

Power Relations and Recognition
Analyzing the Relationship Between Struggles and Mutual Recognition in Honneth's
Theory of Recognition

“The fact that millions of people share the same vices does not make these vices virtues, the fact that they share so many errors does not make the errors to be truths, and the fact that millions of people share the same forms of mental pathology does not make these people sane.” – (Fromm, 2002, p. 15)

One of the socio-political struggles in the Netherlands from the last few years is the struggle regarding Black Pete. Black Pete is a black servant of Sinterklaas, assisting him in bringing ‘kruidnoten’ and presents to the children.¹ Black Pete has the stereotypical appearance of a slave in the 1900’s: fat red lips, golden earrings, and frizzy hair. The link between the stereotypical appearance of slaves and Black Pete is, for a growing group of people, a reason to call Black Pete a racist phenomenon. Therefore, a movement has occurred in opposition to Black Pete. This movement has been met with a lot of resistance. In the first few weeks over one million people signed a petition stating that Black Pete should remain black.

If we follow Foucault’s description of conflict the problem with this struggle seems to be that the decision about the appearance of Black Pete is decided by power.² In this case the majority has the power to decide what to do with this cultural phenomenon. The majority does not think Black Pete is racist so they oppose change. Since the majority opposes change this change comes slowly, this to great dissatisfaction of those who oppose the phenomenon of Black Pete. Subsequently, this dissatisfaction leads to polarization in society. Those opposing Black Pete started claiming that those in favor of keeping Black Pete are secretly racist. This claim lead to an uproar leading to those in favor of keeping Black Pete as he is to break out in racial slurs.³

The struggle in favor of changing Black Pete’s appearance boiled down to a power struggle pitching those with different interests against each other. The same polarization appears to have happened in another struggle: the discussion of what to do with Muslim immigration. It has been a long time since the United States started their ‘War on Terror’. This ‘War on Terror’ was an important factor in destabilizing the Middle East.⁴ To me it seems that the immigration of millions of Muslims from these regions is a direct effect of this ‘War on

¹ Kruidnoten are a sugary cookie-like confectionery which gets its name from the spicy ingredients such as cinnamon, pepper, and nutmeg.

² Foucault, 1978, p. 92

³ This might not be representative for the whole opposition to Black Pete; it does however manifest itself every time these discussions are being held publicly as the Black Pete phenomenon is compared to slavery and those who celebrate Sinterklaas this way to slavers.

⁴ George Galloway was right: Destabilizing the Middle East created more terrorism, 2016

Terror', the reason for this is that the instability of a region leads to an upheaval of large portions of a population seeking a safe haven in other countries. A part of these populations sought this safe haven in Europe. While the political majority seems to be in favor of letting in immigrants a growing number of citizens has started to fear the Muslim immigrants and to oppose immigration. With the decision being a political one it is once again a decision made by the majority⁵, and since the majority is in favor of letting in the immigrants the immigration continues. In recent years, the frustration of this continuous immigration has led to an increased popularity of Geert Wilders and the PVV (Party of Freedom) and a lot of violence against immigrants. Two examples spring to mind: the first example is the attack on "snellerpoort" in my place of residence.⁶ The second example is the riots in Heidenau in Germany in which the frustration of misrecognition is explicitly mentioned.⁷

The problem with struggles like these is that they are decided by the majority. What the majority thinks is normal decides what is normal for a society. The majority however is not always right.⁸

This thesis started with a quote from Erich Fromm. Just because a large portion of a society thinks the same thing is normal does not make it normal. Superior numbers do not make you more right, and sometimes a majority can be plain wrong. This definition of 'right' heavily depends on the conception that what is right is independent of what the majority thinks is right. I will explain this further in chapter 1.3. I agree with Fromm on this analysis. The current situation is that a majority can decide what is normal for a society, even if this majority is wrong. Having a majority gives power in our democracy. But having a majority decide struggles is a risk because it may not be right. From this can be derived that power is the real problem. It is only because the majority has power that it can decide what is normal. This power is a threat to citizens who disagree with those who are in power. If citizens cannot trust the judgement of those in power they should find a way to solve struggles without relying on power. If citizens cannot find a way to solve struggles without relying on power they remain dependent on the judgement of those in power to decide what is normal irrespectively of whether or not that judgement is right.⁹

This paper wants to address this problem of struggles as power struggles. In this I define struggles as contending opposition to a claim. This means that whenever someone makes a claim with which you disagree and you oppose this claim you will be in a struggle with that actor. For this I will analyze the theory of recognition by Axel Honneth.

Before analyzing the theory of recognition by Honneth this thesis will give some context to Honneth's work. For context this thesis will look at the tradition of the Frankfurt school. It is

⁵ Many decisions in politics are done by majority vote. With this I do not intend to imply that foreign relations and pressure, or political consensus have no influence on these decisions.

⁶ Smal & Pijpker, 2015

⁷ Merkel: Gewalt gegen Asylsuchende ist beschämend, 2015

⁸ Fromm, 2002, p. 15

⁹ In this paragraph I described how power is a problem. The explanation heavily implies power as an agent-based notion of power. This thesis will not rely on this notion of power but will follow the notion of power as understood by Foucault. Chapter 3 of this thesis will explain Foucault's notion of power. In this thesis I decided to rely on an agent-based notion of power in my explanation here because it serves the purpose of explaining why power is a problem without making it too complicated.

Anderson who places Axel Honneth in the tradition of the Frankfurt school. He grounds this on the fact that the Frankfurt school focuses on analyzing and solving pathologies in society. Pathologies are those beliefs that are inherently wrong within a society. In order to solve these pathologies, the Frankfurt school seems to focus on proposing a solution that is not based on power. The tradition of the Frankfurt school, and the critical theory that followed from this tradition, will be explained in chapter 1. Honneth tries to achieve this by breaking down struggles not as struggles of power but as struggles for recognition.¹⁰ A struggle is not decided by what those with power decide to be normal but by which decision recognizes people as autonomous, individuated, and equal.¹¹ Honneth proposes to replace what is normal by decision of those with power with what is in line with mutual recognition between all citizens. The theory of recognition proposed here by Honneth has both a descriptive and normative component. Since Honneth follows in the tradition of the Frankfurt School he makes a descriptive analysis of the current situation and then follows up with a normative judgement of why this current situation is problematic. This leads him to propose an alternative to change the current situation. How Honneth's theory functions will be explained in chapter 1. By basing struggles on mutual recognition instead of power a decision will not risk being wrong because of a majority vote. This will result in less frustration and polarization than between parties that are opposing each other in a struggle of power. The theory of recognition by Axel Honneth will be discussed in chapter 2.

The theory of recognition by Honneth has been criticized many times. In the book *'Recognition and Power'* edited by Bert van den Brink and David Owen many writers claim that Honneth does not deal with power sufficiently.¹² If these criticisms are correct, and power still influences decision in the theory of recognition, the theory cannot help us solve pathologies without power struggles. It is because of these claims that this thesis will research the theory of recognition and how it deals with struggles. The research question for this paper will be: "Is it necessarily so that a struggle in the theory of recognition is a power struggle?" In this research question I understand the definition of a 'power struggle' as a struggle in which power is the main deciding factor in solving the struggle.

Honneth answers this question by saying that a struggle in the theory of recognition is not necessarily a power struggle. That would have been sufficient if no one objected to this claim made by Honneth. There are however writers who dispute this claim saying that Honneth does not sufficiently deal with power. In this paragraph I gave the example of Bert van den Brink and David Owen who think that Honneth does not deal with power sufficiently. I hold that these writers used different interpretations of the conception of power than Honneth did and in doing so gave his theory an unfavorable chance of defending itself. This thesis will contribute to the discussion by analyzing Honneth's theory at the hand of the conception of power Honneth used himself: the conception of power by Foucault.

To be able to answer this question this thesis will have to rely on a definition of power. Since Honneth uses a theory of power to come up with an answer to struggles as power struggles, it is best to have a definition that is compatible with Honneth's work. If this were not the case then Honneth would be at an unfair disadvantage since his arguments might not be suitable to

¹⁰ Anderson, 2011, p. 34

¹¹ Honneth, 1995, p. 174

¹² Brink & Owen, 2007

the understanding of power with which this thesis analyzes it. It is because of this that this paper will rely on the definition of power by Michel Foucault. The reason for this is that Axel Honneth said in the introduction to *'The struggle for Recognition'* that it were the social-theoretical insights of Foucault that led him to start his project on the theory of recognition.¹³ Honneth does not very clearly explain how Foucault's social-theoretical insights inspired him but I think it is reasonable to assume that the reason Foucault inspired Honneth is that, although Honneth agrees with the insightful analysis that power exists whenever any struggle between actors is decided, he disagrees with the fact that it is necessarily true that all relations between actors are power relations.¹⁴ This is indicated by how the theory of recognition is directed at taking away power relations in struggles by taking away the idea that struggles are dependent on conflicting interests.¹⁵ If he did not believe power is present in relations of conflicting interests he would not have tried to come up with a theory that does not rely on this relation, and if he did not believe there are other relations possible he would not have come up with the relation of mutual recognition as being excluded/devoid of power relations. It is because of these considerations that I will use the definition of power by Foucault in analyzing the theory of recognition by Axel Honneth. This definition of power will be addressed in chapter 3.

