



Universiteit
Leiden

R2P and the 2011 Libya Intervention

A Critical Discourse Analysis of Russia and China

Master's Thesis

Charles E.A. Hamilton

S1238426

Email: ch@charliehamilton.co.uk

Word Count: 15,913

Supervisor: Dr. M. Forough

Abstract

This thesis seeks to explore what the results of the 2011 Libya intervention have been for the Responsibility to Protect principle (R2P). In order to achieve this thesis conducts a Critical Discourse Analysis into Russia and China. The choice of Russia and China is to remedy the overreliance on Western thinking on R2P present in the existing literature. This thesis argues that the Libya intervention has resulted in increased difficulties for the R2P, though deepening existing scepticism as well as providing more evidence as to the damaging results of military interventions.

Contents

1. Introduction	3
2. Literature Review	5
First Debate	6
First Approach.....	6
Second Approach.....	6
Limitations of Approaches 1 and 2.....	8
Third approach	8
Second Debate.....	9
3. Methodology	11
4. Analysis Chapter 1 – China.....	13
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.....	13
Permanent Representation of China at the United Nations.....	16
Brief Summary	17
5. Analysis Chapter 2 – Russia.....	19
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.....	19
Permanent Representation of Russia at the United Nations.....	22
Brief Summary	24
6. Discussion and Conclusions.....	25
R2P discourses as part of Broader Policy	25
Results for R2P.....	26
Conclusion	27
7. Final Remarks.....	29
Bibliography.....	30

1. Introduction

Through the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document the international community adopted and formalized the Responsibility to Protect (hereon: R2P) concept in International Relations. In this document, the criteria of R2P were defined as the protection of populations from war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.¹ While these responsibilities continue to be held primarily by national governments, the concept of R2P expands this to the international community in cases when a government is unable or unwilling to provide protection. Although adopted at the 2005 summit by the UN General Assembly, the 2011 Libyan intervention was the first time that military action against a state was mandated under the auspices of R2P. The background to the 2011 intervention lies in the wider Arab Spring movement; initially peaceful demonstrations in the eastern city of Benghazi spread and evolved into a full scale uprising against Gadhafi's regime. The subsequent Libyan Civil War between forces loyal to Gaddafi and rebel groups lasted until the overthrow and death of Gaddafi at the hands of rebels. In the initial stages of the conflict, in the face of an imminent attack on Benghazi by Gaddafi forces, the international community sought to prevent possible genocide with the UNSC passing Resolutions 1970 followed by 1973. Both UN Resolutions invoked the principle of R2P to engage in a sanctions regime, weapons embargo and other measure against the Gaddafi regime. UN 1973 mandated 'all necessary measures to protect civilians', leading to NATO air operations against Gaddafi forces.² Initially NATO's mission consisted of enforcing a no-fly zone. However, it subsequently evolved into providing direct air support to rebel forces. Under NATO air cover, rebel forces subsequently gained ground leading to the demise of Gaddafi in Sirte and the end of the NATO operation. Since 2011 however, Libya has endured continued instability and violence, the lack of a central government since the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime has also contributed to the ongoing Mediterranean migration crisis. This thesis will seek to establish what has been the influence of the Libya intervention on the principle of R2P. In order to explore the consequences of the intervention the following research question will be used: How has the Libya case affected the principle of R2P: a Critical Discourse Analysis on Russia and China?

Exploring what the effects of the Libya intervention have been on the principle of R2P is relevant to International Relations for three reasons. Firstly R2P, despite its adoption in 2005, remains a distinctly controversial principle in global affairs. Differences between both academics and states as to how and whether R2P should be carried out, make continued study of the principle necessary and relevant. Secondly, the Libya case represents the first application of the principle's third pillar, allowing for military intervention against the will of the target state. The use of force between states will continue to be a relevant area of study for some time. Even more so, the norms and justifications for the use of force, again demonstrate the significance of studying the Libya intervention. Finally, the choice to focus the research on Russia and China's relationship with R2P as a result of Libya, demonstrates the relevance of the study further still. Firstly, due to the existing academic overreliance on Western thinking on R2P, focusing on non-Western states aids in remedying this. Secondly, as a result of the significance of Russia and China to R2P. Both have a complex relationship with the principle, having signed the 2005 document but, since then, maintaining a sceptical view of R2P. The two however did not veto the UN resolution allowing for the NATO mission, instead abstaining. This serves to demonstrate how the study of Russia and China provides valuable insight into R2P itself, by exploring the effects of the Libya case on their relationship with the principle.

¹ '2005 World Summit Outcome document' United Nations General Assembly, 15/09/05

² UN Resolution 1973, UNSC, 17/03/11

In order to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question, this thesis will be structured as follows. Firstly, a comprehensive critical review of the literature will outline the debates on R2P and Libya. The literature review will identify the limitations of the existing literature due to its overreliance on Western thinking on R2P, with this thesis providing a new perspective by seeking to focus instead on Russia and China. The subsequent methodology chapter will fully explain how this will be done through the use of a Critical Discourse Analysis. Moreover, the methodology chapter will explain the data selection process and detail how the data will be analysed in the following chapters. The focus of the first chapter will be the analysis of the discourse from China. This chapter will be structured systematically around its two document sources, firstly the Chinese Foreign Ministry followed by the Chinese Permanent Representation to the UN. The next chapter will follow the same structure for the analysis of Russian discourse. Again, firstly the Foreign Ministry followed by the Permanent Representation to the UN. Subsequently the discussion and conclusions chapter will bring together the findings of the analysis chapters to provide an answer to the research question. This chapter will demonstrate how the analysis has led to the conclusion that the Libya case has negatively affected R2P, demonstrating that the Russian and Chinese discourses have maintained their scepticism of the principle, and what this means for the principle. Moreover, it will be shown how the Libya case has been effectively used by Russia and China to further justify their opposition to R2P. Finally, there will be a brief section mentioning the limits of the research and pointing to potential future study on the topic.

2. Literature Review

In order to situate the research within the literature on R2P, this section will critically review the relevant debates on R2P and demonstrate the gap in which the research fits. This review will start with a brief outline of the history of R2P debates, followed by a critical review of the current debates on R2P and the Libya mission that are relevant for this thesis. The first section will outline and critically review the primary debate, on whether the Libya mission has enhanced or diminished the standing of R2P. The first section will discuss the camp of writers arguing that the intervention has led to broader acceptance of the principle. The second will address those arguing that R2P has been damaged by Libya. The third section will explore the more nuanced authors who accept the significance of the adoption of an R2P mandated intervention but also address the effects on the principle, when the failure subsequently became apparent. Through critically reviewing these three standpoints I will demonstrate their clear limitations, primarily in their over reliance on Western R2P discourses. Many authors have continued to make the same arguments on R2P before and after the Libyan intervention. In effect these authors, both pro and more sceptical of R2P, have viewed the Libyan intervention through their original lens using the Libya case merely for anecdotal evidence. Finally I will critically review the more limited literature that actively includes non-Western thinking on R2P, in addressing the principle post-Libya. Here, it will be demonstrated how the thesis will add to the discussion through including non-Western perspectives on R2P, looking into Russia and China.

It is important to briefly present the history of the debates on R2P as many of the themes continue to be relevant in the debate on R2P in Libya, particularly legitimacy, neo-imperialism and sovereignty. At the time of the emergence of R2P in the 1990s, the debate at first concerned the issue of legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, exploring ideas of neo-imperialism and sovereignty.³ Subsequent debates prior to the 2005 adoption revolved around the relationship between the rights and responsibilities on state sovereignty.⁴ Despite the 2005 World Summit's relative consensus on R2P, both it and humanitarian intervention remain controversial within the literature, especially with regards to the violation of state sovereignty.⁵ Moreover, the underlying intentions of intervening powers continued to be a point of contention in the literature throughout the 1990s and 2000s.⁶ These debates remain relevant, as in the aftermath of the Libya intervention many of the same themes are used by authors both promoting and detracting R2P. Moreover, the 2011 intervention led to extensive debates on the actual motivations of intervening powers.⁷ Furthermore, Libya highlighted again the disagreement amongst the powerful actors, a theme consistent with the history of R2P. Continuing the trend, as both Russia and China throughout the 1990s and early 2000s expressed scepticism of the concept.⁸

³ David Chandler, 'The responsibility to protect? Imposing the 'Liberal Peace'', *International Peacekeeping*, 11, no.1 (2004).

⁴ Ramesh Thakur, 'Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from ICISS,' *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3(2002).

⁵ Hugh Roberts, 'Who said Gadhafi had to go,' *London Review of Books* 33, no. 22 (2011).

⁶ Marina Ottaway, Bethany Lacina 'International Interventions and Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s,' *SAIS Review* 23, no. 2 (2003).

⁷ Stanley C. Igwe, 'An Assessment of the Motivations for the 2011 Nato Intervention in Libya and Its Implications for Africa,' *Canadian Social Science* 13, No. 4, (2017).

⁸ Aglaya Snetkov, Marc Lanteigne, 'The Loud Dissenter and its Cautious Partner' – Russia, China, global governance and humanitarian intervention,' *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 15 no. 1 (2015).

First Debate

Subsequently the first debate in the literature on R2P and Libya has been divided into the three approaches which will be addressed in order. The first approach being, those authors arguing that R2P has benefitted from Libya. The second approach, those arguing that R2P has been damaged. Finally a more nuanced third approach encompassing both. By reviewing these debates this research aims to demonstrate the limitations of all three approaches' overreliance on Western thinking on R2P.

First Approach

The primary debate on R2P in the Libya intervention addresses the question of whether the intervention has been beneficial or damaging to the concept of R2P.⁹ Those in favour advocate that R2P has been validated by the intervention, such as Alex J. Bellamy, who argues that because the intervention's mandate specifically referenced R2P that the concept has therefore become universally accepted.¹⁰ Moreover Paul D. Williams, while acknowledging at his time of writing in mid-2011 that it was too early to observe the ramifications for R2P, does argue that the adoption of Resolution 1973 is in itself a significant milestone.¹¹ Williams and others attempt to argue that the adoption by the UNSC of resolutions based on the principle of R2P, signify that the concept has 'come of age' in that it now enjoys global support.¹² The glaring limitation in this line of argumentation is the fact that it ignores the failures in the Libya intervention. While it may be true that the resolutions were the first authorised by the UNSC on the principles of R2P, this was not without controversy. Moreover the authors ignore the fact that R2P has not fulfilled its goals successfully, as it can be very easily observed that the intervention has not led to increased protection of the Libyan population. While the initial intervention may have prevented civilian deaths in a Gaddafi led assault on Benghazi, currently Libya is a failed state suffering from an ongoing civil war.¹³ However, there is a more important limitation in these authors' argumentation. The authors arguing that R2P has benefitted from the Libyan intervention largely take a very Western centric approach. This is understandable in that much of the debate on R2P especially in the period up to 2005 is itself largely Western centric, including dissent in the West.¹⁴ However, there is extensive vocal dissent from the non-West, which has also contributed to the debate on R2P. This strand of the literature for the most part ignores this however. During debates prior to voting on Resolution 1973, dissent from Brazil, China, India and Russia clearly shows that R2P was far from universally accepted at the time of the adoption.¹⁵ Moreover this part of the literature ignores the strong criticism from the non-West in the aftermath of failure of the Libya intervention. The research in this paper will fill this gap by looking in depth at Russia and China's relationship with R2P as a result of Libya.

