

An investigation into the extent to which weak or fragile states can incorporate hybrid governance with Non-State Actors as an alternative form of governance.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the extent to which hybrid governance structures can be formed between weak or fragile states and non-state actors and how it can result in a challenge to the Mexican and the Jamaican state. This study undertakes this using a literature review, looking at the approach of realism to the topic and two case studies on Mexico and Jamaica. The case studies put the theoretical approaches of the literature review into a real-world context in order to get a complete understanding of the issues at hand. With the ever increasing influence of NSAs in the political system, it is important to understand these actors and how they relate to states that are weak or fragile. By doing so we can see if alternative forms of governance can be made in particularly lawless areas and what, if any, is the realist response. The level of the erosion of state sovereignty is important in influencing the relationship between the state and any NSAs in a hybrid governance structure.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the extent to which hybrid governance between weak or fragile states and non-state actors (NSAs) is feasible. While there has been research into the concept of hybrid governance and its position among weak states in academic discussion, this study extends this research with regard to the potential for hybrid governance to be of use to states like Mexico and Jamaica via my case studies on the two countries. I will be exploring the ways in which some states, whether through choice or by having their hand forced, can co-opt NSAs to use as an alternative form of government in areas of their country that is harder to govern directly and are generally more lawless.

The research question that I am investigating is, to what extent can weak states use hybrid governance structures in concert with NSAs to form an alternative form of government and how far can classical Realism account for it? I hypothesise that, since NSAs have now become very important and are influential players in the international political system, *the weaker the government, the more they can gain from, and in fact need, the NSAs*, as I will explore in the Case study section with Mexico and Kingston, Jamaica. This is something that classical Realism, in its rigid structure cannot fully reconcile. I will explore this by conducting a literature review on the themes at hand and their relationship to classical Realism, since it is important to understand the current state of research by other scholars on the topic. To supplement this, I will also carry out two qualitative case studies. Undertaking a case study deepens our understanding of the forces at play by placing the theoretical foundations into a real world context.

In this thesis I will be looking at how some weak or fragile states are forced to or choose to use the provisions of NSAs to aid themselves in carrying out their governmental functions. To this end, I will be analysing the increasingly relevant notion of hybrid governance, which has been gaining traction among academics like Kate Meagher, who are beginning to seek a reconceptualisation of the weak-state narrative and wish to turn towards a more results-based outlook that is already being put into practice on the ground. “The over-riding emphasis in most cases seems to be about turning a negative discourse into a more positive one: instead of focusing on the state and what it is not or does not do in particular contexts, we should focus primarily on what social and political structures do exist” (Goodfellow, T. 2016). This reflects a change in the approach among academics on the topic.

Out of the different types of non-state actors such as Multi-National Corporations or Non-Governmental Organisations, for the purposes of this thesis, I will mostly be looking at violent non-state actors (VNSAs). VNSAs can be defined as non-state actors that “resort not only to random or opportunistic aggression, but to collective violence as a tool to achieve goals” and in doing so, challenge the state’s legitimate monopoly on violence. (Bartolomei, J, Casebeer, W, Thomas, T. 2004: p:2). These VNSAs can come in all shapes and sizes from warlords, drug cartels, criminal organisations and terrorists, among others. “In many cases these groups are challenging the state; in others they are cooperating and colluding with state structures; in some, the state is a passive by-stander while they fight one another. In several instances they are both fighting one another and confronting state structures that seek either to destroy them or to bring them under control.” (Williams, P. 2008. p:4)

The Mexican drug cartels are a prime example of the kinds of VNSAs that are directly challenging the state. This power that the cartels have to challenge the state is pervasive. Through the systemic use of brutal violence and intimidation tactics, the cartels have been able to take over control of some areas of the country from the government, with the by-product being innumerable deaths and a general sense of insecurity for the people living in these areas. These characteristics of the cartels and their operations is an example of the ways in which violent non-state actors challenge the traditional realist views of state sovereignty, namely the sanctity of the notion in international politics. Sovereignty can be defined as “an idea of authority embodied in those bordered territorial organizations we refer to as 'states' or 'nations' and expressed in their various relations and activities, both domestic and foreign” (Jackson, R. 2007: p IX). Conventional sovereignty is currently the only fully legitimated institutional form, but unfortunately, it does not always work since there is an inherent assumption of a world of autonomous, internationally recognized, and well-governed states. Although frequently violated by VNSAs in practice, the fundamental rules of conventional sovereignty have rarely been challenged in principle, since conventional realist literature doesn’t acknowledge this realistic challenge to sovereignty. This thesis intends to highlight this fact and in doing so aims to contribute to the existing literature.

The challenges to state sovereignty are key to the rise of hybrid governance, since they establish the political environment in which alternative structures of government can flourish. One method of challenging state sovereignty, as I will be illustrating later in the thesis, is the use of narco-terrorism, which challenges the state monopoly on violence and governmental internal supremacy, thus by extension its sovereignty. A state’s monopoly of physical

violence is of key importance to its identity as a legitimate state and to have it challenged is of grave concern. Further challenging state sovereignty is also simply the existence of such a strong violent non-state actor. In the worst cases, these actors have weakened a state to such an extent that they may no longer be recognised as legitimate by other states and as capable of possessing the necessary level of intra-state supremacy needed to carry out its internal affairs unimpeded. The Mexican cartels' ambitious pursuit of power poses a very real threat to the Mexican government and its people. In this way, there is plenty of scope for non-state forms of order to be incorporated into governance in weak or fragile states. This happens unhindered in many regions of the world and thus the research in this dissertation yields broader implications beyond the case of Mexico. Hence it is important to understand the nature of hybrid governance and its effect on the lawless areas of weak or fragile states.

