



Universiteit Leiden

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO CHINA'S RISE TO POWER:

AN ANALYSIS OF THINK TANKS' U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PROPOSALS TOWARDS THE
BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.

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List of Abbreviations

AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CAP	Center for American Progress
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
EU	European Union
IGO	Intergovernmental organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International relations
NGO	Non-governmental organization
RQ	Research question
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

This thesis seeks to enrich the discussion about the impact of China's rise on the role of the US as a global leader, however, it wishes to avoid the theoretical prediction or speculation often seen in this discussion. Instead of using prescriptive theories, the much-anticipated American response to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will be researched from an inventive angle that possesses the ability to bridge the gap between theory and policy: think tanks. Publications by think tanks are distinctly suitable for a pragmatic analysis on the direction of US foreign policy. The policy research publications of three prominent American think tanks will be analyzed to make informed statements about the direction of long-term US foreign policy towards the BRI. These think tanks have been carefully selected to represent all sides of the spectrum that dominate simultaneously the political arena of the US and the think tank sector; conservative ideology, liberal ideology, and the neutral, independent, or moderate center. Besides researching the policy recommendations in general this thesis will also research two dimensions that could have a significant impact on the American response; theoretical lenses and ideological orientations. The policy proposals are researched with a qualitative content analysis to identify their theoretical foundation of the IR-paradigms of realism and liberalism. This thesis will broadly map the position of theory, ideology, and policy in the issue at stake: the American response to the BRI. Given exacerbating trends in the think tank sector, the different positions could ultimately pose threats to geopolitical stability. A more extensive introduction will now explain how the subject of this thesis has been established.

History is in the making as 'the Chinese century' unfolds. Generally, we assume that with economic power comes political influence. Nonetheless, as China's economic power rose aggressively in the last decades, its rise as a global political power was relatively passive. But when Xi Jinping took over control of the communist party in 2012 it marked an end of the established principle that dictated Chinese foreign affairs "hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead," as proclaimed by China's former leader Deng Xiaoping (Bolt & Cross, 2018). But while China's rise is anticipated, the potential demise of the US is also deliberated. The process of geopolitical rebalancing has commenced and will intensify as China asserts more power, which in any outcome

requires a response by the US. What that response will be is of monumental significance and the main concern in this research.

China's bid for global power is perhaps most tangibly discernible by the BRI. This initiative was initially announced in 2013 as a development project to revive the historical silk road by developing the Eurasian continent into a cohesive economic area through the construction of infrastructure for trade and energy. But it has since advanced into an exceedingly more comprehensive project that encompasses much more than just infrastructure and that spans across the globe, space, and even into cyberspace. The project is part of the roadmap of the country's modernization to be completed by 2049, when the People's Republic of China celebrates its hundredth birthday (Johnson, 2016). China seduces countries with the promise of (economic) development and progress. Yet, there is a large degree of skepticism whether the BRI is able to provide sustainable development; the Economist (China's Belt and Road Initiative, 2018; Planet China, 2018), Fontaine & Kliman (2018), EU-members and the IMF (Bulloch, 2018) warn about debt-dependency, an imposed China-development model, and a significant setback for good governance and human rights. Despite the potential ramifications, many countries are enticed by the Chinese BRI-investments; over seventy countries from every continent have joined the initiative.

In return, China receives revenue from the investments, sometimes ownership of the infrastructure, and new markets for China's excess supply. But China also receives something much more valuable and less sincere. The real trophy is the increase of geopolitical and geo-economic power that could propel China into regional hegemony and potentially beyond. The manner in which China's rise will unfold is much cause for debate in the academic realm of international relations, split by realists and liberals*. Some prominent academic scholars like John Mearsheimer (2010) predict that US will try to contain China's power, which will lead to an intense security competition and potentially war. While others like Joseph Nye Jr. reject the realist frame of suggesting an 'American decline,' Nye (2015) professes constructive engagement and argues that the complex nature of the balance of power makes it ill-advised to use concepts such as unipolarity and multipolarity to formulate policy, instead, "the United States must shape the

* This thesis refers to 'liberalism' in two distinct capacities; as the IR-theory and as the political ideology in contemporary politics in the US. The theory and the ideology are related to some extent, but they should not be conflated. From the text it will be made clear in which capacity the term is used.

international environment and create incentives for others through trade, finance, culture, and institutions, and forming networks and institutions for action” (Nye, 2015, p. 190).

However, one might question the propriety of determining foreign policy solely based on IR-theory. In practice, looking beyond the theory, the US foreign policy towards the BRI has yet to fully take form. In 2011, the Obama administration implemented a strategy towards China and Asia that has been given the name ‘rebalance to Asia’ or ‘pivot to Asia,’ this strategy is regarded by many, among them Chinese officials, as a *de facto* containment of China (Saunders, 2013; Pham, 2016). Despite officially denying policies of containment the US explicitly obstructed the formation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the primary funder of BRI-projects, according to Etzioni (2016). According to Roach, Daojiong, Kennedy, & Chovanec (2015), this diplomatic miscalculation indicated that the US is indeed trying to contain China by interfering with the development of the BRI. The Trump administration has discontinued the ‘rebalance to Asia’ strategy but it remains unclear whether it is replaced by a single, comprehensive strategy (Cullen, 2017; Denmark, 2017). The Trump administration initially embraced retrenchment and isolationism as guiding foreign policy principles for the Asia-Pacific region. Contention between the two powers has since mounted, most eminently in trade and economic policy but also in the domain of defense strategy, which increasingly centers around China and does so in hostile terms (Seligman, 2019). In July 2018, the most concrete indication of future US policy formulation came when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced an American infrastructure development plan for the Indo-Pacific region to counteract the economic influence of China (Parameswaran, 2018). However, the size and scope of this plan comes nowhere near the BRI. Therefore, this cannot be considered an all-encompassing response and thus a definitive policy has yet to be determined.

Admittedly, US foreign policy can change during different White House administrations but as the BRI advances towards 2049 it is expected that the position of the US will mature around a coherent, complete, and path-dependent policy. Since the US government currently has not yet implemented such a long-term strategy towards the BRI and such a strategy is necessary and inevitable as geopolitical tensions rise, we can therefore conclude that such a strategy is being developed, formulated, and discussed as we speak.

Forthcoming foreign policy is hard to corroborate, indication can be found with politicians, scholars, experts, and journalists. They interact in organizations such as think tanks, which generate policy-oriented research and analysis (Medvetz, 2012). Think tanks are together with government institutions the most important place in which future policy and political strategy is researched, explored, and formulated. And unlike government institutions, they are largely transparent in this regard. The publications issued by think tanks are therefore exceptionally informative to make substantiated statements about the direction of US foreign policy towards the BRI. Besides their strength in offering a forum for policy analysis, they have another instrumental function. Think tanks are acknowledged to serve as the intermediaries between universities and governments. The intermediaries that transform academic research into accessible knowledge that generate actual policy proposals. In this process IR theories are the input and foreign policy proposals are the output. This thesis aims to find out to what extent the proposals are derived from the IR-theories of realism and liberalism.

Besides IR-theories, political ideology also holds sway over the American response. Directly in the political arena but also indirectly through think tanks. The aggravated politicization and polarization of American society has permeated the once nonpartisan reputation of think tanks. The process of politicization started during the 1970s, when the number of think tanks increased significantly and political interests started to play a more fundamental role, mostly along conservative and liberal lines (Gilroy, 2012; Newsom, 1996). This thesis aims to find out if the issue of US foreign policy towards the BRI is dragged into the political divide and has become part of what is sometimes referred to as the 'war of ideas,' fiercely fought by conservatives and liberals (McGann, 2007).

Within this 'war of ideas' the role of money in American politics has become increasingly controversial (Gehl & Porter, 2017). Lobby-practices and the large flows of money to political campaigns are often scrutinized or at least more widely publicized upon, however, the think tank sector is just as much a domain that is susceptible to the power of money. McGann (2016) explains that historical funding patterns indicate think tanks are less funded by neutral income streams and more by private interests; such as affluent donors, corporations and private foundations, resulting increasingly in project-specific as opposed to general support. Some types of think tanks are even primarily funded by sources with specific interests (McGann, 2016).

Considering the trend of politicization in combination with the elevated position of private money within the think tank sector the repercussions for democratic policy-making are dire and consequential for geopolitical stability. By researching think tanks with distinct ideological orientations, this thesis will prevent the perception of political bias and will simultaneously serve as a hoop test for the potential influence of political ideology on this specific issue. The three think tanks that have been chosen for the analysis are the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Heritage Foundation, and the Center for American Progress (CAP), which represent respectively a centrist, conservative, and liberal ideological orientation. The databases of each think tank have been searched for the publications that address US foreign policy proposals related to China's BRI.

Ultimately, this thesis examines the relationship between policy, ideology, and theory in the case of US foreign policy towards the BRI in the context of China's rise. It is often assumed that this relationship is mostly rigid. But the reality demonstrates this isn't the case. As appears for example from the fact that US presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush Sr., Clinton, and Bush Jr. have justified their foreign policy agendas with liberal IR arguments, despite their pronounced differing conservative and liberal ideological views shows the relationship is anything but to be assumed (Jahn, 2013).

In this light, this thesis hopes to contribute to the discussion of the American response in several ways. First, this thesis aims to find out what range of policy proposals are distributed by American think tanks. Second, because think tanks transform academic theories into policy proposals, acting as the intermediaries between universities and governments, this thesis aims to find out how much and which IR-theories can be traced back from the proposals made by think tanks. And lastly, by analyzing three think tanks with ideologically different backgrounds this thesis seeks to find out if ideology affects US foreign policy towards the BRI. This has resulted in the following research question and sub-questions.

To what extent are the proposals made by American think tanks about US foreign policy towards the BRI aligned within IR-theories and what does this mean considering the developments in the think tank industry?

- What are the US foreign policy proposals regarding China's BRI that are presented by American think tanks in their publications?

- Do the proposals on US foreign policy towards China's BRI reflect a distinct theoretical account of the relevant IR-theories?

Figure 1 offers a schematic representation of the process of policy-making, which shows the relationship between policy (sub-RQ 1), theory (sub-RQ 2), ideology, and think tank developments.




Figure 1. Focus points of research questions (Adapted from Chernoff, 2007, p. 37).

Literature Review

The literature review discusses two topics that lie at the base of this thesis. Starting with the current balance of power in China-US relations in the context of the BRI to identify what theoretical debate lies at the heart of the potential American response. Thereafter, think tanks will be discussed and more specifically the politicization of think tanks and their funding will be reflected.

Power Relations Between China and the US

Considering the breadth and size of the initiative it is unsurprising that the BRI receives attention from a variety of academic disciplines; ranging from engineering, logistics, tourism, agriculture, to geography but most academic literature focuses on the economic and political aspects of the BRI (Leung, 2018). Leung (2018) explains that the novelty of the project constrains the ability of academics to perform quantitative and

qualitative research methods. Leung (2018) argues it is notable that despite the fact that the US is not directly involved in the project a considerable number of academic articles pays attention to China-US relations in the context of China's rise as a great power. Precisely this angle in the existing literature will now be further contemplated.

Within this angle, the underlying crux of the debate can be reduced to the perception of China's rise as either peaceful or aggressive. This antagonism originates from the eminent and dominant debate that has defined international relations theory; realism vs. liberalism (Mearsheimer, 2001). These two foundational schools of thought have come to dominate IR-research, and various new theories have emerged that draw back on their fundamentals. The details of these schools of thought will be discussed in more detail in the theoretical framework.

The disagreement over China's rise is presided by two of the most influential scholars in international relations: John Mearsheimer and Joseph Nye Jr. (Callahan, 2015; Maliniak, Peterson & Tierney, 2011; Ricks, 2014). Mearsheimer is best known for his theory on offensive realism and Nye is one of the key contributors to the neoliberal school of thought, and who is renowned for his work on complex interdependence and soft power. But striking is the fact that the disagreement is not just restricted to American or Western circles, Mearsheimer (2011, p. 690-702) informs us of the Chinese account of the disagreement, which shows us that the matter is not settled in China yet. But as this thesis is researching the American response the Chinese academic view on its rise will not be further explored.

Academics that have adopted a world view underpinned by realist notions have a rigid perception that China's rise will not be peaceful. The essence of realism can clarify why they have this expectation (Mearsheimer, 2001; Toft, 2005). Central to realism is that there is no enduring possibility for states to transcend the international order, which is defined by zero-sum security competition for power. Following a realist worldview, China's rise can almost exclusively be interpreted as a threat to the security of the US. Mearsheimer (2001, 2010) therefore explicitly argues that if China continues to rise the US will seek to contain China and a high probability exists for an intense security competition and the risk for all-out war increases.

Nye originates from the liberal school and believes the anarchic tendencies over the international order can be mitigated by cooperation and interdependence between states (Keohane & Nye, 2012). Approaching the discussion from such a perspective results

in conceivable scenarios in which China's rise can be peaceful and the American response won't exclusively be about competition. Nye's (2015) prescription to reduce the chances for conflict as China rises is to promote intergovernmental cooperation by integrating China into the international order and to shape an environment that encourages China to act responsibly and carefully treads to balance the power.

