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Global Conflict in the Modern Era

The Practical Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine

The Cases of Syria and Central African Republic

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Abstract

The inconsistent application of the United Nations (UN) Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine has facilitated a discussion on the legitimacy of the principle. While the legal and ethical issues concerning R2P have been examined in detail, scholars have mostly neglected its practical dimension. In order to interpret the inconsistent implementation of R2P, the cases of Syria and the Central African Republic (CAR) serve as a comparative framework. Thereby, this paper argues that the geopolitical interests of the Security Council's permanent member states had a major impact on the adoption of R2P's non-coercive and coercive instruments. From these case studies and the UNSC's in/-action three implications for R2P are inferred: that the conditions for the successful implementation of the principle are dependent on the P5, that its application does not in fact delegitimise the doctrine and that a reformist approach can improve the inconsistencies in international response.

Contents

List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CoI	Commission of Inquiry
GCR2P	Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
MINUSCA	Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic
OHCHR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition for Chemical Weapons
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SC Report*	Security Council Implementation Report
SC RES*	Security Council Resolution
SC Statement*	Security Council Statement
UN	United Nations
UN PR*	United Nations Press Release
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WSOD	World Summit Outcome Document
P5	Permanent Members of the Security Council

*In order to differentiate between the different types of UN Security Council documents, this paper as well as the reference list cite these sources according to the abbreviations specified.

Introduction

The 1990s are perceived as somewhat of the "golden era" of humanitarian activism (Weiss, 2007, p. 136). In the name of humanitarian purposes, policy-makers were using force in such countries as Iraq (1991), in response to Saddam Hussein's oppression of the Kurds, or Somalia (1992), as a reaction to the famine following the military coup against Mohamed Siad Barre (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2014, p. 484). Yet these cases also highlighted the limitations of previously established methods of collective international action and the necessity of a more cohesive global framework. Since then mechanisms have been developed that attempt to address the issues of justifiable use of force, the necessary circumstances for- and legitimacy of- intervention.

One such framework is the UN's R2P doctrine. The inaction to the mass atrocities in Rwanda and Srebrenica facilitated the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to develop a set of common principles that outlined the obligations of the individual state as well as that of the international community (Annan, 2000, p. 48). The World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) of 2005 endorsed this principle and the duties in it (ICISS, 2001; UN, 2018a). The doctrine embodies the political commitment of its members states to international humanitarian and human rights law, combined with, the practical instruments for the prevention of four atrocity crimes; genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing (UN, 2018a). Its three-pillar strategy of implementation thereby creates the foundation for collective humanitarian action in response to mass atrocities.

The inconsistencies in R2P application, especially since the case of Libya in 2011, have facilitated a discussion on the legitimacy of this framework. While the non-coercive strategies of the principle were applied in several cases, Libya tested its "most coercive policy instrument", in other words military intervention, for the first time (Paris, 2014, p. 580). Justified in terms of systematic attacks and 'crimes against humanity', the UN authorised a NATO-led armed intervention (Doyle, 2016, p. 21). In academia, however, this instance is considered a turning point for R2P. For some, it represents its 'coming of age', or even an illustration of the doctrines' abilities, while for others it served to discredit any future collective humanitarian response (Evans, 2012; Doyle, 2016). This paper shows that there are other factors, than the case of Libya, which can explain the inconsistent implementation of R2P since then.

Which raises the question: Why were R2P's coercive instruments applied in the case of CAR, but not in the case of Syria? This paper hypothesises that the actions of the UNSC, especially in regards to R2P's coercive measures, were very much driven by the geo-political

interests of its five permanent member states (P5), China, France, US, UK and Russia. The case examples chosen thereby present an interesting comparative framework, as they demonstrate a compelling contrast in terms of which non-coercive and coercive instruments were implemented by the UNSC as well as the external factor that influenced the decision-making process.

Besides illustrating R2P as a mechanism for collective humanitarian response, this research presents a twofold extension on the present academic literature. Firstly, it provides a continuation of the analysis on the peaks and troughs of the multilateral intervention since the 1990s. Thereby presenting a factor external to the doctrine itself as an aspect impacting the application of R2P. Secondly, it expands upon the presently more ethically- and legally-based research on the doctrine, by addressing its practical implementation. This perspective grants insight into the feasibility of this framework in its objective of preventing atrocity crime and moves towards policy recommendations for its future application.

To address the overarching research question, the following paper is structured into five main sections. To begin with, this study is placed into the wider academic debate by discussing the historical context, the ethical and legal aspects surrounding R2P, and previous research on Syria and CAR. Thereby demonstrating the relevance of this type of research. The subsequent section describes the methodological approach applied to these cases. The ensuing analytical body of the paper is divided into three Chapters. The first, introduces the structure of the UNSC, particularly in terms of the competences of the P5, as well as the framework of R2P by examining its three-pillar structure and practical implementation. The second section analysis the adoption of R2P's non-coercive and coercive instruments through the lens of the motivations and incentives of the P5. The third draws inferences from this study, by discussing three implications for R2P: the conditions for the successful implementation, the legitimacy of the principle and policy recommendations for its future application. The conclusion, summarizes the main findings, considers the outcomes, presents the limitations of this study and suggests areas for future research.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

The implementation of R2P has stimulated a mainly two-dimensional research on the doctrine concerning the ethical and the legal issues of intervention. Prior to the adoption of R2P, public opinion played a major role in the process (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2014, p. 486). Therein, US intervention in Somalia in 1991, for example, was based on the citizen's compassion for the causalities of the civil war (ibid., p. 484). While in contrast, fear of losing influence in its African territories and domestic support at home, prevented a more rapid French intervention during the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (ibid., p. 484). Even with the R2P framework in place, enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention, as in the 1990s, comes in waves. The precedent set by the case of Libya, the inconsistencies in international response, the mixed motives of intervention, as well as a number of other issues have strongly influenced research on this topic.

A Turning Point: The Case of Libya

The first use of coercive intervention, under the R2P framework, is considered to be both a turning point for collective human security and a discouragement to future intervention. For some, the political willingness to engage in third pillar strategies represents a 'coming of age' for the doctrine (Evans, 2012; Thakur, 2011). Military intervention in Libya thereby solidified the reinterpretation of sovereignty in international law and the conditions that constitute a "threat to peace" (Powell, 2012, p. 315). It gave the doctrine normative weight, not only in the obligations that the state has committed to uphold, but also by setting a precedent for future UN responses to mass atrocities. In contrast for many others, Libya presents both a "*license for* and a *leash against* forcible intervention" (Doyle, 2016, p. 15). The operation revealed that R2P's preventative aspects do little to inhibit the offending state and that practical implementation is confronted with a number of seemingly insurmountable problems (Janzekovic & Silander, 2013, p. 120). Since then, defenders of the traditional interpretation of sovereignty are even more cautious of UN intervention (Doyle, 2016, p. 27).

The Ethical Implications

Two issues make R2P especially susceptible to ethical criticism: the unreliability of application and the unpredictability of the result.

Firstly, the inconsistency in applying R2P measures confuses the intentions of intervention and the legitimacy of the doctrine. Thereby there are two inherently different outlooks regarding member states' motivation. Evans & Sahnoun, argue that common human

decency, compassion, and moral appeals, as well as, the financial argument, that preventative strategies are often cheaper than a reactive one, mobilizes domestic support for humanitarian aid (2002, p. 109). This is in stark contrast to the realist perspective in international relations, where the materialistic factors i.e. national interest, power capabilities and spheres of influence, are observed to be the driving factors of the UNSC decision-making process (Binder, 2009, p. 19). While the intervener presumably is not troubled by their own mixed motives, intervention that is not solely based on humanitarianism challenges the legitimacy of this framework.

The inconsistency of R2P application also threatens to delegitimize the norm of intervention. Nowhere is that more apparent than in the case of military intervention. Different responses to mass atrocities thereby, not only sends out mixed signals to those states that are likely to ignore international law, but also challenges the credibility of the UN's mandate to infringe upon the self-determination of others (Diggelmann, 2015, p. 411; Cunliffe, 2017, p. 481). Particularly for those, whose sovereignty is encroached upon, this becomes a viable point of criticism to international interference. Subsequently, this practice of "political exceptionalism" demonstrates the paradox of R2P, while easily institutionalised it neglected to demand "any greater commitment" (Cunliffe, 2017, p. 466). Whether this ethical issue just necessitate the improvement of the criteria for- and the process of- authorizing the use of armed force (Evans, 2012), or whether the very nature of exceptionalism means that R2P is destined to fail (Cunliffe, 2017, p. 481), remains an unresolved discussion.

Secondly, the unpredictability of implementing R2P measures prevents a more dynamic international response. The effect of intervention or the 'ethics of consequentialism' illustrates three problems: that intervention can cause more victims than intended, that it requires the need to take responsibility for the psychological after-effects of conflict and that another failed intervention could have further ramifications for future collective action (Diggelmann, 2015, pp. 413 - 414). These concerns make it even more salient that intervention occurs within certain standardized processes and with consideration of the motives that guide it.

