister	1953	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2015	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2016	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud	2015	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2016	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2015	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2016	Foreign Affairs	1930	Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubayr	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2016	Defense	2011	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2015	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2016	National Guard	2013	Mutaib II bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2013	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2016	Interior	1951	Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud	2012	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2016	Finance	2003	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	1996	2016	0	0	1/2	0	0
2016	Finance	2003	Mohammed bin Abdullah Al-Jadaan	2016	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2016	Economy and Planning	2003	Adel bin Mohammed Fakeih	2015	2017	0	0	0	1	0
2016	Health	1951	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Faleh	2015	2016	0	0	0	0	1/2
2016	Health	1951	Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah	2016	2018	0	0	0	1/2	0
2016	Education	2015	Azzam bin Mohammed Al-Dakhil	2015	2016	0	0	1/2	0	0
2016	Education	2015	Ahmed bin Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Issa	2016	2018	0	0	1/2	0	0
2016	Environment, Water and Agriculture	2016	Abdulrahman bin Abdulmohsen Al-Fadley	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2016	Commerce and Industry	2003	Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah	2011	2016	0	0	0	1/2	0
2016	Commerce and Investment	2016	Majed bin Abdullah Al-Qasabi	2016	2018	0	0	0	1/2	0
2016	Petroleum and Mineral Resources	1960	Ali bin Ibrahim Al-Naimi	1995	2016	0	0	0	1/2	0
2016	Energy, Industry and Min. Resources	2016	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Faleh	2016	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2016	Transport	2003	Abdullah bin Abdulrahman Al-Muqbil	2014	2016	0	0	0	0	1/2
2016	Transport	2003	Sulaiman bin Abdullah Al-Hamdan	2016	2017	0	0	1/2	0	0
2016	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Suwail	2015	2017	0	0	1	0	0
2016	Culture and Information	2003	Adel bin Zaid Al Tarifi	2015	2017	0	0	1	0	0
2016	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mohammed Saleh bin Taher Benten	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2016	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1	0	0	0
2016	Civil Service	1999	Khalid bin Abdullah Al-Arj	2015	2017	0	0	0	0	1
2016	Justice	1970	Walid bin Mohammad Al-Samaani	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2016	Labour	2004	Mufrej bin Saad Al Haqbani	2015	2016	0	0	0	0	1/2
2016	Social Affairs	2004	Majed bin Abdullah Al-Qasabi	2015	2016	0	0	0	1	0
2016	Labour and Social Development	2016	Ali bin Nasser Al-Ghafis	2016	2018	0	0	0	1/2	0
2016	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Abdullatif bin Abdulmalek Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1	0	0	0
2016	Housing	2011	Majed bin Abdullah Al-Hogail	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2016	State (without portfolio)	2015	Khalid bin Abdulrahman Al-Issa	2015	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2016	State (without portfolio)	2016	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	2016	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2016	State (without portfolio)	2015	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2015	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2016	State (without portfolio)	2015	Issam bin Saad bin Sayid	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2016	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2016	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2016	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2016	State for Shura Affairs	2015	Mohammed bin Faisal bin Jaber Abusaq	2015	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2016	State (without portfolio)	2015	Mohammed bin Abdulmalik Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1	0	0	0
2017	Prime Minister	1953	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2015	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2017	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud	2015	2017	1/2	0	0	0	0
2017	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2017	2018	1/2	0	0	0	0
2017	Second Deputy Prime Minister	1967	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2015	2017	1	0	0	0	0
2017	Foreign Affairs	1930	Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubayr	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2017	Defense	2011	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2015	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2017	National Guard	2013	Mutaib II bin Abdullah Al-Saud	2013	2017	1/2	0	0	0	0
2017	National Guard	2013	Khalid bin Abdulaziz bin Ayyaf Al-Muqrin	2017	2018	1/2	0	0	0	0

2017	Interior	1951	Mohammed bin Nayef Al-Saud	2012	2017	1/2	0	0	0	0
2017	Interior	1951	Abdulaziz bin Saud bin Nayef Al-Saud	2017	2018	1/2	0	0	0	0
2017	Finance	2003	Mohammed bin Abdullah Al-Jadaan	2016	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2017	Economy and Planning	2003	Adel bin Mohammed Fakeih	2015	2017	0	0	0	1/2	0
2017	Economy and Planning	2003	Mohammed bin Maysed Al-Tuwaijri	2017	2018	0	0	1/2	0	0
2017	Health	1951	Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah	2016	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2017	Education	2015	Ahmed bin Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Issa	2016	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2017	Environment, Water and Agriculture	2016	Abdulrahman bin Abdulmohsen Al-Fadley	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2017	Commerce and Investment	2016	Majed bin Abdullah Al-Qasabi	2016	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2017	Energy, Industry and Min. Resources	2016	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Faleh	2016	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2017	Transport	2003	Sulaiman bin Abdullah Al-Hamdan	2016	2017	0	0	1/2	0	0
2017	Transport	2003	Nabil bin Mohammed Al-Amudi	2017	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2017	Communications and IT	2003	Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al-Suwail	2015	2017	0	0	1/2	0	0
2017	Communications and IT	2003	Abdullah bin Amer Al-Sawaha	2017	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2017	Culture and Information	2003	Adel bin Zaid Al Tarifi	2015	2017	0	0	1/2	0	0
2017	Culture and Information	2003	Awwad bin Saleh Al-Awwad	2017	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2017	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mohammed Saleh bin Taher Bente	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2017	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1	0	0	0
2017	Civil Service	1999	Khalid bin Abdullah Al-Arj	2015	2017	0	0	0	0	1/3
2017	Civil Service	1999	Issam bin Saad bin Sayid	2017	2017	0	0	0	0	1/3
2017	Civil Service	1999	Sulaiman bin Abdullah Al-Hamdan	2017	2018	0	0	1/3	0	0
2017	Justice	1970	Walid bin Mohammad Al-Samaani	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2017	Labour and Social Development	2016	Ali bin Nasser Al-Ghafis	2016	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2017	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Abdullatif bin Abdulmalek Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1	0	0	0
2017	Housing	2011	Majed bin Abdullah Al-Hogail	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2017	State (without portfolio)	2015	Khalid bin Abdulrahman Al-Issa	2015	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2017	State (without portfolio)	2016	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	2016	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2017	State (without portfolio)	2015	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2015	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2017	State (without portfolio)	2015	Issam bin Saad bin Sayid	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2017	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2017	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2017	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2017	State for Shura Affairs	2015	Mohammed bin Faisal bin Jaber Abusaq	2015	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2017	State (without portfolio)	2015	Mohammed bin Abdulmalik Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1	0	0	0
2017	State for Gulf Affairs	2017	Thamer bin Sulaiman Al-Sabhan	2017	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2017	State for Energy Affairs	2017	Abdulaziz bin Salman Al-Saud	2017	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2018	Prime Minister	1953	Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud	2015	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2018	First Deputy Prime Minister	1953	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2017	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2018	Foreign Affairs	1930	Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubayr	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2018	Foreign Affairs	1930	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	2018	2018	0	0	1/2	0	0
2018	Defense	2011	Mohammed bin Salman Al-Saud	2015	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2018	National Guard	2013	Khalid bin Abdulaziz bin Ayyaf Al-Muqrin	2017	2018	1/2	0	0	0	0
2018	National Guard	2013	Abdullah bin Bandar Al-Saud	2018	2018	1/2	0	0	0	0
2018	Interior	1951	Abdulaziz bin Saud bin Nayef Al-Saud	2017	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2018	Finance	2003	Mohammed bin Abdullah Al-Jadaan	2016	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2018	Economy and Planning	2003	Mohammed bin Maysed Al-Tuwaijri	2017	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2018	Health	1951	Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabiah	2016	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2018	Education	2015	Ahmed bin Mohammed bin Ahmed Al-Issa	2016	2018	0	0	1/2	0	0
2018	Education	2015	Hamad bin Mohammed Al-Sheikh	2018	2018	0	1/2	0	0	0
2018	Environment, Water and Agriculture	2016	Abdulrahman bin Abdulmohsen Al-Fadley	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2018	Commerce and Investment	2016	Majed bin Abdullah Al-Qasabi	2016	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2018	Energy, Industry and Min. Resources	2016	Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Faleh	2016	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2018	Transport	2003	Nabil bin Mohammed Al-Amudi	2017	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2018	Communications and IT	2003	Abdullah bin Amer Al-Sawaha	2017	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2018	Culture and Information	2003	Awwad bin Saleh Al-Awwad	2017	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2018	Media	2018	Turki bin Abdullah Al Shabana	2018	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2018	Culture	2018	Badr bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Farhan	2018	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2018	Hajj and Umrah	1993	Mohammed Saleh bin Taher Bente	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2018	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1/2	0	0	0
2018	Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance	1995	Abdullatif bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	2018	2018	0	1/2	0	0	0
2018	Civil Service	1999	Sulaiman bin Abdullah Al-Hamdan	2017	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2018	Justice	1970	Walid bin Mohammad Al-Samaani	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2018	Labour and Social Development	2016	Ali bin Nasser Al-Ghafis	2016	2018	0	0	0	1/2	0
2018	Labour and Social Development	2016	Ahmed bin Suleiman Al-Rajhi	2018	2018	0	0	1/2	0	0
2018	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Abdullatif bin Abdulmalek Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1/2	0	0	0
2018	Municipal and Rural Affairs	1975	Majed bin Abdullah Al-Qasabi	2018	2018	0	0	0	1/2	0
2018	Housing	2011	Majed bin Abdullah Al-Hogail	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2018	State (without portfolio)	2015	Khalid bin Abdulrahman Al-Issa	2015	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2018	State (without portfolio)	2016	Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Assaf	2016	2018	0	0	1/2	0	0
2018	State (without portfolio)	2015	Mansour bin Mutaib Al-Saud	2015	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2018	State (without portfolio)	2015	Issam bin Saad bin Sayid	2015	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2018	State for Political Affairs	1995	Muttlab bin Abdullah Al-Nafissa	1995	2018	0	0	1	0	0
2018	State for Foreign Trade	1995	Mased bin Mohammed Al Aiban	1995	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2018	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Nizar bin Obaid Madani	2005	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2
2018	State for Foreign Affairs	2005	Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubayr	2018	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2

