# An Inquiry into the Reasons Behind the Negative European Attitudes Toward Refugees:
## Comparing the Post-WWII European Refugee Crisis and the Contemporary European Refugee Crisis in Search of Continuity

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# 1. Introduction

It is impossible to ignore the European media's uptick in covering refugee-related subjects and issues in the second decade of the twenty-first century. In 2015, more than twice as many refugees applied for asylum on the European continent (Eurostat, 2015), causing a shockwave of fear for refugees to spread across several European countries. Approximately 1 million refugees applied for asylum in 2015 alone (EU Parliament, 2017), turning this event into the 'biggest wave of mass migration since the Second World War' (Kingsley, 2016, p.21; Niemann & Zaun, 2018). Today, these refugee-related events collectively have come to be know as the European Refugee Crisis (Clayton, 2015; Spindler, 2015).

This so-called crisis became highly politicized in Europe for it quickly climbed to the top of the national and international political agenda, heavily impacting national elections and the European process of EU integration (Harteveld, Schaper, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2018; Zaun, 2018). As a result, anti-immigrant and anti-EU populist political parties rose in popularity. These parties have the tendency to pick up on the fears of the average European citizens with regards to the refugee crisis. Consequently, if the population of a country feels dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, politicians only have to preach for "change" and "better security," while pointing their fingers at a weak political minority as the boogieman (CESifo, 2017; Saxer, 2017). This way, they effectively divert the focus of the voting population from domestic political adversity toward a "foreign" scapegoat.

Unfortunate for them, immigrants and refugees have always made for great scapegoats, and politicians are not afraid to use them in their political games. By the use of the media, populist political parties can effectively talk fear into the European voting population, thus, heavily influencing public opinion (Hovil, 2016; Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). This politically and socially constructed fear for immigrants and refugees, combined with centuries old resentment and anxiety toward outsiders and minorities, fuels the overly negative attitude many Europeans tend to have toward refugees. Research done by Lambert et al. (2017) shows that in 2016 large quantities of the European population, (i.e. Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, France, Greece, Great Britain, and Italy) perceived immigration as one of the most important issues facing their country (ranging from 15% up to almost 45% per country). Consequently, when Europeans feel threatened by this immigrant issue, public outcries such as "they steal our jobs; they assault our women; they cause for

radicalization and terrorism; and they cost the taxpayer a lot of money," are heard to a greater extent. This makes resentment toward immigrants and refugees increasingly common within several European nations (Wike, Stokes, & Simmons, 2016).

The refugee crisis that had started somewhere in the second decade of the twenty-first century is not the only time Europe had faced a refugee crisis of this magnitude (Kingsley, 2016). One only needs to circle back to the 1940's and 50's to find a refugee crisis that was probably more gruesome than the crisis contemporary Europe is facing. After Nazi Germany had raged its Blitzkrieg upon the European continent, Europe was nothing more than a pile of ruble. Whole nations had to be rebuilt both physically and culturally. Approximately 30 to 40 million people were displaced because they had to work in forced-labor camps all throughout the Third Reich, because they had collaborated with the "enemy," or because they had simply nothing left (Cohen, 2011). Because of this, a great amount of people from all backgrounds, such as Jews, Christians, communists, capitalists, fascists, Germans, Soviets, and many more were forced to seek refuge in different European nations for numerous reasons (Frank, 2011).

Just like the refugees in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the refugees created by WWII also had to face an overall negative attitude stemming from the native European citizens (Marrus, 1985 p.311). This makes for an interesting link between the two different refugee crises, for both events triggered a lot of national resentment toward refugees. The average European citizen's negative attitude toward refugees is central in this correlation between the post-WWII European refugee crisis (post-WWII ERC) and the second decade of the twenty-first century European refugee crisis (21$^{st}$ Century ERC). Therefore, the overly negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees and the reasons behind it will be the main focus of this essay. After WWII, Europe and its citizens had to prove that they were up to the task of dealing with a full-blown refugee crisis. What they did not know was that almost seventy years later they would have to overcome such a challenge once more.

## 1.1 Research Puzzle

In light of the above paragraph it will come as no surprise that this thesis will be a comparative case study on the reasons behind the average European citizen's negative attitude toward refugees in both the post-WWII ERC and the 21$^{st}$ Century ERC. What makes these two cases interesting and worth studying is the fact that in current day literature, the two crises have

never really been compared before, even though they share many similarities. Especially the negative attitudes toward refugees has never been examined in light of these two periods. Therefore, the focus of this thesis will be on the general trend of the negative attitudes imposed on refugees. Why do the European citizens have such a bad perception of refugees and is the origin of this perception subject to continuity when both cases of the post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC are compared? What are the main reasons behind this bad perception and is it different when both cases are examined? In order to answer these highly interesting questions, the following research question has been constructed: *To what extent is there continuity in the reasons behind the average European citizen's negative attitude toward refugees when both European refugee crises of the post-WWII period and the second decade of the twenty-first century are compared?*

In short, this thesis investigates the reasons behind the average European citizen's negative attitude toward refugees, which will be done in light of the two following cases: the post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC. These cases will first be examined separately and afterwards they will be compared as to find out if there is continuity. Important concepts that are used to explain the reasons behind the aforementioned negative attitude are the following so-called real-world concerns: *national security*, *national identity*, and *economic livelihood*. These need to show whether there is continuity or not and will be explained in the literature review. In the end, this essay will argue two things: (a) that in fact there is often continuity in the reasons behind the average European citizen's negative attitude toward refugees, even though both ERC's happened in their own specific timeframes. Especially the concepts of national security and national Identity will show signs of continuity, for fear deriving from these concerns have always been present among European citizens; (b) on the contrary, the point will also be made that there are some substantial differences, causing the actual *reasons* behind both cases to be somewhat distinct in nature, especially when the overall historical context and the smaller details are taken into consideration.

## 1.2 Relevance

So, why is this topic relevant? The first thing to note about this subject is that today Europe is still stuck in the aftermath of the so-called 21st Century ERC. Especially when we look at the political aspect in combination with European integration, the influence of the refugee problem becomes clear. The EU is still trying to find its sweet spot by constructing a working

coöperation between the national governments and its own political institutions. The refugee crisis puts a lot of pressure on this political process (Zaun, 2018). This has to do with one of the cornerstone concepts of a western democracy: voting. A lot of European citizens use their national right to vote, which means that they have a voice within the political specter. Politics in the second decade of the twenty-first century is highly focused on the refugee crisis and how the media portrays this international dilemma to the voters. This has positive and negative aspects that follow, for an increasing amount of people blames the EU for this crisis (Harteveld et al., 2017). The voters then tend to show their discontent by voting for national parties that are less in favor of European cooperation, making this subject even more dire and very relevant. Especially in an age where a more united Europe is favored, an event like the refugee crisis can severely damage European cooperation. Therefore, this subject needs to be studied thoroughly as to discover what to do about it and it might even offer the opportunity to learn something from the past to understand the now. By comparing this 21$^{st}$ Century ERC with the post-WWII ERC, some nuances can be brought to the debate about refugees. Are they really a threat to European society or can they actually prove to be valuable assets? In the end, the harsh views of European citizens toward refugees needs to be softened to overcome and bring to an end this so-called refugee crisis. Maybe, if we take a step back from this century's refugee problem, look at the past and the now objectively, some valuable insights might be exposed that will help us review the refugee-related issues the world is facing today.

## 1.3 Outline

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 and 3 will mainly cover traditional IR literature on the creation of public opinion and the origin of the negative attitude toward refugees. It will also provide for the necessary contextual background of both cases. Chapter 4, 5, and 6 will consist of a case study between the post-WWII ERC and the 21$^{st}$ Century ERC as to figure out if there is continuity in the origin of the negative attitude toward refugees. The last chapter, chapter 7 will be the conclusion.

In detail: chapter 2 will be a literature review, discussing current literature and scholarly debates that are going on with regards to the creation of public opinion. The negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees is, of course, part of public opinion and, therefore, the creation of public opinion within IR needs to be discussed. The role of the

politicians and the voters will also briefly be covered, to figure out where such a negative attitude toward refugees comes from and why many people perceive refugees the way they do; chapter 3 will focus on the research design of this thesis, to better understand the structure of this essay and the concepts that are being used; chapter 4, 5, and 6 will focus on the three real-world concerns that will be explained in the literature review section. These three chapters need to give tangible evidence for discovering continuity in the reasons behind the negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees. Both ERC's will first be discussed separately, after which there will be a comparison; Chapter 7 will be the conclusion, where the findings of the three comparative chapters will be discussed and summarized and where the primary research question will be answered.

# 2. Literature Review

In this chapter, the existing IR literature about public opinion and its creation will be discussed. As is mentioned in chapter 1.3, the negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees is also part of the overall public opinion and, therefore, important literature covering the reasons behind the public opinion is of major importance to this thesis. First, Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration will be discussed. Second, the role of the politicians as important actors within the creation of public opinion will be covered. The third sub-chapter will try to expose important thoughts about the voters and their role in the creation of public opinion. Lastly, the three real-world concerns that play an important role in the formation of the average European's negative attitude toward refugees will be illustrated and explained.

## 2.1 Theory of Structuration

The underlying theory within this thesis will be Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration. Giddens (1986) argues that there is a duality between social structures (powerful institutions) and social agents (individuals). In his eyes, people behave the way they do because of powerful social institutions like culture, religion, ideology, etc., but also because of free will or agency. He proclaims that there is some kind of synthesis between the two because the former cannot exist without the latter. Therefore, both of them are equally important to each other and together they define societal behavior and social relations.