Second Approach

On the other side of this debate, authors argue that the Libya intervention has in fact damaged the standing of R2P internationally. The main criticisms have been on the inconsistent application of R2P.

⁹ See: Ivo H. Daalder, and James G. Stavridis. "NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 2 (2012). AND Eric A. Posner, 'Outside the Law', *Foreign Policy*, (2011).

¹⁰ Alex J. Bellamy, "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm." *Ethics & International Affairs* 25, no. 3 (2011): 264.

¹¹ Paul D. Williams, 'The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya, 3 *Global Responsibility to Protect* 248 (2011): 259.

¹² See: Ban Ki-moon, "'Responsibility to Protect' Came of Age in 2011, Secretary-General Tells Conference, Stressing Need to Prevent Conflict before It Breaks Out,' United Nations, 18/01/12, Accessed 01/11/18 <https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sgsm14068.doc.htm>

¹³ See: Libya data, *Fragile States Index*, Fund for Peace.

¹⁴ See: Germany was one of the five abstentions of UN 1973.

¹⁵ See: Brazil, China, India and Russia, abstention of UN 1973.

Authors have argued that the intervention in Libya demonstrates an inconsistent commitment by states to R2P, citing cases of possible crimes against humanity being largely ignored by the international community, while others lead to interventions as in Libya.¹⁶ The authors advocate that this arbitrary approach has damaged the standing of R2P, as humanitarian justification for interventions has become harder to argue. Christopher Zambakari contends that the intervention in Libya had little to do with any desires to protect the Libyan people, which indeed it has failed to do, but instead was part of great power politics.¹⁷ Moreover Zambakari asserts that NATO overstepped the mark in Libya by becoming deeply involved in the outcome of the Libyan civil war leading to the death of Gadhafi, further damaging the concept of R2P.¹⁸ The use of R2P as cover for regime change is common theme among the authors who follow this line of argumentation.¹⁹ Patrick CR Terry argues that NATO both broke international law and violated UNSC resolution 1973 in its implementation of the resolution.²⁰ Terry however, asserts that the failure of the intervention is in fact more damaging to R2P than NATO overreach.²¹ He argues that the very visible failure to protect civilians in Libya, the entire rationale of R2P, has led to a return to paralysis over R2P in the UNSC.²² Brent Steele and Eric Heinze also contend that there is an inconsistent approach to R2P by the international community, particularly among foreign policy elites in the West.²³ They argue that R2P has been used by 'interventionist' leaning foreign policy operatives as justification for action. Steele and Heinze label R2P as used by these groups as an 'option' for states as opposed to an 'obligation'.²⁴ The authors on this side of the debate argue that the Libyan case has strongly damaged the concept of R2P, however this also faces limitations.

The limitations of these authors' arguments are similar to that of the opposing side of the debate. While the other authors ignored the failures of the actual mission, instead focusing on the role of R2P in the mandate, this second group of authors have overplayed the importance of these failings. While the shortcomings of the Libyan mission are severe and very visible, authors arguing that R2P has lost all legitimacy have failed to take into account recent UNSC resolutions on Côte d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic, that build upon R2P.²⁵ Using the failings of the Libyan intervention to claim that R2P has been fundamentally damaged therefore is somewhat short sighted, with continued commitment to its principles at the UN. Moreover, as with the first group of authors, over reliance on Western thinking on R2P also limits this group of academics. However, writers more critical of R2P, through dealing with dissent do come into more contact with non-Western literature on R2P, although in a limited way. In fact, this narrow interaction with non-Western criticism of R2P is even more problematic given the amount of dissent from the non-West.

¹⁶ Mehdi Hasan in Zambakari (2016)

¹⁷ Christopher Zambakari, 'The misguided and mismanaged intervention in Libya: Consequences for peace,' *African Security Review* 25, no 1 (2016): 56.

¹⁸ Ibid Zambakari, (2016):56.

¹⁹ Ibid Roberts, (2011)

²⁰ Patrick CR. Terry, "The Libya Intervention (2011): Neither Lawful, nor Successful." *The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa* 48, no. 2 (2015): 167.

²¹ Ibid Terry, (2015)

²² Ibid Terry, (2015)

²³ Brent J. Steele, Eric A. Heinze, 'Norms of Intervention, R2P and Libya; Suggestions from Generational Analysis,' *Global Responsibility to Protect* 88 no. 6 (2014)

²⁴ Ibid Steele and Heinze, (2014)

²⁵ See UNSC Resolutions 1975 (2011) and 2127 (2013)

Limitations of Approaches 1 and 2

A criticism that can be made against both groups of authors is that they are merely continuing the same debates on R2P that have been going back and forth since the 1990s.²⁶ Indeed many authors who were strong supporters of R2P in the 1990s and early 2000s claim that Libya has validated R2P, while those traditionally sceptical of R2P argue the opposite. Through this both sides have been largely using the Libyan case to advance their traditional agendas on R2P. Both sides taking what they want from the Libya intervention has led to limitations in both sides' argumentations. For the purposes of this thesis, the second group of authors more critical of the effects of Libya on R2P, have provided more convincing insight. They are however, still limited in their narrow inclusion of non-Western thinking on R2P. While both approaches are useful for this research in order to understand the full debate and literature around R2P, a third group of authors offering more nuanced approach exists. This next group will now be critically reviewed, demonstrating how its contributions on Libya and R2P are more valuable to this thesis.

Third approach

A third group of authors take an overall more nuanced approach to R2P in Libya, with the intervention resulting in neither the death of the concept nor its universal acceptance. While this group of authors in general take an overall more critical approach to the intervention, they do acknowledge the significance of R2P in its mandate. Compared to the first two approaches, the strength of these authors argument lies in their more balanced criticism of the intervention. These authors provide strong groundwork for this thesis to build upon, however again there is a general overreliance of Western thinking on R2P.

Roland Paris critiques the Libyan intervention on the grounds of the structural problems of R2P.²⁷ He argues that there is an inherent problem in conducting military interventions in order to prevent mass atrocity killings, using the Libya case as an example.²⁸ While Paris does not dismiss R2P in Libya he states that the Libya case exposed the flaws inherent in R2P. For Paris, Libya both confirmed R2P global acceptance while simultaneously demonstrating its weakness, neither branding Libya the death of R2P nor its renaissance. Paris sums up stating in Libya 'R2P failed because it worked... It may not be destined to fail, but it does seem fated to flounder'.²⁹ As well as structural issues surrounding R2P, this group of authors also argue that the debate on R2P post-Libya has been dominated by a black and white debate, characterized by Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho as a 'dead or alive dichotomy'.³⁰ They assert that this is unhelpful for understanding the debate on R2P, instead calling for a more nuanced approach. They contend that R2P is neither dead nor fully alive, however what is clear is that the Libya intervention has contributed to the current deadlock in the Security Council over Syria.³¹ Justin Morris also argues that R2P is neither dead nor alive post-Libya, but the failings of the intervention have strongly affected the current Security Council deadlock.³² What marks out Morris as an exception to this group, is his inclusion of the non-Western dissent in the BRICS, particularly Russia and China. While this third group of authors does provide the best and most convincing picture of R2P post-Libya, there are still some limitations. Similar to the first two groups

²⁶ See: Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). And Daalder, Ivo H., and James G. Stavridis. (2012)

²⁷ Roland Paris, 'The 'Responsibility to Protect' and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention.' *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 5 (2014).

²⁸ Ibid Paris, (2014).

²⁹ Ibid Paris, (2014): 593.

³⁰ Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel & Marcos Tourinho, 'The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection,' *Global Society* 30, no. 1 (2016): 114.

³¹ Ibid Brockmeier, Stuenkel & Tourinho (2016): 131.

³² Justin Morris, 'Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum' *International Affairs* 98, no. 5 (2013).

there is in general, Morris being the exception, an overreliance on Western IR. The research will build on the work of authors like Morris who have included the non-West, for this thesis, Russia and China, through exploring their respective discourses on R2P post-Libya. The next section will address the limited literature that has explored R2P post-Libya, with the focus non-Western perception.

Second Debate

While the first debate on R2P in Libya relied too heavily on Western thinking on R2P there is a second smaller group of authors who engage more with non-Western ideas on R2P. While this still remains an underexplored area of research, a small number of authors such as, Ramesh Thakur and Justin Morris have laid the foundations for the research through the inclusion of non-Western thinking on R2P in regards to Libya. Critically reviewing these authors is relevant for the analysis in two ways, firstly to demonstrate how limited the field is, and secondly to show their groundwork onto which this research will build.

Ramesh Thakur's writing on R2P after Libya explores the role of the non-West/ emerging powers in shaping the debate.³³ Thakur argues that for emerging powers, traditionally sceptical of R2P, Libya raised questions of the legitimacy of military interventions as well as the nature of R2P as a mandate for the use of force.³⁴ Thakur states that all the BRICS nations protested at the way in which NATO carried out its mission, arguing that the interveners overstepped the UNSC mandate in pursuing regime change in Libya.³⁵ However, what is important is Thakur's argument that while emerging powers, exemplified by the BRICS, were highly critical of NATO's actions this does not mean that they are against the principle of R2P.³⁶ Thakur strongly argues against the oversimplification of the debate on R2P as a simple North vs South, asserting that the debate on R2P must be more engaging of non-Western thinking on R2P.³⁷ As well as demonstrating that many non-Western states both support and stand to gain from R2P, Thakur contends that scepticism as a result of the failings in Libya have not led to the complete rejection of R2P by the non-West. Indeed he argues that the shifting global power dynamics away from the West, referred to by Thakur as power diffusion, has led to more space for criticism of global norms such as R2P and that this dissent is now more relevant.³⁸ Thakur's contribution is valuable to the research as it lays the groundwork in the role of the non-West in debates on R2P post-Libya. His writing is useful for demonstrating the complexity of the R2P debate post-Libya, not simply as a North-South divide but a multi-layered discussion. Thakur however provides only an outline of the debate, his inclusion of the BRICS is useful but deeper research is still necessary. Thakur provides relevant foundations for the thesis but there is still a need for this more in-depth research into non-Western actors, in this case, Russia and China.