While several solutions have been proposed to counteract these issues, none consider that shifting focus towards non-coercive R2P instruments might also solve some of the ethical problems addressed above. So far, most studies suggest a change in the human security paradigm towards preventative rather than reactive R2P strategies (Janzekovic & Silander, 2013, p. 125). This could be achieved by facilitating the integration of an "atrocity prevention lens", the sharing of information, continuous assessment of a policy and the process of lesson-

learning in the three-pillar strategy (Bellamy, 2013, p. 185). Although, these measures are certainly integral to improving the recognition of mass atrocities, they do not necessarily deal with the ethical issues of the doctrine. However, shifting focus towards non-coercive strategies might reduce the geopolitical interest of the permanent member states and assist with a more standardized application of the doctrine. An aspect of the literature that this paper can contribute to, as it studies the non-coercive as well as the coercive strategies of the principle.

The Legal Implications

The sources and ambiguity of international law forms the second dimension of most R2P research. A prevailing system that provides both positive and negative implications for the doctrine.

The legitimacy of infringing upon state-sovereignty stems from two sources of international law: treaties – agreements ratified by sovereign states and/or organisations –, and customary law – the unwritten body of rules that develop out of state practice (Keohane & Holzgrefe, 2003, p. 179). The UN's International Law Commission plays a significant role by combining these two sources to articulate the responsibilities of the international community within the framework of R2P. This practice has cultivated humanitarianism as a normative standard, a process that has made "lawful what was formerly unlawful" (Janzekovic & Silander, 2013, p. 75; Hurd, 2011, p. 302). It has transcended the traditional definition of sovereignty to include the rights and obligations of the international community to "assist" states in their primary responsibility towards its citizens (Stoll, 2015, p. 153; Dederer, 2015, p. 178). The continuous application of R2P therefore confers the doctrine with legitimacy and credibility under international law.

Yet, while customary law presents a case for the legality of intervention, it can be countered by the diversity of its application. For any law to be considered a legal rule, general application of the doctrine has to *"exist"* and be *"accepted"* by all states and organisations involved (Focarelli, 2015, pp. 418 - 422). However, this remains debatable considering how differently R2P has been applied in the past and present. This places the practice of humanitarian intervention in the realm between "legality and illegality" (Hurd, 2011, p. 294). An aspect that can also be regarded as something positive, as it not only places more pressure on those who intervene to justify their actions, but also allows for the development of a normative consensus based on a case-by-case decision-making process (Keohane & Holzgrefe, 2003, p. 133).

Although the legal approach towards R2P addresses the issue of customary law and the challenge of inconsistent application, few studies connect the theoretical legality with the voluntary nature of the concept based on the examination of case examples. This paper contributes to this dimension of R2P research, by deepening awareness for the absent customary law in regards to the principles application, through the cases of Syria and CAR. As it contends the legal conditions remains subordinate to the geopolitical interests of the P5.

Beyond R2P's Ethical and Legal Implications
This study expands R2P's two-dimensional research by addressing a neglected aspect: the practicalities of its implementation. Which in this context, specifically refers to the geopolitical interests of the P5.

This deficiency in R2P research was addressed by Paris (2014) in the article titled *The 'Responsibility to Protect' and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention*. Paris pinpoints that especially the strategic logic behind intervention and the assumed "relationship between the interveners' action and the desired outcome" has been neglected (2014, p. 570). Thereby contending that "R2P failed because it worked" (ibid., p. 593). Even though the mass atrocities in Libya were categorically countered, using its coercive instruments demonstrated its innate flaws. This case exposed structural problems, which limited any indication of R2P's effectiveness, emphasised the human and financial cost, increased its hypocrisy and will likely delegitimise the principle (ibid., 2014, p. 593). Consequentially, placing the framework into somewhat of a catch-22. In both scenarios, whether R2P is used as a framework for military intervention or not, its "own internal logic" – in other words its structural problems – prevents the principle from fulfilling its main objective.

Yet, this interpretation of R2P's failure hinges very much upon its measure of last resort and on its "internal logic", instead of – as this paper does – examining the coercive and non-coercive instruments as well as factors external to the doctrine. By illuminating the structural limitations of preventative intervention and its long-term prospects as a framework, Paris (2014) provides an interesting take on the doctrine. However, despite the inherent impact the geopolitical interests of the P5 have, this study contends that R2P's structural issues in fact do not delegitimise the framework. Therefore, this research forms a dual response in that it addresses this gap in R2P research from another perspective and as to whether R2P should be considered destined to fail.

The Cases of Syria and CAR

Besides moving beyond the two-dimensional research into R2P, this paper also investigates a case study that has been underappreciated in literature. While Syria is a controversial conflict that has instigated many debates both within the UN and in academia, the case of CAR has found little attention in either field. This is demonstrated both in terms of the number of studies that consider the legal and ethical aspects, and in terms of those that address the practical implementation. However, as this paper focuses on the latter aspect, studies that consider the practical dimension are primarily examined.

The few studies that address the practical implementation of R2P in Syria mostly focus on the use of coercive tools – or more specifically the lack thereof – than the implementation of its non-coercive instruments. To begin with, this case fulfils the legal conditions for intervention under the R2P framework and embodies the previously addressed ethical implications its application brings (Erameh, 2017, p. 526; Cronogue, 2012, 147). As for the practical dimension, these studies present different explanation for the inaction of the UNSC. Often cited reasons for the Councils paralysis are: the strategic interests of China and Russia, Syria's military strength, the support Assad retains in large parts of the state and population, the damage the case of Libya caused and the geographic concerns of escalation (Cronogue, 2012, pp. 149-153; Doyle, 2016, p. 28; Berman & Michaelsen, 2012, p. 358; Erameh, 2017, p. 526). Their explanations for non-intervention thereby fixate on the extensive influence the UNSC retains in the principles application and the paradoxical nature of R2P addressed above. Yet, considering that the doctrine primarily embodies non-coercive means, this fixation on military intervention seems to be disproportionate to the actual tools it is capable of employing (Pratiwi, 2017, p. 103). By concentrating on this aspect alone, it seems to undermine the diversity of its applicability and presents a more straightforward conviction of its failure. Hence, the contribution of this paper is to observe the non-coercive measures in order to ascertain a more holistic perspective of the doctrines application as well as contend that the geopolitical interests of the P5 have had the greatest impact in this process.

Although the legal and ethical implications are similar to the case of Syria, the adoption of R2P policies presents itself differently in the case of CAR. There have been only a few studies that mention the possible legal and ethical concerns and even less so in respect to the practical implementation of R2P. As in Syria, the legitimacy of intervention, resides in the continuous commitment of mass atrocities and the unwillingness of the state to protect its own citizens (Cinq-Mars, 2015, p. 3). While in terms of the ethical considerations, the unreliability of application and the "ethics of consequentialism" remain of concern in this

case as well. However, the international response to the mass atrocities in CAR was very different. Thereby, the lacking geopolitical interests in CAR as well as the missing military and institutional resources of the country, have been presented as possible explanations for the implementation of diverse R2P measures (Zifcak, 2015, p. 69). Thus, this paper not only adds to the comparative analysis on the implications of inconsistent R2P application, but also addresses a case that has been neglected in the literature.

Conclusion

As the literature review has shown there are several ways in which this study can contribute to the examination of R2P as a framework for the prevention of mass atrocities. Besides providing a continuation of humanitarian study, it also extends the presently two-dimensional research on R2P. The contrasting cases of Syria and CAR, illustrate the UNSC's diverging application of the principle and the P5's geopolitical interests as an external factor affecting the doctrine. By examining the inconsistencies in international response this paper brings awareness to the voluntary nature of this framework, while observing the implementation of its coercive as well as its non-coercive tools contributes towards a more holistic perspective. In addition, analysing the practicalities of implementation not only fills a substantial gap in the literature, but also demonstrates the significant implications this external factor has had on R2P. Both aspects facilitate insight into the feasibility of this principle and moves towards policy recommendations for its future application.

Chapter 2: Research Design

This section aims to fulfil two objectives, to address the relevance of the cases selected as well as illustrate the methodology of this study.

The cases of Syria and CAR were chosen because they demonstrate the mechanisms of UN humanitarian intervention under the R2P doctrine. They present an interesting comparative framework, as they are located in different regions and subsequently trigger different strategic concerns in the P5. In addition, both cases present situations in which the governments of each country have not only chosen to disregard their obligations to protect their citizens, but have reportedly committed 'war crimes' and 'crimes against humanity' (UN, 2018a; 2018b). Thereby, they are cases that fulfil the legal requirements for adoption of R2P measures, but have also experienced a very different response from the international community.

An analysis of the geopolitical interests of the UNSC's permanent member states explains this dichotomy. Upholding the responsibility to protect has been characterised by a case-by-case community response. Although there is an enormous amount of interest in Syria, especially by the P5, the application of R2P instruments has been limited. In contrast the case of CAR, which garnered a lot less international concern, has experienced the implementation of more diverse R2P measures. Therefore, the main variable of interest, within this paper, is the P5's geopolitical interests and their impact on the application of R2P's coercive and non-coercive tools.

The second objective of this section is to illustrate the set-up of this study. The method used is a between-case comparative analysis, meaning that it focuses upon a limited number of cases to allow for a better understanding of each individually. In order to examine these conflicts comprehensively, the five years following the beginning of the conflict are analysed as they provide an adequate framework in which to scrutinize the international community's response. For Syria this encompasses the time period between 2011 and 2016, while for CAR it spans the years 2013 to 2018. Each case is examined within its individual timeframe and through the method of analysis described below.