In chapter 1, I will be carrying out a literature review, where I will explore the theoretical approaches to the topic, including how NSAs affect state sovereignty, the academically budding concept of hybrid governance and the realist approach towards NSAs. In chapter 2, I will undertake a case study of the operations of the drug cartels in Mexico and their relationship with the government. In chapter 3, I will look at my second case study on the dons of Kingston, Jamaica and their relationship with the government. The next section will be my concluding remarks where I bring all my findings together.

METHODS

A thesis like this needs to have a clearly demarcated methodology in order to be well-rounded. I will be carrying out a literature review of the relevant topics and themes in order to gauge academic writing on these issues. It is important to highlight the key concepts that I will be analysing in the literature review section. I will be looking at the literature on non-state actors, especially with a focus on violent non-state actors (VNSAs), since oftentimes in weak states, it is the VNSAs that can form hybrid governance structures with the state. To this end I will analyse how some academics view hybrid governance and how it fits into the current IRT framework. The growing influence of NSAs and hybrid governance has a significant impact on state sovereignty, thus I will be looking at the theoretical approaches towards state sovereignty and its relationship with VNSAs and hybrid governance. I will also look at how the established international relations theory of classical Realism relates to these themes. I will review the work of various realist scholars and explore it in relation to the themes at hand. Analysing the some of the previous research on these topics undertaken by other academics is an important medium through which we attempt to understand their subjective and objective reality. So it is essential to take a step back and critically analyse the debate as it is presented by academics for any biases or alternative perspectives.

There has been a broad range of research conducted on the 1990s, but not as much on the 2000s onwards, hence I will focus more on the actions of non-state actors and their relationships with weak or fragile states from 2000- 2016. This time frame is relevant to the two case studies I will be carrying out; one on VNSA activity in Mexico and one on VNSAs in Jamaica. Case studies are incredibly useful tools to put to use in a thesis. Robert Yin defines it as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, R. 2009: p14). This way we can reach a better understanding of the themes and ideas being discussed. In the Case Study sections, I will see how congruent the theories and approaches that were covered in the literature review section are to the situations in the Jamaica and Mexico. Carrying out two case studies in this way, adds more value than doing just one, as they can be compared to each other and the themes of challenges to state sovereignty and hybrid governance structures can be fleshed out in a real world context.

In my case studies, I will use process tracing to make sure the cases are fleshed out and relevant. Process tracing is an important methodology in qualitative international relations research. It can be defined as “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator.” (Collier, D. 2011. p:823). In other words, in using process tracing, one asks ‘how does X produce circumstances or conditions that together produces Y?’ In the case of this thesis, the dependant variable, X, would be non-state actors, the conditions would be the challenge of state sovereignty and the independent variable, Y, would be hybrid governance. So in essence, the real aim of process tracing is to find the causal mechanism by examining how far a proposed theory fits the intervening causal steps. “Process-tracing case studies can make a critical contribution in providing a more precise measurement of these critical junctures and tipping points in individual cases” (Tarrow, S. 1995. p:474). So by going through this process in my case studies, I intend to validate my hypothesis that the weaker the government, the more they can gain out of cooperating with NSAs.

This approach fits well with the congruence method that comes with process tracing. Having first described the various theories and approaches relevant to the topic, I will then see how congruent my case studies are with the theories explored. In congruence testing, there is a particular focus on the values of the dependant and independent variables instead of the various intervening variables. In doing so, one tests to see whether the dependant variable’s predicted value, when compared to the value of the independent variable is indeed congruent to the outcome of the case. However, one should bear in mind some of the shortcomings of this method. “Congruence tests are usually less conclusive than process tracing because in the social sciences we usually lack precise models of the value that the individual variables, individually and collectively, should produce in the dependent variable.” (Sprinz, D. F; Wolinsky, Y. 2004. P:32). However, I will be using congruence testing, in concert with process tracing, which will result in a stronger methodology.

It is important that there is triangulation in my research for this thesis. In conducting research, there are many factors involved from data collection to source selection and one must be mindful that these factors could distort the results of your research. For example, in my research I could only choose information from different publication of the same source which would colour my findings with the same bias, thus yielding skewed results. By employing triangulation, the potential for these factors to skew your results is reduced. “Triangulation’ is a process of verification that increases validity by incorporating several viewpoints and

methods. In the social sciences, it refers to the combination of two or more theories, data sources, methods or investigators in one study”. (Yeasmin, S; Khan, R F. 2012. p:156). Thus in this thesis, I aim to have a triangulated approach in my data collection, where I use a variety of different sources apart from journal articles and academic books, such as newspapers, UN documents, government or NGO policy papers etc. This kind of a triangulation is important, as it gives a ‘balance’ to the thesis since it acts as a cross-checker from potentially different viewpoints, thus increasing credibility and the validity of the findings.

