

# The EU Towards China in Africa

---

*Self-interest covered in a normative narrative*

Name	S. A. M. van der Meer
Student Number	s1430564
Thesis Supervisor	Dr. Prof. A. W. M. Gerrits
Second Reader	Dr. A. M. O'Malley
Course	Master International Studies
Date	June 15, 2014
Number of Words	9914

# Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations .....	3
Introduction .....	4
Methods .....	6
Discourse Analysis .....	6
Pros and Cons of Discourse Analysis .....	6
Conducting a Discourse analysis.....	7
Different Opinions within the EU .....	8
Opinions within the EU through Time .....	8
Views of the Different Parties and MEPs .....	13
Normative Power Europe? .....	15
Use of Norms and Values.....	15
Interests in Africa.....	16
Interests in Danger.....	18
Spreading a Narrative: A Political Tool?.....	20
Identity Politics .....	20
Constructing the Self .....	21
Constructing the Other .....	22
Conclusion.....	25
Literature.....	26
Primary Sources .....	26
Secondary Sources.....	29

## List of Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
China	People's Republic of China
EC	European Commission
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
ILO	International Labour Organization
IND/DEM Group	Independence/Democracy Group
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEP	Member of Parliament
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPE-DE	Group of the European People's Party and European Democrats Group
PSE Group	Socialist Group in the European Parliament
UEN Group	Union for Europe of the Nations Group

## Introduction

After decades of development policies of the West, little progress has been made in the economic situation of the African states (Sachs, 1999, p. 73). Even more, due to the economic crisis, the European Union (EU) decreased its financial aid flow to Africa (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012). Interestingly, some Southern countries have profiled themselves as important aid actors in the African region. According to some scholars, mainly the involvement of the People's Republic of China (China) in the region, may become one of the most positive development in Africa in years (Tull, 2006, p. 459). However, the EU seems to think otherwise. Over the past decades, China's involvement in Africa has received huge attention from the European media and political circles (Tull, 2008, p. 2). China is often represented as a self-interested donor, which supports authoritarian regimes, while ignoring Western aspects of development such as democracy and human rights promotion (Anshan, 2007, p. 83; and for example, Gomes, on behalf of the European Parliament, 2008; European Parliament, 2008a, European Parliament, 2008b; European Parliament, 2011; Morazán et al., on behalf of the European Union, 2012). Its aid policies are viewed as a way of securing access to Africa's natural resources (Condon, 2012, p. 6; and for example, European Parliament, 2007; Gomes, on behalf of the European Parliament, 2008; European Parliament, 2008a; European Parliament, 2011) and allows it to conduct 'land-grabbing' practices (Hall, 2011, p. 194; and for example, Morazán et al., on behalf of the European Union, 2012, p. 20).

However, many academics argue that the EU's development policy is not that sincere, either. For instance, Abrahamsen (2006) states that western countries hold power on the African countries through aid dependencies (p. 1464). Kohnert (2008) argues that the relations between the EU and Africa are based on 'asymmetrical power relations inherited from colonial rule' (p. 7). The EU's trade policy is centered around self-interest and therefore cause a perpetuation of poverty in many African countries. Due to this, trade policies are not compatible with its development goals. The increased involvement of China, on the other hand, increased the competition in the African region, which turned out well for the African economies (p. 3). Therefore, this thesis will question if there are other reasons behind the normative rhetoric of the EU to spread negative narratives about China's development policy in Africa.

This question is relevant for several reasons. A first reason is that the strong reactions by the EU changed the relationships between the EU and Africa and the EU and China (Wissenbach, 2009, p. 662). Since China is an important partner of the EU, the EU should not risk this relationship on a quarrel which is mainly based on believes within the EU than on reality.

Secondly, it will gain more insight in whether or not the accusations of the EU are grounded or not. If the EU has a negative perception of China's policies out of concern for Africa's development, they should be taken more seriously, than when the EU does it out of self-interest. Third, actors<sup>1</sup> outside the EU, might be influenced by the perception of the EU towards China. This would have a negative effect on the image of China.

In answering the research question, this thesis is structured as follows. The first section will consist of a methodology section in which the theory and practice of discourse analysis will be discussed. The second section will be an analysis about the perceptions towards China in Africa within the different organs of the EU, through time. In this analysis, several documents - mainly of the EU, European Council, European Parliament (EP), European Commission (EC) - will be used. These documents are different policy papers, reports, resolutions, reports of discussion, etcetera, ranging from 2005 until 2013. This thesis will solely discuss the European angle on this subject, thus, no Chinese literature will be used. Some secondary literature will be used in order to understand the political context in which these documents are produced and what political effects these text had. The third section will look at if the EU itself is any different from China and if it is such a benevolent donor as it claims. In doing so, there will be looked at what the interests of the EU are in giving financial aid to Africa. There will be discussed whether the concept of 'normative power Europe' is based on reality or rhetoric. The fourth section will look at the possibility if states could use a negative narrative of other states, in order to reach certain gains for themselves. The last section will be the conclusion of this thesis.

---

<sup>1</sup> In this thesis, the definition of 'actor' by Frieden et al. (2010) will be used: '[t]he basic unit for the analysis of international politics; can be individuals or groups of people with common interests' (p. A-1).

## Methods

The primary method in this thesis will be a discourse analysis. However, there are many forms of discourse analyses and different ideas about how a discourse analysis should be used. This section will discuss what kind of discourse analysis will be used in this thesis. It will discuss some pros and cons of this particular kind of discourse analysis and how it is applied in this thesis.

### Discourse Analysis

There are many ways in which ‘discourse’ can be defined. Foucault (2002) defines discourses as ‘practices that systematically form the object of which they speak’ (p. 54). By this he means that our language about a certain object, changes our knowledge about this object.