When the negative attitude toward refugees is examined, it is possible to apply Giddens' theory. This is the case because on the one hand people are influenced and biased by their own social structures. Think of a different religion (Christianity vs Islam or Judaism), or because of ideological premises. People view different structures as a threat to their own institutions and because of this fear they try to defect the incoming of "different" refugees. On the other hand, because most European countries are Western democracies, the native Europeans have a great deal of autonomy and free will. They are free to vote and to speak their minds so that they can individually or together influence and alter the social structures when they feel like this is needed (Moravcisk, 1993). For example, the government of a country influences refugee policy, but because a governing party wants to stay in power (based on representation) it also needs to listen to the voices of their voters (Moravcisk, 1993; Savigny, 2002; Zaun 2018). Therefore, both the social structures and the social agents

influence and work each other, shaping refugee-related policies and perceptions all in their own space and time (Giddens, 1986). Everything is interconnected, making it particularly hard to pinpoint why people perceive refugees the way they do. However, what is certain is that they are influenced by the existing structures and these structures are influenced by its agents. Giddens' theory, thus, perfectly explains the societal balance that directly influences and creates the overly negative perception toward refugees.

## 2.2 Politicians and Public Opinion

Politicians are undeniably important actors when it comes to the creation of public opinion for they can heavily influence society (Savigny, 2002). The same goes for their influence on the public opinion with regards to refugees. As Andersson (2014) discusses, an event such as the 21st Century ERC should be mainly humanitarian in essence. However, because the political realm ultimately decides what to do with them through the creation of policy, refugees are transformed into some kind of political subjects (Andersson, 2014). Hovil (2016) continues, that because refugees do not have meaningful citizenship, they do not have much political power, making them very susceptible to be used by national political parties in their political games. Because refugees are de facto political weak minorities, politicians can for example use them as scapegoats to gain political support. If they then portray this self-constructed scapegoat as the cause of national discontent, citizens naturally come to fear this particular group of outsiders (CESifo, 2017; Saxer, 2017). According to Hargrave and Dempster (2017) a common way of preaching fear is through the use of threat narratives. They state: 'this 'threat narrative' has been picked up by the political far right in many contexts, and has been used to depict refugees and migrants as a challenge to values and culture, a source of terrorism and crime, and a threat to living standards, jobs and public services' (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017, p.15). However, the accusations toward migrants and refugees that they are a challenge to values, culture, terrorism, and crime usually does not rest on a solid argumentative foundation (Greenslade, 2005). Greenslade (2005) furthermore explains that these threat narratives are naturally very selective to the authors viewpoint and are often simplified. As a result, the audience that receives these threat narratives does not posses adequate knowledge on the subject and they often lack a of basic understanding. By proclaiming false truths and spreading fear, the right-wing politicians thus can heavily

influence their constituency (Greenslade, 2005). Indirectly this leads to the creation of public opinion on refugees.

What needs to be kept in mind, is that not every politician has bad intentions toward the refugee minorities. There are also politicians that genuinely want to help the refugees in question and try to do something about the overall situation. Where the right-wing politicians use the refugees as scapegoats to draw voters, left-wing liberal politicians try to do this the other way around. Dempster and Hargrave (2017) illustrate that these liberals play the humanitarian card all the while promoting the positive site of diversity and integration. By the use of political narratives, they can touch upon the public's feeling of guilt, empathy, and sympathy and they can meanwhile create public awareness of the "humane" obligation to help the refugees who have no other place to go. Just like with the right-wing politicians, liberal left-wing politicians are also selective and subjective and they often use a simplified version of reality in order to draw voters to their side (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). This way, both sides of the political specter equally influence public opinion.

Lastly, it is important to understand that within the realm of western democratic politics, not only the right or the left-wing parties and politicians influence public opinion. There is a huge grey era in-between these two anti and pro refugee fronts. This grey era reflects the "anxious middle" of the population, because they are also divided and or conflicted on the subject of refugees and refugee policy. There are many differences between political parties, media, and societal groups, which makes it hard to pinpoint where certain opinions or perceptions originate. On top of that, the political battleground is not always linear shaped (Elsas, Hakhverdian, & van der Brug, 2016), which makes it even more difficult to determine the origin of public attitudes toward refugees. Elsas et al. (2016, p.1194) furthermore explain that politics can often be seen as an "inverted U" or "horseshoe," meaning that sometimes both ends, left and right, are more in accordance with each other than that they are opposed. In this way, the opposition is actually the moderate middle part of the political body, making anti and pro refugee politics even more complicated. Nevertheless, the political atmosphere within a country is obviously very important in the creation of public opinion and, therefore, continues to return repeatedly within the overall debate of this research essay.

## 2.3 Voters and Public Opinion

As is described in the above paragraphs by the use of Giddens' theory of structuration, politicians are not the sole creators of public opinion. There is a relationship between the politicians and their voters, for they mutually influence each other, based on representation and the fact that parties want to stay or get into office (Moravcisk, 1993; Zaun, 2018). For example, Harteveld, et al. (2017, p.158) state that because of the western democratic model, the populace of a country keeps an eye on its government through a system of checks and balances. Therefore, when things turn sour in a country or within a multilevel governmental institution like the EU, they blame the politicians that are supposed to be accountable. This way, they can put a lot of pressure on the political figures that are in office, who sometimes change their standing points to fall in line with its constituency. Because of this, a vicious circle is created, for the politicians then portray their adjusted viewpoints to the other voters, thus, influencing them on their turn. This goes on and on, which spirals into some kind of general public opinion.

Something else that needs to be noted when it comes to the formation of public opinion is the tendency of most voters to stay in their own political "bubble" or "echo chamber" by selecting specific sources of (social) media that they politically or ideologically prefer, often without even realizing it (Sunstein, 2007; Garrett 2009; Iyengar & Hahn 2009; Munson & Resnick 2010; Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2016). Greenslade (2005, p.5) furthermore argues that often newspapers and other media that cover political issues are a mere reflection of their audience:

> *In general, papers reflect what people think or, to be more specific, they reflect what they think people think. But the press is not a simple mirror when it seeks to reflect existing public attitudes. Publication endorses and reinforces those attitudes, lending them credibility. At the same time, papers select material which underpins their editorial viewpoint and reject material which undermines it, providing their readers with only a partial (and usually simplistic) view of events.*

Lastly, the public opinion is also influenced by the amount of attention the political parties and the media give to the audience. Most people get their political knowledge from second-hand information provided by the media (Harteveld et al., 2017). Whenever the media covers something like the refugee crisis over and over again, citizens feel like it really is a grave issue and they will generally become more skeptic about these refugee-related events. They

will get more outspoken in their opinion and they will talk about it with other people that are in their societal sphere (Myers & Bishop, 1970; Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990; Schkade, Sunstein, & Hastie, 2007; Flaxman et al. 2016). Voters, thus, heavily influence each other and their political representatives. Therefore, the assumption can be made that this is also the case for the creation of public opinion and the negative attitude toward refugees.

## 2.4 Real-World Concerns

On 27 February 2017, the Overseas Development Institute and Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (2017), held a summit in London. What they did was discussing the changing European perception of refugees and migrants in the last couple of years and why many people are against integration of these refugees and migrants. In their examination, they have come up with the categorization of three types of European perception: the pro-migration liberal cosmopolitans who are in favor of integrating refugees and migrants, the anti-migration hostile nationalists who are against the inflow of refugees and migrants, and, last but not least, the "anxious middle," which is comprised of most of the European people. This anxious middle is conflicted, for on the one hand they feel the obligation and humanitarian need to help the displaced victims, but on the other hand, they are also afraid of the impact the intake of these refugees might have on their; *national security*; *national identity*; and *economic livelihood* (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). These three so-called "real-world concerns," are the main drivers that create the perception of the average European citizen toward refugees (Hatton, 2016; Katwala & Somerville, 2016; Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). When these concerns are minimized, the refugees would be seen as less of a threat. On the contrary, when these concerns are maximized, a negative attitude will develop among the average European citizens. In sum, these three drivers can explain the the reasons behind the negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees. Therefore, these real-world concerns will be examined in light of both the Post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC, to find out whether we can speak of continuity in the reasons behind the average European citizen's negative attitude toward refugees.

# 3. Research Design

This chapter will examine the overall foundation of the research that is conducted in this thesis as to get a firm grip on the structure of the remaining chapters. First, the methods will be discussed. Second, the important concepts will be covered (i.e. refugees, average European citizens, and public opinion) to solidify and clarify the overall research puzzle of this thesis. Third, the two cases will be more clearly explained and a case justification will be provided. Then, the measurement used to answer the research question of this thesis will be examined, and, lastly, the data selection will be discussed.

## 3.1 Methods

In terms of methods, the first half of this thesis mainly covers IR literature on the creation of public opinion. The second part of this research essay will be a holistic case study comparing historical foundations and narratives to more current data and IR literature. The reasons behind the negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees will be compared and analyzed to discover if there is continuity. That being said, one of the hardest things to do is to measure the the negative attitudes of all European citizens. It is simply not possible to go over all European populations in both the post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC, as to examine their own specific perceptions. Therefore, this essay will mostly explore the general trend within most European countries. This will be done by comparing both ERC's in light of the three real-world concerns put forth by Dempster & Hargrave (2017) (i.e. *National security*; *national identity*; and the *economic livelihood*). These three drivers behind the creation of public opinion will be discussed in three separate chapters. These chapters will be build up out of four sections: first, they will be discussed in light of current IR theory; then, they will be examined through the scope of the post-WWII ERC; next, the 21st Century ERC will be covered; and, lastly, the findings of both cases will be compared as to figure out if there is continuity in the reasons behind the negative attitudes toward refugees.

