Countering Radicalisation by Engaging Mosques and Imams: The UK's Case

MA International Relations: International Studies
Zahra Shah
S1635638
January 8, 2016

CONTENTS

Introduction

Since the events of 9/11, the discourse surrounding causes of radicalisation amongst Muslims in the West and terrorism have been important topics in international relations. Combatting terrorism is one of the world's greatest challenges today. In 2006, the UN adopted a counter-terrorism strategy which urged member states to 'take urgent action to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations' (United Nations General Assembly 2006). The rise of the so-called Islamic State (IS) has only further exacerbated this threat and brought forth a multitude of challenges for countries worldwide. A June 2014 report by the Soufan Group identified over 12,000 foreign fighters that had travelled to Syria; 3000 of which were from Western countries and 400 from the UK (The Soufan Group 2014). Their recent December 2015 report outlines that there are now between 27,000 and 31,000 people who have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join IS and other violent extremist groups, with an increase to 760 foreign fighters from the UK (The Soufan Group 2015). In 18 months the figures have dramatically increased, which illustrates that despite the efforts made by states to reduce this number, they have not had a major impact.

To properly analyse why recent initiatives to curb radicalisation have failed, it is important to investigate the efforts made by governments on a micro level. Each country has its own perception of how to combat radicalisation at home and with the increasing number of foreign fighters, this topic needs to be examined domestically. This will help draw conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages of a particular initiative, and create best practices for countries facing similar problems. Specifically, the relationship between governments and mosques has been significantly under-researched. With mosques being a well-known hub of recruitment for extremist groups, it is imperative to dig deeper and investigate how mosques have been involved in anti-radicalisation and counter-terrorism. In the study of international relations, it is important to examine a state's domestic policies, rather than focusing solely on a state's foreign policy. This will not only provide us with a far more detailed appraisal, but will also delineate where suitable policy recommendations can also be made.

The UK is an especially fascinating case study due to the many criticisms it has received for its controversial counter-terrorism programme CONTEST (Halliday & Dodd 2015). It is also interesting because its Muslim population is the third highest in Europe (Pew Research Center 2012), as well as the fact that the number of foreign fighters has almost doubled within the last 18 months. The UK is also the only country to have created an

organisation of mosques for the purposes of counter-terrorism, and with first-hand accounts from members of the organisation, I am able to provide an original and comprehensive examination into its relationship with the UK government – including its successes and failures.

Therefore, this thesis will be investigating the UK's attempts to combat radicalisation through community cohesion and dialogue with mosques during Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron's leaderships spanning from 2006-2011. The Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) was an organisation created for Blair's counter-terrorism 'Prevent Strategy' for the purpose of targeting radicalisation. It did this by reaching out to Muslims at the community level and setting minimum standards for mosques throughout the country.[1] This organisation is greatly under-researched due to scholars dismissing the initiative as a watchdog attempt, and a general lack of interest in soft power methods for counter-terrorism. However, with further investigation of MINAB, and comparison with France and Germany, it can provide us with effective policy recommendations for dealing with radicalisation in the West.

[1] An imam is an Islamic preacher and leader

Sources and Methodology

The limited number of scholars that have focused on this area of the UK's counter-terrorism strategy have taken a Foucauldian approach. However, their approach has proven to be largely unfruitful due to the lack of investigation focusing on the details of the day to day operations of the organisation. Such Foucauldian analyses of governance looks at government involvement in a negative way. Many criticisms can be made, however, without some government support, MINAB would not have been seen as an authentic organisation by UK mosques. Such Foucauldian theoretical approaches can only criticise the government's actions, but does not provide an in-depth insight into the management nor the conflicts within MINAB, nor does it offer any alternative ideas on how such an organisation should operate.

Instead, this thesis aims to bring forth a unique and detailed approach through qualitative methods, including official MINAB documents and semi-structured interviews with two MINAB board members. The thesis will examine why this initiative failed and conclude with policy recommendations on how to deal with radicalisation among Muslims in the West through mosque-government relations.

A short comparative study will also be made with France and Germany in order to observe how government-mosque relationships are handled internationally. These countries have been chosen due to their high Muslim populations and number of foreign fighters. Analysis of these case studies will help create best practices.

The History of Counter-terrorism and Radicalisation in the UK

The 2005 terrorist attacks in London prompted the radicalisation discourse in the UK, and the issue of 'home grown' terrorism (Kundnani 2012). The terrorists responsible for the atrocities were born and raised in the UK and were known to be 'well integrated' within western culture (House of Commons 2006). This has sparked a lot of debate about how such acts can be avoided and how and why one can go from living a relatively 'normal' life to being radicalised.

In an effort to pre-empt terrorism, counter-radicalisation policies were created by the Blair government and the 2003 CONTEST programme was revised and made public in 2009. CONTEST is made up of four areas: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. This thesis will adopt the CONTEST definition of 'radicalisation' as 'the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups' (Home Office 2009, 11), as well as focus on the Prevent strand which encompasses the following aims:

1. To challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices.
2. Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate.
3. Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists.
4. Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism.
5. To address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting (Home Office 2009, 14).

Within this soft power approach to win the 'hearts and minds' of Muslims (Heath-Kelly 2013), the UK government created the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) in 2006:

> *To improve mosque governance and management and to enable imams to work in this country and with young people in particular. This work was funded by Prevent on the basis that better-governed mosques and more capable imams would increase what*

was then described as 'community resilience' to terrorism (Home Office 2011b, 81).

London mosques have been under increasing scrutiny since key cases such as the issue of Abu Hamza, who served as the imam of Finsbury Park Mosque, recruited for terrorism, and incited racial hatred. Suspected Al Qai'da member Kamel Bourgass and Zacarias Moussaoui who was allegedly involved in the 9/11 plot, were also known to have visited there (Dean and Allen 2006). Further to this, mosque preachers have also been made accountable for indirectly facilitating radicalisation. A reason for this is that most imams have come to the UK from abroad and do not understand Western culture; nor can they speak English. This creates inaccessibility between them and youth, pushing youth to seek answers elsewhere. Some imams have also been directly responsible for spreading radical Islamic interpretations (Bureš 2011). Many radical preachers have been prosecuted, arrested, deported, or refused entry to the UK (Home Office 2011).

Furthermore, since the rise of IS, mosques have become a particularly important institution in combatting radicalisation. Despite the group's rampant presence on social media, their recruitment is also occurring on the ground due to measures taken by governments and social media companies in limiting their online reach (Malik and Laville 2015). There is also the current threat of Arab migrants' susceptibility to radicalisation as they seek Arabic-speaking mosques, some of which have ties to terrorist groups and can take advantage of migrant's' vulnerability (Troianovski and Bender 2015).

As Islam encompasses a range of differing schools of thought, MINAB is represented by an alliance of four different Muslim associations. Each association represents different sects of Islam and thus varying interpretations of the Quran — ranging from the spiritually moderate to semi-extreme: The Al-Khoei Foundation **(**Shia sect), the Muslim Association of Britain (Sufi sect), the Muslim Council of Britain (unofficially representing the Wahhabi sect), and the British Muslim Forum (Sunni-Barelwi sect).