This thesis will be written from a post-structural perspective. Theory on this subject assumes that there are no such things as ‘universal truths or absolute ethical positions’ (Graham, 2011, p. 666). A discourse must be viewed ‘as a matter of the social, historical and political conditions under which statements come to count as true or false’ (Hook, 2008, p. 542). Thus, discourses are constructed by the social system, but they also ensure that the social system is reproduced. This is done by processes of domination, exclusion and selection (ibid., p. 522). Therefore, power is important in the shaping-process of what we regard as ‘the truth’ or knowledge. Hence, ‘truth’ can be reduced to a reflection of the most dominant constructions of knowledge. That power shapes common knowledge will be a basic assumption in this thesis.

Historical representations are central within discourse analysis. A historical representation is how the object under investigation ‘has been represented over time and space’ (Dunn, 2008, p. 79). The representations of this object become ‘knowledge’ or ‘regimes of truth’ as it is discursively produced, consumed and circulated by society (ibid.). Thus, a historical representation is the product of a discourse. Hence, in this thesis there will be looked at the historical representation of China by the EU. However, it will appear throughout this thesis, that it is not only important what the representation of China by the EU is, but also what the self-representation of the EU is.

### Pros and Cons of Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is a useful method in understanding how and why actors, objects or events are represented by actors. Although discourse analyses might provide some insight into a certain subject, it cannot give complete answers to a certain question. As Fairclough (2003) put it: ‘we

should assume that no analysis of a text can tell us all there is to be said about it – there is no such thing as a complete and definitive analysis of a text’ (p. 14). There are many facets within a text to which one can pay attention to. Thus, although this thesis might give a basic overview, it is far from a complete understanding about the interactions between the EU, China and Africa.

Additionally, it could be argued that the practice of discourse analysis is quite subjective. It is always open to interpretation and there can be a selection bias in the process. Therefore, one must bear in mind that the analysis of a researcher might always be influenced by its own social background.

Discourse analysis could enhance our understanding how common knowledge is a product of ‘truth’ constructions by power relations. However, as Milliken (1999) states, the field of ‘International Relations theory is one of the many sites of the production of common sense’ (p. 238). Thus, while it is a goal of discourse analysis to change the common sense of society, it simultaneously reinforces another common sense.

### Conducting a Discourse analysis

When conducting a discourse analysis, it is first necessary to select texts. As Neumann (2008) states, when reading secondary literature, it becomes apparent which texts are anchor points for the research topic (p. 67). Thus, secondary literature was first read as point of departure. Other texts were selected by searching on terms as ‘China’, ‘Africa’, ‘development policy’, etcetera, on various websites of different organs of the EU. There is always the possibility that not every text is included. However, as Neumann argues, this is not necessarily a problem, because ‘relatively few texts will constitute the main points of reference’ (p. 70).

A second step Neumann gives, is the mapping of representations. In this step, one has to identify the ‘various representations and possible asymmetries between them’ (ibid.). This is done by looking at how different organs within the EU represented the presence of China in Africa. In this step, it is not only important what is explicitly said in a text, but also what is implicitly mentioned and what is not said at all. There will be looked at how a certain use of words generates a representation of China and the EU itself.

Neumann’s third step is the layering of discourses. In this step, there will be demonstrated that representations ‘differ in historical depth, in variation, and in degree of dominance/marginalization in the discourse’ (p. 73). Herein, there must be questioned what ‘degree of social construction’ there exists between the relation of ‘representation’ and ‘fact’ (p. 74). The differences of what the EU says and what actually happens will be under investigation.

## Different Opinions within the EU

Before analyzing why the EU seems to be negative towards China in Africa, it is necessary to understand what this negative attitude might be and by whom it is constructed. This section will question what the different views among the different actors of the EU are through time. In answering this question, it will become clear which actors within the EU contributed to the negative historical representation of China in Africa.

### Opinions within the EU through Time

As Castillejo (2013) explains in a policy brief, the response of the EU towards China's increased role as a donor has not been coherent. It went from harsh criticism to ideas of broad collaboration between the donors and recipients (p. 2). Additionally, Huliaras argues that many journalists, academics and politicians tend to analyze the EU and China as a unitary actors, following clear-cut strategies towards Africa. This led to misinterpretations about how the interactions between China, Africa and the EU are (p. 425). Therefore, this paragraph will provide a more detailed overview of what the different perceptions of the different organs within the EU through time were.

Around the mid 2000's, China's interference in Africa became a topic on the EU agenda. In the EU strategy for Africa report of 2005, China's interference in Africa was mentioned a few times. In the paragraph *Geopolitical dynamics: areas of insecurity and centres of stability*, China was described as an emerging economy, which has become a provider of new export markets and important source of foreign investment. According to this report, China's engagement in Africa has to do with the strategic and political importance of the continent, together with its economic potential. It said that the interference of China - and other new external players such as Brazil or India - changed the geopolitical context, which 'poses new challenges and opportunities for the formulation and implementation of the EU's Africa policy' (European Commission, 2005, p. 10).

According to Castillejo (2013), it was in 2006 that the EU and China together discussed the development of the African countries on China-EU summits for the first time, but without concrete outcomes (p. 3). In a report about EU-China relations, Africa is only mentioned in the context of energy security. The EC states that the EU and China share a responsibility and common interest in ensuring the sustainability and security of energy supplies. Both parties are called to work together to increase international cooperation, in order 'to improve transparency and reliability of energy data and the exchange of information aimed at improving energy security

in developing countries, including Africa' (European Commission, 2006, p. 5). In the case of development policies, this report calls the EU and China to engage in a dialogue, and to be transparent about the activities and priorities of both China and the EU. In addition, it is recommended that they both support regional initiatives to improve African governance. It is further recommended to look for opportunities to integrate China in the international improvement of aid coordination and efficiency (ibid., p. 6). Notably, although the EC tells something about difficulties with divergent values with China (p. 4), these differences are not mentioned in relation with China's Africa policy.