## 3.2 Concepts and Context

One of the more important concepts within this thesis is, of course, the concept of "refugee." Generally speaking, there are many definitions of the word refugee and its meaning developed bit by bit over time. A more constant and reliable legal definition of this term stems from the

year 1951, when the United Nations Refugee Convention was ratified by the UN (McFayden, 2012). Before 1951, refugees had no legal international basis to stand on (Cohen, 2011). However, as Cohen (2011) explains, this changed after the end of WWII, when the world witnessed the emergence of a new kind of political refugee. These refugees were people who in the wake of the struggle between the Axis and Allied powers had no home to go back to and no government that was willing to protect them. These refugees were coined by the Allies as "displaced persons" or "DP's" and this terminology only applied to Europeans, which turned the concept of refugee into a Eurocentric phenomenon (Cohen, 2011, p.3-4). In order to relocate all the DP's after the end of the war, the Allied forces established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). In 1947 the UNRRA would be replaced by the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and had as its task to repatriate, resettle and integrate DP's (Gatrell, 2011). In 1949 the UN recognized that it was its responsibility to internationally protect refugees and, therefore, decided to 'establish, as of 1 January 1951, a High Commissioner's Office for Refugees' in order to 'provide the necessary legal protection for refugees (…) after the International Refugee Organization terminates its activities' (UNHCR, 2007, p.2-10). This was all concluded when in 1951 the United Nations High Commissioner's Office for Refugees (UNHCR) ratified the United Nations Refugee Convention and where the international community established a legal definition of the term "refugee." Up until today, this definition is still used and is as follows: 'a refugee is an individual who has left their country of origin and is unable or unwilling to return 'owing to the well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion'' (McFayden, 2012, p.9). This definition still dominates the international refugee regime and is, therefore, also used within the latitudes of this thesis.

What needs to be noted is that in current IR literature the concepts of "refugees" and "immigrants" are used in all kinds of fashion. Of course, these concepts are all but the same. Nevertheless, when it comes to public opinion, refugees and immigrants are often viewed as one and the same thing by the public (Jeffers, 2012). This thesis does not argue that the two concepts can be used interchangeably. However, literature and data that covers immigration sometimes offers valuable insights on refugee-related issues. Therefore, literature on immigrants will be used in this essay when it proves to be a viable asset to the discussion.

The next important concept that needs to be discussed is the concept of "the average European citizen." Within this thesis, the average European citizen includes native or local

European citizens that show political participation in their national or the European society in both the post-WWII era and the second decade of the twenty-first century. The bulk of these people are the ones that have the right to vote, which makes them more politically active. Of course, not only people who have the right to vote are covered under this umbrella, for there are also Europeans that proclaim their political opinion through other means than voting. They can, for example, express their political opinion through (social) media and their participation within society. Furthermore, this concept limits itself to people that nationally and ethnically feel like they belong to a specific European nation and are regarded as "one of them" by the national society in question. This distinction is very important because refugees are often seen as national and ethnical outsiders (Mustafa & Richards, 2017).

Another concept that is important to this thesis, is the term "public opinion." This is the case because public opinion is the umbrella that covers the negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees. So what is public opinion? According to Savigny (2002, p.2), 'the term [public opinion] tends to be used in the broader sense as a representation of public consciousness or will, anything acted upon or expressed in public.' Habermans (1991) argues that this public opinion is created within the 'public sphere' of society. In this sphere, the realm of politics and civil society interact with each other and the individuals within society come together to reflect critically on themselves and the government (Habermans, 1991; Savigny, 2002). In short, by doing this, individuals express their political views within society. Naturally, when these individuals are not content with the current political state of affairs a negative public opinion is created. This is also the case within both ERC's for the presumption of the average European citizens that their societies are in peril, makes them politically dissatisfied and overly pessimistic toward refugees.

### 3.3 Defining the Two Cases

In order to compare both the post-WWII ERC and the 21$^{st}$ Century ERC, it is important to properly define the two cases. So, what is the post-WWII ERC? According to Cohen (2011), approximately 30 to 40 million people were displaced after the Second World War had ended. The number of refugees created by WWII 'exceeded every experience before' and the international community had to come up with a plan as of what to do with all the refugees (Cohen, 2011, p.3). Before the end of 1945, some 10 to 15 million refugees found their way home unassisted and many others would be repatriated or resettled both forcibly or with the

help of refugee aid organizations such as the IRO (Marrus, 1985). Current day literature mostly depicts this period as the period of "European Displacement." However, for the sake of comparison, this thesis will refer to the European Displacement era as the post-WWII ERC. The timeline of the post-WWII ERC case begins in 1943, the starting point of German defeat in Europe, and ends somewhere around 1957 when the last DP camp was closed. By then, most of the European refugees had been repatriated or resettled (Kochavi, 2001), marking the end of the post-WWII ERC case's timeframe within this thesis.

The 21st Century ERC is somewhat harder to define than the post-WWII ERC, for there is no clear beginning or end. As is discussed in the introduction, people began to speak of a European refugee crisis after the events of 2015 (Clayton, 2015; Spindler, 2015). By then, the amount of refugees arriving at European borders had increased substantially, which shocked several European nations that were affected by this predicament (Eurostat, 2015). However, the 21st Century ERC found its origin somewhere earlier than 2015. The main spark that ignited the fire of mass migration of refugees (i.e. Syrian and Iraqi) toward Europe begins somewhere around 2013, with the (civil) war in Syria and the subsequent rise of Islamic State in the region (Larivé, 2015; Oosterveld & Bloem, 2017). Although the bulk of the refugees that fled to Europe were of Syrian and Iraqi origin, there are also many refugees from countries such as Mali, Gambia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, and Somalia (Larivé, 2015, p.5), making the 21st Century ERC much more complex. It also makes it harder to pinpoint an exact starting date. Nevertheless, the starting date of this timeframe will be in 2013 in correlation with the eruption of the (civil) war in Syria, which caused for a substantial increase in the amount of refugees flocking to Europe. Lastly, the end date of the 21st Century ERC is even harder to determine, for Europe still finds itself in the aftermath of the crisis even though the amount of refugees that have come to Europe has substantially declined after 2016 (Eurostat, 2018). Therefore, the end date of the 21st Century ERC is undetermined within this thesis.

### 3.4 Case Justification

So why do the post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC make for such a good case study? In order to find this out, the similarities and dissimilarities of both cases need to be discussed. First, the similarities will be covered.

The most important thing that the two cases have in common is the simple fact that there were a lot of refugees, all of them at or in the European borders (Marrus, 1985; EU

Parliament 2017). Practically all of these refugees were victims to the act of war and most of them had nothing left. No family, no housing, no home state, or a combination of these factors. Moreover, both in the post-WWII era and the second decade of the twenty-first century the refugee problem has been coined as a European crisis (Cohen, 2011; Clayton, 2015; Spindler, 2015). On top of that, both crises have a high religious aspect, for in the 1940's and 50's anti-Semitism caused for a bad perception on the many refugees (Loescher & Scanlan 1986; Kochavi, 2001; Greenslade, 2005). Nowadays the same negative perception can be seen through European thoughts of Islamophobia (Greeslade, 2005; Guild, 2009; Wike et al., 2016; Mustafa & Richards, 2017). Lastly, in both cases, European countries wanted to keep their borders shut because the native population was not keen on the many refugees that were flocking towards their doorsteps (Bruneau, Kteily & Laustsen, 2018). Just like the refugees of today, the refugees created by the second world war were not at all welcomed by their host nations.

In every case study, there are also some dissimilarities and limitations that need to be pointed out to objectively compare both cases. The first dissimilarity that stands out is that after WWII, Europe was a war victim in and of itself and had to be reconstructed (Marrus, 1985). On top of that, the refugees were mostly ethnical Europeans. Today, Europe is not a war victim and the influx of outer-continent refugees is mainly considered to be a burden (Wike et al., 2016). Also, the creation of the European Union causes for a big difference because this adds another political layer within European politics. Lastly, a great difference is the fact that after WWII the many refugees were put into camps with the primary intention of repatriating them to their original home countries for as much as this was possible (Cohen, 2011). Today, the refugees that come from other continents, cannot be sent back. Therefore, they have to be distributed and resettled in European nations. These refugees will probably never return to their country of origin and tend to stay in Europe for the long run.

## 3.5 Measurement

To answer the research question of this essay, continuity within the reasons behind the negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees has to be measured. The problem with continuity, however, is that it is a rather ambivalent concept to measure. Generally, continuity is perceived as an uninterrupted connection, succession or union (Merriam-Webster, 2018). In IR and other social sciences this is difficult to measure, because

many events seem to happen without a regular pattern (Nicholsen, 1989). Nicholsen (1989, p.167) continues by stating that patterns do change from time to time. However, these changes are often undetectable for the eyes of the observer. So how does continuity fit within this thesis and how can it be observed? The answer to this question can be found in qualitative research. Within qualitative research, the focus lies on historical analyses and the overall context behind main events. When this kind of research is conducted within a case study, replacement and novelty between the main events of the two cases indicate change (Weiss & Daws, 2007). Change resembles that the connection, succession or union is interrupted, which signifies that there is no continuity. Of course, this also works the other way around. When the connection, succession or union stays intact, the assumption can be made that there is in fact continuity.

## 3.6 Data Selection

In this thesis, research is conducted through qualitative examinations. Therefore, the discussion within this essay will mostly rely on historical narratives and IR literature on both cases of the post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC. Other important sources that will be used are second-hand quantitative research studies, conducted by international think tanks and research institutions, such as the Overseas Development Institute & Chatham House or Pew Research Centre. That having been said, there are some limitations when it comes to data selection within this thesis. Especially the case of the post-WWII ERC lacks valuable second-hand quantitative sources. Therefore, this case will mostly rely on historical narratives, which in some instances makes it difficult to get a grip on the objective truth behind the negative attitude of the average European citizens of that time. The same cannot be said about the 21st Century ERC, for more than enough literature and second-hand qualitative research can be found on this particular case.