While Thakur has provided groundwork of the non-Western role in the debate on R2P post-Libya, Justin Morris has explored deeper the role of non-Western actors particularly the BRICS. The focus of Morris' writing is in what the Libya intervention means for R2P in the UNSC, particularly in regard to debates on Syria.³⁹ Morris' arguments are strengthened by his effective inclusion of non-Western perspectives. He does so by exploring the relationship to R2P post-Libya of primarily the non-Western members of the UNSC. In doing so Morris provides a deeper analysis of Russia and China,

³³ Ramesh Thakur R2P after Libya and Syria: engaging emerging powers, *The Washington Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (2013)

³⁴ *Ibid* Thakur, (2013): 64.

³⁵ *Ibid* Thakur, (2013): 70.

³⁶ *Ibid* Thakur, (2013): 70.

³⁷ *Ibid* Thakur, (2013): 62.

³⁸ *Ibid* Thakur, (2013): 61.

³⁹ *Ibid* Morris, (2013)

in particular Russia. Morris is right to acknowledge the role of ulterior motives in both the West as well as the non-West in debates on R2P.⁴⁰ While other authors explore extensively the questions of NATO's motivations, partially that of regime change, Morris brings another perspective to the discussion by exploring the motives of Russia in passionately defending the sovereignty of Syria.⁴¹ Morris goes deeper than Thakur in providing more comprehensive analysis of non-Western thinking on R2P. For this research Morris' exploration of Russia and to a lesser extent China's relationship to R2P post-Libya is useful in demonstrating how research into these actors can provide useful insight into R2P. With the foundations laid by Morris, this research will through a discourse analysis look more in-depth into the effects of Libya case on Russian and Chinese thinking on R2P. As well as addressing what this means for the concept. The next section will explain the methodology of the research, demonstrating what data will be used and how the data will be analysed to address this question.

⁴⁰ Ibid Morris, (2013): 1277

⁴¹ Ibid Morris, (2013): 1277

3. Methodology

In order to explore the research question of how the Libya case effected the principle of R2P, this paper will conduct a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of documents published by the Chinese and Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs as well as their respective representations at the UN. The Critical Discourse analysis will be based on the first dimension of Norman Fairclough's framework for CDA through treating 'discourse-as-text'.⁴² Fairclough's framework allows for the systematic analysis of the 'choices and patterns in vocabulary (e.g. wording)'.⁴³ Through Fairclough's first dimension the analysis will be done on the 'concrete textual features', i.e. analysing the actual content of the statements published by Russia and China.⁴⁴ The justification for using this framework of CDA is due to its relevance to the object of the research. That being to explore the effects of the Libya intervention on R2P. This framework of CDA allows the analysis to focus on the language and context, i.e. framing, used by Russia and China regarding the Libya case and R2P. A CDA based on Fairclough's first dimension is more relevant to the research than other forms of discourse analysis that instead focus more on power relations through discourse such as Foucauldian discourse analysis. This is because Fairclough's CDA framework will allow the research to explore and demonstrate how R2P is viewed by Russia and China and what effect the Libya case has had, by directly analysing the wording and framing of R2P in the texts. Moreover through this framework, the research will explore how Libya has been explicitly used by the two countries in articulating and justifying their view on R2P. What will now be addressed is the data used in the thesis, firstly identifying the data, secondly the selection process of the data, thirdly the justification for this selection and finally how the data will be analysed through this framework.

The data used in the discourse analysis will be documents published by Russia and China's Foreign Ministries and their respective Representations at the United Nations. What will now be explained systematically is how the data was selected from each of the four sources. In order to access relevant documents from the website of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the site provides country specific pages. Although on the Libya page the 'documents' and 'Spokesperson's remarks' tabs are empty, it is possible to use the 'activities' tab to access all documents on Libya published by the Foreign Ministry. Moreover the use of the website's search function, with the term 'Libya', allowed for the inclusion of documents that were relevant but had not been properly filed by the website. For the documents regarding Chinese discourse at the UN level, this was done through the Permanent Representative page of China at the UN. The China at the UN site provides access to all published documents regarding Libya at the UN level through a dedicated 'Libya' page. For Russia, the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry provides extensive archived material filed according to a country specific map. Documents published on Libya were accessed through here. Russia's Permanent Representation at the UN page does not have a country specific page for Libya, but the website's search function was used to access all documents on Libya. What will now be addressed is how this data was selected and the justifications for using this data.

As a further part of the data selection process the documents were further filtered to attain a workable set of appropriate documents to analyse. Primarily the documents were filtered as to their relevance to the goal of the research. As the country specific pages contained all statements on bilateral relations

⁴² Norman Fairclough (1992) in Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen 'Critical Discourse Analysis' *Annual Review of Anthropology* 29, no. 1 (2000): 448.

⁴³ Ibid Fairclough (1992) in Blommaery and Blucaen (2000): 448.

⁴⁴ Ibid Fairclough (1992) in Blommaery and Blucaen (2000): 448.

between Libya and Russia/China, documents that were not relevant to the 2011 intervention were removed. Documents such as those on the status of Russian/Chinese nationals in Libya and general statements on bilateral relations were excluded through this filtration process. This process was extensive for the documents obtained through the search function on the Russia at the UN page. This systematic process to ensure that the data was relevant to the aim of the research resulted in all the remaining documents containing explicit mentions of the 2011 intervention or its aftermath. Furthermore, the resulting documents dated from throughout the period during and after the intervention, allowing for the tracking of changes in the relevant discourses over time. After the filtering criteria were applied the resulting documents consisted largely of; statements of Foreign Ministers or Foreign Ministry spokesperson/ UNSC representatives, press releases, reports of meetings and conferences, reports of official visits and interviews with the media.

The justification for the choice of these departments as data sources is due to their relevance to both the intervention in Libya and the concept of R2P. Firstly, documents from the relevant Foreign Ministries are important as they are the main portal through which nations communicate to the outside world. Moreover, through Foreign Ministry documents, the relative positions of nations on global affairs is expressed as part of their larger foreign policy agenda. Therefore, in order to analyse discourse on the effects of the 2011 intervention in Libya, the Russian and Chinese Foreign Ministries are relevant data sources. Secondly, documents from Russian and Chinese UN representation are important as the UN is the most relevant arena for the discussion of both the Libya case and the concept of R2P. It was through the UNSC that the 2011 intervention was mandated on the grounds of R2P and the UNSC remains the arena in which any future interventions will be debated. Moreover it is at the UN level that nations have the ability to be most direct and vocal in their positions, therefore providing strong insight into Russian and Chinese discourse on Libya and R2P. Furthermore, it is in the UNSC that both Russia and China enjoy equally with each other as well as the West through the veto power. Therefore, the Russian and Chinese representations at the UN provide a good data source for documents relevant to conduct a critical discourse analysis. Next the focus will be on how the data will be analysed.

In terms of how the data will be used, through Fairclough's CDA framework the text of the documents will be the focus of the analysis. The text of the various documents will be systematically analysed to explore how the 2011 Libya intervention has affected Russian and Chinese discourse on R2P. This will be done by analysing the wording of the statements, the tone of the statements and how hostile the statements are, to demonstrate how Russia and China view R2P and how Libya has affected this. Moreover the texts will be analysed to explore how Russia and China have used the Libya intervention in discussions on other cases, namely Syria. Through this, it will be demonstrated how Russia and China have tried to use Libya to frame the debate on R2P and interventions.

4. Analysis Chapter 1 – China

This focus of this chapter will be on the analysis of the Chinese discourse on Libya based on the data from the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Permanent Representation at the United Nations. This chapter will be structured as follows. Firstly, a brief section outlining the justification for the choice of China as an object of study. Secondly, the analysis of the data from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. This subsequent part will itself be broken into sections, each addressing one of the themes raised in the material. The third section will consist of the analysis of data from China at the UN, again structured systematically around the themes raised in the documents. Finally, there will be a brief summary of the findings, which will then be further addressed in the final chapter and conclusion. The structure of this chapter will provide systematic and clear analysis of the data

The reasons for the choice of China in conducting a discourse analysis on R2P post-Libya is threefold. Firstly China has traditionally been sceptical of R2P and humanitarian intervention. Secondly China clearly represents non-Western thinking on R2P and thirdly China is a veto-wielding member of the UNSC. China's relationship to R2P is notable, although China endorsed the 2005 Summit Outcome Document, it has remained largely sceptical of humanitarian interventions.⁴⁵ China however, did not veto the UNSC 1973 allowing for the intervention in Libya. Therefore, analysing what effect the Libya intervention has had on China's scepticism is important for understanding the future of R2P. Moreover, the study of China is useful in order to redress the academic overreliance on Western thinking on R2P. Furthermore, being a permanent member of the Security Council, understanding Beijing's relationship to R2P is important as China is one of the few states with the power to veto future application of R2P. Analysing Chinese discourse on the subject will provide insight into how Libya has affected R2P for China and how the conversation will be framed in the UNSC in future votes on the principle.

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

This section will be structured around the themes present in the Chinese Discourse, analysing them systematically. Firstly, there is China's promotion of UN supremacy. Secondly, there is China's stressing of regional actors. Thirdly, there is Beijing's promotion of state sovereignty. The fourth section analyses how the Libya case has been used in Chinese discourse on R2P. Finally, this last section looks into the changes to Foreign Ministry discourse over time. By structuring the chapter so, the research will provide a clear understanding of the Foreign Ministry's stance towards R2P.

In analysing the discourse on the Libya intervention emanating from the Chinese Foreign Ministry various trends in Beijing's thinking emerge. The language of China's statements made at the major international conferences on Libya, the Paris Conference in 2011 and the Rome Conference in 2015, demonstrates and reinforces China's scepticism of R2P. At the 2011 Paris Conference, China's statements repeatedly stress that the primary actor through which the international community should act in Libya is the United Nations.⁴⁶ Moreover, at the 2015 conference, a time when the failings of the intervention were clear, China continued to stress its desire for involvement at the United Nations

⁴⁵ Courtney J. Fung, 'China and the Responsibility to Protect: From Opposition to Advocacy,' *United States Institute of Peace* (2016)

⁴⁶ 'Speech of Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the International Conference on Libya' 02/09/2011, Accessed 15/12/18.