According to Foucault a power struggle is defined by one actor overpowering another in a clash of mutually exclusive conflicting interests.¹⁶ This is a reductive account of Foucault, a better explanation will be given in chapter 3. Since Foucault holds that all people ever do is struggle for their own interest a struggle is always a power struggle. According to Honneth there is a possibility of having the same interest. Honneth calls this interest the interest of mutual recognition. How this interest of mutual recognition is also a struggle will be explained in chapter 4.1. This interest of mutual recognition is an objective point which helps transcend conflict as a struggle of conflicting interests. From this follows that a struggle is not necessarily a power struggle.

To show how I came to this conclusion and answered the research question I have divided the thesis in four chapters. The first chapter will be about the tradition of critical theory by the Frankfurt school. This will help us place the theory of recognition in this tradition and understand the intentions and the method used by Honneth better. The second chapter will explain the theory of recognition by Honneth. This chapter will look at how Honneth proposes to replace a conflict of interest with mutual recognition of the other as an autonomous, individuated, and equal person. The third chapter will analyze the theory of power by Foucault. This chapter will show how according to Foucault normality is necessarily decided by power because those with power decide what is true. The last chapter will use this notion of power by Foucault to analyze whether or not a struggle for recognition is necessarily a power struggle. This thesis will show that a struggle for recognition is not necessarily a power struggle by making a distinction between three forms of struggle. A struggle for self-interest,

¹³ Honneth, 1995, p. 1

¹⁴ Foucault describes that actors are not the same as agents. Being an actor means to be part of a struggle. This will be discussed in chapter 3.

¹⁵ With this I do not mean that power is dependent on conflicting interests but that struggles are. If there are no conflicting interests there is no struggle.

¹⁶ Foucault, 1978, p. 95

a struggle for recognition and a collision. This chapter will also address the practical goals of the theory of recognition and the necessity of focusing on bonds of trust. Since Honneth follows in the tradition of the critical theory his goal is also to change society in order to address pathologies. This will be explained more in chapter 1. Since changing society in a practical sense is also a goal by Honneth I will argue the importance of trust in the theory of recognition in order to sustain and nurture relations of mutual recognition.

In the conclusion, this thesis will look back at this introduction and see how the research question has been answered in this thesis.

1. The tradition of Critical Theory

This thesis will aim to answer the question whether or not a struggle in the theory of recognition is a power struggle. To better situate this analysis, this thesis will look at the tradition in which the theory of recognition is founded: that of the Frankfurt school. This chapter will be divided into four parts. First it will start off with a historical background of the Frankfurt school and secondly, it will follow up with the goals of this tradition and its relation to power. The third part will discuss the methodology of critical theory with which this tradition tries to achieve those goals, and the fourth part will discuss the situations of respectively Honneth and Foucault in this tradition.

1.1

The tradition of critical theory finds its roots in the Frankfurt school. To understand the tradition of critical theory this thesis will rely on the concise description of the history and goals of critical theory by Anderson. Anderson divided the Frankfurt school into three distinct generations. The first generation started in the institute for social research in Frankfurt am Main. Here a group started out with a distinct approach to social theory through social inquiry. Anderson describes the intention of the tradition as; to make clear how ideology blinded people from perceiving the world as something other than what was perceived as normal.¹⁷ According to Anderson people used to believe that culture progressed in the same manner everywhere, which led to the opinion that cultural and ideological beliefs of what is right and wrong were taken to be an objective judgement.¹⁸ This assumption of an objective ideology blinded people to perceiving the world as possibly being different. It was after people realized that culture did not progress in the same manner everywhere that they realized that cultural and ideological beliefs are subjective. According to Anderson, the tradition of critical theory sought to analyze what was wrong with what was thought to be normal according to culture and ideology and change these pathologies.¹⁹

Even after the discovery that ideologies are not objective a large remainder of the population still believed that they were. I think this is the reason why the Frankfurt school did not try to change the pathologies in a society with the proposition of an ideology of their own. If they

¹⁷ Anderson, 2011, p. 32

¹⁸ This thesis uses the definition of culture by Foucault as a consolidated web of truths. This is further explained in chapter 3.2

¹⁹ Anderson, 2011, p. 33

had done that they would have risked forming different pathologies which no one could challenge. To me this makes clear why the Frankfurt school came up with the tradition of critical theory. Anderson describes critical theory as seeking a method of criticizing society on the basis of social inquiries by taking the subjective experiences of citizens as a starting point rather than rational theories.²⁰

The first generation ended with the Nazi's shutting down the institute in 1933 and exiling the remaining members across the world: mainly to Columbia University in New York. It is from here that the second and third generation took over. Anderson describes the aim, especially of the third generation, to focus on the struggles of a society and on how culture and ideology force a specific outcome.²¹

It is in this third wave that Anderson situates Honneth. Anderson bases this on Honneth's focus of changing pathologies in a society by reframing the subjective relation of people to their social world.²² My understanding of this is that Honneth tries to state how the social world should be based on a bond of mutual recognition between those actors that live in this social world. This makes culture dependent on what people perceive as mutual recognition.

1.2

The tradition of critical theory has various uniting areas of focus. According to Anderson, these include: the concern for normative questions regarding the tuning and calibration of instruments of perceived injustice, the critical and reflexive role of the social sciences as method of analysis and solving, the issue of how to correctly theorize capitalist crisis, and how to support the social fabric to come to a stable society.²³

Honneth says the focus of critical theory is directed at social developments which can be viewed as pathologies.²⁴ A pathology in a society is something that is inherently wrong with how a society functions.

After analyzing the focus of the tradition of critical theory and comparing it with the goal Honneth stated it seems to me that the tradition of critical theory focuses on those social problems that affect reason, autonomy, and freedom. You can see this clearly where Honneth states that he wants people to be autonomous, individuated, and equal to all others.²⁵ The goal of critique in the tradition of critical theory is to understand society and its roots and change it so that there will no longer be social circumstances in which people feel alienated, meaningless, reified or demented.²⁶ According to Anderson this way of looking at a society will lead to a more inclusive society.²⁷

In the introduction I mentioned that if you want to change pathologies in a society you need to address the power that makes it in order to let a group decide what is true and false for everyone. If a group in power thinks a certain pathology is not wrong but right it will not

²⁰ Anderson, 2011, p. 33

²¹ Anderson, 2011, p. 46

²² Anderson, 2011, p. 34

²³ Anderson, 2011, p. 56

²⁴ Honneth, 2007, p. 4

²⁵ Honneth, 1995, p. 174

²⁶ Honneth, 2007, p. 34

²⁷ Anderson, 2011, pp. 56-57

change. This means that the methodology of achieving this inclusive society needs to address these power relations inherent to these pathologies.

1.3

The method of critical theory is based on the realization that the social world could have been different. The best way of explaining this is by starting to explain what pathologies are within the conception of critical theory on the one hand and in the form of ideology on the other hand.

I loosely base this interpretation on the use of normality by Honneth.²⁸ Normality basically means ‘that which is normal’. That which is normal also has a normative element in that it states that what is normal is also good. In an ideology, everything that is in line with this ideology is considered normal: the normality of an ideology is everything that the ideology supports. This means that everything that is normal in a culture is also considered good, because what is good depends on what is considered normal. In this case of normality in an ideology it means that everything that is not in line with the ideology is not normal. It is those things that are not considered normal according to the ideology that are called pathology. Everything that does not follow the culture is henceforth pathology. In the tradition of critical theory this is different. Pathologies are not something against the culture of a society. A pathology is something that is inherently wrong in the culture of a society. The method of critical theory bases itself on the belief that there is something outside the scope of culture that determines what is good and what is bad. It is this outsider’s point of view that gives the criterion by which something is determined good or bad. Those things that are considered bad from this outsider’s perspective are called pathology. This outsider’s point of view can be anything and is necessarily vague to leave room for various theories.

According to Honneth this outsider’s position should not become another ideology. That means it should not depend on the interpretation of what is normal according to one group but leaves room for different interpretations. Honneth’s theory only ensures that everyone is given this room to have different interpretations. From this it follows that Honneth’s theory is not an ideology because it does not force people to accept one form of normality and denounce their own. To achieve a position in which everyone is free to live by their own interpretations of normality Honneth proposes a conception in which normality is not culturally dependent but is an independent condition that supports undistorted self-realization.²⁹ This undistorted self-realization is not an implicit truth-claim by Honneth. People themselves decide what it means for them to have an undistorted self-realization: meaning that in this they themselves decide their normality. Honneth’s theory of mutual recognition only ensures that the conditions to come to a self-realization are met.

This paper will follow up the assumption that the tradition of the critical theory tries to create a theory in which an outsider’s position determines what is normal without becoming an ideology. You can see this in what Honneth tries to achieve. Honneth wants to achieve a conception of normality that is only a condition to determine what is good and bad, not what

²⁸ Honneth, 2007, p. 35

²⁹ Honneth, 2007, p. 35

decides what is good and bad. This means normality becomes some a sort of checklist, a multitude of interpretations can all follow this checklist. If normality decided what is good only one interpretation would have been allowed.

1.4

In the introduction, I already mentioned that I will use Foucault's definition of power to analyze the theory of recognition. The main reason for this is that Honneth mentions Foucault as being one of the reasons he started his project on the theory of recognition. Honneth here mentions that it was Foucault's social-theoretical insight that was the main attributing factor.³⁰ In the introduction my analysis describes that with those social-theoretical insights Honneth refers to his agreement with Foucault that power is a relation between conflicting interest, and to his disagreement with the statement that all relations between actors are relations of power. According to Honneth there is a possibility of resolving struggles without pitching conflicting interests against each other. In this part of this chapter this thesis will analyze the position of Honneth and Foucault in relation to the tradition of critical theory to support my analysis.

