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German Political and Military Policy in times of change

Germany defence today and in the past

Master-thesis

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2018

Abstract

There are many forms and types of culture - violent cultures, peaceful ones, democracy, authoritarian, civilian and military orientated ones among many more. This paper will pay attention to German military culture and how it shifted from an aggressive culture to a pacifistic one to a 'defensive' military culture since the 1990s. In particular, the text will focus on changes in recent time, studying the political incentives in the 1990s. Upon it, a new case study will be made looking at the 2010s and how the new White Papers in 2006 and 2016 have changed the official military culture.

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Introduction

The political notion of a civil non-militarised state and citizens allows Germany to marginalise right-wing thoughts as well as create a stable support of that notion until now. This strategy of soft-power development also forms the basis of pro-European Union (EU) politics. However, in the vice of terrorism in Europe, the Ukraine-Crisis with Russia, and President Trump, who tweeted: “Germany owes (...) vast sums of money to the [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] (NATO) & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defence it provides to Germany,” German politicians are increasingly forced to reconsider Germany’s military development and therefore, hard-power (Gambino, 2017). Furthermore, among the United States of America (USA), the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and India, also the European Union (EU) has political, economic and cultural ambitions to maintain and develop. Hence, military requirements to secure, maintain and enhance the EU and in this case foremost Germany’s position are naturally rising. Especially due to the apparent political and economic international tensions mentioned above. This paper will focus on the development of German hard-power, the German armed forces called Bundeswehr. The research will focus on **why and how hard-power changed substantially in Germany ever since the Second World War with focus on the time after the German Union in 1989 and what obstacles were involved in that process?** Aiming to answer the above, this text will use tools of constructivism (culture, history, identity and norms). From an academic perspective, it is important to consider the internal and external context influencing relevant debates among involved decision-makers. This will show if and why links between different events exist and possibly lead to a chain of other events. Here one comes back to the research question of what, how and why did Germany act or not as it has in the past and currently.

Furthermore, after examining the scholarly debate, the text will move on to analysing how Germany’s balance act was managed and shaped by politicians and the Bundeswehr. This paper will then analyse (1) the German history since World War Two and what has shaped the German culture, identity and norms with regards to the Bundeswehr. Afterwards, it will examine political opinions in the 1990s and how the before mentioned factors influence that time. It will discuss (2) briefly the idea of an EU army. In addition, it will examine to a larger degree (3) how the Ukraine-Crisis and the threat of terrorism interplay with the aforementioned question of militarisation of Germany. Moreover, it will bring into perspective (4) how the

situation took a turn when President Trump appeared on political stage and moved into the office. The importance of answering these points is to understand political debates and security policy development of past and present, summing up where history, cultures, identities and interests may lead Germany.

Literature review

Chapter 1 will look at the academic literature on constructivism and how its tools can answer the question. Before starting to review literature, several definitions are going to be presented to clarify the text. The use of these tools will be clarified along their definitions.

Definitions and concepts:

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilder present two versions of security definition (1998: 1-20). The traditional view on security is only concerned with military security, strategy, including nuclear strategy focussing on the state (politics), interstate warfare and threats from the outside (Buzan et al., 1998: 2-3). The new definition of security widens the traditional perspective to “non-military sources of threats”, which is not state-centred and therefore, is more applicable also to intrastate warfare (Buzan et al., 1998: 3-5). These non-military areas include “economic, societal, and environmental security issues playing alongside with military and political ones” (Buzan et al., 1998: 7). There is a substantial academic argument on whether this widening of the definition of security is more destructive than constructive. The argument for keeping security a military state-centred definition is that otherwise security becomes everything, including for example health, which would make security more complex, unwieldy or to use more strong vocabulary cumbersome than necessary (Buzan et al., 1998: 3-4). Additionally, security was already beforehand a complex enough issue to deal with and find “devise solutions to any of these important problems [military security; “pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions”]” (Walt 1991: 212-213 in Buzan et al., 1998: 3-4). “In varying degree, [traditionalists] accepted the need to look more widely at non-military causes of conflict in the international system and made little explicit attempt to defend the centrality of the state in security analysis at a time when so many nonstate actors were playing vigorously in the military game” (Buzan et al., 1998: 3). Here Buzan and his

fellow scholars make the crucial point, which indirectly already speaks more for the new definition of security. This being the (international) interconnectivity among the different private and public sectors as well as the 'new' non-military areas, providing new grounds for threads and conflicts. In Peter Katzenstein's book *'The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics,'* he states that "[t]he narrow definition of security tends to focus on material capabilities and the use and control of military force by states" (1996: 9).

Furthermore, its focus on states being at least one of the involved actor, if not all, hinders to see that the focus of states can change away from the use of force and the state as the thing to protect first. Looking at the above one realises that a narrow definition of security by a state could lead to a narrow definition of the state itself. Thus, from the above two paragraphs, one can deduct that a narrow definition of the state, as a concept it is not useful to analyse a wider range of contemporary German security issues, and the importance of military security and its position among the wider security issues.

"Actors, institutions (...), ideas" (Howlett et al, 2009), identity, interest (Wendt, 1992), culture and norms (Katzenstein, 1996) are the main concepts. Ideas, beliefs and assumptions are what constitutes how one thinks about the world and how everything works (Howlett et al, 2009). Those ideas do not need to be rational from the point of another one, but him- or herself only. Another point to be mentioned within this context is the degree or extent to which one believes in and follows those ideas, beliefs and assumptions. Institutions are organisations of two or more actors, which share common ideas on a certain topic, which make them align their interests within that institute within a certain situation. However, this does not mean that all their interests are aligned and that they agree on even most things, but only to the extent that they deem fit and necessary. States are institutions, which stand for and hold certain ideas, beliefs, assumptions, norms and values. The people, who are part of the state, as an institution, hold their own ideas, beliefs, assumptions, norms and values. The latter ones constitute the identity of each. As institution and humans will not submit fully to the other, both humans and institution shape and reshape one another. By quoting Wendt's book title of 1992, Zehfuss states that "[a]fter all, 'anarchy is what states make of it' because states' identities are made, not given" (2009: 41). This also means that their identities are not constant, but can transform over time. As one example, Russia has through the centuries prevailed, but had many sudden changes and rebirths through for example the Russian Revolution after the Great War, the First World War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. When a new kind of Russian government ruled, new ideas, beliefs and assumptions were set up. Hence, not only a few people were exchanged for others, but the

majority of the middle and upper government offices. Meaning that the identities changed drastically of both humans and people, reshaping each time the institution substantively to the extent that it is new rather than old. Nevertheless, the history of the Russian state continued together with the Russian people and allowed each time to be integrated into the policy-making process of the succeeding state. Identity also instils interests in the actors and institutions, which make them agree, stay neutral and disagree with others. Vice versa interests also change the institutions and actors through pressure from others and time, making one want to achieve a chain of certain goals. As for example, the US' war on terror had to show success in a certain amount of time to maintain public support. To achieve these goals, certain values such as human rights of non-American people had to suffer extensively, even though human rights are a value of the US government.

Constructivism versus liberalism and realism:

In realism, liberalism and constructivism it is believed that states are the main actors. The first two schools of thought also take for granted that the relation between states is anarchic in nature. “[B]oth sides share a commitment to rationalism and thus the assumption that agents’ identities and interests are given” (Zehfuss, 2009: 38). It is understood that actions cause reactions, where all states are sovereign, but shape other states’ actions and reactions. As this paper focuses on hard power and Germany, the inevitable example is Germany itself, which in military terms was for a few years without a military of its own. Even in the years after the founding of the Bundeswehr, it was without considerable influence on other states but rather controlled by other states. Only in the 1990s after the German Union, the German army was sent to missions abroad by request of the western Allies and Germany’s will to contribute (Zehfuss, 2009: 47). Wendt looks at the transformation from one “relatively stable identity to another”, but does not mention unstable state identities in the process of transformation (Zehfuss, 2009: 90; Wendt, 1992). Zehfuss argues that “Wendt’s anthropomorphic concept of the state cannot cope with identities which are unstable in themselves,” which Germany could be categorised as, due its historical guilt and debt (Zehfuss, 2009: 90). The opposing forces in the arguments of military involvement, including on the one side “Germany’s ability to be part of an alliance [...] at risk”, therefore, risking legitimacy, cultural, economic, political and military ‘partners and friends’ and on the other side the fear of being tagged as exclusive, nationalistic, selfish, violent, aggressive or similarly, when refusing to go along NATO

members' policies, and on the next side the Basic Law of Germany as well as the widespread domestic non-military opinion (Zehfuss, 2009: 65-68). The 'partnerability' (ability to be a partner) was only possible due to the trust from NATO members in Germany, their investment and security provided to Germany, which for Germany also meant commitment "in the difficult cases in which there is no full agreement between all partners but in which acting is nevertheless necessary' (Klose, 1991 in Zehfuss, 2009: 67)". Furthermore, as Zehfuss described the discussions on the use of the German military were heated within the population as well as from outside Germany (2009: 71-72). This highlights that the identity formation inside a state is crucial when studying the identity of a state. In realism, hard power is what a state must use to survive in the anarchic international system. Germany with its unstable identity does not fit into the traditional sense of protecting its sovereignty with hard-power tools to reach security on the international sphere. Germany is more relying on its soft power skills such as diplomacy and economic trade to maintain security at home. Therefore, the (neo-) realist school of thought has difficulty to analyse Germany's foreign policy, which is so heavily influenced by its history and domestic factors, including its Basic Law.

