

Regionalistic Nationalism in the Basque Country and Galicia:  
A Voter and Class Based Explanation

Master Thesis

Master Political Science International Relations

Leiden University

Stéphanie van Heusden

Student number: 11 80 576

Supervisor: Dr. J.G. Erk

Second Reader: Dr. L.J.M. Seymour

Haarlem, May 2012

## CONTENT

Acknowledgements	IV
List of Abbreviations	V
List of Tables	VI
Introduction, The Puzzle	7
Literature Review	11
The Influence Of Patterns of Development	11
Influence Of The Perceived Identity and Intellectuals	12
Historic Causes and Suppression	14
Linguistic Differences	16
Literature Review Applied	17
The Influence Of Patterns of Development Applied	17
Influence Of The Perceived Identity and Intellectuals Applied	18
Historic Causes and Suppression Applied	19
Linguistic Differences Applied	21
The nexus and problems with other theories	22
Research Question and Relevance	24
Methodology	25
The Importance of Negative Cases	25
The Possibility Principle	26
Most Similar System Design	27
Methodology of This Research	27
Analysis	28
Electorate of the Basque Nationalist Party	28
Electorate of the Galician Nationalist Party	29

The Influence of Class on Regionalistic Nationalism in Spain	30
Why the Basque Country Is More Regionalistic Nationalistic Than Galicia	32
The Influence of History	32
Use of Regional Language	33
The Influence of the Catholic Church	34
The Age Factor	35
Conclusion	37
The theory and the Future of Spain	38
Further Research	39
Bibliography	41
Tables	46

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. J. Erk for his support, directions and guidance during the writing process of this thesis. He helped me change my disorganized thoughts into what this work is now. But most importantly, he reminded me that a thesis is nothing more than a large paper, and with that gave me the confidence that finishing was a possibility that slowly changed into a certainty.

Second, I would like to thank Dr. L. Seymour for his thorough comments on my research proposal.

Finally, thank you to all my friends and family who offered to help when times were tough and celebrated when deadlines had successfully past.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BNG	Bloque Nacionalista Galego, Galician nationalist party.
EE	Euskadiko Ezkerra, Basque nationalist party.
ETA	Euskadi Ta Asatasuna, armed Basque nationalist organization.
EU	European Union.
GDP	Gross Domestic Product, refers to the market value of all officially recognized final goods and services produced within a country in a given period.
MSSD	Most Similar System Design, method of research which seeks to identify the key features that are different among similar countries.
NLM	National Liberation Movement in Ghana.
PNV	Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Basque nationalist party.
PSdeG	Partido dos Socialistas de Galicia, left wing socialist party in Galicia.
PP	Partido Popular de Galicia, centre-right political party in Galicia.
PV	Possible Voters, the part of the electorate that fits in the voter profile of a political party.
UCD	Union de Centro Democratic, centre-right political party in Galicia.
WW I	First World War.
WW II	Second World War.

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: The Moreno Question.

Table 2: Elections for the Basque Parliament in 2009 .

Table 3: Profile of the Basque regions.

Table 4: Galicia autonomous elections 2005 per region.

Table 5: Profile of the Galician regions.

Table 6: Age and urbanisation division Galicia.

Table 7: Religiosity and perception of parties defending Christian values PNV and EE.

Table 8: Religion in the Basque Country and Galicia in 2006.

Table 9: Distribution of votes of practising and non practising Catholics in 1979 as a percentage of a whole.

Table 10: Age demographics in the Basque Country and Galicia in % of the population in 2008.

Table 11: EU Farm subsidies in 2010.

Table 12: Overall comparison between the Basque Country and Galicia.

## INTRODUCTION, THE PUZZLE

When Meliton Manzanas came back to his residence in 1968, a rude surprise awaited him. Several men had been waiting for his arrival and shot the chief of the secret police in the city of San Sebastian seven times (BBC: 2011). Manzanas did not survive the attack. This was the first planned killing by Euskadi Ta Asatasuna, better known as ETA, which stands for Basque Homeland and Freedom. Since this first shooting more than 800 people have been killed in attacks of ETA, who fight for independence of the Basque Country. Forty years after the start of this reign of terror in October of 2011, ETA declared a unilateral end to its campaign of bombings and shooting stating it wished to seize a "historical opportunity to reach a just and democratic resolution to an age-old political conflict" (Burns 2011). What causes for the members of ETA to be so driven by their ideology that they are willing to sacrifice hundreds of lives? Why does the population of the Basque Country in general perceive such a strong sense of regionalistic nationalism? And why is this not the case in other Spanish regions?

When researching ethnic minorities and how they influence politics, one quickly thinks of secession, nationalism and other problems that may arise. The attention is mainly focused on cases in which these problems show their ugly head. One well known case of a minority striving for secession is the one of the Basque Country in Spain. Throughout their history, the Basques have fought for their autonomy and the prevalence of their local structures and charters (Guibernau: 2008). Of course, not all citizens of this region fight for secessionism and regionalistic nationalism in the extreme manner that ETA does. Still, it is interesting to consider why this ethnic minority has such a strong sense of regionalistic nationalism.

This question becomes even more interesting when one considers that Spanish regions are very diverse when it comes to regionalistic nationalism. The Basque Country is an example of a region with a strong regionalistic nationalistic movement but some Spanish regions are not regionalistic nationalistic at all. A good example of this is Galicia, a region located north of Portugal. This region shows a lot of similarities with the Basque Country. Both are historically and culturally distinct and both enjoy full autonomy (Guibernau 2006: 62). However, there is a great distinction between them: while the Basques are so strongly regionalistic nationalistic, the Galicians are not.

Most theories concerned with explaining why minorities are regionalistic nationalistic in general, and the case of the Spanish regions in particular, focus solemnly on the positive cases. However, as seen in the examples above, there are cases known of minorities that are not regionalistic nationalistic, even in the same nation as others who are. These cases must be researched in order to get a

complete view of regionalistic nationalism as an ideology of minorities. In other words: attention must be paid to the negative cases. Although Mahoney and Goertz (2004: 653) state that the inclusion of negative cases in research is a widely recognized method for theory testing, it has not been given the attention it should have within the field of nationalistic research in general and the Spanish case in specific. In the case of Spain, the negative case of Galicia is mainly used as a control case instead of an active case.

Because of the gap in the literature this research will answer the following question: What can be accounted for the differences between the Basque Country and Galicia when it comes to regional nationalism?

Other authors have shed their light on question about nationalism in Spain. Several theories have been developed on what influences regionalistic nationalism in this country. Multiple factors have been named independent variables to match the dependent variable of regionalistic nationalism in Spain. The influence of patterns of development, perceived identity, intellectuals, historic suppression and language are discussed in the literature. However, as I point out in this article, none of these theories explain why the Basque Country is so regionalistic nationalistic while Galicia is not. This is the case because both regions have many similarities when it comes to the variables named above. Both are historic regions, with there own language, both have been suppressed in the past, both populations have a strong perception of regionalistic feelings and perceive their identity in a manner quite similar to one and another. Therefore, a thorough explanation for the difference between the negative case of Galicia and the Basque Country can not be found in the present literature.

I argue that the explanation can be found in the difference of the electorate of the social class which is deterministic in the presence or absence of regionalistic nationalism: the middle class. The middle class in both regions may have started at the same point, but have been influenced differently because of several factors like economy, history and the use of regional language. This has influenced the societal classes in the Basque Country and Galicia in different ways, which lead to a different outcome in regionalistic nationalism. I will argue that the middle class acts as a rational actor, whose behaviour is a consequence of a balance made of costs against benefits and eventually chooses the behaviour which leads to maximal personal advantage. In order to research how these middle classes are different in the Basque Country and Galicia, research is done through the model of the possible voter of the nationalist parties in both regions; the PNV in the Basque Country and the BNG in Galicia.



This model shows that the chances of more votes for the Basque nationalistic party PNV are significantly higher than for the Galician nationalistic party BNG, simply because it is rational for the middle classes in Galicia and the Basque Country to relate themselves to the regionalistic nationalism question in the manner they do.

That societal classes in general, and the middle class especially, are important in determining regionalistic nationalism becomes clear when one overviews the history of these classes in general and the rise of their power in specific. After the ending of the First World War, it became clear that in the Western world capitalist development had undermined the structural logic of Marx that class polarization would come about. With the diminishment of this idea the possibility for a global and universalistic working class movement as the path of the transformation of a capitalist society into a society with one equal working class seemed to disappear for good. During this time three different societal classes developed: the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the working class (Bush: 1999). Bush (1999: 17-20) argues that the influence of these different classes on nationalism are great. The bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie are a determinant factor when it comes to the development, or the lack of nationalistic feelings and political mobilization.

That the middle class can be decisive when it comes to nationalism becomes clear within the case of African Americans in the United States. Bush (1999) describes that in the case of the United States, the three classes mentioned above went through a developmental stage in which the working class was divided in two; the upper part of the working class sought for connection with the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie and was aiming for political mobilization. The lower part of the working class was made up out of an ethnic minority, being the African American slaves. Because of the discrimination that took place against these people a strong perception of nationalism was present in this group and it turned into a struggle for freedom. One would expect that this lower class would need the power of the higher classes in order to follow through with their ideology. According to Bush (1999) this is the case with Black Nationalism since today the struggle is still present, even though it has changed drastically with the prohibition of slavery.

The influence of the middle class on political phenomena being so important, it is peculiar that this middle class has never been used as the explanatory variable in solving the question on the differences in regionalistic nationalism in Spain. This article is built up in six parts. The first part consists of a literature review. First an overview is presented of what other authors put forward as explanatory variables for the differences in regionalistic nationalism in Spain. However, none of these theories have been applied to the negative case of Galicia. To demonstrate that none of these

theories described are applicable to the case of Galicia in providing an explanation for the differences between regionalistic nationalism in Galicia and the Basque Country, these theories will be applied to the case of Galicia in the second chapter. The third chapter will present the research question that flows out of this review together with the scientific relevance. The fourth part sets apart the methodology used in this research, focusing on negative cases, the possibility principle and the Most Similar System Design. The fifth and sixth chapters consists of the analysis of the voting patterns of the middle classes of both regions researched here. By doing so, a voter profile will be created which shows there is a strong divergence between the voters of the PNV, the Basque nationalist party, and the BNG, the Galician nationalist party. The seventh chapter will provided an explanation for these differences. The final part consists of a conclusion, the impact this theory might have with the changing economics of Spain now that the Euro crisis is coming about and recommendations for further research are provided.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

A considerable amount of literature has been published on the different outcomes of Spanish regions considering regionalistic nationalism. However, none of the explanations are focused directly on the Basque Country and Galicia, or on the decisive role the middle class plays in this matter.