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zjjz_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t855660.shtml

level.⁴⁷ While stopping short of using language explicitly denouncing the Libya interveners' military actions Chinese statements repeatedly stress a desire for political solutions.⁴⁸ What can be understood through Chinese discourse at international conferences is that China is highly alarmed by unilateral interventions, justified though humanitarian or R2P mandates, as demonstrated through repeatedly stressing the role of the United Nations. This is important for two reasons; firstly it demonstrates that the Libya intervention has failed to assuage China's scepticism of R2P as cover for Western military interventions and secondly that China's desire to maintain the supremacy of the UN is due to its position within the UN. For China, maintaining the UN's central position in mandating interventions is part of ensuring that China keeps the ability to influence or veto such actions.

China's discourse on the Libya intervention also repeatedly stresses the role of 'regional actors' namely the African Union, Arab League and Islamic Conference Organization.⁴⁹ Chinese wording repeatedly advocates for the role of these 'regional actors' alongside the UN in securing a ceasefire.⁵⁰ It appears that China is attempting to, while maintaining the UN as the central actor in Libya, push for a regional response to Libya's instability. In terms of what this means for R2P, this again serves to demonstrate China's traditional scepticism of the third pillar of R2P, allowing for military intervention. China's push for a regional response is more in line with the second pillar's wider international community's responsibility to assist states in protecting their populations, albeit on a more local level.⁵¹ However, China's repetition of the term 'regional actors' in Libya demonstrates Beijing's concerns about Western, particularly US, involvement in its own region. China attempts to frame the Libya situation as a local situation, not requiring global powers to become involved. By advocating towards a more local understanding of the second pillar and stressing the importance of regional actors, Beijing is trying to secure its power over its own 'regional' affairs and limit potential Western involvement. For future votes on R2P situations, as well as arguing for decision making at a UN level where China holds veto power, Beijing will continue to push for regional responses in an attempt to limit Western external involvement in crises.

As well as the trends of promoting UN supremacy and regional actors, throughout China's discourse on R2P and the intervention in Libya the, theme of sovereignty is repeatedly used. China's traditional position of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty remains constant through the discourse on interventions and R2P. Indeed during the period of fighting, while NATO was in the process of bombing Libya, China made reference to respecting Libyan sovereignty, meanwhile directly linking this to Beijing's opposition to 'acts beyond the authorization of the UN Security Council'.⁵² This

⁴⁷ 'China's Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue Gong Xiaosheng Attends Ministerial Meeting on the Libyan Issue' 14/12/15, Accessed 15/12/18
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t1324809.shtml

⁴⁸ 'Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Attends the International Conference on Libya' 02/01/11, Accessed 15/12/18
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t855661.shtml and Ibid 'Speech of Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the International Conference on Libya' 02/01/11.

⁴⁹ Ibid 'Speech of Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the International Conference on Libya' 02/01/11

⁵⁰ 'U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's Special Envoy to Libya Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib Visits China' 02/08/11, Accessed 15/13/18
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t845606.shtml

⁵¹ Three Pillars of R2P 'About R2P', Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Accessed 02/01/19:
http://www.global2p.org/about_r2p

⁵² 'Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets with Special Envoy of the Libyan Government' 08/06/11, Accessed 15/12/18

again, demonstrated China's concerns regarding R2P as cover for Western military interventions, by masking very little Beijing's thoughts on NATO action. Moreover, the timing serves to show that Beijing has maintained this position since the beginning of the conflict; that interventions even under the mandate of R2P infringe on state sovereignty. Furthermore, in 2015 Foreign Minister Wang Yi again stressed that protecting Libya's sovereignty was the first of China's three principles for resolving instability in Libya.⁵³ What this tells us about China's relationship with R2P is that again Beijing's commitment to the principle lies primarily, and consistently, with the first two pillars, while remaining sceptical of the third pillar. For future international debates on interventions with R2P mandates, particularly through the UNSC, Libya has demonstrated that for China the issue of sovereignty will remain a primary concern. While China does not reject R2P completely, Beijing's commitment to non-intervention and state sovereignty as demonstrated by Foreign Ministry discourse on Libya, make Beijing's support for future missions unlikely.

Looking into Chinese Foreign Ministry discourse regarding the use of Libya in subsequent debates reveals that the trend of scepticism continues. While the Chinese Foreign Ministry has been careful not to directly blame the Libyan violence directly on NATO's actions, Beijing has been emboldened regarding the more recent Syria debates. Chinese Foreign Ministry discourse has directly linked outside interventions to increases in instability and violence in Syria. Speaking on Syria in an interview, Chinese Ambassador to Croatia Deng Ying, states that 'intervention of various forces [...] have driven the situation into a tangled web that is hard to unravel'.⁵⁴ Moreover, official discourse on Beijing's differences with the United States directly states the contrasting thoughts on interventions. Ambassador to Belgium, Qu Xing demonstrates Chinese thinking on the use of force by the US in promoting democracy; 'The US believes that democracy can be introduced into countries by using military force. We Chinese believe [...] a reckless use of force against other countries will create more problems than solutions'.⁵⁵ In this example Ambassador Xing goes as far as to mention by name Iraq, Libya and Syria. Ambassador Xing's choice of examples clearly demonstrates how Beijing links Western military interventions to failures, choosing cases renowned for negative outcomes. Regarding R2P and interventions, it is clear that China's enduring scepticism is not based purely on principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. China's distrust of R2P has also been influenced by negative results in the Middle East, including Libya. In terms of future debates on R2P-led interventions, China's commitment to sovereignty and highlighting of previous failures, combine to strengthen Beijing's non-intervention stance. Incorporated with Beijing's strong promotion of the UN role, Chinese discourse reveals continued and empowered opposition to R2P

Using Chinese Foreign Ministry discourse to observe changes in Beijing's thinking on R2P led interventions as a result of Libya, two outcomes emerge. Firstly, the discourse demonstrates the consistency of Chinese thinking on interventions and R2P. Indeed throughout the Libyan civil war, from the initial days of the fighting until the present day, documents show that China's discourse on R2P has continually promoted the role of the UN, the role of regional actors and a strong respect for sovereignty. Secondly however, Foreign Ministry discourse does reveal a slight shift as a result of the

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t829460.shtml

⁵³ 'Wang Yi Expounds China's Three Basic Principles on Resolving the Libyan Issue', Accessed 15/12/18

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t1294314.shtml

⁵⁴ 'Ambassador Deng Ying Gives An Written Interview on Croatian Well-known Magazine-"National", 29/11/16, Accessed 16/12/18

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1420122.shtml

⁵⁵ 'China-US: Duel of the Century or Partner of the Century?' Qu Xing, 04/09/15, Accessed 16/12/18

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1254993.shtml

Libya case. More recent documents on Syria, demonstrate how Chinese diplomats now draw direct comparisons between interventions and instability, something that was absent in Foreign Ministry discourse in the early stages of the Libyan case. What these two outcomes mean for R2P? Firstly, the Libya case has not had an effect on consistent Chinese reservations on R2P and interventions. Secondly however, the fact that the NATO mission failed to bring peace and stability, has led Beijing to directly link R2P led interventions to instability. For future debates and votes on R2P mandated interventions, the effects of Libya on the Chinese discourse demonstrates that Beijing remain opposed, with even stronger justification for its scepticism.

Permanent Representation of China at the United Nations

This section is structured around the themes that have emerged in analysing the discourse from documents published by the Chinese representation at the UN. The first part, regarding the similarities to the documents from the Foreign Ministry. Secondly, a section addressing the significance of the Libya situation to Chinese discourse on R2P. The third part addresses how Chinese discourse has used reports of civilian casualties as a result of NATO strikes to frame the debate on R2P. Finally a section on how the promotion of regional actors has been used at the UN level. Again the structure is to provide a full and clear understanding of discourse at a UN level.

Overall, in analysing Beijing's discourse through documents from China at the UN level, there are broadly similar themes to the discourse from the Foreign Ministry. At the UNSC, Chinese language repeatedly demonstrates the same thinking on R2P, a general scepticism outlined through stressing opposition to the use of force, the importance of regional actors and the supremacy of the UN in decision making.⁵⁶ Indeed even in explaining its voting on Resolution 1973 mandating military intervention, in which China abstained, Beijing demonstrates its continued scepticism of R2P, stressing its reservations and 'concerns'.⁵⁷ Throughout the period China continues to demonstrate its scepticism of outside intervention, repeatedly promoting 'Libyan-led' efforts to promote stability and the importance of Libyan 'sovereignty and territorial integrity'.⁵⁸ In terms of what this means for R2P, Chinese discourse at the UN level demonstrates a continued scepticism of the third pillar mandating military intervention. China's abstention in the Libyan vote demonstrates that Beijing does not necessarily completely reject R2P, but undoubtedly maintains strong reservations about the concept.

Analysing the overall subtext of Chinese discourse at the UN level however, it becomes apparent that Libya itself is of little importance to Beijing, hence the abstention in UN1973. For China however the Libya case's importance lies in the precedent it sets for R2P at the UNSC level. China's discourse on Libya doesn't directly link the ongoing instability to the Western intervention, this is not necessary as it is clearly evident to observers. Instead China's language at UN level debates continually its scepticism of R2P led interventions, demonstrating Beijing's view that military intervention leads to instability thus strengthening its position in the UNSC against authorising future R2P led interventions. China's UN level discourse uses the continued Libyan instability as an effective

⁵⁶ 'Statement by Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Security Council Briefing on the Impact on the Sahel Region Caused by Libyan Conflict' 26/01/12, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t930690.htm>

⁵⁷ 'Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Li Baodong after Adoption of Security Council Resolution on Libya' 17/03/11, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhggywj/smhwj/2011new/t807544.htm>

⁵⁸ 'Statement by Ambassador WU Haitao at the Security Council Briefing on Libya' 19/04/17, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t1458981.htm> And 'Statement by Minister-Counsellor SHEN Bo at the Security Council Debate on Libya' 16/11/2017, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t1515162.htm>

argument against authorising R2P mandated missions, as well as Western interventionist thinking. China is deeply concerned by the West particularly the USA's interference in global affairs, Chinese discourse demonstrates that for Beijing the Libyan failure provides a useful tool against Western hegemony.