In order to gauge the implementation of R2P in these two instances, a form of qualitative research called document analysis is utilised. This approach seeks to find "convergence and corroboration" using a range of different data-sets to limit the impact of potential bias and facilitate the validity of the results (Bowen, 2009, p. 28). In addition, it is a cost and time efficient way of gathering data as information is compared from various primary sources. As the UN documents were not created with this research agenda in mind

and the analysis is based on interpreting the in-/action of the P5 through UN publications, this method of analysis accounts for some of the biases they present as well as the validity of the result.

The actions or inactions of the P5 are examined through a diverse set of sources. For one, the documents published by the UN, such as the UNSC working documents, annual reports, draft proposals and resolutions are analysed. These are substantiated through physical evidence, taken from the briefing and monitoring reports of independent organisations, such as Human Rights Watch or the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P). For another, the public announcements, agreed upon policies, media coverage and the official statements of the permanent member states are considered. As states are constantly weighing their options, presenting half-truths and masking their motives, the perspectives gained from these statements are taken with a grain of salt. To combat this aspect, all announcements, statements, and policy initiatives are placed into the context of the individual states' foreign policy objectives to illustrate the geopolitical interests that could have influenced its decision or statement.

To lend coherency to the data collection the actions of the UNSC are placed within the framework of two categories: non-coercive and coercive tools. As the subsequent Chapter demonstrates, while the pillar system describes the tools, policies and responsibilities of the state as well as the international community, R2P instruments do not necessarily coincide with this structure. By differentiating between these two categories, these instruments become reference points to interpret the action or inaction of the UNSC, i.e. whether it was in the geopolitical interest of the P5 to support a pacific settlement of disputes or rather a coercive approach.

Chapter 3: The Structure of the UNSC and the Framework of R2P

The structure of the UNSC and the framework of R2P facilitates the decision-making in accordance with the P5's geopolitical interests. The structure of the Council, as provided by the UN Charter, has had a large impact on the role-distribution and the competences of the P5. While the framework of R2P, not only illustrates the conditions and means for international collective response, but also the P5's ability to retain authority over its process and its reform. Therefore, both aspects are examined within this section to give the analysis below some necessary legal and structural context.

As the primary organ responsible for implementing R2P, the origin, function and structure of the UNSC are especially important. Although the six principal organs of the UN are formally equal, the UNSC retains the main obligation under Article 24 of the Charter to maintain international peace and security (UN, n.d.b). Thereby it has three main functions: formulate and regulate armament under Article 26, adopt and enforce non-coercive and coercive instruments under Chapter VI and VII of the Charter (Oludoun, 2014, p. 68). Not only does that give the UNSC the main authority over the decision-making process within the R2P framework, it also permits the powerful states in it to guide its actions.

The UN Charter gives five states permanent membership status as well as the authority to veto any initiatives presented to the Council. As the UN was born out of a post-WW2 world, the UNSC reflects the power structures of 1945. Thereby rewarding those powers that contributed most to "securing military victory", in other words Russia, China, UK, US, and France, with permanent membership (Oludoun, 2014, p. 66). The rest of the Council is made up out of ten non-permanent members, elected every two years according to a regional allotment system (ibid., p. 66). These P5 also received the 'power of veto'. Which under Article 27 of the Charter gives these states the right to prevent any initiative or draft proposals put forward by the General Assembly (UN, n.d.a). As a result, these states have extensive control over the application of R2P measures.

As for the framework of R2P, three consecutive follow-up reports to the WSOD, placed the measures already outlined in the Charter into a three-pillar approach. The first pillar, 'Building National Resilience', describes the obligations of member states to protect their respective populations (General Assembly, 2013, p. 1). The second pillar, 'International Encouragement, Assistance and Capacity-Building', outlines the collective responsibility of the international community to assist member states in their duties (General Assembly, 2014, p. 1). Here the UNSC has instruments, such as preventative diplomacy, investigations, mediation or conciliation, at its disposal. While the final pillar, 'Timely and Decisive

Response', elaborates upon the international communities right to use more drastic means to ensure the prevention of mass atrocity crimes (General Assembly, 2012, p. 1). It allows for measures, such as public advocacy, criminal investigation, sanctions or even the use of force.

Within this three pillar-approach, there are two types of instruments: non-coercive and coercive. These categories reflect Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter that describe the pacific settlement of disputes and actions with respect to the threat peace and acts of aggression (UN, n.d.a). Thereby, the different types of R2P instrument to not necessarily coincide with the pillar system as certain non-coercive measures, such as 'preventative diplomacy' or 'observer missions', can be adopted under pillar II or III of the framework (UN, n.d.a). While the doctrine does not favour any pillar or measure over the other, in practice its non-coercive measures are applied far more often (General Assembly, 2009, p. 2). This remains in stark contrast with the presently conducted studies that focus mostly on the coercive instruments, particularly military intervention, rather than on the predominantly non-coercive tools available.

Although there are certain legal preconditions that need to be fulfilled for the implementation of R2P's instruments, the authority of the UNSC and the veto power of the P5 suggest that it remains at the discretion of the P5 in which cases they are actually adopted. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's (ICISS) report titled *The Responsibility to Protect*, endorsed the legality of these instruments in cases where a states has been unable or unwilling to prevent the commitment of four atrocities: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing (UN, 2018a). Thereby offsetting a response to "simple" violations of humanitarian law, conflict and human security situations in general. Yet, as the P5 are able to prevent any initiative presented to the UNSC and there are no legal provisions that obliges the UNSC to apply these measures in all cases of mass atrocities, this framework becomes voluntary from the outset.

The implementation structure of R2P also means that this process remains under the authority of the UNSC. While Chapter VIII of the Charter acknowledges the contributory scope of these organisations, it also subordinates its ability and capacity under the supremacy of the Council (UN, n.d.a). Consequently, the actions that regional organisations can take are dependent on the mandate given to them. The General Assembly has criticised the insufficient cooperation between the UNSC and regional organisations as they have prevented efficient early warning mechanisms and the constructive prevention of mass atrocities (General Assembly, 2010; 2011). Continuous reference to more regional action and cooperation, demonstrate how influential the UNSC is in facilitating the application of R2P measures.

Chapter 4: The UNSC's Adoption of R2P Measures

To investigate the inconsistent implementation of R2P measures, the geopolitical interests of the P5 are analysed in the cases of Syria and CAR. To begin with, each sub-section discusses the legality of R2P application, by examining the monitoring reports of human rights organisations and UN investigative bodies. Subsequently, the respective case study is observed in terms of the foreign policy objectives of the P5, the actions taken under the framework and the incentives that could have guided the action or inaction of the UNSC.

Case Study: Syria

The Legality of the Case

Between 2011 and 2016, the crimes committed in Syria exhibited the legal requirements for the adoption of R2P measures. Since the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, the Commission of Inquiry (CoJ) has reported atrocities, allegedly committed by government forces, which were considered conducive to two of the four triggers of R2P: war crimes and crimes against humanity (General Assembly, 2015, p. 8). The civilian population experienced torture and inhumane treatment "as part of a widespread and systematic attack" (ibid., p. 44). The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and CoI discovered the use of chlorine gas on multiple occasions and chemical weapons in at least 34 instances (SC Report, 2016a, p. 8; Human Rights Council, 2018). Furthermore, the UN Secretary General documented the killing of 4,000 children, and attacks on over 350 schools and hospitals (UNSC, 2018, p. 10). By 2018, Human Rights Watch registered the forcible disappearance of over 90,000 individuals by the Syrian government, and the displacement of over 5,6million Syrians (Human Rights Watch, 2018a). Despite this, the adoption and implementation of R2P instruments has been very much limited to non-coercive measures.

The Motivations and Foreign Policy Objectives of the P5

The structure of the UNSC and the framework of R2P permit the legal preconditions to come secondary to the interests of the P5, especially when one state favours a unilateral approach. In the case of Syria, the foreign policy priorities of Russia and China obstructed collective humanitarian action. Their objectives converged in two main ways: in a common respect for the principle of sovereignty and in establishing a counterweight to the Western powers in the UNSC (Ferdinand, 2013, pp. 10-15). Cooperation between these states thereby avoided isolationism in the Council.

Russia's position within the UN is marked by two interconnected priorities: self-serving policy-making, whether in terms of its economy or in restoring its prestige on the global platform, and to oppose US proposals (Ferdinand, 2013, pp. 16-17; Popescu, N. & Secrieru, 2018, p. 21). Support for a political solution under the R2P framework as well as unilateral military intervention in Syria achieved both. A collective political solution facilitated by Russia maintained its position of power in the UNSC, while a unilateral military presence in Syria countered the otherwise strong hegemony the US has in the Middle East.

China has adopted an "all-round/all-directional" foreign policy that emphasised the development of ties with important powers, as well as a specific focus on developing countries, such as Syria (Sun, 2014, p. 13). The UNSC thereby provided and still provides a framework to cultivate a favourable image in the international community, compete with traditional hegemony, support the sovereignty of new nations and promote economic and political interests (Ferdinand, 2013, p. 13). Furthermore, the unspoken solidarity with Russia, to present a common front in the UNSC, also motivated China to act similarly (ibid., p. 17).