But to what extent can theory help us unravel the nature of China's rise and the appropriate response of the US? Mearsheimer and Nye are both willing to admit that theories are imprecise in explaining reality and predicting the future. Keohane & Nye (2012) indicate that the 'ideal types' found in IR-theory do not reflect the reality of world politics and consider reality to be some fusion of multiple types. Likewise, Mearsheimer (2001) also admits that offensive realism is simply a theory that simplifies the complex reality of world politics with naturally some limits in its explanatory power. In addition, the late Kenneth Waltz argues that theories on international politics should not directly instruct foreign policy, and states: "A theory is an instrument used in attempting to explain "the real world" and perhaps to make some predictions about it. In using the instrument, all sorts of information, along with a lot of good judgment, is needed" (1996, p. 56).

But this can be interpreted as an attempt to hedge against real-world consequences. And so Kirshner (2010) argues that the choice of theoretical approach in foreign policy undeniably does have consequences, specifically in the case of the American response to China's rise. Using an offensive realist approach results in a "self-fulfilling, and self-defeating, prophecy" (Kirshner, 2010, p. 70), whether China rises peacefully is contingent upon American foreign policy towards China. Kirshner argues that it is quite likely that in the long-run the US does not have the capability to prevent China's rise, but a costly attempt to contain China will backfire and result in a hostile and powerful competitor. The theoretical approach that is adopted does shape the kind of policies that are pursued and the subsequent outcome of state interaction.

Think Tanks

But if renowned IR-theorists claim that theory should not directly instruct policy, does it make sense to use theory in formulating policy? The answer is yes according to several scholars, they argue the existing gap between academic theory and actual policy is bridged by think tanks (Lepgold & Nincic, 2001; McGann, 2007; Newsom, 1996; Stone,

1996; Wiarda, 2010). Despite their important function the amount of research into think tanks is relatively modest.

An important segment of existing research relates to the think tank's role in policy-making, sometimes specifically on foreign policy. In the US, foreign policy is ultimately legitimized by the public, argues Newsom (1996), this has caused the process of policy-making to be more transparent than undemocratic governments and as a result this created a marketplace for ideas. Nakamura views think tanks as part of a policy community in democratic societies that aid in "assuring a pluralistic, open and accountable process of policy analysis, research, decision-making and evaluation" (Nakamura, 2002). Think tanks provide an influential marketplace of ideas on policy, a less formal exchange in comparison to government branches, people from different backgrounds partake in this exchange; such as academics, government officials, diplomats, media, business-representatives, experts, advocacy organizations and lobbyists (Newsom, 1996; Roberts, 2015).

Ahmad (2008) reports that think tanks in comparison with media outlets receive much less attention from the general public, but they exert more influence on US foreign policy formulation. Ahmad (2008), McGann (2007), Weaver (1989), and Wiarda (2010) explain some of the mechanisms on how policy is influenced by think tanks: source of original ideas and alternative policies; evaluation and examining of policy proposals; alerting, anticipating, and identifying problems and issues; educating and providing government personnel; providing a forum for high-level discussion; educating the public; and generating competence and knowledge. This shows the complex and inconspicuous ways in which think tanks exert influence.

The methods used by think tanks have been identified, but proof of influence is often circumstantial (e.g. McGann, 2016). Academic research that proves that think tanks have a direct impact on policy is non-existent. The nature of the policy-making process is too complex, opaque, and irregular for the development of an instrument of influence-measurement. Stone mentions the following on this subject: "The complexities of the policy-making process create a gap between the inputs of policy institutes and the outputs of policy-making. ... This hiatus prevents measurement of their impact" (1996, p. 4). In other words, the holy-grail of think tank research is measuring the influence of think tanks on actual policy.

A considerable part of the existing research on think tanks seeks to define what think tanks are and what they are not, and how think tanks have developed historically (Ahman, 2008; Gilroy, 2012; McGann, 2016; Medvetz, 2012; Rich, 2004; Roberts, 2015; Pautz, 2011; Weaver, 1989). An early categorization made by Weaver (1989) divides think tanks into 'universities without students' and 'contract research organizations.' The first category highlighting academia as a guiding principle and the latter is more or less navigated on the basis of research outlined in contracts with predominantly government institutions. But Weaver in 1989 reports on a third and new type of think tank: 'advocacy think tanks,' which "combine a strong policy, partisan or ideological bent with aggressive salesmanship and an effort to influence current policy debates. Advocacy tanks synthesize and put a distinctive "spin" on existing research rather than carrying out original research" (Weaver, 1989, p. 567). Ahman (2008) adds a fourth type to the list: 'party think tank,' which has an explicit allegiance to the Democratic or Republican party. It becomes clear that a think tank has no universal definition, and its status is increasingly controversial; especially due to politicization.

The most noteworthy finding of the research into defining think tanks is the way numerous think tanks have evolved into entities which aren't motivated anymore by seeking the truth, instead, they're operating in service of political agendas. McGann (2007), renowned for his research on think tanks, found out in a survey among leaders in the industry that think tanks role should be "to serve as independent, innovative, and credible providers of ideas and analysis for policymakers, the public, and the media." This 'intention' is however not reflecting reality as the trend of advocacy and party think tanks persists. The division of think tanks by political orientation was launched by conservative advocacy during the 1970s, Newsom (1996) explains that conservatives felt that the existing think tanks were promoting policies that had a distinct liberal signature, to counter the influence of liberal thought conservatives established their own think tanks.

The trend of politicization is observed by Rich (2004), Gilroy (2012), and McGann (2016) among others. Gilroy (2012, p. 39) researched if Washington-based think tanks have indeed become politicized over time and found unequivocal evidence that this is indeed the case, stating that "Empirically speaking, they have organizationally transformed from open-minded truth-seekers into hard-headed advocates of a broadly liberal or conservative worldview." This process of politicization is caused by several factors (Gilroy, 2012; McGann, 2016; Rich, 2004). The availability of resources provided

by businesses, government, private foundations, and wealthy individuals have steered this development, as competition increased among think tanks for donations. Also, there are several contributing factors; such as preferences of journalists, and policymakers; the relative weak American party system, polarized political environment, and the tax environment for think tanks (full tax-deductibility of donations). Gilroy fears that this outcome will increasingly corrode the sector as a whole as appears from: “the last decades’ sustained wave of advocacy think tanks has swamped the city with a morass of deeply politicized, unreliable or downright sloppy policy research and analysis, which frequently serves to hysterize rather than scrutinize policy debates.” (2012, p. 40).

The empirical research of Gilroy (2012) identified two trends with regard to the politicization of Washington, D.C.-based think tanks (see Figure 2 below). First, think tanks with an ideological basis have come to dominate the sector. And second, conservative think tanks outnumber liberal think tanks, by a ratio of 2:1. As this trend continues, we risk that the policy-making process is ideologically captured by private interests, considering that think tanks are predominantly funded by individuals, foundations, and businesses (McGann, 2007). This combination has caused the conservative think tanks to be strongly outperforming their liberal counterparts and seem to be winning the ‘war of ideas’ (McGann, 2007, 2016).




Figure 2. Trends in politicization (From Gilroy, 2012, p. 24).

Because the process of policy decision-making remains opaque and intangible, we are unable to find out what the exact influence and role of think tanks is. By logic and reason, we can assume though that the number of think tanks, the quantity of their output, and the amount of funding they receive have a positive relationship towards influencing policy through the various channels.

Magnified by the rise of the lobbying industry and the funding of political campaigns (e.g. supreme court ruling of *Citizens United v. FEC*), these developments in the think tank industry can be characterized as the privatization of the American public policy process. Wiarda (2010) stresses the fact that accountability and oversight are lacking, making this a potentially dangerous trend. Donations can come with certain expectations, potentially creating conflicts of interest in which the integrity of independent research is at risk. Newsom (1996) argues that this risk is mitigated to a certain extent by the necessity of preserving a reputation of professionalism and objectivity; which is a weak safeguard.

While there more or less exists a code of ethics in academia, this isn't the case for think tanks. Causing an opaque reality of forced outcomes due to funding primarily based on ideology rather than seeking the truth. The corrosive role of money in politics is mostly ascribed to practices in campaign finance, advocacy groups, and the lobbying industry, much less so to the think tank sector. But the distinctions between these and more types of organizations are vague, to say the least, and often exploited (e.g. Plehwe, 2014; Stone, 2007). The lobbying industry is more heavily regulated and requires extensive disclosure, unlike think tanks. Appeals for increased transparency, oversight, and scrutiny of think tanks practices are made often (Alterman, 2011; Krugman, 2005; Transparify, n.d.).

However, transparency is not the issue per se. The three think tanks examined in this thesis all receive a four out of five-star rating and are designated as 'broadly transparent' by Transparify (2016), an organization that investigates think tanks' transparency. In addition, all three offer insights into their donors, financial records, or annual reports on their website. Despite these favorable scores and efforts to improve transparency, the root of the issue persists; some think tanks are no longer independent and neutral and offer an instrument in which money can influence policy. The far-reaching consequence that this reality implies is that the battle over the US response to the BRI or even the future of US-China relations can be determined by the amount of funding each

ideological branch of think tank receives; if their policy suggestions diverge. As a result of this consequence, the discoveries or differences that emerge from the analysis are invigorated in their significance.

Theoretical Framework

As mentioned previously, think tanks are considered to serve as the intermediaries between academia (input) and government (output). In order to understand where think tanks derive their policy proposals from, the theoretical framework of this thesis will help us to identify the IR-theories (input) that think tanks have used in their publications. For this purpose, the material provided in this chapter focuses on the theories in their elemental form, not in their applied or tampered form. The first part of this chapter addresses how IR-theory has developed and which theories have been chosen and for what reason. The second part specifies the dominant theories that serve as the framework for the analysis. In the Appendix, two tables are available that are based on the information provided in the theoretical framework. Table 1 offers a concise classification of the dominant IR-paradigms, Table 2 offers a classification of the relevant IR-theories.

Theories on International Relations

Ideas on international relations have a long history, often originating from contemplations about conflict and war expressed as early as ancient Greece by the hand of Thucydides. As an academic discipline, IR matured only until World War II already happened with increased recognition and development of knowledge and theory (Knutsen, 1992). The development of IR-theory has been accompanied by three important debates: idealism vs. realism, history vs. science, and finally the positivist vs. post-positivist debate (Lapid, 1989).

The last debate has divided the discipline into two opposing epistemologies: empiricism and interpretivism (Lamont, 2015). One camp sees IR as a positivist academic discipline and argues that knowledge, just like the natural sciences, can be accumulated by empirical evidence and logical reasoning. The other camp holds IR as a post-positivist academic discipline because there cannot be objective independence between the researcher and the reality he/she observes, the researcher has certain social biases in the form of identities, ideas, norms, and culture that limit the researcher's ability to observe the world objectively. Post-positivist theories therefore often focus on underlying social

and power structures, such as gender and ethnicity, that affect international relations, examples are constructivism, feminism, Marxism, and postcolonialism.

The pivot of this thesis relates to concepts and a unit of analysis that are central in the positivist theories; mainly state power and state interaction. For this reason, this thesis has confined itself to the primary positivist theories. The positivist theories are dominated by two building blocks: realism and liberalism. The theoretical framework will provide a background of the realist and liberal paradigms and a more detailed account of the contemporary theories that have originated from them.

This thesis does not involve testing the explanatory power of theories; instead, it examines the manifestation of theory in policy proposals. For that reason, this thesis will not critically assess every claim or discuss all the reciprocal critique.

Realism

The long history of realist thought has resulted in a considerable number of differentiated branches from which multiple classifications, terminologies, and criteria have emerged, as explained by Feng & Ruizhuang (2006). In order to avoid ambiguity, only the essence of relevant realist thought is discussed by passing through its historical development.

Realism is a long-lasting tradition that has been propagated by old philosophers and intellectuals such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes (Feng & Ruizhuang, 2006). But after World War II academics started to modernize and formalize the academic discipline of IR, most notably with 'Politics amongst Nations' by Morgenthau (Elman, 2007; Wohlforth, 2008). All these early expressions of realist thought have come to be known as classical realism and can be recognized by its focus on the flawed, competitive nature of humans. This split was induced by the influential scholar Kenneth Waltz, who successfully proposed a more elaborated theory called neorealism or structural realism.

The theories of the realist tradition are connected by four principles, these are the imperatives that states face in international politics (Wohlforth, 2008). First, states are the principal actors in international politics. Argued by the claim that politics takes places by groups (e.g.: tribes, city-states, and empires), nation-states are currently the most important groups and nationalism the biggest source of in-group cohesion. Second, states are rational and driven by self-interest, this principle is often referred to as 'egoism.' Third, international politics is inherently anarchic by nature which stems from the absence of an enforcing supranational authority. Fourth, the combination of a motivation

of self-interest and an international order of anarchy induces international politics to be predominantly about competition for power and security. The crucial deduction from these principles is the grim outlook on the achievability and desirability of cooperation between states.