CHAPTER 1- LITERATURE REVIEW

To get a firm understanding of NSAs in International Relations Theory (IRT), it is best to lay a foundation with the Classical Realist approach. “Realists and neo-realists not only assume that human nature is essentially bad, but also assume that the state matters most. They make state sovereignty and the ungoverned nature of a state-made world their key political reference points.” (Pettman, R. 2005: p144). Classical Realism puts great importance on the rationality of actors in the international system. As one of the founding fathers of Classical Realism, Hans Morgenthau puts it, “[Realism] believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion- between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.” (Morgenthau, H. 2005. p:34-35). Realism is one of the most widespread and traditionally strong ideals in IRT and deals more with ‘high politics’, matters of war and foreign policy focusing almost entirely on the state as the most important actor in the international system.

This primacy of the state is a key tenet of Realism, as Hobson agrees, “Autonomous nation states are the central actors in International politics” (Hobson, J.M: 2000). At this point, it is important to clarify that Realism is still the very central to IRT. “Realism remains the primary or alternative theory in virtually every major book and article addressing general theories of world politics, particularly in security affairs.” (Legro, J; Moravcsik, A. 1999. P:5). Thus, despite significant amounts of new research, Realism still enjoys a prominent place in IRT.

However, due to its blinkered approach, especially when it comes to the state, Realism often misses the nuances involved in the nature of international relations such as the influence of NSA on government policy or the influence of market forces on a state’s economy. This led to the development of neo-realism, as initially outlined by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, where he ran realism through a systemic approach that helped explain actors’ decision making and behaviour with regard to the structural constraints in the international system. “In response to accelerated activity by non-state actors and the resulting criticism of realism in the 1970s, Waltz emphasized the role of these actors and argued that while the nature of power had changed (and was divided at that time among different types of actors), its use had not” (Valensi, C. 2015: p64). So we see that Classical Realism by itself struggled to explain the rising influence of NSAs in the world, resulting in neoliberals like Robert Keohane making

their mark in IRT. Extra-state actors in the international system began to exert influence often countering the need to display military might. “Interdependence and globalism is becoming more widespread, so relations between different networks and countries have become more important” (R O Keohane & J S Nye, 2000: 109). So we see that according to neoliberals like Keohane, the concept of the state as the prime actor is slowly losing its monopoly in IRT.

To return to Classical Realism, the focus is towards power and the military in an anarchic world; its foremost paradigm being that all political groups are first and foremost concerned with their own security against potential threats. In realism, these threats are seen as other states- “National security systems are often directed at other states.” (Baldwin, D. 1997: p15) Of course, this situation often leads to conflict between different groups operating within the same system. States exist as independent entities in an anarchic system, meaning that there is no ‘government of governments’ which can be relied upon to keep the actions of rebellious sovereign states in check, although the United Nations does try to fulfil this role, arguably with limited success. As Krasner puts it, “external sovereignty does not imply that the state will be entirely unconstrained in its action. It is, instead, the claim that the state is authorised to reject commands from any outside body. Whether the state can make the rejection stick is another matter; the theory is often violated by the facts.” (Krasner, S.D. 2001: 58). However, “to say that states are sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please, that they are free of others’ influence, that they are able to get what they want.” (Waltz, K.N. 1979: 96). This approach puts the state in a ‘dominant’ position, having to deal with large and internationally important bodies like the United Nations and other nation states.

Tying in closely with this notion of the state, is the importance of state sovereignty for realists. This can be seen as “Internal sovereignty, which means supremacy over all other authorities within that territory and population” and “external sovereignty, by which is meant not supremacy, but independence.” (Russett, B, Starr, H. 1996: 54). This notion is held sacrosanct by die-hard realists. However, it is far too rigid in its approach to account for the effect that the actions of VNSAs have on traditional views of security as they are often able to erode state sovereignty. VNSAs like the Mexican drug cartels are a prime example of this.

With the rise in the numbers and activities of non-state actors since 1990, has come a renewed interest in NSAs. Academic writing has moved from *whether* NSAs actually matter to *how* they matter and the ways in which they are impacting the international system. (Meagher, K; De Herdt, T; Titeca, K. 2014). Non state actors, are those actors on the

international stage that do not represent any nation state, yet are highly relevant in and operate at the international level. One common definition of the term in literature can be put forth as organisations “emanating from civil society, or from the market economy, or from political impulses beyond state control and direction.” who act “in ways which affect political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international institutions, either purposefully or semi-purposefully, either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities.” (Josselin, D & Wallace, W. 2001: p3-4).

The strong effect that NSAs can have on a nation state’s policies is highlighted by Morris. In response to the immense power and dominance of the Cartels, “Soon after taking office in December 2006 following a highly disputed election, President Felipe Calderon dispatched tens of thousands of military troops and federal police to key states, launching a self-declared war on organised crime and drugs that would trigger an unprecedented wave of violence and insecurity”. (Morris, S. 2013: p43). In doing so, Calderon steered a sovereign nation to engage in a form of high politics of war with another actor that is not in fact also a state. This is an conundrum for classical realism which is unable to adequately account for it within the inflexible theoretical framework of realism. They cannot account for the fact that on the ground, the cartels have essentially managed to hijack and take over control of local state apparatus in some areas and use that power to further their own aims. This again highlights the idea that the primacy of state sovereignty as a concept is being challenged due to the fact that a nation’s security is being threatened not by another sovereign state as is traditionally expected, but by a violent non-state actor.

It is not just VNSAs that are challenging state sovereignty. The growing interconnectedness of the world also contributes to this, as Liberalists argue that “state sovereignty is being eroded by economic interdependence, global scale technologies and democratic politics... states can no longer control their borders.” (Thompson, J. 1995: 215). Theoretical frameworks like Responsibility to Protect also work to further erode the strength of state sovereignty, as the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Programme in 1994 argued that “focusing on the protection of people rather than state sovereignty is the most valuable approach to tackling global insecurities.” So it is evident that the notion of state sovereignty being of overriding importance over all other considerations is losing influence and doesn’t hold the same monopoly it once did.