In setting out the position of Foucault and Honneth in the tradition of the theory of recognition I will mainly focus on the concept of normality. It is also important to note that I will draw on McCarthy's analysis of Foucault in relation to the tradition of critical theory. I do this because there is no direct relation between Foucault and the Frankfurt school: Foucault has never written anything in his lifetime that would directly relate him to the Frankfurt school. Instead he has written a different theory named genealogy. It is this theory of genealogy that this thesis will compare with the tradition of critical theory.

According to McCarthy, genealogy and critical theory both come to the same conclusion that 'reason' is something embedded in culture and is entangled with power and interest.³¹ He bases this on a comparison between the two.

They both shift away from a metaphysical approach to one that sees people as members of a social world, products of their thoughts, interests, and situations.³² From this I understand that they both saw that ideology and normality is not a necessary objective truth in a society but could have been different. Both the traditions of critical theory and genealogy believe that there is a possibility that normality can be different. It is this understanding that led them to the investigation of whether normality should be different. In their investigation, they both acknowledge that there are pathologies in this normality that have to be changed. You can see this in McCarthy's claim that both theories do not just want to make an analysis of what normality is but also want to change this practically.³³

Anderson states that in the theory of recognition Honneth focuses on addressing pathologies in society as resulting from unequal power relations.³⁴ Important here is to note that he says pathologies that result from unequal power relations. In analyzing Anderson's claims this

³⁰ Honneth, 1995, p. 1

³¹ McCarthy, 1990, p. 437

³² McCarthy, 1990, p. 438

³³ McCarthy, 1990, p. 438

³⁴ Anderson, 2011, p. 48

thesis will focus on two important things. The first important thing is that he says that Honneth lays emphasis on power as a relation. I think this is well supported by the fact that you see that it is the interpersonal relations that Honneth focuses on. The theory of recognition tries to address struggles by seeing relations as relations of mutual recognition. This relation of mutual recognition seems to be a substitute for another sort of relation that leads to pathologies: I think those relations are as Anderson correctly states power relations. This strongly implies that Honneth agrees with Foucault that power is a relation between actors and as support for my analysis of how Foucault has inspired Honneth.

The second thing is that if Honneth states that normality is not ideological, this means that pathologies are not the result of unequal power relations but of a criterium outside the normality as envisioned by ideology. Any imbalance in power relations would result in one definite answer which would become the ideology. If pathologies are a result of these unequal power relations this means that his definition of pathology must be based on something else. According to McCarthy this something else in the tradition of the critical theory is an objective standpoint based on the subjective worldview of the people.³⁵ This alternative standpoint is objective because it does not depend on the ideology of a group of people. That is because Honneth's theory does not claim to state what normality is but only provides the tools for people to decide that themselves without excluding the idea of normality by others. Honneth seems to follow both these points in his theory if you look at his book *'the struggle for recognition'*. First, he seems to follow the idea of an objective standpoint in his theory by providing that everyone should be recognized as an autonomous, individuated, and equal person.³⁶ This taking the other as an autonomous, individuated, and equal person is the criterium of the objective analysis. This means that the objective analysis and taking the other as autonomous is the same thing. This recognition provides a new normality that is not based on the current ideology but an objective analysis of what it means to take someone as autonomous, individuated, and equal. The second is that he seems to acknowledge that it should be based on the subjective worldview of the people.³⁷ With worldview I mean the understanding of people of how the world is and how it should function. Honneth's theory proposes that everyone has to mutually recognize each other as this autonomous, individuated, and equal person. This ensures that this new normality and the interpretation of this are based on the subjective worldview of the people.

It seems that genealogy and the tradition of critical theory differ on this point. McCarthy says that Foucault does not purport any objectivity in society in order to address the pathologies in the ideological normality. Foucault only seeks make people aware of the historical contingency of the ideological normality. With this he hopes to create a situation in which people themselves can change their social world. This becomes possible because they learn to see how they would want to see the world instead of being told how it should look like. This leads them to be able to address pathologies and change them.³⁸ Foucault seems to believe that the best he can do in order to change normality is to make people aware of the power

³⁵ McCarthy, 1990, p. 439

³⁶ Honneth, 1995, p. 174

³⁷ The theory of recognition should be based on the subjective worldview of all people, not only the majority or those that have the power.

³⁸ McCarthy, 1990, p. 440

relations in a society. This follows logically from the fact that he himself said that all relations are relations of power. Foucault believes that all relations are relations of interest and interests are always conflictual. Since only one interest, at most, can prevail in a conflict of interests the relation is necessarily a relation of power.³⁹ It is with this that Honneth clearly disagrees since he proposes an alternative relation to be in, i.e. a relation of mutual recognition. This supports my second claim that Honneth disagreeing with Foucault's statement that all relations are power relations validates how Foucault inspired Honneth to write his theory of recognition.

I have focused on the relation of genealogy and the tradition of critical theory on the previous points. While there are many differences as well, I consider those of lesser importance as they do not relate much to the topic of this thesis and will thus not be analyzed in this thesis. The comparability on these points and this level is what makes the definition of power by Foucault a good candidate to use to analyze the theory of recognition by Honneth. The comparability ensures that both lines of argumentation about the definition of power are based on the same line of reasoning.

2. Theory of recognition

In the previous chapter this thesis has discussed how Honneth fits into the tradition of critical theory. In this chapter this thesis will show how his theory of recognition functions in dealing with recognition and struggles.

This chapter will be divided into four parts. The first part discusses what Honneth wants to achieve with the theory of recognition and the second part how he wants his theory of recognition to achieve this. The third part will discuss what exactly recognition is and introduce the three modes of recognition that Honneth distinguishes. The last part will discuss the distinctive modes of struggles that can be understood from Honneth's theory of recognition.

2.1

Honneth follows in the tradition of the critical theory and many of the things he wants to achieve are in line with the goal of this tradition. Honneth's goal is to achieve a society in which no one is set apart from the rest, no one feels meaningless, reified or demented.⁴⁰ In other words, Honneth wants to achieve the exact opposite thing of what many argue is happening in the United States of America(USA) at the time of writing this thesis.⁴¹ A lot of people in the USA seem to feel alienated by their government voting in 'protest' against the system rather than just voting for someone.

This alienation started long before mister Trump came to power. With a constant leftist criticism focusing on right wing supports as being racist and bigoted, they alienated these voters from the common ground such as being Americans. This alienation outed itself in a

³⁹ Foucault, 1978, p. 94

⁴⁰ Honneth, 2007, p. 34

⁴¹ American's sense of alienation remains at record high, 2016

struggle against the established government which did not seem to understand the position and problems of the rural areas.

According to Anderson, it is those sorts of struggles that Honneth wants to replace with struggles for recognition. By making mutual recognition a keystone in his theory he seeks to make sure that people are not alienated.⁴²

The supporters of Trump felt as if their vote was a protest vote against the establishment and with their victory they might feel more in power to achieve what they want without being marginalized. It is this power that is a contributing factor for the continuation of these sorts of alienating struggles. Either side wins and alienates the other while the problem is never addressed.⁴³

The theory of recognition is to be viewed as a conception that tries to address these struggles by addressing them as struggles for recognition.⁴⁴ The theory of recognition tries to play the role of explaining these struggles and help society develop in such a way as to deal with these kinds of struggles more appropriately. Here you can see that the theory of recognition is in line with the tradition of critical theory as it forms a critique of the current pathologies in society to then work towards a solution.⁴⁵

The theory of recognition wants to achieve a situation in which mutual recognition helps criticize ideological pathologies. Only if all people recognize the other as being equal to them can people focus on what is dividing them. Recognition in this form would, for example, mean that those who supported Clinton no longer look at Trump supporters as lesser people, idiots, bigots, or racists. This does of course not excuse the difference between those two groups. To take the other as equal means you cannot be racist, since racist means that you do not take another race to be equal to yours. What would happen is that Clinton supporters see Trump supporters as equals but with clear differences that need to be addressed. This would lead to a conflict for recognition. In a struggle for mutual recognition there is no mutual recognition yet. I describe this sort of struggles in chapter 2.4.

Recognition would try to achieve communication and understanding between hostile groups, overcoming the alienation so that there is no reason to push back and form fronts.⁴⁶

Honneth distinguishes three modes of recognition. And for the overcoming of these pathologies all three forms of recognition have to be achieved. These three modes are self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem.⁴⁷ I will explain self-respect as respect and self-esteem as esteem in chapter 2.3. I will not address self-confidence any further. Only when people manage to achieve recognition in all three forms can those people overcome struggles. Recognition is something personal; no theory can decide for you whether you are recognized. However this does not mean that Honneth wants a subjective theory of recognition to solve pathologies. That is why he understands his ideal of recognizing everyone as an autonomous,

⁴² Anderson, 2011, p. 33

⁴³ Honneth, 1995, p. 174

⁴⁴ What exactly a struggle for recognition is will be explained in 2.4.

⁴⁵ Honneth, 1995, p. 171

⁴⁶ The theory of recognition tries to achieve a situation in which there is mutual recognition. There can still exist struggles in such a situation but only about the interpretation of what it means to have mutual recognition. I call this form of struggle collision and describe it in chapter 2.4. Evidently there can be no racism or bigotry in a struggle like this because that would mean there is no mutual recognition.