In this part of the paper an overview will be given of what others put forward as explanations of the peculiar differences between Spanish regions when it comes to regionalistic nationalism. This will show what has been found up to this point concerning other Spanish regions as well as indicate what still has to be done and what can be improved in this area.

### The Influence of Patterns of Development

Juan Díez Medrano (1995) presents his explanation on the different outcomes in Catalonia and the Basque Country. He does not include Galicia in his theory or research. Medrano (1995) argues that the different patterns of development of the two regions played a crucial role in the cause of different outcomes in Catalonia and the Basque Country. According to Medrano (1995: 190), these differences in development caused for a difference in the intensity of class conflict, the size of the regional bourgeoisie and the strength of the ties and relationship between the regional political leaders and their national Spanish colleagues. In their turn, these characteristics have shaped the structure of political mobilization and with that the strength of separatist movement.

Applied to the case of Catalonia and the Basque Country: at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century different social groups were harmed by the upcoming capitalism and state centralization in Spain. At first, the different social groups supported local or national political parties, who they perceived to fit their ideology. However, after the electorate of the different classes were let down by these existing parties nationalistic parties arose, influenced by similar developments throughout the rest of Europe (Medrano 1995: 190-192).

The rise of nationalistic political parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country may have occurred during a similar time period, the outcome was very different. In the case of the Basque Country the social base of these parties was formed by social groups displaced by industrialization. The Basque elite did not support these parties since they supported the Spanish centralisation, out of their own economic interest. The Basque bourgeoisie also did not support these parties because this group was too small to have an impact and was also too divided on ideology and opinion (Medrano 1995: 191).

In the case of the Catalans, their nationalistic party was heavily supported by the bourgeoisie, who were unhappy with their inabilities to shape the Spanish politics. In Catalonia a large bourgeoisie

developed during the process of industrialization but its political and economic power was much smaller than was the case in the Basque Country. This led to an unhappy large group of influential intellectuals striving for nationalism. However, the Catalan bourgeoisie never strived as openly for secessionism as their Basque equivalents since they did not underestimate the economic importance of cooperation with Spain as a whole (Medrano 1995: 191-192).

The explanation Medrano (1995) puts forward why there are differences between Catalonia and the Basque Country when it comes to secessionism are largely based on who made up the social base of the nationalistic parties in the two regions. In its turn, this was influenced by differences in economic development. Even though this explanation sounds relevant, and partially overlaps with the theory presented in this thesis since it both focuses on social classes, Medrano failed to apply this theory to other regions in Spain like Galicia. Also, Medrano (1995) solemnly focuses on how the different social classes in the past have influenced the development of regionalistic nationalism. The theory in this thesis will focus on their influence in the present, which of course is also affected by the history of these classes.

#### Influence of the Perceived Identity and Intellectuals

Another explanation of why there is such a different outcome within Spain when it comes to nationalism of the regions has to do with the perceived identity and the influence intellectuals have.

According to Conversi (1990) both the Catalan and Basque languages have been an important factor within the nationalistic movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country since it influenced the perceived sense of identity in the two regions. However, because of the high diffusion and liveliness of the Catalan language, the use of it became a key element in the development of Catalan regionalistic nationalism, and around it the nationalistic movement was able to develop and grow. The use of the Catalan language was promoted by politicians, artists and nationalists, who all emphasized the importance of the use of the regional language and even suggested a federal Spain with divisions based upon the use of the different languages. This to the contrary of Euskada, the Basque regional language, which was poorly diffused, which caused for Basque intellectuals to overlook this important factor, especially in the early moments of the nationalistic movement. The origins of the two movements were therefore centred around different core values, the regional language in Catalonia and race and religion in the Basque Country. During the development of the movement, the Catalans kept loyal with language as a core factor of their regionalistic nationalism, while the Basques changed these key elements often. This led to two different situations: Catalans closely relate their identity to the usage of their language. To the contrary; the Basques did not

identity themselves as much through their language but through their race and religion. This is the cause of the difference between the inclusive nationalism of Catalonia and the exclusive nationalism of the Basque Country. Simply stating: one can learn a language but can not change ones race. Therefore, the Basques are much more exclusive then the Catalans are. This leads to the fact that Catalans do not perceive the need for secession as strongly as the Basques do. The latter perceive themselves as a whole different and unique group, which should enjoy exclusive rights (Conversi: 1990).

Conversi (1990) puts forward an explanation in which the intellectuals of the region are highly influential because they mold which core values are perceived to be the ones responsible for the regionalistic identity. In this case, intellectuals molded the core values around which the nationalistic movement rose; the regional language in Catalonia and race and religion in the Basque Country. Yoshino (2001: 144-145) agrees with the fact that intellectuals are highly determinative when it comes to nationalistic movements of the regions. However, a division is made by Yoshino (2001: 143) when it comes to primary and secondary nationalism and the influence different types of intellectuals have on both processes.

Primary nationalism is imposed from above and imposed on society via the state, for example through the educational system and official ceremonies. Secondary nationalism is the maintenance and re-enhancement of national identity in established nations. Secondary nationalism is not imposed through the state and its power on society but originates in the ideas of artists, authors and other non-state actors. Therefore, secondary nationalism is much more informal then primary nationalism and is a market oriented process.

Elites of the state mainly play a role in primary nationalism, since they are 'historians' or myth-makers. For example: with the power these state elites impose on national education the opinion of youngsters can be molded into what the state desires it to be. This will influence these youngsters and their feeling of nationalism when they grow up and is partly responsible for the presence or absence of the feeling of historical suppression and relative deprivation, which will be discussed later in this chapter as an important factor in the sense of regionalistic nationalism. To sum up, the state based elite class provides society with a sense of common and distinctive ancestral history and culture. This in its turn provides for a feeling of common uniqueness and unites past and present generations. This to the contrary of secondary nationalism, which is much more free and less deterministic because the chances of this type of nationalism of reaching the whole population of a

state are much smaller than in the case of primary nationalism. However, Yoshino (2001: 144) argues that secondary nationalism is still highly influential in cases as Japan and South Africa.

Applied to the Spanish case; secondary nationalism was strongly present and has influenced the development of regionalistic nationalism in both regions. The non-state elite have influenced the usage of the regional language in both regions, be it in opposite directions. In Galicia the use of this language is perceived as backward and underdeveloped, which is partially caused by the absence of literature and art in Galego. This to the contrary of the Basque Country, where the usage of the regional language is associated with upward mobility. This will be discussed in more depth later.

Next to the influence these non-state elite had on the use of regional language, Guibernau (2000) describes that the Basque elite was divided between those who supported Francoism and those who did not. The latter group was often prosecuted by the regime but this could not stop this growing group of elite from fighting for the Basque identity. Guibernau (2000) argues that these nationalistic elites are a necessary requisite for nationalism to rise and the strive for secessionism to occur. All together, the influence of state based and non-state elite on regionalistic nationalism in Spain can be described as strong.

#### Historic Causes and Suppression

Historical suppression implies that when a minority has been suppressed in the past this is very likely to influence the possible presence of regionalistic nationalism. The reasons for this are several. Firstly, when a minority has been suppressed in the past, the chances are high that others in the region have been suppressed as well. Even if this is not the case, suppression of a group does not favor the community feeling of the nation state, which leads to a higher sense of regionalistic nationalism in the suppressed region.

Secondly, when a community has been suppressed in the past, it is very likely that this leads to aggression within the minority towards the suppressors, mostly who are now the central government. Gurr (1993: 167) puts the blacks in South Africa, even though they are not a minority but they have been suppressed, and the Kurds in Iraq forward as examples of ethnic groups which have grievances about differential treatment and suppression in the past. Both groups have been suppressed in the past and nowadays suffer under unequal rights and opportunities compared to other groups in their nations. This leads to an aggressive outlook towards the central government, heightens nationalistic feelings and may be a reason for regionalistic nationalism.

In case of Spain, the historic regions have been suppressed in the past by the Castilians, who are now a large part of the political rulers in Madrid. Therefore, the Basques might feel a strong sense of animosity against Madrid and its rulers, which makes the sense of regionalistic nationalism even higher.

Thirdly, and maybe most important, historical suppression might add to the feeling of relative deprivation. This theory has been put forward by Gurr (1993) who describes relative deprivation one of the main reasons why minorities rebel and try to secede. Korpi (1974) describes relative deprivation and the conflicts which may arise from it as:

“Conflicts like revolutions and collective violence are primarily responses to an intolerable gap between normative expectations and actual achievements created by cumulated experiences of hardship in a collectivity i.e., as a result of an increase in relative deprivation” (Korpi 1974: 1596).

With that, Korpi (1974) agrees that this feeling of a minority of being deprived compared to others contributes to the likeness of a conflict to occur.

An example of relative deprivation leading to regional or ethnical nationalism is that of the guerilla war in Western Missouri in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. When in 1861 the Union occupied the Missouri River and the military took over the rule of this region this threatened landowners and slaveholders in Missouri since they previously had enjoyed the value of a position they had attained in the past. With the coming of the military rule and the occupation of the Missouri River by the Union, these landowners and slaveholders felt they were being disadvantaged in comparison with others in the same position in other regions which were not as heavily suppressed by the Union. This led to a major up rise in violence, ending in a guerilla war directed against the Union Army and pro-Union sympathizers in the region (Bowen 1977). This shows how a feeling of relative deprivation may lead to a heightened sense of nationalism, whether ethnic, regional or otherwise within a group, which may even lead to violence.