Structural realism deviates from classical realism because the premise of egoism is perceived differently (Burchil et al., 2005; Walt, 1998). Egoism as the main driver does not emanate from human nature (central in classical realism); instead, it is guided by structural constraints of the international system. This means that the behavior of states is predominantly ordered and determined externally by the anarchic nature of the system and the distribution of (power) capabilities among states (Burchil et al., 2005, p. 35-39).

The number of great powers has a great impact on the structural constraints, it defines the system; unipolar (or hegemony), bipolar, and multipolar. The emphasis on distribution of capabilities leads structural realists to focus more distinctly on relative power gains (as opposed to absolute power gains). The presuppositions of structural realism on anarchy, egoism, and relative power gains strongly impedes the possibility for cooperation. Stein (2008) explains that the fear that another state would benefit more from mutually beneficial cooperation restricts cooperation. Forming an alliance against a rising power is the occasional situation in which realists believe cooperation is more likely and viable, explains Wohlforth (2008). Forming alliances is defined as external balancing as opposed to internal balancing which refers to increasing the power capabilities within the state. These rationales have been further developed in theories on balance of power, which has become a central theme in realist thought.

The contemporary and dominant approaches in realism are defensive realism, offensive realism, and neoclassical realism. These are now discussed and form the basis for the classification in Table 2 in the Appendix. Directly originating from structural realism, two more distinguished theories were developed; defensive and offensive realism (Burchil et al., 2015; Mearsheimer, 2001; Toft, 2005; Wohlforth, 2008). The two theories are separated by two orientations on the primary aim of the state. According to defensive realism, there is a majority of status quo states who don't want to antagonize other states and wish to maintain the balance of power, they are reluctant to be expansionist, and not exclusively seek to maximize relative power. In addition, there are some revisionist states who wish to alter the balance of power and maximize relative power. Offensive realists, on the other hand, argue that there are only revisionist states

who will always seek to maximize relative power because security is scarce, survival is paramount, and the ultimate aim is hegemony.

Neoclassical realism combines structural realism and classical realism. According to neoclassical realists, structural realism is too much of a universal theory with strong explaining power for the outcomes of state interactions, but in its disregard for the differentiated behavior of states it is unable to account for actual foreign policy (Wohlforth, 2008). Rose (1998) therefore views structural realism as a theory of international politics and neoclassical realism as a theory of foreign policy. Rose explains how neoclassical realism is formed:

It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insight drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical. (Rose, 1998, p. 146)

Before this part on realism is completed and we continue with liberalism, it is important to note that realism does not simply deny the existence of international institutions. The realist argument, as explained by Mearsheimer (2001), focuses on the outcome and asserts that they are not central in state interaction. The belief is that in the end, the present liberal world order cannot be maintained and when it falls apart like a house of cards, all we have left are the conditions described by realism.

Liberalism

Liberalism is often emphatically framed from the antagonistic relationship it keeps with realism. Similar to realism, it signifies a paradigm and encompasses a range of theories which have been derived from foundational ideas on IR. But unlike realism, the theories of the liberalist school are less at variance with one another. The paradigm disagrees with realism because of three main tenets; the view of the state as a unitary actor, the fixation on power and security, and the rejection of opportunities for cooperation. By implication, liberalism's central postulations are that state preferences and behavior are also determined by internal factors and non-state actors, and that

despite the anarchic nature of the international order states can achieve mutually beneficial cooperation between states.

The roots of liberalism lie in the ideas and beliefs proclaimed by the enlightenment movement (Burchil et al., 2015); such as liberty, reason, equality, tolerance, rationality, democracy, and secularism. Over the years, differing interpretations and interests have been given to these concepts and ideas, therefore liberalism is a heterogeneous collection of theories that covers several academic disciplines (Jahn, 2013). The discipline of IR got acquainted with liberalism during the first important debate of idealism vs. realism. US President Wilson is a well-known advocate of this liberal movement of idealism that “sought to establish a liberal peace marked by open diplomacy, the right of self-determination, free trade, disarmament, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the establishment of an international security organization in the form of the League of Nations” (MacMillan, 2007, p. 21). During the following development of liberalism, the paradigm relinquished the emphasis on human morale seen in idealism, similar to the way realists relinquished the role of human nature when it evolved into structural realism.

Burchil et al. (2015), MacMillan (2007), and Mearsheimer (2001) explain that because liberalism, in contrast to realism, is built upon the beliefs of enlightenment they distinguish between the internal attributes of states, this has created an appearance of preference for certain forms of government over others. Realists clearly oppose this thesis because they argue that the internal characteristics of states have no influence over the outcome of international politics. The accusation of normativity is amplified due to a specific manifestation of liberal thought; the democratic peace thesis. This postulation states that democracies are more reluctant to use force in settling disputes with other democracies, contrary to the settlement of disputes with or between non-democracies.

The clear difference is that realists regard competition as a natural outcome in the struggle for power because of the external constraints of the international order, and liberals believe that state preferences (originating from internal attributes) also influence state interactions and that cooperation is also possible, as opposed to merely competition (Burchill et al., 2015; MacMillan, 2007). Liberal thought proclaims that the creation of common interests between states reduces the likelihood of conflict. Originating from Adam Smith, liberals believe that trade is such a common interest, it can improve the wealth of all involved states and creates interdependence and peace. This process starts

in mutually beneficial areas, most commonly in trade, and develops into institutionalized cooperation in multiple areas. An important take of liberals is that the channel for cooperation is not exclusively claimed by the rulers of states but also takes place by non-state actors; such as (multinational) companies, NGOs, IGOs, and even individuals. Liberals have hereby altered the realist's fatalistic outcome of anarchy, as Burchill et al. explains:

Anarchy is mitigated by regimes and institutional cooperation which brings higher levels of regularity and predictability to international relations. Regimes constrain state behaviour by formalizing the expectations of each party to an agreement where there is a shared interest. Institutions then assume the role of encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring compliance and sanctioning defectors. Regimes also enhance trust, continuity and stability in a world of ungoverned anarchy. (Burchill et al., 2015, p. 65)

According to the liberalist vision, the domestic structures that uphold enlightenment-inspired values in liberal democratic states can be appropriated to the international level in order to create a peaceful global order. The international analogies are universal human rights, an open, globalized world economy, and a world government: comparable to the United Nations. Because of this, liberals are often characterized as proponents of globalization. However, Moravcsik's (2007) importantly notes that liberals see globalization is as a universal condition of world politics and not an end in itself; instead, domestic and transnational social pressures determine the distinct state preferences on how to deal with globalization.

Jahn (2013) explains that the liberal paradigm has undoubtedly developed, but predominantly into various academic disciplines and specialized directions. Regrettably, this caused a level of complexity and fragmentation that has impeded the creation of a comparative research-account of contemporary and well-defined liberal IR-theories.

The development of liberalism has led to neoliberalism, a prominent example of a neoliberal theory is 'complex interdependence,' developed by Keohane & Nye (2012). This theory specifies how conflict can be avoided by a complex web of interdependencies between states using a variety of multidimensional channels (e.g. economic, social, cultural, and ecological channels) with states explicitly acting as non-unitary actors. Neoliberal theories offer more detailed and developed accounts of liberal foundations but there is no clear theoretical break with foregoing liberal beliefs. Other neoliberal theories

are sociological liberalism, institutional liberalism, and republican liberalism, which respectively explore how sociological relations, international institutions, or democratic structures explain international cooperation (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010). However, this is just one way of categorizing neoliberal theories, Jahn (2013) explains that the categorization of neoliberal thought is not conclusively approved, leading to varying accounts of categorization (see Jackson & Sørensen, 2010; Keohane, 2002; Moravcsik, 2008).

Jahn (2013) explains that most categorizations are quite similar and categorize on the basis of substantive issue areas. Meaning that all theories have maintained a similar formula but have been divided on the basis of the central variables or dynamics that are seen as crucial for the establishment of a peaceful world order. No comparative research has been done into the relationship between these theories. They are thus perceived as complementary theories that exhibit some contradictions but never fundamentally opposing one another. Because a clear systematic account of contemporary liberal IR-theories is absent this thesis will not distinguish between the theories within the liberal IR-paradigm.

Research Design and Methodology

This chapter will explain in what way the analysis in this thesis is conducted to answer the research questions.

Previous US foreign policy is mostly researched by analyzing government records and statements by officials and the future course of relations between states are often approached from the descriptive IR-theories. As previously indicated, researching prospective US foreign policy is somewhat problematic. Access or insight into the decision-making process is doubtful. Think tanks do have limited access but the impact is close to immeasurable. McGann (2007) explains actual policy adoption is self-evidently the best indirect proof of influence of think tanks. When it comes to the topic of this thesis, there is no other option than to wait for the implementation of concrete US foreign policy towards the BRI in order to find workable proof of potential influence of any of these think tanks. While this thesis examines the American response, it does not pretend that the policy suggestions that have been found in the analysis will form the prospective US foreign policy, however, it does argue that these policy suggestions are the most informed indicators of such a prospective policy. Callahan (2017) has encountered that research

into the BRI is predominantly performed by think tanks over academia. Which shows the significance for policy-makers and signifies that publications of think tanks are potentially a rich source for the direction of US foreign policy towards the BRI.

Ultimately, this thesis seeks to find prevailing policy proposals and examine the extent to which several IR-theories are detectable and assess the role of ideology indirectly. In order to do that this thesis is constructed as a qualitative research (see Lamont, 2015). The research is document-based because the focus lies on official online publications of think tanks. Consequently, the suitable method is archival research relying on three online archives operated by the think tanks themselves. The primary resources collected are subjected to a content analysis using qualitative data analysis software, the specific procedure is outlined later in this chapter.

Data Selection

The analysis is performed on the textual publications of think tanks. These publications will serve as the primary resources, which will be examined for policy suggestions. Considering the number of think tanks has reached over 6500 (McGann, 2018), the scope of this thesis is narrowed down to three think tanks. The think tanks that are examined in the analysis are the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Heritage Foundation, and the Center for American Progress. These think tanks are all in the top 10 of American think tanks according to an extensive survey (McGann, 2018, p. 75).

These three think tanks are selected to represent respectively an independent, conservative, and liberal orientation. The Center for Strategic and International Studies is regarded as a centrist or neutral think-tank or one without an identifiable political ideology (Medvetz, 2007, p. 239; Rich & Weaver, 2000, p. 96) or center-right (Ahmad, 2008, p. 542; McGann, 2007, p. 25). Heritage Foundation is viewed as a distinct conservative think tank (Ahmad, 2008, p. 542; Gilroy, 2012; McGann, 2007, p. 25; Medvetz, 2007, p. 238; Rich & Weaver, 2000, p. 96; Seidmedova, 2016). The Heritage Foundation is unlike other politicized think tanks remarkably open about their political orientation as clearly indicated by their mission statement: “The mission of The Heritage Foundation is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense” (The Heritage Foundation, 2018). The

Center for American Progress is viewed as a liberal/progressive think tank (Ahmad, 2008, p. 542; Gilroy, 2012; McGann, 2007; p. 25; Selee, 2013, p. 49).

The timeframe used for finding the appropriate publications is from the day that President Xi Jinping announced the BRI on September 7, 2013 (Fallon, 2015) until July 2018. To find the relevant publications this thesis has made use of Google's advanced search capabilities on the webdomain of each think tank. The reason for not using the think tanks' own search functions is because they offered particularly limited search options, which led to an inability to find the relevant search results in an efficient way. The specific search queries are found in Table 3 in the Appendix. The results have been filtered to acquire the textual publications, omitting the audio-visual publications. The remaining publications have been analyzed and are available in the Appendix. The searches led to 106 publications from CSIS (Table 4), 43 publications from the Heritage Foundation (Table 5), and 11 publications from CPA (Table 6).

Method of Analysis

The content analysis performed on the publications has not been quantifiable coded because the nuance of IR theory and US foreign policy is too context-dependent and not suitable for such a method. Instead, both research questions have a separate quantitative method of content analysis. The analysis is in part carried out using NVivo; a qualitative data analysis software. The approach (including categorization and coding), purpose, and expectations of each research question will now be discussed.

RQ1: The American response according to think tanks

- What are the US foreign policy proposals regarding China's BRI that are presented by American think tanks in their publications?

The first mission of this thesis is to penetrate the realm of policy-making and thereby increasing our insights of what prospective US foreign policy towards the BRI will probably look like by examining the ideas and proposals that are floating around in the publications of think tanks. The first research question serves this general purpose. The scope of this question is rather broad, so the indication of policy proposals are all things related to actions, strategies, interests, or activities by/of American actors that directly or indirectly affect the BRI.

RQ2: Bridging the gap between theory and policy

- Do the proposals on US foreign policy towards China's BRI reflect a distinct theoretical account of the relevant IR-theories?