2018	State for Shura Affairs	2015	Mohammed bin Faisal bin Jaber Abusaq	2015	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2018	State (without portfolio)	2015	Mohammed bin Abdulmalik Al-Sheikh	2015	2018	0	1	0	0	0
2018	State for Gulf Affairs	2017	Thamer bin Sulaiman Al-Sabhan	2017	2018	0	0	0	1	0
2018	State for Energy Affairs	2017	Abdulaziz bin Salman Al-Saud	2017	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2018	State for African Affairs	2018	Ahmed bin Abdulaziz Kattan	2018	2018	0	0	0	0	1
2018	State (without portfolio)	2018	Saleh bin Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh	2018	2018	0	1	0	0	0
2018	State (without portfolio)	2018	Turki bin Mohammed bin Fahad Al-Saud	2018	2018	1	0	0	0	0
2018	State (without portfolio)	2018	Fahd bin Abdullah Al-Mubarak	2018	2018	0	0	0	0	1/2

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ANNEX 2: Council of Ministers, distribution of portfolios between examined groups (1953-2018)

CoM share (% of AVG) > 150% > 130% > 110% < 90% < 70% < 50%

YoY change (% of AVG) Growth > 200% Growth > 150% Decline > 150% Decline > 200%

	Al-Saud		Al-Wahhab		Najdi Elites		Other Elites		Common		Elites (Najdi & Other)	
	CoM share	YoY change	CoM share	YoY change	CoM share	YoY change	CoM share	YoY change	CoM share	YoY change	CoM share	YoY change
1953	81,8%	-	0,0%	-	9,1%	-	0,0%	-	9,1%	-	9,1%	-
1954	70,8%	11,0%	0,0%	0,0%	4,2%	4,9%	16,7%	16,7%	8,3%	0,8%	20,8%	11,7%
1955	59,1%	11,7%	0,0%	0,0%	4,5%	0,4%	27,3%	10,6%	9,1%	0,8%	31,8%	11,0%
1956	54,5%	4,5%	0,0%	0,0%	9,1%	4,5%	27,3%	0,0%	9,1%	0,0%	36,4%	4,5%
1957	53,8%	0,7%	0,0%	0,0%	15,4%	6,3%	23,1%	4,2%	7,7%	1,4%	38,5%	2,1%
1958	52,4%	1,5%	0,0%	0,0%	16,7%	1,3%	23,8%	0,7%	7,1%	0,5%	40,5%	2,0%
1959	61,5%	9,2%	0,0%	0,0%	7,7%	9,0%	23,1%	0,7%	7,7%	0,5%	30,8%	9,7%
1960	50,0%	11,5%	3,6%	3,6%	7,1%	0,5%	22,6%	0,5%	16,7%	9,0%	29,8%	1,0%
1961	35,7%	14,3%	7,1%	3,6%	7,1%	0,0%	21,4%	1,2%	28,6%	11,9%	28,6%	1,2%
1962	34,4%	1,3%	10,4%	3,3%	17,7%	10,6%	15,6%	5,8%	21,9%	6,7%	33,3%	4,8%
1963	40,0%	5,6%	13,3%	2,9%	30,0%	12,3%	6,7%	9,0%	10,0%	11,9%	36,7%	3,3%
1964	40,0%	0,0%	13,3%	0,0%	30,0%	0,0%	6,7%	0,0%	10,0%	0,0%	36,7%	0,0%
1965	40,0%	0,0%	13,3%	0,0%	26,7%	3,3%	6,7%	0,0%	13,3%	3,3%	33,3%	3,3%
1966	40,0%	0,0%	16,7%	3,3%	23,3%	3,3%	6,7%	0,0%	13,3%	0,0%	30,0%	3,3%
1967	43,8%	3,8%	18,8%	2,1%	18,8%	4,6%	6,3%	0,4%	12,5%	0,8%	25,0%	5,0%
1968	41,2%	2,6%	17,6%	1,1%	17,6%	1,1%	11,8%	5,5%	11,8%	0,7%	29,4%	4,4%
1969	41,2%	0,0%	17,6%	0,0%	17,6%	0,0%	11,8%	0,0%	11,8%	0,0%	29,4%	0,0%
1970	38,9%	2,3%	13,9%	3,8%	22,2%	4,6%	11,1%	0,7%	13,9%	2,1%	33,3%	3,9%
1971	33,3%	5,6%	7,1%	6,7%	23,8%	1,6%	19,0%	7,9%	16,7%	2,8%	42,9%	9,5%
1972	31,8%	1,5%	4,5%	2,6%	27,3%	3,5%	18,2%	0,9%	18,2%	1,5%	45,5%	2,6%
1973	31,8%	0,0%	4,5%	0,0%	27,3%	0,0%	18,2%	0,0%	18,2%	0,0%	45,5%	0,0%
1974	31,8%	0,0%	4,5%	0,0%	27,3%	0,0%	18,2%	0,0%	18,2%	0,0%	45,5%	0,0%
1975	31,5%	0,3%	9,3%	4,7%	25,9%	1,3%	12,3%	5,8%	21,0%	2,8%	38,3%	7,2%
1976	30,8%	0,7%	11,5%	2,3%	23,1%	2,8%	11,5%	0,8%	23,1%	2,1%	34,6%	3,7%
1977	33,3%	2,6%	11,1%	0,4%	22,2%	0,9%	11,1%	0,4%	22,2%	0,9%	33,3%	1,3%
1978	33,3%	0,0%	11,1%	0,0%	22,2%	0,0%	11,1%	0,0%	22,2%	0,0%	33,3%	0,0%
1979	34,6%	1,3%	11,5%	0,4%	19,2%	3,0%	11,5%	0,4%	23,1%	0,9%	30,8%	2,6%
1980	34,6%	0,0%	11,5%	0,0%	19,2%	0,0%	11,5%	0,0%	23,1%	0,0%	30,8%	0,0%
1981	34,6%	0,0%	11,5%	0,0%	19,2%	0,0%	11,5%	0,0%	23,1%	0,0%	30,8%	0,0%
1982	34,6%	0,0%	11,5%	0,0%	21,2%	1,9%	11,5%	0,0%	21,2%	1,9%	32,7%	1,9%
1983	32,7%	1,9%	11,5%	0,0%	23,1%	1,9%	9,6%	1,9%	23,1%	1,9%	32,7%	0,0%
1984	30,8%	1,9%	11,5%	0,0%	23,1%	0,0%	7,7%	1,9%	26,9%	3,8%	30,8%	1,9%
1985	29,6%	1,1%	11,1%	0,4%	22,2%	0,9%	7,4%	0,3%	29,6%	2,7%	29,6%	1,1%
1986	29,6%	0,0%	11,1%	0,0%	22,2%	0,0%	7,4%	0,0%	29,6%	0,0%	29,6%	0,0%
1987	30,8%	1,1%	9,6%	1,5%	25,0%	2,8%	7,7%	0,3%	26,9%	2,7%	32,7%	3,1%
1988	30,8%	0,0%	7,7%	1,9%	26,9%	1,9%	7,7%	0,0%	26,9%	0,0%	34,6%	1,9%
1989	30,8%	0,0%	7,7%	0,0%	26,9%	0,0%	7,7%	0,0%	26,9%	0,0%	34,6%	0,0%
1990	30,8%	0,0%	5,8%	1,9%	26,9%	0,0%	7,7%	0,0%	28,8%	1,9%	34,6%	0,0%
1991	30,8%	0,0%	5,8%	0,0%	25,0%	1,9%	7,7%	0,0%	30,8%	1,9%	32,7%	1,9%
1992	30,8%	0,0%	9,6%	3,8%	23,1%	1,9%	7,7%	0,0%	28,8%	1,9%	30,8%	1,9%
1993	30,8%	0,0%	11,5%	1,9%	23,1%	0,0%	9,6%	1,9%	25,0%	3,8%	32,7%	1,9%
1994	30,8%	0,0%	9,6%	1,9%	25,0%	1,9%	11,5%	1,9%	23,1%	1,9%	36,5%	3,8%
1995	25,0%	5,8%	7,8%	1,8%	29,7%	4,7%	18,8%	7,2%	18,8%	4,3%	48,4%	11,9%
1996	25,0%	0,0%	6,3%	1,6%	25,0%	4,7%	25,0%	6,3%	18,8%	0,0%	50,0%	1,6%
1997	25,0%	0,0%	6,3%	0,0%	25,0%	0,0%	25,0%	0,0%	18,8%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
1998	25,0%	0,0%	6,3%	0,0%	25,0%	0,0%	25,0%	0,0%	18,8%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
1999	23,5%	1,5%	7,4%	1,1%	23,5%	1,5%	22,1%	2,9%	23,5%	4,8%	45,6%	4,4%
2000	23,5%	0,0%	8,8%	1,5%	23,5%	0,0%	20,6%	1,5%	23,5%	0,0%	44,1%	1,5%