To come back to liberalism, it looks more at the intertwined international system, where international institutions led by states create a tightened system, where freedom, equality, and sovereignty, including human rights, are respected. These institutions include the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), International Criminal Court (ICC) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). Additionally, realists and liberalists do not often look at the long-term internal history as well as what exactly led to a certain situation, but rather look at the situation itself. This is rather limited, due to their believe-like modified impressions on how the states' game of pool works. Their frameworks are not holistic approaches, while as constructivists like Peter Katzenstein question what the other two schools of thought take for granted (1996). Alexander Wendt still sees the state's identity as given and can change (1992), but was one of the scholars, which brought constructivist thought forward and challenged the international system's construction. He phrased "[a]narchy is what states make of it" and states that "[t]he intersubjective understandings embodied in the institution of sovereignty, in other words, may redefine the meaning of others' power for the security of the self" (Wendt, 1992: 415). Zehfuss puts it that "[s]tates may be self-interested but they continuously (re)define what that means" (2009: 4). Zehfuss criticises that Wendt (1992) takes the identity of states as a given and does not take domestic factors and their relation to the international sphere into closer consideration (2009: 76) and that speech acts are excluded (2009: 22). For quite some time, it is believed that democracy will be the international future, which becomes steadily more and

more reality. While it certainly is a reality, one cannot forget that while the state continues to be there, the internal actors do not live forever and they also have their ambitions, interests and cultural notes, which can differ substantially from the one of the former government. As democracy allows for any other political system to be elected if the majority votes for it. Constructivism looks from a more holistic perspective on a certain situation. This includes a deeper outline of the history of a situation. This means that for example, constructivism looks at the reasons why Germany had a weak German military for such a long time, and a culture of peace and redemption and why the parliament members have committed to strengthening its military after such a lengthy period. In realism, a weak military does not make sense. In liberalism, the focus does not lie on hard-power, but rather capitalism, privatisation of the public sector and peace through international economic trade in an interdependent system of states and the democratisation of the international system through international institutions such as the ICC, IMF, WB and WHO (Griffiths et al., 2014: 92-94, 203-206, 238-239). Liberalism seemed, therefore, more suitable to analyse Germany than realism. However, it cannot explain the remilitarisation of Germany, which again realism can better explain. Constructivism looks at the identity and interest formation of a state from a domestic and international perspective, which makes it a more suitable approach to analyse the research question and Germany's actions through history.

Constructivism does not analyse a situation by itself, but scholars use it as a tool to do so. That means that each one of the great schools of thought mentioned above is broad in meaning. They have subcategories, which differ among one another, and they contain a few means and character, with which they analyse international relations and beyond. "Self-proclaimed constructivists often have (or at least are seen to have) worldviews that fall within liberalism, broadly defined, and often accept that categorization" (Barkin, 2010: 2). Constructivists see self-help not only from the short term of a current situation. The situation is rather seen as a fragment of a construct, a process over time, through the history of the actors. Therefore, a situation is not a purely contemporary event of actors and the international structure. Constructivism "means, believes and asserts that socio-political reality does not exist (...) reality exists, but only to the extent that they are constructed" (Gerrits, 2017). This is what Zehfuss (2009) means by constructed identities, which leads to "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992). Furthermore, constructivism makes the effort to grasp the context, "culture and ideas in international interactions," local and national processes, which added to a discussed event (Tsygankov, 2010: 7). Wendt mentions "identity- and interest-formation," which is "not important to students of international relations," including realists and liberals, but for

constructivism (1992: 392, 406). However, as Zehfuss criticises, he missed to analyse the internal construction of identity- and interest formation (2009: 76). “A rationalist problematique, which reduces process to dynamics of behavioural interaction among exogenously constituted actors, defines the scope of systemic theory.” (Wendt, 1992: 392). Additionally, Wendt argues that the intersubjective structure is more important than the material structure because the international system and human action, in general, are based on interaction, which makes the intersubjective one a priority to the material. However, I disagree to the extent that the material structure and capabilities of the different actors partly predefines a situation and influences the interaction between actors. If actor A points a gun directly at actor B and demands something, actor B will not refuse the demand of actor A, except B accepts B’s death or if B can defend against A, B will defend, if B deems A’s demands wrong. However, if actor A does not have any tool and is equal in any physical and psychological point, but demands something of B, B can freely agree or refuse the demand based on B’s identity and interests. Zehfuss states one’s “[i]dentity is the key to the development of different security environments or cultures of anarchy” (2009: 40-41). An underlying example is a pacifistic Czechoslovakia, as Nazi-Germany invaded it. Showing that foreign policy and anarchy are not necessarily most influential, but the identities of states and their people is decisive. Katzenstein argues “that security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors [, which] does not mean that power, conventionally understood as material capabilities, is unimportant for an analysis of national security” (1996: 2). Katzenstein also connects Wallerstein and Meyer to show that both their approaches together “recognise the importance of combining an analysis of power and wealth with issues of state sovereignty and cultural elements in the international society of states” (Meyer, 1980; Wallerstein, 1984 in Katzenstein, 1996: 4). Constructivism, therefore, allows for the inclusion of constructed domestic identity, its intersubjective structure internationally as well as material influence. This is a far more elaborate approach to study German identity and its interests in militarisation.

Constructivism will be used to understand the change in German politics in the 1990s and 2010s. This text will analyse the process of German sovereignty and therefore, also statehood, which were only slowly passed to the German government and its authorities over decades. “Identity- and interest formation, as Wendt (1992) mentioned it, “norms, identity, and culture” (Katzenstein, 1996: 5) are major indicators and factors, which can help to understand German remilitarisation in these moments. “These factors result from social processes, purposeful political action, and differences in power capabilities” (Katzenstein, 1996: 5). Constructivists generally find themselves close to agreeing or fully agree with the last sentence.

Wendt states that “transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations of structure” (1992: 393). Wendt “disentangle the concepts of self-help and anarchy by showing that self-interested conceptions of security are not a constitutive property of anarchy” as well as “[he] show[s] how self-help and competitive power politics may be produced causally by processes of interaction between states in which anarchy plays only a permissive role” (1992: 396). Keeping the above in mind, it is highly important not to wish for and consider humans as rational, while people can be irrational.

Main part: Historical context, culture, identity, norms, political opinions and military development

These chapters will provide one after the other the foundation for the chapters to follow by introducing links between identity, culture and norms from before the German Union and after. This will provide the reader with the necessary knowledge to see the profound roots and effects of these concepts in Germany security policy development and implementation. These chapters will look at the history of Germany from a political and military perspective as well as how foreign influence played into German history. The domestic political and military perspectives will show concrete changes in hard-power and their gradual introduction. It will look at the election programmes of the German parties over time to analyse changes in politics and differences between parties on the topic of the Bundeswehr. This will follow much more the Zehfuss inclusion of speech acts (2009). The historical perspective will allow the reader to grasp what Germany wants – international recognition as a peaceful and reliable partner within NATO and beyond and how foreign policies influence that. Furthermore, that perspective will show how foreign policies not directed at Germany still substantially influence its security policies. Both will help to understand why hard-power changed in Germany. It will examine German military strengths and preparedness for conflicts at home and abroad and how this provoked fast changes to increase readiness, especially in the Ukraine-Crisis and Trump’s criticism on Germany’s input in NATO. Moreover, it will examine norms such as the constitutional law of Germany; identity construction over time for example during the Kosovo case and the historical fear in politics over German militarisation, and how different

connotations of culture created obstacles for hard-power development even though they may not be widely spread in the population and the Bundeswehr.

German military and political history - The effects of culture, identity, norms and interests:

Alike colonial armies the German armed forces post WWII has had a development following its hegemon, which in the case of Germany were the victorious Allies – France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in West-Germany and the Soviet Union in East-Germany. The US and its allies, excluding the Soviet Union (USSR), structured and integrated the West-German armed forces through NATO after having abolished the Wehrmacht and created a new one – the Bundeswehr (Allied Control Council, 2004). The East-German armed forces called ‘Nationale Volksarmee’ [National People’s Army] was within the sphere of influence of the USSR. After the German Union in 1989, the Russian forces called ‘Western Group of Forces’ withdrew from German territory by 1994. However, the National People’s Army was integrated into the Bundeswehr already beforehand. Therefore, adapted to the structure, norms, identity and culture of the Bundeswehr. This also helped the understanding between the former east and western populations, due to exchanges and allocations of soldiers from one side to the other (Interviewee A, 2017). This will be discussed to highlight and explain the initial obstacles and their legacies in the fields of culture, identity and norms created in the aftermath of the Wehrmacht, the overarching history.