Literature Review

Marc Sageman, in his influential book *Understanding Terror Networks*, emphasises the roles of friendship, kinship, and social networks as the main elements in the process of radicalisation (Sageman 2004). He pioneered the widespread belief that recruitment and radicalisation happen at mosques in the UK and US:

> *These mosques served many functions in the transformation of young alienated Muslims into Salafi mujahedin. A mosque was an ideal place to meet familiar people, namely fellow Muslims—an important desire in upwardly and geographically mobile young men who missed the community of their friends and family. Friendship groups formed around the mosques…each new group became "a bunch of guys," transforming its members into potential mujahedin [holy warrior], actively seeking to join the global jihad* (Sageman 2004, 115).

He argues that mosques strengthen religious sentiment and are able to transform potential Muslims to extremist fanatics who follow the Salafi sect of Islam (Sageman 2004). Sageman is careful to point out that the 'bunch of guys' theory has its limits, and although it can produce a 'gang member' or 'dedicated political militant', it will not produce a 'religious fanatic, ready to sacrifice himself for the glory of God', as this requires a religious affiliation that can only be attained in a place of worship (Sageman 2004, 115). Therefore, a religious background is needed to breed such fanaticism as you would not see the same effect on an atheist (Sageman 2004).

It is important to note here the relationship between the Salafi and Wahhabi doctrines of Islam, and their links with radical violent behaviour. Due to the nature of both Islamic interpretations, these ideologies have been further developed by fanatics to justify their beliefs and violence (Peter and Ortega 2014). After the terrorist attacks in Madrid, a link was identified by authorities between terrorists and places of worship that advocated Wahhabism (Dittrich 2007). Furthermore, Olivier Roy, previously a research director at the French National Center for Scientific Research, upholds that the growing Salafi movement has resulted in the radicalisation of mosques, and this has enticed young people who feel rejection within Western societies (Dittrich 2007). Of course, this is not to say that all Muslims that identify with these schools of thought are violent fanatics or share the same

beliefs. A minority have taken the fanatical route and violently act upon the teachings within these schools of thought. Such a teaching is the idea that Muslims who follow the Shia ideology are regarded as non-Muslims. This makes it permissible to kill them and is shown in the bombing of Shia mosques by IS (Withnall 2015). The rocky relationships between the Shia, and Wahhabi and Salafi sects are further exemplified in the difficult relations between the Wahhabi state of Saudi Arabia and the Shia state of Iran (Warnaar 2015).

Wiktorowicz reinforces Sageman's emphasis on socialisation but delves further into psychological reasons as to why an individual would be influenced by radical views (Wiktorowicz 2005). He also notes the importance of radical mosques as a creator and breeder of fundamentalism (Wiktorowicz 2005). Whilst trying not to delve into the exploration of why and how people are radicalised, it is important to note Sageman's and Wiktorowicz's work in the field of radicalisation due to its influence on US and UK counter-terrorism policies (specifically CONTEST). Further, their work can be considered to be revolutionising the way radicalisation is approached from a religious focus to a social and individual focus (Kundnani 2012 and Heath-Kelly 2013). This is why the examination of the community cohesion aspects of Prevent are essential for this investigation.

When critiquing Prevent's soft power methods to curb radicalisation through community cohesion, many authors touch upon the partnership between the police and the Muslim community, and criticise its surveillance-like, and invasive nature (Ragazzi 2015; Heath-Kelly 2013; Thomas 2010 and Spalek and McDonald 2009). Within Spalek and McDonald's exploration of this partnership, they highlight the issue of homogenising Muslims communities by placing 'all Muslims at the heart of British counter-terrorism policies and practices' (Spalek and McDonald 2009, 125). They criticise the notion of 'shared values' as a criteria used by police when choosing which groups and individuals to engage with about counter-terrorism (Spalek and McDonald 2009, 127). The notion risks alienating other groups who can then be seen as too extreme in their beliefs (Spalek and McDonald 2009). However, the Muslim Council of Britain has been deemed as holding extreme views due to its association with the Wahhabi school of thought, but its inclusion in MINAB has gone unnoticed by these scholars. This issue will be addressed below.

Heath-Kelly and Ragazzi also critique Prevent's referral system where persons deemed to be 'at risk' of radicalisation are directed to professionals, (such as students who will be referred by their teachers) after which a 'support plan' may be implemented (Heath-Kelly 2013; Kundnani 2012 and Ragazzi 2015). The system is condemned for referring Muslims just for engaging in political activities, and 'punishing' the Muslim population for

acts that are deemed unremarkable for non-Muslims (Ragazzi 2015). The 'indicators' of extremism and how these are used are also points that are highly criticised (Heath-Kelly 2013). Furthermore, Kundnani argues that the referral programme depends 'on the ability of the state to collect highly detailed information about the lives of Muslims' (Kundnani 2012, 20). To an extent the referral system is discriminatory and intrusive (Kundnani 2012), however, none of the scholars look at the willingness of Muslims to be part of Prevent and the wider CONTEST strategy. Most criticisms of Prevent are rooted in the referral system and the relationship between Muslims and the police. This has created a narrowing of critiques in Prevent's effectiveness in counter-terrorism.

Charlotte Heath-Kelly adds another dimension to these critiques through focusing on radicalisation and the Foucauldian idea of 'risk', and applying it to CONTEST (Heath-Kelly 2013). She argues that the policy tries to 'govern the conduct of subjects that it understands as 'risky', but also those it considers 'at risk of becoming risky' (Heath-Kelly 2013, 397. It does this by 'using knowledge about radicalisation to perform counter-terrorism' and thus creating a 'linear narrative about transitions to terrorism' which allows for intervention in community conduct and governance (Heath-Kelly 2013, 397). Heath-Kelly emphasises and criticises the view of Muslim individuals and communities as being seen as 'risky', however, does not apply this view to Islamic institutions that have been shown to promote radicalisation, as we have seen in the case of Finsbury Park Mosque.

Spalek and McDonald do mention the government's marginalisation and disconnection with the Muslim Council of Britain after it was seen as holding radical views. However, they have not addressed how it became one of the main components within MINAB, and thus how their relationship with the government had changed (Spalek and McDonald 2009). As we can see, a lot of research has been conducted about Prevent, but not much about the specifics of the products of the programme, especially when it comes to mosques. This has created a gap in the literature, and overlooks the intricacies of such a unique and official partnership between mosques and government.

Nadya Ali is one of the only scholars who has explored the role of MINAB and the community cohesion relationship between Britain's mosques and the UK government. She argues that the view of mosques as radical spaces is a central theme in the UK's counter-radicalisation discourse (Ali 2013). She further states that UK mosques are undergoing a 'reformation' – the management of mosques as an attempt to create a new Muslim identity which is firmly rooted in Britain rather than the Islamic Ummah (Ali 2013, 1). Ali takes the Foucauldian idea of governmentality, and focuses on MINAB's role in improving structure

and quality of UK mosques as ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Ali 2013). However, her Foucauldian approach places blame on the government as exercising regulatory practices and does not allow for a deeper analysis of the issue.