All together, being suppressed in the past may cause for a strong sense of regionalistic nationalism by a minority. How does this apply to the Spanish case of the regions researched here? Aguilar (1998) describes how the suppression during the Spanish civil war influenced Basque nationalism. According to Aguilar (1998: 15-16) this civil war was not perceived as a war against the suppression of dictator Franco by the Basques but as a struggle fought against the foreign enemy, being the Spanish state as a whole. Francisco Letamendia, the radical nationalist and member of the PNV stated: “the Civil War continues to be seen as a fight of national resistance against a foreign occupier” (Aguilar 1998: 16).

Aguilar (1998: 21-22) argues that the suppression during the Spanish Civil War was no greater in the Basque region than it was in other Spanish regions. However, because it is perceived in a different manner than in other regions, being the fact that the Basque perceived the civil war as one against the Spanish state and it therefore not being over after the ending of the civil war, this led to a higher sense of suppression in the Basque Country. This in its turn led to a higher feeling of regional nationalism and secessionism. Aguilar (1996: 22) also argues that during the 1960's the Basque Country did suffer greater suppression under the Francoist regime than other Spanish regions. This was evoked by the ETA's terrorist attacks of that period, which caused for great tension between the Basque region and the Francoist regime. Al together, Aguilar (1998) argues that the suppression during and after the civil war caused for a higher sense of regionalistic nationalism and secessionism.

### Linguistic Differences

When linguistic variation is in place, the chances for the presence of a nation state are slimmer and the presence for a highly developed communal identity is probably higher. An example is provided by Brilmayer (1991), who argues that the history of India, Bangladesh and Pakistan was highly influenced by its cultural and linguistic difference. After the British colonial age had passed, the East Pakistanis became increasingly dissatisfied by the ruling of the West Pakistanis. After a civil war, East Pakistan successfully seceded and formed Bangladesh. Different regional languages played a large role in this (Brilmayer 1991: 196). Martinez Herrera (2006: 426) applies this to Spain and argues that flags, culture and the use of language contribute to regionalism in Spain.

Sorens (2005: 307) argues in the same direction: according to him the regionalistic nationalism depends on the strength of the minority's ethnic identity, which is often associated with a minority language. Sorens (2005: 321-322) argues that the Euskadi, the Basque language strongly influences the Basque nationalistic feeling, leading to a higher sense of regional nationalism and secessionist feelings than in region that do not use a minority language. However, Sorens (2005) does not speak about Galicia, which also uses a regional language. Therefore, the theory that the Basques are regionalistic because of the use of Euskadi seems to lack potential as a true explanation.

Five major variables have been set apart here which, according to other authors, influence regionalistic nationalism in Spain: the role of patterns of development, intellectuals, perceived identity, historical suppression and the presence and use of regional language. However, none of the theories have been applied to the negative case of Galicia. Only the theory of Medrano (1995) focuses on social class, but in the next chapter it will become clear why this theory can not be applied to Galicia.



## LITERATURE REVIEW APPLIED

The explanations provided by other authors who are mentioned above only apply to the Basque Country, some in comparison to other Spanish regions like Catalonia. However, these authors do not apply their theories on what leads to the absence of regionalistic nationalism in Galicia, nor is attention paid to the decisive factor of the electorate of the middle class. This following section will present case studies of both regions, stating that these theories do not provide the explanation on why the Basques do perceive strong regionalistic nationalistic feelings and the Galicians do not.

### The Influence of Patterns of Development Applied

According to Medrano (1995) at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century different social groups were harmed by the upcoming capitalism and state centralization in Catalonia and the Basque Country. At first these social classes supported local or national political parties but after they were let down nationalistic parties arose, influenced by similar developments throughout the rest of Europe (Medrano 1995: 190-192). With this, Medrano (1995) argues in the same direction this paper does by under scribing the influence of social classes on the development of regionalistic nationalism. However, Medrano's (1995) theory is based only on how social classes influenced regionalistic nationalism in the past and with that fails to recognize their importance in the presence. Medrano (1995) also avoids the negative case of Galicia in his explanation.

When the theory of the influence of economic development on the mobilization of social classes is applied to the case of Galicia it becomes clear that the possibilities for the development of regionalistic nationalism were present in Galicia, even though it has not been economically prosperous in the past. The reason for this is that both economic prosperity and the absence of this may influence the development of regionalistic nationalism positively. First, there is the possibility that minorities experience an advantage in being an autonomous state because the economy of the 'motherland' is not very prosperous and the minorities expect to do better on their own. This is also the causation that Collier and Hoeffler (2006) put forward. Collier and Hoeffler (2006) argue that common identity is not 'real' since this does not reflect objective social interaction. Therefore, the common identity must be imagined. Collier and Hoeffler (2006) then argue that this identity can only be 'imagined' in cases where parts of the secessionist political communities perceive secession to be economically advantageous, which heightens the sense of regionalistic nationalism.

On the other hand, when a region is economically prosperous and self sufficient, they may feel hesitant towards contributing to the central government in the form of taxes. This is not the case with regions which are economically less blooming. Also, when a region is economically not so

prosperous, it might perceive secessionism and economically advantageous when the central economy is not blooming either.

The Basque Country is one of the most prosperous regions in Spain. Its GDP per capita was €29.986 in 2010 and has risen steadily since 1980 with an average of seven percent a year (Eustat 2012). To compare it; the GDP per capita in Spain as a whole was €22.649 in 2010 (IMF 2012). The unemployment rate in 2010 was 7,4 percent. This is extremely low compared to the unemployment rate in Spain as a whole, which was 20,1 percent in the same year (Eustat 2012). With that, the Basque Country falls in the category described by Collier and Hoeffler (2006) as an economic prosperous region which perceives advantage in economic independence, which leads to a heightened sense of regionalistic nationalism.

This all to the contrary of Galicia, which fits in the latter category named above. One would expect for Galicia to have had an economic prosperous past with its strategical geography location boarding the Atlantic Ocean but this is not the case. The American trade was monopolized by Cadiz and Lisbon's harbour took away the options for Portuguese goods. This developed the Galician economy into what it is now: a large fishing fleet at the relative prosperous coast and a hind land filled with little farms that can barely make ends meet because they are poorly commercialized. As a cause for the Galician backwardness Keating (2001: 226) names the individualistic and family orientated peasant that lacks ambition and is unwilling to cooperate for the greater social good. Also, the businessmen are claimed to not be innovative, poorly trained and unwilling to specialize. With economic prosperity absent, capitalism drove those who did have the right attitude away from the region and the immigration numbers in Galicia got extremely high. In the 1950's there was a massive flow from Galicia to South America. Until the end of the 1950's, fifty percent of all immigrants coming to Argentina Uruguay, Brazil and Venezuela were for Galician origin (Núñez 2002: 231). The major outflow of people was not compensated with people moving into Galicia and the population declined. With that the economy declined even further, which led to one of the lowest GDP numbers of Spain. The GDP per capita of Galicia in 2010 was €17.200. This is much lower then the average in Spain of €22.649. The unemployment rate lays at 18,9 percent, which is lower then the national average of 20,1 percent (Eustat 2012). With this economy being troubled, Galicia would also have had a reason for a sense of regionalistic nationalism since the Spanish economy has been challenged, particularly in the last decade. With that, the Galicians may have perceived that secession would have been desirable since the population could have felt that an autonomous region was economically more advantageous.

I argue that if Medrano's (1995) theory on the influence of the economy in the past can go both ways and that the population of Galicia had plenty of reasons to become regionalistic nationalistic since they would not have been hesitant towards paying taxes to the central government. Therefore, it is a spurious relationship if one argues that a blooming economy always results in regionalistic nationalism. I argue that the independent variable here should not be economics, like Medrano (1995) provides us with, but should be the middle class of both regions making a rational choice, largely based on economics. However, economics itself is not the explanatory factor since it can go both ways.

#### Influence of the Perceived Identity and Intellectuals Applied

Yoshino (2001) argues that elites are very important in the shaping of regionalistic identity. Guibernau (2000) and Conversi (2001) show that different types of elites can be accounted for differences between the Basque region and Catalonia. However, when one researches the identity in Galicia, it becomes clear that there is a strongly regional identity present in this region as well. The Moreno question is used to research this regional identity. This question through which participants will express whether they feel, in this case, Basque and not Spanish, more Basque than Spanish, equally Basque and Spanish, more Spanish than Basque and Spanish and not Basque, provides clear insights in the presence or absence of regional identity (Moreno 2006: 7). Table 1 provides an overview on how these questions have been answered in Galicia and the Basque Country.

To start with the Basque Country; in 1979, nearly fifty percent of the Basques felt more Basque than Spanish and up to 2002 these numbers stay roughly the same. The percentage of Basques feeling more Spanish than Basque declines over time: from 29 percent in 1979 to about 10 percent in 2001. This decline is the cause for the rise in number of people which view themselves equally Basque and Spanish: this number starts with 25 percent in 1979 and rises up to 38 percent in 1989, remaining around the same level ever since (Martinez Herrera 2002: 437). These numbers show that over time polarisation between regionalism and nationalism has declined in Basque Country. However, still about 12 percent more people feel more Basque than equally Basque and Spanish. This shows that there is still a strong sense of Basque identity present.

Equally to the Basque Country did the Galicians in 1979 predominantly perceive themselves as equally Spanish and Galician. With a percentage of 43 this is higher than the 35 percent who view themselves more Galician or only Galician. The least amount of people, 21 percent perceived themselves as only or dominantly Spanish. Over time, this develops into a rise of people who feel equally Spanish and Galician, to 60 percent in 2001. The number of people feeling more Spanish

drops because of this to 10 percent and the people who perceive themselves more Galician flows around 30 or 40 percent (Martinez Herrera 2002: 443).

These numbers show that the Galicians perceive less regionalistic identity in comparison to the Basque Country, which has a lower number of people perceiving themselves as equally Spanish and regional. However, the numbers do not deviate so greatly that it would explain for the difference between regional nationalism being strongly present in the Basque Country and absent in Galicia. With that it is shown that the Basque Country and Galicia might have been influenced by intellectuals in a different way but this has not led to a difference in identity. This makes the explanation of the authors mentioned above unsuitable for explaining the differences in these two regions.

#### Historic Causes and Suppression Applied

Aguilar (1998) argues that the Basque suppression during the Spanish civil war and during the Franco regime influences the nationalistic Basque feelings greatly. However, the suppression of the Basques was not that different of the suppression of other historic Spanish regions.