Goals, missions, structure and visual aspects, including uniforms, flags and alike were changed and the tangible and intangible things symbolising fascism forbidden or put under reconstruction in the process of denazification. For example, eagle statues with a swastika may not be completely destroyed, but only the swastika erased. It is debatable if the shape of the eagle is also a symbol itself. To identify the issues German hard-power development developed. After signing the Treaties of Paris in 1954, “Germany enters the alliance [NATO] and may also set up its own armed forces” (Dames and Bötzel, 2015). With the building of the German armed forces, applicants, who previously held the rank of a “colonel and higher had (...) to appear in front of a mainly composed of civilians’ personal assessment committee” before employment, which would examine the applicants’ pasts during the Third Reich and if they had committed crimes (Dames and Bötzel, 2015). Philipp Freiherr von Boeselager, one of the figures involved

in the creation of the Bundeswehr, mentioned that there was much discussion on the personal assessment committee, whether it would take too much time and effort and whether it would be feasible to expel certain people for their rank in the Wehrmacht (Freiherr von Boeselager, 2015).

In 1955, a new German military uniform was introduced (See Picture 1 below). It was later seen as too much “leaned on the Wehrmacht” uniform and was thereafter, changed in 1963 to a more US leaning uniform in West-Germany (See Picture 1). Whereas in East-Germany, the ‘Nationale Volksarmee’ of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) created in 1956 leaned towards the USSR. Regarding the West-German military, the uniform was more a representative uniform rather than a practical one after 1963, which can be seen in Picture 1. More changes in uniform style took place until the 1990s, it only became more practical, when Germany stood as one of the strongest and again more trusted economic states in Europe and was requested and allowed to contribute to Western-European military missions and goals on a larger scale. One can speak of this change in the 1990s, where Germany was no longer seen as a military goal of the Allies, but more and more as an integrated partner.



(Bundeswehr, 2005)

After the Second World War, German military norms, identity and culture obviously had to change drastically. Until the German Union in 1989 numerous policy changes were implemented, which are still valid today. **Norms:** The German constitution called ‘Basic Law’ was found and restricted the power of the government and the Bundeswehr over humans and how it had to respect them and their personal rights. Additionally, the German law and state structure divided the power over the armed forces to the whole parliament rather than only one minister or a ('oligarchic') group within politics. Additionally, one must see that the Wehrmacht was mostly at war and so was the state, which gave special powers to the Wehrmacht, as the martial law was enforced with the beginning of the Second World War. Power of the armed forces and the legislative power-holders over it was substantially different. Hence, the Bundeswehr, as part of the executive branch, received much less power than the Wehrmacht used to have. For example, the use and holding of weapons was allowed and not seen as bad or disturbing during the Wehrmacht, while by law in the Bundeswehr it is to be considered a necessary evil only considered in the worst case, if the freedom and democratic values of Germany were at stake (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 2017).

Identity: Since the Bundeswehr could not do other than employ former high-ranking Wehrmacht soldiers if they were not to choose to employ children or young adults without high ranking officer experience or guidance. For example, the former Wehrmacht Generals Adolf Heussinger (later first General-Inspector of the Bundeswehr; highest ranking soldier of the Bundeswehr) and Hans Speidel were granted access into the new German military (Bald, 2005). This inability to make a clean cut of personnel led to disagreements on military culture, identity, norms and which historical sources to use for them. For example, the former military elite “‘demanded a stop of the defamation’ of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS, so that instead, the German soldier through a political declaration of honour” was rehabilitated (Bald, 2005). The decision was made in 1955 “that ‘without following the forms of the old Wehrmacht today to create fundamentally new’ and that ‘the German contingent cannot become >State in the state<’” (Bald, 2005). These debates last until today, mostly guided by the historical identity of guilt and responsibility. “It is a sentence set in stone, especially in Germany, which has fed its identity since the Second World War with calling for a political solution in conflicts rather than weapons” (Braun, 2016). Additionally, “[i]n [Germans] search for German guilt, they often accused abstract authorities - the state, the professors – instead of dealing with their concrete

parents (Bruns, 2009). By reminding others of the German guilt and criticising others for in this case security policies, “there is always the need to assure oneself of one's innocence” (Bruns, 2009). This is, of course, good to do, however, what if peace cannot be reached without a solution which also involves military violence? In the following chapters, this process of realisation and how it came about will be highlighted to explain the course of change in German security policies. For example, the policy against a state in the state has become invalid with the end of general conscription, making the Bundeswehr professional career armed forces (discussed later).

Culture: Bald states that in 2005, the Bundeswehr is “a new army, in which civility, internationality and democratic conformity find compliance,” but it is haunted by “conflicts of interests [...] between the land, naval and air forces” and within each group too (Bald, 2005). He highlights the “warrior culture, [...] care for right-wing example in the military milieu, [...] the profile of the job [...] the openness towards society” (Bald, 2005). He concludes, “a leitmotif of federal military policy becomes clear currently (2005) again: its power political character” (Bald, 2005). He sees a connection between the 1950s and 2000s, that both times the reformation of the armed forces is used “to increase influence and power of the state” (Bald, 2005). From the above one can see that some issues such as flags were easier to overcome than others such as the issues of culture and identity.

Politics and Bundeswehr: 1955 and similarities to today

Interdependency of Germany on the international community: Ever since the Second World War, states are decreasingly able to act on their own, but rely on the support or at least allowance by another state or group of regionally or internationally stronger states for example within international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and NATO to commence with an action. “Regimes present states with political constraints and opportunities that can substantially affect how governments calculate their interests” (Katzenstein, 1996: 19). The United States of America and NATO have substantial influence and power over German security policy-making as a security policy measure in the aftermath of the Second World War. The German government rather likes to think of Germany, as part of the peaceful, democratic, liberal, developed and modern West and leading force of the EU than as an again isolated, egocentric aggressive militarised Germany, as during the Nazi-Regime. However, speaking in

terms of national security and sovereignty, this is an unusual case, substantially different to other states in the past. Due to Germany's past goal to gain sovereignty through NATO membership and then recognition and trust as new Germany through looking for peaceful solutions and participation in humanitarian missions. NATO in the sense of gathering different states' militaries has been the most successful military alliance.

The development of the Bundeswehr by Germany was no independent decision for the second half of the last century, and for the most supervised by the western Allied forces through NATO. Additionally, it was Chancellor Adenauer's political plan to create and improve Germany's international reputation, as a trustworthy partner and member of the western alliance. In 1949, NATO was created for three purposes: "detering Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration," which included Germany, as an important geographic area and strategically important partner (NATO, 2012). Little of these goals and missions have changed, even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union into 15 sovereign states. While politically motivated, the Germans' morality and willingness to fight and die were low. Therefore, the transition and translation from political strategic goals through military operational planning to tactical execution proved difficult, also due to the tensions of the Cold War. After the Second World War, the will not to fight was large or in other words the "unpopular[ity of] rearmament" was large in Germany (Thoß, 1995: 25). Even though to rearm may not have been the opinion of the majority, it still happened for international reasons mentioned above.

Within the Bundeswehr, this inability to find consent between the top (politics) and bottom (population) caused sayings like: "The Bundeswehr is there for holding up the enemy at the border [Iron Curtain] until the military arrives," which was used in the 1970s (Michelis, 2015). With that was meant the US army and the other western allies. This shows the level of willingness and morality to fight for German politics. Additionally, the anti-military and anti-war education of the allies and the German government last until today. For example, some schools do not welcome officers to visit public schools to teach or advertise the Bundeswehr (Loy, 2010). Coming back to the internal situation of the Bundeswehr, another example were soldiers too thinly spread through the tank troops of the reconnaissance battalion. Hence in some "troops, each tank was staffed with one man less" (Herzog zu Mecklenburg, 2017). Where higher officers insisted to train with all tanks, the direct officer in charge of a troop rather trained with fewer tanks, but fully staffed ones (Herzog zu Mecklenburg, 2017). To convince and

motivate the civilians in uniform to fit the strategic goal faced similar levels of difficulty. In 1995, some just joined the army, “because the mandatory civil service was three months longer” than the military service, between which you could choose (SpiegelTV, 2015: 3:04 minutes). The will to fight for Germany, “comes second,” or is of no interest, but rather to protect “oneself, (...) property and certain things, friends” (SpiegelTV, 2015: 3:13 minutes). The above paragraphs show internal issues of the Bundeswehr, which on the other side hinder politics to become overly positive on the Bundeswehr, especially when talking about it with and in front of the population.