In contrast, humanitarian obligation as well as national security concerns united the UK, France and the US in support of more proactive R2P measures (SC Statements, 2012; 2014a). For the UK and France, the instability in the Middle East had a direct impact on their foreign policy objectives. Since the beginning of 2015, the refugee crisis created substantial division between EU member states over finding sustainable solutions to a myriad of problems (Hamid, 2019, p. 6). However, French and British objectives remain similar in that they support ending the conflict through an inclusively negotiated peace settlement, providing humanitarian assistance and strengthening Syria's as well as the regions ability to withstand future conflict (Gov.UK, n.d.a; France Diplomatie, 2018). The US' stance was expedited by national security concerns of a different kind. Specifically securing the defeat of international terrorist organisations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, countering Iran's destabilising regional influence in the Arab-Israeli peace and otherwise, and in protecting their strategic interests and allies (U.S. Department of State, 2018; Karem, 2018, p. 1; Gresh & Keskin, 2018. p. 239).

The R2P Measures Taken

The geopolitical interests of the P5 are reflected in the non-coercive and coercive measures taken within the R2P framework. As adversaries to a multilateral approach and nations with the power to veto, the inaction of the UNSC displays in particular the preferences of Russia

and China. Accordingly, between 2011 and 2016, coercive tools were prevented and non-coercive measures were restricted in Syria.

The first sign of dissonance between the P5 were the amount of times R2P was referenced in UNSC documents. In comparison to other cases of mass atrocities, such as in Sudan or Libya, the UNSC published five proposals and one presidential statement that alluded to the doctrine (GCR2P, 2018a). They did so in two ways. For one these reports 'reaffirm', 'demand', or 'recall' the responsibility of the Syrian authorities to protect its population (SC RES, 2014a, p. 2; 2015b, p. 2). For another, they demanded that all parties take the proper steps to fulfil their commitment as members of the international community (SC RES, 2014a, p. 4; 2015a, p. 1). However, whenever international responsibility is called for two aspects are sure to be emphasised; that the primary duty remains with the Syrian government and that the implementation of R2P measures by the UNSC should be taken in agreement with national authorities.

Even the few non-coercive R2P measures that were supported by all of the P5 were mindful of infringing upon the sovereignty of Syria. Between 2011 and 2016, instruments that facilitated building the capacity for dialogue, humanitarian aid and denying the Syrian government the means to commit atrocities, were adopted.

General support for a political solution to the Syrian conflict aided the capacity building for dialogue. The initiative International Syria Support Group, co-chaired by Russia and the US, sought to achieve a peaceful settlement between all the parties involved (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Throughout the conflict, the group managed to establish a common set of principles, a three-phased "road map" for the peace process, as well as a mediated cessation of hostilities with the Syrian government (SC RES, 2015c, p. 1). For Russia and China, it presented a way to resolve the crisis without breaching the sovereignty of the Syrian government. While for the US, France and the UK, it was another means to alleviate human suffering, prevent further instability in the Middle East and establish a more sustainable solution (SC Statement, 2015b, p. 3). In addition, for the US a peaceful solution would also preserve favourable regional balances of power, specifically by preventing the strengthening of ties between Iran and Syria. However, even in this non-coercive instrument of R2P, the divergence in respect to the principle of sovereignty was pronounced. The clear lack of unity regarding the transition of power, with the UK, France, and US in favour of a regime change, and China and Russia opposed to the removal of Assad, hindered dynamic political progress (The Syria Institute, 2016).

Similarly, China and Russia only endorsed a humanitarian aid package, under the R2P framework, that had the potential to protect the civilian population without infringing upon the sovereignty of the Syrian government. The UNSC thereby unanimously adopted one proposal for increased aid that authorised regional organisations the use of routes across conflict lines in order to reach secluded areas (SC RES, 2014b; 2015e). However, aside from providing the Syrian population with relief assistance, it granted both fractions the ability to insert language into the proposal. The US, UK and France to advocate for the adherence to the provisions of humanitarian law and the implementation of more extensive measures (SC RES, 2015e, p. 4). While for China and Russia, to campaign for a political settlement conducive to the principle of sovereignty and the adoption of measures proportional to the conflict (SC Statements, 2014b, pp. 5-10). This is particularly demonstrated by the fact that the resolution includes a provision that requires the consent of Syrian authorities for any border crossing. Thereby ensuring that the government retains control over humanitarian relief.

Support for the scheduled destruction of chemical weapons and the mechanism for the identification of the perpetrators were facilitated by the P5's diverging interpretations of this action. In 2013 the UNSC, for the first time, adhered to concerns brought forth by the OPCW by unanimously adopting three proposals that condemned the use of chlorine gas, scheduled the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons, and authorised a mechanism to identify the perpetrators using them (SC RES 2013; 2015d; 2016a). By 2016, all chemicals *declared* by the Syrian government, as well as, 24 out of 27 production facilities were destroyed (SC Report, 2016a, p. 8; 2016b, pp. 4-6). This conspicuous break from Russia and China's vetoing policy can be rationalised by how differently the implementation of this tool was interpreted. While the UK, France and the US found this to be a stepping-stone towards more coercive measures, Russia and China understood it to be conducive to a fact-finding mission of "alleged" government forces use of chemical weapons rather than an acknowledgement that Assad has shirked his responsibilities (SC Statements, 2015a, pp. 3-7). This interpretation is also supported by the OPCW report that criticised that its mandate was limited to the voluntary submission of information by the Syrian government, to the gathering of samples and the inspection of Chemical facilities.

However, there were also some non-coercive instruments of R2P that were categorically obstructed by Russia and China. In terms of impartial oversight, the UNSC neglected to implement most of the recommendations presented to them by UN mandated organisations. There were three ways in which the UN gathered information in Syria, through a joint observer mission with the League of Arab States, through an in-house Observer Force

and briefings from independent agencies, such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) or Human Rights Watch (Security Council Report, 2017; UN PR; 2013c; 2015d). Despite UN officials frequently noting the appalling humanitarian situation and requesting the implementation of more coercive measures, i.e. sanctions or steps towards political transition, no proactive proposals were passed (UN PR, 2013a; 2013b; 2015a; 2015b). Russia and China's preference for a more political solution and respect for the sovereignty of Syria thereby prevented their adoption. Instead, the UNSC adopted quite a placatory stance. Aside from condemning the mass atrocities taking place, they refrained from an outright discredit of Assad's legitimacy and reaffirmed their commitment to the "sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria" (UN PR, 2012). Thereby creating the basis for sustained diplomatic relations with the Syrian government.

The more progressive proposals for the protection of civilians also illustrated the curbing influence of Russia and China's foreign policy objectives. Two documents regarding the 2016 atrocities in Aleppo were proposed to the UNSC (SC RES, 2016b, 2016c). The French and Spanish text, vetoed by Russia, demanded a monitoring of the cessation of hostilities, termination of aerial bombardments and military flights, as well as unhindered access for humanitarian envoys. It was deemed by Russia and China as an attempt to violate existing structures of cooperation, in other words a political solution, as well as a breach of Syria's sovereignty (SC Statements, 2016, p. 5). While the second proposal, was a confrontational stand against the West. The Russian proposal, vetoed by France, US, and UK, provided an alternative solution that suggested a cessation of hostilities and the prevention of material and financial gains of terrorist groups. This draft was criticised by the Western states as a "hollow" commitment to the political process and a "deceptive" attempt to distract the Council (ibid. pp. 6-13). It retained few provisions that would have presented a sustainable solution, nor facilitated the stabilisation of the region in general.

The issue of Syria's sovereignty, as with R2P's non-coercive measures, was prevalent in the UNSC's approach to coercive instruments. Only one proposal, the referral of Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC), was even included on the agenda of the UNSC. Draft Resolution 348, not only clearly placed this action under Chapter VII of the Charter, it also referenced clearly the allegations that war crimes and crimes against humanity were being committed (SC RES, 2014c, p. 2-3). It presented an opportunity to implement a more leveraging instrument to stabilise the region and secure the accountability of perpetrators (SC Statements, 2014a, pp. 3-7). However, as in previously more proactive resolutions, Russia and China vetoed this proposal. Both perceived it as a pretext for armed intervention in Syria

as well as an attempt at facilitating a regime change (ibid., pp. 12-14). The Chinese representative even stressed their principled opposition of ICC referrals on the basis of sovereignty and the principle of complementary. Demonstrating anew the fundamental division within the UNSC concerning the suitable level of collective response.

The Incentives for Inaction

The case of Syria is particularly characterised by the division in the geopolitical interests of the P5. Within this timeframe there has been a clear focus on the guiding foreign policy objectives of Russia and China, and the pacific settlement of the Syrian conflict. The latter of which was illustrated both by the lack of references made to Chapter VII of the Charter and that neither sanctions nor military intervention have even been considered in the form of a UN draft proposal. It exposes the discretionary power of the P5 and the voluntary nature of the R2P framework.

Russia and China's support for the principle of sovereignty presented itself as a driving force against non-coercive and coercive instruments alike. The actions and official statements of Russia created a narrative within the UNSC predominantly based on the principle of territorial sovereignty and a rejection of the "standards of political legitimacy devised in western capitals" (SC Statements, 2013; 2014a; Allison, 2013, p. 796). Supporting a pacific approach in the UNSC, while rejecting sanctions and a UN mandated military intervention thereby has a self-serving purpose. Russia profits through bilateral arms trade or military aid, as well as an unencumbered military presence in Syria (Allison, 2013, pp. 804-819). Unilateral intervention in form of naval support in Tartus, air strikes and reinforcement of the Syrian army, thereby provides Russia with an opportunity to counter the otherwise strong US hegemony in the Middle East (Lutta, 2018, p. 25).