During the Spanish civil war, the Basque Country officially started in the hands of the republicans, like the rest of Spain. Most of Spain was quickly conquered by the nationalists but the battle took longer in the Basque Country than it did in the rest of the nation. Eventually the nationalists were able to take over the Basque Country but this did not lead to a unitary vision of all Basques supporting the nationalists or republicans. The PNV decided to side with the republicans, since the nationalists were anti-separatists with anti-Basque feelings. The PNV siding with the republicans was enforced when the nationalists, led by General Franco, brutally murdered several PNV members. However, the siding of the PNV with the republicans did not mean this led to a unitary support movement for the republicans in the Basque Country. In Vizeaya and Guipozcoa, many citizens sided with the republicans, leaving some PNV members behind. This was completely different in Navarre and Alava, where not only most of the citizens side with General Franco, it also became one of the regions with the highest numbers of voluntary members of the nationalist's army. This division of the inhabitants causes Aguilar (1998: 9) to call it a civil war between the Basques.

Galicia is one of the regions which was quickly concurred by the nationalists; the first rebellion of the nationalists in July 1936 took over the power in Galicia (Barton 2004: 236). However, this does not mean that the Spanish Civil War did not have any impact on the region. Like the Basque Country, Galicia is one of the historic regions in Spain. The Spanish army officers who took on arms in 1936 at the start of the civil war were infuriated by the program of the Republicans which provided the

historic nationalities with conceding regional autonomy. Therefore, these three historical regions were heavily suppressed during the civil war (Preston 1978: 7-8).

This suppression of the historical regions continues after the ending of the civil war. During the Franco regime, the use of the Galician and Basque languages were suppressed, similar to the Catalan. Because of Franco's ideal of a homogenous Spain, there was a completely control over the mass media and the education system, which led to a loss of the Galician language. During this time, most Galicians were not bilingual since they did not use Castilian. This changed under the regime of Franco, during which Castilian was forced to be taught at school and it was the only language used in the media (Beswick 2007: 69). Similar to the Galician language, the use of Basque was strongly prohibited and cultural manifestations like music and dance were banned. It was a time during which state propaganda took over the place of cultural diversity (Barton 2004: 248).

This shows that suppression was equal in the Basque Country and Galicia during the Franco regime and its preceding civil war. With that it has been shown that the theory of Aguilar (1998) on what influenced Basque nationalism can not be applied to solve the puzzle on why the Galicians do not experience these nationalistic feelings. If Aguilar's (1998) theory was correct, and suppression is an independent variable which strongly influences the dependent variable of nationalism, there should have been hardly any suppression in the Galician region, which is not the case.

When applying the theory of relative deprivation to the cases of the Basque Country and Galicia, it becomes clear that this theory is a questionable device for explaining the differences in this specific case and even in other cases. The theory of relative deprivation implies that when a minority feels deprived in comparison with others around them, they will sense a higher level of regionalistic nationalism and even strive for secessionism then when this sense of relative deprivation is absent. However, the Basques are highly regionalistic nationalistic, whilst the Basque economic is highly prosperous, which goes against this theory. According to the theory of relative deprivations the Galicians should have a high sense of regionalistic nationalism since they are economically deprived compared to other Spanish regions. These problems with the theory of relative deprivation do not only apply to the Spanish case, Wood (1981: 116) argues that there are many instances of economically worse-off groups known who do not feel nationalistic or strive for secession, as well as better off people who do, like the Ibos and Croatians in the 1980's. With that it can be concluded that the theory of relative deprivation, as well as the theory that historic suppression leads to regionalistic nationalism, does not apply to the regions of Galicia and the Basque Country.

### Linguistic Differences Applied

As mentioned above, Sorens (2005: 321-322) argues that Euskadi, the Basque language strongly influences the feelings of nationalism in the Basque Country. However, Galego, the Galician language, is also a separate language of the common Spanish Castillian. This part of the paper will research if there are differences between the two which influence the highly nationalistic feeling in the Basque Country to the contrary of the near absence of this feeling in Galicia.

The Basque language is a very distinctive language, which is close to impossible to learn at a later age and its origins are found in the earliest inhabitants of the region (Plat Parmele 1906: 4). A good measurement of how common the usage of the Basque language is, is the usage of it in schools. This has changed dramatically over the last decades. In the 1970's less then 10 percent of the teachers were able to provide their program in Basque, nowadays this number has heightened to up to 80 percent. This is also reflected by the number of Basque speakers in general: from 24 percent in 1991 to 30 percent in 2010 (Goter and Cenoz 2011: 657).

At this moment about 83 percent of the population of Galicia is able to speak Galego and 61 percent has it as their mother tongue. Galician is taught at primary schools and 73 percent of the children are raised bilingual (Información Estadística 2011). Galego is spoken much more at the countryside then in the urban areas and is used more by the lower class then the middle and upper class (Keating 2001: 227). This usage of Galego by the lower class originates from the 19<sup>th</sup> century. During that time, Galicia experienced a renaissance in their cultural and literary profile. However, this was very different from for example the same period in Catalonia since the region was undergoing a huge emigration wave and was largely underdeveloped. Within the cities of Galicia this lead to the perception that Castilian was the language of sophistication, advancement and success and the Galego was only spoken by poor and rural populations (Beswick 2007: 83).

This shows that even though Galego is used frequently, it is used differently then the Catalan and Basque language. These languages are used in art and literature and are therefore used with pride. This is unlike the Galego, which is only used by the lower classes and more in rural areas. I argue that not the presence of a regional language influences the sense of regionalistic nationalism, but the use of it and the image which it provides its users with is of major importance. This difference between the use of language in the Basque Country and Galicia will be used in the further research in this paper.

### The nexus and problems with other theories

This shows that some parts of the previously described theories on why there is a deviation between the absence and the presence of regionalistic nationalism in Spain can be applied to the case of Galicia. Medrano's (1995) theory on the influence of social classes will partially return later on in this research since it does put emphasize on the importance of the different social classes. However, his argument that a less blooming economy immediately leads to less regionalistic nationalism seems not to be correct.

When the theory of perceived identity is applied it becomes clear that even though there are small differences present between the Basque Country and Galicia, these do not seem large enough to account for the absence of regionalistic nationalism in Galicia.

The third theory applied here focuses on historical suppression, which presumably leads to a heightened sense of regionalistic nationalism. However history shows that Galicia has been suppressed in the past, both during the Spanish civil war and the Franco regime. Therefore, this theory can not explain the different outcome. Nevertheless, I will argue later on that the differences are present in the history of both regions, which does account for part of the explanation. The theory of relative deprivation also lacks explanatory value in these cases. The Basques experience the advantages of economic prosperity together with the sense of regionalistic nationalism. This does not fit the theory of relative deprivation since this theory. When this theory is applied to Galicia it seems that it does not fit here either since the Galicians should have a high sense of regionalistic nationalism because they are economically deprived compared to other Spanish regions and this is not the case.

Finally, the influence of the presence of a regional language is discussed. I show that the theory that when this variable is present, leads to higher regionalistic nationalism does not match with the Galician case since it does have a regional language but is not regionalistic nationalistic. However, I will argue that the use, not the presence, of regional language has influenced this regionalistic nationalism, since it influences voting patterns and societal classes.

All the theories described in the last chapter seem to have problems with explaining the difference in regionalistic nationalism in Galicia and the Basque Country. Neither of them focuses on the electorate of the middle class, even though the answer to the nexus seems to be hiding in there. From here forward, the emphasize will lay on the electorate of the middle class and how this is an explanatory variable to this problem.

## RESEARH QUESTION, RELEVANCE, VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESIS

The literature review shows that even though some explanations are provided by other authors on the causes for the differences in nationalistic feelings in Spanish regions, they do not provide a solid theory on why these feelings are present in the Basque Country and simultaneously absent in Galicia. Therefore, this paper will answer the following research question:

What can be accounted for the differences in between the Basque Country and Galicia when it comes to regional nationalism?

By answering this question inferences can be made about the causes of regional nationalism in general and in Spain in specific. Within the Spanish nation other regions experience feelings of regional nationalism. In some Spanish regions this is combined with the strive for secessionism but this is not always the case. For example the region of Andalucia is not very nationalistic but has strived for secessionism in the past and the population of Catalonia experiences a high sense of regionalistic nationalism in the absence of a strive for secessionism. By researching what leads to the difference in regionalist nationalism in the Basque Country and Galicia inferences can be made about why these differences exist throughout Spain. Also, none of the theories described above provided for a class or voters based explanation to this question. This is peculiar since it is clear that different classes influence nationalism in different manners. By answering the question, the gap in the extensive literature on regionalistic nationalism in Spain will be filled. Also, it provides the opportunity for further research in two directions: that of regionalistic nationalism in Spain and the decisive power coming from the middle class in different situations.

The dependent variable researched in this thesis is regionalistic nationalism, which is applied to the two cases selected; Galicia and the Basque Country. The independent variable which influences this are economics, history suppression and regional language, which in their turn influence the middle classes of both regions. I expect that because of a different course history had, together with the absence or presence of the variables named above, this has influenced the presence of regionalistic nationalism in the Basque Country and the absence in Galicia.



## METHODOLOGY

The methodological tool used in this research is that of negative cases; negative cases should be included in research to provide for complete conclusions. This type of research has not been applied to the field of nationalism in Spain and therefore might lead to new insights.

### The Importance of Negative Cases

As stated before, usually research focuses on cases in which the outcome that an explanation is sought for does occur. Or if negative cases are included, they are mostly used as control cases. However, this underestimates the value of researching the negative cases; or those in which the outcome did not occur. In case of this research this implies that attention is paid to both positive and negative cases. By comparing cases that do want to secede with cases that don't, a more complete insight will be provided on why this difference exists.

Why are negative cases so important? First of all, because they help with what Karl Popper calls 'falsificationism'. Within this method, falsibility is the criterion of demarcation. In other words: a theory may only be called scientific when it can be falsified, or proven wrong. However, this does not mean that a theory should actually be falsified to be scientific. Popper uses the often cited example of white and black swans: the theory 'all swans are white' can be falsified because a non-white swan can be found. Therefore, it is a scientific theory, even if one does not find a non-white swan immediately (Doormalen, de Regt and Schouten 2007: 205-208). Of course, swans have nothing to do with ethnic minorities but the message that a theory must possibly be falsified to be scientific does apply to negative cases. Through the use of negative cases, falsifiability can be proven, which heightens the strengths for a theory.