A clear example of Chinese thinking on Libya and R2P is found in the discourse surrounding reports that NATO airstrikes had killed civilians. China chooses to stress reports that NATO actions during the intervention resulted in civilian casualties and urges the UNSC to 'draw lessons from the way the Libyan issue was addressed'.⁵⁹ China promotes the idea that the UNSC bears responsibility for civilian deaths as a result of mandating NATO action, arguing that 'The Security Council has the right and obligation to know the truth'.⁶⁰ Chinese discourse attempts to frame the debate on R2P in the UNSC in line with Beijing's own views, that the concept and the use of force are negative. Moreover, China moves to frame future debates on R2P, by stressing that it is the UNSC that is ultimately responsible for the civilian casualties. China argues that the UNSC and must bear this in mind when debating future potential mandates for intervention under R2P. The ramifications for R2P and future votes are clear, China remains sceptical and attempts to frame the R2P debate in terms of the negative consequences as well as the responsibility of the UNSC.

As do documents from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, documents published by the permanent representation at the UN strongly promote the role of regional actors. The difference being that at the UN level China acknowledges that the European Union is a regional actor with a vested interest in the situation in Libya.⁶¹ The importance of this continuing trend in Chinese discourse on R2P, is that the regional framing of Libya is an attempt to limit the involvement of the West, particularly the USA in global affairs. However, in this case China's acknowledgement of the European Union's interest in Libya demonstrates a move beyond the traditional anti-Western intervention position. Previously China took the position that the only concerned parties in Libya are Libya itself, the AU, Arab League, Islamic Conference Organization as well as the UN. Taking the position that the West should indeed play a role, but specifying the EU, demonstrates that China is not concerned with European involvement but directly attempts to exclude the USA from Libya. In terms of what this means for R2P, this is not to say that China is in favour of Western-led interventions as long as they exclude the USA. China continues its scepticism of R2P, which serves to demonstrate as to how important to China limiting the US role in global affairs is. This reflects how Chinese discourse on R2P has been shaped by its greater foreign policy of checking US hegemony, through limiting Washington's role in global affairs.

Brief Summary

In analysing Chinese discourse on R2P through documents from both the Chinese Foreign Ministry as well as the Permanent representation at the UN, various trends emerge. The primary observation of the analysis has been that the case of Libya has not altered Chinese thinking on R2P. China demonstrates consistency in its scepticism of the third pillar of R2P that allows for military interventions. In the case of Libya China has continually argued for the strong role of both the United

⁵⁹ 'Statement by Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Security Council Briefing on the Libyan Issue' 07/03/12, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t930694.htm>

⁶⁰ 'Remarks by Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the UN, at the International Criminal Court Briefing on the Situation in Libya' 16/05/12, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t934150.htm>

⁶¹ 'Statement by Ambassador WU Haitao at the Security Council Briefing on Libya' 17/01/18, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t1533671.htm>

Nations as the main mediator and the involvement of regional actors in combating Libyan instability. While China has maintained throughout the Libyan conflict a consistent position on R2P, one way in which the Libya case has affected Chinese discourse on R2P is that Beijing has become more vocal in linking Western interventions to the instability that follows. Overall Chinese discourse on R2P reveals that Beijing's thinking on the concept is guided by its larger foreign policy concerns. Namely that R2P mandated Western-led interventions are a tool in which the USA attempts to maintain a position as a global hegemon. For this reason China seeks to maintain debates on R2P exclusively at the UN level and frame discussions in the UNSC in line with their own scepticism of the principle.

5. Analysis Chapter 2 – Russia

This chapter will focus on analysing the Russian discourse on Libya, the data sources being The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Russian Permanent Representation to the United Nations. The structure of this chapter will be, firstly a brief section justifying the choice to study Russia. This will be followed by the analysis of the data, firstly from the Foreign Ministry and secondly from Russia at the UN. These sections will systematically analyse the documents, divided into parts each addressing the dominant themes in Russian discourse. The Final section will provide a brief summary of the findings that will be further addressed in the final chapter and conclusion. This chapter's structure will provide a systematic and clear analysis of the data in order to effectively answer the research question.

The choice of Russia in conducting a discourse analysis on the effects of the Libya case on R2P is similar to the choice of China, there are however differences. Firstly like China, Russia has been traditionally sceptical of the concept of R2P. Secondly like China, Russia represents a non-Western understanding of the concept. Finally in a manner somewhat similar to China, Russia represents a strand of thinking in global affairs, not only on R2P, that is distinct from the prevailing Western narrative. Like China, Russia endorsed R2P at the 2005 world summit it has however remained continually sceptical of both R2P and humanitarian intervention, indeed Russia largely does not differentiate between the two.⁶² Again as with China, Russia did not veto UNSC Resolution 1973 instead abstaining while stating their misgivings about the use of force and the precedent set by the resolution.⁶³ For Russia, like China, addressing the effects of Libya on its relationship to R2P is useful for understanding the future of the concept. Moreover, again as with China, the study of Russia presents an opportunity to remedy the over reliance on Western thinking on R2P. Moreover Russia is not a passively non-Western actor, but indeed promotes itself as a leading alternative to a Western-led global order, which will be addressed in the analysis.⁶⁴ As part of Moscow's aim, its relationship to R2P plays a role, Russia's scepticism can be seen as part of its anti-Western global policy, R2P being a distinctly Western concept. Therefore the analysis of Russian discourse will provide insight into how both Libya has affected R2P for Russia and the effect of this on the concept.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

This section is structured around firstly, a part outlining the differences to Chinese discourse regarding themes of the role of the UN, the role of regional actors, and state sovereignty. The next part addresses Russia's much more vocal and direct discourse on NATO in Libya, analysing systematically the three main points of critique. Firstly, reports of civilian casualties in NATO strikes, secondly directly accusing NATO of responsibility for Libya's current crisis, and finally arguing that NATO deliberate pursued regime change. Subsequently a section addresses the changes in Foreign Ministry discourse over the period.

In some regards the Russian discourse on R2P in Libya bears external similarities to that of China. Russian discourse on Libya, in a similar manner to that of China, serves to demonstrate Moscow's

⁶² Kuhrt, Natasha. 'Russia, the Responsibility to Protect and Intervention' In: Fiott D., Koops J. (eds) *The Responsibility to Protect and the Third Pillar*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, (2015)

⁶³ Vitaly Churkin in 'Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions' Security Council Meeting Coverage, March 17th 2011. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>

⁶⁴ Bobo Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, Brookings Institution Press, (2015)

continued scepticism of the principle of R2P.⁶⁵ Similar to China, Russia repeatedly stresses its strong commitment to Libya's 'sovereignty' alongside Moscow anti-interventionist standpoint.⁶⁶ Exploring the subtext of Russia's stated opposition to interventions it is clear that the target of Moscow's scepticism is the West. Russia obviously does not draw parallels between NATO intervention in Libya and Russian intervention in Crimea and Ukraine. Syria, however, presents a different case. Not only does Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict not contravene its commitment to state sovereignty, its presence sanctioned by Damascus, Moscow actively uses the Libya case in justifying action in Syria.⁶⁷ Moreover, in a similar vein to China, Russian discourse promotes both the importance of UN leadership in resolving the Libya crisis as well as the role of regional actors.⁶⁸ As with China, Russia's promotion of UN supremacy when it comes to interventions stems from the fact that it is an arena in which Russia maintains equality with the West due to the veto power. However while Russian motivations for promoting the UN's role may be similar to China's the extent to which it features in Russia discourse is not. Promotion of the UN's role features much less in Russian discourse on Libya compared to China, the same is true for the role of regional actors. Indeed, the only regional actor mentioned by Russia is the African Union, and even that is limited. Russian discourse therefore while stressing Moscow's continued scepticism of R2P, unlike China does not attempt to frame the Libya crisis as a purely regional affair nor a matter to be dealt with solely at the UN level. In terms what this means for R2P, the Libyan conflict has not dampened Russia's scepticism of the concept, indeed Libya has led to a more vocal opposition to R2P in Russian discourse as will subsequently be addressed.

The primary difference between Russian and Chinese discourse on Libya and R2P lies in Moscow's much more vocal opposition to the NATO actions. While Russia and China share scepticism of R2P and an aversion to the use of force by the West in Libya, Russian discourse demonstrates that Moscow does not shy away from directly linking the failings in Libya to NATO action. Russian discourse on Libya focus on repeating three main points of critique, firstly the stressing of reports of civilian casualties in NATO airstrikes, secondly the narrative that Russia had warned that an intervention would end in failure and finally that NATO used humanitarianism as cover for regime change in Libya.

Russia devotes much more attention to allegations that NATO strikes resulted in civilian casualties, as well as directly attributing blame to NATO.⁶⁹ Moreover, Russia uses these reports to outright accuse

⁶⁵ 'Statement by Russian MFA Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich on the Situation around Libya' 20/03/11, Accessed 14/01/19. http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/214622

⁶⁶ 'Statement of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 20/08/11, Accessed 14/01/19. http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/197394

⁶⁷ 'Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks and replies to media questions at the Rome Med 2018 - Mediterranean Dialogues' 23/11/18, Accessed 14/01/19.

http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/3419721

⁶⁸ 'Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Speaks to Libyan Prime Minister Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi by Telephone' 26/05/11, Accessed 14/01/19. http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/205404 AND 'Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Meets with Abdelati Obeidi, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of Libya' 20/07/11, accessed 14/01/19. http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/199598

⁶⁹ 'Statement by Russian Foreign Ministry Ombudsman for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law Konstantin Dolgov Regarding the Developments in Libya' 11/08/11, Accessed 14/01/19

http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/197402 And, 'Statement by Russian Foreign Ministry Ombudsman for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law Konstantin Dolgov on Libya' 20/05/11, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/205662

NATO of violating the UNSC mandate.⁷⁰ In terms of what this means for the concept of R2P, Russia much more so that China is attempting to frame the debate on interventions in terms of the damage caused to the receiving nation. Russia clearly and directly uses reports of civilian casualties to discredit the ‘humanitarian’ notions of Western interventions, much more so than China’s more nuanced approach.

Additionally Russian discourse repeatedly blames NATO action for the current instability stating that ‘Libya's deep political and military crisis [...] originated from NATO military intervention in the internal affairs of this country’.⁷¹ This directness is remarkable in itself and demonstrates the degree to which Moscow’s tone is more accusatory and aggressive compared to Beijing’s.⁷² Furthermore, throughout Russian discourse on Libya, Moscow adopts a tone of, put simply ‘I told you this would happen’. As well as directly blaming Libya’s current disorder on NATO, Moscow openly states that it had forewarned of this outcome; ‘We anticipated such a development of events in 2011’.⁷³ Regarding the concept of R2P, Libya’s instability has allowed Russia to strengthen its scepticism. Framing NATO as responsible for the ongoing crisis again demonstrates how Libya has in effect provided evidence for Moscow’s anti-Western intervention position. This argument is further strengthened by stating that NATO ignored Russia’s advanced warning of the outcome, in effect proving Moscow correct, providing more evidence to attack R2P and the West.