This research question examines the extent to which the IR-theories penetrate the realm of foreign policy-making in this particular case. The theoretical framework explained what the relevant elementary theories are for examining power relations between the US and China; defensive realism, offensive realism, classical realism, and liberalism. The categorization and coding within the analysis will be performed on the basis of the classifications and descriptions of the theoretical framework, which have been summarized in Tables 1 and 2. It is important to reiterate that the conceptualization of IR-theories within publications is not necessarily evident. Therefore, the publications will be searched for references, perceptions, or attitudes that reflect a certain IR-theory, hereby helping us identifying a potential adherence to an IR-theory. In particular, attention is paid to statements that indicate what's the organizing principle for world order, the dominating factors and channels in the international system, and to the contextual use of important terms, such as power, rivalry, containment, and engagement. In addition, the specific policy proposals have been evaluated to see whether they fall within a strategy that flows out of an IR-theory (e.g. containment).

The hypothesis of this question is that think tanks will indeed bridge the gap between theory and practice/policy. Furthermore, aspects of multiple theories are expressed in the policies suggested by think tanks because the complexity of relations between China and the US in a changing world order does not allow for the use of a strict or exclusive theoretical approach. Formulated policies will thus reflect a fusion of both theories. However, the think tanks will differentiate by relying heavily on a distinct IR-theory.

Analysis

The next section will present the analysis, each sub-question is addressed based on the think tank.

RQ 1: The American Response According to Think Tanks

Center for Strategic and International Studies

The publications of the CSIS are rich in quantity and quality, producing a wide range of policy proposals and thorough reasoning. Striking is the neutral approach, as

demonstrated by recognizing and condemning the pronounced negative or positive sentiment among fellow observants of the BRI (Johnson, 2016; Sutter, 2018). In addition, Hillman (2018a) declares that the BRI is well-known but little understood, and the multifaceted nature of the BRI makes reliable information hard to come by. To some extent the CSIS professes restraint in taking a strong position, even explicitly stating: “Employing evidence-based analysis helps specialists avoid excessively positive or negative conclusions about China’s recent rise in international stature.” (Sutter, 2018). It shows the CSIS’ approach is relying on facts, deliberation, and is less infused with ideology.

The level of comprehensiveness of the research done by the CSIS appears from wide-extending policy proposals and underlying reasoning. For example, Florick (2017) makes the interesting case for cooperation with China in Central-Asia to counter the growing Russian influence in the region. On a different note, Runde & Milner (2016) argue that the U.S. must engage constructively in order to maintain the Dollar as the primary currency and to preserve English as the primary global operating language. Another interesting angle by some authors (Goodman, 2017; Schaus, Matlaga, Hicks, Conley, & Rathke 2018) is the suggestion that fixing domestic issues is required for the US to respond accordingly to China’s rise; for the US to be able to compete with China in the long run and to receive broad support at home for an all-encompassing strategy towards China the US needs to invest in the future, education, infrastructure, and research. Besides several particular proposals like these, there are several leading themes that are more frequently discussed.

Cooley (2016) remarks that the US often takes a supportive stance to China’s BRI in Eurasia and takes an adverse stance in East Asia, such and other inconsistencies ought to be addressed by formulating an aligned policy response. A number of articles, therefore, argues that the US must develop a coherent and complete (economic) vision or strategy for the region, in order for the US to retain its position in Asia and to secure that the economies in the region are open and free (Barker Gale & Shearer, 2018; Goodman, 2017; Harding & Natalegawa, 2018; Hillman, 2018a). Consequently, the influence of the US in the region suffered a huge strategic blow when the US decided to withdraw from the TPP, this compelling assessment was shared in various publications (Barker Gale & Shearer, 2018; Goodman, 2017; Hillman, 2018a; Runde & Milner, 2016). Barker Gale & Shearer (2018) clarify this view by stating:

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) originally offered an attractive U.S.-led alternative to China's economic vision for the region, limiting the attractiveness of Chinese economic overtures in the Indo-Pacific. It would also have acted to reinforce the international rules-based order and the Trump administration's proclaimed objective of a "free and open" region. Instead, the U.S. withdrawal from this important, high-quality trade pact has hobbled American strategy in Asia and provided an opportunity for the spread of Chinese influence.

In a multitude of publications, engagement in the region and with the BRI is recommended for a variety of purposes. The notion that economic development offers opportunities for the US is often regarded as a wise rationale for engagement (Haider, 2017; Kuchins & Kourmanova, 2015). Engagement is envisioned in a complementary role in which China builds hard infrastructure and the US focuses on soft infrastructure; regulatory and legal frameworks (e.g. technical, environmental, transparency, and loans standards/rules), agreements that facilitates open markets and trade, and minimization of corruption (Goodman, 2017; Hillman, 2018a; Kuchins & Kourmanova, 2015; Kuchins & Mankoff, 2015; Runde & Milner, 2016). Engagement or involvement for the purpose of setting international or even American standards, norms, and rules is probably the most cited policy proposal.

But that's not enough, the US should also try to improve access to development financing and aim to provide alternatives to BRI-funding (Goodman, 2017; Haider, 2017; Hillman, 2018a). Alternatives can be provided through, existing but ideally transformed, American development institutions and agencies, and the many multilateral development institutions and banks that have the potential to substantially provide funding. Hillman (2018a) clarifies that the US should by no means try to emulate the BRI with an American alternative, instead, the US should accumulate resources together with allies, partners, and the private sector for meaningful development funding.

The general message in the publications expresses a reluctance to propose an overall strategy that involves directly countering China. Hillman (2018b) explains that the goal is (economic) development with the outcome of sound infrastructure projects, therefore, absolute opposition is unjustified. Hillman continues:

Rather than framing a response against the BRI, concerned countries can explain what they are for: greater openness, transparency, financial oversight and so on. They can work to broader support for those principles bilaterally and

multilaterally, through the G-20, multilateral development banks, and other international institutions. To further put those principles into operation, particularly for developing economies, they should scale up capacity-building administrative programs and pool resources to offer better infrastructure financing alternatives. (Hillman, 2018b)

Evidently, the CSIS places a lot of emphasis on using multilateral initiatives, institutions, and development banks as a means to constructively engage and/or serve as a platform to cooperate with China (Goodman, 2017; Haider, 2017; Kuchins & Mankoff, 2015; Runde & Milner, 2016). In doing so US-China relations are less undermined by straightforward animosity and can be guided towards better outcomes for the BRI and regional stability.

In a very extensive report on US military defense strategy, Green, Hicks, Cancian, Cooper, & Schaus (2016) affirm the imperative of the existing rebalance to Asia strategy of the US and insist that the US should pursue alignment of strategy within US government and with allies and partners, improve the capabilities of allies and partners in the region, sustain and expand military presence in the region, and develop and innovate US capabilities faster. Schaus et al. (2018) makes the case for updating the resilience and the toolbox of the US to not only cope with conventional warfare but also modern warfare (cyber, economic, disinformation, etc.). Policy proposals regarding military are not a cornerstone of the CSIS publications, for the most part, the CSIS suggests a continuation of existing policy in which the US sustains regional stability through engagement, presence, and alliances.

The position or view of the CSIS can roughly be summarized as follows. According to the CSIS, the BRI represents a diverse set of challenges in the economic, political, and security arena and each challenge requires a distinct response, elaborated in a comprehensive strategic vision. In articulating such a vision/strategy the CSIS relies on the historical interests in the region; preserving peace and stability, promoting trade and economic opportunities, and pushing democratic norms and values. As is apparent from the publications, engagement is the main instrument that can be exerted through many channels. Engagement is a means for the US to retain influence in the region and to secure that the BRI and overall development in the region lead to balanced economic and political progress in the countries concerned.

Heritage Foundation

The first publication that substantially addresses the BRI describes China's current efforts as "a comprehensive, coordinated, and integrated strategy to protect China's national interests through economic, diplomatic, political, and even cultural elements in addition to military means." (Cheng, 2015). The publication extensively argues that the US should adopt a comprehensive strategy to counter China's growing sphere of interests. More specifically by pressing an agenda that stresses economic freedom, both domestically and beyond. Mr. Cheng argues that the differences in diplomatic, political, and public/private economic configuration don't allow for the US to simply mirror the Chinese model. In addition, the US government should pursue cooperation with other government agencies in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen defense ties by increasing military presence in the region and more multilateral defense exercises.

In the publications of the Heritage Foundation, it becomes clear that the economy is perhaps the central domain of the conflict between China and the US. The diverging economic models of China and the US is for various authors cause to stress the need for the US focus on a strategy buttressed on economic features, in which (American) values of free-market principles, entrepreneurship, and competitive innovation are pushed (Cheng, 2015, 2017; Walters, 2017; Wilson, 2016).

Carafano (2017) argues that the BRI is motivated not solely by benign economic development. With increased Chinese influence in Europe, Carafano recommends that the US cooperates more intensely with Europe to better understand and manage the growing Chinese presence in the West. Kochis (2018) likewise expresses increased cooperation with European allies in an effort to counterbalance the growing economic, diplomatic, and political influence of China in Europe.

Later on, once the China-US trade war has commenced, Roberts (2018) proposes a tariff-free containment strategy and condemns Trump's trade tariffs which hurt American workers and consumers, and the US economy. Instead, the US should pursue a vigorous campaign through international (financial) institutions to pressure China into changing its behavior and practices. Roberts resembles the current situation to the cold war and argues the US should pursue the same method of a tariff-free containment strategy to interact with "a newly expansionist Communist China". Specifically focusing on working with economic allies to repress unfair or illegal Chinese trade practices, improve BRI loan structures and conditionalities, and prevent intellectual property theft.

Walters (2017) makes several specific recommendations for US policy. Foremost, maintaining national security interests by reforming the export control regime to guarantee that critical and sensitive technology is not ending up in China. The US should simultaneously prevent theft of intellectual property and defend the American free-market principles. Notable is the suggestion to 'play down' future dialogues as long as China is unwilling to have a bilateral relationship guided by mutual improvements.

China's development of space capabilities, that are in part an element of the BRI, is justification for the US to equally develop its space activities and incorporate these activities within the national strategy, linking them with economic, political, diplomatic, and military activities (Cheng, 2017). In a publication on military strategy, Cheng (2016) argues in response to China's anti-access/area denial efforts (in the seas between China and the first island chain) for adapting military capabilities to address this threat and expanding budget and manpower of the US army for additional resources.

In two publications the BUILD act is reviewed, Carafano (2018) and Roberts & Schaefer (2018) express support for establishing a better mechanism in which American development finance effectively serves foreign policy and security interests, specifically to counter China and the BRI. Roberts & Schaefer argue that the BUILD act is unable to do so and even go as far as to suggest that the text of the legislation should explicitly include that the mission is to counter China's influence. Carafano regards the BRI as a great challenge that destabilizes the region and states that "the U.S. needs more flexible tools to work with partner nations such as Japan, Australia and India to support investment that make national security and economic sense." (Carafano, 2018). In essence, both publications propose that the US offer an alternative to the BRI to suppress the BRI's destabilizing effect in the region and to preserve US interests by maintaining ties and influence.

Generally speaking, the Heritage Foundation takes an antagonistic position towards the BRI and China. The (underlying) aims of the BRI are mostly viewed as an attempt to increase China's interests and power in the world and often this is regarded to be at the expense of the interests of the US. In turn, the recommendations are quite clearly to counter China through multiple channels and in multiple fields. Essentially, the publications recommend taking action and/or a targeted and comprehensive strategy that falls into various overlapping categories. Economically, the US needs to push for the adoption of free-market and free-trade principles. Regional and national security should

be maintained by countering the growing Chinese influence through mainly containment and partly by allocating more military resources. These categories are targeted through multilateral institutions, strengthening relations with allies, improving development opportunities with potentially providing an alternative to the BRI, and upgrading American laws and regulations.

Center for American Progress

The publications of the CAP generally take a supportive but occasionally a critical position when it comes to the BRI, steadily discussing the opportunities and risks that the BRI poses for the countries involved from both an American and a Chinese perspective. For instance, the BRI, in the opinion of Viehe, Gunasekaran, & Downing (2015), meets the much-desired demand for funding of development projects in the region. The authors argue that the US should get involved because it is an economic opportunity, but also to ensure that the initiative will move forward in a cooperative and sustainable manner, taking into account China's viewpoint. The writers propose the following:

Given its leading role in decades of global development, the United States should keep an eye on the Belt and Road initiative's expansion but avoid instinctively reacting negatively to China's global economic ambitions. The United States should instead assess specific projects in key regions and make smarter, nuanced assessments regarding China's rising role in the world and its effect on the international system, as well as what it will mean for U.S. interests around Asia and beyond. (Viehe, Gunasekaran, & Downing, 2015, p. 3)

Several publications support the aim of development within the BRI but question the consequences in terms of sustainability of the initiative and underlying projects specifically, and therefore argue that some involvement of the US is key for setting standards and guidelines (Elgin-Cossart & Hart, 2015; Hart, Ogden, & Gallagher, 2016; Viehe, Gunasekaran, & Downing, 2015). The publications generally profess engagement to fulfill these goals of guiding the BRI towards good outcomes.