Much alike but more closely related to negative cases is the raven's paradox. This investigates the theory 'all ravens are black'. All raven-like objects that are also black confirm this theory. However, the paradox can be found in the fact that all non-raven, non-black objects also confirm this theory. In other words: negative cases add to proving a theory (Hempel 1945: 1-5).

In general, Emigh (1997) puts three distinctive reasons forward why the usage of negative cases is positive in social science research. First, it lies the emphasize on the general phenomenon that focusing on differences puts forward explanations. This phenomenon is not only focused on with the usage of negative cases but is generally used in all research methods focusing on most similar system design (see below for a further explanation). Second, by using negative cases, it is relatively easier to distinguish irrelevant variables, events and information. This is caused by the fact that it is more

difficult to assume that when the outcome is negative all of the elements contributed to the outcome. By focusing on positive cases only, it becomes easier to assume that a certain outcome is inevitable, and therefore the observed variables are not the explanatory ones. When comparing this to negative cases, it becomes clear that the outcome is not inevitable and another outcome is possible. The third reason why negative cases are important tools in social science research is that negative cases provide for anomalies necessary to rethink theoretical applications and thereby extend a theory's range. This last reason fits with Lakatos philosophy of scientific research, which was aimed at the gaining of knowledge through the incorporation of potentially damaging findings in the theory (Emigh 1997: 656-659).

### The Possibility Principle

However, as Mahoney and Goertz (2004: 653) suggest, one can not simply pick any negative case in order to perform useful and scientific research. Mahoney and Goertz (2004: 653) suggest that one must follow the possibility principle. This principle states that

“only cases where the outcome of interest is possible should be included in the set of negative cases, cases where the outcome is impossible should be relegated to a set of uninformative and hence irrelevant observations” (Mahoney and Goertz 2004: 653).

This leads to the next problem; how is the concept 'possible' defined, which sets for the boundary between negative and irrelevant. Mahoney and Goertz (2004: 657- 658) propose two rules for implementing the possibility principle: a rule of inclusion and a rule of exclusion. The rule of inclusion implies that cases are relevant if at least one independent variable is positively related to the outcome of interest. The rule of exclusion states that cases are irrelevant if it possesses a value on a variable which previous research determined to be impossible to lead to the outcome of interest. This rule of exclusion prevails over the rule of inclusion. For example; if one proposes a theory on genocide which highlights ethnic diversity as one of the most important independent variables. According to the rule of inclusion, Canada could be included in this research since it is a nation with a high level of ethnic diversity. However, previous research shows that political upheaval must be present in order for genocide to occur. Since this variable is absent in the case of Canada, it can not be included and used as a negative case.

When this possibility principle is applied to the research on regionalistic nationalism in Spain, Galicia may be included as a negative case. First, it fits the rule of inclusion since many independent variables which may cause for regionalistic nationalism are present in Galicia; the region has been suppressed in the past and it has its own language and culture. Galicia also follows the rule of exclusion since no previous research has indicated that with the variables present in Galicia

regionalistic nationalism is an impossibility in Galicia. With that, Galicia may be used as a proper negative case.

#### Most Similar System Design

Another research method used here is that of the Most Similar System Design (MSSD). As Landman (2000) puts it: this method “seeks to identify the key features that are different among similar countries and which account for the observed political outcome” (Landman 2000: 70). In this case, a comparison is not made between countries but between regions. As stated above, Galicia has a lot of similarities with the Basque Country but both have a different outcome when it comes to regionalistic nationalism. By comparing the two and searching for the differences in variables, the explanations for the difference in regionalistic nationalism can be found. With that inferences can be made about other regions with the same similarities (Collier, Seawright and Munck 2004: 24-25).

#### Methodology of this research

In order to find an explanation for the differences between regionalistic nationalism in Galicia and the Basque Country an analysis will be made of the voter of both PNV and BNG, the nationalistic parties of both regions. Both parties are regionalistic nationalistic and by researching their electorate, I construct a profile of the population in both regions who are regionalistic nationalistic. By comparing the two profiles, I expect to find both similarities and differences between the two. When this voter profile is known, it is researched how many people of the middle classes of both regions fall into this category. Then, the number of people who would rationally vote for PNV and BNG is known, and with that are therefore regionalistic nationalistic. The research will show that it is rational for the middle class of the Basque Country to vote for the PNV and not rational for the citizens of Galicia to vote for BNG. With that, it becomes clear why the Basque Country is regionalistic nationalistic and Galicia is not.

## ANALYSIS

Major difference can be found in the percentage of votes going to the regional nationalist parties; in the 2009 autonomous elections for the Basque Parliament, 36 percent of the votes were rewarded to the PNV, the Basque Nationalist Party (Eustat 2012). In comparison; during the 2009 elections for the Galician parliament only 17 percent went to the nationalist party, the Galician Nationalist Bloc. This made this party the third largest party in Galicia (Xunta de Galicia 2012). When trying to find the cause of why the number of citizens voting for regional nationalistic parties is that much higher in the Basque Country than it is in Galicia, and with that the influence of the different classes in both region on regionalistic nationalism, an analysis will be made on which people vote for the two parties.

### Electorate of the Basque Nationalist Party

When analysing the 2009 elections for the Basque Parliament more thoroughly, several aspects are peculiar (see Table 2). First, the percentage of votes used varies some between the different regions of the Basque Country. In Bizkaia 61 percent of the electorate used their votes while in Gipuzkoa only 53 percent decided to do so. A second observation that stands out is that there is some variation between the regions in the percentage of people voting for the PNV. The highest percentage of 41 percent can be found in the Bizkaia. This is more than 8 percent higher than in Alava, where only 30 percent of the electorate voted for the PNV. Note worthy is the fact this eight percent of the electorate in Alava that decided not to vote for the PNV used their votes for the Popular Party. This party received 21 percent of the votes in Alava and only 13,9 percent in the Bizkaia.

So, when researching which people vote for the PNV, one must research what the differences in population are between Alava and the Bizkaia. Table 3 depicts the results of case studies of these regions and shows that there are major differences to be found. First, the GDP per capita is the lowest in Alava of all Basque regions. Second, the percentage of Alava population born in Alava is only 50,2 percent. This is much lower than for instance the same variable in the Bizkaia with 68 percent. This low percentage shows that there has been much migration for Alava to other Basque regions, other regions in Spain or even abroad. Most part of the population, 26,8 percent, works in the manufacturing industries and is therefore part of the 'working force'. This is the opposite of Bizkaia, where only 8 percent may be accounted to this working force. The last remarkable observation is that only 2,3 percent of the population of Alava speaks Basques, which is only a fraction of the 30 percent in Bizkaia.

From a comparison between Alava and Bizkaia a profile of the PNV voter can be conducted. The PNV voter has a high sense of Basque identity, which is reflected in the ability to speak Basque and the

fact that he originates from the region. He is working in the middle or upper class and has a relative high income.

Secondary sources add to this profile that the PNV voter is a practising Catholic (see Table 9) and is old, with 49 percent of the electorate being 50 tot 70 years old and only 8 percent between 18 and 35 (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 372-375).

#### Electorate of the Galician Nationalist Party

As is the case with the Basque Country in Galicia the votes for the nationalist party, the BNG varies between regions. Table 4 shows that in La Coruna nearly 6 percent more people decided to use their vote for the BNG then in Lugo. When a comparison is made between the two regions it becomes clear that the inhabitants of La Coruna probably have a higher sense of Galician identity since many of them speak the language and were born in the area (see Table 5). Research of the electorate of the BNG shows that its average voter is young and that the population of the urban areas are slightly more likely to vote BNG (see Table 6).

This a very limited profile of the BNG voter, namely him having a relative strong sense of regional identity, mainly living in the city and relatively young. When secondary sources are characteristics are added it shows that the BNG voters are mainly non practising Catholics (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 386).

This analysis shows that differences are present in the electorate of the PNV and BNG. With that, a voter profile has been set up for both parties, which shows similarities on some points and differences on others. The next sections will discuss both these similarities and differences in depth.

## THE INFLUENCE OF CLASS ON REGIONALISTIC NATIONALISM IN SPAIN

The previous part shows that the average voter of the PNV and BNG diverge on some characteristics and are similar on others. With that not only a profile is presented of the average voter of the two regionalistic nationalistic parties, it also provides a profile of the average nationalistic citizen in the two regions. This is the case because one can assume that the regionalistic nationalistic citizens in both regions would vote for these parties.

As has been stated before, the influence of class on political mobilization is high and this is also the case with regionalistic nationalism. I argue that the middle class in both regions influence the intensity of regionalistic nationalism highly. I will argue that voting for BNG is not attractive for the middle class in Galicia, while voting for PNV is attractive for the same group in the Basque Country. With that comes the fact that being regionalistic nationalistic is rational for the middle class of the Basque Country, and at the same time is not rational for the middle class in Galicia. The reason for this is mainly economic, which is influenced by other variables researched.

As it has been described before: economics may influence regionalistic nationalism positively in two possible manners. First, when a region is economically affluent, it may strive for secession because the population believes it would be economically better off when it does not pay centralised taxes. On the other hand, when a region is economically not so prosperous, it might perceive secessionism and economically advantageous. However, this is only the case if the region has economical problems which may be solved when secessionism has occurred. When this is not the case secessionism, and with that regionalistic nationalism, can hardly be found economically advantageous. The latter is the case in Galicia: it is economically unadvantageous to secede for this region, and therefore the feeling of regionalistic nationalism is low. The explanation of this lays with the voters, and in particular the middle class.

Galicia is an economically troubled region, with one of the lowest GDP's of all regions in Spain. Because of this, Galicia is economically highly dependent on the centralised power in Spain and on the European Union. Examples of this dependence can be found when comparisons are made between farming subsidies in the Basque Country and Galicia (see table 11). The amount of farming subsidies received in Galicia in 2010 is almost 14 times as high as the amount received in the Basque Country. Of course, Galicia's agricultural industry is much higher than in the Basque Country and therefore it is logical that more subsidies are received in Galicia. However, the number of recipients in Galicia is only five times higher than in the Basque Country. This shows Galicia's high dependence on subsidies.