⁴⁷ Honneth, 1995, p. 174

individuated and equal person as being an objective framework for solving pathologies. Honneth admits that there will still be deliberations and struggles about what this formal conception exactly entails and when someone is recognized as an autonomous person: the important part however is that an acceptance of wanting to recognize everyone properly opens up a possibility of deliberating without fear of judgement and alienation.⁴⁸ This becomes possible because you take a shared idea of normality as basis for deliberation in the theory of recognition. Everyone wants to achieve the same formal conception of recognition: this means that everyone has a mutual goal with no reason to attack each other.⁴⁹ The theory of recognition thus tries to achieve a way of solving pathologies without fear and psychological barriers.⁵⁰ In discussing this theory of recognition and its goals, Bertram and Celikates describe the theory of recognition as a positive theory. With this they mean that its intention is to achieve something and create instead of limit. The theory of recognition tries to enable positive relations and combine these in mutual recognition to realize freedom for all.⁵¹ I think this analysis by Bertram and Celikates of the theory of recognition as a positive theory is a good representation of what Honneth wants to achieve: a theory in which pathologies no longer alienate people, without dominating others to achieve their freedom.

2.2

Honneth wants to deal with struggles coming from pathologies by explaining those struggles as struggles for recognition. A struggle for recognition is not dependent on an ideological normality but on normality based on recognition of the other as an autonomous, individuated, and equal person. This means that you struggle to be recognized as autonomous, individuated, and equal to the other person. Pathologies exist because conflicting interests are decided by power struggles. These struggles of power lead to misrecognition, i.e. not being recognized as an autonomous, individuated and equal person. Honneth believes that by explaining struggles as failures of recognition that he can take away the self interest in struggles and with them the relation of power. Once struggles are understood as the failure to recognize they can be solved by introducing mutual recognition as a new basis to decide struggles on. The goal of mutual recognition is to put an end to struggles. However it is still possible to have struggles even when a bond of mutual recognition is established. I describe this as a collision and explain this further in chapter 2.4. This mutual recognition will inevitably lead to a society in which there are no pathologies. This society would then be based on the idea that instances of misrecognition are pathologies. In this sense, mutual recognition becomes an enabling condition to solve pathologies because it gives a condition to which those pathologies can be tested. Honneth states that it is when people come into a relation of mutual recognition that

⁴⁸ The difference between deliberation and struggles is that a deliberation is a form of a struggle. Struggles are not necessarily rational. A struggle can also be a demonstration or a hunger strike, as long as it tries to change something with which you disagree.

⁴⁹ Honneth, 1995, p. 178. Important to note here is that people agree to the formal conception of mutual recognition; the interpretation of what mutual recognition means can still differ.

⁵⁰ Honneth, 1995, p. 174

⁵¹ Bertram & Celikates, 2015, pp. 838-839

they inevitably address these pathologies that alienate people because it leads people to recognize each other as autonomous, individuated, and equal people.⁵²

An example in which the theory of recognition could avoid conflict is in the case of the Dakota access pipeline in North Dakota. In this case a pipeline was rerouted through sacred land of the Sioux tribe. The indigenous people of the Sioux tribe protested against laying the access pipeline in their land, not only because it is sacred, but also because they feared an oil spill in their main water source. The initial plan for the access pipeline route would have it cross the Missouri river in Bismarck: but after protests of the, predominantly white, village against the risk of oil spills the pipeline was rerouted.⁵³ This indicates that there was a feeling that the rights of the Sioux tribe were less important than those the population of Bismarck. In this scenario, the Sioux tribe is not seen to be equal to the village of Bismarck. If this conflict were to be decided by employing the theory of recognition, there would be no need for conflict. According to the theory of recognition, the Sioux tribe would it be seen as equal to the village of Bismarck. This means that if the risk of an oil spill in the village of Bismarck is a reason to reroute it, this also goes for the land of the Sioux Tribe. From this follows that the access pipeline should not be rerouted through Sioux land. The result of this would be a solution to the conflict without alienation or unequal treatment leading to a society in which everyone feels validated as equal. I believe that it is exactly this line of reasoning that led the Army Corp of Engineers to decide that the pipeline cannot run across the sacred Sioux grounds.⁵⁴

2.3

Honneth wants to solve pathologies with the use of a theory based on mutual recognition. Although I have mentioned different attributes to recognition I have yet to fully explain the concept completely. In understanding this concept I will rely heavily on the interpretations of Bertram and Celikates, and Thompson. The reason for this is that I think that Bertram and Celikates gave the best overview of the aspects of recognition.

By analyzing Honneth they came up with four aspects which I will set out in my own words down below. Those four aspects are⁵⁵:

- a) Recognition is the affirmation of the positive characteristics of human subjects or groups
- b) Recognition is realized in acts that have a correspondingly affirmative character
- c) Acts of recognition realize a distinctive intention that is directed at the value of another person
- d) Recognition is a generic concept that encompasses more specific kinds of recognition- that is to say, those of love, legal respect, and social esteem for distinctive achievements.

⁵² Bertram & Celikates, 2015, p. 840

⁵³ Noah, 2016

⁵⁴ Kenny, Krieg, Sidner, & Blau, 2016

⁵⁵ Bertram & Celikates, 2015, p. 850

Recognition is standing in an affirmative relation to someone else. Recognition has to do with public recognition from an individual, a group, or an institution. This institution acknowledges you in a positive way by attributing some characteristics to you that are valuable to the country. A clear example of this recognition is that of a purple heart awarded to war heroes in the USA. A purple heart acknowledges the fact that you sacrificed yourself for your country, that this is a positive thing to do and that it is valued by others. You can also see this with various discounts for veterans. Another example is a thank you present you give someone when they have helped you. This shows that you recognize that the other went out of his way to help you, that you appreciate that and that you value it. Part of this acknowledgement is voicing your opinion that you want the other to be treated just the same as you are being treated. The other has an equal standing to you. Thompson describes the act of acknowledging as a way of saying that you want to validate someone in your life in a positive way. Thompson says that in the act of acknowledging you make them audible and visible in your world: you take notice of someone and acknowledge this as something positive.⁵⁶ This description of acknowledgement by Thompson shows a clear line with the ideal set out by Honneth that no one should feel alienated. By acknowledging someone you actively pull them into your social world.

From this, Thompson argues that recognition demands reciprocity. To actively pull someone into your social world only works if that person pulls you into their social world too. You cannot be part of someone's social world if that person does not include you in it: a social world consists in the combination of at least two people. According to Thompson, this also means you have to take the other as an equal before the law. If I would give someone presents whenever they helped me but they would not do the same it means they do not follow my idea of recognition. To be equal for one may mean to give presents when people get helped and receive them when people are helping. Since the other person is not doing this, and does not treat me as an equal it means that he is not an equal to me. After all being an equal to me is giving me presents when I help you, and since you do not do this it means you do not recognize me in the sense that I understand recognition.⁵⁷ This argumentation by Thompson leads me to believe that Honneth thinks it is necessary to be equals to share in the same social world. The best way of understanding this is that the social world for Honneth follows the normality based on mutual recognition. Recognizing the other as an equal is part of this, which means that treating the other as an equal is essential for sharing the same social world. From this follows that recognition of the other and including them in your social world cannot be an empty promise or chain of meaningless words. Recognition entails something: it demands a stand or an action. Thompson also describes a specific action. This action that Thompson describes is that if you want someone to be your equal you have to help them achieve self-realization.⁵⁸ Without the ability to distinguish your self-interest you cannot decide what your own interests are, and without knowing what your interests are you can also not decide that mutual recognition is your interest. This inability of coming up with an own way of recognition will result in that you can only follow the idea of recognition by someone

⁵⁶ Thompson, 2006, p.7

⁵⁷ Thompson, 2006, p. 48

⁵⁸ In this thesis I understand identity to 'have the ability to autonomously decide what your interests are' and self-realization as the 'autonomous way of distinguishing your interests and achieving them'.

else. Thompson believes that it is impossible to be in an equal relation if the other is the perpetrator of grounds of the relation.⁵⁹

Thompson follows in the line of Honneth here who said that it is your duty to help others achieve self-realization as condition of equality.⁶⁰

Bertram and Celikates say about this that you can only have a continuous self-conception in relation to others. This relation of mutual recognition forms a solid basis to relate to yourself, as without this relation there would be a constant struggle for your interest of having a conception of yourself. This struggle would, by nature of it being a power struggle, be very unstable.⁶¹

From this I draw the conclusion that mutual recognition only gives a more solid basis for self-realization, but does not give certainty. Recognition is still always more a process than a state of affairs. Recognition necessitates that someone receives a present every time he helps you. Since this interaction can change recognition is better to be seen as a process. You might recognize someone every time for helping you by giving a present, but there might be a case in which you did not recognize someone helping you. In that case, you might not have given him a present, thus not fulfilling the criteria of recognition.

Honneth divides recognition into three different modes. These modes of recognition have always existed and form the basis for relations. Bertram and Celikates describe how the idea of the theory of recognition is to make these modes of recognition clear and bring them to their full potential.⁶² The three forms of recognition Honneth distinguishes are: love, respect, and esteem.⁶³ Thompson gives a very clear description of those three modes of recognition. According to Thompson, each form of recognition deals with a different form of relation between people.