Since the peace movement of the 1960s, military service was seen increasingly as a waste of time as well as soldiers were not liked among the population, but regularly insulted, as murderers, blood lusting and wardrivers (Wullers, 2013, Wagner, 2015, Frohloff, 2016). Folz, a military chaplain in the Bundeswehr, states during an interview that the prejudice “always depend on the current societal situation” (Bödicker et al., 2014). Furthermore, he states that debates about the Bundeswehr, as an institution, “were already existing during the rearmament and after all especially in the course of the 1968-movement” (Bödicker et al., 2014). This movement was a diverse one, a political left orientated student-movement, which was also associated with hippies, pacifism and freedom. In Germany, these people would most likely have voted for center and centre-left parties. However, the education, which that generation passed on to its children, was the legacy, which everyone lives and or remembers. When looking at online discussions about the Bundeswehr, one can see a divide between pro and contra Bundeswehr. Some are against fighting all around the world and therefore, see it has an attack by Germany rather than a defence of Germany (Wagner, 2015; Wullers, 2013). Furthermore, they see it as a means to sustain “capitalism” and work for the “USA” (Wagner, 2015). While other share the opinion of the government and see the importance of providing and developing security around the world (Wagner, 2015; Wullers, 2013). The divide seems to be between the political left and right orientated sides of the population, which until today can be seen in German political opinions too. However, before coming to the political opinions another important divide, for which the Bundeswehr is subject to discussions.

Right-wing radical thoughts, soldiers and civil employees of the Ministry of Defence leaning towards the conservative and right political ideas and to a lesser extent tangible symbols reminding of the Wehrmacht within such debates are often subjects to demand carefulness and deem the danger within the Bundeswehr reality. This is also the case in debates in talk-shows and public debates (Plättner, 2017: 0:10 min). Additionally, clothing and equipment was in the past especially before the German Union an issue (See Picture 1 above). However, the latter is

not an issue anymore. Even though there are also some honours, which caused heated debates in Germany such as the ‘Ordensgemeinschaft der Ritterkreuzträger’ (Order of the knight's cross holders), which wear the ‘Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross,’ which was initiated by Adolf Hitler and awarded to the bravest soldiers of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS (mostly by Hitler himself). This organisation in so far is a closed glasshouse surrounding the Bundeswehr, which needs to be tackled one way or another to get out, due to the ambiguity of identity of the Bundeswehr, which that organisation causes. This is due, as many former members of the Bundeswehr, including some, of which would mark the top of the new-found Bundeswehr (Ordensgemeinschaft der Ritterkreuzträger, n.d.). However, the generation, which served in both militaries thinned out and hence, a reconsideration became more and more possible without touching at the time the current identity of the Bundeswehr. In 1999 contact of the Bundeswehr with the organisation was forbidden. However, the rule not to official interact with them did not prevent private contact and thus, a connection of identities (Jahn and Walter, 2004). At the same time, sexual harassment and harassment in general in barracks (Südwestrundfunk, 2017) are linked to the history of the Bundeswehr. This, of course, increases the difficulty to defend the opinion with which the politicians argue for a stronger Bundeswehr. This concludes that the identity and culture of the German Bundeswehr were divided and at the same time these aspects of culture are continuing to today.

The 1900s: ‘One state one army policy’ and Kosovo

Before East and West Germany fused together, the Bundeswehr had “about half a million soldiers and 170,000 civil servants (... and the National People's' Army had) 90,000 uniformed and 47,000 civil” workers (Bundeswehr, 2015: 1:55 minutes). When the two German states fused many large issues had to be solved. Former Minister of Defence Stoltenberg concluded the policy: “One state one army” (Bundeswehr, 2015: 1:41 minutes). The top soldiers of the National People’s Army (NVA) were not included in the Bundeswehr, while all other career soldiers below the rank of colonel and about “10 percent of the colonels”, were included, as well as the “Political Officers’ organisation was dissolved,” of which again not all should be continued for the medium-term future (Bundeswehr, 2015: 2:13 minutes). For “more than 30 years the two armies were opposed” and suddenly had to befriend one another “by command” of the Federal government (Bundeswehr, 2015: 4:45 minutes). Hence, existing concepts and equipment of the Bundeswehr had to be acquainted with by former members of the National

People's Army and their concepts and equipment abandoned (Bundeswehr, 2015: 4:55 minutes). This transition of identity was solved through exchanges and allocations of soldiers from the east to the west and vice versa (Interviewee A, 2017).

Politically the enemy states, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic were 'defeated' and the issue of the enemy solved. However, with the disintegration of this problem, the confrontation between East and West Germans widened. The new German political landscape then included the left party, Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus [Party of Democratic Socialism] (PDS), which was only a marginal party in the whole of Germany. On a side note, the left party 'Die Linke' is the successor of the PDS. Therefore, today one may think that the PDS would have been larger at the time. However, the centre-left Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) split in 2004-2005 and later the left wing of the SPD fused with the PDS. (von Alemann, 2015). This means that the political debate on the military in the 1990s was not driven because of the PDS, but by members, which formerly were part of the SPD. As the SPD was a party reaching from the centre-left to the far-left, the party had a much larger basis before its divide. That gave the far-left opposition within the SPD on the Bundeswehr debates a much stronger foundation and backing than today within 'Die Linke'. Here it is also important to consider the unity, which each party aims to reach among all its politically active members and voters.

"Self-reflection does not occur in isolation; it is communicated to others. In the process of communication norms can emerge in a variety of ways," which are based on ideas (Katzstein, 1996: 21). Germany and its politicians self-reflects constantly, highlighting the Second World War and the Germans responsibility to pay careful attention to preventing the repetition of that dark era and policies fostering such history. This is highly important when considering Germany, its government and people, as since WWII they became extremely sensitive and self-reflecting. The Nurnberg-Trials as the hardest example of punishments, the guidance and educational reforms to be against German nationalism, isolation, aggression, militarisation and an authoritarian governance directly and indirectly supported by the Allies played a decisive role until today. Since the German Union, the whole of Germany increasingly befriended the idea that it cannot do without the international community, especially European neighbours. This is described in the parties' election programmes. To explain the division among and within the political parties, the following paragraphs will elaborate on each party: The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian-Social Union (CSU), the SPD, the PDS and the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) - and their party programmes in 1990, 1994 and 1998

will be examined. The CDU and the CSU both already fused on federal level to one block called 'die Union', as the CSU is the Bavarian equivalent of the CDU in the rest of Germany, before the German Union.

1990: 'Die Union' stated that "Germany will participate in the construction of a new European peace-order (...) [i]mportant building blocks of [it] are arms control and disarmament" (CDU and CSU, 1990: 21). This includes a decrease in the military budget for the Bundeswehr and prioritising and harmonising of NATO militaries for that peace-order (CDU and CSU, 1990: 21). The SPD published that "most of all it requires drastic [financial] cuts in the defence sector (...) drastic disarmament (...) halving of the current headcount of the German armed forces" (SPD, 1990: 21). These policy proposals will experience a dramatic 180 degrees turn in already before the next federal election and the prime example, when the SPD and 'die Grünen' were in government office and in majority voted for the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1998. In 1990, at the same time the SPD demanded a "single European security [defence not attack] system," that NATO contingents would not leave NATO territory and the dissolving of the security blocks (SPD, 1990: 22). Furthermore, the SPD was for the widening of conscription to include the possibility to choose mandatory community service instead, as well as cutting down the time to serve (SPD, 1990: 22). The FDP had the same opinion on introducing the choice of mandatory community service, with understanding "to refuse military service" (FDP, 1990: 28). Nevertheless, the party realised the importance of the "opportunities and challenges" behind these changes and supported "UN peace missions" and NATO missions within NATO territory (FDP, 1990: 28-29). Similarly, other points, which the SPD made, the FDP stated these in a less radical way. The PDS was much more radical in its views demanding long-term complete disarmament, was critical of NATO, was for an inclusion of Russia in the European security organisation, against striving for world-power ambitions and "Great Germany in NATO" (PDS, 1990: 8-9). Moreover, it is for abandoning the conscription and mandatory community service (PDS, 1990: 9). Fundamentally common grounds were held by all to demilitarise and keep peace in Europe. However, the differences of methods and their level of speed show the difference in values seen in the Bundeswehr. While in each of the party programmes numerous references were made to the German identity. For example, "Germany will live up to its responsibility for Europe" (CDU and CSU, 1990). Of course, the sudden change of security policy and its timing were no coincidence, but because of the disintegration of the USSR. Therefore, it is questionable if the policy change was due to the end of the Cold War and to what extent the Second World War guilt still played a role. Only the remaining carefulness and time it took after more than 40 years to commit to such changes

in terms of identity, culture and norms and the use of language hint towards the German trauma of the dark past.