# 4. Real-World Concern: National Security

Since time immemorial, security has been a key driver within human history. This is not different when it comes to all the refugee-related events that have happened over time or are still happening to date. Simplified, if the refugees had felt secure in the first place they would probably not have fled their home countries. On top of that, societies that take in these refugees often fear them with regard to their national security (Jeffers, 2012; Wike et al., 2016). Nowadays, terrorism is a good example, for many people believe that the intake of Muslim refugees causes for a higher risk at Islamic radicalization of the population (Gibney, 2010; Jeffer, 2012). This increased risk of radicalization is often perceived to result in the horrible acts of terror many European are so afraid of these days. Terrorism, however, is not something that is exclusive to this day and age, for people in the post-WWII era were also afraid of ideological and religious groups using terror as one of their weapons (Kochavi, 2001). One can think for example of the Communists and the Zionists movements. Furthermore, national security is easily one of the main drivers behind the origin of public opinion (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). Therefore, it will be discussed in light of both the post-WWII ERC and 21st Century ERC as to discover if there is continuity.

## 4.1 Security in Context

Traditional IR literature describes security as an implication of 'freedom from threats to core values (for both individuals and groups)' (Baylis, 2008). This definition is, of course, also applicable to both ERC's and works twofold. On the one hand, refugees generally flee their precarious situation in order to find a secure place for themselves and their families. On the other, the population of the European countries that take in these refugees feel threatened by them for they supposedly cause harm to their national security (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). This creates some kind of vicious circle and both parties (i.e. the refugees and the host nation's population) are in a stalemate of what to do about this.

Legally speaking it is not an option to deny or send back refugees. This has to do with the international duty of non-refoulement manifested by the 1951 Convention. The international law of non-refloulement basically forbids the expelling or returning of refugees 'to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or

political opinion' (Gibney, 2010). The problem with this, however, is that the account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, often is a driving force that feeds the emotion of fear of the native population that is taking in the refugees (Esses, Hamilton, & Gaucher, 2017). Many Europeans, in this case, fear the impact the refugees and their many differences have on national security. The concept of terrorism is the one reason that generally strikes the most fear among the European populace (Wike et al., 2016). After this, many Europeans of both the post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC are concerned about the increasing crime rate, for many people tend to think that refugees often resort to criminal pursuits (Wike et al., 2016). Of course, identity and economic concerns are also perceived to be grave threats to the overall feeling of security. However, these will be discussed in chapter 5 and 6.

After the post-WWII ERC had been resolved the fear for refugees slowly faded away and shifted toward the arising political tension between the capitalists and communist worlds. The status quo of the Cold War made it that the average European citizens had other fears to worry about (e.g. nuclear threat) and the refugee issue was not at the top of the political agenda. This would change with the end of the Cold War, for new fears appeared at the horizon (Gibney, 2002). The European Union was taking shape and politicians began to talk about open European borders. However, people were concerned about the effects this would have on national security (Gibney, 2002). Especially after the events of 9/11, when the United States were attacked by Muslim extremists, people all over the world began to fear (Muslim) refugees (Gibney, 2002; Zard, 2002; Jeffers, 2012). The issue got highly politicized and in light of Giddens' theory of structuration, citizens and the government increasingly created some kind of "us" against "them" environment (Betts & Loescher, 2011). "Us" being the native citizens and "them" being the refugee minority.

## 4.2 Security and the Post-WWII ERC

After the whole European continent had been disrupted by the events of WWII, the Allied victors first sought to implement measures to ensure that the European security issue was dealt with accordingly (Gatrell, 2011). Both the east and the west feared political enemies that undermined their distinct ideological believes (Marrus, 1985). On top of that, the many changes within the European borders after the Allied Yalta (1944) and Potsdam (1945) agreements, caused many people to be ethnically stateless (Gatrell, 2011, p.90). So what to

do with all these stateless people? According to Frank (2011), national minorities were seen as one of the biggest threats to security, for they were an important driver in the fruition of both world wars. For example, the Nazi regime occupied and invaded parts of Austria and Czechoslovakia with the intention to liberate what they called the *Volksdeutsche*[1] (Marrus, 1985, p.311). Therefore, after the Second World War, the Allies wanted to repatriate and resettle the many refugees in a place where they ethnically and nationally belonged. In their eyes, this would cease the likeliness of another future war (Marrus, 1985, Cohen 2011). Repatriation, thus, was the primary mean through which stability and security had to be brought back to Europe.

Of course, this post-WWII policy did rub off on the average European citizens. Due to the idea of repatriation, the European populace was not very keen on political outsiders, because they perceivably would impose a threat to the stability of the nation state. On top of that, many ethnic groups of refugees were perceived to commit crimes, which caused fear among the native populations (Marrus, 1985). Three distinct groups of people that suffered from this political upheaval the most were: eastern Europeans who "ethnically" belonged to Soviet controlled territories; Jewish Holocaust survivors; and ironically, the many displaced Germans scattered throughout the remnants of the Third Reich.

First, the policy of repatriation was a good way for the Soviet Union to establish a national Soviet identity and to get rid of anti-communist Russian communities outside of Soviet controlled areas (Frank, 2011). The anti-communist groups also imposed a threat to western public order and these undisciplined people 'quickly acquired a reputation for boisterous, destructive behavior and drew constant attention of hostile Soviet observers,' who on their turn heavily influenced public opinion of western Europeans on Eastern European refugees (Marrus, 1985, p.314). The fate of these repatriated "Soviet citizens" was quickly sealed when the Western Allies eagerly cooperated with the Soviet Union, which caused many of these people to get deported, interned, or killed by Soviet authority if they did not pass a harsh process of (paranoid) Soviet screening (Shephard, 2011). Once again a political "us" against "them" environment was created, backed up by the populace of many western European countries.

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[1] People who were considered to be ethnic Germans by the Nazi regime, regardless of their possession of actual German citizenship.

The second group of refugees who were victim of the overall policy of repatriation, were the Jewish holocaust survivors that were scattered around Europe (Kushner & Knox, 1999). Many of them had nothing left. No belongings, no family, no home, and often not even a country that was willing to protect hem. Anti-Semitism was still present on the European continent and many people were all but fond of Jewish refugees returning or resettling in their country (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986). Scapegoating and hostilities were to be found throughout all of Europe. Especially in eastern European countries the public opinion of Jewish refugees was dire, mainly because five years of anti-Jewish Nazi propaganda had fueled centuries-old anti-Semitic feelings among eastern Europeans (Kochavi, 2001). Security wise, the populace felt threatened, because during the war many of them acquired former Jewish property. When the war was over, they were afraid of losing their newly acquired possessions to Jewish returnees. Unfortunately, this resulted in many violent episodes (Kochavi, 2001). A grave example of this comes from *Kielce,* a Polish town where in the summer of 1946 some forty Jewish holocaust survivors were killed and about seventy-five were badly injured by an angry Polish mob (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986). Events like this happened on a daily basis in the years after the end of WWII. Finally, it was not only anti-Semitism that turned European public opinion of Jewish refugees in a downward spiral. It was the Zionist movement that made things even worse, for they presumably used the grim Jewish situation to press the international community for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine (Kochavi, 2001). They did this, by stating that they would instigate Jewish refugees to commit acts of violence or disrupt the public order if the Allies would not help them with opening up Palestine for immigration (Kochavi, 2001). News reports of Zionist militants in Palestine attacking British subjects by a campaign of terrorism even fueled more hate and racism among the British and other Europeans, who were afraid that these terrorist attacks would also spread throughout Europe. This furthermore negatively influenced European public opinion for they felt that national security was at stake (Greenslade, 2005).

Ironically, the last group that was subject to a negative public opinion of refugees were the Germans that lived in former Nazi-controlled territories (Shephard, 2011; Douglas, 2012; Merten, 2012). In a way, the German refugees faced the same violent faith as their Jewish counterparts. A horrible example comes from Czechoslovakia, where 'the surrender of the Wehrmacht was followed by an orgy of violence in which armed Czech fighters beat up, shot, humiliated, and tortured Germans. Villages were burned to the ground, Germans hanged in

trees and set alight, beaten to death, and tortured. Czech paramilitaries, army units, and local vigilantes drove hundreds of thousands of Germans from their homes and across the border' (Shephard, 2011, p.172). These episodes were very common and many nations expulsed the German refugees from their land, for they were seen as the ones who initiated the horrible events of the Second World War. This condemnation of the German people ignited a series of expulsions of German refugees and minorities from former Nazi-occupied territories in eastern Europe (Marrus, 1985; Cohen, 2011; Douglas, 2012). Naturally, many Europeans were devastated after what Nazi Germany had done to them and in light of their own security, their natural response was to get rid of these Germans as fast as possible. This, of course, also complimented to the negative attitude the average European citizens had toward refugees.