Recognition of love is the strong attachment to family, friends and lovers. Respect addresses the recognition of rational autonomy of individuals in a universal way, and esteem is the form of recognition that recognizes others as having the same values as you do and provides solidarity.⁶⁴

Love is the first mode of recognition. It is the first natural relation that people form with their family.⁶⁵ From the moment people are born they naturally have their mothers love, or for example the care of the father for his child and the wish for that child to grow up to be a wonderful person.⁶⁶ Love is a sort affectionate attention to a concrete other person. You cannot love an idea of someone you have no concrete image of. To love someone means to have an understanding of who they are. The nature of love is that it cannot affect as many people as other forms of recognition. Love is such a deep emotional affection that makes it is hard to extend it to a larger circle. A relationship with your significant other, the partner you potentially marry, is a relationship in which you are not merely seeing the other as someone such as yourself: It may even come as far as that you become a part of them and they become

⁵⁹ Thompson, 2006, p. 48

⁶⁰ Honneth, 1995, p. 91

⁶¹ Bertram & Celikates, 2015, p. 840

⁶² Bertram & Celikates, 2015, p. 842

⁶³ Honneth, 1995, p. 174

⁶⁴ Thompson, 2006, p. 11

⁶⁵ Thompson, 2006, p. 26

⁶⁶ There are exceptions to all rules: unfortunately also to this rule.

a part of you. Such a relationship demands constant attention and work, which is impossible to do with a large group of people. Thompson calls it the most primal relationship and says that Honneth sees this as forming the basis for the other modes of recognition.⁶⁷ Only when you are loved and can you establish a conception of self-love and self-worth. If no one loves you there is no basis from which to build love for yourself. Since a relationship to the other in the form of recognition implies you take the other as equal it means that at least some form of basis of this self-appreciation needs to exist. Does this mean that loving someone always means that you take the other as an equal? I think understanding the other as an equal does not necessitate that you take the other as equally autonomous. Otherwise the recognition of autonomy and equality would not be named separately in Honneth definition of how to recognize the other. Instead I think that being equal to each other means that you take the other as having the same equal rights and worth as you have, but still take into account the different positions you are in.

The second mode of recognition is respect. Respect is recognizing someone as having the same legal worth as you have. You take them to be an equal in the eyes of the law.⁶⁸ For this it means you need to have at least some form of self-respect. Self-respect means that you have to take yourself as having certain rights as a human being. According to Thompson respect is, contrary to love, a developed form of recognition. This developed form of recognition encompasses both learned and socially constructed forms of development.⁶⁹ Only through relations with others can you come to understand the relation of laws, rules, rights, and obligations. In describing the general form of what recognition is I used the example of giving someone a gift when he helps you.⁷⁰ The law is a form of respect. Since it is the law that you have to give a gift to someone who helped you it is also a form of respect. This example could also be a mode of esteem. Esteem is when you acknowledge someone's contributions to shared objectives. These contributions can be any action by someone that contributes to the shared objectives. While there might be a law necessitating you to give a present when someone helps you, it might not be the case that someone is by law forced to help you. Helping you is something completely voluntary. Being appreciated for helping is not the same as being respected, since being appreciated does not have to do with rights and obligations. It can however still be something that people see as an ideal state for their society: something that their society aspires to. This characteristic of you helping people is then a contribution towards this common goal of a society in which people help each other. The gift is then an appreciation of this selfless effort towards this common objective and then takes the place of a form of recognizing someone's contributions. Honneth would then call this gift recognition of esteem, in which you esteem the person who helped you.

⁶⁷ Thompson, 2006, p. 25

⁶⁸ Honneth, 1995, p. 107

⁶⁹ Thompson, 2006, p. 50

⁷⁰ This law of having to give someone a present when he helps you is a purely hypothetical law that I made up for this thesis. Of course, in our society it is still an unwritten rule: not giving someone a present does in general give people the idea that their help was not appreciated.

2.4

The theory of recognition wants to create a normality based on mutual recognition. It also wants to analyze struggles. In analyzing Honneth I came to distinguish three different relevant forms of struggle. These three different forms are a struggle for self-interest, and two forms of a struggle for recognition. First you have a struggle for recognition in which there is not yet any form of mutual recognition, this I call a conflict for recognition. This is a conflict for recognition because you try to attain recognition that you do not have yet. Second you have a struggle for recognition where there is already mutual recognition, I call this a collision.⁷¹ A collision is still a struggle because even though there is mutual recognition there is no shared interpretation of what mutual recognition entails. I will discuss all three forms separately in relation to society, normality and Honneth's normative standpoint.

The first mode of a struggle is for self-interest. This is the mode which is also described in the conflict surrounding Black Pete in the introduction. This form of conflict has no connection to the theory of recognition. This self-interest can encompass different things: your religious beliefs or your personal preference. This means that a struggle for self-interest is not necessarily egocentric. It is a struggle for what you think is right: in this you try to dominate the ideology and culture to exclude interests that conflict with yours. This means that a struggle for self-interest tries to influence what is perceived as true through enacting their interest as normality. From this it follows that a struggle for self-interest is a power struggle. This deciding of what is normal leads to alienation and domination by whichever group has the power to decide on what normality is. This thesis has shown the position and the goals by Honneth: it is because of these goals of encompassing a theory that includes everyone that I conclude that Honneth would think of this form of struggle as normatively bad. A lot of struggles are struggles for self-interest and lead to violence and frustration, and it is because of this that I think Honneth would argue that these sorts of struggles should be avoided.

The second form of struggle is conflict for recognition. A revolt by slaves for equal rights is a conflict for recognition. Slavers do not recognize their slaves as having equal rights. Another example is the conflict for recognition for homosexuals. For a long time they did not have the right to marry in the same way as heterosexuals could. Their struggle and protest was in order to get this same recognition. This struggle is a struggle of conflicting interests, which means that a conflict for recognition is also a power struggle. Despite these struggles being power struggles, they are necessary to come to a position in which there is mutual recognition. Struggling for recognition is directed at a normality based on mutual recognition but is not yet in a position in which the rest of society is on the same page. Although Honneth argues that power struggles bring imbalance and alienation to a society it must be that he sees power in a conflict for recognition as a necessary evil. Power against mutual recognition is bad, but power used in order to struggle for this recognition is necessary to achieve a better mode of living together. From this follows that Honneth would argue that a conflict for recognition as a power struggle is at least normatively acceptable.

⁷¹ I base the name of these distinctions on the following text: Bertram & Celikates, 2015 P. 841. My distinctions however differ in that I distinguish three forms of struggles which do not coincide exactly with the definitions set out by Bertram and Celikates.

The last form of struggles is a collision. A collision is a struggle when there is already a basis of mutual recognition. In a collision there is a form of recognition, but what the interpretation of this mutual recognition may be is unclear. I think that a collision mainly deals with the lack of knowledge and understanding. The conflict occurring around Black Pete could be an example of a collision if there was a situation in which everyone recognized each other as equal. The reason that black people felt alienated was not because there was an act of discrimination or unwillingness to recognize them properly but because of a lack of understanding how a character like Black Pete affects black people. In this example you could understand that those in favor of Black Pete are unaware of the effects but would still want to live in mutual recognition, also in their actions.⁷² By explaining the effects and discussing this conjointly, an understanding could be achieved. This understanding would result in an effectuation of mutual recognition by acting in accordance with this new insight. A collision is not a power struggle because there is no conflict of interest. Both groups want to recognize each other as individuated, autonomous, and equal. This recognition of the other as an individuated, autonomous, and equal person is the normality on which these struggles are based. It includes everyone based on the fact that they are not only recognized in a formal way but that society also actively seeks to effectuate this in actions. This is the closest step towards a society which is completely based on mutual recognition. From this follows that this would be the most preferred form of struggle by Honneth. I then conclude that Honneth would then argue that a collision is a normatively good form of struggle.

3. Theory of power

When discussing the notion of power by Foucault it is important to note that he takes a radical departure from previous modes of conceiving power. Gaventa describes Foucault's definition of power as different from other notions of power: while others are concentrated around an entity that employs and possesses power, Foucault's notion of power is that power is more diffuse and can be embodied in various agents during conflict.⁷³ The conception of power by Foucault is hard to understand because of its elusive status: there is no specific thing, attribute, or moment that can be pinpointed as being power. This chapter will be divided into three parts. The first part will discuss Foucault's definition of power, and the second part will go into the relation power has with knowledge. The last part will relate the definition of power and knowledge to normality, normativity, and pathologies. In the last part, this thesis will also explain why Foucault does not believe in struggles that are not power struggles.

3.1

Foucault encounters difficulty giving a simple definition. Instead, he resorts to making a list of those things that can be said about power.

⁷² Honneth's theory offers to a certain way to distinguish between conflicts for recognition and collisions. Because of this there is no clear way of saying whether or not the Black Pete discussion was a conflict for recognition or a collision. This thesis will argue that this is because Honneth does not take into account the position mutual trust has in a conflict. I will address this criticism in 4.2.