1994: ‘Die Union’ was then for “helping in catastrophes and humanitarian actions (...) only with [Germany’s] western partners” (CDU and CSU, 1994: 52). This also did not exclude peace-making missions. The party was for a body of “50,000 Crisis-reaction forces” (CDU and CSU, 1994: 52). It was for the further reduction of the mandatory services, but wanted to keep the community service higher than the military one (CDU and CSU, 1994: 52-53). SPD highlighted the importance of “NATO and the European Union (...) [and] the relations to the USA and France weigh particularly strong” (SPD, 1994: 75). They wrote that “the Bundeswehr should support the UN, so that it can carry out its tasks in peace-maintaining and humanitarian measures” (SPD, 1994: 75). However, “the SPD assure[d] that the Bundeswehr d[id] not become a freely available intervention army and that it d[id] not involve the Bundeswehr in wars, for example after the sample of the Golf-War regardless of whether such wars take place under the umbrella of the UN, NATO or [West European Union]” (SPD, 1994: 77). The FDP set strong accents on the necessity of the existence of the Bundeswehr (FDP, 1994: 8). It was against the idea of the Green party to dissolve the Bundeswehr and refused to participate in UN military missions (FDP, 1994: 8). It condemned the demand from Bavaria (hinting towards the CSU) to loosen the EU cohesion (FDP, 1994: 8). The FDP acknowledges the success of the Bundeswehr to push German integration forwards, but also favoured a reform from defence at home to an additional reorientation towards the “ability to participate in all measures to peace-keep of the UN-Security Council decisions (... including) peace-making measures” if it was for the defence reason (FDP, 1994: 130-131). Furthermore, it was for the introduction of freely increasable time spent in conscription, women’s free choice to serve in the military and a widened security definition (FDP, 1994: 132-133). The FDP presented a detailed structural reform of the Bundeswehr to facilitate missions abroad. The PDS was still against “Bundeswehr missions outside German territory and in domestic conflicts” and military development, except to decrease it in all terms (PDS, 1994). ‘Die Grünen’ were in 1990 and 1994 for a dissolving of the Bundeswehr, an exit from NATO and cancellation of military treaties (Die Grünen, 1990; ‘Die Grünen’, 1994). Therefore, they were, of course, also against missions abroad. ‘Die Grünen’ fused in 1993 with the party ‘Bündnis 90’ (Die Grünen, 2009). Thereafter called ‘B’90/ Die Grünen’, but often still referred to as ‘Die Grünen’, which will be done in this text too. As ‘die Union’, and SPD held the majority of seats in the parliament, the existence of the Bundeswehr was guaranteed, whilst following the trade-off of hard financial cuts. ‘Die Union’ and the ‘FDP formed the government in both terms, which allowed for a more gradual change

of the Bundeswehr. Between 1990 and 1994 a specification and intensification of the Bundeswehr and its tasks, while also decreasing the Bundeswehr's size were highlighted by all parties, except by the PDS and 'Die Grünen'. Here it was visible that it was rather a transformation of the Bundeswehr rather than a substantial shrinking of it. This provides room for the fact that as the majority of the population were for a functioning prepared Bundeswehr rather than for a unfunctional cheaper one. The slow process to reach a positive policy change for the Bundeswehr showed the hesitation domestically and internationally. Furthermore, the start of humanitarian missions inside NATO-territory since almost the beginning of the united Germany highlighted the will to use the military, later on also 'out of area' (outside of NATO) (BPB, 2014). However, the SPD and 'die Grünen' won the elections in 1998, which could have meant a sudden strong decline of the Bundeswehr budget if not even the dissolving of it, would they have been elected in 1990 and earlier.

1998: In the election programme of 'Die Union', they criticised the position of the SPD and 'die Grünen' opposing the government's action, tagging them as "militarisation of German foreign policy" (CDU and CSU, 1998: 30). The SPD however, did not put anymore criticism in its election programme, but even mentioned the necessity to remain in Bosnia for the time being (SPD, 1998: 76-78). 'Die Grünen' stated that the goal to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr was not reached, but had only transformed its shape and abilities to act also in regions abroad such as Bosnian (Die Grünen, 1998: 6). Furthermore, they were against the inclusion of women in the conscription and for a long-term dissolution of the Bundeswehr, acknowledging the impossibility to dissolve it at once (Die Grünen, 1998: 147). The FDP and the PDS still remained roughly in their position of 1994 before (FDP, 1998; PDS, 1998). The FDP mentioned first "the protection of outside peace" before other main tasks (FDP, 1998). Overall, all parties emphasised the responsibility Germany had to maintain or make peace abroad. The difference became visible in the election programmes of 1994, where the methodologies of how that responsibility was supposed to be implemented diverge from non-violence methods to the latter one (by PDS and Die Grünen) and the additional use of force as the very last resort if no other possible (by SPD, die Union and FDP) to make peace. The SPD was less willing to initiate the call that a situation was in a state, where it needed military force to step in. In 1992, the constitutional court made the legal basis (norms) that missions abroad are allowed, after which the SPD became more favouring to agree also to peace-making missions, visible in its election paper 1994 (Stelzenmüller, 1994; SPD 1994). By 1995 also 'die Grünen' were in divide on missions abroad, as "22 members of parliament voted for yes, 22 with no, (and) five abstained" (Schulze, 2016). By 1998, the majority of the SPD and 'Die

Grünen' voted for the armed Kosovo mission, while already 'Die Union' and FDP were for such missions beforehand, which can be seen on the fact that only one present party member of both party voted for no and one present of each party abstained (German Parliament, 1998).

Aforehand, it is worth mentioning that the German government in the 1990s had no major international pressure, which might have a decisive influence on German politics (Zehfuss, 2009: 71-78). At the same time, the international community allowed Germany to participate in international security policy implementation. In 1998, the SPD and 'die Grünen' forming the government, increasingly felt morally obligated, due to their guilt responsibility (identity) to help people, whose rights were infringed upon. This enabled the mission in Kosovo. The SPD has to change its opinion from peacekeeping to peace-making missions abroad. 'Die Grünen' drastically had to change 180 degrees around from anti-Bundeswehr policies to pro-Bundeswehr policies, including missions abroad. 'Die Union', FDP and die Linke remain in their policy ideas. This suddenly allowed for larger support from four out of five parties and much more decisively methodologies allowed by the parliament to be used by the Bundeswehr. As an anonymous employee from the security sector describes in my interview: The government risked open war, sending ground troops and not only air forces to Kosovo, knowing that Serbians and allies of them might attack also German soldiers (Interviewee A, 2017). This is truly a new feature of government policy, even though that may risk the first dead German soldier outside Germany since WWII. However, with the large offence against human rights in the former Yugoslavia, the parliament continued its efforts until today to maintain the peace they made (Bundeswehr, 2017). At the same time, this development gave the opportunity to redefine, experience and build a new Bundeswehr identity and culture, with minimally limited political constraints and little suspicious surveillance from the political sphere until the 2009 Kunduz (Afghanistan) airstrike by a German officer (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2015). After that, pressure on politicians rose causing the former Defense Minister zu "Guttenberg [to] releas[e] Inspector General Schneiderhan from office" in 2009 (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2015). An actively deployed Bundeswehr history, which helps through peace-making and peace-keeping, was created until then, highlighting the goodness of the German norms (constitutional laws) based on human rights and their defence. The KFOR mission overall presented a culture of assistance, aid, care and defence of ones in need by stopping together with the NATO community the ethnic cleansing and the mass violations of human rights (Bundeswehr, 2017: 2:00 minutes). This successful mission gave clear goals and structure to the future of the Bundeswehr, as a mission abroad military, which only with Afghanistan became fragile.

The Ukraine-Crisis, Russia and the USA:

This paragraph will summarise the above chapters and highlight what factors from abroad allowed these changes and introduce what is important in this chapter. The internal political opinions just after World War II and again after the German Union were divided when it came to parliamentary decisions on the Bundeswehr and its future. However, it seemed that this critical notion of German guilt and dark past has decreased in power over the last few decades. This change has come, of course, over time and rather slowly. The **first change** was, as already stated above with the entry into NATO in 1955, the introduction of the ministry of defence and the creation of the Bundeswehr. The **second main event** began after the German Union and was intensified after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and when the last Russian armed forces left the former East-German territory. This was also the period when the first missions abroad took place, which is because German territory became secure and the line of tension between East and West moved into Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe (the Balkan Wars). Furthermore, the **(third) change** was triggered by September 11th and the counter-campaign, the war on terror by the USA and European states, excluding Germany and France (The Guardian, 2003). However, this change was not politically followed by Germany with military involvement. The **fourth focus event** was the Ukraine-Crisis and the decline of Russo-EU-US relations already starting after the 2009 gas crisis. The **fifth development** to encourage further change was the return of terrorism in Europe with events such as Charlie Hebdo and other acts of terror in Belgium, France and Germany committed on grounds of religious extremism. This is, of course, a continuation of the third development, but at home, in Europe and not in the Middle-East. This is indeed also linked to the mass migration, due to the rise of the terrorist organisation the so-called Islamic State (IS).