2001	23,5%	0,0%	8,8%	0,0%	23,5%	0,0%	20,6%	0,0%	23,5%	0,0%	44,1%	0,0%
2002	22,9%	0,7%	8,6%	0,3%	27,1%	3,6%	18,6%	2,0%	22,9%	0,7%	45,7%	1,6%
2003	25,0%	2,1%	8,8%	0,3%	29,4%	2,3%	16,2%	2,4%	20,6%	2,3%	45,6%	0,1%
2004	25,8%	0,8%	6,5%	2,4%	30,6%	1,2%	17,7%	1,6%	19,4%	1,2%	48,4%	2,8%
2005	25,0%	0,8%	6,3%	0,2%	31,3%	0,6%	15,6%	2,1%	21,9%	2,5%	46,9%	1,5%
2006	22,6%	2,4%	6,5%	0,2%	32,3%	1,0%	16,1%	0,5%	22,6%	0,7%	48,4%	1,5%
2007	22,6%	0,0%	6,5%	0,0%	32,3%	0,0%	16,1%	0,0%	22,6%	0,0%	48,4%	0,0%
2008	22,6%	0,0%	6,5%	0,0%	32,3%	0,0%	16,1%	0,0%	22,6%	0,0%	48,4%	0,0%
2009	27,4%	4,8%	4,8%	1,6%	32,3%	0,0%	14,5%	1,6%	21,0%	1,6%	46,8%	1,6%
2010	33,3%	5,9%	3,0%	1,8%	28,8%	3,5%	16,7%	2,2%	18,2%	2,8%	45,5%	1,3%
2011	32,4%	1,0%	2,9%	0,1%	29,4%	0,6%	17,6%	1,0%	17,6%	0,5%	47,1%	1,6%
2012	28,1%	4,2%	3,1%	0,2%	31,3%	1,8%	18,8%	1,1%	18,8%	1,1%	50,0%	2,9%
2013	30,9%	2,8%	2,9%	0,2%	30,9%	0,4%	17,6%	1,1%	17,6%	1,1%	48,5%	1,5%
2014	30,9%	0,0%	2,9%	0,0%	27,9%	2,9%	18,1%	0,5%	20,1%	2,5%	46,1%	2,5%
2015	25,0%	5,9%	6,7%	3,8%	24,1%	3,9%	16,2%	1,9%	28,0%	7,9%	40,3%	5,8%
2016	20,6%	4,4%	8,8%	2,1%	20,6%	3,5%	19,1%	2,9%	30,9%	2,9%	39,7%	0,6%
2017	22,9%	2,3%	8,6%	0,3%	18,1%	2,5%	18,6%	0,5%	31,9%	1,0%	36,7%	3,0%
2018	23,7%	0,8%	10,5%	2,0%	15,8%	2,3%	15,8%	2,8%	34,2%	2,3%	31,6%	5,1%
AVG	34,2%	2,2%	7,9%	1,2%	22,8%	2,1%	14,9%	1,9%	20,2%	1,9%	37,7%	2,6%

Source: Author's calculations based on Annex 1.

ANNEX 3: Council of Ministers, long-term ministerial domains of examined groups (1953-2018)

Ministerial Portfolios (1953-74)	Al-Saud	Al-Wahhab	Elites (Najdi & Other)	Common	Years	Officials	AVG office length
Executive (PM, FDPM, SDPM)	100%	0%	0%	0%	45	7	6,4
Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	91%	0%	9%	0%	22	3	7,3
Defense (MoDAMI, MoD)	100%	0%	0%	0%	22	4	5,5
National Guard (MoNG)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Interior (MoI)	100%	0%	0%	0%	22	6	3,7
Finance (MoFNE, MoF)	74%	0%	26%	0%	22	8	2,8
Economy and Planning (MoP, MoEP)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Health (MoH)	7%	18%	73%	2%	22	8	2,8
Education (MoE)	34%	66%	0%	0%	22	3	7,3
Higher Education (MoHE)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA, MoAW, MoEWA)	11%	2%	39%	48%	22	7	3,1
Industry, Electricity and Water (MoIE, MoWE)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commerce and Investment (MoC, MoCI, MoCInv)	0%	42%	33%	25%	21	6	3,5
Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MoPMR, MoEIMR)	0%	0%	83%	17%	15	2	7,5
Culture and Information (MoInf, MoCuI, MoM, MoCu)	0%	0%	52%	48%	22	3	5,0
Communications - Transport (MoCom, MoT)	39%	0%	0%	61%	22	6	3,7
Communications - IT (MoPTT, MoCIT)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hajj and Umrah (MoPIE, MoHU)	0%	0%	65%	35%	13	2	6,5
Islamic Affairs (MoIADG)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Civil Service (MoCS)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry of Justice (MoJ)	0%	0%	100%	0%	5	1	5,0
Labour & Social Develop. (MoLSA, MoL, MoSA, MoLSD)	4%	0%	90%	6%	14	4	3,5
Public Works and Housing (MoPWH, MoHo)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Municipal and Rural Affairs (MoMRA)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministries of State (MoS)	12%	0%	88%	0%	33	9	3,7
AVERAGE	36%	8%	41%	15%	-	-	4,8

Ministerial Portfolios (1975-96)	Al-Saud	Al-Wahhab	Elites (Najdi & Other)	Common	Years	Officials	AVG office length
Executive (PM, FDPM, SDPM)	100%	0%	0%	0%	66	9	7,3
Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	100%	0%	0%	0%	22	2	11,0
Defense (MoDAMI, MoD)	100%	0%	0%	0%	22	1	22,0
National Guard (MoNG)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Interior (MoI)	100%	0%	0%	0%	22	2	11,0
Finance (MoFNE, MoF)	2%	0%	98%	0%	22	5	4,4
Economy and Planning (MoP, MoEP)	0%	0%	100%	0%	22	2	11,0
Health (MoH)	0%	0%	68%	32%	22	5	4,4
Education (MoE)	0%	2%	98%	0%	22	3	7,3
Higher Education (MoHE)	0%	57%	43%	0%	22	3	7,3
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA, MoAW, MoEWA)	0%	86%	11%	2%	22	4	5,5
Industry, Electricity and Water (MoIE, MoWE)	0%	0%	100%	0%	22	3	7,3
Commerce and Investment (MoC, MoCI, MoCInv)	0%	0%	98%	2%	22	3	7,3
Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MoPMR, MoEIMR)	0%	0%	100%	0%	22	3	7,3
Culture and Information (MoInf, MoCuI, MoM, MoCu)	0%	0%	39%	61%	22	4	5,5
Communications - Transport (MoCom, MoT)	0%	0%	0%	100%	22	3	7,3
Communications - Information Technology (MoPTT, MoCIT)	0%	0%	0%	100%	22	2	11,0
Hajj and Umrah (MoPIE, MoHU)	0%	0%	16%	84%	22	3	7,3
Islamic Affairs (MoIADG)	0%	0%	100%	0%	2	1	2,0
Civil Service (MoCS)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry of Justice (MoJ)	0%	89%	2%	9%	22	4	5,5
Labour & Social Develop. (MoLSA, MoL, MoSA, MoLSD)	0%	0%	39%	61%	22	4	5,5
Public Works and Housing (MoPWH, MoHo)	100%	0%	0%	0%	22	1	22,0
Municipal and Rural Affairs (MoMRA)	39%	18%	36%	7%	22	6	3,7
Ministries of State (MoS)	24%	2%	19%	54%	80,5	17	4,7
AVERAGE	25%	11%	42%	22%	-	-	8,2