However, these steps towards cooperation between China, the EU and Africa was not backed by the EP. In August 2007, the EP published a study – written by Holslag (2007) - which was critical about China's impact in Africa. In this report, *Chinese Resources and Energy Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa*, the EP argued that the energy and resources policy of China, undermined the 'conditional engagement approach<sup>[2]</sup> and the actorness<sup>[3]</sup> of the EU as an international player' (p. i). The EP argued that China involved in Africa in order to guarantee foreign supplies in the long-run, by combining free-trade policy with a 'realistic control-over-the-well approach' (p. 24). That the EP perceives China as a realist actor – which only acts out of self-interest - is confirmed by its use of words. For instance, it talks about 'China's Africa offensive' in describing China's quest for resources (p. 31). In addition, the perception of the EP of China as a self-interested actor also becomes clear when it argues that China is conducting its go-out strategy for resources on corrupt, repressive and weak regimes, because the Chinese companies face less competition from these states (p. 47).

At the 10<sup>th</sup> China-Africa Summit on 28 November 2007, both China and the EU had the intentions to continue their dialogue on Africa's development. According to the European Council (2007a), they both welcomed 'a more practical cooperation by the two sides through their respective existing cooperation mechanism with Africa'. With existing cooperation mechanisms they mean the EU-Africa Summit and the Forum on China-Africa cooperation (p. 5).

In the same year, on December 9, the European Council published *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*. In this report, it is stated that the partnership between the EU and Africa 'will be based on a Euro-African consensus on values, common interest and

---

<sup>2</sup> This entails that the aid the EU provides, is tied to some conditions, for example the condition that the recipient country should implement certain democratic principles.

<sup>3</sup> Actorness can be defined as 'the ability to function actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system (Smith, 2008, p. 25 cited in Greiçevci, 2011, p. 285).

common strategic objectives' (2007b, p. 2). Some of these values mentioned are 'human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law' (ibid.). With this report, European Council seems to promote the idea that it is a benevolent donor. In addition, another objective was to 'promote more accurate images of each other, in place of those that are dominated by inherited negative stereotypes and that ignore the overwhelmingly positive developments on the two continents' (p. 4). This also implies that the EU wants to maintain its positive image. The report also stated that the EU needed to shift from traditional relationships to a 'real partnership' which is characterized by 'equality and the pursuit of common objectives' (p. 4). Thus, this means that it gradually shifts from 'aid' to 'trade' policies in Africa. It does not seem to be the case that the Council has a negative stance towards the 'emerging' donors. Rather, it states that both the EU and Africa recognize 'the need to broaden their cooperation with third partners through enhanced tripartite dialogue' (p. 14). It is said that this is needed 'to ensure coherence and complementarity with the work of other international actors' (ibid.).

On 28 March 2008, Member of Parliament (MEP), Ana Maria Gomes – member of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PSE Group) - drafted a report named *China's policy and its effects on Africa* (Gomes, 2008). In order to cope with the increased involvement of China in Africa, this report proposed that a dialogue with China on Africa would be useful. However, it was stressed that such a response to the 'new challenges raised by emerging donors in Africa (...) must not attempt to emulate China's methods and aims, since that would not necessarily be compatible with the EU's values, principles and long-term interests' (ibid., p. 11). Notably, it was stressed in the report that the EU should have a constructive and open attitude towards China, without imposing European views and models (p. 12). However, later on it is suggested that the EU should encourage China to adopt similar principles regarding control of illegal trades of timber and ivory (p. 14). In addition, it urges China to act responsibly towards its ecological impact in Africa (p. 16) and it urges China to respect the principles of human rights, democracy and good governance in their relationship with Africa (p. 18). It is stated that China's policy of no-strings attached, hinders improvements in good governance, human rights and democratic progress. Thus, although the report proposes a dialogue with China, the negative perception towards China's engagement in Africa, shimmers through the text. In this report, it is assumed that China's main driver to engage in Africa is its quest for oil and other natural resources, and new markets. Africa is attractive for China, because the African countries do not have the capacity to control their own natural resources, since there are barely regulatory constraints. Beside the

economic strategic interest, it is believed that China also ‘seeks to reinforce political leverage, gather endorsement for the “one China policy” and profile itself as a global power’ (ibid., p. 21).

This report led to a discussion on April 22, 2008, which is written down in the report *Debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law*. In this debate, the differences in opinion between the EP and EC are clear. The views shared by the MEP towards China in Africa are quite negative. Most of them view China as a (neo)colonial power, which exploits Africa’s natural resources and does not pay attention to democracy, human rights and good governance, in its no-strings attached non-transparent development policy. However, Member of the Commission Louis Michel, took a more understanding attitude towards China’s policy in Africa. For instance, he acknowledged that China has strategic, economic and diplomatic interests in Africa, but he also pointed out that ‘Europe has all too often made the mistake of not admitting that it is tempted by the same thing’ (2008a, p. 176). He also agrees that China lacks attention to democracy, rule of law and governance. What makes his opinion different in this, is that the MEP see these points as a condition for a dialogue with China, whereas Mr. Michel proposes that these points can be stipulated within a dialogue with China (p. 174). First a dialogue, then a discussion about certain norms, instead of the other way around.