Paul Thomas further argues that Prevent is ‘an intelligence-gathering and surveillance system, operationalised overtly at least partially through ‘engagement’’ (Thomas 2015, 176). This is evidenced in Higher and Further Education sectors where the activities of Muslim students have been heavily monitored without any real engagement with the students themselves (Thomas 2015).

We can see that there are a range of views with regards to the issues of radicalisation, community cohesion, risk, and the effectiveness of the CONTEST and Prevent strategies. All authors agree with the Foucauldian approach that CONTEST is a watchdog initiative that aims to control Muslim individuals and communities, whilst also creating room for further alienation of Muslims through its implementation (Thomas 2015; Kundani 2012; Spalek and McDonald 2009; Heath-Kelly 2013; Kundnani 2012; Ragazzi 2015 and Ali 2013). However, the organisation of MINAB, its decline, and its relationship with the government is yet to be thoroughly examined. The failure of MINAB is a new and unique topic that, given better knowledge and understanding, can expose the inadequacies of the relationship between mosques and the UK government, display the flaws of the Prevent programme, and provide policy recommendations on how to improve counter-terrorism policies and Muslim-government relations. These recommendations can also help to reduce the number of foreign fighters going to Iraq and Syria by strengthening mosques throughout the West.

MINAB and the UK Government: Successes, Failures, and Critiques

This section aims to tackle the varying misconceptions about MINAB's role and alleged control and funding by the UK government. It also brings forth its successes and failures, and addresses the organisation's role in tackling radicalisation. The UK's approach is critiqued and the future potential of MINAB is also discussed. The evidence here consists of official documents and interviews with MINAB board members who do not wish to be identified. To respect their privacy, interviewees will be referred to as 'MINAB member'.

The tackling of radicalisation through MINAB was to be carried out through the implementation of five core standards for mosques throughout the UK:

1. Corporate governance.
2. Service provision by qualified personnel.
3. Participation of youth.
4. Participation of women.
5. Promotion of civic responsibility.

Once these standards had been met, MINAB would issue an accreditation (MINAB Operational Plan 2009).

Although Nadya Ali acknowledges some of the inadequacies of some mosque imams, she criticises the core standard of 'service provision by qualified personnel' as creating a 'job' for imams to do (Ali 2013, 21). This guides the 'conduct of conduct' of mosques and imams (Ali 2013, 20). This criterion of improvement in UK mosques is one of the most important and should not be dismissed as purely a form of control. Such an assessment dismisses the former unreliable practices of hiring that took place within mosques. The hiring of not just imams, but other roles such as cleaners and chefs were usually conducted informally. Staff were generally found through word of mouth and there were hardly any formal agreements made on employment logistics (Peter and Ortega 2014 and interview with MINAB member). The introduction of this criterion was intended to raise standards of hiring practices by introducing the advertising of vacancies, and the conducting of interviews for these roles. Such changes were welcomed by MINAB members because it was seen as a form of improvement (interview with MINAB member). This change was also integral to combatting radicalisation because it attempted to vet imams who wanted to preach in the UK.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that there were never any types of vetting taking place; rather, that this was dependant on the capabilities of the chairman of each mosque to appropriately ascertain the legitimacy and knowledge of a prospective imam.

Through the many Foucauldian views adopted by the likes of Ragazzi and Ali, Ali specifically argues against the government and mosque collaboration. She states that 'the notion of partnership between government and voluntary organisations does not exclude the possibility of governing at a distance' (Ali 2013, 10). As such, MINAB has been repeatedly criticised for having too many links with the government (Ali 2013, Bunglawala 2015). On paper it certainly seems that way, as the organisation received funding from the Department of Communities and Local Government, and its 2009 Operational Plan mentions bi-monthly meetings with the Prevent Unit (Ahmed 2009). However, after interviewing MINAB members, it comes to light that the four main mosque associations also funded MINAB, and contributed £10,000 each to the organisation (interview with MINAB member). Also, despite the scheduling of regular meetings with Prevent in the agenda, in reality this hardly occurred (interview with MINAB member).

Initially, the Department of Communities and Local Government, and the Charity Commission did hope to exercise more control and there was always a government representative involved in MINAB, but each of the four bodies made clear that they did not want to be a part of Prevent (interview with MINAB member). It also proved impossible for the Department of Communities and Local Government to control the organisation due to the multitude of voices (interview with MINAB member). This became one of the many factors for MINAB's downfall. Agreements were made with difficulty or sometimes not at all due to more extreme Islamic views clashing with moderate Islamic views (interview with MINAB member). Not only did such disagreements occur between the four bodies, but also within them, leading to a lack of common vision (interview with MINAB member).

Another point that often gets overlooked by the scholars that have assessed community cohesion within Prevent, is that despite the involvement of a number of notable mosques, MINAB failed to secure the involvement of *all* mosques in the UK. Although a plan on the agenda was to engage other mosques by providing accreditation once they had reached core standards, there was nothing forcing these mosques to join MINAB. One of the main criticisms from an interviewee was that "MINAB had no teeth", as such there was no real motive for mosques to seek its accreditation (interview with MINAB member). The Foucauldian idea of government control of mosques was not implemented through any

forceful means, but through willingness of the Muslim community. This promoted a harmonious relationship between the government and mosques.

With regards to MINAB's role in tackling radicalisation, the organisation was useful in spreading knowledge about the subject and creating actionable criteria to work on. In a seminar that was held to introduce the organisation in Scotland in 2009, one of the subject areas discussed was radicalisation among young Muslims (Rabbani 2009). The report points out that radicalisation among Muslims in the West can be attributed to feelings of social exclusion and alienation, along with the experience of identity crises where radicalisation is a last resort to fill the cognitive opening (Rabbani 2009). The feedback from the seminar suggested three main areas of action:

1. Enhancing the educational standards and vocational skills.
2. Political will.
3. Diversionary resources (Rabbani 2009).

By making mosques aware of these issues, providing them with the necessary background knowledge, and creating actionable criteria, the organisation had shown itself to have the potential to play a leading role in combatting radicalisation. Not only would terrorist recruitment be hindered through the five core standards, but it could have also potentially acted as a travelling body to educate mosques on how to deal with mosque attendees showing signs of radicalisation. Despite the many disagreements among and within the bodies involved, the one thing they all agreed on was that they were against any forms of violent extremism. This could have worked to the government's advantage.

Along with the agreed agendas, MINAB members hoped to promote Islamic unity by targeting sectarian differences. A terms of reference for sub-committee membership document outlines this in their aims of dialogue with other mosques:

> *The targeted organisations must believe that MINAB can be a catalyst that would kick start the process of Muslim unity on practical grounds through the implementation of its standards and secularist approach. A thousand years of glorification of diversity has been a breeding ground for sectarian divide…this will attract not just the targeted membership but would bring every knowledgeable and sensible Muslim into the fold of MINAB* (MINAB terms of reference).