Next to these high amounts of subsidies Galicia receives from the European Union, it also has a high level of dependence on the centralised Spanish system. One can imagine that with the one of the lowest GDP numbers in the whole of Spain, and simultaneously such a high level of unemployment, this region relies on the central authorities greatly. This in contrast to the Basque region, which has a much lower unemployment percentage, 7,4 percent instead of the 18,1 percent in Galicia, and a much higher GDP.

I argue that voters use their vote according to the rational choice model. This model states that all actors are rational and that these actors can be modelled when they choose between the range of strategies that are open to them, as if they made this choice on the basis of a calculation. Through this model, one can always calculate in what manner actors would act, since it is assumed that they would make a calculation of what is most rational and follow this path (Laver 1997:22). When this model is applied to the cases studied here, it is logical that the middle class of Galicia does not perceive regionalistic nationalistic feelings since it would be economically extremely unadvantageous to secede from the Spanish nation. This to the contrary to the Basque cases, where the economy flourishes, the GDP is higher than the Spanish average and the unemployment rate lower. For this region to secede, it would experience many economic advantages.

However the influential middle class is not only impacted by economy. The influence of the other classes may not be underestimated. The analysis showed that the average PNV voter is older and has an income higher than the average. This shows that a larger part of the upper class is regionalistic nationalistic in the Basque Country. As stated before, Yoshino (2001: 144-145) agrees with the fact that intellectuals are highly determinative when it comes to nationalistic movements of the regions. This is the case because they are responsible for shaping the image the lower classes have of the region. As Yoshino (2001) calls it; they are mythmakers. These mythmakers are regionalistic nationalistic in the case of the Basque Country, but they are not in the case of Galicia.

The next part will provide for an explanation why it is rational for the Basque middle class to vote for the PNV and be regionalistic nationalistic and at the same time this is not the case for the middle class in Galicia.

## WHY THE BASQUE MIDDLE CLASS IS MORE REGIONALISTIC NATIONALISTIC THEN GALICIA

When the voter profiles are applied to the profiles of the regions as a whole the answer is straight forward: simply more Basque voters fit into the voting profile of the PNV then Galician voters do with the profile of the BNG (see Table 3 and 5). I call this group the possible voters, or PV. For example: the PV in Galicia is limited because the number of native speakers is limited. This to the contrary of the PV in the Basque Country, this is much higher because the percentage of population speaking Basque is much higher. The PV in Galicia is also confined because of the lower percentage of people born in the region, to the contrary of the Basque Country. The base for the difference in PV in the Basque Country and Galicia is found within the middle class, which is made up differently in the two regions. In the Basque Country this middle class is made up out citizens with a high sense of regional identity, caused by the factors named above. This to the contrary to the middle class of Galicia, which is less regionalistic nationalistic. Why these differences in the middle classes of the two regions diverge so much will be discussed here. First, an explanation will be provided for the similarities in both regions which are a part of the explanation: both have a similar history of suppression and both have regional languages. After that, the differences in the voter profiles and how this is part of the theory of the decisive factor of the middle class will be discussed.

### The Influence of History

Why are the middle classes in both regions so different? The answer can be found in the influence of the history of the two regions. As stated before, the history of Galicia has not been as prosperous as could have been expected with the strategic location it finds itself in. The economic limitations of the 20<sup>th</sup> century have led to high immigration numbers, which caused for the Galicians to find themselves trapped in a downward economic spiral. This all to the contrary of the Basque Country, which was going through an economically very prosperous time with a GDP twice as high as in Galicia during the same time. This led to a much lower emigration number in this region, and with that was preserving the regional identity (Payne 1975: 230-232).

This difference in economics in the past still influences regionalistic nationalism in the regions in the present in two ways. The first is that because Galicia never has been economically prosperous, the chances for its economics to make a positive turn are slim. With these economic problems, the rational direction for the Galicia middle class would be to maintain their relationship with Madrid it is in the present. This because with the maintenance of this relationship comes the economic certainty which the Galicians can not provide for themselves. This to the contrary of the Basque Country. This region has been prosperous in the past, and therefore is prosperous now. With the Basque Country being a region with a GDP per capita almost twice as high as the national average,



and an unemployment rate much lower than the Spanish numbers, it is economically costly for the Basques to keep their ties with Madrid and relinquish part of their economic prosperity with that.

The second manner in which the economic differences of the past influence regionalistic nationalism in today's society is that, like the influence the past economics have on present economics, the presence or absence of regionalistic nationalism in the past influence the absence and presence of it today. It has never been rationally relevant for the middle class of Galicia to have a sense of regional nationalism since there was no rational reason for the middle class to strive for secession or be regional nationalistic. This history of an absence of regionalistic nationalism leads to an absence today. The reason for this is that citizens of the Galician region do not grow up with a regionalistic feeling, and therefore do not sense this regionalistic nationalism throughout the rest of their lives. In the Basque Country, citizens did get raised with this sense of regionalism, which marks their feelings towards it in the present and future.

#### Use of Regional Language

A second influential factor to the sense of identity is the different usage of the regional language. Galego, the Galician language is spoken much more at the countryside than in the urban areas and is used more by the lower class than the middle and upper class (Keating 2001: 227). In the Basque Country, the use of Basque is associated with an upward mobility. The Basques use their language with pride, which adds to the feeling of regionalistic nationalism (Beswick 2007: 83). In Galicia the use of this language is not associated with any type of positive development and therefore it does not add to the regional pride and a sense of regional nationalism. This different use and association of regional language makes for two different middle classes in both regions.

The different development of the Galician and Basque sense of regional identity can be imputed to the different economic development, which caused for different immigration waves, or the lack of them. This in its turn influenced regionalistic nationalism in the present in two ways; the economy in the present is partially caused by past economics and the economic possibilities in a region. The second reason is that citizens in the Basque Country have always been regionalistic nationalistic because of the economic prosperity, which causes them to experience this feeling since they were youngsters, which influences them throughout their lives. This to the contrary of Galicia.

Also, the usage of the regional languages are very different, Galego is used with much less pride than Euskada is. These two factors contribute heavily to the difference in regional identification, which lead to a different PV for both regions.

Next to these variables which seemed to be similar, differences can be found in the voter profiles. This can be found in the differences in the voter profiles. Two main differences stand out: the difference in age and Catholicism. These differences will be focused on next because they will provide for the second part of the explanation.

### The Influence of the Catholic Church

Religion originally played a central role in the regional nationalistic politics in the Basque Country. The intentions of the founder of the PNV, Sabino Arana, were to defend the Basque culture, language and religion against the invasion of other cultures. This also comes forward in the 1960 manual of ETA, which started off as a daughter of the PNV. This document states that:

“A logical premise of our activity must be a tremendous concern with responsibility of our behaviour; this behaviour is consistent with an ideal, with the vocation of a nationalistic faith because must understand that, as the apostle demonstrated regarding his Christian faith that without labour such faith was lifeless, so must be also with our nationalist faith. And we need a great deal of living faith, for he who fights with faith deserves victory” (Pérez Agote 2006: 85).

However, because of the secularization, which also occurred in the very religious Basque region, the regional nationalism slowly reformed into political nationalism instead of cultural and religious nationalism. Or as Pérez Agote (2006: 88) puts it: “politics became sacred”.

This secularisation of the regional nationalistic parties did not mean that religion disappeared all together in the party politics and program. Table 7 shows that the PNV is still perceived by the religious and non religious parts of the population as defending Christian values. This table also shows that even though Christianity used to be viewed as being intertwined with regional nationalism in general, the EE (Euskadiko Ezkerra), is perceived to defend these values much less than it is the case for the PNV. This is peculiar since the EE is also a nationalistic party. This shows that the PNV in particular is linked with the perception of defending Christian values. This explains why many Christians vote for the PNV.

That Catholics are not as drawn to the BNG as to the PNV is clearly depicted in Table 9. Only 19 percent of the BNG electorate considered themselves as practising or non practising Catholics. This to the contrary of the 62 percent of the PNV voters. The BNG is a left wing nationalistic party, which usually has a non-religious and young electorate (Gunther, G., G. Sani and G. Shabad 1986: 371). This influences the PV for the PNV in a positive manner. In 2006, 57 percent of the Basques were Catholics and 53 percent of the Galicians found themselves to be practising or non practising

Catholics (see Table 8). Because of the history of the PNV and its close connection with the Catholic Church, this increases the number of possible voters for the PNV over the number of possible voters for the BNG.

In this again, the power of the electorate on how the region develops in the direction of regionalistic nationalism becomes clear. Because of the strong Catholic preferences of the Basque middle class, the PNV receives more votes than the BNG since the numbers of middle class citizens in Galicia who are Catholic are much lower.

### The Age Factor

As stated above, a major difference between the PNV and the BNG electorate is that the PNV seems to attract older people while the BNG do so with the younger part of the population. Why is this the case?

Theories do provide a simple explanation on why the elder part of the population would vote for the PNV more often; simply because elders vote more often than young adults do (Campbell et al 1960: 493-496). However, this does not explain why more young adults vote for the BNG, like the research has shown. The cause for this can be found in voting patterns. The reason why people would vote for regional nationalistic parties is that they feel a strong sense of identity with the region and feel proud. The way people vote is determined in their younger years, and has an influence on their voting behaviour throughout life. The elderly group voting for the PNV at this moment grew up in the 1950's and 1960's, periods which were very prosperous for the Basque region. The economic gap with the rest of Spain has never been so high, in a positive manner for the Basques. This caused for a higher sense of regional identification and regional contentment (Payne 1975: 227-238).

The period after the 1950's also fed the nationalistic feelings of the Basques. In the 1960's Basque nationalism began to dominate the political and social realm and young adults perceived the Franco regime as one of horror. The answer to this horror was the Basque nationalistic ideology, which provided for the possibility of active political participation, something this generation longed for (Pérez Agote 2006: 112). It is logical and rational that the generation of the 1950's up to the 1970's voted for the PNV in their youth and continued to do so up to the 2009 elections. This all to the contrary of Galicia, which was economically challenged during this time, it was one of the regions which was the least content with itself and suffered from major immigration numbers (Payne 1975: 229-236). This all led to a low sense of regional identity, which explains the low number of elderly voted for the BNG.