Eventually, the report by Ana Maria Gomes changed into a resolution which was agreed upon on 23 April 2008, by the EP. According to Carbone (2011), this resolution was a setback in the process of constructive engagement with China. The European Parliament saw China as a ‘competitor’ (Carbone, 2011, p. 212). For instance, in this resolution it was mentioned that the EU is in ‘competition with other donor nations’ (2008b, p. 8). In order to position itself vis-à-vis its ‘competitors’ it was recommended to offer aid which is ‘qualitatively more attractive’ (ibid). It also accused China of using aid-for-oil strategies (ibid., p. 5). In addition, it did not want the EU to engage in trilateral cooperation with China and Africa, if they had to compromise about human rights and democracy issues (Carbone, 2011, p. 212-213). The adopted resolution referred to the principle of solidarity and the aspiration of the EU to be a normative power. For example, it is recommended to ‘persuade Chinese authorities to encourage national banks to adopt the “Equator Principles” on social and environmental standards’, ‘encourage China to voluntarily adopt the provisions of the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention’, ‘encourage China to ratify the ILO [International Labour Organization] Conventions’ (p. 14), and so on. These recommendations are likely to enhance the EU’s normative image, which will be discussed in the following section. This report caused a ‘we-they’ feeling, implicitly identifying China as a major threat and the EU as a benevolent donor (ibid., p. 213).

The European Commission took a more constructive approach, and published a report naming *The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation*, on October, 17, 2008. Notably, this report does not discuss the importance of values and principles of the EU in its development policy. The report proposes a more pragmatic way of cooperation between China, the EU and Africa (p. 5). The concrete objectives of trilateral cooperation mentioned in this report, lie in the areas of peace and security, infrastructure, sustainable management of natural resources and the environment and food security and agriculture (p. 5-6). However, this report was criticized by the European Economic Social Committee and the European Parliament. Their critique mainly sprung from the argument that democracy and human rights should have a central role in any trilateral process. In addition, Chinese officials thought that the report of the European Commission 'was an attempt to 'sociali[z]e' China', and African policymakers perceived it as 'an attempt at big power collusion over Africa'. Thus, the proposal was put aside (Castillejo, 2013, p. 3).

In the report *Trade and Economic Relations with China* of 2009 - written by Wortmann-Kool (2009) on behalf of the EP Committee on International Trade - the EP took a more positive attitude to the EC's attempt to engage in trilateral cooperation. In regards to China's pursuit of natural and energy resources, it welcomes the report *EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation* (p. 20). However, the EP still mentioned its concern about China's 'lack of any reference to existing social, environmental and human rights standards for foreign investments'. (p. 24). In addition, it wanted a dialogue between the EU, China and Africa, to make the activities regarding the exploitation of natural resources by China more transparent (ibid.). Also, it called on China to increase its Official Development Assistance in relation to agriculture, infrastructure and health sectors. Additionally, more coordination between Chinese and EU aid would lead to more efficient use of aid (p. 25). Thus, in this report, the EP does want to cooperate with China, but still takes a patronizing attitude.

In 2010, the House of Lords European Union Committee published the report *Stars and Dragons: The EU and China*. In contrast with the EP, the Committee has a much more clear believe that China's engagement in Africa might endanger EU interests. It states:

China's worldwide search for resources to feed its economic development has implications for the EU's own economic and industrial needs. The EU must monitor Chinese commodity deals, whether on food, minerals or energy resources, to ensure that Europe's strategic interests and access to global resources are safeguarded (p. 67)

Still, in 2011, the EP saw China's export finance activities with African countries as a way to secure access to new markets and natural resources. In addition, China's activities were seen as an instrument to enhance its influence in these countries to become a 'global superpower' (Massa, on behalf of the European Parliament, 2011, p. 17). And because China is not a member of the OECD community, it does not have to comply with its rules about social, economic and environmental standards. Thus, it was said that Chinese exporters have an unfair advantage compared with their competitors from Western countries (ibid.). These arguments were still present in the 2012 report *EU and China: Unbalanced Trade?* (De Sarnez on behalf of the European Parliament Committee on Trade, 2012). Although in the 2013 resolution *EU-China relations*, the EP welcomed China's 'current open promotion of a diversification of its activities on the African continent', it was still critical about its disregards to human rights and security (European Parliament, 2013, p. 14). Hence, although the opinion of the EP seems to have become somewhat moderate, it is still critical on the same points about values and principles.

Thus, the perception of the EU towards the policies of China in Africa is not based on a shared consensus between its different institutions. Mainly the EP seemed to have concerns about China in Africa. Its criticism is mainly based on the fact that China has a no-strings attached policy. In contrast with the EU, it does not pay attention to the promotion of human rights, good governance and democracy. The EC is also critical about China's Africa policy, but in a much more moderate way. In the view of the EC, the EU cannot afford to be too critical towards China's policy. Probably because China is an important ally for the EU. Thus, it seems useful to focus the rest of the thesis on the European Parliament's attitude towards China in Africa, instead on the EU as a whole.

### **Views of the Different Parties and MEPs**

Remarkable is that the views between the different MEPs and parties did not differ greatly. For instance, only sixteen MEPs voted against the report of Ana Maria Gomes of 2008, against the 618 MEPs who voted in favor. Seventeen of the MEPs did not vote at all (European Parliament, 2008c, p. 1). It is, however, nowhere explicitly mentioned which MEPs voted against the adaptation of this report.