Until the Ukraine-Crisis in 2013 political looseness on national security in Germany through good relations with Russia was a deepening process. However, in 2013 the looseness and internationalisation of national security was a changing idea in Europe in the process of regionalisation (regional security) pushed by terrorist threats targeting Europe's population, a hybrid war in Ukraine seeming to threaten also EU states and a migration wave causing tensions and divide among the EU population between right and left political groups, amplified by media attention. These feelings of insecurity were 'long' (roughly for ten years in the whole of the EU and 20 years in Germany) not felt in Germany, which was reflected in the chapter before. These

changing factors forced Germany's politicians to put more effort into security policies at home not only regarding the Bundeswehr, but also the police forces and the intelligence organs. Using the same tools as before, I will analyse the parliamentary decisions on military defence, which comes much closer to Wendt's methodology of act-reaction (1992). In the parliament are the following parties: CDU, CSU, SPD, B'90 - Die Grünen, Die Linke, and the latest addition the 'Alternative für Deutschland' (AfD). On a side note, it is worth mentioning that the SPD lost its left-wing in 2004-2005, which fused with the PDS creating 'die Linke'. The text will look how these changing factors mentioned above influenced these parties and the decisions. Until nowadays, efforts to improve the German military have continued with periods of more and less intense policy developments. This will be elaborated on in the following chapters also again looking at obstacles. Additionally, the integration of European Union member states militaries (sometimes referred to as the process towards the European Army or European Defence Union (discussed below) with Germany and France (and the United Kingdom) at the top) are politically debated in Germany, but rather a side track. This can be seen in the four parties' election programmes (which will not be looked at here). In the strategic papers of the parliament, the influence of these different threats is visible and therefore, discussed below. The reason for this change of sources is that the election programmes became increasingly similar and therefore, would not have given clear answers.

In 2011, the parliament made a decisive decision: the end of the general conscription. The aim was to decrease the number of soldiers from "about 255,000 soldiers to up to 185,000" (German Parliament, 2011). This required a restructuring of the Bundeswehr and decrease its resources. The reason was that "Germany need[ed] a powerful and affordable armed forces" (German Parliament, 2011). Coming back to the obstacles produced by the Bundeswehr, binge drinking (Löer, 2017), political incorrectness (extremism) and roughness are still happening (Leber, 2017). Keeping such employees shows a counterbalance to that reform and further cuts. From that one can question the Bundeswehr's powerfulness. Additionally, the Bundeswehr's willingness, in need of a stable transition, to make also sacrifices in the quality of soldiers and to ensure some kind of quantity of employment. That decision to abandon mandatory military service and to reform the Bundeswehr to pure career armed forces also stopped the reflection of the German population with all its differences and common grounds in the Bundeswehr itself. This was during the office (2009-2011) of former Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU) (in the same year irregularly replace by Thomas de Maizière (CDU)). Therefore, it also provoked a further reduction of political diversity in the German armed forces. That the CDU and CSU decided for such a hard cut of German hard-power is a break in their

line security-policy, as they at that time also composed the democratic right side of the parliament. That is, of course, due to the absence of a Cold-War scenario and good relations with Russia. This hints to a shift of political ideas in the right half of the political environment. Back then, the dividing line seems to be between the ‘more conservative, and political right’ and the ‘more liberal ones in the conservative block’. The non-liberals of the conservatives adjusted slower to the international security-policy environment than the liberal ones. This has proven to be the right choice compared to the more liberal ones.

Without doubt the Ukraine-Crisis and shortly after followed Russian annexation of Crimea have caused the largest reconsideration of European and German security policy in the 21st century. This is especially visible in with the production of the Spearhead during the NATO meeting in Wales in 2014 (Zeit Online, 2014). The German White Paper 2016 refocused Bundeswehr efforts back to Germany and NATO rather than out of area missions (German Parliament, 2016). The last White Paper was produced in 2006 and the one before that in 1994, which shows how long each paper was politically seen as valid. The German NATO-General Hans-Lothar Domröse formulates it in the following words: “I hate to do it Dr Keim, but for me, the situation has fundamentally changed. (In) 2010 Putin was my friend, there I would have taken a selfie, there we would have cheered, today I stand with four tanks for the defence of millions of people with a 21st-century threat that also threatens Germany” (Domröse, 2016: 12:05 minutes). A weakening of EU-US relations amplified the vulnerability of EU-security and increased risks for the successful development of NATO. Wolfgang Ischinger from the Munich Security Conference stated that US President “Trump’s statements make it harder for European leaders to contribute more to NATO” (J.C., 2017). Therefore, a stronger EU with Germany and France at the top is necessary, while US relations should be maintained at the best possible (J.C., 2017). Additionally, the German military strategic papers, German White Papers from 1994 and 2006 have more tended towards a defence abroad for example in Kosovo and the Hindukush (Afghanistan) rather than at home, viewing the conflict as outside its territory (German Parliament, 1994; German Parliament, 2006). This rather shows an interest in the representation of interests abroad than a true interest in defence of Germany from 1994 until 2014. Nevertheless, the latest White Paper 2016, reversed that back to a focus on a traditionally armed force with tanks and aeroplanes at home due to the threat of Russia since 2014. From this one can deduct that German political and military culture is based on foreign policy impulses.

The ongoing parliamentary debate since 2014 to lower entrance requirements for the Bundeswehr creates further doubts (Karrierespiegel, 2014). This may be a further incentive to slow down the effects of the end of general conscription. On one side, this could be understood as a measure to fit more low-educated employees with low salaries into the Bundeswehr budget. That again would put the target of the powerfulness of the Bundeswehr in doubt in the educational sense, but not in physical strength. On the other side, it could help information technology specialists, cooks, lawyers and other employees, who are not regular foot-soldiers to increase the powerfulness in the level of education. That again would increase the quality and diversity of skills. When the conscription was ended, Minister of Defence de Maizière stated: “That it was not an act of happiness (...), but it [general conscription] [was] security-policy wise not anymore justifiable” (German Parliament, 2011). The ongoing parliamentary debate and reform to modernise the Bundeswehr may furthermore be a reaction to the Russian actions in Ukraine, which demand faster development of the Bundeswehr. In contrast, in 2013 (before the beginning of the Ukraine-Crisis) all federally parties (CDU, CSU, SPD and die Grünen), except ‘die Linke’ still saw no necessity to change the focus on missions abroad of the Bundeswehr (Tagesschau, 2013).

Having mentioned impulses, like the one of the US to become militarily more independent, these triggered and intensified several debates on the defence of the states in the EU. The European Union member states had difficulties to clarify what the so-called European Army was supposed to be doing and where. First, the name of the European Army would imply to only focus on ground forces (Interviewee A, 2017). Hence the name has been changed to European Defence Union (Interviewee A, 2017). While the focus of resources has been clarified, the goals of the European Defence Union were still not clarified. The Baltic states see the goal in the defence against Russia, especially since the annexation of Crimea (Interviewee A, 2017). France defines it mostly in the defence of its own and common European interests abroad such as in Mali (Tagala, 2017). Germany floats in between these opinions of these western and eastern neighbours, while the United Kingdom has a similar idea to France, but has not joined “Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)” (Allison, 2017). At the end of 2017, PESCO has been finalised and is now ready for implementation. That the UK has not joined, allowed for more presence of Germany in the PESCO projects. It will lead “a coordination centre for medical services, a logistics network, joint training for military officers, a centre of excellence for EU training missions, joint helicopter and transport aircraft units” (Gotkowska, 2017). At the same, time Germany absorbed and still continues to include foreign armed forces with the consent of the individual European states. That is the case for Czech

Republic, France, the Netherlands and Romania, who have given troops to the German military, while France also has German units under its command (Braw, 2017, von der Leyen, 2015: 22:27 minutes). Poland and Germany plan to exchange battalions too (Von der Leyen, 2015: 22:27 minutes). This shows an increase in the internationalisation of the Bundeswehr, its culture and identity. Even though France and the UK have larger armies, Germany has the biggest single population in the EU and is the biggest EU economy. Germany's White Paper 2016 highlights the political will to reverse Germany's tendency to lean more towards France opinion on defending interest in missions abroad. Since the Russian intervention in Ukraine, Germany came closer to the opinion of the Baltic states and the necessary focus on home defence at home (German Parliament, 2016). If the focus of interests abroad is highlighted, then the EU could do so also without the defence union and just use NATO as it was before 2014. A major issue here is also the fact that if the European Defence Union wants to include NATO tasks, it either needs to be part of NATO or it will risk becoming a competition to NATO for resources, "capabilities" and decrease NATO's importance for the EU (Talaga, 2017; Ladurner, 2017).