The final main point of critique present in Russian discourse on Libya is the claim made openly by Moscow that the motive of NATO was in fact regime change. Russia argues that NATO was not pursuing a humanitarian agenda in Libya, but instead the Western powers deliberately, ‘aimed at deposing the Gaddafi regime and the forceful "democratisation" of the country’.⁷⁴ Russia even goes as far as to state that, ‘Muammar Qaddafi was murdered - I cannot find another word - by those who grossly violated the Security Council resolution about no-fly zone’.⁷⁵ Again Russia takes a very accusatory tone in discussing the Western intervention, directly stating that Western virtue signalling is in fact empty rhetoric to cover underlying geopolitical aims. In terms of what this means for R2P, this tone demonstrates strong opposition to Western interventions in Russian discourse. Moreover the argument that humanitarian justifications were a smokescreen for regime change in Libya, allows Russia to frame the debate on R2P as cover for Western geopolitical manoeuvring.

In terms of tracking the changes in Russian discourse on Libya, there is clear evidence of a shift in 2014 as a result of external events affecting the Russia-West relations. While throughout the period Russia has consistently maintained a sceptical position on R2P and the mission in Libya, 2014 saw a clear intensification of Russian criticism of NATO actions. With this it is possible to observe how in 2014 the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s deepening role in the Syrian conflict directly affected Moscow’s

⁷⁰ ‘Russian MFA Press and Information Department Comments Regarding Russia’s Proposal for Investigation of Civilian Deaths during NATO Operation in Libya’ 23/12/11, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/176418

⁷¹ ‘Comment by the Information and Press Department on developments in Libya’ 18/01/15, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/916785

⁷² ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s opening remarks during talks with Patriarch John X Yazigi of Antioch and All the East’ 05/12/17, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/2979012

⁷³ ‘Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister’ 06/03/14, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/71914

⁷⁴ ‘Libya update’ 25/08/2014, Accessed 15/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/673226

⁷⁵ ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’ remarks and answers to media questions during the Rome MED: Mediterranean Dialogues international conference’ 01/12/17, Accessed 15/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/2973946

rhetoric on Libya. This trend has continued throughout the years since 2014, in the period 2017 to the present day the rhetoric has again hardened in accordance with declining Russia-West relations. Indeed in December 2017 Russia went as far as to implicate NATO in reports of migrant slavery auctions taking place in Libya stating, ‘It is deeply regrettable that some members of the Security Council do not acknowledge their responsibility’.⁷⁶ In terms of the effects on R2P, these changes serve to demonstrate how R2P is framed by Russia as a distinctly Western concept and how the failings in Libya can be and indeed are used to discredit the West. Tracking changes in Russian discourse also reveals that the Libya case has had a profoundly negative affect for R2P in Russian discourse, both deepening Moscow’s scepticism of the concept and providing rich evidence of its shortcomings in action.

Permanent Representation of Russia at the United Nations

This section is structured into four main parts, the first briefly addressing the difference in tone between Russian UN level discourse and both the Russian Foreign Ministry as well as China as a whole. The next two parts systematically analyse the two main overarching narratives present in Russian discourse at the UN level. Firstly, that NATO overstepped the UN mandate including excessive use of force, and secondly that in Libya the true motivation of the West was regime change. The final part addresses the changes in Russia’s UN level discourse.

At the UN level the tone of Russian discourse is even more confrontational and open in its criticism, than that coming from both Chinese sources as well as the Russian Foreign Ministry itself. This increased harshness in tone can be attributed to the venue of the UN, where political grandstanding is relatively commonplace. This is also as a result of the nature of the sources available from the Russian representation at the UN, being speeches and public statements made to both the UNSC and the UN General Assembly. The two major narratives in Russian UN discourse on Libya and the effect on R2P will now be addressed.

The first strand of criticism present in the Russian statements regarding Libya focuses on the charge that NATO deliberately and consistently went beyond the UN mandate.⁷⁷ Vladimir Putin himself in his address to the UNGA attributes the ‘destruction’ of the Libyan State directly to NATO’s ‘gross violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973’.⁷⁸ Moreover, Moscow repeatedly stresses reports that NATO strikes were responsible for the deaths of Libyan civilians.⁷⁹ What is notable is just how confrontational Russian wording of its statements on the civilian casualties reports are, arguing that, ‘NATO countries arrogantly refused to address this issue altogether [sic]’.⁸⁰ Russia routinely highlights these reports in the years after the intervention, repeatedly stating that the UNSC should be aware of the reports. Russia even goes as far as to criticise the ICC itself for not investigating

⁷⁶ ‘Comment by the Information and Press Department regarding the statement of the President of the United Nations Security Council’ 08/12/19, Accessed 15/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/2983567

⁷⁷ ‘Statement by Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations At the Security Council Briefing in Connection with the Consideration of the Report of the ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on the Investigation of the Situation in Libya’ 04/05/11, accessed 16/01/19 http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_libya

⁷⁸ ‘Statement by H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, at the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York’ 28/09/15, accessed 16/01/19 <http://russiaun.ru/en/news/vladimirputin70thsession>

⁷⁹ ‘Statement by H.E. Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, at the Security Council Meeting on the explanation of vote on the draft resolution on the referral of the situation in Syria to the ICC’ 22/05/14, accessed 16/01/19 http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_syr22

⁸⁰ Ibid Churkin, (2014)

thoroughly enough the reports.⁸¹ It is clear that Russia is using both these points of criticism to push the debate at the UN level against the Libya intervention and thus against R2P. Russia consistently attempts to associate R2P and humanitarian interventions with contraventions of International Law and the UN Charter as well as more vividly with the death of Libyan civilians. Russia, in a much more direct manner than China, consistently frames the discussion on R2P as negative in order to influence future debates on the concept.

The second overarching narrative in Russian UN level statements is that the real motivations of the NATO interveners was in bringing about regime change in Libya. With this frequent criticism, Russia on many occasions draws a parallel between Libya and Iraq, highlighting the similar fates of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gadhafi.⁸² While Russia's rhetoric differs across time, variously describing the Iraq invasion as 'dubious' as well as 'criminal', the comparison is a constant in Russian discourse.⁸³ The choice of this comparison is clear, the toxic legacy of the 2003 Iraq invasion is extremely damaging to both the US and the UK within the UNSC. The legality as well as the long term effects of Iraq severely limit the attractiveness of military interventions. Moreover, the Iraq comparison allows Russia to demonstrate effectively that Western humanitarian aims are mere rhetoric. Russia effectively and repeatedly links the Libya intervention to Iraq in a long line of failed Western interventions carried out under false pretences, thus tarnishing the principle of R2P with Iraq's toxic legacy. This comparison largely made during debates on Syria.⁸⁴ Indeed, Russia openly states that it is 'seeking to protect' Bashar al-Assad from suffering a similar fate to Gaddafi at the hands of the West who 'abused' Resolution 1973.⁸⁵ Furthermore it is in Syria debates that the most aggressive and theatrical rhetoric is deployed by Russia, going as far as to suggest that the US is 'unworthy of its status as a permanent member'.⁸⁶ In terms of what this means for R2P as a concept, in the UN arena Russia has stepped up its attempts to discredit Western interventions by dismissing them as cover for regime change, tying them to the poisonous legacy of Iraq. The effects of this on debates on R2P can already be observed in votes on Syria. Therefore it is possible to conclude that at the UN level, the Libyan case has been used effectively by Russia to discredit R2P and moreover, that this tactic has been largely a success.

In tracking changes across the timeframe since the Libya intervention, Russian discourse at the UN level largely mirrors that of the Foreign Ministry. As with the Foreign Ministry while Russia's consistent scepticism of R2P is reflected, the rhetoric becomes increasing hostile in 2014 as a result of

⁸¹ Ibid Churkin, (2014)

⁸² 'Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks at a joint news conference with US Secretary of State John Kerry and UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura' 18/12/15, accessed 16/01/19 http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_prcf

⁸³ 'Statement by Ambassador Vassily A. Nebenzia, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, at the Security Council after the vote on the American draft resolution on the Joint Investigation Mechanism mandate in Syria' 17/11/17, accessed 16/01/19 <http://russiaun.ru/en/news/jim21116> And: 'Statement by Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, during the Security Council meeting on the situation in Syria' 25/09/16, accessed 16/01/19 http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_salp

⁸⁴ 'Remarks to the press by Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, following the UN Security Council consultations on humanitarian situation in Syria' 10/02/16, accessed 16/01/19 http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_prcf

⁸⁵ 'Interview by Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, for "Der Spiegel" magazine' 12/01/17, accessed 16/01/19 http://russiaun.ru/en/news/int_ch_sp

⁸⁶ 'Statement by Ambassador Vassily A. Nebenzia, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, at the Security Council meeting on threats to international peace and security (the situation in Syria)' 13/04/18, accessed 16/01/19 <http://russiaun.ru/en/news/syr130418>

the Ukraine crisis. This trend continues through the present day amid continuing bad relations between Russia and the West. This is especially visible as a result of worsening relations over the deepening of the Syria conflict, especially due to the significance of Syria to the UNSC. Moreover, the very nature of the UNSC as a public arena reflects the increasing hostility of statements over time, as conflicts like Ukraine and Syria lend themselves well to political grandstanding. It can be clearly observed that Russia's distrust of R2P increases in the aftermath of the Libyan intervention, as well as providing more firepower to public attacks on the West as a result of its clearly evident failings.

Brief Summary

In analysing Russian discourse on R2P through data from the Foreign Ministry and Representation to the UN, the main theme exposed has been Russia's much more aggressive and direct hostility. Russia has zeroed in its criticism of the Libya mission in three main ways. Firstly, Russia has consistently highlighted reports of NATO strikes causing civilian casualties in order to discredit the mission. Secondly, that NATO overstepped the UN mandate and bears direct responsibility for the current chaos in Libya. Finally, that the NATO powers were in fact deliberately pursuing regime change in Libya. In tracking changes across the time period, the intensity of Russian discourse on Libya mirrors Russia-West relations as a whole. Moreover, it has been demonstrated by the analysis that, as for China, Russia's relationship with R2P and Libya is a part of its broader relationship with the West, as will be further explored in the discussion chapter.