Although no state is completely free of VNSAs, weak states and VNSAs go hand in hand. Some analysts see states which are either weak or incompetent as ideal breeding grounds for the development of VNSAs- “the roots of violence create the optimal conditions for VNSA incubation... failures in governance, identity mobilisation and reinforcing behaviour” are necessary to cement VNSA presence. (Bartolomei, J, Casebeer, W, Thomas, T. 2004: p:6). Failures in Governance like the inability to provide basic goods and services, lack of security for its citizens, illegitimacy due to ideological incompatibility can all lead to the forming and strengthening of VNSAs. Transformation processes like identity mobilisation is important in understanding the formation of VNSAs, where ‘members of the disaffected community begin to associate with other identity cleavages’. A charismatic leader is often key in this process, who leverages the failings of the government and the conditions of violence to manipulate these identity cleavages. This process of identity mobilization, where members of the disaffected community begin to associate with other identity cleavages, is often overlooked but has an impact in the formation of VNSAs in weak states. The psychological process of identity formation is explored and related to forming or joining a VNSA. A key agent in this conversion is the identity entrepreneur, or charismatic leader that leverages the conditions of violence and failures in governance to manipulate identity cleavages. A prime example of this is Ernest Wamba dia Wamba of The rally for Congolese Democracy, backed by the governments of Uganda and Rwanda which led to the Second Congo War (1998-2003.)

One of the key theoretical qualifiers for statehood generally agreed upon by academics such as Max Weber, is the monopoly of violence held by the state; it is of prime importance for its continued legitimacy. “The monopoly on the use of physical force if it succeeds using its organisational capacities (military and police force) to overcome competitors (eg. Rebel groups, organised crime) who threaten the state’s monopoly on physical force.” (Schlenkrich, O, Lemm, L, Klotzbach, M. 2016. P:). Here it is important to distinguish between juridical statehood and empirical statehood. Juridical statehood refers to the legal status of the state with regard to other states viewing it as a sovereign nation. This gives a blinkered, incomplete view on statehood. A state needs have empirical statehood as well. Traditionally, empirical statehood is when a state is seen to display an ‘effective government’ and ‘compulsory jurisdiction.’, which includes centralised administrative and legal organs.

However, this can appear to be Eurocentric in its approach since, on top of administrating, it also associates governance with legislating. However, as can be seen in many parts of Africa,

governance is not necessarily carried out through legislation, but by the arbitrary decrees and edicts of personal rulers and their inner circle. Taking this into account, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosenberg propose a more universal definition, “a centralized government with the capacity to exercise control over a state's territory and the people residing in it. By "exercise control" we mean the ability to pronounce, implement, and enforce commands, laws, policies, and regulation” (Jackson, R, Rosenberg, C. 1982. P6). So we see that in some parts of Mexico and Jamaica, the government is unable to ‘exercise control over a state’s territory’, due to the actions of its internal enemies. This calls into question its internal legitimacy, since although they might have juridical statehood, their empirical statehood can be weak in practice. However, it is important to mention that this prevalence of VNSAs is not just limited to weak states. They have made their presence felt in nearly all the nations of the world and have left the state monopoly on violence as a convenient fiction.

With the continued pervasiveness of failed states has come a general sense of disillusionment among academics and policy-makers with the notion of failed state ideas of governance in Africa and other parts of the world, where the neoliberal state building agenda of ‘good governance’ is fast losing steam in favour of practical solutions such as local non-state actors already at work at the ground level- ‘arrangements that work’. This enables the prevalence of instances of hybrid governance. Although specifying an exact definition is difficult, since it is a fluid and changing process, hybrid governance, “has emerged to refer to these new organizational arrangements, incorporating local institutions and popular organizations, which fill gaps in state capacity.” (Meagher, K; De Herdt, T; Titeca, K. 2014. p:5). Although hybrid governance arrangements, where non-state institutions are incorporated into formal government is nothing new, academics and policy-makers are now looking beyond the traditional state-centric notions of governance to see the extent to which new strategies of incorporating non-state actors into governance can form order. So we see that the previously accepted theoretical judgements on informal non-state actors’ role in governance is being suspended in favour of results-based, practical outcomes such as continued delivery of public services. There is a strong prevalence of different types of non-state actors that engage in carrying out government functions, such as policing underprivileged neighbourhoods in Kingston by the Dons or to use an example outside the purview of this thesis, as Kate Meagher points out- “A surprising array of non-state actors are carrying out governance functions, including rebel militias engaging in taxation and service provision in neglected areas of the DRC, or public health services in Niger depending on bribery and voluntary

cleaning services by hospital users.” (Meagher, K, De Herdt, T, Titeca, K. 2014. p:2). Taking an African example such as this demonstrates the global scope of these characteristics of VNSAs. Apart from these internal actors, there is also a significant amount of international actors that get involved, further complicating matters and yielding mixed results. This can be seen in the intense pressure that the United States’ government puts on the Mexican authorities to handle the drug situation within Mexico that often spills over within US borders. “International actors can shift the balance of forces away from socially accountable political processes, substituting upward for downward accountability in response to resources and monitoring systems” (Meagher, K, De Herdt, T, Titeca, K. 2014. p:3). In this way, hybrid governance can have a serious impact on states’ handling of VNSAs, especially states like Mexico, where mishandling of relations with VNSAs have led to a dire situation internally.