Even though China maintained, according to its official statements, a position of impartiality and lack of self-interest in Syria, such altruistic motives seem unlikely (SC, Statements, 2014a, p. 14). China's obstruction of R2P's more coercive measures falls in line with its general foreign policy of facilitating the sovereignty of developing countries and counterbalancing Western hegemony, thereby making a performative vote improbable (Wong, 2012). While its current trade relations with Syria remain statistically insignificant, it profited from a non-interventionist policy as it facilitated economic ties between these two countries (OEC, 2017). Thereby bilateral agreements that have rebuild Syria's industry have given China's state-led companies control over the construction of power plants, car manufacturing, hospital development or even a telecommunication system (Lyall, 2019).

Another likely incentive is China's position on the global forum. Following the Cold-War rhetoric, protecting the Assad regime provided an opportunity to undermine the continued US hegemony in the Middle East and establish itself as a global power by presenting a common front with Russia.

As for the three Western powers, their actions within the UNSC also fall in line with their general geopolitical interests. Besides Russia's draft proposal on Aleppo in 2016, UK, France and the US did not veto any initiatives. The national security concerns of the US and the refugee crisis for the European countries have incentivised a proactive approach. All three have consistently advocated for a more multifaceted approach in order to achieve a quicker end to the conflict and stabilise the region (France Diplomatie, 2018; Gov. UK, 2018; U.S. Department of State, 2018). Yet, as the previous Chapter demonstrated, the structure of the UNSC inhibits their foreign policy objectives tremendously. Consequently, these countries have resorted to organisations outside of the UN forum. The most notable of which is the Syrian People International Working Group, a collective of countries that decided and enforced restrictive measures as well as sanctions on the Syrian regime (Government of the Netherlands, n.d.).

Case Study: CAR

The Legality of the Case

The mass atrocities committed in CAR, also exhibited the legal requirement for the adoption of R2P measures. The OHCHR and the COJ reported crimes conducive to at least two of the four triggers of R2P: war crimes and crimes against humanity (OHCHR, 2017, p. 248, p. 259). Already since 2003, numerous coup d'etat and armed conflict, between CAR's governmental forces and the Muslim Séléka rebels, have destabilised the region. Under President Francois Bozizé armed conflict resulted in a systematic attack against the civilian population, in form of murder, rape, extrajudicial executions and torture (OHCHR, 2017, pp. 248-250). Despite the overthrow of President Bozizé in 2013 and the Brazzaville ceasefire agreement, signed by Séléka rebels and the newly formed Christian militia anti-balaka, conflict continued (GCR2P, 2013, p. 1). Both rebel groups have killed civilians, attacked displacement camps, recruited children as soldiers, raped and assaulted women, and burned down settlements (Human Rights Watch, 2018b). In addition, the anti-balaka were reported to have committed actions conducive to ethnic cleansing, such as in Bangui where these crimes reduced the Muslim population by 99% (SC Report, 2014, p. 19, p. 94). All of which culminated in the forcible displacement of at least 2.4 million civilians (Amnesty

International, 2018, p. 118). In response the UNSC has adopted and implemented both non-coercive and coercive R2P measures, which stands in stark contrast with the inaction in the case of Syria.

The Motivations and Foreign Policy Objectives of the P5

Although the geopolitical interests of the P5 differ, their nominal foreign policy objectives facilitated the adoption of R2P's non-coercive and coercive measures.

As French claims of grandeur and great power status in the UNSC are heavily based on ties with post-colonial Africa, its foreign policy objectives aim to preserve its position. However, with the loss of Rwanda in 1994, its military policy has been undergoing a shift towards dealing with threats to regional interests with the lowest force possible (Gregory, 2000, p. 435; Harshé, 2019, p. 115). As a result, its foreign policy towards Africa is shaped through several objectives: preservation of international status, strong activism, a need to secure access to strategic resources and retain profits made out of a quasi-monopoly of French companies (Vériter, 2015, pp. 2-7). As for CAR specifically, France retains strong political, economic, scientific and technical relations, which incentivised an active approach within the R2P framework.

In contrast to the previous case, Russia and China's lack of strong foreign policy priorities facilitated rather than obstructed collective humanitarian action. As in Syria, their objectives converged in two ways: in support of the sovereignty of African countries and in challenging the hegemony of Western powers (Aras & Fidan, 2010, p. 55; Ferdinand, 2013, pp. 13). Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has had an "image" problem, the change in foreign aid policy towards Africa crippling its credibility there (Aras & Fidan, 2010, p. 55). Besides that they continue to lack diplomatic presence with no larger platforms and institutions for Russia-Africa relations and struggled with ongoing racist violence against African citizens (ibid., p. 55). Consequently, Russia has three foreign policy objectives in Africa: expanding its sphere of influence, pragmatic policy-making and economic cooperation (ibid., p. 54; Ferdinand, 2013, pp. 16-17). Similarly, CAR fits into China's general "all-round/all-directional" foreign policy (Sun, 2014, p. 13). Cooperation on the global platform thereby provided an opportunity to strengthen the political, economic and strategic ties with a developing country as well as challenge the hegemony of Western powers in Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs China, n.d.).

In comparison, the US and the UK maintain even broader regional aims. According to an official statement by the US' foreign ministry, increased aid and diplomatic efforts should

be seen as part of a broader objective of mass atrocity prevention and lessons-learned from the Rwandan genocide (Arieff & Husted, 2016, p. 13). However, larger stabilising efforts in Africa, likely also facilitated its objectives in CAR of improving its stability, economic growth and institutional capacity building (U.S. Department of State, 2019). The UK also had no precise interests in CAR. Besides purely developmental or humanitarian interests, the priorities in neighbouring countries, such as Uganda, Nigeria or Sudan, likely promoted CAR as part of a general regional approach (Cargill, 2011, p. 5; Gov.UK, n.d.b). Therefore expressing broad objectives of minimizing instability in CAR as well as promoting British trade interests.

The R2P Measures Taken

The diverse multilateral measures taken between 2013 and 2018, within the R2P framework, reflects the relative unity of the P5 or at the very least the general disinterest of preventing it. Consequently, the UNSC adopted several non-coercive measures, such as preventative diplomacy, platforms for mediation and political dialogue, regional arrangements, as well as coercive instruments, such as sanctions, peacekeeping and military missions. As there was no clear opposition to R2P, the incentives that facilitated a multilateral approach are discussed in the final part of this section, rather than in terms of the specific measure taken.

The first indication of a more unified approach is the consistency with which R2P is referenced in the resolution documents of the UNSC. Thereby, two interesting aspects become apparent: the semantics utilised and that there were no demands for international responsibility (SC RES, 2013a, p. 3; 2014a, p. 2). In terms of semantics, they did not "demand" but rather used circumspect wording, such as "recall" or "underscore". A possible explanation is that in 2013 a new interim government was formed that did not engage in the systematic commitment of mass atrocities. In terms of placing responsibility, these documents focused on the primary responsibility on CAR authorities, however refrained from calling for unified international action. Thereby demonstrating that the UNSC was cohesive in its response and consistently adopted R2P measures.

Already the P5's approach to diplomacy and peace settlements demonstrated a willingness to engage in R2P's more proactive measures. The UNSC took an assertive stance towards the actions in CAR that were less conducive to a political solution. Besides officially declaring their willingness to take any appropriate measures that could prevent an escalation of violence, the presidential statements also strongly condemned the atrocities committed (SC Statements, 2014a; 2014b; 2017a). Similarly, while attempts were made to build the

capacities for dialogue, these peace talks also illustrated a disinterest of the UNSC to concede to the demands of the rebel groups at any cost. Three rounds of negotiations took place: the Brazzaville accord of 2014, the Bangui National Forum in 2015, a joint UN-African Union (AU) peace initiative in 2018 (Labuda, 2019). In these reconciliation conferences exhibited that the UNSC was unwilling to absolve perpetrators from their responsibilities, despite the consequences this decision would bring.

This convergence of P5 interests was also demonstrated by the adoption of R2P measures under the broader umbrella of regional arrangements. The UNSC deployed the Stabilisation Mission in CAR (MINUSCA), with a multidimensional mandate of impartial oversight, the protection of civilians, support for the political process and delivery of humanitarian assistance (SC RES, 2014b, p. 1). MINUSCA successfully established the Bangui Forum, facilitated the implementation of agreements, as well as took institutive actions to enable peaceful referendums and elections (SC Statement, 2014c; 2015; UN PR, 2016). Thereby two aspects are interesting. For one, all resolutions that extended MINUSCA's mandate firmly placed this action under Chapter VII of the Charter. For another, the P5 adhered to the recommendations given to them in mission reports of MINUSCA and other independent organisations. For example, in 2013 where the UNSC passed a resolution that expanded the arms embargo to include travel bans and asset freezes of individuals, after a UN humanitarian official recommended sanctions against individual perpetrators (SC Statement, 2013, p. 4; SC RES, 2014c).