Singh et al. (2016) mostly adheres to increased cooperation between China and the US in broad terms, and further recommends that the US should become actively involved in the part of the BRI that stretches into the region of the ASEAN nations because further connectivity and integration here benefits the US economically and cultivates stability that benefits all countries in the region. Recommended areas of cooperation are "finance, poverty reduction, water resources protection, and cultural heritage protection" (Singh et

al., 2016). Other publications also recommend to find areas where interests align and that can potentially serve as starting points for increased cooperation; such as development financing (Elgin-Cossart & Hart, 2015), security-issues like denuclearization on Korean peninsula, Iran nuclear negotiations, and securing peace in Afghanistan and Syria (Hart, 2015; Legarda & Fuchs, 2017), energy and climate cooperation (Hart, 2015; Hart, Ogden, & Gallagher, 2016; Singh et al., 2016), human and drug trafficking (Singh et al., 2016), and infrastructure for connectivity (Elgin-Cossart & Hart, 2015; Harding, 2017).

On another note, Harding, Fuchs, & Green (2017) recommend that the Trump administration needs to address the growing concern of countries in the region that emanates from the Trump administration's disinterested and unclear strategy for the region, which will ultimately lead some countries into the open arms of China. The authors believe that the increased uncertainty could destabilize the region, which does not serve American interests. The US should recommit to the region and with allies continue to build on a regional order that preserves peace and security, upholds mutual beneficial economic cooperation, and relies on democracy and human rights.

Melanie Hart, Director of China Policy at the Center for American Progress, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism. In her testimony, Hart (2015) describes the foreign policy of the last forty years of the US towards China as an engagement strategy that has aimed to integrate China into the international system. By doing so the Asia-Pacific region has had the opportunity to develop economically and didn't prioritize strategic competition among each other. Hart believes that China's expanding actions and interest are a natural outcome from China's economic rise and shouldn't constitute a justification for the abandonment of the strategy of engagement. Overall, the US should follow a multi-track engagement approach in their dealings with China; simultaneously increase cooperation on issues of mutual interest and push back in problematic areas. In addition, Hart suggests several approaches that will transform the problematic areas into areas of cooperation. Such as multilateral pressuring, smart statecraft, institution-building, and minimizing exposure to problematic actions.

As time goes by a more critical stance towards the BRI becomes distinguishable. Legarda & Fuchs (2017) observe that US leadership in the world is dwindling under the Trump administration, this has led to opportunities for China (like the BRI) to advance its interests at the expense of American and European interests. The authors wonder

whether China will play a constructive role abroad and recommend that the US shapes China's role by working with them on key areas that pose concern and simultaneously cooperate more intensively with Europe. Legarda & Fuchs assert that the "trans-Atlantic allies must remember that they have strong shared interests in continuing to advocate for rules-based, peaceful approaches to global challenges and in working together to push back against damaging Chinese influence where necessary." (2017, p. 2).

Summarizing the proposals of the CAP, the think tank takes a receptive, yet realistic position towards the BRI. They recognize the value of development in the region and acknowledge the (economic) opportunities this can create for the US. On the other hand, they increasingly identify the potential conflict of interests as China's BRI takes further shape. The CAP argues the American response should be engagement; cooperate where possible and push back where necessary.

RQ 2: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Policy

Center for Strategic and International Studies

The CSIS commonly takes a practical approach in their analysis and recommendations towards foreign policy, resulting to some extent in the concealment of theoretical foundation. The result is that the publications display realist and liberal notions only mildly and often in a refined or moderate manner.

In some instances, the publications expressed clear realist language: "great power competition" (Hillman, 2018a), "more countries will jump onto the Chinese bandwagon" (Ho & Ho, 2017), "[China Dream]for promoting national rejuvenation and cementing the country's place as a leading world power" (Johnson, 2016), "preventing the rise of a Eurasian hegemon" (Hillman & Goodman, 2017),"a truly revisionist course aimed at fundamentally reshaping the balance of power in East Asia" (Johnson, 2016), and "China has a broad interest in undermining U.S. global hegemony" (Alterman, 2018). But considering the frequency within the great number of publications the clear expression of realist language appears to be incidental rather than fundamental.

In comparison, liberal expressions are more commonly expressed but not necessarily in explicit language. There are four recurring themes that indicate a liberal account; perspective on world order, the types of foreign policy instruments, result of transactions, and the emphasis of democratic and liberal values. First, the recognition and emphasis of the international order being defined as institutionalized, rules-based, or

multilaterally structured, which shows a clear adherence to the liberal perspective in international relations (Barker Gale & Shearer, 2018; Conley, 2017; Goodman, 2017; Harding & Natalagewa, 2018; Ho & Ho, 2017). Only on occasion contrasted, for example by Ho & Ho (2017), who perceive China as pursuing the status-quo not seeking to alter the regional order. By interpreting China as a status-quo seeking state and not as a revisionist state the authors have implicitly projected defensive realism in their interpretation of China's aim.

Another indication of liberal IR-theory is the varied instruments used by states as foreign policy tools, not limited by military-security but other instruments of which economic policy is the most significant (Barker Gale & Shearer, 2018; Goodman, 2017; Haider, 2017; Johnson, 2016; Kuchins & Mankoff, 2015; Schaus et al., 2018). Economic policy in this regard is a mechanism to exert influence and guide behavior.

In several publications, a preference for transactions that generate win-win outcomes over zero-sum outcomes in international relations likewise suggest an adherence to liberalism (Haider, 2017; Hillman, 2018a; Johnson, 2016; Kuchins & Mankoff, 2015; Reinsch, 2017). It indicates that states are not solely self-interested, and cooperation is favored in the interaction between states.

The liberal school heavily relies on democratic or liberal values, several publications refer to them as (higher) ambitions, purposes, or aims that should guide policy (Conley, 2017; Harding & Natalegawa, 2018; Schaus et al., 2018). An evident example that shows this observation well is given in a publication by Conley:

[T]he German and the U.S. governments should commit to a new common transatlantic agenda. We should renew the partnership that seeks to defend a peaceful and rules-based order, for it is rules-based international cooperation that will yield the best deals in the long run. Of that, I'm convinced. A partnership that fights for the separation of powers for inalienable human rights, for the rule of law, for the representative democracies – those values are in need to defend today. (Conley, 2017, p. 8)

Looking at the policy proposals of the CSIS, the think tank quite clearly favors a strategy that falls within the IR-theory of liberalism. The general conviction is that the US should pursue engagement, mainly economically and preferably through multilateral institutions. This will serve the interests of the US and preserve the regional stability, as well as sustain the rules-based world order defined by liberal values and norms. The

promises of the BRI are valuable but in order to actually realize these promises engagement is crucial to guide the BRI towards the right outcomes. In a few publications, the case is made for strengthening US defense/military in the region, which suggests a realist mindset. However, the underlying strategy is not motivated by containment but rather by a cautious balancing of power, indicating to some degree a defensive realist approach. Still, the majority of publications indicate the CSIS promotes the liberal strategy of engagement as the desirable policy of the US towards the BRI.

Heritage Foundation

The publications of the Heritage Foundation reflect themes from all the IR-theories, which show they have an inclusive approach when it comes to distilling theories into policy. On the other hand, their actual policy proposals show a perspective more in line with realism. In essence, China's actions are perceived as malign and China's growing power has to be countered or at least balanced.

Arguably unsurprising, the publications demonstrate the Heritage Foundation adopts a more broad or liberal expression of power, as appears from the many ways or forms in which China asserts power, according to the publications. The narrow expression of power as pure militaristic used in pure realism, is in the publications complemented with economic, political, cultural, or diplomatic power (Carafano, 2017; Cheng, 2015, 2017; Curtis, 2016; Kochis, 2018).

Looking at the usage of engagement it stands out that the term is seldom used in the liberal sense of bilateral interaction for the purpose of cooperation; instead, it is almost exclusively used to mean (active) involvement. For example, one publication states: "To maintain American economic influence, Washington must stay deeply engaged in the world as well." (Wilson, 2016). And in another publication, it is stated: "As China makes clear its competitive bent, it is essential for the U.S. to respond with deeper engagement and more extensive, expanded engagement, including in the security arena." (Cheng, 2015).

Cheng (2015) regards China's actions as indications that the country has adopted an expansive and competitive strategy in which their interests are now actively protected far beyond its borders. This point would suggest a realist account due to the focus on expansion and competition. On the other hand, Cheng (2015) also signals a liberal view by characterizing China's national power as a mixture that comprises not only military power but also economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural aspects.

Within the branches of realism, it is quite clear that the publications bear more resemblance to defensive realism as opposed to offensive realism. In the publications, states are usually seen as differentiated and for the most part looking for a balance of power, with only some revisionist states looking to significantly expand power (Brookes, 2018; Cheng, 2015; Curtis, 2016; Roberts, 2018). For example, Brookes states the following: “Xi’s revisionist plans are clear: Return China to its self-perceived rightful place atop the international system, replacing the United States.” (Brookes, 2018).

When considering the policy proposals (from research question 1), the Heritage Foundation articulates a strategy that is defined by containment, balancing power, economic power, and security concerns for the position of the US threatened by China’s rise. The proposals indicate a preferred reliance on realism for its main focal points of containment and balancing power, more specifically defensive realism. The chosen method by the Heritage Foundation is not solely relying on military means as can be inferred from realism. Instead, it is commonly combined with America’s economic power and/or model, which is to be advanced with allies through the multilateral institutions, this shows a liberal reality as well.

Center for American Progress

The publications of the CAP express to a greater or lesser extent terminology of liberalism and realism, although not unequivocal. While used notions reflect accounts of both theories, the CAP does advocate an engagement strategy that aligns within the liberal school of thought. As an example, consider the following quote:

The United States should not rely on the bilateral U.S.-China relationship to solve problems that are multilateral in nature. Where Chinese behavior is a common concern for multiple nations, the best way to address that behavior is to make the issue a broader multilateral discussion. In the past, it has been much easier to change Chinese behavior on issues relating to international norms rather than a U.S.-specific complaints (sic). When the United States is the only party challenging a particular action, Chinese official often suspect that the United States is doing so as a tactic to block or contain China’s rise. That can lead China to harden its positioning rather than accommodate American interests. When the United States works in concert with other nations, the dynamic changes, and Beijing can view the issue as a wide-ranging problem rather than a U.S. containment strategy. (Hart, 2015)

This part shows that terminology from realism is used, most evidently by the use of containment (also used in Elgin-Cossart & Hart, 2015). On the other hand, it talks more dominantly in liberal terms by pointing to international norms, state behavior, cooperation, and multilateralism. Throughout the publications of the CAP the multilateral cooperation in existing or new institutions is emphasized for its importance in the interaction between the US and China, and the need to include China into the international order (Elgin-Cossart & Hart, 2015; Hart, Ogden, & Gallagher, 2016; Singh et al., 2016), signaling a liberal IR-perspective.

In another publication both schools of thought are again revealed: “This multitrack approach enables the United States to push back against problematic actions as needed without curtailing overall U.S.-China cooperation. This is a *realpolitik*, eyes-wide-open approach to engagement.” (Hart, 2015). The term ‘*realpolitik*’ finds its origin in realism and has come to purport a pragmatic and/or realistic approach to foreign policy. Still, the publication upholds the liberal strategy of engagement.

Furthermore, the clearest indication of a liberal theoretical account is found in the use and active defense of engagement as the appropriate strategy for the US (Elgin-Cossart & Hart, 2015; Harding, 2017; Harding, Fuchs, & Green, 2017; Hart, 2015; Hart, Ogden, & Gallagher, 2016; Legarda & Fuchs, 2017; Singh et al., 2016). To exemplify:

[T]he new administration should take a more assertive approach directly with China and continue to deepen alliances and engagement in multilateral forums to push back against China, while continuing to forge a pragmatic relationship with Beijing in ways that benefit both countries and the region. (Harding, Fuchs, & Green, 2017)

In Singh et al. (2016) it is recommended that both the US and China improve mutual understanding and increase awareness of each other perspectives, this will lead to the recognition that respective interests are not necessarily zero-sum. The rejection of zero-sum as the main facet of their interaction shows a rejection of realism and an implicit recognition of liberalism’ adoption of potential win-win cooperation.

In the publications of the CAP the recommended way for seeking cooperation or engagement is evidently liberal; finding mutual interests to build cooperation upon and aim to find additional areas to reinforce cooperation, and potentially institutionalize it. The publications stress the importance of focusing on mutual interests for long-term

relations. While at the same time pressing or prudently containing China on issues of diverging interests, if possible, with allies.

Discussion

Starting with a broad comparison, it is noteworthy that across the think tanks there is quite some variety in the level of details provided for policy proposals. Based on the number of publications, we can state that the CSIS investigated the BRI more closely than the CAP, and the Heritage Foundation fares somewhere in the middle. In addition, the publications of the CSIS are on average much lengthier and more thorough. The result is that the CSIS offers more comprehensive policy publications.