Ministerial Portfolios (1997-2018)	Al-Saud	Al-Wahhab	Elites (Najdi & Other)	Common	Years	Officials	AVG office length
Executive (PM, FDPM, SDPM)	100%	0%	0%	0%	61	15	4,1
Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	84%	0%	2%	14%	22	3	7,3
Defense (MoDAMI, MoD)	100%	0%	0%	0%	22	3	7,3
National Guard (MoNG)	100%	0%	0%	0%	6	3	2,0
Interior (MoI)	100%	0%	0%	0%	22	4	5,5
Finance (MoFNE, MoF)	0%	0%	89%	11%	22	2	11,0
Economy and Planning (MoP, MoEP)	0%	0%	82%	18%	22	5	4,4
Health (MoH)	0%	1%	92%	7%	22	9	2,4
Education (MoE)	27%	2%	48%	23%	22	7	3,1
Higher Education (MoHE)	0%	0%	92%	8%	19	2	9,5
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA, MoAW, MoEWA)	0%	0%	84%	16%	22	4	5,5
Industry, Electricity and Water (MoIE, MoWE)	0%	0%	100%	0%	20	3	6,7
Commerce and Investment (MoC, MoCI, MoCInv)	0%	0%	100%	0%	22	5	4,4
Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MoPMR, MoEIMR)	0%	0%	89%	11%	22	2	11,0
Culture and Information (MoInf, MoCuI, MoM, MoCu)	4%	0%	9%	87%	23	9	2,6
Communications - Transport (MoCom, MoT)	0%	0%	5%	95%	22	5	4,4
Communications - Information Technology (MoPTT, MoCIT)	0%	0%	27%	73%	22	6	3,7
Hajj and Umrah (MoPIE, MoHU)	0%	0%	11%	89%	22	5	4,4
Islamic Affairs (MoIADG)	0%	87%	13%	0%	22	5	4,4
Civil Service (MoCS)	0%	0%	27%	73%	20	5	4,0
Ministry of Justice (MoJ)	0%	57%	27%	16%	22	3	7,3
Labour & Social Develop. (MoLSA, MoL, MoSA, MoLSD)	0%	0%	76%	24%	35	9	3,9
Public Works and Housing (MoPWH, MoHo)	47%	0%	29%	24%	15	4	3,8
Municipal and Rural Affairs (MoMRA)	55%	14%	2%	30%	22	5	4,4
Ministries of State (MoS)	17%	7%	59%	17%	181	31	5,8
AVERAGE	25%	7%	42%	25%	-	-	5,3

Ministerial Portfolios (TOTAL)	Al-Saud	Al-Wahhab	Elites (Najdi & Other)	Common	Years	Officials	AVG office length
Executive (PM, FDPM, SDPM)	100%	0%	0%	0%	172	25	6,9
Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	92%	0%	4%	5%	66	6	11,0
Defense (MoDAMI, MoD)	100%	0%	0%	0%	66	6	11,0
National Guard (MoNG)	100%	0%	0%	0%	6	3	2,0
Interior (MoI)	100%	0%	0%	0%	66	10	6,6
Finance (MoFNE, MoF)	26%	0%	71%	4%	66	13	5,1
Economy and Planning (MoP, MoEP)	0%	0%	91%	9%	44	6	7,3
Health (MoH)	2%	6%	78%	14%	66	20	3,3
Education (MoE)	20%	23%	48%	8%	66	11	6,0
Higher Education (MoHE)	0%	30%	66%	4%	41	4	10,3
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA, MoAW, MoEWA)	4%	29%	45%	22%	66	13	5,1
Industry, Electricity and Water (MoIE, MoWE)	0%	0%	100%	0%	42	4	10,5
Commerce and Investment (MoC, MoCI, MoCInv)	0%	14%	78%	9%	65	12	5,4
Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MoPMR, MoEIMR)	0%	0%	92%	8%	59	5	11,8
Culture and Information (MoInf, MoCuI, MoM, MoCu)	1%	0%	33%	66%	67	14	4,8
Communications - Transport (MoCom, MoT)	13%	0%	2%	86%	66	12	5,5
Communications - Information Technology (MoPTT, MoCIT)	0%	0%	14%	86%	44	7	6,3
Hajj and Umrah (MoPIE, MoHU)	0%	0%	25%	75%	57	8	7,1
Islamic Affairs (MoIADG)	0%	80%	20%	0%	24	5	4,8
Civil Service (MoCS)	0%	0%	27%	73%	20	5	4,0
Ministry of Justice (MoJ)	0%	65%	23%	11%	49	6	8,2
Labour & Social Develop. (MoLSA, MoL, MoSA, MoLSD)	1%	0%	67%	32%	71	15	4,7
Public Works and Housing (MoPWH, MoHo)	78%	0%	12%	10%	37	4	9,3
Municipal and Rural Affairs (MoMRA)	47%	16%	19%	18%	44	10	4,4
Ministries of State (MoS)	19%	5%	51%	25%	294,5	45	6,5
AVERAGE	28%	11%	39%	23%	-	-	6,7

Source: Author's calculations based on Annex 1.

ANNEX 4: Complete overview of relevant legislative documents (1953-2018)

Issued (d/m/y)	Document type and code	Subject	Primary source (all links accessed on October 22, 2018)	Expert assessment (links accessed on October 22, 2018)
09/10/53	Royal Decree No. 5/19/1/4288	Formation of the CoM (1st session and issuance of Statutes in March, 1954)	-	Harrington 1958
15/08/54	Royal Decree No. 5/20/1/6498	Appointing Prince Faisal President of the CoM	-	Harrington 1958
08/05/55	Royal Decree No. M2/13/8759	Formation of the BoG	-	Vogel 2000, 288-89
11/06/56	Royal Decree No. 17/2/23/2693	Banning strikes, demonstrations, and labour unions	-	Al-Nuaim 1987, 373-74 Vitalis 2007, 158-193
19/10/56	Royal Decree No. 14/3/1376	Exempting Saudi nationals and corporations from income tax	-	Sfeir 1988, 737-38
15/11/57	Royal Decree No. 23	SAMA Charter (ammendment of the 1952 original)	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=&SystemID=192&VersionID=207	http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/About/Pages/SAMAHistory.aspx
11/05/58	Royal Decree No. 38	Statutes of the CoM (ammendment of the 1954 original)	-	Kechichian 2013, 64-66 Vogel 2000, 289-90
16/06/58	Royal Decree No. 42	General Personnel Law	-	Al-Hamoud 1991, 178-81
31/12/59	Royal Decree No. 6	The Fourth Currency Law	http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/Laws/BankingRules/Currency%20Law.docx	http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/About/Pages/SAMAHistory.aspx
06/12/60	MoF Decree No. 13/1/4/1213	Reinstatement of zakat collection	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=&SystemID=191&VersionID=206	Chaudhry 1997, 76-83
18/08/62	Royal Decrees No. M/18, M/19	Social Security Regulations	-	Beling 1980
22/07/62	Royal Decree No. M/11	Commercial Agencies Regulation	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=35&VersionID=45	Chaudhry 1997, 154 Sfeir 1988, 739-40
05/08/62	Royal Decree No. M/15	Anti-Bribery Regulation	-	Ansary 2015 Sfeir 1988, 745
06/11/62	PM's Statement	Ten-Point Program	Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, Ministerial Statement of 6 November 1962 by Prime Minister Amir Faysal of Saudi Arabia, <i>Middle East Journal</i> Vol. 17, No. 1/2 (Winter - Spring, 1963), pp. 161-62.	Niblock 2007, 39-41
25/06/63	Royal Decree No. M/58	Restricting the Arbitration Law	-	Albara 2015, 32, 64
09/10/63	Royal Decree No. M/12	Provincial Regulations	-	Abu-Hamad 1992, 47-8
24/02/64	Royal Decree No. M/35	Regulations for Investment of Foreign Capital	Saudi Arabian Foreign Capital Investment Code, International Legal Materials Vol. 3, No. 3 (May 1964), pp. 561-563.	Beling 1980
18/11/64	Royal Decree (unspecified)	Constitution of the CoM (ammendment)	-	Kechichian 2013, 67
22/07/65	Royal Decree No. M/6	Companies Regulations	-	Sfeir 1988, 735-36 https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/saudi-arabia-legal-framework
11/06/66	Royal Decree No. M/5	Banking Control Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=193&VersionID=209	Sfeir 1988, 738-9
15/05/67	CoM Resolution No. 186	Establishment of a Commission for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes	-	Sfeir 1988, 742-43