6. Discussion and Conclusions

This chapter will function as a discussion and conclusion chapter, bringing together the findings of chapter one and two's respective critical discourse analyses. The purpose of this will be to provide a coherent and systematic summary of the findings in order to establish a clear answer to the research question. The structure of this chapter will be as follows, the first section will address how the findings of the discourse analysis are part of China and Russia's larger foreign policy aims, exploring the motivations of their thinking on R2P. This part will commence with China, move to Russia and then finish by addressing the similarities in Russian and Chinese aims on R2P but the differences in the underlying reasons why. The second section of this chapter will address what the results of the analysis mean for the principle of R2P. This will be demonstrated through looking at the significance of Libya to Russia and China as a test case for R2P. Subsequently the effects of this will be shown in observing the subsequent UNSC votes on Syria. The final part will conclude, demonstrating how the analysis comes together to answer the research question addressed in the thesis.

R2P discourses as part of Broader Policy

Through the analysis of Chinese discourse on Libya it has been made clear that Beijing's thinking on R2P, exists as a part of its foreign policy aims regarding its relationship with the West. China has in more recent years become increasingly assertive in pursuing its own territorial concerns, most obviously in the South China Sea.⁸⁷ How this has influenced thinking on R2P is that by framing Libya as a regional issue requiring a regional response, China tries to exclude non-regional actors from playing a role in Libya. China is therefore attempting to de-legitimise US involvement in affairs outside Washington's 'region'. The areas of concern for China being; the South China Sea, Taiwan and to a lesser extent the Korean Peninsula. This demonstrates how for China its relationship to R2P is heavily influenced by its own territorial ambitions, as R2P could potentially allow for future US involvement in China's near abroad, Beijing will maintain its sceptical position. Furthermore, China's consistent commitment to maintain discussions on R2P within the confines of the UN, demonstrates again how its relationship with the West guides its thinking on R2P. The equality of China and the West in the UNSC allows Beijing to maintain a say on the application of the principle. Therefore, for China it is important to promote the supremacy of the UN in decision making on R2P, unilateral missions carried out by the West are deeply alarming to Beijing. Moreover, in the UNSC China can both veto future applications but also continue to shape the debate on R2P in its favour. This has been demonstrated through China's voting pattern regarding UNSC Resolutions on Syria, where it has used the veto four times.⁸⁸ As well as the intervention's failure to bring peace and stability, it has been made clear that the underlying China's policy towards the West combine to demonstrate that the Libya case has not altered Beijing's opposition to R2P.

As with China, the analysis has shown clearly that the Russian relationship to R2P is heavily linked to Moscow's policy regarding itself within global order. While much has been written on to what degree Russia has pursued the goal of re-establishing itself as a global power, this debate is not relevant to this thesis, but what is clear is that Russia does position itself as an alternative to prevailing western led world order.⁸⁹ For Russia, R2P is very much a product of a Western dominated global system therefore Russia's opposition to the principle is guided by Moscow's goal of limiting this world order.

⁸⁷ Sendil Murugesan, 'New perspectives on China's foreign and trade policy' *Asian Journal of German and European Studies* 3, no.12 (2018): 3.

⁸⁸ Ibid Murugesan (2018)

⁸⁹ See Trenin (2006), Rywkin (2008) And Lo (2015)

The Libya case presents a clear picture of Russian hostility to the principle of R2P. This has been further demonstrated by tracking the changes in Russian discourse over the period, as Russia-West relations have declined, the hostility towards R2P increased. Furthermore, it can be observed in how Russia has made use of the Libya case over time, again as relations with the West declined, using Libya as an example of damaging Western interference has increased. Moreover, the intensity of criticism is part of Russia's policy of establishing itself as an alternative. Russia, in order to present itself as a distinct pole of attraction in a multipolar system must demonstrate its credibility as such. Russia achieves this especially through the use of statements arguing that it had warned the West that instability would be the outcome of an intervention. Moreover, this allows Russia justifies the fact that it did not veto UN 1973, demonstrating that the warnings it gave at the time were ignored and the consequences severe for Libya. These severe consequences, the ongoing instability in Libya have in effect strengthened Russia's aim of establishing itself as a credible alternative to the West, by providing clear evidence of Western failings in the face of Russian warnings.

In terms of the principle of R2P, Russia and China together share a similar goal, however they have gone about achieving this through different ways and for different underlying reasons. They do present a common front in their opposition to R2P, the goal being that they both seek to limit R2P led interventions to limit the Western led global order. For China, ensuring that it maintains equality to the West at the UN and protecting its own regional concerns. For Russia, as part of its goals of limiting Western hegemony and presenting itself as a viable alternative pole of attraction. The effect of the Libya case for this goal has been in its failure, providing both Russia and China with good evidence to further these respective goals, as has been demonstrated in the discourse. Having observed this effect the next part will explore what this means for the principle of R2P.

Results for R2P

That neither Russia nor China made use of its veto power to block the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973 demonstrates that for both states the fate of Libya itself mattered relative little other than as a test case for R2P. Both states however in explaining their abstentions highlighted that their concerns remained unanswered. This allowed them to demonstrate their willingness to be convinced of the merits of R2P, while not being committed to supporting the intervention, should it as they argued, fail to achieve its aim of stability in Libya. In effect Libya was a test case for both Russia and China to gain the evidence needed to justify their scepticism of the principle. The findings of the analysis clearly demonstrate that Libya has provided the evidence needed, and that Russia and China have subsequently made effective use of this. The Libya case provides stronger evidence than Iraq 2003. Libya can be regarded as a textbook example for R2P in action, the intervention was not unilateral and its mandate issued by the correct channel, the UNSC. Yet as was the case in Iraq, the Libya intervention has ended in an abject failure. However, as demonstrated in analysing the Russian discourse, tying Libya to Iraq as part of a long line of the West conducting regime change, is an effective strategy to damage R2P. Indeed arguing that the motivations of NATO in Libya were not humanitarian but part of geopolitical manoeuvring has been convincingly made by Russia. Furthermore the comparatively simple argument that interventions, even those carried out for ostensibly humanitarian reasons result in increased instability in the target state has been effective. The clear negative outcome of the Libya case has been used by both Russia and China to argue against interventions, for example both the continuing violence in Libya as well as reports that NATO strikes killed civilians. Indeed Russia has gone as far as to link reported occurrences of human slavery to highlight the negative outcomes of interventions. In terms of how this contributes to answer the research question, the two respective discourses have made use of the Libya failures to fault the

principle of R2P. The results of both Russia and China's use of the Libya case can be observed in subsequent votes in the UNSC on Syria which will now be addressed.

The findings of the discourse analysis on Russia and China demonstrate clearly that Libya provided an opportunity to observe the negative results of R2P in action and therefore justify their respective opposition to the principle. The results of the Libya intervention on the standing R2P can be observed in the outcomes of subsequent UNSC Resolution debates on Syria. The twelve UNSC resolutions concerning the Syrian civil war that have been vetoed, Russia all and China six, serve to demonstrate this affect. While Russian voting is also motivated by the desire to protect its ally, it has however made explicit references to the outcome of the Libya intervention in justifying its voting record.⁹⁰ For China, its voting is primarily motivated by principle, however the Libya case has had an effect on this, reinforcing China's commitment to the principle of non-intervention. It has therefore been comprehensively demonstrated that the effect of using Libya as a test case for R2P, has both validated Russian and Chinese opposition and significantly damaged the standing of the principle internationally.

In comparison to the existing literature debates on R2P, the findings of this thesis largely fit with arguments of the more nuanced third group of authors in the first debate, as outlined in the Literature review. Moreover, the findings have also expanded upon the literature that does engage with the non-West through focusing on Russia and China. The analysis has demonstrated, through exploring their respective thinking on R2P that the principle is neither fatally damaged nor enjoying renewed support. It has been comprehensively demonstrated that Libya has directly contributed to the current UNSC 'deadlock' over R2P, confirming the argument of Morris as well as Brockmeier, Stuenkel & Tourinho. Moreover, the findings have also confirmed Paris' statement that R2P is not dead but seems 'fated to flounder'. Indeed, the research shows that the failure in Libya has limited the attraction of R2P, confirming Russia and China's longstanding opposition.

Conclusion

In answering the question of how the Libya intervention has affected R2P through exploring the discourses of Russia and China, the analysis has provided a clear set of findings. It has been demonstrated that the Libya case has resulted in both China and Russia maintaining their opposition to R2P. Moreover, the Libya case has provided a good example for both Russia and China to justify their continued antipathy towards R2P. Indeed the research has shown that both Russia and China have made use of this, although to differing extents. The research has also demonstrated how China and Russia's relationship to R2P exists as part of their broader concerns, and how Libya has been used to further these agendas. However, while Russia and China's motivating reasons behind their opposition to R2P may be different, this matters little to the question of what has been the affect. It has been demonstrated that both Russia and China are united by their opposition, despite different underlying reasons, it is the strength of this combined opposition that will limit future applications of R2P. Again despite the different motivations for limiting R2P between Russia and China, the failings of the Libya case provide equal evidence for both parties. The results of how Russia and China use the Libya case have been demonstrated in the subsequent Syria debates. Showing how the Libya case has had an overall negative affect on the principle of R2P, aided by both Russia and China's discourses.

However, while the research has demonstrated that Libya has had an overall negative outcome for R2P, this is not to say that R2P is dead. This would be a step too far that indeed ignores how elements

⁹⁰ 'Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria's Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China' UNSC 04/10/11
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10403.doc.htm>

of the principle have been used in UNSC resolutions in both Côte d'Ivoire and the CAR since Libya. Indeed Russia and China themselves are not opposed to the principle in its entirety, it is only the third pillar allowing for military interventions against the wishes of the target state that they take issue with. Therefore to claim that R2P has had its day is short-sighted, indeed future resolutions that do not threaten Russian and Chinese global interests are likely to enjoy their support. The lasting effect of the Libya intervention is that through empowering Russian and Chinese scepticism this is likely to embolden the remaining members of the BRICS in their own opposition to the controversial elements of the principle.

7. Final Remarks

Although the choice was made to specifically focus on Russia and China's relationship to R2P in order to provide in depth research within the limitations of the thesis, further research on a broader selection of states is a potential future project. Conducting a discourse analysis into all five of the BRICS's relationships to R2P as a result of Libya would provide a useful and more comprehensive insight into non-Western thinking on the principle post-Libya. While the length of the study would have to be increased this would subsequently allow the project expand the depth of research into each respective state. Each of the BRICS forming the basis of a chapter would allow for a much deeper comparative discourse analysis to be conducted.