The CAR governments support and request of international aid as well as the opportunity to challenge the hegemony of Western powers, altered Russia and China's otherwise vehement opposition to R2P's coercive instruments. Since 2013, in accordance with the government of CAR, the UNSC has adopted sanctions in the form of an arms embargo and military intervention, through several different missions. The arms embargo, included measures to prevent the direct and indirect sale or transfer of arms and related material, travel bans and asset freeze of individuals, as well as an embargo of any assistance related to military activities (SC RES, 2013b; 2014c, 2015a). The 2017 arms embargo exemption, thereby allowed the international community to trade and deliver technical and military assistance to CAR's governmental forces (SC RES, 2017, p. 4). Besides that, the UNSC also adopted proposals that mandated the deployment of French troops, authorised the peacekeeping forces of MINUSCA as well as military training assistance from the EU and other UN member states (SC RES, 2013b; 2015b, 2014a;). By 2016, with the peacekeeping

operation, sanctions and the presence of French troops, the country experienced a gradual transition towards peace and stability and the return of refugees (UNHCR, 2019).

As for the referral of CAR to the ICC, this coercive measure of R2P would have been particularly interesting in light of China's principled opposition in the case of Syria. However, as a state party to the Rome statute, the right to an investigation could and was uninitiated upon the request of interim President Catherin Samba-Panza (ICC, n.d.; International Justice Resource Center, 2014). Thereby, preventing a comparative assessment of China's actions in an instance where its geopolitical interests presented itself differently than the otherwise unified P5.

The Incentives for Action

The case of CAR is an interesting case as it demonstrates how absent geopolitical interests facilitated the adoption of non-coercive and coercive instruments. Between 2013 and 2018, the UNSC clearly emphasised the adoption of R2P's coercive measures, rather than a pacific settlement of the conflict. This is illustrated by the consistent references made to Chapter VII of the Charter and proposals that have outlined sanctions as well as military intervention.

After the partial collapse of Francophone influence in Africa, a multi-dimensional and multilateral approach towards the conflict enabled France to strengthen its international status, and improve its relations with CAR (ECR2P, 2018). This approach was incentivised by its inability to afford large-scale interventions, willingness to maintain its long-standing interference in CAR's politics, secure its commercial relations as well as protect its companies there (Renou, 2002, pp. 19-20; France Diplomatie, 2017). Supporting the wishes of CAR's interim government also insured future support of other Francophone countries in the UNSC.

Russia and China also did not find it in their interest to veto CAR proposals. Absence of a strong regime and request for UN intervention by CAR's government, negated the issue of sovereignty and enabled a multilateral approach. For Russia, enhanced presence in CAR, international prestige and economic opportunities incentivised a multi-dimensional approach. The adoption of R2P's coercive and non-coercive measures, created an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic ties with CAR and to enhance Africa's independence from traditional hegemonic influence of Western powers (Goodison, 2019, p. 34). Strengthened diplomatic relations also clearly facilitated Russia's economic interests. The 2017 bilateral agreement, for example, improved its influence in Africa and expanded its control over CAR's rich mineral and energy resources (Aras & Fidan, 2010, p. 56; Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Russia, 2017). Furthermore, exemption from the otherwise comprehensive arms embargo facilitated international prestige and an "an atmosphere of indebtedness" (Goodison, 2019, p. 38). Arming and training support, strengthened Russia's presence in Africa, its ability to build strategic and logistical strength and balance Chinese interests.

Similarly, China's support of a multilateral approach under the R2P framework stemmed from an opportunity to protect the independence of CAR from imperial powers, and facilitate diplomatic and economic relations. By fostering non-coercive as well as coercive measures, China maintains Africa as a source of "prestige diplomacy" on the international platform (Sun, 2014, p. 15). Furthermore, while economic development in Africa has not been a priority for China, stabilising a developing country with rich natural resources, great market potential and labour resources CAR fits well into its general foreign policy. (ibid., p. 6). Especially as investment, such as through 67.4million dollar-loan to fix mobile networks or 13.6million dollars in debt relief, to fulfils China's foreign policy objective of creating business and employment opportunities for Chinese labourers (AidData, n.d.). Promoting security and stability within CAR thereby protects Chinese investments and interests.

Few initiative and official statements from the US and UK demonstrated their minimal interest in the case of CAR. Both had finite political and economic ties with the country, and restricted their involvement to humanitarian aid (Arieff & Husted, 2016, p. 13; Cargill, 2011, p. 5). While limited bilateral economic and political relations corroborate this perspective, continued involvement in Africa was likely also incentivised by larger national security concerns. For the US, the impact this conflict could have on its other stabilisation efforts in Sudan, Burundi or the Democratic Republic of Congo, and concerns that transnational extremist organisations would radicalise the population in CAR (Arieff & Husted, 2016, p. 16). As for the UK, considerable bilateral ties with CAR's neighbouring countries facilitated a multilateral approach under the R2P framework (Cargill, 2011, p. 5).

Chapter 5: The Inferences Drawn from these Case Studies

From the case studies of Syria and CAR, this paper surmises three implications for the R2P framework, which are presented in the subsequent three sub-section of this Chapter. Firstly, that the other external conditions for the successful implementation of R2P are overpowered by the geopolitical interests of the P5. Secondly, that its application does not in fact delegitimize the entirety of the framework, thereby disputing Paris's (2014) argument that the structural problems of the principle makes it destined to fail. Thirdly, that certain R2P reforms can limit the impact the P5's geopolitical interests have on the application of the doctrine.

The Conditions for the Successful Implementation of R2P

The conditions for the successful implementation of R2P are applied to these case studies in order to ascertain why coercive instruments were adopted in CAR but not in Syria. By addressing other relevant external factors, this paper demonstrates that the conditions for the adoption of R2P measures are all dependent on the geopolitical interests of the P5.

The four prerequisites for the successful implementation of the R2P framework follow an assessment by Evans (2011) and a comprehensive study on UN humanitarian response by Genser (2018). Firstly, that the members of the UNSC retain a universal conceptual understanding of R2P (Evans, 2011, p. 5). Secondly, that cooperation exists between the UNSC and regional organisations and/or powers (Genser, 2018, p. 1). Thirdly, that the UN has the financial, material, technical capacities to react to those atrocities. While fourthly, that there is no obstruction by the government committing the atrocities – or that if so the P5 are unified in their willingness to overcome it.

Even though the conceptual understanding of R2P has improved, the suitable level of implementation remains an aspect of contention between the P5. Evans argues that the scope and limits of the doctrine as well as confusion over the kind of cases in which R2P should be applied has enhanced (2011, p. 5). The General Assembly's R2P debate of 2018, demonstrated a much broader agreement on its main principles and the conditions for mobilising collective action (GCR2P, 2018b, p. 1). This was also illustrated in Syria and CAR where for the most part the crimes in both conflicts were recognised to fulfil the legal conditions for R2P application. However, in terms of the suitable level of implementation, these case studies displayed a clear inconsistency in opinion.

This discrepancy is exhibited by the implementation of coercive strategies in CAR vs. the strictly pacific measures in Syria. What was deemed a suitable measure of response remained adaptable to the interests the P5 had in a given instance. In CAR, where none of the

P5 found it in their interests to veto CAR proposals, diverse pacific and proactive instruments were adopted that could be firmly placed under Chapter VII of the Charter. In contrast in Syria, where strong motivations and incentives were involved – especially Russia and China's aim of upholding the principle of sovereignty – limited international response to the implementation of R2P's non-coercive instruments. Thereby demonstrating how disruptive the interests of the P5 really are.

In regards to the second precondition for R2P, the P5's willingness to adhere to the recommendations of regional organisations also influenced the success of the framework. These agencies are in so far significant as they offer regional solutions to regional conflicts, have the potential to be more dynamic than the at times confined UNSC, are more committed to conflict prevention as well as post-conflict reconstruction (Hettne & Söderbaum, 2006, p. 230; Porter, 2015, p. 5). However, while in the case of CAR the UNSC was cooperating actively with these institutions and adopting R2P measures in accordance with their recommendations, they did not do so in the case of Syria. Interaction between the UNSC and regional organisations, such as the LAS or the UN Observer force, were characterised by criticism and repudiation (ICRtoP, 2012). Their strong stance towards the Syrian conflict and calls for the implementation of R2P's coercive instruments went inherently against the geopolitical interests of Russia and China. As a result, the UNSC failed to adopt proposals that considered the issues presented to them in mission reports. In contrast, strong cooperation existed between the UNSC and the missions of MINUSCA, the AU and the EU. As demonstrated previously the suggestion made in mission reports had a strong impact on the initiatives presented to the Council and the measures subsequently adopted. Consequently, they were more successful in establishing the capacity for political dialogue, implementing objectives set out in the agreements and facilitating peaceful election.

The capacity to react to these atrocities, the third prerequisite for R2P, is also dependent on whether the UNSC member states are interested in contributing to the cause. As it was not in the P5's interest to prevent a multilateral approach, CAR had a more favourable position in terms of material and technical assistance. Thereby CAR received a diverse set of material and technical aid from agencies, such as MINUSCA, EU, France, China, US and Russia, amongst others (The Defense Post, 2019). While in the case of Syria, absence of a multilateral response not only meant that this type of support remained outside of the framework of the UN, it also benefited the unilateral approach favoured by Russia and China. The distinct disinterest in the case of CAR was also reflected in the financial support offered. While the humanitarian response plan for Syria required donations of $3.36B, of which

$2.18B was funded, CAR's plan proposed much less with $515.6M, of which only $258.2M was financed (OCHA, 2018). Although in neither appeal the required amount was met, the completely different ballparks display the divergence in international interest and mirror the contrasting incentives of the P5 as displayed in the case studies.