28/01/68	Royal Order No. 20941	Granting the BoG independence from the Shari'ah court system	-	Ansary 2015
24/02/68	Royal Decree No. M/6	Bid and Tender Act	-	Alhudaithy 2006, 35
29/09/68	Royal Decree No. M/26	Public Land Distribution Ordinance	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=109&VersionID=132	Woertz 2013, 74-77
25/08/69	Royal Decree No. M/5	Commercial Agencies Regulation (ammendment)	-	https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/commercial-agencies-in-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia
15/11/69	Royal Decree No. M/21	Labor and Workmen Regulation	https://www.saudiembassy.net/labor-and-workmen-law	Sfeir 1988, 735
15/11/69	Royal Decree No. M/22	Social Insurance Law	-	Aljallal 2014
17/12/69	CoM Resolution No. 779	Educational Policy Document	-	HRC 2013
23/03/70	Royal Decree No. M/2	Law of Commercial Courts	https://wipo.lex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/14595	http://t-lawadvisors.com/uploads/published_articles/Saudi_Insolvency.pdf
28/03/71	Royal Decree No. M/8	Public Personnel Law	Al-Hamoud 1991, 753-771	Al-Hamoud 1991, 184-86 Hertog 2010, 104-5
14/05/71	Royal Decree No. M/10	Law of the CoM, Vice Ministers and Officials in Excellent Grade (ammendment)	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=105&VersionID=125	-
18/08/71	Royal Decree No. M/24	Law of Public Investment Fund	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=39&VersionID=49	Chaudhry 1997, 150-52
28/08/71	Royal Order No. A/137	Law of the CoSU	-	Haykel et al. 2015, 58-66
24/02/72	Royal Decree No. M/1	Law of Imams, Muezzins and Mosque Servants	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=79&VersionID=96	-
21/07/72	Royal Decree No. M/22	Law of Literacy and Adult Education in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=253&VersionID=88	HRC 2013
27/08/73	Royal Decree No. M/41	Civil Pension Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=126&SystemID=106	-
03/10/73	Royal Decree No. M/16	Tax Exemption for Foreign Companies	-	Chaudhry 1997, 143-45
02/09/74	Royal Decree No. M/48	Law of Saudi Development Fund	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=51&SystemID=237	Chaudhry 1997, 150-52
02/07/74	Royal Decree No. M/23	Law of Real Estate Development Fund	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=106&SystemID=88	Chaudhry 1997, 150-52
21/03/74	Royal Decree No. M/3	Law of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=181&SystemID=167	Chaudhry 1997, 150-52
12/08/74	Royal Decree No. M/45	Direct Tax on Salaries (abolished the same year)	-	Chaudhry 1997, 143-45
13/08/74	Royal Decree No. M/44	Minimizing custom duties	-	Chaudhry 1997, 143-45
17/04/75	Royal Decree No. M/24	Military Pension Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=118&SystemID=98	-
15/05/75	Royal Decree No. M/37	Withdrawal of All Income Taxes on Foreign Workers	-	Chaudhry 1997, 143-45
23/07/75	Royal Decree No. M/64	Law of the Judiciary	https://www.saudiembassy.net/law-judiciary	Sfeir 1988, 746-48

22/09/75	Royal Decree No. M/75	Statute of the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=182&SystemID=168	Hertog 2010, 99-100
07/11/76	CoM Resolution No. 529	Withdrawal of Zakat from Companies and Commercial Agencies	-	Chaudhry 1997, 143-45
27/03/77	Royal Decree No. M/14	Purchasing Law	-	Alhudaithy 2006
26/06/77	Royal Decree No. M/49	Civil Service Regulations	Al-Hamoud 1991, 664-73	Al-Hamoud 1991, 186-88
10/02/77	Royal Decree No. M/5	Municipalities and Village Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=107&SystemID=90	Al-Fahad 2005, 380 Abu-Hamad 1992, 18
17/01/78	Royal Decree No. M/2	Service Agents Regulations	-	Chaudhry 1997, 153-55
25/02/79	Royal Decree No. M/4	Foreign Capital Investment Codes	Sewilem 2012, 247-249	Sewilem 2012, 149-63
18/03/80	Royal Decree No. M/6	Law of Chambers of Commerce and Industry	https://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=52&SystemID=238	http://www.incge.com/13/RiyadhChamber.html
23/06/80	Royal Decree No. M/32	Commercial Agencies Regulation (ammendment and implementing regulations)	https://wipo.lex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/8521	Cartwright 1982
07/09/80	Royal Decree No. M/37	CPVPV Charter	Mack 2013, 301-4	Mack 2013, 252-4
04/05/81	Royal Decree No. M/29	Employees' Pay and Grade System	Al-Hamoud 1991, 773-4, 780	Al-Hamoud 1991, 290-301
07/02/82	Royal Decree No. M/17	Control of Publications and Publishing	-	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2006/saudi-arabia
11/05/82	Royal Decree No. M/51	Law of the BoG	https://www.saudiembassy.net/board-grievances-law	Ansary 2015
14/03/83	CoM Resolution No. 124	30 Percent Rule	-	Chaudhry 1997, 289-90
25/04/83	Royal Decree No. M/46	Arbitration Law (ammendment)	https://www.saudiembassy.net/arbitration-law	Albara 2015
26/04/83	Royal Decree No. M/47	Civil Aviation Tariff Regulation	-	Chaudhry 1997, 274
30/05/83	Ministerial Decree No. 151	Development of the Registration Procedures in the Commercial Register	http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/sa/sa023en.pdf	-
01/09/83	Royal Decree M/53	"Raising Fees for the Verification of Documents"	-	Chaudhry 1997, 274
02/03/84	Royal Decree No. M/11	Anti-Commercial Fraud Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=68&VersionID=84	-
06/08/84	MoF Circular No. 5767/404	Implementing Rules for Revised "Buy Saudi" Regulations	-	Chaudhry 1997, 289-90
17/03/85	CoM Resolution No. 101	Rules for Reducing Overtime Pay and Allowances	-	Hertog 2010, 124
23/03/85	Royal Decree No. M/40	Profit Tax on Foreign Businesses	-	Chaudhry 1997, 274
24/03/85	Royal Decree No. M/42	Law of Port Service Fees and Charges	https://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=212&SystemID=196	Chaudhry 1997, 274
28/05/85	CoM Resolution No. 7/2021/M	Implementing Rules of the Arbitration Law	-	Albara 2015
16/07/85	Royal Decree No. M/55	Rules for Real Estate Appropriation by Nationals of GCC countries	-	https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/saudi-arabia-legal-framework
14/12/85	Royal Decree No. M/451/8	New Regulations for Transfer of Sponsorship	-	Chaudhry 1997, 274

22/06/86	Ministerial Decree No. 3/2149	Rules for Enforcing the Provisions of the Banking Control Regulation	FATF 2010, 273-75	FATF 2010, 128-38
23/12/86	Royal Decree No. M/7	Civil Status Law	https://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=228&VersionID=33	-
24/02/87	Ministerial Decree No. 139	The Unified Rules of Granting Priority in Government Procurements to National Products and Products of National Origin in the GCC	-	https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/doing-business-in-saudia-arabia
23/06/87	CoM Resolution No. 241	Implementing Rules of the BoG Law	-	Chaudhry 1997, 280
30/12/87	Royal Decree No. M/13	Personal Income Tax for Foreigners	-	Chaudhry 1997, 274
27/06/89	Royal Decree No. M/61	Law of Commercial Books	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=239&VersionID=53	-
23/01/90	CoM Resolution No. 107	Regulation on Charitable Associations and Private Foundations	http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Saudi%20Arabia/saud.pdf	HRC 2005
29/08/91	Royal Decree No. M/4	Law of Professional Companies	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=240&VersionID=54	-
01/03/92	Royal Order No. A/90	Basic Law of Governance	https://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=240&SystemID=4	Abu-Hamad 1992, 47-8 Aba-Namay 1993 Ansary 2015
01/03/92	Royal Order No. A/91	Law of the Shura Council	https://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=10&SystemID=5	Abu-Hamad 1992, 47-8 Aba-Namay 1993 Ansary 2015
01/03/92	Royal Order No. A/92	Law of Provinces	https://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=12&SystemID=7	Abu-Hamad 1992, 47-8 Aba-Namay 1993 Ansary 2015
29/06/92	Royal Decree No. M/35	Rules Regulating Advertisements	https://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=20&SystemID=222	-
30/06/92	Royal Decree No. M/36	Anti-Bribery Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=27&VersionID=35	-
20/08/93	Royal Order No. A/137	Law of The CoM	https://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=11&SystemID=6	Ansary 2015
26/09/94	CoM Resolution No. 50	Recommendations Regarding the Replacement of Foreign Labour with National Labour in the Private Sector Establishments	http://www.saudiaramco.com.sa/content/dam/pageassets/suppliers/Doing%20Business%20with%20Us%20forms/Decision%2050_EnGLISH.pdf	Hertog 2010, 192-94
17/07/95	Royal Decree No. M/1	Law of Commercial Register	https://www.saudiembassy.net/law-commercial-register	-
24/01/96	Royal Decree No. M/16	Bankruptcy Preventive Settlement Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=243&VersionID=57	Aleid 2017
05/08/97	CoM Resolution No. 60	Privatization Strategy	https://www.mafhoum.com/press/3/112E15.htm	-
29/08/99	Royal Order No. A/111	Statute of the Supreme Economic Council	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=244&VersionID=58	Hertog 2010
20/11/99	Royal Decree No. M/15	The Trade Names Law	https://www.saudiembassy.net/trade-names-law-and-regulations	https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/saudi-arabia-legal-framework
10/04/00	Royal Decree No. M/1	Foreign Investment Act	https://www.saudiembassy.net/foreign-investment-act-and-executive-rules	Hertog 2010 Sewilem 2012