When talking of hybrid governance with the involvement of non-state actors, the question of legitimacy invariably comes up. Who defines the legitimacy of hybrid arrangements? Is it the international state system or the citizens? Or is it in fact the scholars or the policy-makers? This is the key drawback of the hybrid governance system, since it is very difficult to come to a consensus on the true legitimacy of any particular arrangement. Although it is often assumed that the embedded local non-state actors that are already active on the ground are legitimate by definition, oftentimes, their legitimacy is as contested as that of any official order in many states. As I will expand in the case study section, a good example of this in action can be seen in the Kingston, Jamaica, where “Dons – local gangs leaders [are] now deeply involved in Jamaica’s political turf and patronage – gained more power, rendering them more autonomous and transforming political-criminal relationships even further.” (Dr. Arias, E.D. 2013: p222). The decision-makers on the ground tend to be too short-sighted in their approach when co-opting questionable non-state orders like warlords or local dons into a hybrid governance arrangement, as this may yield low-cost solutions to governance problems in the short term, but they risk wearing away local consent and legitimacy in the long run. The danger of this is that if it is allowed to continue, over time it becomes incorporated into the norm and violent and oppressive social orders become a normalised feature of officially recognised government systems.

In this way, by going through these ideas by other academics, we see that state sovereignty is being challenged by non-state actors and in fact state sovereignty has never been absolute. This challenge to sovereignty is particularly destabilising for weak states such as Mexico and Jamaica, where government assistance in many aspects of life is often non-existent. Thus,

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they have a higher proclivity to engage NSAs in hybrid government structures. Oftentimes, these states engage with the ordering capabilities of VNSAs and in doing so, are often in danger of permanently legitimising the oppressive and violent nature of these actors into the official governance stance.

CHAPTER 2- CASE STUDY: MEXICO

VNSOs like the Mexican drug cartels have the country in a tight grip of violence and fear. To understand the impact that VNSOs in Mexico have on the country, it is important to have an understanding of the overall situation in Mexico. Since 2006, there has been an ongoing Drug war, where the Mexican government has engaged in an all-out, military style assault on the drug cartels' operating in Mexico, coming at an exorbitant cost to the state. Although exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, it is estimated by the end of Philippe Calderon's administration that over 60,000 people have lost their lives both directly and indirectly because of it, and that number has grown ever since then. The war is far from won, with the cartels becoming even more bold and successful. In fact, they even began operating with impunity in many of the major cities of the United States to the point that it has become a matter of homeland security for the Americans.

The situation is far worse for the Mexican government, as in some parts of the country, the cartels have effectively overrun some aspects of government to the point that Mexico could even be considered a weak state. Through bribes and threats of violence the cartels have managed to get members of the judiciary in their pockets and in doing so have been able to sway court proceedings in their favour.

The concept of VNSAs eroding state sovereignty, as explained in the previous chapter is starkly highlighted in Mexico. Jackson (2007) defines Sovereignty as "an idea of authority embodied in those bordered territorial organizations we refer to as 'states' or 'nations' and expressed in their various relations and activities, both domestic and foreign" (Jackson, R. 2007: p IX). In this framework, conventional sovereignty is the only fully legitimated institutional form, but unfortunately, it does not always work due to the anarchic nature of the political system and the actions of VNSAs. This is the key threat that the government faces from the cartels. When a population is threatened, the state's capacity for protecting its people is central to maintaining its continued legitimacy. In the case of Mexico, we see that, "Hobbled by economic adversity, outrun by globalization and undermined from within by bad governance, the capacity for some states to provide this protection has increasingly come into question" (Axworthy, L. 2001: p19). The situation even goes against the tenets of the United Nations, where the importance of the state providing security for its population is emphasised. The notion of Human Security has increasingly been on the forefront of the

UN's agenda. The 2012 General Assembly passed a resolution on Human Security which stresses the role of "Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to survival, livelihood and dignity of their people". (General Assembly resolution 66/290). So it is clear that the Mexican government faces an uphill struggle against the cartels.

So we see that the Mexican government is faced with stagnation in many areas of the economy and contends with a serious problems of corruption within its ranks. Corruption is a key method VNSAs like the Mexican cartels employ to ensure their position of power.

"Corruption—purchasing the non-enforcement of the law through bribes and payoffs—can have a pacifying effect, since it reflects informal accommodation. Indeed, the breakdown of this arrangement in the case of Mexico has contributed to the great upsurge in violence since 2006." (Andreas, P. 2011:420). So the cartels have managed to secure these 'informal accommodations' to further their cause. Having cornered the multi-billion-dollar drug market into the US, the cartels have large reserves of money that they can use to grease the pockets of corrupt politicians and law enforcement officials. Despite the fact that the Mexican government has acknowledged the problem and have taken steps to address it, corruption and bribery is endemic. The Cartels, through their extensive finances and ruthless intimidation tactics have managed to control not just vast swathes of territory but also many governmental institutions. The corruption of the judicial system enables many captured cartel members to avoid convictions. By targeting the politicians and judicial officials in this way, the cartels manage to weaken the local government and impose their power over the area and are able to operate with virtual impunity.