Considering Russia and China's interest in respecting the principle of sovereignty and the UNSC's inaction in the case of Syria, limited obstruction by the government is a necessary precondition for R2P implementation. Syria's government was active in rejecting UN proposals throughout the timeframe observed, from fulfilling the provisions for a UN Supervision mission in 2012 to the UN supervision of a brokered agreement (UNSMIS, 2012; DW, 2017). Furthermore, Assad not only retained support from the army and large parts of the state, but from the populace, such as the Alawite community, as well (Doyle, 2016, p. 28). Consequently, UN interference was perceived by Russia and China as actions going against a sovereign nation and therefore a breach of the principle of sovereignty. In contrast, from 2014 onwards, the government of CAR was more accommodating. Besides giving the ICC the authority to investigate the crimes committed, it actively briefed the UNSC on the latest development and supported proposals, such as the deployment of MINUSCA or the extension of the arms embargo (SC Statement, 2014d, p. 8; 2017b, p. 3). Here the question of sovereignty was less prevalent and therefore also less of an obstruction to the application of R2P measures.

These prerequisites illustrated the impact the P5's geopolitical interests can have on the successful implementation of R2P. Despite the contextual similarities demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this paper, the disparity in the sheer volume of official statements during UNSC meeting already suggested the different levels of interest in these cases. Many of the member states and all of the P5 accompanied each draft proposal regarding Syria with proclamations and allegations. China and Russia's interest in protecting the traditional interpretation of the principle of sovereignty, exacerbated by their economic and military incentives, thereby made them adversaries to R2P. In comparison, the case of CAR received much fewer statements by the P5. Absence of objections from the government and limited geopolitical interests in the country facilitated the prevention of mass atrocities under the R2P framework. Thereby, the more accommodating role of the CAR government negated the issue of sovereignty and enabled Russia and China to support the preconditions for a unified multilateral approach towards the R2P framework, i.e. consensus on the suitable level of implementation, cooperation with regional organisations and the capacities to react to the atrocities.

The Strategic Logic behind R2P

With the implementation of R2P in Syria and CAR as well as factors external to the concept in mind, this Chapter discusses the legitimacy of the framework by disputing the structural problems presented by Paris (2014). Paris argues that R2P's own "internal logic" has delegitimized the concept and therefore had a substantial impact on its implementation (2014, p. 26). The "internal logic", thereby is the assumed link between actions taken under the R2P framework and the desired outcomes (ibid., p. 1). Thereby, contending that fundamental issues prevent the doctrines implementation, without considering the factors external to the principle. In contrast to this perspective, this paper ascertains R2P to be a favourable framework for the prevention of mass atrocities that requires a reformist approach in order to improve its ability to function.

Limited attention has been paid towards the strategic logic of R2P in existing literature, especially in comparison to its legal and ethical implications. However, there has been one significant debate, between Paris (2014), Thakur (2015) and Evans (2015), regarding whether the internal logic of the doctrine itself is the greatest obstacle to intervention. Paris finds several structural problems within R2P: the mixed motives of intervention, that there is no clear-cut evidence that the prevention of mass atrocities is due to the doctrine, the unpredictability of the results, the problem of disengaging or withdrawing from a particular area, and the inconsistencies in international response (2014, p. 570). Besides countering each of these issues in turn, Thakur also rejects this concept of R2P's "internal logic" on the basis of Evans' (2015) arguments (2015, p. 15-22). According to Evans the near universal consensus on the basic principles of R2P, a continued endorsement of its instruments in resolutions and presidential statements, as well as initiatives that refine rather than reject the doctrine, speak against the existence of these structural problems (2015, pp. 34-46).

There are three inherent issues with Paris's (2014) perception of the R2P framework. Firstly, the mixed motives of intervention, which is perceived as a failure of R2P's altruistic purpose, should rather be seen as a necessity as self-interest is essential to ensure the political commitment for the implementation of R2P's measures (Thakur, 2015, p. 17). Secondly, upholding the responsibility to protect is equated with R2P's most coercive instrument, military intervention. Thereby not only discounting the other non-coercive and coercive instruments the principle has to offer, but also conflating the dilemma ingrained in the use of force to R2P in general. Especially since the practical consequences the use of force brings with it is a constraint that does not stem from the framework itself but rather from the act in

general (ibid., 2015, p. 16). Thirdly, most of the structural issues are based on enigmatic arguments. While the unpredictability of the result or the issue of clear-cut evidence are important factors that need to be countered through an informed assessment prior to UN involvement, using these arguments paralyzes the actions of any individual, government or organisation. It is impossible foresee whether action or inaction will bring about a more favourable outcome, however that does not mean that the international community should not at least try to fulfil its responsibility.

Although there are inconsistencies in the international response to mass atrocities, the consistent endorsement of R2P and attempts to improve it, suggests that the problems Paris (2014) contends have not in fact delegitimized the doctrine. Contrary to Evans's (2015) conclusion, consensus on the basic principles of R2P has only been achieved in terms of a general acceptance of the scope and limits of its instruments. The inconsistent adoption of measures in response to the atrocities in Syria and CAR demonstrated that if a consensus on the suitable levels of intervention exists – which remains questionable – it remains at the discretion of the P5 whether or not to act. The continued endorsement of R2P's instruments however suggests that the doctrine retains legitimacy in the international community. Even in Syria, where there were strong geopolitical interests at play, the doctrine was referenced and some non-coercive instruments implemented. Furthermore, the framing reports, considerations on its gaps and capacities, as well as ongoing deliberations indicates a refinement rather than a dismissal of the principle. Consequently, a reform of R2P could limit the impact the geopolitical interests of the P5 have on the doctrine by creating a stronger consensus on the suitable level of implementation.

The Reformist Approach to R2P

As the geopolitical interests of the P5 are a core problem to the prevention of mass atrocities, this Chapter presents some policy recommendations that could improve the consistent application of the framework. Throughout the implications or the "lessons learned" from the case studies of Syria and CAR are addressed. Thereby there are two main approaches towards R2P: a pluralist anti-imperialist perspective that advocates for radical change and a reformist position that supports a more subtle refinement of the principle itself.

Although this study demonstrated a particular inconsistency in the application of R2P's coercive measures that does not mean that an abolishment of these strategies, as proposed by Graubart's (2015), should be accepted. Graubart argues that abolition is preferable to reform based on two arguments (2015, pp. 217-218). For one that the external

normative constraints have diminished to the extent that leading states are able to justify force whenever strategically useful. For another, that past propositions for operational and monitoring criteria have failed, making reform unlikely in future. However, while removing the use of force under this framework would quite possibly solve the issue of sovereignty that has divided the P5, an elimination of this component has a more fundamental consequence. By focusing on non-coercive measures in an effort to make "R2P sound more benign", this reform could contribute to an "operational paralysis" (Sewall, 2010, p. 162). As the example of CAR shows, under R2P's coercive measures, especially with the help of peacekeeping operation MINUSCA and the presence of French troops, the country experienced a gradual transition towards peace and stability, and the return of refugees (UNHCR, 2019).

At its essence it is a question of what is more preferable "rules-based, multilateral and consensual" actions through the framework of R2P or the alternative "unilateral intervention by the powerful"? (Thakur, 2015, p. 22). Even if the framework enables the P5 to make decisions over the future of other nations, it also attempts to balance the power of nation-states, to inhibit unilateral actions and find a consensual approach to the prevention of mass atrocities. A reformist approach towards R2P thereby could address some of the issues that presented themselves in this comparative study. This paper outlines suggestion on how to improve R2P based on three lessons learned: that the structure of the UNSC facilitates maltreatment of the doctrine, that the P5 disagree on the suitable level of R2P implementation and that regional organisations are restricted in their ability to act. These recommendations thereby propose reforms that limits the overarching impact of the geopolitical interests of the P5, particularly in terms of the issue of sovereignty.

Although veto reform would certainly reduce the weight of the P5's geopolitical interests in the application of R2P, this amendment seems unattainable in the present geopolitical climate. Vetoes in cases of mass atrocities have instigated much discussion on whether or not these members have neglected their responsibility to sustain international peace and security (GPF, 2019). Besides the 2014 Secretary General Report on R2P, there have been initiatives led by governments of Mexico and France, as well as the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group that have called for veto restraint or even abolishment of this provision entirely (ibid.). However, as this would inhibit the P5's position of power on the global platform and amendments to the UN Charter have to be ratified by the permanent member states, such a change is unlikely to occur.

Instead, a more feasible alternative is the expansion of the UNSC. It would not only counter some of the democratic and representative deficit in the Council, but could restrict the

inconsistent application of R2P. Since the establishment of the UN, the P4 (Brazil, Japan, India and Germany) and the AU have presented requests for permanent membership status (Kugel, 2009, p. 4). While, France and the UK were in favour of these initiatives, China, Russia and the US were supportive of a compact UNSC for efficiency purposes (GPF, 2010a; UNA-UK, 2015; GPF, 2009; 2010b; Russian Federation to the UN, 2019). The positions of the latter three are unsurprising as they generally pursue foreign policies that maintain their position of power on the global platform, which a larger number of permanent representatives would inhibit or even undermine. However, recently Russia, China and the US have been outspoken in their willingness to include other permanent membership position, such as for India (Business Standard, 2019). Expanding the UNSC would not only present an opportunity to reduce the underrepresentation of Africa and the Middle East, but their voices could possibly generate some restraint of the P5's maltreatment of the doctrine in those regions.