19/07/00	Royal Decree No. M/15	Regulations of Ownership and Investment by Non-Saudis	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=&SystemID=92&VersionID=109	https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/saudi-arabia-legal-framework
20/08/00	Royal Decree No. M/21	The Law of Procedure before the Shariah Courts	https://www.saudiembassy.net/law-procedure-shariah-courts	Ansary 2015
30/11/00	Royal Decree No. M/33	Social Insurance Law (ammendment)	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=&SystemID=183&VersionID=198	-
24/03/02	Royal Order No. A/2	Placing the GPGE under the MoE's jurisdiction	-	Nolan 2011 202-3
24/04/02	Royal Decree No. M/6	Property Registration Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=&SystemID=94&VersionID=112	https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/005/893/original/Measure.pdf?1526563888
07/08/02	Royal Decree No. M/21	The Trademarks Law	https://www.saudiembassy.net/trademarks-law-and-regulations	https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/saudi-arabia-legal-framework
06/01/03	Royal Decree No. M/41	Ratification of the GCC Common Customs Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=&SystemID=197&VersionID=214	-
24/07/03	Royal Order No. M/33	King Abdulaziz Centre for National Dialogue (establishing decree)	-	Thompson 2014, 58-127
31/07/03	Royal Decree No. M/30	The Capital Markets Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=&SystemID=56&VersionID=69	Hertog 2010
30/08/03	Royal Decree No. M/41	Copyright Law	https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/sau_e/WTACCSAU56_LEG_4.pdf	https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/saudi-arabia-legal-framework
27/11/03	Royal Order No. A/198	Law of the Shura Council (ammendment)	-	Ansary 2015
07/03/04	Royal Decree No. M/1	Income Tax Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=215&SystemID=198	https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/saudi-arabia-legal-framework
22/06/04	Royal Decree No. M/25	Competition Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=73&SystemID=60	Alotaibi 2010
17/07/04	Royal Decree No. M/27	Patent Law	-	https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/saudi-arabia-legal-framework
27/09/05	Royal Decree No. M/51	Labour Law	https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=74429	Hertog 2010 https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/saudi-arabia-legal-framework
02/04/05	Royal Order No. A/14	Establishment of specialized courts	-	Ansary 2015
19/04/06	Royal Decree No. M/18	Contractor Classification Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=62&VersionID=77	-
02/08/06	Royal Decree No. M/45	Social Security Law (ammendment)	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=187&VersionID=202	-
25/09/06	Royal Order No. 6487/MB	National Strategy for Protecting Integrity and Combating Corruption	http://friends.nazaha.gov.sa/en/About/Pages/Strategy.aspx	-
27/09/06	Royal Decree No. M/58	Government Tenders and Procurement Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=202&VersionID=219	-
20/10/06	Royal Order No. A/135	Law of the Pledge of Allegiance Council	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=&SystemID=8&VersionID=13&languageid=2	Ansary 2015 Kechichian 2013

01/10/07	Royal Decree No. M/78	Law of the Judiciary	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=131&VersionID=160	Ansary 2015 Kechichian 2013
01/10/07	Royal Decree No. M/78	Law of the Board of Grievances	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=132&VersionID=161	Ansary 2015 Kechichian 2013
30/04/08	Royal Decree No. M/19	Anti-Commercial Fraud Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=68&VersionID=84	-
08/07/08	Royal Decree No. M/37	Credit Information Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=203&VersionID=220	-
14/02/09	Royal Order No. A/4	Abandoning exclusiveness of Hanbali scholars	-	Ansary 2015
24/02/10	Royal Order No. A/19	Statute of the Economic Cities Authority	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=248&SystemID=268	-
12/08/10	Royal Order No. 13876	Restricting Fatwas to the CoSU	http://www.alwatan.com.sa/Local/News_Detail.aspx?ArticleID=16807&CategoryID=5	Ansary 2015 Boucek 2010 Nolan 2011 259-260
03/01/11	Royal Decree (unspecified)	Requirement of government license for online media and blogs	-	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/saudi-arabia
23/02/11	Royal Order No. A/28	Fiscal packages introducing subsidies and social benefits	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=346&SystemID=367	-
06/03/11	CoSU Fatwa (unspecified)	Fatwa Banning Protests	https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=870879	-
18/03/11	Royal Order No. A/79	Introduction of Nitaqat System	-	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-king/saudi-king-orders-more-handouts-security-boost-idUSTRE72H2UQ20110318
18/03/11	Royal Order No. A/65	Statute of The National Anti-Corruption Commission	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=265&SystemID=285	-
12/04/11	Royal Decree No. M/35	Penal Law on Dissemination and Disclosure of Classified Information and Documents	https://wipo.lex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/8508	-
29/04/11	Royal Decree (unspecified)	Press and Publications Law (ammendment)	-	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/saudi-arabia
04/06/11	Royal Decree No. A/121	Expanding job opportunities of Saudi women	-	Alhussein 2014, 3
22/11/11	CoM Resolution No. 353	Statute of Job Seekers Allowance (Hafiz program)	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=276&SystemID=297	-
16/04/12	Royal Decree No. M/34	Arbitration Law (ammendment)	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=270&SystemID=123	Albara 2015
03/07/12	Royal Decree No. M/48	Finance Lease Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=272&SystemID=293	Aleid 2017
03/07/12	Royal Decree No. M/49	Registered Real Estate Mortgage Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=274&SystemID=295	Aleid 2017
03/07/12	Royal Decree No. M/50	Real Estate Finance Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=271&SystemID=292	Aleid 2017
03/07/12	Royal Decree No. M/51	Finance Companies Control Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=273&SystemID=294	Aleid 2017

03/07/12	Royal Decree No. M/53	Enforcement Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=275&SystemID=296	Ansary 2015
11/01/13	Royal Order No. A/44	Gender quotas for the Shura Council	-	Ansary 2015
27/05/13	Royal Decree (unspecified)	Establishment of the MoNG	-	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-nationalguard/saudi-king-turns-national-guard-into-ministry-run-by-son-idUSBRE94Q0C220130527
25/11/13	Royal Decree No. M/1	Law of Civil Procedures	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=303&SystemID=125	Ansary 2015
25/11/13	Royal Decree No. M/2	Law of Criminal Procedures	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=304&SystemID=127	Ansary 2015
25/11/13	Royal Decree No. M/3	Law of Procedures before the Board of Grievances	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=302&SystemID=324	Ansary 2015
28/12/13	Royal Decree No. M/16	Anti-Terror Law	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=305&SystemID=327	https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/23/saudi-arabia-new-counterterrorism-law-enables-abuse https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/07/new-anti-terror-law-used-imprison-saudi-arabian-human-rights-activist/
06/01/14	CoM Resolution No. 82	Housing Subsidy Act	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=309&SystemID=332	HRC 2018
27/03/14	Royal Order No. A/86	Succession Decree	-	Ansary 2015
10/12/14	Royal Order No. A/20	Establishment of a committee for codification of judicial decisions	-	Ansary 2015
29/01/15	Royal Decree No. A/69	Establishment of CEDA and CPSA	-	Ansary 2015
26/03/15	Royal Decree No. M/46	Labour Law (ammendment)	https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=101848&p_country=SAU&p_classification=01.02	Almutairi 2017
10/11/15	Royal Decree No. M/3	Companies Law (ammendment)	https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=352&SystemID=373	https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/101841/122923/F1928085439/SAU101841%20Eng.pdf
13/11/15	Royal Decree No. M/4	Land Fees Law (also White Land Tax Law)	-	Aleid 2017, 99-104
01/12/15	Royal Decree No. M/8	Law of Civil Associations and Foundations	https://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&VersionID=353&SystemID=374	http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/saudi-arabia.html
11/04/16	CoM Resolution No. 289	CPVPV Charter (ammendment)	-	HRC 2018
25/04/16	CoM Resolution No. 308	Adopting Vision 2030	-	HRC 2018 Hanieh 2018, 203-17
08/08/16	Royal Decree (unspecified)	New Visa Fees Structure	https://www.spa.gov.sa/1525689	Hanieh 2018, 226
28/09/16	CoM Resolution No. 551	Public Employees Cuts	-	Hertog 2018, 89-91