Addressing such a topic is another vital issue that would have targeted one of the root causes of the ideologies underpinning radicalisation. A public partnership between Wahhabi and Shia Muslim representatives could have helped counter the anti-Shia thinking of fanatics. It is evident that MINAB members were keen to use the organisation as a platform upon which to encourage Muslim unity. This was shown in its allowance of all sects to share the same platform and collaborate on multiple issues. The MINAB Constitution further entrenched this equal representation by giving each of the four bodies a Vice Presidency position and allowing the Shia minority a 20% representation on the Board (interview with MINAB member).

The organisation further had the potential to make mosques accountable for the imams they allowed to preach. It could have acted on complaints and investigated mosques and imams that were deemed suspicious. This has proved to be needed in recent times, as evidenced by the events surrounding Jalalia mosque in Cardiff where three Britons travelled to fight in Syria. The local community has complained of radical preaching taking place, however, the mosque's chairman has denied this (Malik and Laville 2014).

Unfortunately, the core of MINAB's failure comes in its biggest strength. MINAB's representation of all Islamic sects was an integral part of its identity, especially when the extremist views of the Muslim Council of Britain was initially shunned by the Labour government (Peter and Ortega 2014). However, this also hindered its progress as agreements could not be reached in multiple meetings (interview with MINAB member). Criticisms can continue to be made of the government's involvement, but where the members were not agreed on certain issues, any initiatives undertaken could not advance and in any case the government representatives did little to push any agendas (interview with MINAB member).

When the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government came into power in 2010, it took a large step back in wanting to deal with organisations holding extremist views, such as the Muslim Council of Britain. In 2011, the new government reviewed the Prevent Strategy and clearly set out that 'funding and other support will not be provided to extremist organisations. Neither Government Departments nor the police will rely on extremists to address the risk of radicalisation' (Home Office 2011b, 6-7). This raises issues about how wary the government was in associating itself with mosques deemed to be extreme whilst also trying to influence such beliefs. It further brings into question the UK's relationship with states such as Saudi Arabia who share the same Wahhabi ideology as the Muslim Council of Britain.

The Review highlights the idea of terrorism's incompatibility with 'British values': 'work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values' (Home Office 2011b, 13). Such values include 'democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind' (Home Office 2011b, 34). Thus in the eyes of the government, the views of the Muslim Council of Britain do not coincide with these values and this has led to their exclusion. Ragazzi argues that such a disassociation runs the risk of 'delegitimizing non-violent organizations by making them out to be radicals' (Ragazzi 2015, 33). This also links to Ali's earlier criticism of the UK's attempt at creating a new Muslim identity embedded in Britain. Such rhetoric by the government has repeatedly proven to alienate the Muslim population as it suggests that such values are incompatible with Islam (Khan 2014). It creates an 'us' and 'them' mentality and risks creating further identity issues for young British Muslims.

Along with this, the new government mentions, in particular, the role of Salafi theology in violent extremist behaviour among Al Qai'da and its sympathisers. However, the state is wary of engaging in any type of theological debate due to the risk of 'seeming either to want or to endorse a particular kind of 'state Islam'…the vast majority of this work can and should only be done by communities and scholars in this country or overseas' (Home Office 2011b, 47). Alarmingly, the UK is aware of the threats the ideology poses yet puts the onus on Muslim communities and scholars to address this alone without any state support. These issues surrounding Western values and Islamic theology are running themes in many Western approaches to terrorism and will be further examined in the next section.

The Prevent Review maintains that the government does have a dialogue with mosques but on a lower profile, and takes advice from local communities. This has been criticised because the government has engaged with Muslim associations that are not representative of the majority of British Muslims, such as the Quilliam Foundation (interview with MINAB member and Home Office 2011b). It is also important to note here that at the time of this Review, the greatest threat to the UK was from Al Qai'da and its associated groups and individuals. This has drastically changed now and the threat is much more substantial. In response to this, further changes have been made by David Cameron to close down mosques where extremist meetings have occurred (Dathan 2015). However, his newest 2015 counter-extremist strategy hardly mentions mosque engagement (Home Office 2015). The approach currently being adopted urges mosques and leaders to do more but without actually helping them to achieve these goals (The Telegraph 2015).

The effort that the Labour government invested in attempting to develop a partnership with Muslims were wasted as the Conservative government retreated from this arrangement. In an interview with The Times, MINAB member Mustafa Field comments:

> "*They wanted us to cut ties… We have groups in our organisation with very conservative views on women, homosexuality… if we have groups that condemn homosexuality, do we shun them or do we engage with them and have that internal debate? If you have someone who's sympathetic to terrorists, it's important to engage with them, otherwise they go underground. If someone wants to go to Syria, we can show them how they can get involved in charity [work] here in the UK instead*" (Pitel 2014).

Members saw MINAB as a way of discussing and influencing mosques with more extreme views. By excluding these mosques from such dialogue, it meant that they were being left to continue their practices without any accountability and with the risk of evolving into something more dangerous. Some cautious form of dialogue with mosques holding extremist beliefs could be considered to be imperative in order to monitor and assess the threats that could potentially arise. This is due to the similarities that radical beliefs have with Salafi and Wahhabi ideology.

MINAB has been unable to succeed without government support, however, there have been many advantages for UK mosques since it was introduced. This includes improved relations between mosques, more youth engagement, and the opportunity for mosques to look at their practices objectively and address their weaknesses (interview with MINAB member). Furthermore, it also helped reduce the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims by involving local communities and starting mosque open days, where members of the public were encouraged to visit their local mosques (Shahid, The 'Mosques in Communities' Project). Such initiatives nurture integration of Muslims in their community and help break down negative stereotypes of Muslims.

Ultimately, the implementation of Prevent and the creation of MINAB enabled a dialogue between the British government and various Muslim communities (O'Toole et al. 2013). Despite the criticisms of Prevent being an intelligence-gathering and surveillance system, the concerns raised by MINAB members were more based on the fear of direct state involvement in mosques (interview with MINAB member). MINAB was a filter between mosques and the government. It benefitted mosques and helped facilitate inter- and intra-

cultural relations between the varying sects of Islam. This helped members overcome psychological barriers that each sect had about the other (interview with MINAB member). Without this platform for Islamic unity, there would have been less chance of cooperation among British Muslims in trying to raise mosque standards and in turn, target radicalisation.

MINAB has recently announced its revival. In response to the recent counter-terrorism measures by David Cameron's Conservatives government, the organisation mentions its worry in the impending state interference in religion (MINAB 2015). How MINAB conducts itself in the future as an independent organisation remains to be seen.