Establishing more cohesive criteria for the application of R2P instruments could close the conceptual gaps in the P5's understanding of the doctrine and possibly limit the inconsistencies of it application. There are three significant suggestions for the development of common guidelines: the US government report titled "Peace Operations", the Brazilian "Responsibility while protecting" and Pape's "Pragmatic Standard" (U.S. Department of Defence, 2012; Tourinho, Stuenkel & Brockmeier, 2015, p. 138; Pape, 2012, p. 43). Even though the UNSC has not passed any of these proposals, the Brazilian initiative has the potential to limit the inconsistent application of the principle as it provides measures that reduce the issue of sovereignty while maintaining the oversight role of the UNSC. "Responsibility while protecting" proposes a shift towards non-coercive measures (Tourinho, Stuenkel & Brockmeier, 2015, p. 138). This shift could limit the issue of sovereignty as it presents itself most prominently in the adoption of R2P's coercive tools, without removing the coercive strategy altogether. Furthermore, a review mechanism would ensure that the UNSC retains an oversight role in its implementation, which would make sure that critics of R2P remain authoritative over the process.

Finally, enhancing the capacities of agencies could facilitate a more consistent cooperation between them and the UNSC, as well as promote pre-emptive rather than reactive international response. For one, as the case of CAR demonstrated, efficient cooperation between the UNSC and regional organisations can facilitate proposals that specifically address the issues at hand with suitable solutions. By prioritising dialogue with civil society organisations, shifting some of the responsibility to the national and regional level and strengthening their architecture, while ensuring that the UNSC retains an overwatch position,

those organisations would be less restricted in their ability to act and could contribute more to a consistent implementation of R2P (ICRtoP, 2015, p. 4). For another, promoting a strong network of agencies that incorporate instruments that preside over early-warning mechanisms and international responsibility in post-conflict situation could confine the issue of sovereignty between the P5. Early warning mechanisms thereby could facilitate a preventative rather than a reactive response, which would reduce the use of R2P's coercive measures (Porter, 2015, p. 5; ICRtoP, 2015, p. 4). While, an atrocity-specific lens in the UN's Peacebuilding Commission, that already embodies preventative tools and mechanisms for reconciliation and rebuilding, could make a strategic contribution to the prevention of conflict reoccurrence (Porter, 2015, p. 4; von Schorlemer, 2007, p. 1).

Conclusion

This paper posed the overarching research question: Why were R2P's coercive instruments applied in the case of CAR, but not in the case of Syria? Throughout the inconsistent implementation of the R2P framework was analysed by means of the case example of Syria and CAR. After discussing the relevance of this particular study, by illustrating the predominantly ethical- and legal- based research on R2P, and outlining the research design, this paper examined the adoption of the principles coercive and non-coercive measures through the lens of the motivations and incentives of the P5. Thereby, three implications were drawn from these cases: that external conditions to R2P implementation are overpowered by the geopolitical interests of the P5, that its application does not delegitimize the framework and that reforms can limit the lessons learned.

So, why were R2P's coercive strategies applied in CAR, but not in the case of Syria? As hypothesised, the geopolitical interests of the P5 were the main contributing factor to the inconsistent adoption of R2P instruments. In the case of CAR, where the objectives and incentives of the P5 were minimal, a diverse set of measures were implemented between 2013 and 2018. A more unified multilateral approach in CAR thereby facilitated the endorsement of a few non-coercive strategies, such as diplomacy, humanitarian aid and public advocacy, as well as varied coercive instruments, such as the peacekeeping mission or the arms embargo. In contrast, political self-interest was a lot more inherent in the case of Syria. The active participation of the P5 in UNSC meetings, the financial assistance given, as well as the actions taken between 2011 and 2016, all point towards it. As the adversaries to the implementation of R2P in Syria, the geopolitical interests of Russia and China were significant. Thereby, their converging objectives of respecting the principle of sovereignty and utilising the UN as a platform to counterbalance Western powers particularly inhibited the doctrine. Consequently, non-coercive measures were emphasised, facilitated by Russia and China's objective of finding a political solution, while instruments under Chapter VII of the UN Charter were disregarded, as they were perceived as a clear breach of Syria's sovereignty.

The four preconditions for the successful implementation of R2P, as proposed by Evans (2011) and Genser (2018), also demonstrate the relevance of the geopolitical interests of the P5. The prevailing circumstances in the case of Syria suggested that the necessary prerequisites for the implementation of R2P measures were purely not present. However, while the limited cooperation between the UNSC and regional organisation or the lack of material and technical assistance certainly did not make upholding the responsibility to

protect easier, these prerequisites were dependent on the political will of the P5. What was considered a suitable level of response, which regional organisations received a mandate, which recommendations the UNSC adhered to, or which assistance was given, were all aspects that the P5 had authority over.

These conditions for R2P implementation, however also illustrated that within the general geopolitical interests of the P5, the issue of sovereignty creates the most disunity in the UNSC. The Western powers conform to R2P's premise that sovereignty also entails an obligation of the international community to act when a state is unable or unwilling to do so. Whereas Russia and China adhere to a more traditional interpretation of sovereignty that respects the authority of a regime, even when it has been accused of committing atrocity crimes. As the case of Syria demonstrated, where the government resisted UN interference and maintained support of parts of the populace, the support of Russia and China was prompted. In contrast, where there was no obstruction and even support for international assistance, as in the case of CAR, the issue presented no obstacle to the adoption of R2P measures. Thereby displaying how disruptive the P5's diverging interests in respect to this principle really are.

The consistent endorsement as well as the frequent considerations of its gaps and capacities demonstrate the legitimacy of R2P as a framework for the prevention of mass atrocities. However, in order to retain its legitimacy and improve the consistency of its application, more effort should be placed into reforming the doctrine. This paper contends that three policy reforms have the potential to address the lessons learned from Syria and CAR. Firstly, an expansion of the UNSC could restrain the P5's misuse of the doctrine by improving the Council's democratic deficiencies and giving regional powers a stronger voice. Secondly, the adoption of a set of agreed upon guidelines could facilitate a consensus on the suitable level of implementation and conceivably negate some of the discord over the concept of sovereignty. The Brazilian initiative thereby presents an interesting proposal as it shifts the application of R2P towards non-coercive measures, without eliminating the indispensable military component. While thirdly, enhancing the capacities of regional and national organisations could balance out state authority, expand accountability, emphasise pre-emptive rather than reactive policy-making as well as make a strategic contribution to the prevention of reoccurring mass atrocities crimes. In general prioritising R2P's non-coercive measures over coercive ones should be pursued in order to limit the disunity in the UNSC over the issue of sovereignty.

This study contributes to the present academic literature on R2P in several ways. For one, it presents a continuation of research on collective international response to humanitarian crises. Thereby Syria and CAR offer an interesting comparative framework, as they have triggered different strategic interests in the P5 and illustrate the inconsistency in international response. Furthermore, the situation in CAR has found little attention both in academia and by policy makers, therefore demonstrating a relatively new and compelling example of R2P application. For another, this paper expands research into the practical implementation of the doctrine, rather than focusing on the ethical and legal implications. It considers – unlike most research – the coercive as well as non-coercive measures of the framework, demonstrates the voluntary nature of its implementation and presents in detail an external factor that influences its application in Syria and CAR. Thereby the implications drawn from the case studies contribute to the overall practical understanding of R2P. This paper contends that despite the inherent impact the P5 have on the adoption of the principle, its continued application does not in fact delegitimise the entire framework, as suggested by Paris (2014). R2P's consistent endorsement as well as frequent discussions demonstrate that reforms, as the ones considered above, could improve upon its deficiencies especially in terms of its inconsistent implementation.

Nevertheless, there were several limitations to this study that stem from the research design and from the topic addressed. The cases chosen for this research are both a weakness and a strength of this study. While Syria and CAR demonstrate an intriguing comparative framework that trigger different strategic concerns in the P5, they also represent countries from two very different regions, with distinct histories and conflicts. As there are so many different internal and external factors involved it complicates the conclusions drawn from this comparison. Besides that, the premise and set up of this study required the analysis of a diverse set of primary sources published by the UN. Even though, information gathered from these documents was corroborated through other UN agencies as well as the briefing and monitoring reports of international organisations, some bias may still remain. Finally, R2P and the workings of the UN are in and of itself a complex subject matter to analyse. A few examples are, the difficulty of assigning resolutions to the pillar structure of R2P, obtaining all the documents associated to a certain draft proposal or resolution, and the abundance of actors involved.

Consequently, future studies could address some of the other external factors involved, in more detail. The scope and complexity of these conflicts meant that this paper was limited in its ability to focus on all the factors involved. Addressing aspects that could

have possibly influenced the decision-making of the permanent member states, such as the circumstances within the countries themselves, the material capacities of the UNSC or the actual leveraging abilities of R2P coercive strategies, could produce interesting results. A better understanding of them could thereby contribute to the doctrines improvement as well as uphold its legitimacy as a framework for the prevention of mass atrocities. As determined by Thakur (2015), a multilateral approach to atrocity prevention remains preferable to the unilateral intervention by the powerful.

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