While it is out of question that the US through NATO might deny help to the EU in event of war, one of the points to be considered is the reallocation of funds towards a military, whether it would be Germany funding US through decreasing the need for US funds for NATO, an army of the EU, or national armies within the EU. Of course, the US military has by far the largest budget and military arsenal, partly located in the EU. Therefore, it is questionable how much of a relief for the US, the German support of its two percent for NATO would be. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel already state an increase in the budget of the 'Bundeswehr', the German armed forces from currently "34.3 billion Euro [and] (...) until 2020 shall rise to 39.2 billion Euro "as well as she was quoted saying: "[t]o come from 1.2 to 2.0 percent (of the NATO contribution), we must increase [the military budget] very strongly" (Zeit Online, 2016). Also in an interview with a person from the German security sector, he has made the same suggestion. Additionally, the focus of some debates has been put on deterrence like in Cold War policies against the Soviet Union. However, acquiring nuclear bombs is still not in the interest of Germany in the opinion of Wolfgang Ischinger, as "[Germany is] married to the American nuclear security umbrella, whether we like it or not" (J.C., 2017).

The Basic Law, politics and strategy: Changing culture?

With the rise of terrorism and its unlawful violence, German laws experience new challenges and threats to its very foundation, the constitution of Germany called Basic Law. Additionally, the migration wave has caused difficulties to divide threat from threatened, however, the migration-crisis is not for this paper. The only important thing to it for politics and its security policies is that it caused a move to the political right populist party – the AfD, which entered the federal parliament with “12,6 percent”, as third biggest party in Germany by its first time to participate in federal elections (Bredow, 2017). A German movie called ‘Terror - Ihr Urteil’ [Terrorism - Your verdict] shown by the ARD, one of the main German television channels, to the public visualises this threat. In the movie, a civil aeroplane is hijacked by a terrorist, who most likely aimed for a football stadium, visited by 70,000 people. The German armed forces sent two fighter jets of its air force (called Alarmrotte) to try preventing human harm. After following the official procedure of attempting to force the aeroplane to take a different course and land, and if that does not work giving warning shots, there was only one last possibility. For the soldiers in the fighter jets to stop the by that time most likely terror attack from happening leaves only to shoot the aeroplane with a rocket (Kraume, 2016). After consulting with the operational centre and ministry of defence, who do not give the green light for the last resource, one soldier takes the initiative to shoot. Usually, the leader of the two fighter jets takes the shot, which was the accused, Mayor Koch (Kraume, 2016). Additionally, the operational centre had not taken any action such as the evacuation of the stadium (Kraume, 2016). Mayor Koch succeeds and most likely prevented the death of about 70,000 people. However, he killed all 164 passengers on the aeroplane. He decided for the lesser evil in his eyes. After the Basic Law, one life cannot be weighted higher than others, no matter how many they are. The fundamental laws are based on and manifest the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as an outcome of the Second World War to prevent that the German government and its people could ever commit atrocities such as the ones of Nazi-Germany. Hence, the infringement of the Basic Law is a highly political topic, especially since in this case, a German soldier, an official of the German government, committed the crime. Under the current law, this action is in no way permissible and thus, to be condemned and punished. While such a case in the reality, of course, would not be a case for the public to decide, in the film the audience is asked to file a verdict upon the information presented in it. After the film was shown to the public, all could vote online on the website of the ARD or via telephone. The outcome of this survey was that 86.9% of the people filed the verdict in favour of the soldier, while 13.1% voted for the

guiltiness of the soldier (Das Erste, 2016). This shows the discontent of the German people and their culture and values with the current norms (laws) ruling within Germany. The identity constructed through culture and norms has changed. From a law obeying, passive (led by America, Britain and France or the Soviet Union) or accepting culture and anti-military culture as described in the earlier parts of this thesis to a critically observing, law questioning, active and military-friendly culture, when the military has its focus on defence at home and not somewhere abroad such as Afghanistan.

While of course, the Basic Law is what many Germans are proud of, terrorism seems to change the game substantially. It here caused for the majority to voice their disapproval with the law, as for most it seems much more favourable if only 164 people die rather than 70,164 people. In the movie the soldier puts the following argument to the judges: The people in the aeroplane were in that situation not only humans but also a part of a weapon of the terrorist to reach the goal (Kraume, 2016). Hence, each life of them was already forsaken to die within a few moments, whether the terrorist murder them together with 70,000 people or the soldier kills them, as collateral damage, to neutralise the terrorist and its weapon does not matter (Kraume, 2016). Another important argument of the soldier was that the state also is willing to take the risk that soldiers die, or in other words to sacrifice a soldier's life for others, meaning the state still weights human life against others (Kraume, 2016). To solve such cases is highly difficult, as there is only a choice among worse options. Politically, there have been efforts to clarify such situations in favour of shooting such as in 2005 (Tagesschau, 2007), which in 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court has revoked, forbidding civilian collateral damage (Federal Constitutional Court, 2006). The former Minister of Interior Schäuble (CDU) brought in the perspective of introducing a "Quasi Case of Defence" next to the existing cases: the case of defence and the case of tension (Zeit Online, 2009). However, his idea has not become reality and in 2013, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that only the parliament can make the decision to shoot (Zeit Online, 2013). Therefore, the Bundeswehr faces the big issue, that one of the cases does not apply, the Law of Armed Conflict does not apply either. This means that heavy weapons such as rockets cannot be used. This restricts also the German parliament and hence, it limits the ability of the Bundeswehr, not only through the Federal Constitutional Court. Schäubles attempt to introduce an in-between-case would have solved these issues.

Furthermore, considering the above one should further consider the question whether the Alarmrotte is actually a viable measure to face such terrorism if soldiers are not allowed to shoot by law. Moreover, should the soldier be given the responsibility to decide to shoot or to

let the terrorist continue? Such terrorism is used as a political tool to provoke a transition of ideas from seeing what it prevents to limitations of the Basic Law. While the government is still unable to find a legal and political balancing, which is timely sufficient, the Bundeswehr and its employees are made responsible. As shown in the movie, first it is solely the responsibility of the soldier and the command centre. It misses that (1) the Alarmrotte serves the parliament and (2) the political security goals (strategy) of the state is the responsibility of the parliament, while generals and officers are translating those in the process of operational planning to tactics. The actions of the simple soldier in the field are tactics, attempting to come as close as possible to the operational plan and the strategic goal. If the legal framework and politics do not permit such actions, the use of the Bundeswehr at home is questionable.

However, what is the legal framework regarding the Bundeswehr and its tasks? The Basic Law on Human Rights and article 87a states a few points to be discussed. While the Basic Law is without doubt also aiming to prevent the state to harm a person and a people, because of certain backgrounds such as ethnicity, religion and nationality. This should be the most vital for the German people, to prevent history to repeat itself. However, terrorists have the ultimate path paved within the Basic Law when using civilians as shields for their goals, as in the aeroplane case. Nevertheless, the Basic Law allows for defence “during a state of defence or a state of tension (... , where) the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities,” such as the police. An anonymous interviewee from the German security sector stated that it would be already enough helped for the short term that simple cases of terrorism could be fought by governmental security forces more easily, where civilians are not used as shields (Interviewee A, 2017). For this one should consider the following two paragraphs of Article 87a together with Article 35 on ‘Legal and administrative assistance and assistance during disasters,’ where the latter one enables a regional government within Germany to request assistance from the federal government (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 2017).

Article 87a: “(3) During a state of defence or a state of tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and to perform traffic control functions to the extent necessary to accomplish their defence mission. Moreover, during a state of defence or a state of tension, the Armed Forces may also be authorised to support police measures for the protection of civilian property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities.