## 4.3 Security and the 21st Century ERC

The existence of ethnic and national minorities within the borders of a particular nation has often been linked to the idea of these minorities imposing a threat on national security (Esses et al., 2017). This was the case in both the post-WWII ERC and this is also the case in the 21st Century ERC. According to Wike et al. (2016), it is common among several European nations to have a negative attitude toward minorities. For example, research conducted by Pew Research Center in 2016 shows that in Italy, Greece, Hungary, France, Spain, Great Britain, Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands, large quantities of the population have negative attitudes toward i.e. Roma, Muslim, and Jewish minorities (Wike et al., 2016, p.9). An average of 43% of this combined European population holds a negative view toward the group of Muslims residing in their countries (Wike et al., 2016, p.9). On the contrary, only an average of 16% of the combined population has a negative attitude toward the Jewish minorities (Wike et al., 2016, p.9). What is interesting about this is that in the second decade of the twenty-first century Muslim minorities are more feared than their Jewish counterparts. This shows a major shift in perception between the post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC. Loescher & Scanlan (1986), Kushner & Knox (1999) and Kochavi (2001) argued that in the post-WWII era, many average European citizens possessed feelings of anti-Semitism. However, this is not the case anymore, for in the second decade of the twenty-first century the Muslim minorities have risen to the top of the European xenophobic agenda, linked to the many acts of terrorism conducted by Muslim extremists (Gibney, 2012; Esses et al., 2017). Therefore, the assumption can be made that in the 21st Century ERC, Muslims are the most prominent entity to be

subjected to the average European citizen's negative attitude toward minorities. So how is this negative view of Muslim minorities connected to national security within the 21st Century ERC?

Thus, the main group that is perceived to bring along threats such as radicalization, crime, and terrorism, are the Muslim refugees from the Middle-East and Northern-Africa (Gibney, 2012). The extensive coverage of Muslim crime and terrorism by the media is intrinsically linked to the origin of this negative perception toward Muslim refugees (Greenslade, 2005; Harteveld et al., 2018). Greenslade (2005) argues that in the twenty-first century, the media is way more developed and present in day to day life. Therefore, it more heavily influences the public. An unintended result of the extensive coverage in the media of the Muslim Refugees is that many Europeans are inclined to view refugees and Muslims as a synonymous subject (Jeffers, 2012). When right-wing politicians combine this constructed synonymous subject with the presumption that the inflow of Muslim refugees increases Islamic radicalization, the European populace will only get more frightened (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017).

Also, many Europeans believe that Muslim refugees cause for a higher risk of terrorist attacks (Gibney, 2012; Wike et al., 2016). As Guild describes, these Muslims are often seen as an enemy from within, which frightens the average European citizen even more (Guild, 2009). Another study done by Pew Research Center in 2016 shows the average European citizen's fear of Muslim refugees with regards to terrorist attacks (Zard, 2002; Wike et al., 2016). According to this research, an average of 59% of the combined populations of Hungary, Poland, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Greece, Great Britain, France, and Spain believes that the influx of refugees will increase domestic terrorism (Wike et al., 2016, p.30). Only an average of 36% of the combined European populations thinks that this is not the case (Wike et al., 2016, p.30). This indicates that the reasons behind the negative attitude of the average European populace toward (Muslim) refugees in intrinsically linked to their fear for terrorism and, thus, their national security even though this relation is often based on ungrounded arguments and a simplified view provided by the media (Greenslade, 2005; Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2016).

As is already hinted in the above paragraphs, more and more people view Muslims and refugees as two sides of the same coin (Jeffers, 2012). When people have a negative opinion on Muslims, they also quickly tend to have a negative attitude towards refugees. Once again,

a vicious circle is dominating European public opinion. Jeffers explains that often 'immigrants, refugees and terrorists have become linked in a metonymic chain' (Jeffers, 2012, p.26). This metonymic character makes it that Europeans with Islamophobic thoughts, generally hold fears of all refugees. In their eyes, all refugees are terrorist. This furthermore influences the negative attitude of the average European citizens, because their fear for terrorists are imposed on the entire minority group of Muslim refugees.

Another interesting phenomenon that can be traced to the negative perception of many Europeans toward refugees, comes from a survey report published by Eurobarometer in 2017. In the report it becomes clear that the top two fears of all EU member states are terrorism and immigration (Eurobarometer, 2017, p.4-5). The fear for immigration slowly decreased between 2015 (the pinnacle of the 21st Century ERC) and 2017 (Eurobarometer, 2017, p.4-5). However, the European held fear for terrorist attacks is still steadily increasing since 2013 (the start of the 21st Century ERC). The fact that both terrorism and immigration are perceived to be the top two threats to national security have dire consequences for the Muslim refugee minority. Especially when Jeffer's (2012) statement about the metonymic character of refugees and terrorist turns out to be true. Then the average European citizens perceive the refugees to be the cause for the two biggest threats to their national security. In this way, Muslim refugees simply do not stand a chance against the resentment of the native European population.

Lastly, another fear of Europeans with regards to refugees and national security is the increase of national crime rates (Guild, 2009; Dempster & Hargrave, 2017; Wike et al., 2017). Often refugees are linked to crime related events. Guild (2009) states that 'the relationship between foreigners, i.e. non-EU nationals, and crime is a source of substantial anxiety in many European countries. A good example is the event that happened in Cologne Germany around the time of New Year's Eve 2016 where supposedly a group of "1000" men of Arab and North African background had assaulted women and orchestrated robberies. Many people in Germany imidiatly drew a link between these men and the many refugees that had entered the country in 2015 (Calamur, 2018). Other examples of the perceived relation between refugees and increasing crime rates are that they often resort to thievery and that they easily end up within the latitudes of organized crime syndicates (Wike et al., 2017). In the end, even though the average European citizens have always feared refugees in relation to increasing crime rates, fear for terrorism remains their top concern with regards to national security.

## 4.4 Comparison & Conclusion

After both cases are examined in light of national security, it is now time to look for continuity in the reasons behind the negative attitude of the average European citizens toward refugees. The first thing that stands out, is that there are many similarities between both the post-WWII ERC and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century ERC. For example, in both ERC's the average European citizens were afraid of religious minorities, violence, crime, and terrorism. However, when we look at the bigger picture, things seem to differ a lot. A great example is the fact that after the Second World War, people were supposed to go back to the country where they ethnically belonged. This had mainly to do with the fact that Europe was a war victim in and of itself and, therefore, whole nations had to be rebuilt. Security, thus, was recreating strong national entities to prevent a future European war. This legitimized the fact that there were many refugees scattered around all of Europe, because the whole European continent had been affected by WWII. However, the same cannot be said about the case of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century ERC, for there Europe had not been the actual battlefield. In this case, Europe is only a safe heaven for the (Muslim) refugee who try to escape the war torn areas in the Middle-East and Africa. This causes the predicament to be a "far from our bed show," which results in less sympathy from the native population toward the refugees. Of course, in both ERC's there was some kind of "us" against "them" idea, where everything that is different imposes a threat toward national security. However, the nature of this feeling of fear is very different in both eras. Where in the post-WWII period Europeans mostly feared a whole range of minorities like Soviets, Jews, and Germans, the average European population of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century ERC mostly fears Muslim refugees from outside the European continent. Also the fact that the media is way more developed in this day and age, turns refugees, Muslims, and terrorist into a metonymic concept. Terrorism, although also present in the time of the post-WWII ERC, today is the main concern of the European population, which mainly facilitates the negative attitude of the average European citizens toward refugees.

In short, there is continuity in the negative public perception of Europeans toward refugees because people have always feared outsiders and minorities in relation to their own national security. The same agents i.e. terrorism, crime, and immigration in both cases resulted in the feeling of fear. On the other hand, it seems like there is no continuity when the

actual *origin* of the negative attitude of the average European citizens toward refugees is examined. This has to do with the fact that the nature of the agents of fear have a totally different historical background. In the post-WWII ERC, people feared ethnic minorities of all sorts. In the 21st Century ERC, people mostly fear Muslim refugees in relation to increasing radicalization and terrorism.

# 5. Real-World Concern: National Identity

Another major apprehension commonly known to influence the average European negative attitude toward refugees is national identity. This concern finds its origin in the time when nation-states had become the dominant actors within the international order (Gellner, 1997). Since then, fear for national identity has been vividly present among the people of several European nations (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). This has been the case in the post-WWII ERC, for this was one of the main drivers behind the policy of repatriation, and this still is the case in the 21st Century ERC where Europeans, despite increasing globalization and more racially mixed societies, still worry about their own national identity (Greenslade, 2005).

## 5.1 Identity in Context

According to Gellner (1997), identity is inseparably linked to the ideology of nationalism. This has to do with the idea that 'nationalism is a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond' (Gellner, 1997, p.7). Initially, the influx of immigrants perceivably threatens this similarity of culture for they bring with them many different cultural values and traditions (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). Guild (2005, p.102) explains the perceived threat to national identity as follows:

> *Threat to cultural identity is based on the implicit idea that homogeneity of culture is a good thing and that persons with different cultural norms are threatening or a risk to the dominant group.* (...) *There is a need 'to protect the national culture by endowing it with its own state-protector, the need to unmask, neutralise and drive out the foreigners, who wish to destroy and debase that culture.*

Of course, there would not be a problem if refugees would easily integrate into the dominant group of the host society (Guild, 2005). The thing is, however, that people with different identities have trouble integrating and adapting to the host society, which troubles the native citizens. An example comes from Timotijevic and Breakwell (2000). They argue that this non-integration is especially evident among the refugees and asylum seekers who were predominantly forced to leave their counties because of war and other violent conflicts. Because they were forced to leave their homes in dire circumstances, they often experience psychological disorders such as anxiety, PTSD, or depression. This makes it even harder for

them to adapt, connect, and integrate into the cohesive social bond that is perceived to be important by the local citizens (Timotijevic & Breakwell, 2000).

Something else that influences the average European citizen's concern for national identity is related to the idea of "visible" and "invisible" immigrants (Guild, 2005). For example, immigrants from the US who moved to the UK are almost never seen as a threat, albeit them having different cultural values and traditions. The host society pardons their differences even though the American immigrants will still celebrate their own culture. This makes them "invisible" immigrants (Guild, 2005, p.103). On the other side of this spectrum are the "visible" immigrants (i.e. Muslim refugees). They have a very distinct or different national identity and host societies tend to feel that they will remain different even after a period of integration, thus, actively threatening the national "social bond" (Gellner, 1997; Guild, 2005). Especially when there are many visible immigrants who are not adapting to the host culture, different minority groups will arise within the host society.