What causes the young generation to vote for BNG then? Galicia is still economically less prosperous than the Basque country, with a GDP per capita in 2009 of €17.200, which is almost half of the €29.986 in the Basque region. However, the Galician economy has been growing the past decade and the unemployment rate is 18,9 percent, which is lower than the Spanish rate of 20,1 percent (Eustat 2012). This upward mobility of the economy influences young adults to sense an increasing regional nationalistic feeling. This economy growth is not the case in the Basque region, with a GDP per capita being steady for a number of years (Eustat 2012). This causes for the young people to not vote for PNv as much as they do for BNG.

This explains why the average age of the electorate of the PNv and the BNG diverge. This divergence does not influence the PV since the age demographics are quite similar in the two regions (see Table 10). However, it is a final proof of the decisive power of the middle class. In the Basque Country the middle class who votes for the PNv has been born in the 1950's and 1960's, a time which was prosperous for the Basques on many levels. This part of the population grew up with regionalistic feelings, which causes for them to continue a strong sense of this throughout their lives. In Galicia this same generation did not experience regionalistic nationalism in their younger years, and with that grew up in a time in which it was rational for the middle class to not be regionalistic.

## CONCLUSION

The question which has been answered with this research is: What can be accounted for the differences in between the Basque Country and Galicia when it comes to regional nationalism?

Many authors provided the field of political science with their visions of how to explain secessionism in the Basque Country, or how to explain the differences between this region and Catalonia when it comes to regionalistic nationalism. The explanations described here are based on the role of patterns of development, intellectuals, perceived identity, historical suppression and the presence and use of regional language. However, none of the authors above focused on the negative case of Galicia, a Spanish region north of Portugal. This lack of attention for this negative cause is unfortunate, since it does fit the possibility principle; it fits the rule of inclusion as well as the rule of exclusion provided by Mahoney and Goertz (2004). This leads to a research according to the Most Similar System Design, which focuses on the differences between the two cases. Table 12 provides a clear overview on the similarities and differences between the regions, and it must be concluded that economics provides the variables which deviate the most between the two regions. It has been argued here that the importance of economics can be explained through the decisive power the middle class has as a group of national actors.

The middle class of the Basque Country has developed differently than the same class in Galicia, which leads to a different outcome as to which ideology is rational for both classes to support. The middle class in this region has been influenced by history in two different manners. First, since the Basque Country has been economically prosperous in the past, the chances are high that economics would be thriving in the present, which is the case. Also, since the Basque Country has been economically blooming in the past, a sense of regionalistic nationalism has been present throughout the lives of the current citizens. Because of that, it is logical for the middle class of the Basque Country to remain regionalistic throughout their whole lives. This is antagonistic to the case of Galicia, in which the economics have been troublesome in the past and therefore there has been an absence of regionalism within the middle class since it is not rational for this class to support this ideology. The reason for this is that it is economically more interesting for the Galicians to support Madrid and stay a part of the state of Spain.

Another attribution to the divergence between the two social classes is the use of the regional language. Because of the economic problems in the past, the use of Galego is coupled with backwardness in Galicia and is not as widely, and certainly not as proudly used as the Euskada in the Basque Country. This accounts for a different developed sense of pride with the two regions, which makes it rational for both classes to relate to regionalistic nationalism in the manner they do.

The third influence on the difference between the two middle class finds its origin within the Catholic faith. Both PNV and BNG have a Catholic base, and because the middle class of the Basque Country of more Catholic than the same class in the Galician region, it is logical and rational for the two classes to vote the way they do.

The final independent variable influencing the regionalistic nationalism of the middle classes in both region is the age factor. The average PNV voter is much older than the average BNG voter. The reason for this is that the older generation in the Basque Country grew up in an economically prosperous time, in which it was rational to be regionalistic nationalistic. This is not the case with Galicia, which was economically challenged during the same period.

With that, this research has provided an explanation for the differences between regionalistic nationalism between the Basque Country and Galicia based on the middle classes and the rational choice they make when using their vote. It is rational for the middle class of the Basque Country to be regionalistic nationalistic because it is economically advantageous for them to support that ideology. Also, they have grown up with this regionalistic sense, have a language and culture which is used with pride and are strong support of the Catholic Church, which is linked to regionalism. In Galicia, it is unadvantageous and irrational for the middle class to be regionalistic nationalistic since there is no economic gain for the middle class, there has never been a strong feeling of regionalism, the language is used with much less pride and the middle class does not support the Catholic Church as much as is the case in the Basque Country. With that, the nexus of using the negative case of Galicia and providing a class based explanation for the differences between the Spanish regions when it comes to regionalistic nationalism has been filled.

#### The theory and the future of Spain

The theory that the middle class can be very decisive when it comes to regionalistic nationalism may be applied to the future expectations of Spain as a nation.

Now that Spain is economically imbalanced, and problems in the Euro zone arise, it can be expected that the middle class in both regions researched adjust to this economic transition. With that may come changes in regionalistic nationalism. In the case of Galicia it can be expected that when it becomes economically disadvantageous, or at least less advantageous than it is now, to support Madrid the middle class of this region will become more regionalistic nationalistic. The reason for this is, like described above, because this middle class is made up of rational actors, and as soon as it becomes more advantageous to be independent of Madrid, the middle class will fight for that. In the

case of the Basque Country change influenced by the economic uncertainty of Spain as a whole will be less likely since the middle class is already regionalistic nationalistic. However, economic instability in Madrid may also cause for other regions to become more regionalistic nationalistic than they are at this moment. Examples of this are Catalonia, Extremadura and Aragon.

#### Further research

The other authors presented at the beginning of this paper did not apply their theories to other regions in Spain. I would recommend for further research to be done to other regions in Spain to provide this theory with more stability. It would be interesting to apply this to the case of Catalonia, which is also highly regionalistic nationalistic and the third historic region next to Galicia and the Basque Country. It could also be applied to the case of Andalucia, which is lacking regionalistic nationalism.

Application of this theory to the region of Catalonia would be interesting since this region, as stated above, experiences a lot of similarities with the regions researched in this thesis. Like the Basque Country and Galicia, Catalonia as the third historic region of Spain was heavily suppressed during the course of history. During the Franco Regime Catalonia was severely suppressed. The same regulations accounted for the Catalans as they did for the Basques; the Catalan language was prohibited and cultural expressions were banned. Especially the prohibitions of the use of the Catalan language were rigorous; all public notices, advertisements and documents had to be replaced by ones in the 'national language'. Also, civil servants and teachers who refused to use Castillian were immediately dismissed (Barton 2004: 247).

Also, the Catalan region shows similarities with the Basque Country and Galicia when it comes to feelings of regionalism. When the Moreno question is asked to the Catalans, it provides a somewhat similar image as in the Basque Country. In 2002 37 percent thought they were equally Catalan and Spanish, only 21 percent felt only Spanish or more Spanish than Catalan and 41 percent felt only Catalan or more Catalan than Spanish. When this is compared to earlier numbers it showed that over time, less people viewed themselves as only Spanish, but unlike the case in the Basque Country, did this not only cause for an increase in the number of people that felt equally Spanish and Catalan, it also accounted for a growth in the part of the population that felt solely Catalan or more Catalan than Spanish (Martinez-Herrera 2002: 435-436).

Next to the examples described above, other similarities can be found between Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia; there is a regional language in place which is widely used, and the GDP per capita is relatively high with €27.713 in 2010, similar to the Basque case.

The case of Catalonia could be compared to the case of Andalucia, a region that does not experience a sense of regionalistic nationalism, which becomes clear when the Moreno Question is asked in this region. Statistics show that, compared to the other regions, Andalucia has an extremely high percentage of people who feel equally Andalucian and Spanish: 68 percent. Of the remaining people, 18 percent feels more Andalucian than Spanish and 14 percent feels more Spanish than Andalucian (CIS 2012).

I argue that an explanation for these differences between these two regions in Spain can be found in the middle class of Catalonia and Andalucia. By applying this theory to other regions, it gains profoundness and stability and it may fill the gap which is currently present in the literature.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aguilar, P. (1998) 'The Memory of the Civil War in the Transition Towards Democracy: The Peculiarity of the Basque Case', *West European Politics*, 21(4): 5-25.

Barton, S. (2004) *A History of Spain*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

BBC (2011) Time line: ETA Campaign. On: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11181982> (8-5-2012).

Beswick, J. (2007) *Regional Nationalism in Spain, Language Use and Ethnic Identity in Galicia*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters LTD.

Bowen, R. (1977) 'Guerrilla War in Western Missouri, 1862-1865: Historical Extensions of the Relative Deprivation Hypothesis', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 19(1): 30-51.

Brilmayer, L. (1991) 'Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation', *Yale Journal of International Law*, 16(177): 177-202.

Burns, J. (2011) Basque Separatists Halt Campaign of Violence. On: [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/europe/eta-basque-separatists-declare-halt-to-violence-in-spain-and-france.html?\\_r=1&hp=&pagewanted=print](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/europe/eta-basque-separatists-declare-halt-to-violence-in-spain-and-france.html?_r=1&hp=&pagewanted=print) (8-5-2012).

Bush, R. (1999) *We Are Not What We Seem, Black Nationalism and Class Struggle in the American Century*. New York: New York University Press.

Campbell, A., P.E. Converse, W.E. Miller and D. Stokes (1960) *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley Press.

CIS (2012) Centro de Investigación de Sociológicas. On: [http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/ES/2\\_bancodatos/](http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/ES/2_bancodatos/) (13-4-2012).

Collier, P. and A. Hoefler (2006) 'The Political Economy of Secession'. In: H. Hammun and E.F. Babbitt (eds) *Negotiating Self-Determination*. Lanham: Lexington Books: 37-59.

Collier, D., J. Seawright and G.L. Munck (2004) 'The Quest for Standards: King, Keohane, and Verba's Designing Social Inquiry'. In H.E. Brady and D. Collier (eds.), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham etc.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: 21-44.