The analysis further indicates that IR-theory is not easily distinguished and often depending on context and nuance. Consequently, a more candid theory such as offensive realism is more easily ascertained in comparison with neoclassical realism, which has not been explicitly expressed in the publications. In distinguishing IR-theories there is a distinction between the IR-theories expressed in the language of the publications and the proposed policy strategies. Often there is much more variety in the former, and the latter is usually more coherent among the think tanks. In comparison, it becomes more insightful and less ambiguous to look at the policy proposals themselves and placing them in a specific branch of IR-theory. This yields more apparent results, the proposed strategy of the CSIS and the CAP are simply stated revolving around engagement, while the Heritage Foundation proposes containment more or less.

As expected, all think tanks have adopted terminology and views that can be traced to several IR-theories. Still, in this regard, the CSIS and the CAP rely more heavily on liberalism and the Heritage Foundation more on realism. The Heritage Foundation did so more notably through their framing of the BRI as negative for US interests and the region, and the description or approach usually focuses on (security or economic) competition.

Similarities arise with the observation that think tanks have moved uniformly towards the liberal IR-account on some topics, although on some more than others. Most distinctly on the conceptualization of the world order. Not any of the publications refer to anarchy as the defining principle for world order. Additionally, all think tanks deem the multilateral and institutionalized structures in the world order as useful for the American response. The CSIS and CAP have identified that cooperation is desirable, and the Heritage Foundation regards it as functionally useful for interaction between states. More

specifically, multilateral institutions are viewed as a proper channel to steer the BRI and China's actions towards better outcomes, practices, and behavior for the three think tanks.

There are more examples that the think tanks have move uniformly towards liberalism on certain topics. The publications reveal that all think tanks have moved beyond states as the only key actor or analytical unit and have come to include also non-state actors in their analyses. Finally, all think tanks have accepted that the expressions of power are not limited to military and security factors, they are joined by economic, cultural, social, and ecological factors. The think thanks have done so in different degrees. The Heritage Foundation places much more importance on the role of military and security factors in the US strategy towards China, in comparison with the CSIS and the CAP. It shows that on this topic the Heritage Foundation lies closer to the realist perspective on crucial expressions of power.

Based on the analysis several findings have emerged. The three think tanks have certainly many similarities but also some indicative differences. By comparison, the CSIS and CAP seem to have more in common with each other than with the Heritage Foundation. The underlying cause and effect of this observation remains unclear. Thus, whether ideology is the root cause of this can be debated. Still, the differences are reason enough to further examine the implications of ideological think tanks potentially influencing US foreign policy.

Conclusion

This thesis has analyzed the US foreign policy proposals of three ideologically diverse think tanks towards the BRI in the context of China's rise. As expected, all think tanks make use of terms and concepts that emanate from multiple IR-theories and thus we can conclude that think tanks serve as the bridge from university to government, in which theories are transformed into policy. However, the analysis shows that tracing back policy to theory is more complicated than expected, multiple IR-accounts have been blended into a mix, making it ambiguous to distinguish or ascertain a clear dominant account. In other words, policy has made a long way from theory and again this demonstrates the complex reality of world politics.

Still, it appears from the analysis that there are some differences. The Heritage Foundation is distinctly skeptical of China's intentions and approaches the foreign policy

of the US more in competitive terms, at times suggesting that the future of US-China interaction will consist of conflict and potentially rivalry. In their usage of competitive terms, the Heritage Foundation seems to have adopted a realist IR-perspective. In comparison, the CSIS and the CAP have used some explicit terms of realism. However, they generally express implicitly, yet more consistently, a liberal IR-perspective.

In terms of proposed strategy, the analysis yields more definite results. The CSIS and the CAP are quite similar and believe that development funding for infrastructure, among other things, are in dire need of improvement. Therefore, in this context, the BRI has great potential, and as such, should be welcomed, not categorically opposed. Admittedly, the BRI and China's rise do pose challenges and risks for the US. These should be tackled through active engagement using various channels and methods, mainly using multilateral initiatives, institutions, and development banks. Engagement ought to steer the BRI towards desirable outcomes in terms of regional development and (American) economic interests. Constructive engagement will lead to cooperation on issues of mutual interest and offer a platform to push China on points of contention or possibly resolve them. The strategies outlined by the CSIS and the CAP clearly belong to the IR-theory of liberalism.

The Heritage Foundation proposes a strategy that aims to serve American interests economically and to preserve stability and security in the region. First, the growing influence of China in the region needs to be countered and contained. Especially, the spread of China's economic or development model. Furthermore, the US should push values in line with American interests; free markets and trade, transparency, rule of law, entrepreneurship, enforcement of intellectual property rights, and competitive innovation. Secondly, China is regarded as an expansionist state that jeopardizes the regional stability that has long been sustained by America's presence and commitment to the region. The Heritage Foundation proposes a strategy in line with defensive realism. By allocating more military resources, strengthening ties with allies, and improving military capabilities the US should aim contain China's rise and try to preserve the regional security and the balance of power.

Clearly, the stakes are high when it comes to the American response to the BRI. Especially, when it is being fueled by ideology and partisanship; aggravating polarization of American politics. The findings of this research suggest but not confirm that ideology affects the use of IR-theory and consequently foreign policy proposals. The biggest

limitation of this research is that measuring or detecting IR-theory in the publications is not clear-cut and can generate ambiguity. A limitation in line with previous studies that determined that research into think tanks and policy decision-making is complicated and the causality problematic. This reflection suggests that approaching the subject with a qualitative content analysis is limited in providing hard evidence. Further research could approach the subject differently in order to find more conclusive research, opportunities lie in using a different research method, focusing on another policy-influencing instrument of think tanks (besides publications), or increase the scope of the study. Given the stakes and the findings of this thesis, further research is strongly recommended to find out more.

All things considered, the three ideologically diverse think tanks derive their reasoning and arguments in various gradation from liberalism and realist theories. They also arrive at different conclusions and subsequently at different foreign policy proposals. The glasses we use to observe the world around us, define the policies and ultimately the outcome. The difference between the outcome of engagement and containment is significant and should not be underestimated. Given the changing nature of the think tank sector, in which money is allowed to play a stronger and stronger voice, we risk skewing policy formulation and research away from neutral and truth-seeking motivations towards money-driven ideological agendas. As the boundaries between academia, politics, and think tanks are clandestinely revised, the current functioning of think tanks in American democracy should be further scrutinized in order to preserve democracy itself.

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Appendix

Table 1.

General classification of the two principal IR-paradigms

	Realism	Liberalism
World order	Continuous anarchic order causes strict self-reliance	Level of anarchy can be reduced by international, institutional cooperation and economic interdependence
Core belief	States compete for power and survival out of self-interest	Democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations strengthen peace
Tries to explain the ...	Outcomes in international politics	Behavior of states in international politics
Interaction between states	Intergovernmental	Transnational
Key actor(s) or analytic units	States (unitary actor)	States + non-state actors
Interaction is determined by ... (ordering mechanism)	Anarchic system and distribution of power capabilities (external factors)	International system and internal attributes of states, interdependence, and cooperation (external and internal factors)
Transactions are ...	Zero-sum, relative power gains	Win-win, absolute power gains
Defining factors or channels	Military and security	Military, security, economic, cultural, social, and ecological
General policy towards other states	Containment, coercion and deterrence	Engagement and diplomacy
Stereotypical attitudes towards IR	Realists and pessimists	Idealists and optimists

Table 2.

Classification of the selected IR-theories

	Defensive realism	Offensive realism	Neoclassical realism	Liberalism
Importance of anarchy	Occasionally important	Highly important	Important	Not necessarily important
Focus on	Outcome of interaction	Outcome of interaction	Behavior of states	Behavior of states
Independent variable	Structural constraints of the system OR internal factors	Structural constraints of the system	Structural constraints of the system	Structural constraints of the system, internal factors, and interdependence
Intervening variables	-	-	Domestic constraints and elite perceptions	-
Dependent variable	Outcomes of international politics	Outcomes of international politics	Foreign policy	Foreign policy
Aim(s)	1. Balancing of power 2. Status-quo	1. Maximizing power 2. Hegemony	Not fixed	Not fixed for states (aim of theory is peaceful order)
Analytic units	Differentiated states	Undifferentiated states	Differentiated states	Differentiated states

Table 3.

Search queries

Think tank	Input google.com search bar, date 2018, September 10 (timeframe: 7/9/2013-31/7/2018)
CSIS	site:csis.org "Belt and Road initiative" OR "Belt & Road Initiative" OR "One Belt, One Road" OR "Silk Road Economic Belt" OR "21st century Maritime Silk Road"
The Heritage Foundation	site:heritage.org "Belt and Road initiative" OR "Belt & Road Initiative" OR "One Belt, One Road" OR "Silk Road Economic Belt" OR "21st century Maritime Silk Road"
Center for American Progress	site:americanprogress.org "Belt and Road initiative" OR "Belt & Road Initiative" OR "One Belt, One Road" OR "Silk Road Economic Belt" OR "21st century Maritime Silk Road"

Table 4.

Publications of CSIS resulting from search query.

Date	Title	Author(s)	URL
2014, December 1	A tale of two tales: competing narratives in the Asia Pacific (PacNet #84)	Cossa, R.A., & Glosserman, B.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-84-tale-two-tales-competing-narratives-asia-pacific
2015, March 11	China's AIIB challenges (PacNet #16)	Sun, Y.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-16-china%E2%80%99s-aiib-challenges
2015, March 31	Navigating Choppy Waters: China's Economic Decisionmaking at a Time of Transition	Goodman, M.P., & Parker, D.A.	https://www.csis.org/files/publication/150327_navigating_choppy_waters.pdf
2015, April 3	Building China's "One Belt, One Road"	Kennedy, S., & Parker, D.A.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-china%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cone-belt-one-road%E2%80%9D
2015, April 14	A Vision for Shared Prosperity in Central Asia	Kuchins, A.C., & Kourmanova, A.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/vision-shared-prosperity-central-asia
2015, May 11	Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: U.S. Policy Interests and Recommendations	Kuchins, A.C., & Mankoff, J.	https://www.csis.org/files/publication/150507_Kuchins_CentralAsiaSummaryReport_Web.pdf
2015, June 18	Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Kyrgyzstan's Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests	Kuchins, A.C., Mankoff, J., & Backes, O.	https://www.csis.org/files/publication/150513_Kuchins_CentralAsiaKyrgyzstan_Web.pdf
2015, June 18	Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Tajikistan's Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests	Kuchins, A.C., Mankoff, J., & Backes, O.	https://www.csis.org/files/publication/150513_Kuchins_CentralAsiaTajikistan_Web.pdf
2015, June 18	Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Turkmenistan's Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests	Kuchins, A.C., Mankoff, J., & Backes, O.	https://www.csis.org/files/publication/150513_Kuchins_CentralAsiaTurkmenistan_Web.pdf
2015, June 18	Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Kazakhstan's Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests	Kuchins, A.C., Mankoff, J., Kourmanova, A., & Backes, O.	https://www.csis.org/files/publication/150612_Kuchins_CentralAsiaKazakhstan_Web.pdf
2015, June 18	Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Uzbekistan's Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests	Kuchins, A.C., Mankoff, J., Kourmanova, A., & Backes, O.	https://www.csis.org/files/publication/150612_Kuchins_CentralAsiaUzbekistan_Web.pdf
2015, July 27	Defense diplomacy in East Asia: will ASEAN continue to be central? (PacNet #42)	Ho, B.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-42-defense-diplomacy-east-asia-will-asean-continue-be-central
2015, July 27	Kazakhstan and the WTO: A New Era	Kourmanova, A.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/kazakhstan-and-wto-new-era
2015, September 9	China recreating the American "hub-and-spoke" system (PacNet #57)	Lee, J.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-57-china-recreating-american-%E2%80%9Chub-and-spoke%E2%80%9D-system
2015, December 15	Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A Comparative Analysis	Cordesman, A.H., Colley, S., & Wang, M.	https://www.csis.org/files/publication/151215_Cordesman_ChineseStrategyMilitaryMod_Web.pdf
2016, February 18	AIIB: Now Comes the Hard Part	Greenwood, L.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/aiib-now-comes-hard-part
2016, March 28	President Xi Jinping's "Belt and Road" Initiative	Johnson, C.K.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/president-xi-jinping%E2%80%99s-belt-and-road-initiative
2016, April 28	Southeast Asia from Scott Circle: The Overlooked Gap in the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative	Cronin, C.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/southeast-asia-scott-circle-overlooked-gap-southeast-asia-maritime-security-initiative
2016, May 17	Southeast Asia Dances to the Tune of Japan's Abe Doctrine	Nguyen, P.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/southeast-asia-dances-tune-japan%E2%80%99s-abe-doctrine