Lastly, Jeffers (2012, p.9) and Malkki (1996) conclude that many people see refugees and all their differences as a threat to national identity, simply because 'refugees appear to threaten or disrupt the so-called natural order of things.'

## 5.2 Identity and the Post-WWII ERC

In the post-WWII ERC, national identity was mainly based on the idea of ethnic homogeneity (Frank, 2011). As Frank (2011, p.27) argues, this 'ethnic homogeneity had become the sine qua non of political stability and nation-state viability.' Because many Europeans feared ethnic minorities with regard to (inter)national stability, they did not want ethnically different refugees to resettle in their country (Ballinger, 2011; Frank, 2011; Gatrell, 2011). Canefe (2018) perfectly summarizes this predicament, for she states that after the Second World War, many refugees with different skin color or religion became targets of violent national disputes about authenticity and national identity. Despite the tragic happening of the Holocaust, xenophobia had not been reduced. Even more so, it had only increased among the European public (Loescher & Scanlan 1986; Kochavi, 2001; Greenslade, 2005). This fear for other identities reached all the way into the realm of politics, for displaced persons and refugee camps were organized by means of ethnical and national (prewar) definitions (Marrus, 1985). This imposed a lot of resistance because this prewar nationality system was out of date and

in some instances did not even exist anymore. This caused for many groups of refugees, such as Jews or Ukrainians, to be stateless entirely and not many European countries were willing to take them in (Slatt, 2002). Arendt describes that the arrival of these refugees shocked many Europeans, for 'it was impossible to get rid of them or transform them into nationals of the country of refuge' (Arendt, 1979, p.181). The fact that they would not adapt to the host country's identity made for one of the gravest concerns within many European nations. Arendt (1979) continues that because a sense of old nationalism was still very present among these refugees, albeit them being stateless, they did not at all care to be assimilated into the host country. This stubbornness ultimately resulted in the creation of refugee minorities within the country of refuge, which in the eyes of the average European citizens threatened the national homogeneity that was so important to them (Arendt, 1979).

A good example of this negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugee minorities within post-WWII ERC is exemplified by Greenslade (2005). He explains that in post-WWII GB there were many anti-refugee feelings that were influenced by and combined with ideas of racism. In this time racism still played an important role within public opinion and the media was an important actor in spreading discriminatory ideas and worldviews (Greensalde, 2005; Webster, 2018). At first, during the Second World War, mostly white continental European refugees were preferred above refugees who had a very distinct culture or religion (Webster, 2018). Then, after the war had ended, the UK quickly wanted to disperse these groups of refugees, even though they had fatefully supported the British war efforts. An article in *The Times* stated that 'it is felt that the time has arrived when special efforts should be made to repatriate them [the refugees] now that their homelands have been liberated.' Furthermore, the article made clear that 'those who should go back included people who had served in the armed forces, and named Poles, Czechs, and German Jews as groups that were occupying houses 'badly wanted by homeless Britons' (Webster, p.234). On top of that, both white and non-white refugees were heavily discriminated by the United Kingdom's populace for they created signs that stated things such as: 'no poles, Irish, or East Europeans,' for a wide variety of occasions (Webster, 2018, p.243). With all this in mind, the assumption can be made that the racist atmosphere that was present in Great Britain and in other European countries, caused for the origin of a negative attitude toward refugees among its citizens.

Another example that underlines the perceived threat imposed by refugees on national identity comes from Douglas (2012). He explains that many ethnic Germans who had

always lived outside the actual German borders, such as in Czechoslovakia, quickly wanted to disavow their "German Identity" for they feared the wrath of many Eastern Europeans, who had felt oppressed by German culture imposed on them during the Nazi regime (Marrus, 1985; Cohen, 2011; Douglas, 2012). The idea of national identity, thus, could also work the other way around. This event also caused for the origin of a negative attitude toward refugees among the average European citizens.

Lastly, some European citizens also feared religious minorities, such as the Jews, for they had their own distinct identity within a host nation (Kochavi, 2001). These religious minorities often excluded themselves from the dominant group within society, which made them all but popular among the ethnic majority of a nation. Especially when these minorities were behaving as religious sects that undermined political institutions, the native citizens increasingly developed negative attitudes toward these minorities (Marrus, 1985; Kocahvi, 2001; Cohen, 2011). This partly explains why several (Eastern) European countries did not want the Jewish refugees to (re)settle on their national territory (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986). Just like what was the case in Great Britain, the racist attitude of people in Eastern Europe likely also resulted in an overly negative attitude of the average European citizens toward refugees.

## 5.3 Identity and the 21st Century ERC

So how do Europeans today see national identity? According to a 2016 survey conducted on the combined populations of France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Sweden, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, and Spain by Wike et al. (2016, p.10), there are four important factors contributing to someone's feeling of identity. These factors are language, customs and traditions, place of birth, and religion. The concept that comes in at the first place is the notion of language. Almost 97% of the combined European populations think that speaking the host nation's language is a prerequisite in identifying oneself with a particular nation. At second place comes the notion of culture. 68% of the combined populations that were surveyed think that it is important to have shared traditions and customs in order to identify oneself with a particular nation. Third, some 58% of the Europeans believe that it is of importance to be born in the country you identify with. Lastly, 34% of the Europeans feel that to identify yourself with a particular nation you need to have a shared religion, which in the European case is Christianity. These four factors, thus, create what Europeans call national identity (Wike et al,

2016). However, the problem is that many refugees that apply for asylum in one of the surveyed nations often do not possess these four perquisites (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). Therefore, they are not perceived as competent "nationals" by the host society. In the eyes of the average European citizen these culturally different refugees only undermine the socially constructed concept of national identity, and, therefore, they developed a negative attitude toward the refugee outsiders.

The emergence of the 21st Century ERC, resulted in the creation of more negative attitudes of the average European citizen toward refugees with regards to national identity. Especially nativist parties that underline the importance of national identity play an important role in creating this negative attitude (Hovil, 2016; Dempster & Hargrave, 2017; Davis & Deole, 2018). Danziger (2018) explains that the rise of these nativists probably has its roots in a 'long term inability to assimilate immigrant populations.' She continues that this problem was already evident in Europe well before the rise of Islamic State. The concern for immigrant assimilation and integration came up around the 1970's, when many European nations witnessed that the many foreign workers they had eagerly invited, stayed longer than the length of their work contracts. Some of them even settled and sent for their families to come over (Danziger, 2018). However, because there never was a real policy of integration, these immigrants who were supposed to stay for just a few years had not been assimilated into society when they ultimately decided to stay (Lozano, García-González, Sebastiani, Veinguer, & Araujo, 2014). This had to do with the fact that immigrant communities were never really able to 'feel whole with the majority' (Lozano at el., 2014). As a result, the offspring of these unintegrated people most likely did not feel culturally European, which made them susceptible to political and religious radicalization (Danziger, 2018). Because of this, they will not create a political and cultural bond with the overall host nation's society. In contradiction, there even is a great chance that they will feel solidarity towards other minority groups within the country. 'This in-group solidarity makes native Europeans more likely to consider immigrant communities as "the enemy"' (Danziger, 2018). In short, because the Muslim minorities of the past have been accused of non-integration, the average European citizens of the 21st Century ERC have the tendency to form prejudices with regards to Muslim refugees that enter their countries today. Research done by Wike et al. (2016, p.5) shows that a median of 58% of the combined populations of Greece, Hungary, Spain, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands, France, Sweden, and Poland accuse Muslims to be subjected to non-integration.

In the eyes of the average European citizens, the Muslim refugees that enter their countries will probably also be subjected to non-integration, which threatens the national identity.

The notion of the non-integrating Mulsim refugees being "the enemy from within" is often picked up by nativist and right-wing political parties. Especially Muslim refugees, created by the turmoil in the Middle-East, are given a raw deal from these nativists political movements (Telhami, 2016; Wike et al., 2016; Danziger, 2018). Examples stem from all over Europe. Think of the Dutch Party For Freedom, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swedish Democrats, and so on (Davis & Deole, 2018). These parties call on their voters to demonstrate anti-refugee voices and when it comes to immigration policies, they wish to close the border to almost any kind of foreigner (Bruneau, Kteily, & Laustsen, 2018). According to Goodwin, Raines, and Cutts (2017), 55% of the average European populations (i.e. Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria, Great Britain, Hungary, and Poland) agreed that further immigration from Muslim countries should be stopped for they threaten the national economy, identity and socio-economic situations of the native populations.

So, why do these right-wing nativist parties primarily target Muslim immigrants? According to Mustafa and Richards (2017), this has also to do with the idea that Muslim minorities are often accused of non-integration. Bruneau et al., (2018) follow up on this by stating that especially the far-right people perceive Muslim refugees as savage, aggressive and lacking morality, which basically dehumanizes them. They continue that this can be one of the reasons for why native Europeans want to bar the Muslim refugees from their borders. On the other side, they also state that people do not only want to dismiss Muslims the right to enter their country because they necessarily see them as less human. Sometimes people just perceive the values of these Muslim refugees to be too different. In other instances, they also think that the refugees will 'place an undue strain on the in-group' (Bruneau et al., 2018, p.5). Often these negative feelings can be linked to the national security issue with regards to the idea of radicalization and terrorism.