In a debate report of 2008, there are some slight differences in opinion between the MEP's. In this debate, 31 MEP's – rapporteur Ana Maria Gomes excluded – of six different parties participated. Almost all MEPs are concerned about China's lack of respect to democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance (p. 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 191,

192) and its access to raw materials (p. 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 186, 187, 192, 193). However, they differ in how to react towards the increased engagement of China. Some suggest that cooperation with China in Africa is needed, while others are reluctant to work with this self-interested donor, which does not comply to the European norms. Remarkably, within parties the opinions are not coherently shaped. For instance, Karin Saks of the PSE Group believes that cooperation with China is not possible (p. 185). At the same time, her party-member Józef Pinoir argues that he 'would like to see China as a real partner of the European Union in the process of globalisation' (p. 178). Thus, while there were some differences of opinions between the MEPs, there were no substantial differences between parties.

## Normative Power Europe?

From the previous section appeared that mainly the EP constantly uses the narrative of norms and values in blocking trilateral cooperation between China, the EU and Africa. It was not willing to engage in trilateral cooperation, because China refused to align its policy with the norms and values of the EU. However, it is questionable whether the EU itself is such a benevolent donor. This section will question the notion of 'normative power Europe' and will argue that this self-identity is used in order to protect certain interests of the EU.

### Use of Norms and Values

According to Manners (2002), Europe can be identified as a normative power in international relations. Normative power can be viewed as 'the ability to define what passes for 'normal' in world politics' (p. 236). By pursuing immaterial aspects, such as status and reputation states can generate normative power (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2009, p. 83). In its purest form, normative power is without other forms of power, such as physical force or material incentives (Manners, 2009, p. 10). This concept 'acknowledges the normative foundations of Europe's supranational project and the EU's apparent predisposition to act in accordance with embedded ethical principles concerning human well-being' (Langan, 2011, p. 244). According to Manners (2002), the normative basis of the EU consists of five core norms, namely, peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and 'respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms' (p. 242, emphasis in the original). Manners also discusses four 'minor' norms, which are: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (p. 242-243).

However, the idea that the EU is a normative or ethical power, rests on the assumption that universal values and norms exist. As Hyde-Price (2008) explains, states with power-maximizing or hegemonic goals tend to use this universalist language to cover their own national interests (Hyde-Price, 2008, p. 33). Langan (2012) also argues that the concept of 'normative power Europe' can rather be seen as the ability of the EU to achieve commercial or geopolitical interests. It uses moral narratives to legitimize its actions in the relations with its 'external partners' (p. 244-245). He claims that the practices of the EU should be framed in the light of a 'moral economy'. He defines this concept as 'both the study of how moral norms are infused within economic structures and possibly work to shape, veil, or legitimise economic practices – as well as to the object of study of this analysis, that is to instituted moral economies' (p. 250). This is in contrast with Manners' notion of normative power, since the concept of moral economy

assumes that norm-laden ideas of policy are not necessarily moral in their outcomes. Instead, in a moral economy, the actor is aware of how moralities can be used to obscure present power relations. Moralities can help to maintain the ‘economic systems that have negative outcomes for those whom economic activity is nominally supposed to serve’ (p. 251). From a moral economy perspective, there is no ‘reductive binary opposition’ between self-interest and ethical or moral norms (p. 252).

According to Langan, this is especially true in the case of EU’s development policy in Africa. During the historical course of the Africa-EU ties, the moral economy of these ties has been core legitimizing the EU’s norms which relate to its ‘duty to help ‘the poor’” and to facilitate development for them. Other norms are compensation for its colonial past and social and economic solidarity towards economic less developed countries (Langan, 2012, p. 254). These norms have become the foundation of the ‘instituted moral economy’ of Africa-EU cooperation. They are seemingly ‘ethical parameters’ and aims for an effective economic relation between these ‘partners’ (Langan, 2012, p. 254). However, the moral economy was not a moral economy in the sense that norms were purely institutionalized, from an altruistic motivation. Langan states that in EU-Africa relations, ‘moral norms are often used to perpetuate and entrench European interests which are pursued at the expense of nominal ethical drivers’ (p. 265). The true nature of ‘normative power Europe’ is the capability to utilize ethical norms in the self-rationalization and public legitimization of the pursuit of geopolitical and economic interests abroad (p. 254). For instance, as Youngs (2004) claims, some governments in the EU believe that the EU’s external operations gain legitimacy from its citizens when they are carried out to defend European values (p. 417). Citizens will believe that the use of force by the EU lacks ‘dubious interest’ which in the past drove interventions by states alone (p. 417-418). In addition, the adaptation of normative aspects in its external policy will lead to a decrease in pressure from non-governmental organizations (p. 418). This might explain why the EP in particular is negative towards China in Africa. Since it is a parliament, it is important for the different parties to preach what the people want. This increases the chance that a party gets reelected.

### **Interests in Africa**

If the EU really uses moral narratives to legitimize its actions and secure its interest in Africa, the EU must have some interests in Africa which it wants to protect. Thus, this paragraph will discuss which interests drove the EU in giving financial aid to Africa.

From the beginning, the development policies of the EU were based on self-interest. During the period of decolonization, the EU-Africa relations were established because some member states wanted to keep their formal ties with former colonies. They wanted to retain access to natural resources and raw materials and to protect their investments in these countries (Farell, 2005, p. 266). In addition, the economic ties with Africa would also expand the export markets of Europe (van Reisen, 2007, p. 31).

In order to retain its influences on its former colonies, the EU established the Lomé Convention in 1975 (Zanger, 2000, p. 300). The most important characteristics of the Convention were the non-reciprocity in trade preferences in the export from the ACP countries to the European countries; ideas of mutual interest, sovereignty and equality; each state has the right to determine its policies; and, 'security of relations based on the achievements of the cooperation system' (European Commission, 2012a). Strikingly, these points are to a high extent congruent with the China's *Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance*, as formulated on January 1964. Comparable principles are: equality and mutual benefit; sovereignty and no-conditions or privileges attached; independent economic development and self-reliance (Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, 2012).