Conversi, D. (1990) 'Language or Race? The Choice of Core Values in the Development of Catalan and Basque Nationalisms', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 13(1): 50-72.

Doormalen, H., H. de Regt and M. Schouten (2007) *Exploring Humans, an Introduction to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom.

Emigh, R.J. (1997) 'The Power of Negative Thinking: The Use of Negative Case Methodology In The Development of Sociological Theory', *Theory and Society*, 26(5): 649-684.

Euskadi Home Department (2012) Electoral Results. On: [http://www9.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?idioma=i&menu=li\\_2](http://www9.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/eleccionesJSP/q93Contenedor.jsp?idioma=i&menu=li_2) (18-4-2012).

Eustat (2012) Statistics of the Basque Country. On: [http://en.eustat.es/ci\\_ci/indice.html#axzz1rGT5mPMJ](http://en.eustat.es/ci_ci/indice.html#axzz1rGT5mPMJ) (4-4-2012).

Gizaker Encuastas (2006) *Caracterizacion de los Vascos/as Aante la Fe y Religion*. On: [http://www.eitb.com/argazki/forum\\_re/caracterizacion.pdf](http://www.eitb.com/argazki/forum_re/caracterizacion.pdf) (24-4-2012).

Gorter, D. and J. Cenoz (2011) 'Multilingual education for European minority languages: The Basque Country and Friesland', *International Review of Education*, 57 (5): 651-666.

Guibernau, M. (2000) 'Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nations Without States: The Catalan Case', *Political Studies*, 48: 989-1005.

Guibernau, M. (2006) 'National identity, devolution and secession in Canada, Britain and Spain', *Nations and Nationalism*, 12(1): 51-76.

Guibernau, M. (2008) 'Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 53 (1): 55-68.

Gunther, G., G. Sani and G. Shabad (1986) *Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gurr, T.R. (1993) 'Why Minorities Rebel, A Global Analysis of Communal Globalization and Conflict since 1945', *International Political Science Review*, 14 (2): 161-201.

Hempel, C. G. (1945) 'Studies in the Logic of Confirmation' *Mind*, 54 (213-14): 1-26, 97-121.

IMF (2012) GDP per capita Spain. On: <http://www.imf.org/external/country/esp/index.htm> (4-4-2012).

Información Estadística (2011) Coñecemento do Galego. On: [http://www.ige.eu/estatico/html/gl/sociais/benestar/cvida/2003/modulo\\_especifico/T01\\_002.htm](http://www.ige.eu/estatico/html/gl/sociais/benestar/cvida/2003/modulo_especifico/T01_002.htm) (11-4-2012).

Keating, M. (2001) 'Rethinking the Region: Culture, Institutions and Economic Development in Catalonia and Galicia', *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 8(3): 217-234.

Korpi, W. (1974) 'Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation', *The American Political Science Review*, 68(4): 1569-1578.

Landman, T. (2000) *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, and Introduction*. New York: Routledge Publishers.

Laver, M. (1997) *Private Desires, Political Action, An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice*. London: Sage Publication.

Linz, J. (1980) 'Religion and Politics in Spain: From Conflict to Consensus Above Cleavage', *Social Compass*, 27(2): 255-277.

Mahoney, J. and G. Goertz (2004) 'The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research', *American Political Science Review*, 98 (4): 653-669.

Martinez-Herrera, E. (2002) 'From Nation-Building to Building Identification with Political Communities: Consequences of Political Decentralisation in Spain, the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, 1978-2001', *European Journal of Political Research*, 41: 421-453.

Medrano, J.D. (1995) *Divided Nations, Class, Politics and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia*. San Diego: Cornell University Press.

Moreno, L. (2006) 'Scotland, Catalonia, Europeanization and the Moreno Question', *Scottish Affairs*, 54: 1-21.

Newman, S. (1996) *Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies: Mostly Ballots, Rarely Bullets*. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Núñez, X. (2002) 'History and Collective Memories of Migration in a Land of Migrants: The Case of Iberian Galicia', *History and Memory*, 14(1/2): 229-259.

Payne, S.G. (1975) *Basque Nationalism*. Reno : University of Nevada Press.

Plat Parmele, M. (1906) *A Short History of Spain*. New York: Charles Scribners Sons.

Preston, P. (1978) *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic*. London: McMillan Press.

Pérez Agote, A. (2006) *The Social Roots of Basque Nationalism*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Sorens, J. (2005) 'The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced Democracies', *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(3): 304-326.

Wood, J.R. (1981) 'Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 14(1): 107-134.

Xunta de Galicia (2008) *Galicia 2008 Cultura Convidada Na Feira Do Libro Da Habana 2008*, On: <http://www.vieiros.com/enlaces/novas/doc/0219125001196101193-dossier-editado-pola-consellaria-de-cultura-pdf-840-kb.pdf> (11-4-2012).

Xunta de Galicia (2012) *Información Mantida e Publicada na Internet Pola Xunta de Galicia*. On: <http://www.xunta.es/temas> (12-4-2012).

Yoshino, K. (2001) 'Japan's Nationalism in a Marketplace Perspective'. In: M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson (eds.), *Understanding Nationalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press: 142-163.

TABLES

Table 1: The Moreno Question

	Basque Country	Galicia
--	----------------	---------

Identity: percentage more regional than Spanish	49%	31%
Identity: percentage equally Spanish and regional	39%	60%
Identity: percentage more Spanish than regional	12%	9%

Source: (Martinez Herrera 2002).

Table 2: Elections for the Basque Parliament in 2009

	Alava	Bizkaia	Gipuzkoa	Total
% voted	61,4	61,7	53,4	58,9
PNV%	30,0	41,1	36,5	35,8
PSOE%	31,2	30,2	30,2	30,5
Popular Party%	21,1	13,9	10,5	15,2
Aralar%	4,3	4,2	10,2	6,2
EA%	3,5	2,9	5,2	3,9

Source: Eustat (2012)

Table 3: Profile of the Basque regions

	Alava	Bizkaia	Gipuzkoa	Total average
GDP per capita	27 986	30 567	28 875	29 142
Unemployment rate	8,6%	15,2%	9,4%	11,1%
Born in own region	52,4%	67,9%	71,1%	63,8%
Employment in Agriculture/fishing	1,5%	0,4%	0,4%	0,8%
Employment manufacturing industry	26,8%	8,4%	12,3%	15,8%
Basque Speakers	2,3%	30,1%	50,4%	27,6%
Mother tongue Spanish	86,4%	76,4%	53,4%	72,1%

Source: Eustat (2012)

Table 4: Galicia autonomous elections 2005 per region

	La Coruna	Lugo	Ourense	Pontevedra	Total
Turnout	63,2	68,6	64,4	63,6	64,9
BNG	20,4	14,5	16,2	19,1	17,6

PP	42,8	48,7	50,6	43,9	46,5
PSdeG	33,1	34,4	30,7	33,5	32,9

Source: Xunta de Galicia (2012)

Table 5: Profile of the Galician regions

	La Coruna	Lugo	Ourense	Pontevedra	Total
GDP per capita	21 700	22 163	13 892	11 045	17 200
Unemployment rate	18,2	16,6	19,8	17,8%	18,1
Born in own region	47,9%	33,6%	37,5%	38,4%	39,9%
Employment in agriculture/fishing	18,4%	16,7%	19,5%	15,6%	17,5%
Employment manufacturing industry	11,6%	10,9%	9,7%	17,2%	12,4%
Galician speaker	15,9%	3,9%	19%	12,3%	12,7%
Mother tongue Spanish	82,3%	89,8%	67,8%	65,4%	76,3%

Source: Xunta de Galicia (2012)

Table 6: Age and urbanisation division Galicia

	BNPG	PP	PsdeG
Rural	18,5	49,4	28,6
Urban	20,5	39,5	36,3
Age 18-29	38	9	23
Age 30-45	40	20	28
Age 46-55	13	14	16
Age 55+	11	57	33

Source: Xunta de Galicia (2012)

Table 7: Religiosity and perception of parties defending Christian values PNV and EE

	Very practising	Practising	Not practising	Indifferent	Atheist
PNV	57	51	56	67	76
EE	27	19	19	15	16

Source: Linz (1980)

Table 8: Religion in the Basque Country and Galicia in 2006

	Basque Country	Galicia
Catholic	57,6%	53,4%
Atheist/Non believer	31,9%	29,7%
Other religion	3,6%	2,1%

Source: Gizaker (2006) and Xunta de Galicia (2012)

Table 9: Distribution of votes of practising and non practising Catholics in 1979 as a percentage of a whole

	Practising Catholic	Non Practising Catholic
<u>Basque</u>		
PNV	41	21
EE	7	14
<u>Galicia</u>		
BNG	4	15
UCD	63	24

Source: Gunther, G., G. Sani and G. Shabad (1986)

Table 10: Age demographics in the Basque Country and Galicia in % of the population in 2008

	Basque Country	Galicia
0-17	18,3	19,7
18-40	26,7	24,9
41-60	31,2	34,8
60+	23,8	20,6

Source: Eustat (2012) and Xunta de Galicia (2012)

Table 11: EU Farm subsidies in 2010

	Number of Recipients	Amount of euros received
Alava	5 016	29 118 458
Gipuzkoa	12 776	14 702 771



Bizkaya	10 335	13 036 435
Total Basque Country	28 127	56 857 664
Orense	21 937	95 572 925
Lugo	54 673	331 694 303
Ponte Vedra	23 049	89 939 375
La Coruna	48 325	296 053 148
Total Galicia	147 984	786 259 751

Source: Farmsubsidy.org

Table 12: Overall comparison between the Basque Country and Galicia

	Basque Country	Galicia
History of suppression	Strong	Medium
Unity during civil war	No	Yes
Unique ethnic identity	Yes	Somewhat
High immigration levels	Somewhat	No
Identity: percentage more regional than Spanish	49%	31%
Identity: percentage equally Spanish and regional	39%	60%
Identity: percentage more Spanish than regional	12%	9%
GDP per capita 2010	€29.986	€17.200
Unemployment rate	7.4%	18,1%
Different language	Yes	Yes
People vote for region	50.3%	56.2%
People vote for nation	67.7%	72%
Votes for nationalistic parties	22.5%	16%