Comparison with France

As the European country with the highest population of Muslims (Pew Research Center 2012), 1700 foreign fighters (The Soufan Group 2015), and a very similar level of threat from Islamic terrorism as the UK (Foley 2009), France provides us with an interesting comparison to the British counter-terrorism strategy's relationship with mosques.

Islamic terrorism threatened France long before it threatened other European states (Foley 2015). Many attempts were foiled from 1996 to 2004, including a 2002 plot to bomb Paris Orly Airport and the Parisian metro. In 2004, the Front Islamique Français Armé were responsible for an explosion near the Indonesian Embassy in Paris. This successful attempt marked a change in the advancement of Islamic terrorism with the increased amount of terror attacks in 2005 compared to 2004 (Block 2005). French intelligence believed that one of the causes of this was attributed to the recruiting networks operating all over Europe (Block 2005). Authorities have been aware of such networks in social places such as in mosques, prisons, and private gatherings. They have also noticed that the current wave of fanatics are younger, more frustrated, and almost all are the offspring of immigrants (Block 2005). In 2004, a French police investigation showed that out of the 1600 mosques and prayer halls in France, 150 were influenced and controlled by 'extremist elements' (Bureš 2011, 20). The outreach and successfulness of these networks have only been highlighted by the November 2015 attacks in Paris. Ismail Mostefai, one of the people involved in the killings at the Bataclan concert hall, resided in Chartres and lived near Sofiane Sankawi, an IS foreign fighter (Bacchi 2015). It is a big coincidence that both lived in the same area, therefore it is believed that such networks operate in Chartres and that Mostefai was radicalised by a Belgian Moroccan imam (Bacchi 2015).

Like the UK, complaints are made of language barriers between mosque attendees and imams. Due to lack of French-speaking skills, sermons are mostly relayed in Arabic (Peter and Ortega 2014). Young Muslims cannot understand all of the Arabic which prompts them to seek more information on the internet and in turn, this makes them vulnerable to recruitment taking place online (Di Giovanni 2015). Dittrich further notes that in Europe, the Young Muslim diaspora is important for the radical Salafi doctrine (Dittrich 2007). Those susceptible to radicalisation have a lack of knowledge of Arabic and Islam. The little knowledge they do hold comes from 'recruiters' who target youngsters, or from radical websites (Dittrich 2007, 61). This was an issue that the government sought to address by

training imams with the help of the French Council of the Muslim Religion, but such attempts failed.

Despite the many similarities that France has with the UK in the issues posed by mosques and imams, the country has taken a different route in its own anti-radicalisation strategy (Foley 2015). Ragazzi argues that for France's counterterrorism unit, any type of formal partnership with religious institutions and imams is impossible, but their intelligence unit maintains close relations and conducts informal meetings with certain Muslim community representatives (Ragazzi 2015). However, the French Council of the Muslim Faith is an association created by the state to represent French Muslims. The body collaborates with the government to regulate Muslim religious activities and advises the Minister of Interior on policies that affect Muslims. This body has been criticised for being unrepresentative of the majority of French Muslims, but the fact that it has been created shows some cooperation between the state and French Muslims despite not being overt (Institut National De L'audiovisuel, 2014). Most recently, the body hopes to introduce permits for imams wishing to preach in France. Such permits will be granted after thorough tests in theological knowledge and adherence to French principles, where they must sign a charter agreeing to respect French laws (The Guardian 2015). Here we see an example of insuring Islam is compatible with French values.

The body also plans to create a 'religious council', using theological arguments to create a counter-narrative against arguments used by terrorist groups for recruitment (The Guardian 2015). This theologically-based approach is unique and helps to target the root cause of radical views. If successful, this can go a long way in nullifying radical rhetoric used by terrorist groups and supporters.

France's approach towards mosques mostly consists of hard power methods. Since 2012, France has deported 40 foreign imams found to be enflaming hatred amongst Muslim worshippers (Morrison 2015). After the recent Paris attacks, police carried out 2,235 raids across the country, and have closed down three mosques deemed to be 'radical' and from the Salafi sect (France 24 2015). Surveillance has also been increased at places of worship (Sridharan 2015). One of the mosques located in Lagny was previously led by imam Mohamed Hammoumi who has been accused of recruiting for fighting in Syria (The Local 2015). Another of the mosques was found to be in possession of ammunition and IS propaganda videos (France 24 2015).

This secular approach seems like a quick and superficial solution to a deeply embedded problem. Such heavy-duty actions run the risk of pushing extremists underground

and enabling them to think of more creative ways of recruiting and spreading their ideology (Dittrich 2007). It also does not target the inaccessibility of only Arabic-speaking imams who have a hand in pushing younger Muslims to look for answers elsewhere; but the plans to create a permit may once and for all address this issue if it becomes obligatory for all. France would benefit from giving French Muslims a voice, and a more formal partnership with mosque associations that represent the majority of French Muslims.

Comparison with Germany

Germany currently has 760 foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria (The Soufan Group 2015), and the second highest Muslim population in Europe (Pew Research Center 2012). In proportion to its Muslim population, the ratio of foreign fighters is quite low. It is estimated at 8 foreign fighters per million people (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 2015). The country's anti-radicalisation approach is quite different from France's and shows some similarities to the UK's Prevent programme.

After two failed explosion attempts in 2006 and 2007, the latter by members of the terrorist group Islamic Jihad Union, the discourse surrounding international terrorism has heightened in Germany. The issue of 'home-grown' terrorism has also gained importance (Stock and Herz, 2010). Most recently, German authorities have closed a mosque which was recruiting foreign fighters on behalf of IS. The mosque was frequented by 10 of the 50 foreign fighters that travelled to Syria from Baden-Württemberg, and Salafi preachers who were also known to have visited there (Deutsche Welle 2015). One of the emerging struggles that Germany is also facing is the risk of radicalisation among the migrants they are accepting from Arab countries (Troianovski and Bender 2015). The question of how to handle extremist Islamic preachers suspected of radicalising youths, yet who have not broken the law, is a big issue for authorities (Troianovski and Bender 2015). So far, the government has distributed pamphlets to migrant-shelter workers alerting them of mosques believed to be involved in preaching extremist rhetoric (Troianovski and Bender 2015).

Like the UK and France, Germany also faces the same challenges in its high number of 'imported' imams that cannot speak German or relate to the youth (Peter and Ortega 2014). To address this, imam training at multiple German universities is part of a plan to nurture 'home-grown' imams, with the belief that they will better encourage integration. It has now become difficult to recruit foreign imams, yet, imams trained in Germany with German citizenship are at an advantage of employment. The state has been criticised for privileging imams who are not accepted by the wider Muslim community due to unmatched theological and historical beliefs (Peter and Ortega 2014). This example shows how any form of imam regulation must also consider the community's role in accepting them (Peter and Ortega 2014). The problem here lies with the training of imams being university-based, and the criteria of German citizenship being too narrow. It can also risk criticism of favouring a

German-Islamic view, attained in a German institution which arguably does not have as much knowledge to offer as an Islamic university abroad.