Nowadays, the EU's external development action is mainly based on *The European Consensus on Development* (European Commission, 2012b). In this statement, the primary objective of the EU's development cooperation is stated as the 'eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)' (ibid.). Development is seen as a primary goal by itself and is regarded as sustainable when it includes human rights, good governance and economic, environmental, political and social aspects (ibid., p. 5).

Although norms and values have become central in its rhetoric around development policy, it is likely that the EU still gives development aid to safeguard certain interests. As Younas (2008) claims, aid could be used to secure trade benefits. It could enhance the goodwill of the recipient country, which will make the recipients more inclined to import more products of the donor country (p. 662). Using aid to secure trade benefits, might be done by the EU, since it has important economic interests in Africa. According to Olivier (2011), about one-third of all the exports from the EU go to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the imports of the EU make up more than one fifth of the total export of these resource rich countries. Primarily Africa is important for the EU, since it relies on the relative inexpensive oil and raw materials it exports (p. 54). Moreover, in a report by the European Union Committee (2010), it is

said that the EU promotes good governance in order to ensure ‘a level playing field for European companies’ (p. 68). Thus, behind the altruistic narrative of implementing certain norms and values, there are economic interests for the EU itself.

Besides the economic interests, there are also political interests for the EU. Namely, the EU might gain soft power by giving development aid to African countries. Soft power can be defined as ‘the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes’ (Nye, 2011, p. 20-21). It differs from normative power, since it is not founded upon certain norms and values. As the EC (2009) itself acknowledges, external development assistance is an important component of the international influence of the EU and ‘effective instruments of its soft power’ (p. 18).

### Interests in Danger

Some MEPs see the interference of China in Africa as a threat to the economic interests of the EU, which might explain why it is negative towards China in Africa. For example, MEP Colm Burke, of the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (PPE-DE) Group, states that corrupt leaders in Africa prefer the lucrative deals of China, which do not impose any conditions, leaving the EU out (European Parliament, 2008a, p. 185-186). Zbigniew Krzysztof Kuźmiuk of the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) Group, shares this opinion. He states that the aid that is offered by the EU should be linked to an expansion of its trade relation with the African countries (p. 187). Thus, this suggests that aid is given by the EU in order to secure favorable trade relations with African countries. The MEP fears that the tightened China-Africa relationship could cause a decay in the EU-Africa trade relation.

Zita Pleštinská (PPE-DE Group) also had concerns regarding the effects of China’s aid policy on EU-Africa trade. She called China’s ambition to become Africa’s most important trading partner ‘a serious challenge for the EU’ (ibid.). This idea is also adopted in the EP’s resolution about China in Africa of 2008, wherein the EP states that it ‘[t]akes the view that, given China’s engagement in Africa, cooperation with Africa in the field of the EU’s external energy policy should be given greater significance’ (p. 10). It seems like the EP holds the view that it is competing for favorable trade circumstances with China in Africa. As the resolution also mentioned, the EP recognizes that the economic investment of the EU is ‘at a competitive disadvantage in Africa due to hidden subsidizing of Chinese projects and offers made by the

Chinese government - or wholly state-owned companies -, to higher costs caused by social and economic standards which Chinese competitors do not meet, to tied Chinese aid which prevents European companies from joining projects financed by Chinese aid and to limited access to financing and investment risk coverage instruments for European companies' (2008a, p. 16). Some MEPs do even seem to think that the Chinese 'steal' resources which are 'theirs'. For instance, Paul Marie Coûteaux from the Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) Group argued that China was 'gaining control over our staple commodities'.

Thus, it is more likely that the EP had a negative perception towards China in Africa, because it feared for its own interest, than it was concerned about China's lack human rights, good governance and democracy. After all, in reality its own development policy is also mainly focused on securing its own interests in Africa.

## Spreading a Narrative: A Political Tool?

As appeared from section two, mainly the EP was against trilateral cooperation with China and Africa, mainly by using idealist narratives about human rights and democracy issues. However, as argued in section three, the EU's development policy is probably more focused on self-interest than it is on normative aspects. Thus, the stance of the EU that China is a 'rogue' donor, is not based on its normative basis, but on its normative narrative. This section will argue that the EU uses this negative perception of China in Africa, in order to enhance its own image. This might protect certain interests which are discussed in the previous section.

### Identity Politics

As noted earlier, if states enhance their reputation or image, their soft power might increase. Thus, it is beneficial for countries to have a high reputation or positive image. Hence, the self-representation of the EU as a normative actor, might have important benefits. In the same vein, representing China as a 'rogue' donor, might be a strategy for the EP to decrease China's soft power in the region of Africa. This would make the EU a more attractive donor, and thereby, the EU can protect its interests in the region.

This claim can be supported by Diez (2005). As Diez argues, 'the narrative of 'normative power Europe' constructs the EU's identity as well as the identity of the EU's others in ways which allow EU actors to disregard their own shortcomings unless a degree of self-reflexivity is inserted' (p. 626-627). In other words, by presenting itself as a 'normative power' the EU is not only constructing an image of itself, but also what others are not. This allows the EU to feel and presenting itself 'better' than others. Diez (2005) mentions several strategies of constructing the 'self' and the 'other' in international politics. One of these could be applicable to the EP, namely the representing of the other as violating universal principles. Here, the standards of the self are presented as universally valid. This has the 'consequence that the other should be convinced or otherwise brought to accept the principles of the self' (p. 628). According to Scheipers & Sicurelli (2008), this 'mechanism of 'othering' is central in the construction of the EU's identity as a normative power in its external relations' (p. 610). As noted earlier, the EP held the view that China's aid competes with traditional aid. Thus, in making the Chinese aid less attractive, the EU could enhance its own status as an important development aid power, securing certain self-interested gains, discussed in the previous section. However, this theory of constructing images of the self and the other, has never been coupled to perception of the EU regarding China-Africa relations.