21/02/17	Royal Decree No. M/57	Civil Service Regulations (ammendment)	https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=&p_isn=106582	-
26/07/17	Royal Decree No. M/113	VAT Law	https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/xe/Documents/tax/me_tax_ksa-vat-law-english-27-august-2017.pdf	https://www.vat.gov.sa/sites/default/files/2018-11/VAT_Guideline_Agents_EN.pdf
22/08/17	CoM Resolution No. 713	Online transparency of relevant bills, rules, regulations and decisions	-	HRC 2018
26/09/17	High Order No. 905	Traffic Act	https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=ar&newsid=1671323	HRC 2018
22/04/17	Royal Decree No. A/158	Revoking of 2016 Governmental Cuts	-	Hanieh 2018, 223
01/11/17	Royal Decree No. M/21	Anti-Terror Law (ammendment)	-	HRC 2018 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/23/saudi-arabia-new-counterterrorism-law-enables-abuse
04/11/17	Royal Order No. A/38	Formation of the Supreme Anti-Corruption Committee	-	HRC 2018 https://www.tamimi.com/law-update-articles/the-calm-after-the-storm-saudi-arabias-anti-corruption-tornado-and-the-investor-impact/
21/01/18	SJC Circular No. 1020/T	Digitalization of Court System	-	https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/ksa-courts-pushing-forward-to-go-online
13/02/18	Royal Decree No. M/5	Bankruptcy Law	-	https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/new-bankruptcy-law-in-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia
11/04/18	Royal Decree No. M/79	Companies Law (ammendment)	-	https://www.dlapiper.com/~media/files/insights/publications/2018/05/ksa-companies-law-comparison-table.pdf
01/05/18	CoM Resolution No. 439	Food Security Strategy	-	HRC 2018
25/10/18	CoM Resolution No. 103	Revision of the Negative List for FDI	-	https://www.linklaters.com/en/insights/publications/year-review-year-to-come/2018-2019/major-developments-in-saudi-arabian-law-in-2018-and-2019

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ANNEX 5: Selected macroeconomic data for Saudi Arabia (1953-2018)

	GDP (Current, Million SAR)	Expenditures				Revenues				Deficit / Surplus (% of GDP)	Government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)	Reserves		Current Account Balance
		Total (Million SAR)	Current (Million SAR)	Capital (Million SAR)	Capital (% of total)	Total (Million SAR)	Oil (Million SAR)	Non-oil (Million SAR)	Non-oil (% of total)			% of GDP	Months of imports	
1969	20185	6028	3853	2175	36	5668	5119	549	10	-1,78	16,83	13,54	-	-92
1970	24198	6293	3989	2304	37	7940	7122	818	10	7,30	15,86	12,45	-	104
1971	32237	8130	4756	3374	42	11120	9685	1435	13	9,80	13,34	20,35	10,96	974
1972	40056	10158	5654	4504	44	15368	13480	1888	12	13,62	12,73	26,73	16,60	2089
1973	55404	18595	8470	10125	54	41705	39285	2420	6	43,17	14,16	27,39	10,12	2530
1974	161216	35039	15207	19832	57	100103	94190	5913	6	40,74	8,43	32,43	21,61	23095
1975	164530	81235	37931	43304	53	103384	93481	9903	10	13,53	14,53	50,51	22,68	14309
1976	225940	128273	73621	54652	43	135957	121191	14766	11	3,41	16,85	42,68	15,17	14282
1977	261521	138048	71417	66631	48	130659	114042	16617	13	-2,83	18,32	40,99	12,56	11906
1978	272871	147972	83488	64484	44	131505	115078	16427	12	-6,05	24,27	25,20	6,23	-2215
1979	375938	185724	102447	83277	45	211196	189295	21901	10	6,78	21,65	19,32	5,16	12026
1980	547381	236755	132661	104094	44	348100	319305	28795	8	20,37	15,89	15,88	5,00	42758
1981	623367	284650	113636	171014	60	368006	328594	39412	11	13,40	19,55	18,48	5,13	41128
1982	525334	244912	102248	142664	58	246182	186006	60176	24	0,24	26,18	20,65	5,03	7573
1983	446288	230186	124052	106134	46	206419	145123	61296	30	-5,34	29,76	22,48	4,74	-16850
1984	421558	216363	121696	94667	44	171509	121348	50161	29	-10,67	30,14	21,87	4,86	-18401
1985	376318	184004	119865	64139	35	133565	88425	45140	34	-13,40	31,90	25,51	6,63	-12935
1986	322020	137422	98894	38528	28	76498	42464	34034	44	-18,92	34,67	23,14	6,35	-11795
1987	320931	184919	134419	50500	27	103811	67405	36406	35	-25,27	35,22	29,07	7,92	-9775
1988	330519	140856	116283	24573	17	84600	48400	36200	43	-17,02	30,93	25,42	7,60	-7341
1989	357065	154870	118303	36567	24	114600	75900	38700	34	-11,28	33,60	19,50	5,57	-9552
1990	440525	243713	188603	55110	23	158320	123149	35171	22	-18,38	29,02	11,42	3,58	-4153
1991	495176	243713	188603	55110	23	158320	123149	35171	22	-18,38	34,16	10,06	2,40	-27637
1992	513394	238987	162350	76637	32	169647	128790	40857	24	-13,58	29,74	5,45	1,39	-17739
1993	497965	187890	184878	3012	2	141445	105976	35469	25	-9,38	26,30	6,94	2,11	-17269
1994	506230	163776	161380	2396	1	128991	95505	33486	26	-6,91	24,21	6,76	2,60	-10487
1995	536820	173943	148776	25167	14	146500	105728	40772	28	-5,14	23,46	7,25	2,65	-5326
1996	594191	198117	171258	26859	14	179085	135982	43103	24	-3,22	24,37	10,10	3,68	680
1997	621534	221272	218880	2392	1	205500	159985	45515	22	-2,55	26,03	9,77	3,52	306
1998	550408	190060	171163	18897	10	141608	79998	61610	44	-8,86	28,20	10,59	3,94	-13148
1999	606439	183841	167195	16646	9	147454	104447	43007	29	-6,03	25,41	11,34	4,64	411
2000	710681	235322	216958	18364	8	258065	214424	43641	17	3,20	25,86	11,00	4,48	14317
2001	690516	255140	223508	31632	12	228159	183915	44244	19	-3,91	27,33	10,25	4,31	9353
2002	711022	233500	203500	30000	13	213000	166100	46900	22	-2,88	25,95	11,70	4,97	11873
2003	809279	257000	223530	33470	13	293000	231000	62000	21	4,45	24,48	11,37	4,99	23261
2004	970283	285200	247649	37551	13	392291	330000	62291	16	11,04	22,86	11,33	4,98	49295
2005	1230771	346474	284173	62301	18	564335	504540	59795	11	17,70	21,34	47,92	20,47	89990
2006	1411491	393322	322411	70911	18	673682	604470	69212	10	19,86	22,04	60,75	22,90	98934
2007	1558827	466248	347199	119049	26	642800	562186	80614	13	11,33	20,66	74,35	24,05	93329
2008	1949238	520069	388839	131230	25	1100993	983369	117624	11	29,80	17,70	86,82	28,65	132322
2009	1609117	596434	416594	179840	30	509805	434420	75385	15	-5,38	22,19	98,11	29,17	20955
2010	1980777	653886	483996	169890	26	740872	670235	70637	10	4,39	20,20	86,96	29,74	66751
2011	2517146	826700	583895	242805	29	1117527	1034362	83165	7	11,55	19,39	82,92	32,10	158545
2012	2759906	917198	713330	203868	22	1246538	1144818	101720	8	11,93	19,97	91,54	35,48	164764
2013	2799927	994734	731873	262861	26	1152612	1035048	117564	10	5,64	22,45	98,81	36,64	135442
2014	2836314	1140603	821160	319443	28	1040141	913347	126794	12	-3,54	26,06	98,43	33,14	73758
2015	2453512	1001292	790979	210313	21	612693	446432	166261	27	-15,84	30,00	95,83	29,44	-56724
2016	2418508	830513	696358	134155	16	519448	333699	185749	36	-12,86	25,83	84,86	31,82	-23843
2017	2575269	929999	722208	207791	22	691505	435900	255605	37	-9,26	24,50	74,19	29,09	15229

Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Statistics 2017; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; World Bank, National Accounts Data; OECD, National Accounts Data.