The German government's approach to mosques and the Muslim community as a whole has been relatively harmonious compared to the UK and France. Since 2005, dialogue between German Muslim associations and security authorities have been ongoing (Stock and Herz, 2010). Talks include representatives from the Central Council of Muslims in Germany and the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institute for Religion. The aim is to build confidence between the government and Muslims through collaborative action (Stock and Herz 2010). The two Islamic associations and security authorities have agreed to inform each other about 'calls for violence and rabble-rousing agitation in mosques and other institutions' (Stock and Herz 2010, 37). They also hold regional lectures and information events for the purposes of allowing Muslims and staff from the security authorities to voice their concerns, whilst also boosting mutual trust by distributing informative material in mosques that publicises the work they conduct (Stock and Herz 2010).

Along with this, the Federal Ministry of the Interior hosts a German-Islam Conference to facilitate discussions between the government and representatives of German Muslims (Stock and Herz 2010). The Conference consists of 15 Muslim community representatives and 15 government representatives, where the aim is to create a social contract based on recognition of the German Constitution and to discuss issues surrounding internal security (Stock and Herz 2010). This is a way for the government to ensure that they are not compromising on their principles and finding a way for German Muslims to practice their faith within Germany's structure and values. Here we can again see another example of Western values being discussed when battling radicalisation.

As we can see, Germany has put dialogue with and acceptance of the Muslim community at the forefront of their anti-radicalisation efforts. Further to the above, recommendations set out by the Federation-State Project Group on 'Prevention of Islamist extremism/terrorism' depicts Germany's emphasis on the need for informal social controls within Muslim society (Stock and Herz 2010). Such informal controls serve to remove the threat of government surveillance, yet allows some limited regulation on how mosques are managed and run. Stock and Herz conclude:

> *The common objective of all efforts is to deny nourishment to radicalization tendencies in mosques or other areas of Muslim life and also to agitators motivated*

> *by extremism, doing so by taking advantage of every opportunity to gain allies in the affected communities and by gaining trust and knowledge* (Stock and Herz 2010, 38).

Such an approach eliminates the idea of government control and information-gathering and creates an image of Muslim-government partnership to tackle a common enemy.

Germany has gone a step further than France and the UK by publicly addressing the ideological and theological issue of terrorism. Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel has publicly condemned Saudi Arabia's hand in radicalisation within mosques: "Wahhabi mosques all over the world are financed by Saudi Arabia. Many Islamists who are a threat to public safety come from these communities in Germany" (Henderson 2015). From this statement arises the underlying issue of state-funded extremist ideology which runs the risk of leading to violent radical behaviour. This suggests that Western countries should engage more with Saudi Arabia in matters concerning their ideological influence.

Lessons can be learnt from the UK, France, and Germany for Western counter-terrorism strategies in and outside of Europe. Each country faces slightly different forms of threat due to their handling of radicalisation— even to the present day. However, all three countries face the same challenges when it comes to non-native speaking imams, and the clash of their respective Western values with the Islamic theological principles held by radicals.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

If we collate the number of foreign fighters from the UK, France, and Germany, they equate to over 3200. This accounts for more than half of the foreign fighter amount coming from Western states, including North America (The Soufan Group 2015). The total number has more than doubled in the last 18 months, which proves that the actions taken in each country so far have not had a significant impact. However further collaboration with mosques and imams can change this. We have also noted how mosques are becoming increasingly important in recruitment for extremist groups, especially as governments worldwide are monitoring and restricting their influence on the internet. Face-to-face recruitment is increasingly relying on vulnerable mosque attendees, especially those who frequent Salafi and Wahhabi mosques. The current threat is not so much whether mosques themselves preach and promote radicalisation, but how these centres are used by extremists to target recruits, and how vulnerable Muslims can be better equipped to resist such advances. Radicalisation factors also arise from an ideological battle which desperately needs to be addressed by Western states.

With regards to the promotion of respective Western values, all three countries play into the creation of an 'us' and 'them' discourse without emphasising that mainstream Islam is coherent with such values.

Overall, Western governments need to work to empower and toughen mosque resilience to radical interceptions and influence. This will lead to a ripple effect on their Muslim populations — through mutual encouragement of educating Muslims about ideological and theological arguments that counter radical ones. This should not be rooted in monitoring and surveillance, but in collaboration to tackle a mutual enemy.

The important role which mosques and imams can play in anti-radicalisation must not go unnoticed by Western states. Those that have tried to engage mosques have done so with differing intentions. Ultimately, better serving mosques with government-Muslim partnership can raise awareness and stop radicalisation in its tracks. The purpose should now be to informally regulate mosques through collaboration – a form of community policing (Dittrich 2007). This is to ultimately ensure that the voice of the majority of Muslims who follow a moderate and Western-compatible form of Islam is not eclipsed by the extremist minority. This applies to both online and offline awareness-raising.

Equipped with the knowledge of the French and German approaches, along with an in-depth understanding of and lessons learned from the UK's unique creation of MINAB for the purposes of counter-terrorism, the following policy recommendations are suggested for all Western countries to effectively combat radicalisation:

- Create awareness raising campaigns with mosques and well-known Muslim figures to create a counter-narrative to radical propaganda.
- Gain trust and knowledge of Muslim communities through regular consultations with local mosques.
- Create online campaigns warning people of the risks of online radicalisation and communications with fundamentalists.
- Encourage mosques to host public lectures about ideological differences within Islam. Thus educating the public and younger Muslims, and providing them with counter arguments against radical rhetoric.
- Encourage mosques to host forums with Muslim youth to discuss feelings of rejection and alienation, and provide suggestions on how to deal with such frustrations.
- Provide Islamic leaders and government representatives with a shared public platform to speak out against terrorist attacks.
- Provide mosques and Muslim communities with information on anti-radicalisation efforts taking place within their localities. This should include a helpline which can be called for further questions.
- Specifically engage with Wahhabi and Salafi mosques and imams to collaborate on tackling radicalisation.
- Encourage public theological and ideological debates between different sects of Islam.
- Implement a vetting process when hiring any imams. This should include language, cultural, and theological exams.
- Host public conferences and discussions where the public can communicate directly to the government about their concerns.
- Discuss with Saudi Arabia the possible links between Saudi funded mosques in the country and radicalisation.
- Provide a public platform which displays Wahhabi and Shia cooperation in order to promote a counter-narrative to radical views.

- Eliminate rhetoric regarding Western values and its incompatibility with Islam.
- Promote the idea that the views of fundamentalists conflict with both mainstream Islam and Western values.
- Ensure that voices of mainstream Islamic opinions prevail over extremist voices
- Create a MINAB-style independent organisation which encompasses differing Islamic sects and represents the majority of a country's Muslim population. Such an organisation can:
    - Be consulted on policy matters affecting Muslims.
    - Host public theological and ideological debates to counter radical narratives.
    - Equip mosques with protocols on how to deal with radicalised mosque attendees or recruiters.
    - Investigate complaints made within mosques about radical preaching/behaviour.
    - Provide foreign imams with cultural training.
    - Engage more youth and discuss issues of alienation from the beginning to quell any escalating radical behaviour.
    - Encourage mosques to hire more relatable imams.