This level of threat that the cartels pose to the Mexican government is contrary to traditional realist beliefs on security, which is entirely state-centric. The importance of the state cannot be overstated in Realism, as Hobson concurs, "Autonomous nation states are the central actors in International politics" (Hobson, J.M: 2000). However, despite this, the cartels prove to be a dangerous opponent, despite the fact that they are not another state and thus, do not fit the realist criteria of a threat to a state as mentioned in the literature review. So the mere fact that the cartels are still a real threat to the state is a clear illustration of the ways in which VNSAs are challenging state sovereignty.

To make matters worse, in some areas of the country, they are taking over the monopoly of violence from the Mexican government, something that is an integral part of a state's

sovereignty. This again goes against the traditional realist perspective, where the state is the only key actor in the international political system and whose sovereignty is deemed absolute. These tactics are often called ‘narco-terrorism’ and can be defined as “the attempts of narcotics traffickers to influence the policies of government by the systematic threat or use of violence” (Björnehed, E. 2004: 306). So in this way, we see that the use of narco-terrorism challenges the state monopoly on violence and governmental internal supremacy, thus by extension its sovereignty.

As previously mentioned, globalisation has had a significant impact on state sovereignty and the Mexican cartels have managed to use it to their advantage. The state meanwhile has not been able to keep up with the rapidly changing world. The cartels embrace ‘economic interdependence’ and use ‘global scale technologies’ to launder their money. Globalisation has helped them carry out their operations with resounding success. By piggybacking globalised financial networks and carrying out highly sophisticated and specialised money laundering operations they have managed to move and store vast amounts of illegally obtained capital. They have been smart and managed to keep up with the times, often employing new media to help achieve their aims. A prime example of this is the ways in which the drug cartels in Mexico deploy the internet to intimidate and bully their targets. “Mexico’s war is fought through YouTube and mobile phones as well as back-room torture chambers. Cartels and killers use YouTube to threaten rivals and public officials, and boast of their killings, or set up rogue websites to broadcast their savagery.” (Ed Vulliamy, 2010). By doing so, the cartels harness the power of new technologies and run it parallel to the reach and influence of their illicit economic circles. This means that they are able to carry out their operations unhampered across North America, Central America, and South America, even making their way as far as Africa and Europe.

However, apart from this, it is important to bear in mind the economic climate that has helped breed the cartels. Neoliberalism and neoliberal policies have had a significant impact on the present nature of the drug trade. On top of the theories discussed, at the same time, it is important to bear in mind the impact of neoliberalism on the drug trade in Mexico. Harvey defines Neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong property rights, free market and free trade.” (Harvey, D. 2005: p2). The concept of neoliberalism has been developing in IRT for approximately the past two decades. It involves the new forms of politico-economic

governance that is pinned to the extension of market relationships. A key tenet of neoliberalism is the significance of the globalisation of capital as represented by the markets. It is often viewed as a policy framework, “marked by a shift from Keynesian welfarism towards a political agenda favouring the relatively unfettered operation of markets. Often, this renewed emphasis on markets is understood to be directly associated with the so-called ‘globalisation’ of capital.” (Larner, W. 2006: p200). Although Keynesianism had its value and dominated the way economic policy was framed during 1945-1970, the following era followed a more ‘monetarist’ approach. Where previously Keynesian ideas of full employment and the easing of poverty might have held sway, macroeconomic policy began to become dominated by the neoliberalist tradition. This was seen in state regulation of the economy and a marked increase in interdependence between within-state actors. So we see that stability of economic policy was given high importance. There are analysts like Mercille that argue that neoliberal policies like NAFTA has indeed boosted the drug trade and had a supremely negative impact on Mexico. Mercille argues that there are other interests that help propagate trade deals like NAFTA. “US hegemonic projects like NAFTA have been protected and policed partly under the pretext of the war on drugs, which is used discursively to promote closer bilateral relations between the US and Mexican militaries.” (Mercille, J. 2011: p1640). So we see that different state interests can have decisive impacts on policies and outcomes, particularly on the drug trade in Mexico.

However, all this has taken place relatively recently. Although I have set my timeline as between 2000-2016, some historical context is important in order to get a more rounded understanding of the current situation. Mexico is an interesting case in relation to hybrid governance. Before the adoption of these neoliberal ideals, the relationship between the state and NSAs were very different. Before the mid-1990s, the political establishment had worked together with the Mexican criminal elements, in a sense, controlled and managed by the political elites. “The political authorities provided immunity from prosecution for criminal elements, while obtaining money for development, investment and campaign funding for the party, as well as personal enrichment.” (Pimentel, S. 2003. p:175). So as mentioned earlier, hybrid government systems are nothing new. However, for Mexico, over time, things changed. NAFTA came into effect in 1994, new issues gained traction like human rights and global communications and there was a growing middle class that with a bigger demand for democracy. This resulted in those in political power no longer being able to control the criminal organisations and over time they came to be the nemesis of today’s Mexican

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government to the point that the cartels have managed to overtake governmental structures in some parts of the country and provide services for the people in the government's stead. In this way, the Mexican case is interesting in that some hybrid governance structures have formed in some parts of the country, not by choice of the political authorities, but because they have had their hands forced by powerful non-state actors like the cartels.