The following will discuss this theory. First, it will look at how the EU portrays itself. It constructs a certain self-identity, through which it might gain soft power, and eventually, secure its interests in Africa. Second, there will be discussed how the EU simultaneously constructs identities of the other, and how it uses its narratives to enforce these identities.

### Constructing the Self

Africa has always played an important role in shaping the ‘normative’ identity of the EU. According to Hengari (2012), ‘Africa has been, since the beginning of the European integration, an important part of the external identity of Europe’ (p. 2). The Schuman Declaration of 1950 stated that the development of Africa, is one of Europe’s essential tasks. The adoption of concerns about Africa in this declaration, was mainly the result of a colonial history between certain European countries and African countries (p. 1).

As said in the previous paragraph, in order to promote its identity, it could be that the EU promotes its values and ideas as universal applicable. This is certainly the case. For instance, on the website of EuropeAid of the EC it is stated that ‘[t]he European Union believes that democracy and human rights are universal values that should be vigorously promoted around the world. They are integral to effective work on poverty alleviation and conflict prevention and resolution (...)’ (European Commission, 2012c).

Besides promoting its ideas and values as universal applicable, the EP also portrays itself as a distinctive normative actor. Take for example the following quote by Zbigniew Krzysztof Kuźmiuk of the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) Group:

Over the past 15 years, the value of trade between China and Africa has increased 20 times over. It looks as if the European Union is not in a position to counter this expansion. We therefore need to encourage China to ensure that its economic involvement in Africa includes a social and an environmental aspect, as well as maintenance of democratic standards. The European Union should keep tabs on China’s expansion in Africa. We do, after all, continue to be the greatest donor to African countries (p. 187)

How the MEP phrases his argumentation, is important for the message the text generates. By saying that the EU ‘should keep tabs on China’s expansion in Africa’, it stages itself as a kind of watchdog of global affairs. In addition, it presents China as a unitary actor, although its development policy involves various actors.

The following quote by Konrad Szymanski (UEN Group) also illustrates that the MEP regards the EU as a distinctive actor in international relations:

Today we have to concede that Europe is powerless in this situation. Of course we can follow up the Commissioner's appeals and bin the OECD's principles as regards corruption and public finances, and then we can do the same with other international understandings. Finally, we can even bin the United Nations Charter, but in that case we shall cease to know what our role in world politics is based on, and in what way we differ from other players in world politics. (p. 179)

The MEP claims that certain norms and values which the EU uphold, makes the EU a distinctive actor in world politics. He does not state, however, why this is important for the EU.

That the EU uses its external actions in Africa as a way to enhance its reputation, could be evidenced with the visibility reports of the EC. In these reports, the EC evaluates how the image of the EU is promoted with its external actions. These reports make it clear that the EU does want to promote a certain image of itself. Otherwise, it would not take the time to write such reports. In addition, some statements in the reports support the argument that the EU wants to construct a positive image of itself, such as following statement: 'The public image of the EU's external action is substantially in line with what the EU itself has sought to promote' (European Commission, 2012, p. 2). It also becomes clear from these reports, that the EU is not always keen on cooperating with other institutions or governments:

Partnerships with other organisations (UN, governments, NGOs, etc.) are vital in EU external action, but there is a trade-off as visibility then needs to be shared. This remains a source of tension and too much insistence being put on EU visibility can undermine the effectiveness of the cooperation and the sense of ownership felt by partners' (ibid.).

Perhaps, working together with China would lead to a too large decrease of its visibility, since China has become an important actor for Africa's development. In order to ensure that China would not take away the EU's status as the most important development actor in Africa, it could construct images of the 'other'.

### **Constructing the Other**

Constructing a negative narrative around China's policy in Africa is done in several ways. First, the documents of the different institutions of the EU could affect the opinions of other actors. As appeared throughout the documents, the MEPs often used a lot of subjective expressions in their speeches about China's actions in Africa. Words such as '(neo)colonialism' (European Parliament, 2008a, p. 183, 187, 191), the Chinese 'hunger' or 'thirst' for raw materials and oil (ibid., p. 193, 184), 'stealing' and 'plundering' of raw materials (ibid., p. 188, 184), are often used. These words shape a certain image of China's trade and aid policy. It portrays China as an

‘abnormal’ actor, which does not comply to ‘universal’ principles. Namely, the use of these negative and subjective words to describe its interference in Africa, the EP simultaneously dissociates the EU’s policy from that of China’s. It takes its own normative narrative as ‘normal’, and therefore, China’s policy is simultaneously portrayed as abnormal.

Another example of a subjective rhetoric about China in Africa is the following quote by Paul Marie Coûteaux from the Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) Group:

[China] is making a laughing stock of the whole world, because it knows that the world is market-led and that it covets the Chinese market. Therefore, it does exactly what it wants. Its domination will be all the more complete since, through political cunning, the Chinese government has managed to outmanoeuvre Europe, Mr Michel, to get to Africa, thus gaining control of our staple commodities. Who can blame it? It is only profiting from our weakness, not least of all the stupid and dangerous disengagement of Europe, and France in particular, from a continent which will become increasingly important to us in the 21st century (European Parliament, 2008a, p. 180)

Notably, the MEP talks about ‘our staple commodities’ instead calling it the African commodities, for instance. Thus, although some of the MEPs accusing China of neocolonialism, this quote illustrates that the EU is not any better. Thus, behind the normative narrative of solidarity lie economic interests in the EU’s development policy. What is also remarkable about this quote – in particular, the first sentence –, is that the MEP places China in opposition against the world. He transforms the problems the EU has with China in Africa into a problem which concerns the whole world. Thereby, he implicitly states that the ideas of the EU are universal, and China goes against this. China is portrayed as the ‘bully’ in the international community, when the MEP says that China ‘is making a laughing stock of the whole world’. In addition, using the words ‘political cunning’ is also a quite subjective way of saying ‘diplomacy’.