⁷³ Gaventa, 2003, p. 1

Foucault says that the most important difference with other definitions of power is that he does not see it as something stationary. Power is not a group of institutions or mechanisms that overarch society in such a way that it can ensure the compliance of citizens to a state.⁷⁴ With this Foucault does not say that those institutions are void of power, it is just not that it is an intrinsic attribute to those institutions. Foucault adds to this that power is not any other form of generalized system that is exerted over a group of people either.⁷⁵ Many theories follow the idea that power is centered into a governing force, usually a king or a democratic elect. Foucault insists that while power can be attributed to those figures, it is not necessarily so that because of their position that they have power. Patton described it in the easiest terms possible: Power is in its most primary sense the capacity to do something. If A can do something despite being opposed, A has the power to do that thing. Some things can only be done in an exclusive way. This means that when you want to do one thing it excludes the possibility of something else being done. I want to bake the potatoes and my brother wants to ferment it to make vodka. If we bake the potatoes we can no longer make vodka from them, and if we make vodka from them we cannot bake them. According to Patton that person who gets what he wants at the cost of someone else's interest has power and 'overpowers' the other. The act in which my brother succeeds in fermenting the potatoes into vodka and successfully gets what he wants is what coincides with power.⁷⁶ Foucault however does make a distinction between power and violence. Power is a political way of getting what you want while force is the military way of getting what you want. Foucault would not call it power if my brother would shove me and steal the potatoes: an instant like that he would call violence.⁷⁷

What then follows is that power is something that is exercised in relations of conflicting interests without the use of violence.⁷⁸ According to Foucault, power is never absolute. It can always be challenged just as any victory can be challenged. The Third Reich of the Germans had power when they conquered a large part of Europe, but when the Russians, Canadians, and other allies joined the fray the Germans lost the war. Losing the war showed that they lost the ability to do what they wanted and showed that they lost power. The Netherlands on the other hand lost their power when Germany invaded, and retrieved it when it got liberated. From this follows that power only exists in victory, when victory is lost so is power.⁷⁹ This differs from different interpretations of power because other interpretations always give some sort of source of where the power originates. Foucault does no such thing and in doing so gives no explanation of why there is power but only a description of when there is power. Foucault makes clear that power is not something only of the overwhelming and grandeur victories. Power is everywhere in all conflicts.⁸⁰ Nancy Fraser calls this Foucault's most principle contribution to society. In his description of 'micro practices' of power Foucault

⁷⁴ Foucault, 1978, p. 92

⁷⁵ Foucault, 1978, p. 92

⁷⁶ Patton, 1994, p. 63. This possibility of doing something at the cost of other does necessitate that the other accepts it. Doing something behinds someone's back without them knowing it or having the possibility to contest it is not power.

⁷⁷ Foucault, 1978, p. 92

⁷⁸ Foucault, 1978, p. 94

⁷⁹ Honneth, 1993, p. 161

⁸⁰ Foucault, 1978, p. 92

shows how power is also present in everyday struggles.⁸¹ Before Foucault power was conceived as belonging to institutions, and institutions did not have influence in micro-practices. The change Foucault introduces is that power is whenever two conflicting interests collide, and interests collide in everyday struggles.⁸² An example of this is a struggle between two drivers who both want to pull into the same parking spot. Since the interests of both drivers are mutually exclusive there is a conflict of interest in which only one, at most, can be victor.

3.2

The understanding of the conception of power by Foucault would not be complete without an understanding of his conception of knowledge and the intertwined relation those two conceptions have. To Foucault, knowledge is not merely of instrumental value to power. Foucault does not believe that power, a momentary victory in a conflict of interest, is only supported by knowledge as a tool to persuade people: power and knowledge are one and the same thing. For the description of Foucault's relation between power and knowledge I will rely heavily on secondary literature. The reason for this is that the understanding of Foucault's relation between power and knowledge is described in the *'history of sexuality'* but I feel that it is not explained thoroughly enough.

Gutting describes the relation between power and knowledge as follows: there is not an independent conception of power or knowledge, you cannot have power without knowledge or knowledge without power: they are two sides of the same coin. It is in the act of knowing that we have control and have power, and it is in having power that we ensure our knowledge.⁸³

Struggles for power are nothing else than a 'battle for truth'. In a conflict of power, you are also in a conflict of what knowledge is truth. To Foucault truth is not something discovered. There is no absolute truth that stands above everything else. Truth is 'those rules by which true and false are separated'. This truth, just as power, can be challenged. This means that to hold knowledge of what is true means to establish this by power, and to establish something by power is declaring it as truth.⁸⁴

Truth is the nothing else than claiming what you think knowledge is, but only when a claim is successful does it become knowledge. The claiming of truth is a power just as other power relations: claiming truth only makes it truth if it also supersedes the truth of others. This means that claims of truth are in a direct conflict with other claims of truth. If your claim contradicts mine only one at most can determine what is right. This led Rouse to state that a successful claim of truth always depicts for others what is right.⁸⁵ Since knowledge is

⁸¹ Fraser, 1989, p. 18

⁸² Conflicting interests does not presuppose conflicting agents. Interests here are not to be understood as consciously held interests. An interest is to be understood loosely here as 'having a vision of how the world should be'. For example: culture is a vision of how the world should be and can be one actor in a conflict of interest despite the fact that culture has no sentience.

⁸³ Gutting, 2013 Chapter. 4

⁸⁴ Rabinow, 1991, p. 239

⁸⁵ Rouse, 2005, p. 112

dependent on claims of truth, knowledge can also be challenged. European countries have had colonies all over the world. They conquered the lands not only with war and violence, but sometimes by just embarking and declaring that they were the new rulers of that land. With power they ensured that everyone would follow according to their ideals and values. In many former colonies there is still widespread Christianity because it was brought by the colonists as the truth, and since those colonists had the power they decided what the truth was.

Foucault makes a distinction between knowledge and culture. Culture is also a form of power, but it is something more. Knowledge can always directly be challenged, but culture is a strong web of truths that has become very hard to challenge. Culture as a web of truths is hard to challenge because from the moment we are born, we are caught in this web of truths. Foucault rightly questions how we can challenge a truth of which we have no idea of what it is like not to have it.⁸⁶ Honneth explains it as follows: to be able to formulate your own interests means to be able to formulate for yourself what is right. Without any stepping stone to come to any form of independent conclusion of what is right this is really hard. Honneth describes how according to Foucault you need something that is not inside the culture: an ‘outsider’s perspective’. This is a perspective that is very hard to get. The reason for this is that all your thoughts will have a starting point, and this starting point is the culture you are in. Honneth mentions about this that without the capacity to evaluate culture from an outsider’s perspective and come to an independent decision of what is right, there is no basis to challenge the truth of a culture.⁸⁷ It is for this reason that Honneth tries to realize this outsider’s perspective in the theory of recognition.

Gutting showcases the impossibility of an outsider’s perspective by looking at the culture of examination. Examination has to be understood as the examination students have to pass to graduate any form of education. Examination is nothing else than controlling the masses by imprinting them with the cultural idea of what is right. From a young age children are being subjected to moral judgements and normalizing those judgements through repetition. A child who thinks homosexuality is wrong gets corrected, while those who think homosexuality is natural are being praised.⁸⁸ This normalization as a whole represents the case of power/knowledge connection at its prime. The power to form judgements is having the ability to set out a truth to which children have to adapt, and by adapting they take over your truth and act accordingly. This relation between children and their teachers forces the children to adapt: otherwise they cannot pass the class. And in this forcing of adaptation this knowledge controls their behavior exerting power over them because it makes it impossible for them to follow an own interpretation of truth.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Honneth, 1993, p. 153

⁸⁷ Honneth, 1993, p. 110

⁸⁸ Homosexuality has been taught as being unnatural for a long period of time. It seems however that there has been a shift of power on this stance as most elementary and secondary education now teaches homosexuality as being natural.

⁸⁹ Gutting, 2013 Chapter 4

3.3

In the previous two parts I discussed the notion of power and knowledge by Foucault. In this part this thesis will look at the relation of power and knowledge to normality and normativity. In the theory of recognition, Honneth argues that there is a possibility of having struggles which are not necessarily power struggles. In this part this thesis I will show why Foucault thinks this is impossible. Those points that follow from Foucault will be used to analyze the theory of recognition by Honneth further to see if struggles are necessarily power struggles in his theory of not. That will happen in chapter 4.

To continue analyzing Foucault's position on normativity, I will look at the criticism by Fraser. Fraser describes Foucault's theory as based on the idea that power in history always changed. Every regime that took power came from an incommensurable position to the previous. According to Fraser, all power that has ever existed has been resisted by others successfully and replaced by another forms of power.⁹⁰

According to Fraser it is because plurality of power relations and successions that Foucault does not concern himself with the evaluation of the content of those power structures but only with how it functioned and produced itself. In analyzing this Foucault manages to reveal the underlying similarities in process, procedures and apparatuses that connect all those different instances of power. By analyzing the similarities between power relations, genealogy intends to make clear how power works and functions irrespective of its system of knowledge and believes/assumptions.⁹¹ How power functions in all different forms of power does not say anything about the beliefs and the cultural knowledge. Foucault intends to remain entirely descriptive in this part. Fraser says that the intention of genealogy is characterized by the suspension of categories such as truth/falsity and truth/ideology.⁹²

If there is no truth and ideology in the descriptive method of genealogy, there is also no basis to determine value. This demands some sort of belief system. Since the belief systems are the content of the power structures and not the structure, genealogy says nothing about belief systems. Fraser's criticism about this is that Foucault, despite advocating no judgement, still uses words with political significance. In other words: Foucault still uses words with heavy connotation. An example of this is the use of the word 'domination' to explain the function of culture.⁹³

To understand Fraser's critique better, this thesis will look at the relation between Foucault's notion of power and culture. Culture according to Foucault is a web of firmly established beliefs that are perceived as true. The beliefs of a culture have power because they force people to adjust to the rules of this system. Even if these cultural beliefs can be challenged, they are much harder to change than other beliefs. An example of a cultural system of beliefs is Christian culture in Western Europe. Even when more and more people switch to a secular belief system instead of a Christian those beliefs intrinsic to Christianity are still held all across Europe. Examples of these cultural beliefs are that you shall not kill, the sanctity of marriage, and individual accountability. These cultural ideologies are so firmly established