CHAPTER 3- CASE STUDY: JAMAICA

Jamaica is an island nation in the Caribbean with a population of nearly 3 million people. Since its independence in 1962, the prevalence of organised crime has largely been confined to its capital, Kingston. This case study will look at the ways that non-state actors like organised crime syndicates in the city have managed to take on some hybrid governance structures with the state in order to administer societal provisions in some parts of the city. It is important to note that there has been an evolution in the theoretical understanding of governance. Rather than how in the past, analysis focused solely on the actor or entity that governs, analysts now look at the *process* of ruling and managing populations and territories. It is “the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken.” (Gupta, Verrest and Jaffe. 2015. p:28). So we see that international relations scholars like Gupta, Verrest and Jaffe are opening up to alternative modes of thinking about governance such as the dons or crime bosses in Kingston, Jamaica like the infamous Christopher Coke, otherwise known as ‘Dudus’.

In some inner-city neighbourhoods in Kingston, a range of governmental functions have been taken on by dons. As Rivke Jaffe puts it, “they are part of a hybrid state, an emergent political formation in which multiple governmental actors—in this case, criminal organizations, politicians, police, and bureaucrats—are entangled in a relationship of collusion and divestment, sharing control over urban spaces and populations.” (Jaffe, R. 2013. p:734). The Jamaican state, the poor in the inner-city areas of Kingston and the dons are joined in a system known as ‘garrison politics’ - “a type of electoral turf politics achieved through communal clientelism” (Jaffe, R. 2013. p:734), where the dons act as brokers to the urban poor, often taking on functions of the state. This system is able to exist because the dons have managed to hold the loyalty of some of the population, even to the point of them marching or engaging in armed conflict with the state in solidarity with the dons. This legitimacy and authority of the dons is key to their continued role in the hybrid governance structures with the Jamaican state and can be explained by their provisions of public and private goods to the people. “Indeed, in many cities across the world, criminal organizations have taken on many of the functions traditionally associated with the state, providing crucial public goods such as social welfare, security and dispute resolution to the urban poor” (Harbers, Jaffe and

Cummings. 2016. p:98). These kinds of actors often appear when the state does not adequately provide the goods and services it should to the people. Oftentimes, violent non-state actors like the dons are the only actors able and willing to provide some security and protection to a population faced with rampant criminal violence and activity. This again goes against the teachings of realism, where it is solely the state itself that looks after its security interests within its borders.

These non-state actors strike a finely balanced relationship with the state structures, often swinging between collusion and conflict. “On the one hand, non-state armed actors contribute to maintaining order and therefore take on a valued if not always overt role as partners in urban governance. On the other hand, however, groups financing their activities at least in part through an involvement in organized, often transnational crime pursue goals that put them at odds with the formal state.” (Harbers, Jaffe and Cummings. 2016. p:99). This balance is a key feature of hybrid government structures between states and VNSAs. Given this climate of hybrid governance structures, the population living under it goes through a reconfiguring of citizenship. Having interacted with the various new government agents- both politicians and dons, the people are often able to renegotiate their citizenship in their representation of these government structures. These new forms of statehood and citizenship rely on each other to propagate; it is a symbiotic relationship, albeit one involving coercion by the dons. “The hybrid structures and techniques of governance both shape and are reinforced by populations that understand themselves as members of overlapping political communities” (Jaffe, R. 2013. p:736). In this way, Kinston’s ‘garrisons’ are areas where the government, dons and urban poor have a complex and inter-connected relationship. However, generally in realist theory, there has not been much focus on the challenge to state’s monopoly on coercion in urban areas. “We consider this possibility not just because these particular actors and their contributions to violence and insecurity constitute a serious challenge to governance and livability, but also because they have remained of the intellectual drawing board of most work on national politics and state formation, despite their potential to impact the state’s monopoly of the means of coercion.” (Davies, D. 2010. p:3).

The delicate relationship between VNSAs and the state in a hybrid governance structure can often boil over into conflict. In such times, the coercion of VNSAs can often lead to a sense of Stockholm syndrome for the populations living under the dons’ power, making the situation potentially dangerous for them. The case of Christopher Coke or ‘Dudus’ is a prime example of this. Dudus had had a powerful criminal empire as head of the ‘Shower Posse’,

operating in his areas of Kingston and had strong ties to other criminal organisations around the city. His influence grew to such a level that he was accused of drug trafficking and racketeering by the United States government and was ordered to be extradited to the U.S. With Dudus going into hiding in the Tivoli Gardens area of inner city Kingston, the then prime minister of Jamaica, Bruce Golding, ordered state security forces to invade the Tivoli Gardens and Denham Town areas of Kingston in an effort to flush out Dudus. In the days leading up to this, many residents had protested in the area, urging the government to give up its aims to extradite Dudus. As the BBC reported, “Mr Coke, 41, insists he is a legitimate businessman and enjoys the support of many impoverished Kingston residents who see him as a benefactor; He has thousands of loyal followers who have promised to protect him at any cost” (BBC.co.uk. 2016). A number of Gangsters from around the city had converged in the area to protect him and on May 28th, the resulting firefight left around 70 residents dead. However, despite all this, Dudus managed to escape, but he soon surrendered and was extradited to the U.S where he pled guilty to racketeering charges and received 23 years in prison.

Looking at the political mechanisms behind this is very illuminating in establishing the relationship between the Jamaican governmental authority and VNSAs like the dons. After the U.S had sent the request for the extradition of Dudus, the Jamaican government had done all it possibly could to halt the process, to the point that they even hired a law firm to lobby the Obama administration against the extradition. When President Goldings attempts to avoid Jamaica’s treaty obligations with the US came to light, it caused waves among the Jamaican political elite. This together with increasing diplomatic pressure from the US government resulted in Golding ordering the military invasion of some areas of Kingston. Now this action upset the balance between the state and the dons that had previously been reached, so in an effort to bring back the status quo, he “offered exemption from persecution to other prominent gang leaders across Kingston in exchange for relative peace. Lower violence rates in late 2010 and early 2011 testify to those arrangements.” (Dr. Arias, E.D. 2013. p:218). So we see that the political elite in Jamaica are deeply entwined with the criminal elements of the country.