2016, October 24	The Emerging Political Economy of OBOR	Cooley, A.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/emerging-political-economy-obor
2016, October 25	Competing Visions	CSIS	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/competing-visions/
2016, November 15	Too Good to be True: Why Kazakhstan's "New Dubai" May Deserve a "Don't Buy" Rating	Parker, D.A.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/too-good-be-true/
2016, November 16	Marco Polo and the Mongol Hordes	Miller, C.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/marco-polo-and-mongol-hordes/
2016, November 16	The Role of U.S. Soft-Infrastructure in Influencing the Reconnecting of Asia	Runde, D.F., & Milner, A.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/role-us-soft-infrastructure-influencing-reconnecting-asia
2016, November 21	Vaporware in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor	Sofio, D.G.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/vaporware-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/
2016, November 23	China in Europe: OBOR is more likely to succeed outside of Eurasia	Wishnick, E.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/china-europe/
2016, November 30	OBOR on the Ground: Evaluating China's "One Belt, One Road" Initiative at the Project Level	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/obor-ground-evaluating-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-project-level
2016, December 14	The Changing Political Economy of Energy in China	Nakano, J., & Wu, K.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/changing-political-economy-energy-china
2016, December 21	17 Projects to Watch in 2017	CSIS	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/17-projects-watch-2017/
2017, January 11	Asia's Infrastructure Cultures	Inderst, G.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/asias-infrastructure-cultures/
2017, January 13	The Future of Global Trade	CSIS	https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-global-trade
2017, February 2	Quoted: Praise for OBOR at Davos	CSIS	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/world-economic-forum/
2017, February 3	Trump's Global Infrastructure Opportunity	Haider, Z., & Kumar, A.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-global-infrastructure-opportunity
2017, February 8	Going Even Bigger on The Border: A North American Infrastructure Push	Breier, K.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/going-even-bigger-border-north-american-infrastructure-push
2017, February 8	Retracing Marco Polo's Footsteps	The New Silk Road Project	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/retracing-marco-polos-footsteps/
2017, February 17	Driverless in Eurasia: How Autonomous Vehicles Could Reshape the Region	Kurman, M.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/driverless-eurasia/
2017, March 7	Diagnosing Central Asia's Drug Problem	Peyrouse, S.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/diagnosing-central-asias-drug-problem/
2017, March 22	CSIS 2016 Annual Report	CSIS	https://www.csis.org/features/annual-report-2016-impact
2017, March 28	The Road to Extinction	Zahler, P., & Denier, L.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/road-extinction/
2017, April 3	Donald Trump's First Summit with President Xi Jinping of China	CSIS Asia Team	https://www.csis.org/analysis/donald-trumps-first-summit-president-xi-jinping-china
2017, April 10	China's Net Oil Import Problem	Stanley, A.J., Sieminski, A., & Ladislav, S.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/energy-fact-opinion-chinas-net-oil-import-problem
2017, April 26	Asia's Creeping Catastrophe	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/asias-creeping-catastrophe
2017, May 2	China's Role in Central Asia	Florick, D.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/issues-insights-vol-17-no-5-chinas-role-central-asia
2017, May 9	President Xi Jinping's "Belt and Road" Forum	Johnson, C.K., Goodman, M.P., & Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/president-xi-jinpings-belt-and-road-forum
2017, May 10	Iran's Railway Revolution	Alterman, J.B., & Hillman, J.E.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/irans-railway-revolution/
2017, May 12	China's "Belt and Road" Initiative Must Become a Strategy	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-road-initiative-must-become-strategy

2017, May 18	The Marshall Plan at 70: What We Must Remember and What We Must Do for the Future	Conley, H.A.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/marshall-plan-70-what-we-must-remember-and-what-we-must-do-future
2017, May 23	Reconnecting Asia - May 2017	Goodman, M.P., & Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/reconnecting-asia-may-2017
2017, May 24	China's Strategic Gateway to the Indian Ocean	Singh, P.K.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/china-s-strategic-gateway-indian-ocean/
2017, June 1	Should the West heed China's siren call for 'Globalization 2.0'?	Hillman, J.E.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/should-west-heed-chinas-siren-call-globalization-20/
2017, June 2	Trump Should Call Myanmar's Aung San Suu Kyi	Hiebert, M.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-should-call-myanmars-aung-san-suu-kyi
2017, June 7	Zbigniew K. Brzezinski: A Life of Service and Strategy	CSIS	https://www.csis.org/features/zbigniew-k-brzezinski
2017, June 8	India and Pakistan Join the Shanghai Club	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/india-and-pakistan-join-shanghai-club
2017, June 16	Southeast Asia Plans for Its Own Future after Shangri-La	Hayden, S.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/southeast-asia-plans-its-own-future-after-shangri-la
2017, June 19	Infrastructure Boom Offers Fresh Start on Asian Road Safety	Hillman, J.E.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/infrastructure-boom-offers-fresh-start-asian-road-safety/
2017, June 21	Climate change, energy and Asian geopolitics (PacNet #46)	Umbach, F.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-46-climate-change-energy-and-asian-geopolitics
2017, June 26	The Muscle Behind China's New Silk Road Is Over the Horizon	Maxie, J., & Newsham, G.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/muscle-behind-chinas-new-silk-road-over-horizon/
2017, June 26	The Panama Canal's Cautionary Tale	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/panama-canals-cautionary-tale
2017, June 27	Questions Remain for Evolving AIIB	McCalpin, M.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/questions-remain-for-evolving-aiib/
2017, June 29	Southeast Asia from Scott Circle: Marawi Battle Highlights the Perils of a Stalled Peace Process in the Philippines	Hartman, G.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/southeast-asia-scott-circle-marawi-battle-highlights-perils-stalled-peace-process
2017, July 27	Good Policy Starts with Good Analysis	Goodman, M.P.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/good-policy-starts-good-analysis
2017, July 27	Was the G20 Summit a "Win" for Africa?	Downie, R., & Heger, K.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/was-g20-summit-win-africa
2017, September 11	Where Does China's Belt and Road Go?	Brown, K.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/where-does-chinas-belt-and-road-go/
2017, September 18	Chinese High-Speed Rail in Southeast Asia	Kratz, A., & Pavličević, D.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/chinese-high-speed-rail-southeast-asia/
2017, September 22	Opportunities for U.S.-China Trade Cooperation	Reinsch, W.	https://www.csis.org/opportunities-us-china-trade-cooperation
2017, September 22	Managing Bilateral Trade Policy: A Quest for Rebalancing the Global Economy?	Shen, M.	https://www.csis.org/managing-bilateral-trade-policy-quest-rebalancing-global-economy
2017, September 26	Asia's Competing Visions	Hillman, J.E., & Goodman, M.P.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/asia%E2%80%99s-competing-visions
2017, September 29	Southeast Asia from Scott Circle: Prayuth's White House Visit Expected to Kick-start Normalization of Thai-U.S. Relations	Hiebert, M.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/southeast-asia-scott-circle-prayuths-white-house-visit-expected-kick-start-normalization
2017, September 29	World Economic Order: Present and Future	He, F., & Ye, Q.	https://www.csis.org/world-economic-order-present-and-future
2017, September 30	The Belt and Road Initiative: Progress, Problems and Prospects	Jin, F.	https://www.csis.org/belt-and-road-initiative-progress-problems-and-prospects
2017, September 30	Addressing the Global Infrastructure Deficit: Channels for U.S.-China Cooperation	Haider, Z.	https://www.csis.org/addressing-global-infrastructure-deficit-channels-us-china-cooperation

2017, September 30	The Development and Transformation of China's Foreign Aid	Haibing, Z.	https://www.csis.org/development-and-transformation-chinas-foreign-aid
2017, October 4	Mapping the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor	Mohammad, U.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/mapping-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/
2017, October 11	Many Belts and Many Roads	CSIS	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/many-belts-and-many-roads/
2017, October 17	Xi's Signature Governance Innovation: The Rise of Leading Small Groups	Johnson, C.K., Kennedy, S., & Qiu, M.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/xis-signature-governance-innovation-rise-leading-small-groups
2017, October 18	Xi Jinping Opens 19th Party Congress Proclaiming a New Era—His	Johnson, C.K., & Kennedy, S.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/xi-jinping-opens-19th-party-congress-proclaiming-new-era-his
2017, October 23	Economic Rebalancing Should Be the Core of China's Supply-Side Reform	Wang, Y.	https://www.csis.org/economic-rebalancing-should-be-core-chinas-supply-side-reform
2017, October 26	Belt and Road at China's 19th Party Congress	CSIS	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/belt-and-road-19th-party-congress/
2017, November 1	CSIS Press Briefing: President Trump's Trip to Asia	CSIS	https://www.csis.org/analysis/csis-press-briefing-president-trumps-trip-asia
2017, November 6	Is Asia Reconnecting?	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/asia-reconnecting
2017, November 8	After China's 19th Party Congress – implications for the regional architecture and order (PacNet #82)	Ho, S., & Ho, B.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-82-after-chinas-19th-party-congress-%E2%80%93-implications-regional-architecture-and-order
2017, November 17	Explorers' View of China's Belt and Road Initiative	Shah, A., Worthington, C., & Bianchi, G.A.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/explorers-view-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/
2017, November 20	China's Balkan Silk Road	Bastian, J.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/chinas-balkan-silk-road/
2017, November 21	Predatory Economics and the China Challenge	Goodman, M.P.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/predatory-economics-and-china-challenge
2017, November 28	China's Gateway to Europe Raises Questions	Kratz, A.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/chinas-gateway-to-europe-raises-questions/
2017, November 29	Trump's \$3T Afghan Mining Mirage	Hillman, J.E.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/trump-s-3tn-afghan-mining-mirage/
2017, November 30	China's 16+1 Poses Few Risks to Europe	Szczudlik, J.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/china-poses-few-risks-to-europe/
2017, December 5	China's "16+1" Equals Much Ado About Nothing?	Gaspers, J.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/chinas-161-equals-much-ado-about-nothing/
2017, December 6	DFIs Drive the Development Agenda to Center Stage	Runde, D.F., & Metzger, C.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/dfis-drive-development-agenda-center-stage
2017, December 12	Belt & Road is Back on the Rails in Eastern Europe	McCalpin, M.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/belt-road-back-rails-eastern-europe/
2017, December 19	Europe Should Support China-CEE Cooperation	Xin, C.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/europe-should-support-china-cee-cooperation/
2017, December 21	Authoritarian Infrastructure Complex: The Turkish Tale	Sekhniashvili, A.	https://www.csis.org/npfp/authoritarian-infrastructure-complex-turkish-tale
2017, December 21	Balancing Mongolia's Growth and Sovereignty: Up, Down, or Out?	Gill, R.	https://www.csis.org/npfp/balancing-mongolias-growth-and-sovereignty-down-or-out
2017, December 22	18 Projects to Watch in 2018	CSIS	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/18-projects-watch-2018/
2018, January 10	Uncertainty Is Everywhere, Predictably	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/uncertainty-everywhere-predictably
2018, January 23	The Indo-Japanese Pivot to Africa	Watson, S.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/indo-japanese-pivot-africa/
2018, January 25	China's Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-five-years-later-0
2018, January 28	China Launches the Polar Silk Road	Nakano, J., & Li, W.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-launches-polar-silk-road

2018, January 29	New China Data Privacy Standard Looks More Far-Reaching than GDPR	Sacks, S.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-china-data-privacy-standard-looks-more-far-reaching-gdpr
2018, January 30	What Is the U.S. Trade and Development Agency?	Runde, D.F., Bandura, R., & Kosta, B.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-trade-and-development-agency
2018, February 7	The Belt and Road's Barriers to Participation	Hillman, J.E.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/belt-and-road-barriers-participation/
2018, February 16	Is the "Indo-Pacific" Construct Trump's Pivot to Asia Policy? (PacNet #13)	Rabena, A.J.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-13-indo-pacific-construct-trumps-pivot-asia-policy
2018, February 22	China Reconnects with The Balkans	Bastian, J.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/china-reconnects-balkans/
2018, February 22	The Meaning of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum (PacNet #14A)	Marzuki, K.I.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-14a-meaning-indonesias-global-maritime-fulcrum
2018, February 27	Conflicting Signs—and Signs of Conflict	Goodman, M.P.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/conflicting-signs-and-signs-conflict
2018, March 1	China's Maritime Silk Road	Szechenyi, N. (Ed.)	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/china-s-maritime-silk-road-strategic-and-economic-implications-indo-pacific-region/
2018, March 1	Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships	Green, M., Hicks, K., Cancian, M., Cooper, Z., & Schaus, J.	https://www.csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf
2018, March 6	The Rise of China-Europe Railways	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-china-europe-railways
2018, March 9	The Spanish Flu a Century Later: 2018 Is Not That Different from 1918	Morrison, J.S., & Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/spanish-flu-century-later-2018-not-different-1918
2018, March 20	Trade Wars and Real Wars	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/trade-wars-and-real-wars
2018, March 22	Traveling China's Economic Belt from Yiwu to London	The New Silk Road Project	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/traveling-chinas-economic-belt-yiwu-london/
2018, March 26	The Coming Crisis in US-China Relations (PacNet #23)	Glosserman, B., & Roy, D.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-23-coming-crisis-us-china-relations
2018, March 27	What Is an Economic Corridor?	Petrella, S.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/what-economic-corridor/
2018, March 28	China's Shrewd Bet on Intercontinental Rail	Hillman, J.E.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/china-bets-intercontinental-rail/
2018, April 2	China's Maritime Silk Road: Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region	Green, M.J.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-maritime-silk-road
2018, April 2	China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Economic Drivers and Challenges	Funairole, M.P., & Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-maritime-silk-road-initiative-economic-drivers-and-challenges
2018, April 2	The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative	Barker Gale, J.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/quadrilateral-security-dialogue-and-maritime-silk-road-initiative
2018, April 2	Game of Loans: How China Bought Hambantota	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/game-loans-how-china-bought-hambantota
2018, April 2	Pakistan's Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China's String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific	Kanwal, G.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pakistans-gwadar-port-new-naval-base-chinas-string-pearls-indo-pacific
2018, April 2	Kyaukpyu: Connecting China to the Indian Ocean	Poling, G.B.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/kyaukpyu-connecting-china-indian-ocean
2018, April 2	India-Iran Cooperation at Chabahar Port: Choppy Waters	Pant, H.V.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/india-iran-cooperation-chabahar-port-choppy-waters
2018, April 2	Security Implications of China's Military Presence in the Indian Ocean	Cooper, Z.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/security-implications-chinas-military-presence-indian-ocean