⁹⁰ Fraser, 1989 , p. 20

⁹¹ Fraser, 1989, p. 19

⁹² Fraser, 1989 , p. 21

⁹³ Fraser, 1989, p. 20

that they leave very little wiggle room. Whenever a group tries to change and challenge one of those firmly established rules, they can expect to be cast out by society. You can see this in the example of gay marriage. Gay marriage has shown that culture can be changed, but that it is very hard, and takes a long time, to do so. This shows how much influence power in the cultural form of knowledge has and how hard it is to change it.⁹⁴

This thesis will argue that culture is nothing else than normality. Normality is what describes what is normal for a society. This means normality decides what is right and what is wrong. Culture also describes the norms and values of a society. In analyzing Foucault, you can see that he believes culture is nothing else than a firmly established web of beliefs. This web of beliefs consist of claims of what is right. Since these claims are always contested, they are an attestation to power. Culture is then nothing else than a firmly established power over those who differ with those claims. This means that if culture is nothing else than firmly established power the same goes for normality. It is because of this that this thesis argues that normality for Foucault is nothing else than those claims that are victorious in a struggle of power. Patton says that Foucault describes culture as domination. Culture is so firmly established that it leaves little wiggle room. It is this wiggle room that people need in order to come to some sort of self-truth.⁹⁵

It is these normative descriptions that Fraser refers to when she says that Foucault uses words with political significance.⁹⁶ Fraser says that if Foucault wants to remain descriptive and does not want to meddle with normative descriptions, he should engage into normatively neutral interpretations. According to Fraser, Foucault fails to do so: not only does he refer to those with use of power as social scientists and technologists of behavior, but he also states that resistance is preferred to submission.⁹⁷ According to Fraser this is a normative claim of preferring one thing over another and deeming one right and the other one wrong. Since Foucault intends to remain normatively impartial, Fraser holds that he has no grounds to make this claim. I think Fraser has not understood Foucault here properly, and it is this improper understanding that I want to use to explain Foucault's stand on normativity.

Fraser suggests that since Foucault thinks resistance is preferable to submission, he is making a normative claim in his theory of power. This means that, if Fraser is correct, Foucault has a theoretical reason why resistance is preferred to submission. And if that is so, his theory makes a normative judgement. She passes completely over the point that Foucault's definition of power is a description of two actors with conflicting interests in which only one can succeed in attaining his interest. Patton suggests here, I think correctly, that Foucault does not ascribe a normative value to resistance from his theoretical perspective but from the perspective of this interest of the actor.⁹⁸

If I want to eat a cake and my brother wants to eat the same cake our interests conflict. If my brother takes the cake, what am I to do? If I contest his claim I can still try to get a piece of the cake, and in doing so attain my interest. Submission would leave me without a chance of having a piece of pie and ever attaining my interest. This interest is not something that is part

⁹⁴ Gutting, 2013, Chapter 4

⁹⁵ Patton, 1994, p. 64

⁹⁶ Fraser, 1989, p. 28

⁹⁷ Fraser, 1989, p. 29

⁹⁸ Patton, 1994, p. 71

of Foucault's genealogy, he only describes how power functions in my system of beliefs: namely how power functions in my belief that I want a piece of pie. From this I conclude that Foucault does not make a normative claim but only a logical one. If you want to achieve something you will have to resist that which stops you from achieving it. In other words, Fraser's objection to Foucault's descriptive stance in his genealogy is incorrect. In this objection, however Fraser has given us some good insights into Foucault's position on normativity. Normativity is inherent to the beliefs and interest of individual people. Those beliefs and interests are the things that decide for someone personally what is right and wrong: it is from here that normativity stems. Power is only a tool in order to achieve what is deemed to be right. A tool has no normative judgement and the use of power is only good or bad depending on your position. If power is used to dominate over your claim of truth than from your position power is bad; but if it is used in favor of your position it is good. In this sense power has no normative status: it is only in relation to your ambitions and goals that power gets a subjective value.

4. Are struggles in the theory of recognition power struggles?

This thesis wants to answer the question if a struggle in the theory of recognition is necessarily a power struggle. In chapter 2, this thesis described the theory of recognition, and in chapter 3 it explained the theory of power with which the theory of recognition will be analyzed.⁹⁹ This chapter in the thesis will give an answer to the research question by analyzing what points the theory of recognition has to address in order to make struggles possible that are not power struggles. This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will look at the different points the theory of recognition has to address and see if it manages to do so. In this part this thesis will answer the research question. In the second part it will link the theory of recognition to its goal of practical application as being in line with the critical theory. This part will in short discuss the importance of trust in relations in order to practically achieve a form of life based on mutual recognition.

4.1

This part of the thesis will go over all the different points that Honneth has to address in order to make his claim acceptable that not all struggles are power struggles based on the previously stated analysis above.

⁹⁹ If a conflict for recognition is normatively acceptable by Honneth, then why would we want a notion of struggles that do not depend on power? The answer is that we can only achieve mutual recognition through conflicts for recognition. It is a route that has to be taken in order to make it possible to get towards a situation in which struggles are collisions. As a teacher I learned that it is best to settle an argument between students by talking, but sometimes it is necessary to pull them apart from each other. To pull them apart from each other is only permissible because there is not yet a situation in which they can talk. Pulling them apart however should always be in order to be able to talk later. In other words, a collision is preferred to a conflict for recognition but when a collision is not yet available a conflict of interests is normatively acceptable to get to that position in which a struggle is a collision.

In order for a struggle to not be a power struggle the following things need to be addressed: struggles should not be struggles of conflicting interest, resistance should not be targeting others, and the theory of recognition has to be able to overcome the power of culture. This thesis will answer these points in this order.

The first point that Honneth needs to address is that struggles should not be struggles of conflicting interest. This thesis has shown that in Foucault's theory of power, power arises whenever two interests collide and one interest can only be achieved at the cost of the other. It is because of Foucault's belief that it is impossible to have the same interest that he is sure that all struggles are struggles for power. Why would you struggle if you both want the same thing?

Here you can see very well that Honneth follows the conception of power by Foucault, but disagrees that you can only have a struggle when you struggle with each other. You can see this very well in the distinction between three forms of struggles that I have set out in 2.4 as described by Bertram and Celikates.¹⁰⁰ Those three forms of struggle were a struggle for self-interest, a conflict for recognition, and a collision. Those first two are a conflict of interests. You have a separate interest than the other actor. In a collision, this is different. Honneth states that in a bond of mutual recognition you both take the other as individuated, autonomous and equal.¹⁰¹ If you take the other to be equal to yourself you will want to treat them like that too. According to Honneth this means that you have the same interest: to live life in a bond of mutual recognition. There can still be disagreements about what this living in a bond of mutual recognition is. Those disagreements are what I called collisions. The question is: are collisions power struggles? If you have a collision you still disagree about something, and only one interpretation at most can be used to live by. The difference with a struggle of power and a collision is that the differences between standpoints are not a difference between interests. It is not your interest to live in a bond of mutual recognition according to your interpretation. Of course it is so that you believe that your interpretation is correct, but being correct is not what you want. You want to live in a bond of mutual recognition – even if you do not know exactly how that affects your life.¹⁰² This means that your interest is living in a bond of mutual recognition, not your interpretation. From this we can conclude that a collision is not a struggle of conflicting interest, but only a disagreement about what the shared interest is. This is not to say that there is not still a power relation in a conflict like this. Since people want to live in mutual recognition every other interest becomes secondary. Since other interests become secondary they no longer have power, only mutual recognition has power as interest. Since all parties have the same interest of mutual recognition, and only mutual recognition has power, any struggle between actors no longer relies on power. Since a struggle in such a scenario is not decided by power that struggle is no longer a power struggle.

¹⁰⁰ Bertram & Celikates, 2015, p. 850

¹⁰¹ Honneth, 1995, p. 174

¹⁰² How can you want something if you do not know exactly what it is? The best example is romantic love. Most people want romantic love even if they have never experienced it yet. In other words, they do not exactly know what it means to have romantic love, yet they still want it because they crudely understand it.

In a collision, there is no conflictual interest, but you still disagree. This means that there can still be resistance against what someone else proposes. This leads to the second point that Honneth has to address: in order for a struggle to not be a struggle of power, resistance should not be targeted at others. In a collision there is still resistance towards a conflicting interest, but that interest in this case might be a cultural ideology. Since these cultural ideologies become secondary in solving a struggle they become void of power. They would only have power because they are in line with the main interest of mutual recognition.

In chapter 3 this thesis showed that Foucault prefers resistance over submission.¹⁰³ Resistance is a necessary attribute for power. Without resistance there is no power, since power is something attributed to a victory over a conflicting interest. If there is no conflict and no opposition there can be no power.