Lastly, something else that might offer valuable insights in why the average European citizens fear for their national identity with regard to refugees, has to do with the concept of diversity. Wike et al. (2016, p.12) held a survey among the populations of i.e. Greece, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, France, and Spain, asking whether they view diversity in their country as a good or as a bad thing. Interesting is that, although public opinion is highly different per European country, no majority of the surveyed

nations sees diversity as something positive. Not surprisingly this voice mostly comes from the right-wing voters of society. This group has steadily increased since the emergence of the 21st Century ERC (Hartelveld et al., 2018). Adding up to this statement, Wike et al. (2016, p.14) explain that there is also a correlation between people with a low education and people who hold the opinion that more diversity makes their country a worse place to live in. They continue that anti-refugee voices are mostly heard from within the lower educational classes, for these people mostly fear refugees and other immigrants because they see these groups as competitors within their social and economic environment.

## 5.4 Comparison & Conclusion

Now it is time for the comparative analysis of the two cases in light of national identity. The first thing that obviously stands out is that in both ERC's national identity plays a great part in creating the negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees. Therefore, there is to some extent continuity between the two cases. In short, the fear for national identity has always been present. Europeans of both ERC's feared refugee minorities with regard to the effect these refugees had on their cohesive social bond. Another thing that proves continuity, is the fact that nationalism and xenophobia are present in both ERC's. Especially in the first half of the twentieth century, many people feared outsiders for the idea of ethnic homogeneity was perceived to be of uttermost importance to national and international stability. There was a moment when this xenophobic European attitude seemed to soften, however, the non-integration of many labor immigrants shocked many European citizens after the 1970's, making them once again fear for national homogeneity. Because these laborers ultimately settled but did not really assimilate, many native Europeans got concerned about new foreigners that entered their countries. This idea of non-integration, combined with the metonymic character of Muslims, Terrorist, and Refugees that developed during the beginning of the twenty-first century, caused for many Europeans to fall back to a more xenophobic attitude. Initially, this caused the rise of many nativist and far-right political parties that eagerly wanted to implement anti-refugee policies. Nevertheless, this development also hints at discontinuity between the Post-WWII ERC and 21st Century ERC, for the nature of fear for national identity has changed. Back then, it seemed like all kind of refugees were feared, not necessarily pinpointed on one specific group. Today, it seems like Europeans mostly pinpoint their fear of national identity the group of Muslim refugees.

# 6. Real-World Concern: Economic Livelihood

In western democratic societies the economic realm touches upon almost every single individual. The rich, the poor, majorities and minorities all need to have a solid economic foundation to survive in a capitalistic world. When this economic foundation is threatened, many people will show dissatisfaction towards the groups of people they hold accountable for this (Harteveld et al., 2018). Most of the times this resentment is pointed towards the government and its politicians. These politicians, on their turn, then try to diverse attention toward someone or something else. Perhaps the refugee minority?

## 6.1 Economic Livelihood in Context

So why are refugees often targets of public animosity with regards to the economy? According to Dempster and Hargrave (2017) this has to do with the idea of many Europeans that refugees impose an economic burden on their country. Especially people who feel disheartened about their own nation's current economic situation display anti-refugee feelings because they think this group of people will only make things worse (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017, p.14). Mustafa and Richards (2017) continue by stating that many people fear for economic competition from outsiders, in terms of housing, jobs and welfare benefits. This means that most Europeans who are firmly against the influx of refugees for economic reason are individuals who have low social distance from these refugees. Because they feel threatened economically by means of "unfair competition," they are more susceptible to anti-refugee rhetoric (Wike et al, 2016; Dempster & Hargrave, 2017; Mustafa & Richards, 2017). Callens (2015) follows up on this by stating that social and economic vulnerable people are more inclined to feel threatened by outsider competition, which furthermore reinforces this argument.

Lastly, Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders (2002) state that the perceive economic threat also has an ethnic component, for Europeans who hold similar social positions to ethnic minorities, are more inclined to stop the inflow of refugees into their country. Nevertheless, this resentment is not always a fair deal. For example, there are groups of immigrants that leave their country, solely to find better economic circumstances across the borders (Guild, 2005). However, people that are called refugees according to the UN Convention of 1951 are individual who are 'unable or unwilling to return 'owing to the well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group

or political opinion' (McFayden, 2012) Therefore, their main intention is not just economic elevation, but rather a quest for finding a place of safety. The problem is that, once again, a metonymic character is created for many refugees are regarded by the average European citizens as merely economic immigrants, even though this definition is all but just (Jeffers, 2012; Wike et al., 2016; Dempster & Hargave, 2017).

## 6.2 Economic Concerns and the Post-WWII ERC

So, what was the general perception of the average European citizens of the post-WWII ERC toward refugees with regards to (socio-)economic threats? The answer to this question is twofold. First, because Europe was a pile of ruble after Nazi Germany had been defeated, the Allied victors sought easy labor to start on the reconstruction of the European continent and its nations (Marrus, 1985; Cohen, 2011). The many refugees caused by the war, ironically, were a convenient and easy source of labor. Therefore, the IRO tried to resettle many of the refugees that turned out to be not repatriable (e.g. Eastern Europeans who did not want to live under the Stalinist Soviet regime) and distributed them to industries of European nations that needed a quick source of labor (Marrus, 1985). Marrus (1985, p.344-345) even states that the IRO was turning into a fully-fletched 'international employment agency for two dozen different states' and was mainly concerned with finding employment for refugees. This had to do with the fact that many men of the prewar labor force had been trimmed off during the Second World War (Cohen, 2011). Especially in the heavy key industries of France, Great Britain, and Belgium workers were wanted. Over the years these toilsome jobs had lost appeal among many people of the working class, because of bad conditions and low payments (Cohen, 2011). However, DP's who had nowhere to go, such as people from the Baltics, Poland, and the Ukraine, eagerly wanted these jobs in exchange for a permanent demographic solution (Cohen, 2011). The camps that housed these DP's made it easy for other countries 'to examine the refugees regrouped in the camps according to their professional ability, physical shape, social background and behavior' (Cohen, 2011, p.105-106). This caused for some sort of human selection, which was in no way humanitarian in essence, but rather economically (Marrus, 1985). However, a downside to this economic resettlement and the selection of refugees was that at the end, when most refugees had already been resettled and distributed, some 175.000 people were left. These people were deemed to be not fit for hard labor and, therefore, nobody really wanted to take them in (Marrus, 1985).

In conclusion, labor refugees were welcomed by many Europeans, provided that they were able to contribute to society (Marrus, 1985; Greenslade, 2005; Webster 2018). Their contribution, thus, was a perquisite that influenced the average European citizen's attitude toward the group of refugees. This often led to more positive voice to be heard among the native populations of these European countries toward refugees as long as they provided society with hard labor.

Second, there is also evidence that voices were less welcoming toward the economic refugees. This resentment can be found in the fact that many countries were imposing some kind of labor selection, where white Europeans with a less distinct culture had a great advantage over other more distinct individuals (Steinert, 2011). Often this had something to do with the overseas empires of some of the European nations. People from these overseas dominions were considered to be "very different," and Europeans did not want these people to take advantage of the European post-WWII state of affairs (Greenslade, 2005; Webster, 2018). Racism, thus, played an important role within public opining on refugees and the economic concern. A good example comes from Great Britain. There they assumed that white Europeans 'would be more skilled, valuable, and assimilable (…) than non-Europeans' (Steinert, 2011, p.232). Even within the group of European refugees, there was discrimination. Steinert (2011, p.233) gives an example of such a situation going on in Great Britain:

> *Such racialisation of migrants was not limited to a purely positive discrimination towards DPs. Ethnic categorisations were also applied within this group. This followed a general tradition in English-speaking countries of creating something of a hierarchy of wanted migrants by which potential settlers were judged. At the top were the White Anglo-Saxon Protestants, followed by North Europeans and, at quite a distance, South and finally East Europeans. During the political consideration of the recruitment of DPs, a similar 'racialization' occurred, whereby the female workforce of the Baltic States was rated above the 'peasant stock' of the Ukraine. DPs from North-East Europe were considered to be 'superior types'. They were presumed to be easier to assimilate and less prone to psychological disorders and suicide than the southern 'slave races'.*

Adding up to the argument that there was a socio-economic racist attitude toward refugees comes from Webster (2018). She explains that in Great Britain outsiders were often banned in public spaces or had a smaller chance in the overall national economy, for British citizens openly discriminated them when it came to jobs, housing, and social welfare. Especially when reconstruction was finished, British citizens quickly wanted to disperse the foreign laborers

(Webster, 2018). Another argument that shows the negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees comes from Merten (2012). She describes that often refugees that had arrived in a war-torn country, such as West Germany, fiercely had to compete with local residents if they wanted enjoy a tiny bit of the utterly scarce resources that were available at the time. In short, the European continent was not only physically damaged by the Second World War, it also had to be reconstructed economically. This resulted in a scarcity of the economic resources available, which caused fierce competition to arise over these resources (Merten, 2012). Whenever refugees also tried to get a hold of these scarce resources, the local European populace often heavily resisted.

## 6.3 Economic Concerns and the 21st Century ERC

Lastly, it is time to examine the contemporary attitude of the average European citizens toward refugees with regards to their economic concerns. In the 21st Century ERC, anti-refugee outcries such "they steal our jobs" or "they cost the taxpayer a lot of money," are often heard among the average European citizens (Wike et al, 2016). As is explained in chapter 6.1, this public resentment towards refugees with regards to their economic situation, has primarily to do with the fact that the working class individuals feel threatened by the extra economic competition the refugees impose on society (Guild, 2005; Wike et al, 2016; Dempster & Hargave, 2017).