Bibliography

1. Averre, Derek and Lance Davies. 'Russia, humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: the case of Syria,' *International Affairs* 91, no. 4 (2015): 813-834
2. Baranovsky, Vladimir and Anatoly Mateiko. 'Responsibility to Protect: Russia's Approaches,' *The International Spectator* 51, no. 2 (2016): 49-69.
3. Bellamy, Alex and Paul D. Williams. 'The New Politics of Protection? Cote d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,' *International Affairs*, 87, no. 4 (2011): 825–850.
4. Bellamy, Alex J. "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm." *Ethics & International Affairs* 25, no. 3 (2011): 263-69.
5. Blommaert, Jan and Chris Bulcaen. 'Critical Discourse Analysis' *Annual Review of Anthropology* 29, no. 1 (2000): 447-466.
6. Brockmeier, Sarah, Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho. 'The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection,' *Global Society* 30, no. 1 (2016): 113-133.
7. Chen, Zheng. 'China and the responsibility to protect,' *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, no. 101 (2016): 686-700.
8. Chandler David The responsibility to protect? Imposing the 'Liberal Peace', *International Peacekeeping*, 11, no.1 (2004): 59-81.
9. Daalder, Ivo H., and James G. Stavridis. "NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 2 (2012): 2-7.
10. Daalder, Ivo H and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
11. Fung, Courtney J. 'China and the Responsibility to Protect: From Opposition to Advocacy,' *United States Institute of Peace* (2016)
12. Igwe, Stanley C. 'An Assessment of the Motivations for the 2011 Nato Intervention in Libya and Its Implications for Africa,' *Canadian Social Science* 13, No. 4, (2017): 1-12.
13. Kuhrt, Natasha. 'Russia, the Responsibility to Protect and Intervention' In: Fiott D., Koops J. (eds) *The Responsibility to Protect and the Third Pillar*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015.
14. Laskaris, Stamatis and Joakim Kreutz. 'Rising powers and the responsibility to protect: will the norm survive in the age of BRICS?' *Global Affairs* 1, no. 2 (2015): 149-158.
15. Lo, Bobo. *Russia and the New World Disorder*, Brookings Institution Press, 2015
16. Morris, Justin. 'Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum' *International Affairs* 98, no. 5 (2013): 1265-1283.
17. Murugesan, Sendil. 'New perspectives on China's foreign and trade policy' *Asian Journal of German and European Studies* 3, no. 12 (2018).
18. Ottaway, Marina and Bethany Lacina 'International Interventions and Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s,' *SAIS Review* 23, no. 2 (2003): 71-92.
19. Paris, Roland. 'The 'Responsibility to Protect' and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention.' *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 5 (2014): 569-603.
20. Posner, Eric A. 'Outside the Law', *Foreign Policy*, (2011).
21. Roberts, Hugh. 'Who said Gadhafi had to go,' *London Review of Books* 33, no. 22 (2011): 8-18.
22. Rywkin, Michael. 'Russia: In Quest of Superpower Status,' *American Foreign Policy Interests* 30, no. 1 (2008): 13-21.
23. Snetkov, Aglaya and Marc Lanteigne, 'The Loud Dissenter and its Cautious Partner' – Russia, China, global governance and humanitarian intervention,' *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 15 no. 1 (2015): 113–146.
24. Steele, Brent and Eric A. Heinze, 'Norms of Intervention, R2P and Libya; Suggestions from Generational Analysis,' *Global Responsibility to Protect* 88 no. 6 (2014)
25. Terry, Patrick CR. "The Libya Intervention (2011): Neither Lawful, nor Successful." *The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa* 48, no. 2 (2015): 162-82.

26. Thakur, Ramesh. 'R2P after Libya and Syria: engaging emerging powers,' *The Washington Quarterly* 36, no. 2, (2013)
27. Thakur, Ramesh. 'Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from ICISS,' *Security Dialogue* 33, no. 3(2002): 323–340.
28. Tiewa, Liu. 'China and Responsibility to Protect: Maintenance and Change of Its Policy for Intervention,' *The Pacific Review* 25, no. 1 (2012): 153-173.
29. Trenin, Dimitir. 'Russia leaves the West' *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 4 (2006):87-96.
30. Williams, Paul D. 'The Road to Humanitarian War in Libya, 3 *Global Responsibility to Protect* 248 (2011): 248-259.
31. Zambakari, Christopher. 'The misguided and mismanaged intervention in Libya: Consequences for peace,' *African Security Review* 25, no 1 (2016): 44-62.

Misc.

- '2005 World Summit Outcome' United Nations General Assembly, 15/09/05
- UN Resolution 1973, UNSC, 17/03/11
- UN Resolution 1970, UNSC
- Libya Page, *Fragile States Index*. Fund for Peace. 2018
- Three Pillars of R2P 'About R2P', *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect*
- 'Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria's Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China' *United Nations Security Council*, 04/10/11
- Ki-moon, Ban. "'Responsibility to Protect' Came of Age in 2011, Secretary-General Tells Conference, Stressing Need to Prevent Conflict before It Breaks Out,' *United Nations*. (2012)

Data

- 'Speech of Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun at the International Conference on Libya' 02/09/2011, Accessed 15/12/18.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t855660.shtml
- 'China's Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue Gong Xiaosheng Attends Ministerial Meeting on the Libyan Issue' 14/12/15, Accessed 15/12/18
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t1324809.shtml
- 'Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Attends the International Conference on Libya' 02/01/11, Accessed 15/12/18
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t855661.shtml
- 'U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's Special Envoy to Libya Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib Visits China' 02/08/11, Accessed 15/13/18
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t845606.shtml
- 'Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets with Special Envoy of the Libyan Government' 08/06/11, Accessed 15/12/18
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t829460.shtml
- 'Wang Yi Expounds China's Three Basic Principles on Resolving the Libyan Issue', Accessed 15/12/18

- https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2848_663686/2850_663690/t1294314.shtml
- ‘Ambassador Deng Ying Gives An Written Interview on Croatian Well-known Magazine- "national", 29/11/16, Accessed 16/12/18
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1420122.shtml
 - ‘China-US: Duel of the Century or Partner of the Century?’ Qu Xing, 04/09/15, Accessed 16/12/18
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1254993.shtml
 - ‘Statement by Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Security Council Briefing on the Impact on the Sahel Region Caused by Libyan Conflict’ 26/01/12, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t930690.htm>
 - ‘Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Li Baodong after Adoption of Security Council Resolution on Libya’ 17/03/11, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwj/2011new/t807544.htm>
 - ‘Statement by Ambassador WU Haitao at the Security Council Briefing on Libya’ 19/04/17, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t1458981.htm>
 - ‘Statement by Minister-Counsellor SHEN Bo at the Security Council Debate on Libya’ 16/11/2017, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t1515162.htm>
 - ‘Statement by Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Security Council Briefing on the Libyan Issue’ 07/03/12, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t930694.htm>
 - ‘Remarks by Ambassador Wang Min, Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the UN, at the International Criminal Court Briefing on the Situation in Libya’ 16/05/12, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t934150.htm>
 - ‘Statement by Ambassador WU Haitao at the Security Council Briefing on Libya’ 17/01/18, Accessed 16/12/18 <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/africa/lib/t1533671.htm>
 - Vitaly Churkin in ‘Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions’ Security Council Meeting Coverage, March 17th 2011.
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>
 - ‘Statement by Russian MFA Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich on the Situation around Libya’ 20/03/11, Accessed 14/01/19. http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/214622
 - ‘Statement of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 20/08/11, Accessed 14/01/19.
http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/197394
 - ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks and replies to media questions at the Rome Med 2018 - Mediterranean Dialogues’ 23/11/18, Accessed 14/01/19.
http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/3419721
 - ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Speaks to Libyan Prime Minister Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi by Telephone’ 26/05/11, Accessed 14/01/19. http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/205404

- 'Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Meets with Abdelati Obeidi, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of Libya' 20/07/11, accessed 14/01/19. http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/199598
- 'Statement by Russian Foreign Ministry Ombudsman for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law Konstantin Dolgov Regarding the Developments in Libya' 11/08/11, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/197402
- 'Statement by Russian Foreign Ministry Ombudsman for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law Konstantin Dolgov on Libya' 20/05/11, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/205662
- 'Russian MFA Press and Information Department Comments Regarding Russia's Proposal for Investigation of Civilian Deaths during NATO Operation in Libya' 23/12/11, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/176418
- 'Comment by the Information and Press Department on developments in Libya' 18/01/15, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/916785
- 'Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's opening remarks during talks with Patriarch John X Yazigi of Antioch and All the East' 05/12/17, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/2979012
- 'Speech by the Russian Foreign Minister' 06/03/14, Accessed 14/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/71914
- 'Libya update' 25/08/2014, Accessed 15/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/673226
- 'Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov' remarks and answers to media questions during the Rome MED: Mediterranean Dialogues international conference' 01/12/17, Accessed 15/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/2973946
- 'Comment by the Information and Press Department regarding the statement of the President of the United Nations Security Council' 08/12/19, Accessed 15/01/19 http://www.mid.ru/en/maps/ly/-/asset_publisher/wcPZCnhgb1aW/content/id/2983567
- 'Statement by Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations At the Security Council Briefing in Connection with the Consideration of the Report of the ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on the Investigation of the Situation in Libya' 04/05/11, accessed 16/01/19 http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_libya
- 'Statement by H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, at the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York' 28/09/15, accessed 16/01/19 <http://russiaun.ru/en/news/vladimirputin70thsession>
- 'Statement by H.E. Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, at the Security Council Meeting on the explanation of vote on the draft resolution on the referral of the situation in Syria to the ICC' 22/05/14, accessed 16/01/19 http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_syr22
- 'Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks at a joint news conference with US Secretary of State John Kerry and UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura' 18/12/15, accessed 16/01/19 http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_prf
- 'Statement by Ambassador Vassily A. Nebenzia, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, at the Security Council after the vote on the American draft resolution on the Joint Investigation Mechanism mandate in Syria' 17/11/17, accessed 16/01/19 <http://russiaun.ru/en/news/jim21116>
- 'Statement by Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, during the Security Council meeting on the situation in Syria' 25/09/16, accessed 16/01/19 http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_salp

- 'Remarks to the press by Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, following the UN Security Council consultations on humanitarian situation in Syria' 10/02/16, accessed 16/01/19
http://russiaun.ru/en/news/sc_prof
- 'Interview by Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, for "Der Spiegel" magazine' 12/01/17, accessed 16/01/19
http://russiaun.ru/en/news/int_ch_sp
- 'Statement by Ambassador Vassily A. Nebenzia, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, at the Security Council meeting on threats to international peace and security (the situation in Syria)' 13/04/18, accessed 16/01/19
<http://russiaun.ru/en/news/syr130418>