In the theory of recognition there is no conflicting interest between people, but that does not mean that there can be no struggle. Even if your interpretation of how to live in a bond of mutual recognition is not your goal in a struggle, you still think that your interpretation is the best way. This means that you will resist the interpretations by others. How can the theory of recognition ensure that a struggle for your interpretation will not mean that you struggle against the interpretation of others? I think the key lies in the fact that you do not struggle for your interpretation: you struggle for the interpretation that you think is best. This just so happens to be your interpretation. If you did not think your interpretation is the best you would not have it. Even if you think your interpretation is the best it is crucial for this step that you realize that your interpretation might be wrong. This means you have to acknowledge that your interpretation is only the best because of your limited experience and knowledge. In other words, you have to understand that it is possible that your interpretation is not the best. If your interpretation was not the best interpretation it would either harm you as not being an equal to others or harm others. In both cases this is against your interest of wanting to live in a bond of mutual recognition. This ensures that whichever interpretation you have will in your eyes be the best interpretation. Struggling for the interpretation you think is the best leaves open other possibilities. Even if you struggle for your interpretation you may be aware that your interpretation might not be the best. This may open you up to the interpretations of others. You think your interpretation is the best interpretation, but you might be wrong. If you actively seek to understand others and adjust yourself to new knowledge it would be deliberation. This would be preferred to a struggle, but not everyone is capable of deliberation and would only learn that they might be wrong by struggling for their interpretation and experiencing the effects of them. In this resistance becomes something against interpretations that you think are wrong, whichever interpretation that is. This detaches the interpretations away from the persons holding the belief that that interpretation is the best interpretation. Since the interpretations are separated from individuals you can combine your effort in searching for the best interpretations. You struggle for yours because you think yours is the best while others struggle for theirs. In this it would be that a struggle is between interpretations of bonds of mutual recognition and not between people. The people who resist and struggle for their interpretations are only the champion of that interpretation, ready to let it drop when presented with a better alternative. This step can only happen if you understand

¹⁰³ Fraser, 1989 , p. 29

that your idea of what is the best interpretation is based on limited experience and knowledge. Because of this it is possible that you conclude that another interpretation is better based on new experiences and knowledge. From this we can conclude that resistance is not targeted against others in a collision but targeted against other interpretations.

The last point of interest of the theory of recognition is culture. Foucault mentions that culture is a web of beliefs that have been consolidated. The beliefs that make up the culture are very hard to challenge. Patton mentions that Foucault calls this form of power in culture domination.¹⁰⁴ Fraser seems to agree with that ascription by Patton.¹⁰⁵ Even if there are collisions in the theory of recognition, the culture will always overarch these, and because culture has power all struggles in a theory of recognition would still be power struggles. I think that a satisfying answer by Honneth would be to replace other forms of culture with a culture of living in mutual recognition. This means that culture as we know it now would be replaced. Culture now is a normality based on whoever has the most power. Normality in a theory of recognition is based on mutual recognition. That means that power is not what determines normality but the conjoined interpretation of what a bond of mutual recognition would look like. All actors in a society have the same interest: the interest of living in a bond of mutual recognition with all others in a society. This means that culture does not dominate people, because domination presupposes that there are people with conflicting interests. Since everyone has the same interest of mutual recognition there is no reason to object and thus no domination.

A culture of mutual recognition cannot dominate other people. If other people do not want to live in a bond of mutual recognition there is no relation of mutual recognition because such a relation presupposes reciprocity. A culture that dominates others does not recognize them as equal: this means that by definition a culture of mutual recognition cannot dominate other people because it would cease to be a culture of mutual recognition at the moment it tries to dominate others. Of course this interpretation, by definition, excludes people who do not want to live in mutual recognition. Any struggle with people like that will be a power struggle because you have contrary interests. This means that a group that wants to live in mutual recognition to each other may still dominate over others who refuse to live in mutual recognition with that group.

In the previous three points, we have seen that the theory of recognition can sufficiently deal with the problems the theory of power by Foucault sets forth. The theory of recognition does not have a problem with conflicting interest, with resistance directed at others or with culture. From this it follows that a collision in the theory of recognition is not necessarily a struggle of power.

4.2

In 4.1 this thesis has answered its research question. The answer is that a struggle in a theory of recognition is not necessarily a power struggle. This means that the theory of recognition has the ability to provide a form of deciding on struggles without those struggles being power

¹⁰⁴ Patton, 1994, p. 64

¹⁰⁵ Fraser, 1989, p. 20

struggles. The ideal of the theory of recognition is that all struggles are decided as collisions without the use of power. According to Honneth, this can never be fully achieved. That is why there will always be conflicts as struggles for recognition.¹⁰⁶

With the theory of recognition, Honneth did not only seek to be able to have the possibility of struggles that are not power struggles, but he also wants to change society. Honneth falls in the tradition of the critical theory which seeks to change society practically. This means that the theory of recognition should have practical use for society. In its practical use, I think Honneth has overlooked one crucial point, and it is exactly this point that is important as to why the ideal of the theory of recognition cannot ever be fully achieved.

The theory of recognition is based on the idea that there is a bond of mutual recognition between actors. Those two actors live in a society in which they both recognize others as autonomous, individuated and equal.¹⁰⁷ The crucial point here is that this is reciprocal. There is no mutual recognition without it coming from both sides. If I recognize someone else as an equal but he does not do the same, then we are not equal. The decision on how you treat others and how you behave in a conflict decides what sort of conflict it is. If you are only interested in your self-interest then it is a struggle for self-interest, a struggle for recognition a conflict for recognition, and when you try to figure it out together in a bond of mutual recognition a collision. How you behave in the conflict decides what kind of conflict it is, but that also depends on the other person. If you know that the other does not care for your interest, then the best you can do is struggle for recognition in a conflict.

The reason why the ideal of the theory of recognition cannot ever be fully achieved has to do with this mutual dependency in a struggle. If both people are in a bond of mutual recognition, there is no problem: there is however, in real life scenarios, never a sure way to know if the other recognizes you as an equal. Of course, there are some scenarios in which they are easier to distinguish, but this thesis does not suggest that the theory was created to help in scenarios in which this is easy. This means that the important part that Honneth does not fully address is a bond of trust. A bond of trust means that you trust the other to want to live in the same way with you as the other way around. If you know that the other means well and that you can figure things out together, it is much easier to remain calm and listen to each other than when you fear the other. This can lead to either an elimination of struggles or struggles as collision in which even though you listen to each other still disagree about the course of action that should be taken. If you do not trust the other actor it is much safer to only struggle for your own self-interest. If you do not struggle for your self-interest the other may take it away from you. This bond of trust is important even when struggles get heated to still believe that you both are in a bond of mutual recognition and that the other will not decide to do something at your expense. I think that just wanting to live with someone as recognizing them as a mutual is not enough: trust is a necessary condition here. My personal belief is that most people in the Netherlands want to live in mutual recognition with refugees, and that most refugees want to live in mutual recognition with the Dutch citizens. The problem in this scenario however is not the recognition of the other as equal, but the failure of having a bond of trust that the other wants the same thing. This distrust leads to fear of the other and the idea that we have to

¹⁰⁶ Honneth, 1995, p. 178

¹⁰⁷ Honneth, 1995, p. 174

defend ourselves against the other. Without this trust a bond of mutual recognition cannot come about even if people would want it. It should be clear that this criticism is not directed at the theory of recognition as having the goal of mutual recognition: it is aimed at the failure to address the condition of trust in order to achieve this bond of mutual recognition. The theory of recognition follows in the tradition of the critical theory. This means that it seeks to have practical impact. If you want practical impact you have to address the conditions that make it possible what you propose. Maybe my critique would be better formulated differently: by failing to distinguish between conflicts for recognition and collisions, Honneth fails to form a theory that can have a lot of value in practical application. Of course, it is true that his theory will help analyze struggles differently, but without a bond of trust a real change cannot be made. It is because of this that this thesis concludes and suggests that if anyone wants to make the theory of recognition a success, they have to look into the bond of trust between actors and how this can create and solidify relations based on mutual recognition.

Conclusion

This thesis started with a quote from Erich Fromm in which he described how you cannot blindly trust the masses. The fact that many people believe in the same pathologies does not make them virtues, and they can do serious harm to a society.¹⁰⁸ To see this you have to go no further than the discussion regarding the skin color of Black Pete in the Netherlands. The question this thesis has to answer is how can we analyze and solve these pathologies. To answer this question, this thesis focused on the tradition of the critical theory, especially on the theory of recognition by Axel Honneth. So how did the theory of recognition deal with these pathologies? The problem Honneth saw with these pathologies is that they are products of the normality: the cultural ideology of a society constructed by power relations. This means that Black Pete stayed black because of the power culture has over society. To be able to address this pathology, Honneth needed to be able to address power relations. That is why the research question for this thesis was the following: “is it necessarily so that a struggle in the theory of recognition is a power struggle?” This thesis researched if Honneth managed to achieve a theory in which struggles do not necessarily have to be power struggles and in doing so give a possibility to analyze and solve pathologies such as in the discussion about the skin color of Black Pete. The theory of recognition suggests a bond of mutual recognition. This means to take the other as an individuated, autonomous, and equal person. This mutual recognition functions as an objective outsider’s position to judge cultural normality as good or pathologies. Mutual recognition also functions as a way to make people have the same interest as opposed to conflicting interests. In Foucault’s definition of power, we have seen that power is restricted to a struggle of conflicting interests. Since mutual recognition takes away these conflicting interests we can conclude that a theory of recognition is not necessarily a struggle of power. With this conclusion, we can analyze the discussion about the skin color of Black Pete: is this a struggle of power or not? This thesis proposed three possible verdicts. It is a struggle for self-interest, a struggle for recognition, or a collision. The theory of recognition does help us theoretically, but practically it lacks ways to distinguish these different forms of

¹⁰⁸ Fromm, 2002, p. 15

struggles. The reason for this is that the struggle about the skin color of Black Pete can be both a struggle for recognition and a collision: the difference lies in the behavior of people. This thesis suggests that if the theory of recognition wants to have more practical implications, and be in line with the tradition of the critical theory, it has to take into account the relation of trust between actors in a struggle. If you trust the other to take you as an equal it is easier to take him as an equal, this would lead to a struggle being taken as a collision. Without this bond of trust a bond of mutual recognition cannot exist. Ultimately, a struggle in the theory of recognition is not necessarily a power struggle.

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