Something else that compliments to the overall negative attitude of Europeans toward refugees, has to do with the idea of many of these Europeans that refugees are 'bogus.' In their eyes, these refugees are actually economic immigrants in disguise who only want to benefit from the host nation's welfare state. Therefore, the refugees are only perceived to impose a burden on the country in question (Guild, 2005). Guild (2005, p.132-133) explains this as follows:

> *Among the more common complaints which are heard in Europe about asylum seekers is that they are 'bogus' because, in fact, they are economic migrants. (…) This shard of apparent common sense, prevalent across Europe, rests on another assumption, which is that would-be economic migrants are not needed, unskilled, desperate and likely to undermine wages and working conditions in the host country. This prejudice leads then to the concern that economic migrants are unable to provide for themselves, and become a burden on the social assistance system of the state. The foreigner is constructed as a potential threat to collective security expressed in the economic wellbeing of the states.*

*The foreigner is homogenized into one category and that category is allocated negative characteristics.*

The influence of these anti-refugee outcries with regards to the economic situation within a country can have dire consequences. For example, Brexit shows how economic dissatisfaction can lead to drastic political actions. This is especially true in light of Gidden's theory (1986). Simplified, many British people in the second decade of the twenty-first century were dissatisfied by the "unfair" economic competition from outsiders and they blamed their government for their socio-economic downfall (Tilford, 2016). Anti-EU parties within the country were quick to respond to this predicament. They wanted to vote Great Britain out of the EU so the native British citizens would not have to deal with economic competitions from outsiders (Tilford, 2016). Within this event, economic immigrants and other outsider minorities (e.g. refugees) were once again turned into social and political created scapegoats to fulfill political aspirations. Both the native British citizens and the politicians worked on each other's overly negative attitude toward outsiders with regards to the economic situation, which ultimately resulted in Brexit (Tilford, 2016).

Another example that provides for a reason behind the negative attitude of the average European citizens toward refugees, comes from Wike et al. (2016). In a 2016 survey, they asked the combined populations of Hungary, Poland, Greece, Italy, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Germany, if they think that the incoming of refugees has a negative influence on the economy. The median comes in at a striking 50%, which means that half of the combined populations think that refugees are a burden on society because they 'take our jobs and social benefits' (Wike et al., 2016, p.31). However, there is somewhat of a divide within the overall European negative attitude toward refugees with regard to this economic precedent. For example, in Poland, Hungary, Greece, and Italy, 73,5% of the population sees refugees as an economic burden. On the contrary, in the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, German, and Great Britain, people are somewhat conflicted for an average of 38,6% of the population perceives refugees to be a burden to the national economy (Wike et al., 2016, p.31). On this note, the people who think that refugees impose a threat are counterbalanced by an equal amount of people who believe that refugees can actually make the nation a better place (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). In the eyes of the more positive EU citizens, these refugees can work in sectors that have become less popular over the years. In addition, many refugees also have adequate labor skills and working experience, which makes

them a valuable asset to incorporate into society (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017; Esses et al., 2017). Nevertheless, still 50% of the above mentioned combined populations polled by Wike et al. (2016) perceive refugees as a threat to the economy. This naturally results in a negative attitude toward refugees. Especially, when the other real-world concerns of national security and national identity are also taken into consideration.

## 6.4 Comparison & Conclusion

In the end, the economic concern of Europeans with regards to refugees is a though nut to crack when we compare the two eras with each other. This has chiefly to do with the limitation imposed on the literature of the post-WWII period, for there is less analytical evidence available on what the people thought of refugees concerning the economy. Just like what is the case with the other two real-world concerns discussed in chapter 4 and 5, the imposed threat on the economic livelihood of many Europeans has always been around. Also, concepts such as racism and discrimination are notions that are timeless and, therefore, are present in both different cases. This is the case for the Post-WWII ERC, as well as the 21st Century ERC. Because this has always been the case, the assumption can be made that there is, in fact, continuity.

However, there are also some great differences that really show discontinuity between the two cases. The first major argument that points toward that direction is the fact that right after WWII, many countries saw the refugees as a great alternative to complement the deprived labor forces that were needed to reconstruct the devastated European continent. Generally, these workforces were welcomed by the European public as long as they contributed to rebuilding the host nation's society. When we compare this to the twenty-first century, this is not the same. After sixty years of economic immigration, people have grown weary of the effect this economic exchange of people can have on society. Labor migrants did not integrate that well into the host country's society. Whenever they permanently settled these people and their offspring often did not develop a social bond with the native population. This resulted in many Muslim minority groups within the country that perceivably threatened the national identity, security, and economy. Especially working class people felt threatened by them for they made for new competitors within their economic sphere. Because of this, many people feared new – Muslim – refugees entering their countries. Once again, a metonymic character surfaces within the European attitudes toward refugees, for

economic immigrants (that are perceived to only steal jobs and profit of the welfare state), terrorists, criminals, and refugees are perceived as the same. The past experiences gave the average European citizens of the second decade of the twenty-first century some reasons to create resentment toward the new groups of refugees, whereas, in the post-WWII ERC, people were more positive toward this group of outsiders as long as they actively contributed to society. This contradiction between the two timeframes results in discontinuity between the post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC with regards to the reasons behind the negative attitude of the average European citizens in light of their economic livelihood.

After the examination of the important literature on the negative attitude of the average European citizens toward refugees and the comparative case study between the post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC with regards to the reasons behind this negative attitude, it is possible to give an answer to this research question of this thesis: *To what extent is there continuity in the reasons behind the average European citizen's negative attitude toward refugees when both European refugee crises of the post-WWII period and the second decade of the twenty-first century are compared?*

Firstly, the argument can be made that to a certain extent there indeed has been continuity in the reasons behind the negative attitude of the average European citizen toward refugees. This is the case because the EU citizens of both ERC's all had similar concerns when it comes to the influx of refugees. For example, national security had always played a great part in the creation of public opinion and the native Europeans often turned their resentment toward the minority group of refugees when national security was at stake. The same can be said about national identity, for in both cases Europeans feared the influx of refugees with regards to their own identity. In the post-WWII ERC, identity was important because this was the pillar on which future European stability could be built. On the other side, national identity was also important within the 21st Century ERC for in the eyes of the average European citizens the social bond that defined national identity was at stake by the emergence of many (Muslim) minority groups within their countries. Lastly, in both eras, European citizens also developed negative attitudes toward refugees for they perceivably placed an undue strain on the economy of the countries they were settling. On top of that, many of these refugees were also seen as competitors within the socio-economic sphere of many average citizens, which only resulted in more resentment toward them. Therefore, the assumption can be made that there is in fact continuity because the drivers (i.e. the three real-world concerns) have played an important role in both the post-WWII ERC and the 21st Century ERC.

However, this is only true within the bigger picture because when the actual *reasons* behind the negative attitude of the average European citizens toward refugees are compared, some significant differences can be found. For example, when the two cases are compared in light of national security, it becomes clear that the origin of fear derives from two different actors. In the post-WWII ERC, Europeans feared all kinds of ethnically different groups. In the

21st Century ERC, the average Europeans mainly held a negative attitude toward Muslim refugees with regards to terrorism. This created a metonymic character, where all refugees, Muslims, and terrorists are seen as the same thing by the European public. This also had its effect on the European concern for national identity. After WWII, many stateless Europeans wanted to live in countries where they ethnically belonged and where they would not be oppressed by other dominant groups. Therefore, the totality of the concept of outsiders threatened their national identity. In the time of the 21st Century, when most societies are more racially mixed and very diverse, Europeans have mainly come to fear Muslim outsiders because in the past they appeared to be subject to non-integration. This results in the creation of many Muslim minorities who are not identifying themselves with the country they live in, which openly threatens the social and national bond within European societies. Lastly, when the two cases are compared in light of the economy there are some major differences that cause for discontinuity in the reasons behind the negative attitude of the average Europeans toward refugees. In the post-WWII ERC, refugees were more welcomed when they proved themselves to be valuable assets to society. Of course, there was also much discrimination going on, but as long as the refugees worked on rebuilding the host nation after the events of WWII, they would be accepted by the average European citizens. In the 21st Century ERC, this view has turned around, for many Europeans developed a negative attitude toward refugees, because of the non-integrating Muslim laborers that were invited some decades earlier. Once again, the notion of being a "Muslim" plays an important role in the reason the average European citizens hold negative attitude toward refugees, even though not all refugees are Muslim in the first place.

In the end, it thus looks like there is continuity for all three real-world concerns: national security, national identity, and economic livelihood are important in the emergence of a negative attitude toward refugees. However, when the actual reasons are examined it looks like there are also a lot of differences between both cases of the post-WII ERC and the 21st Century ERC. It looks like, back then, people held negative attitudes toward all kinds of outsiders, minorities, and strangers, whereas, in the second decade of the twenty-first century Europeans mainly have a negative perception toward the metonymic character of Muslim refugees. This causes discontinuity between both cases. Then, everything that was strange was bad. Now, Muslims are perceived to be the cause of all evil, even though this is highly unfair.

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**Front-page Image**

'German refugees from the "death march" from Lodz, a Polish city which evicted ethnic German residents.' *The Real Holocaust of World War Two - The Genocide of 15+ Million Germans,* 8 May 2015. Available online at: https://beam-truth.livejournal.com/1339336.html. Accessed: 25 June 2018.

'Syrian refugees walk with their belongings after entering Jordan at the Hadalat border crossing, east of Amman, on Jan. 14.' *These Countries Are Failing to Resettle Their 'Fair Share' of Syrian Refugees,* (Photo: Khalil Mazraawi/AFP/Getty Images), 29 March 2016. Available online at: http://www.takepart.com/article/2016/03/29/refugee-resettlement/. Accessed: 25 June 2018.