ANNEX 6: Selected indicators of institutional, organizational and entrepreneurial environment in Saudi Arabia (2004-18)

Index	Indicator	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	AVG
World Governance Indicators (Percentile Rank 0 to 100)	Voice and Accountability	10	6	4	6	4	3	4	2	3	3	3	3	5	6	-	4
	Political Stability and Absence of Violence	25	39	29	29	32	29	37	31	32	33	36	24	28	24	-	31
	Regulatory Quality	56	57	53	54	55	57	56	54	56	55	54	54	56	55	-	55
	Rule of Law	53	53	55	55	56	56	60	57	60	59	63	60	63	57	-	58
	AVG of Selected Indicators	36	39	35	36	37	36	39	36	38	37	39	35	38	35	-	37
Index of Economic Freedom (>80% = Free; <50% = Repressed)	Property rights	50	50	50	50	50	40	40	45	45	40	40	40	40	62	53	46
	Government integrity	50	45	34	34	33	34	35	43	47	44	44	46	49	46	50	42
	Investment freedom	30	30	30	30	30	40	45	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	37
	Financial freedom	30	30	50	40	40	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	46
	AVG of Selected Indicators	40	39	41	39	38	41	43	45	46	44	43	44	45	49	48	43
	Index Overall	60	63	63	61	63	64	64	66	63	61	62	62	62	64	60	63
Ease of Doing Business Index (Rank out of 190)	Starting a Business	-	-	156	36	31	13	14	10	81	84	109	146	147	135	141	85
	Getting Credit	-	-	65	48	59	61	45	48	52	55	71	78	82	90	112	67
	Trading across Borders	-	-	33	33	18	23	18	18	61	69	92	158	158	161	158	77
	Enforcing Contracts	-	-	97	136	138	140	138	138	124	127	108	103	105	83	59	115
	Resolving Insolvency	-	-	87	79	60	60	69	73	109	106	163	169	169	168	168	114
	AVG of Selected Indicators	-	-	88	66	61	59	57	57	85	88	109	131	132	127	128	91
	Index Overall	-	67	38	23	16	13	10	12	22	26	49	82	94	92	92	45
Global Competitiveness Report (Rank out of 140)	Transparency of government policymaking	-	-	-	54	45	44	40	27	34	36	38	37	38	48	-	40
	Strength of investor protection	-	-	-	77	39	24	16	16	17	19	22	55	86	61	-	39
	Foreign competition	-	-	-	93	82	64	35	26	49	86	94	95	87	91	-	73
	Quality of primary education	-	-	-	67	75	71	54	32	45	59	69	72	64	63	-	61
	Quality of math and science education	-	-	-	67	85	76	49	27	37	64	73	69	65	63	-	61
	Availability of research and training services	-	-	-	68	42	42	34	29	35	55	73	74	76	67	-	54
	No. procedures to start a business	-	-	-	101	34	46	14	15	8	104	106	104	126	131	-	72
	No. days to start a business	-	-	-	80	30	31	9	9	10	91	95	100	98	90	-	58
	Prevalence of trade barriers	-	-	-	69	60	37	23	19	19	34	57	51	49	55	-	43
	Prevalence of foreign ownership	-	-	-	122	114	106	84	58	76	100	106	107	115	109	-	100
	Business impact of rules on FDI	-	-	-	105	92	76	35	10	27	76	95	107	118	119	-	78
	Imports as a percentage of GDP	-	-	-	120	102	78	62	93	122	131	120	118	91	104	-	104
	Redundancy costs, weeks of salary	-	-	-	97	97	98	102	106	88	94	93	88	86	102	-	96
	Women in labor force, ratio to men	-	-	-	130	134	132	138	140	141	145	141	137	135	133	-	137
	Ease of access to loans	-	-	-	57	39	18	6	5	14	24	27	27	63	64	-	31
	Legal rights index	-	-	-	94	93	83	86	76	89	89	85	106	108	106	-	92
	Local supplier quality	-	-	-	50	49	43	24	18	32	50	60	54	55	64	-	45
	Capacity for innovation	-	-	-	49	37	31	26	21	29	43	55	57	72	64	-	44
	AVG of Selected Indicators	-	-	-	83	69	61	47	40	48	72	78	81	85	85	-	68
	Index Overall	-	-	-	35	27	28	21	17	18	20	24	25	29	30	39	26
Economic Freedom of the World Index (Rank out of 162)	Size of Government	-	-	-	-	-	-	126	131	133	136	138	137	131	-	-	133
	Freedom to Trade Internationally	-	-	-	-	-	-	70	68	131	110	124	131	134	-	-	110
	AVG of Selected Indicators	-	-	-	-	-	-	98	100	132	123	131	134	133	-	-	121
	Index Overall	-	-	-	-	-	-	86	95	107	104	108	128	102	-	-	104

Legatum Prosperity Index (Rank out of 149)	Export Quality Index	-	-	-	138	136	131	132	128	128	133	130	130	130	130	130	131
	Labour Force Participation	-	-	-	130	130	130	129	126	120	117	114	112	111	110	110	120
	Ease of resolving insolvency	-	-	-	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	142
	Ease of starting a business	-	-	-	138	78	82	93	97	102	102	106	111	119	120	110	105
	Redundancy costs	-	-	-	120	120	120	120	119	119	90	93	93	92	92	111	107
	Personal Freedom	-	-	-	146	146	147	144	143	145	144	144	135	136	135	135	142
	Political terror scale	-	-	-	88	79	111	111	124	114	118	91	81	89	116	124	104
	Civil liberties	-	-	-	137	138	137	136	135	148	148	147	147	147	147	147	143
	Social religious restrictions	-	-	-	141	141	141	136	137	137	134	127	105	111	127	125	130
	Press freedom	-	-	-	142	139	140	141	140	143	143	141	139	144	142	142	141
	Volunteering	-	-	-	104	103	141	117	67	117	101	121	92	103	110	121	108
	Voter turnout (adjusted by democracy level)	-	-	-	137	139	139	136	138	137	139	140	141	140	140	140	139
	AVG of Selected Indicators	-	-	-	130	124	130	128	125	129	126	125	119	122	126	128	126
	Index Overall	-	-	-	87	81	89	84	80	82	80	80	78	81	78	86	82
Global Innovation Index (Rank out of 126)	Innovation Efficiency Ratio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61	70	69	85	96	104	81
	Regulatory Environment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	79	78	77	75	79	71	77
	Business Environment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51	53	77	99	120	126	88
	Gross expenditure on R&D (GERD)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	97	107	110	106	44	41	84
	Ecological Sustainability	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	105	83	67	92	89	89	88
	Ease of getting credit	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51	53	65	69	72	79	65
	Applied tariff rate, weighted mean	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	67	69	73	64	75	84	72
	Females employed with advanced degrees	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	68	-	78	76	75	80	75
	Foreign direct investment, net inflows	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	74	90	105	98	101	100	95
	Patent applications by origin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	79	81	83	70	74	75	77
	Knowledge Impact: ISO 9001 quality certif.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90	92	105	90	95	98	95
	High-tech exports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	115	110	110	109	109	74	105
	ICT services exports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	114	132	-	120	120	117	121
	Trademark application class count by origin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	113	115	114
	Industrial designs by origin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	103	97	103	101
	Creative goods exports	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	104	88	88	85	96	72	89
	Country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	92	92	90	86	87	87	89
	Wikipedia yearly edits	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	82	67	67	65	66	74	70
AVG of Selected Indicators	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	83	84	84	88	89	88	86	
Index Overall	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	38	43	49	55	61	48	

Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators 2004-17 (<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports>); The Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom 2004-18 (<https://www.heritage.org/index/visualize>); World Bank, The Ease of Doing Business Index 2005-18 (<http://www.doingbusiness.org/>); World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-18 (<https://www.weforum.org/>); Fraser Institute, The Economic Freedom of the World Index 2010-16 (<https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/dataset>); Legatum Institute, The Legatum Prosperity Index 2007-18 (<https://www.prosperity.com/rankings>); Cornell University, INSEAD, and WIPO, The Global Innovation Index 2013-18 (<https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicator>).