It can be argued that they political establishment is forced to do this due to the high levels of mistrust that the population have for the government. The institutions of the Jamaican government are weak, with most institutions failing to maintain the trust of the people. The police are seen as instigators of violence and not as protectors, the courts are backlogged and

slow and corrupt resulting in many in the population feeling like they are not treated equally in the judicial system. “These conditions have created a lack of trust in the justice system, increased incidents of ‘mob justice,’ and fostered a turn to community justice mechanisms to resolve crime.” (Dr. Arias, E.D. 2013. p:228). In this environment, of a vacuum of trust, VNSAs like the dons swoop in and provide for these disaffected people and gain their trust. Academics and policy makers see non-state actors as rational and looking after their own self-interest through making strategic decisions. “From this perspective, a common explanation for non-state actors providing public goods and services is that they do so in exchange for acceptance of their authority. Territorial and political control is seen as a central motivator of non-state actors’ decision-making and behaviour” (Idler, A; Forest, J.F. 2015. P:2)

An understanding of the historic causes of this situation is important to fully consider this role of the VNSAs in Kingston. In the 1960s, the two main parties in Kingston- the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP) created ‘garrisons’ that were loyal to their parties by providing the people there with new housing, jobs and weapons via the local strongmen or dons. This garrison system began to change however, during the 1980s due to increasing debt because of a strong recession and sue to IMF backed neoliberal structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that resulted in cutbacks in government expenditure. This reduced the politicians’ ability to disseminate resources to their constituencies. These changes however, only affected the licit market, thus the politicians and not the dons, who operated outside of this framework. The dons managed to continue their revenue stream both nationally and internationally through the narcotics trade and extortion rackets. This meant that the dons could continue with their social and welfare provisions to the populations of the garrisons independent of the political establishment. This solidification of the dons’ transnational and national networks and financial independence resulted in a shift in the relationship between the dons and the government. “As programs of deregulation and privatization diminished state ability to provide services such as health care and social and physical security, the opportunity emerged for dons to expand their role even further, to go from being patrons to rulers.” (Jaffe, R. 2013. p:737)

So again, we see that with the erosion of a state’s sovereignty, VNSAs establish themselves as viable partners in hybrid government systems to aid the central government in forming alternative forms of government in the more lawless areas of the country.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is safe to say that state-centric realism struggles to account for the continued existence of hybrid government structures between states and NSAs. This shines a light on the complexity of the issue of erosion of state sovereignty of weak or fragile states. As I have highlighted in the previous chapters, the epistemological and even the moral approaches to the issue can often be contentious with different analysts coming out on different sides of the matter. There needs to first be sufficient erosion of the sovereignty of the state for the VNSAs to then fill the void, whether through a backfiring of neoliberal economic policies or simply by violence from VNSAs, to the point that it is weak enough to be susceptible to the manoeuvring of the VNSAs. In this weakened position, states like Jamaica, often finds that the best option at its disposal is indeed forming hybrid government structures with the VNSAs. The extent to which the state can control the NSAs within its borders is of high importance. As has been mentioned in the case studies, Mexico does not have much of a handle on the situation with the drug cartels and oftentimes the hybrid structures are constructed with one of their arms twisted behind their backs. This is indeed one of the hallmarks of a violent non-state actor, namely that they can use their financial, military or cultural power to force the state to compromise in their favour, as the Mexican cartels are infamous for doing. However, as was outlined in the Jamaica case study, the Jamaican government actively perpetrated the collusion with the VNSAs in order to have a system of hybrid governance in place. With the ever increasing power and influence of NSAs comes the strengthening of their bargaining power with states. As I have touched on, recent globalisation has helped the case of the VNSAs and had a major impact on the policies of the state. “Transnational relations matter in world politics and we cannot explain state behaviour in critical issue-areas without taking the cross-boundary activities of non-state actors into account.” (Risse-Kappen, T. 1995. P:280). So we see that there has been a growing acknowledgement of the real-world impact of NSAs and the effect that they have on state policy. However, this type of acknowledgement based on emerging facts cannot be found in classical realism when it comes to the influence of NSAs. It is here that this thesis has aimed to bring a contribution to the existing debates in this field. My arguments in this thesis thus aimed to show that states that are weak or fragile can indeed benefit from establishing hybrid government structures with NSAs, once their internal sovereignty has been sufficiently compromised. However, there is room for further research into the long term effects of such

hybrid governance structures. It would be interesting to see if questions like ‘how sustainable would hybrid governance systems be in the long term?’ or ‘would VNSAs manage to completely dominate the hybrid governance structure over time?’, would be answered. Could this potentially explosive relationship between the state and VNSAs remain stable in the long term, when both the parties are wrestling to gain the upper hand? So continued research into this area would add to the current literature.

To conclude, we see that weak or fragile states can develop hybrid government structures with NSAs. However, the upper hand in these relationships can vary based on the NSA or the state in question. Regardless, these hybrid government relationships can have a governing effect on the lawless areas and oftentimes can be the last recourse left to the government.

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