(4) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, the Federal Government, if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain and the police forces and the Federal Border Police prove inadequate, may employ the Armed Forces to support the police and the Federal Border Police in protecting civilian property and in combating organised armed insurgents. Any such employment of the Armed Forces shall be discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands.” (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 2017)

If the Law of Armed Combat is not ruling over ‘regular’ laws, this article is the framework. In cases of terrorism police forces or the local government must call for help. If one of them does not do so, the issue stays a regional issue and does not become a federal issue. Furthermore, the competent authorities to make the call must specify what assistance is needed and from whom they request it. If own limits are reached, as only a small component of the police force, the *Spezialeinsatzkommando* is trained to handle for example persons with extreme harmful intentions directly targeting humans, usually the federal police are called. This depends, of course, on the time and location, as not everywhere in Germany the regional police are as present and as strong as in the regional capitals. Therefore, the police have a limited capacity of endurance and staying power, which need to be compared to the duration of the threat(s) (Interviewee A, 2017). This is especially problematic when it is a sequence of actions rather than a single act. The interviewee stated that if the federal government and the regional governments would make the decision to calling for assistance faster, then endurance and staying power would not be constrained substantially, but would rather allow for an effective use of police and its enforcement of other tasks, which would not be delegated to the federal border police and the armed forces (Interviewee A, 2017). Such police tasks include a ‘normal’ car accident, controlling parking and speeding of civilians and taking care of reports and complaints of civilians. The federal border police and armed forces would rather focus on showing presence on principal areas (central stations, city centres), conducting patrols, assisting with traffic control around such areas under possible threat and at the border as well as taking care of major security threats such as armed terrorists. Looking at Germany’s neighbours, France and Belgium’s police forces already cooperates with the armed forces. However, “[e]ven a [terror] attack like in Paris would probably not fulfil this criterion” of the Constitutional Court of Germany (Von Hammerstein, 2016). Why has Germany not followed suit besides the issue of the law? The obvious answer is that in these countries the military is seen as honourable in

historical terms compare to Germany. Not so obvious are that the strategic focus was a different one until 2016 and the political sphere is undecided until today. Additionally, the frequent topic of right-wing radicalism (mentioned before) in the Bundeswehr does not help change to come sooner.

In the Munich 2016 case, a single armed person murdered eight people plus himself and injured many more. This caused that the police “mobilised 1000 authorities [policemen and ambulance personal] ad hoc (and) within 1 hour arrived 2300 police forces, also from other Bundesländer [regional governments within Germany] and from Austria” (Wimmer, 2016), including German federal police units such as the counterterrorism unit GSG9 (Backes et al., 2016). The readiness of the police forces shows outstanding ability and care to bring back security by them and determinedness by the regional politicians. However, at the same time, most other police tasks could not possibly be enforced anymore. Additionally, “a unit of the military police (...), medical troops as well as the helicopter regiments” were alerted and mobilised, but not deployed (Gebauer, 2016). Federal politicians were divided about such possible military involvement. The CDU and CSU are for the use of the military in Germany and the SPD is against it (Gebauer, 2016). Therefore, the use of the Bundeswehr, as a hard power instrument in Germany by politics is not yet a preferred tool practically. However, such cases give incentives to rethink and put the defence at home by the Bundeswehr back on the policy agenda.

Theoretically and governmental policy development have been more successful for the Bundeswehr. In the latest White Paper 2016, the government’s official strategic policy paper, accents have been put forward in comparison to the one from 2006 (German Parliament, 2016). In the strategic paper from 2006, (1) “international conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against international terrorism (and (2)) support of alliance partners” got prioritised to “defence of Germany and its citizens” (German Parliament, 2006: 64). In the strategic paper from 2016, first the “defence on Germany territory” is mentioned, then “defence against attacks of alliance partners’ territory” and thirdly “terrorism and hybrid threats” (German Parliament, 2016: 91). Furthermore, all strategic goals aim “to protect Germany, her citizens, and partners and deter potential opponents” (German Parliament, 2016: 91). Hence, while in 2006 the protection of Germany and its citizens were only the third bullet point, in 2016 it is put as the overarching cloak of German military strategy. From the paper of 2006, it is clearly deductible that the German armed forces are a mission abroad army and assistance force. The White Paper 2016 shows a substantial change in Germany’s ambitions to change

back to a traditional shape and structure of an armed force, which can defend the state, its people, its territory, and its borders (German Parliament, 2016). Therefore, also a use of armed forces in Germany to assist the police forces in counterterrorism tasks seems more likely. Additionally, to the support of the police, the armed forces could also help in communication, medical and logistical terms (Gebauer, 2016). The above-mentioned alert of the military police may have been a sign of the Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen from the CDU. When looking at Germany's missions abroad especially in Afghanistan, they have put the population's support for such decisions made by the parliament and the support of the Bundeswehr in substantial decline (Pany, 2016). Germany and France's decision not to join the US in its Iraq war in 2003 may have prevented further disapproval from the population (The Guardian, 2003). Moreover, the change of the strategic paper from a mission abroad force to traditional armed forces also serves more what the actual purpose of the German soldier and their intentions "to serve the Federal Republic of Germany and to defend the right and freedom of the German people bravely" (Reservistenkameradschaft Marine Kiel, 2006). A deployment of the Bundeswehr in for example environmental disasters in Germany and abroad and pure defence of the country in a regional rather than a global perspective would lead to more understanding for a Bundeswehr. While it is undeniable that the work of the Bundeswehr and other UN member states' militaries have increased the life expectancy, health and enabled females again to visit a school, the decreasing Germans understanding for the Bundeswehr missions abroad and their legitimacy and justification is supported also by political facts.

The missing clarity of the roadmap on how to reach political goals in missions abroad is not only because of historically low ambitions to act as a leader in world politics and military projects since the Second World War. While the ambitions are changing, as shown above, this problem is partly also derived from the German language. "The word 'leadership,' 'Führung' has a very ambivalent tone," which politically is a dark word, especially when speaking about the world and European politics (Von der Leyen, 2015: 27:33 minutes). Therefore, Minister von der Leyen developed the phrase "leading from the middle," meaning to lead from within the EU as well as NATO with others through communication and "partnership" (Von der Leyen, 2015: 28:12 minutes). Additionally, politicians such as from the left half of the political spectrum have an ethical issue with such missions as Germany and its allies mainly the US at the same time also sells weapons to states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which are suspected of supporting criminal organisations such as the so-called Islamic State (Bennet, et al., 2017). Furthermore, the use of a blurred roadmap for military missions is also because the US made most calls among the NATO member states in projects in the Middle-East while ignoring

regional cultures, values and norms and their difference to the ones of the West (Shuja, 2011). As the Bundeswehr is also a reflection of the population and seeing the above, the question of trust in the Bundeswehr and its effective use is reasonable. Hence, the change of Germany's hard power institution is a policy shift and reorientation to arrange it with new threats and to test how the Bundeswehr and its different sections fit into the theatre.

Conclusion:

So why has hard-power changed substantially in Germany from the German Union and how? The support of the CDU and CSU allowed for early promises to assist in military missions abroad to governments such as the United States of America and the economic prosperity did not allow excuses to continue to stay away from international military missions. However, a political party paradox in 1998 deepened that integration into NATO and UN military missions such as to assist Kosovo to become independent. While the centre-right CDU and CSU were for the deployment of the Bundeswehr, the centre-left SPD, which at the time included much of nowadays left party 'Die Linke', had much more struggle to define its position. The CDU and CSU usually, if elected the largest party, had the SPD and the centre-left Green party opposed to its proposal regarding deployment of the Bundeswehr. However, due to the election of the SPD chancellor candidate, Schröder, they and the Green party were not in the opposition anymore. In that position, the SPD and the Greens were more under pressure internationally to decide for the deployment of the Bundeswehr to Kosovo. As the CDU and CSU continued to favour Bundeswehr deployment, most of the parliament voted for the Kosovo mission.

Therefore, first, the international political situation of the 1990s required the rethinking of the use of Bundeswehr, while the domestic political situation in 1998 further allowed that. Secondly, the threats starting from the swelling down of Cold War perception of threats against Russia to a focus on non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda. Thirdly, this also put forward the idea in the parliament to protect the human rather than the state with the military. Fourthly, the continuous financial cut downs decided by the parliament to the point that it was harmful to the Bundeswehr first task to protect Germany and its people. Fifthly, the end of mandatory military service in Germany while responsible to face old and new threats and having a financial ceiling to respond to them. This and especially the financial cuts explain the fourth point: the decision

of the parliament and the management of the Bundeswehr to focus mostly on one field of threats. That is the expansion of terrorism and related extremists abroad. Sixthly, the German parliament and other governments within NATO, but also states such as Russia saw themselves forced to act by going to the terrain, where the terrorists were and are rooted and to help states in the Middle-East to develop. The change in the relationship between the member states of NATO and Russia and vice versa since the Ukraine-Crisis again required the German parliament and the Bundeswehr to adjust its security. The seventh point of a change in hard power is the focus of security from the human to the state as the centre of focus. The Ukraine-Crisis and missions abroad like Afghanistan, where no long-term solution was found until now, provoked a change in ideas about the structure and shape of the Bundeswehr. Eighthly, the need for proper armed forces in the traditional sense for at the defence at home seems more appropriate currently. While missions abroad will continue, the current position in which the German parliament finds itself hints towards a matrix approach towards military security, which is similar to the one of the United States of America. That is having the focus on the human abroad and at home as well as on the state abroad and at home to be ready to face attacks on the population and the state. Seeing the substantial changes, the Bundeswehr has been put through, the adjustment will depend on the financial budget decided by the parliament and how long it will keep that line of through on defence. Of course, that will also depend on the EU-US-Russia relation and the development of terrorism and extremism globally. Additionally, it will depend on the parliament and whether it will deepen the Bundeswehr's tasks to act also in cases of health, environment and social security.

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