These recommendations aim to promote dialogue between governments and their Muslim populations. The improved relationship between mosques, imams, local communities, and the state will address the key issues discussed throughout this thesis; specifically, through targeting youth engagement and underlying ideological causes of radicalisation.

Bibliography

Ahmed, Zareen Roohi. *MINAB Operational Plan 2009-2012*. MINAB. April 2009.

Ali, Nadya. "Radicalisation and Counter-radicalisation in Europe, Critical Approaches." Paper presented at the conference of Sciences Po, CERI. October 25, 2013.

Amoore, Louise and De Goede, Marieke. "Introduction: Governing by Risk in the War on Terror." In *Risk and the War on Terror*, edited by Louise Amoore and Marieke De Goede, 5-19. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008.

Amoore, Louise and De Goede, Marieke. "Governance, Risk and Dataveillance in the War on Terror." *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 43:2 (2005); 149–173.

Bacchi, Umberto. "Paris attacks: Bataclan gunman Ismail Mostefai was neighbour of Isis jihadi killed in Syria." *International Business Times*, November 15, 2015. Accessed December 30, 2015. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/paris-atta cks-bataclan-gunman-ismail-mostefai-was-neighbour-isis-jihadi-killed-syria-1528860.

Barrett, Richard. *Foreign Fighters in Syria*. New York: The Soufan Group, 2014. Accessed June 18, 2015. http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf

Bettison, Sir Norman. "Preventing Violent Extremism—A Police Response." *Policing* 3 (2009): 129-138. Accessed March 28, 2015. doi: 10.1093/police/pap008.

Block, Ludo. "Evaluating The Effectiveness of French Counter-Terrorism". *Terrorism Monitor* 3:17 (2005). http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=560#.VnHbkXgrLIU.

Boffey, Daniel. "David Cameron announces funding for anti-extremism strategy." *The* Guardian, October 18, 2015. Accessed December 13, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/18/cameron-funding-anti-extremism-social-media

Briggs, Rachel. "Community engagement for counterterrorism: Lessons from the United Kingdom." *International Affairs* 86:4 (2010): 971–981.

Bunglawala, Inayat. "Minab: community initiative, or quango?" *The Guardian,* May 15, 2009. Accessed August 12 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/may/15/minab-mosques-imams-islam.

Bureš, Oldřich. *EU Counterterrorism Policy*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011.

Casciani, Dominic. “Watchdog for UK Mosques Launches.” *BBC*, June 27, 2006. Accessed February 18, 2015. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5120338.stm.

Coaffee, Jon and Peter Rogers. “Rebordering the City for New Security Challenges: From Counter-terrorism to Community Resilience.” *Space and Polity 12* (2008), 101-118.

Dathan, Matt. "'Do Such Mosques Exist?' David Cameron Accused of Mccarthyism Over Extremism Plans by UK's Biggest Muslim Group." *The Independent*, October 19, 2015. Accessed November 10, 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/do-such-mosques-exist-britains-largest-muslim-organisation-confronts-david-cameron-over-extremism-a6699656.html.

Dean, Neville and Nick Allen. “Finsbury Park Mosque’s Terrorist Roll Call.” *The Independent*, February 7, 2006. Accessed March 20, 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/incoming/finsbury-park-mosques-terrorist-roll-call-465867.html.

Deutsche Welle. "German Police Raid Stuttgart Mosque Linked to 'Islamic State'". 2015. http://www.dw.com/en/german-police-raid-stuttgart-mosque-linked-to-islamic-state/a-18924893.

Di Giovanni, Janine. "Simple Ideas to Counter Terrorism in France." *Newsweek*, February 16, 2015. Accessed December 30, 2015. http://europe.newsweek.com/simple-ideas-counter-terrorism-france-307096?rm=eu.

Dittrich, Miriam. “Radicalisation and Recruitment: The EU Response.” In *The European Union and Terrorism*, edited by David Spence, 54-70. London: John Harper Publishing, 2007.

Dodd, Vikram. “Muslim Council of Britain says government hampering anti-Isis efforts.” *The Guardian*, June 17, 2015. Accessed December 13, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/16/muslim-council-of-britain-says-government-hampering-anti-isis-efforts

Drabu, Khurshid. “Minab will help deliver better mosques.” *The Guardian*, May 14, 2009. Accessed August 12, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/may/14/minab-mosques-religion

Edwards, Jay and Benoît Gomis. “Islamic Terrorism in The UK Since 9/11: Reassessing The ‘Soft’ Response.” International Security Programme Paper. London: Chatham House, 2011. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/pp_edwardsgomis.pdf

Foley, Frank. "Constraining Britain's Legal Response to Terrorism: Norm Competition and the Prospects for Liberal Democracy." *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research Eur J Crim Policy* 18:239 (2012): 329-41. Accessed December 20, 2015. doi: 10.1007/s10610-012-9183-1.

Foley, Frank. *Countering Terrorism in Britain and France*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Foley, Frank. "Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France." *Security Studies* 18:3 (2009): 425-478. Accessed December 19, 2015. doi: 10.1080/09636410903132920.

France 24. "France Shuts Down Three 'Radical' Mosques in Wake of Paris Attacks." *France 24*, December 3, 2015. Accessed December 23, 2015. http://www.france24.com/en/20151202-france-cazeneuve-shuts-down-radical-mosques-paris-attacks.

France 24. "Ammunition, IS Propaganda Found after France Mosque Closure." *France 24*, December 6, 2015. Accessed December 30, 2015. http://www.france24.com/en/20151206-ammunition-propaganda-found-after-france-mosque-closure

Halliday, Josh, and Vikram Dodd. "UK Anti-Radicalisation Prevent Strategy A 'Toxic Brand'". *The Guardian*, March 9, 2015. Accessed April 1, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/09/anti-radicalisation-prevent-strategy-a-toxic-brand.

Heath-Kelly, Charlotte. "Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the 'Radicalisation' Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy." *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 15 (2013): 394–415. Accessed March 12, 2015. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00489.x.

Henderson, Emma. "Saudi Arabia 'funding Islamic extremism in the West', German vice-chancellor Sigmar Gabriel claims." *The Independent*, December 7, 2015. Accessed December 30, 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/saudi-arabia-funding-islamic-extremism-west-german-vice-chancellor-sigmar-gabriel-a6763366.html.

Home Office a. "CONTEST strategy 2011." July 2011a. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97995/strategy-contest.pdf.

Home Office. "Counter-Extremism Strategy." October 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf.

Home Office b. “Prevent Strategy 2011.” June 2011b. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf.

Home Office, “Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism” March 2009. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100418065544/http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/contest/contest-strategy/contest-strategy-2009?view=Binary.

Horgan, John. *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*. London: Routledge, 2009.

House of Commons. “Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005”. London: The Stationary Office, 2006.