2018, April 3	How Big Is China's Belt and Road?	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-big-chinas-belt-and-road
2018, April 17	Asia's Infrastructure Contest: Quantity vs. Quality	Hillman, J.E.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/asias-infrastructure-contest-quantity-vs-quality
2018, April 20	Xi Jinping and the Removal of Presidential Term Limits in China (PacNet #29)	Hickey, D.V.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-29-xi-jinping-and-removal-presidential-term-limits-china
2018, April 24	South Korea's Infrastructure Vision	Lee, K.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/south-koreas-infrastructure-vision/
2018, April 26	Macron Addressing China's Sharp Power Efforts in Europe	Daniels, L.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/macron-addressing-chinas-sharp-power-efforts-europe
2018, April 26	An Uneasy Japan Steps Up	Goodman, M.P.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/uneasy-japan-steps
2018, May 3	Ports Under Heaven: China's Strategic Maritime Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific	Thorne, D., & Spevack, B.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/ports-under-heaven/
2018, May 15	Japan's Critical Leadership Role on Free and Fair Trade	Cossa, R.A., & Glosserman, B.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/japans-critical-leadership-role-free-and-fair-trade
2018, May 15	Comparative Connections Summary (PacNet #32)	Ito, S.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-32-comparative-connections-summary-1
2018, May 15	The Arctic of the Future: Strategic Pursuit or Great Power Miscalculation?: Panel II	CSIS	https://www.csis.org/analysis/arctic-future-strategic-pursuit-or-great-power-miscalculation-panel-ii
2018, May 16	The Enemy Gets A Vote	Alterman, J.B.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/enemy-gets-vote
2018, May 16	The Clouds Gathering around China's Belt and Road	Hillman, J.E.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/clouds-gathering-around-chinas-belt-and-road/
2018, May 16	Southeast Asia Financial Integration and Infrastructure Investment: What Role for the United States?	Johnson, C.K.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebooting-us-china-trade-ties-enter-ye-through-narrow-gate
2018, May 25	Southeast Asia Financial Integration and Infrastructure Investment: What Role for the United States?	Hiebert, M.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/southeast-asia-financial-integration-and-infrastructure-investment-what-role-united-states
2018, May 29	The Belt and Road's Biggest Impact	Zhang, C.	https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/belt-and-roads-biggest-impact-small-high-risk-markets/
2018, June 4	The "Indo-Pacific" Region Takes Center Stage at Shangri La	Searight, A.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/indo-pacific-region-takes-center-stage-shangri-la
2018, June 20	Black Swan Trips Alarm, Fouls Moderate Outlook on China's Rise (PacNet #41)	Sutter, R.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-41-black-swan-trips-alarm-fouls-moderate-outlook-chinas-rise
2018, June 26	The Fellowship of the G7—Minus One	Goodman, M.P.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/fellowship-g7%E2%80%94minus-one
2018, July 9	Enhancing the U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership	Harding, B., & Natalegawa, A.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/enhancing-us-indonesia-strategic-partnership
2018, July 12	The United States and IMF Resources: A Path Forward?	Sobel, M.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-and-imf-resources-path-forward
2018, July 16	What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion	Schaus, J., Matlaga, M., Hicks, K.H., & Conley, H.A.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion
2018, July 24	BET on Southeast Asia: Bending BRI to US Advantage (PacNet #50)	Friedhoff, K.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-50-bet-southeast-asia-bending-bri-us-advantage
2018, July 24	From Rule Maker to Rule Taker	Goodman, M.P.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/rule-maker-rule-taker
2018, July 26	All Rise? Belt and Road Court is in Session	Hillman, J.E., & Goodman, M.P.	https://www.csis.org/analysis/all-rise-belt-and-road-court-session

Table 5.

Publications of Heritage Foundation resulting from search query.

Date	Title	Author(s)	URL
2015, April 25	America Needs a Comprehensive Strategy for Countering China's Expanding Perimeter of National Interests	Cheng, D.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/america-needs-comprehensive-strategy-countering-chinas-expanding-perimeter-national
2015, May 29	First Year: Modi Invigorates Indian Economy and Foreign Policy	Curtis, L.	https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/first-year-modi-invigorates-indian-economy-and-foreign-policy
2015, June 5	China, India and Pakistan - the power players in South Asia	Curtis, L.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-india-and-pakistan-the-power-players-south-asia
2015, June 30	Pakistan's Economic Disarray and How to Fix It	Roberts, J., & Sattar, H.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/pakistans-economic-disarray-and-how-fix-it
2015, July 23	U.S. Engagement Required: Afghanistan Must Avoid an Iraq-Style Breakdown	Curtis, L.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/us-engagement-required-afghanistan-must-avoid-iraq-style-breakdown
2015, August 17	Washington, China, and the Rise of the Renminbi: Are the Dollar's Days as the Global Reserve Currency Numbered?	Wilson, W.T.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/washington-china-and-the-rise-the-renminbi-are-the-dollars-days-the-global-reserve
2015, December 4	The IMF's Addition of China Is Largely a Symbolic Gesture	Wilson, W.T.	https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/the-imfs-addition-china-largely-symbolic-gesture
2015, December 4	A Secure and Stable Caspian Sea Is in America's Interest	Coffey, L.	https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/secure-and-stable-caspian-sea-americas-interest
2016, March 17	China's South Asia Strategy	Curtis, L.	https://www.heritage.org/testimony/chinas-south-asia-strategy
2016, November 21	China's Huge 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative Is Sweeping Central Asia	Wilson, W.T.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/chinas-huge-one-belt-one-road-initiative-sweeping-central-asia
2016, November 30	A U.S. Army Role in Countering China's A2/AD Efforts: The Expeditionary Coastal Artillery Brigade	Cheng, D.	https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/us-army-role-countering-chinas-a2ad-efforts-the-expeditionary-coastal-artillery
2017, January 6	Responding to the Chinese Space Challenge	Cheng, D.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/responding-the-chinese-space-challenge
2017, May 16	China's New 'Silk Road' Is Based on Its National-Security Agenda	Carafano, J.J.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/chinas-new-silk-road-based-its-national-security-agenda
2017, July 24	America's Future Is with India and Israel	Carafano, J.J.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/americas-future-india-and-israel
2017, August 10	The U.S.-China Economic Relationship: Time for a Change in Tone	Walters, R.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-us-china-economic-relationship-time-change-tone
2017, September 8	How China Views the United States and the World	Cheng, D.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/how-china-views-the-united-states-and-the-world
2017, September 28	Confronting the Eurasian Powers of Russia and China	Cheng, D.	https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/confronting-the-eurasian-powers-russia-and-china
2017, October 20	What President Trump Can Learn From Singapore Next Week	Lohman, W.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/what-president-trump-can-learn-singapore-next-week
2017, December 6	Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince is Consolidating his Power	Bromund, T.R.	https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/saudi-arabias-crown-prince-consolidating-his-power
2017, December 30	Snarky World Predictions for 2018	Carafano, J.J.	https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/snarky-world-predictions-2018

2018, January 17	Why Trump's Meeting With Kazakhstan President Was So Important	Coffey, L.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/why-trumps-meeting-kazakhstan-president-was-so-important
2018, February 2	Cabo Verde	The Heritage Foundation	https://www.heritage.org/index/country/caboverde
2018, February 5	How Bangladesh can Improve Indian Ocean Security	Carafano, J.J., & Smith, J.M.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/how-bangladesh-can-improve-indian-ocean-security
2018, February 28	Xi Jinping Amasses Mao-Like Power in China	Cheng, D.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/xi-jinping-amasses-mao-power-china
2018, March 2	Move over Mao, China's Getting New Leader for Life	Brookes, P.	https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/move-over-mao-chinas-getting-new-leader-life
2018, March 14	China Copes With Insecurity by Boosting National Security Spending	Cheng, D.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-copes-insecurity-boosting-national-security-spending
2018, March 16	A Roadmap for Strengthened Transatlantic Pathways in the Western Balkans	Kochis, D.	https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/BG3286.pdf
2018, April 23	A Tariff-Free American Containment Strategy for China	Roberts, J.M.	https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/tariff-free-american-containment-strategy-china
2018, April 24	Can Macron and Trump Bring Stability to the Indo-Pacific Region?	Lohman, W., & Niquet, V.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/can-macron-and-trump-bring-stability-the-indo-pacific-region
2018, April 26	Zambia and Mozambique Illustrate Ballooning African Debt, Growing Chinese Influence, and Challenges to U.S. Interests in Africa	Meservey, J.	https://www.heritage.org/africa/report/zambia-and-mozambique-illustrate-ballooning-african-debt-growing-chinese-influence
2018, May 2	The BUILD Act's Proposed U.S. Development Finance Corporation Would Supersize OPIC, But Not Improve It	Roberts, J., & Schaefer, B.	https://www.heritage.org/international-economies/report/the-build-acts-proposed-us-development-finance-corporation-would
2018, June 11	What China's Moon Mission Means for the United States	Cheng, D.	https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/what-chinas-moon-mission-means-the-united-states
2018, July 2	Bab el-Mandeb: The U.S. Ignores the Most Dangerous Strait in the World at Its Peril	Coffey, L.	https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/bab-el-mandeb-the-us-ignores-the-most-dangerous-strait-the-world-its-peril
2018, July 16	Fixing the Build Act Is Necessary to Counter Chinese Hegemony	Carafano, J.J.	https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/fixing-the-build-act-necessary-counter-chinese-hegemony
2018, July 25	How Pompeo Can Save Money and Return Jobs to the State Department	Roberts, J.M.	https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/how-pompeo-can-save-money-and-return-jobs-the-state-department
2018, July 27	Five Immediate Actions for Reassuring U.S. Allies in Europe	Kochis, D.	https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/five-immediate-actions-reassuring-us-allies-europe
2018, July 30	The Return of the Asia-Pacific Quad	Smith, J.M.	https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/the-return-the-asia-pacific-quad

Table 6.

Publications of CAP from search query.

Date	Title	Author(s)	URL
2015, March 17	Turning the Tide on Afghanistan	Viehe, A., & Gunasekaran, A.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2015/03/17/108944/turning-the-tide-on-afghanistan/
2015, September 22	Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative	Viehe, A., Gunasekaran, A., & Downing, H.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2015/09/22/121628/understanding-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/
2015, September 22	Investments Along China's Belt and Road Initiative	Viehe, A., Gunasekaran, A., Wang, V., & Merchant, S.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2015/09/22/121689/investments-along-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/
2015, September 22	China's New International Financing Institutions	Elgin-Cossart, M., & Hart, M.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2015/09/22/121668/chinas-new-international-financing-institutions/
2015, September 29	Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China	Hart, M.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2015/09/29/122283/assessing-american-foreign-policy-toward-china/
2016, June 13	Green Finance: The Next Frontier for U.S.-China Climate Cooperation	Hart, M., Ogden, P., & Gallagher, K.S.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2016/06/13/139276/green-finance-the-next-frontier-for-u-s-china-climate-cooperation/
2016, October 25	Recalibrating U.S.-China Relations in Southeast Asia	Singh, V., Yuan, P., Hart, M., Harding, B., Zhang, X., Zhang, X., Chen, W., & Zhang, F.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2016/10/25/225690/recalibrating-u-s-china-relations-in-southeast-asia/
2017, March 28	Common Ground for the United States, Japan, and China in Southeast Asia	Harding, B.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/03/28/429312/common-ground-united-states-japan-china-southeast-asia/
2017, November 1	5 Challenges Trump Will Face in Asia	Harding, B., Fuchs, M. & Green, A.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2017/11/01/441991/5-challenges-trump-will-face-asia/
2017, November 29	As Trump Withdraws America from the World, Xi's China Takes Advantage	Legarda, H., & Fuchs, M.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2017/11/29/443383/trump-withdraws-america-world-xis-china-takes-advantage/
2018, May 21	Blue Future: Mapping Opportunities for U.S.-China Ocean Cooperation	Hart, M., Conathan, M., Johnson, B., & Polefka, S.	https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2018/05/21/451064/blue-future/