Hurrel, Andrew. *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Institut National De L'audiovisuel. “Le Conseil Français Du Culte Musulman." *Journal Télévisé France 2*. April 14, 2013.

Kern, Soeren. “Germany Tackles Islamic Radicalization.” *Gatestone Institute: International Policy Council*, July 30, 2012. Accessed December 18, 2015. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3218/germany-islamic-radicalization.

Khan, Sadiq. “British Muslims Have British Values.” *The Huffington Post*, September 24, 2014. Accessed December 18, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/sadiq-khan/british-muslims-uk-religion_b_5620298.html.

Kundnani, Arun. “Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept.” *Race Class* 54 (2012): 3-25. Accessed March 10, 2015. doi: 10.1177/0306396812454984.

Maer, Lucinda. “Preventing Violent Extremism”, *Parliament and Constitution Centre*. House of Commons: 2008. http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN04766/SN04766.pdf.

Malik, Shiv, and Sandra Laville. "Isis Recruitment Moves from Online Networks to British Mosques." *The Guardian*, September 5, 2014. Accessed December 29, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/05/isis-recruitment-moves-to-radical-network-and-mosques

MINAB members. Interview. Personal interview. London, August 18, 2015.

MINAB. *Membership sub-committee: Terms of reference.* MINAB.

MINAB. "MINAB Constitution and Trust Deed." 2010. Retrieved 28/03/2015, from http://minab.lmnocouk.netdna-cdn.com/images/stories/Documents/MINAB-Constitution-Standards012011.pdf.

MINAB, Revival of MINAB, 2015. http://www.minab.org.uk/.

Morrison, Aaron. "Europe Terror Threat: France Deports 40 Imams for 'Preaching Hatred,' Interior Minister Says". *International Business Times*, June 29, 2015. Accessed December 18, 2015. http://www.ibtimes.com/europe-terror-threat-france-deports-40-imams-preaching-hatred-interior-minister-says-1987822.

Neumann, Peter R. "Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s." *International Centre for The Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence*, January 26, 2015. Accessed December 10, 2015. http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/

Peter, Frank and Rafael Ortega, edited. *Islamic Movements of Europe: Public Religion and Islamophobia in the Modern World*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2014.

Pew Research Center. *The Global Religious Landscape: A Report On the Size and Distribution of the World's Major Religious Groups as of 2010*. Washington: Pew Research Center, 2012. http://www.pewforum.org/files/2014/01/global-religion-full.pdf.

Pitel, Laura. "Ministers lose vital link to mosques as pressure alienates Muslim group." *The* Times, August 26, 2014. Accessed March 31, 2015. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article4186951.ece.

Rabbani, Ummul Hassan. "Introductory Seminar and Workshop. Report Findings with Recommendations". MINAB. June 2009.

Rabbat, Paul J. "The Role of the United Nations in the Prevention and Repression of International Terrorism." In *A War On Terror?*, edited by Marianne Wade and Almir Maljević, 81-106. New York: Springer, 2010.

Ragazzi, Francesco. "Towards "Policed Multiculturalism"? Counter-radicalization in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom." *Les Etudes du CERI* 206 (2014): 1-37.

Richards, Anthony. "The Problem with 'Radicalization': The Remit of 'Prevent' and the Need to Refocus on Terrorism in the UK." *International Affairs* 87 (2011): 143-152.

Sageman, Marc. *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.

Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks.* Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Shahid, Raza. "The 'Mosques in Communities' Project: Understanding the Role of Mosques in Relation to Their Local Communities". MINAB.

Spalek, Basia and Laura Zahra McDonald. "Terror Crime Prevention: Constructing Muslim Practices and Beliefs as 'Anti-Social' and 'Extreme' through CONTEST 2." *Social Policy and Society* 9 (2010): 123-132. Accessed March 18, 2015. doi: 10.1017/S147474640999025X.

Sridharan, Vasudevan. "Paris attacks: Anti-terror raids across France as government vows crackdown on mosques". *International Business Times,* November 16, 2015. Accessed December 30, 2015. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/paris-attacks-anti-terror-raids-across-france-government-vows-crackdown-mosques-1528881.

Stock, Jürgen and Annette L. Herz. "International Terrorism – German Police Perspective: The Current Threat Environment and Counterstrategies from the German Police Perspective." In *A War On Terror?* Edited by Marianne Wade and Almir Maljević, 13-50. New York: Springer, 2010.

The Guardian. "Leading French Muslim body to create 'licence to preach' for imams", *The Guardian,* November 25, 2015. Accessed December 19, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/25/leading-french-muslim-body-to-create-licence-to-preach-for-imams.

The Independent. "Eric Pickles' Letter to Muslim Leaders: The Text in Full". *The Independent,* January 19, 2015. Accessed December 29, 2015. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/eric-pickles-letter-to-muslim-leaders-the-text-in-full-9987249.html.

The local. "France Forces Closure of Three 'Radical Mosques'", *The Local,* December 2, 2015. Accessed December 20, 2015. http://www.thelocal.fr/20151202/france-forces-closure-of-three-radical-mosques.

The Soufan Group. *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq.* New York, December 2015. http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate4.pdf.

Thomas, Paul. 'Britain's Prevent Programme: An End in Sight?' in *Critical Perspectives on Counter-terrorism,* edited by Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, 169-186. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Thomas, Paul. "Failed and Friendless: The UK's 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Programme." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 12 (2010): 442-458. Accessed March 28, 2015. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2010.00422.x.

Townsend, Mark. “After Paris, Luton wages its own battle for hearts and minds of homegrown radicals”. *The Guardian*, November 28, 2015. Accessed December 12, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/nov/28/why-luto-mosques-schools-battle-against-jihadi-propaganda

Troianovski, Anton and Ruth Bender. “German Officials Warn of New Security Risk: Local Extremists Recruiting Refugees”. *Wall Street Journal*, November 29, 2015. Accessed January 1, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/german-officials-warn-of-new-security-risk-local-extremists-recruiting-refugees-1448846681

United Nations General Assembly. *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*. United Nations, 2006. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement

Victoroff, Jeff. “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (2005): 3-42. Accessed February 20, 2015. doi: 10.1177/0022002704272040.

Warnaar, Maaike. “Why can’t we be friends? Bridging the divide between Iran and the GCC.” Working paper presented at the January 2015 SeSaMo conference, Venice.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West.* Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

Wilkinson, Michael. "Revealed: Britain Has Foiled Seven Terror Attacks in One Year". *The Telegraph*, November 16, 2015. Accessed December 1, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11997853/Revealed-Britain-foils-seven-terror-attacks-in-just-six-months.html.

Withnall, Adam. “Kuwait Mosques Explosion: ‘Isis’ bombs Shia Muslims during Ramadan Friday prayers”. *The Independent*, June 26, 2015. Accessed January 2, 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/kuwait-mosque-explosion-possible-isis-bomb-attack-launched-on-shia-muslims-during-ramadan-friday-10347740.html.