Remarkable is a statement in the EP’s report *China’s policy and its effects on Africa* (2008a). It contains the following: ‘When engagement does not work, the EU should not underestimate the power of privately and publicly criticising China’ (p. 24). This sentence makes clear that the EP tries to exert soft power on China. It proposes to engage with China in their development policies. However, the report states that China has to comply with the values of the EU, or otherwise, the cooperation will not continue. If China does not want to comply with those values, the cooperation will not continue. And if the cooperation will not continue, it will publicly and privately criticize China. The EP assumes that this will lead China to comply with the norms of the EU. In saying that ‘the EU should not underestimate the power’ of spreading these narratives, it seems as if the EP knows that it can use such narratives in order to put China under pressure. The EP knows that shaping a certain image of China would change the perception of

the international community towards China in Africa. Thus, the EP itself is well aware of the effect its rhetoric can have on other actors.

## Conclusion

This thesis discussed if there are other reasons behind the normative rhetoric of the EU to spread negative narratives about China's development policy in Africa.

First, the different opinions regarding China-Africa relations of the different organs within the EU were discussed since 2005. It appeared that the EP had the most persistent negative rhetoric towards China's involvement in Africa. This narrative was mainly centered around China's lack of respect for the (European) principles of human rights, democracy and good governance or the rule of law.

However, in the section that followed, it was argued that the development policy of the EU is also not based on altruistic concerns. Behind the normative rhetoric of solidarity, norms and values, lie some hard interests in its development policy. It was claimed that the concept of 'normative power Europe' can better be understood as a 'moral economy'; the EU uses a normative narrative to cover up certain interest. Implementing a narrative of norms and values legitimizes certain external actions. However, these interests are threatened by China's involvement in Africa.

In the section *Spreading a Narrative: A Political Tool?* it was argued that the EP perhaps tried to construct a negative representation of China in order to safeguard its own interests in Africa. By constructing images of the benevolent donor (the 'self') and realistic, self-interested images of the 'other', it tries to make the 'self' a more attractive donor. In addition, the EP represents its own values as universal, which simultaneously means that China is a 'abnormal' actor in its foreign policy. Thereby, the EU could gain normative power, which allows the EU to safeguard its interests in Africa.

In sum, the EP portrays China as a self-interested donor in its relation with Africa, while the EU's policy is not any better. The EP probably does so, in order to maintain its image as a 'normative power'. This generates economic and political benefits.

# Literature

## Primary Sources

Chinese Government's Official Web Portal. (2012). *Full Text: China's Foreign Aid*. Retrieved June 19, 2014, from [http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-04/21/content\\_1849913\\_10.htm](http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913_10.htm)

De Sarnez, M. (2012). *EU and China: Unbalanced Trade?* Brussels: European Parliament Committee on International Trade.

European Commission. (2005). *EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development*. Brussels: Author.

European Commission. (2006). *EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities*. Brussels: Author.

European Commission. (2008). *The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation*. Brussels: Author.

European Commission. (2009). *Annual Report on the European Community's Development and External Assistance Policies*. Brussels: EuropeAid Co-operation Office.

European Commission. (2012a). *From Lomé I to IV*. Retrieved June 27, 2014, from [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/lome-convention/lomeitoiv\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/lome-convention/lomeitoiv_en.htm)

European Commission. (2012b). *Development Policies*. Retrieved June 22, 2014, from [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/index_en.htm)

European Commission. (2012c). *Human rights and democracy*. Retrieved June 26, 2014, from [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm)

European Commission. (2012d). *Thematic Evaluation of the Visibility of EU external action 2005-2010*. Retrieved June 15, 2014, from [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation\\_reports/reports/2012/1307-summary.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2012/1307-summary.pdf)

European Commission. (2014). *Development and cooperation: Fighting poverty in a changing world*. Brussels: Author.

European Commission. (2014). *EU Aid Explorer*. Retrieved June 8, 2014, from <https://euaidexplorer.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>

European Council. (2007a). *10<sup>th</sup> China-EU Summit: Beijing, 28 November 2007: Joint Statement*. Brussels: Press Office.

European Council. (2007b). *The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy*. Lisbon: Press Office.

European Parliament. (2008a). *Debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law*. Strasbourg: Author.

European Parliament. (2008b). *China's policy and its effects on Africa. European Parliament resolution of 23 April 2008 on China's policy and its effects on Africa*. Strasbourg: Author.

European Parliament. (2008c). *Statistics: Results of vote in Parliament*. Strasbourg: Author.

European Parliament. (2013). *EU-China relations. European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2013 on EU-China relations*. Strasbourg: Author.

Gomes, A. M. (2008). *China's policy and its effects on Africa*. Brussels: European Parliament.

Holslag, J. (2007). *Chinese Resources and Energy Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Brussels: European Parliament.

House of Lords European Union Committee. (2010). *Stars and Dragons: The EU and China*. London: The Stationery Office Limited.

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. (2011). *White Paper on Foreign Aid*. Retrieved 27 June, 2014, from [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_7116362.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7116362.htm)

Massa, I. (2011). *Export Finance Activities by the Chinese Government*. Brussels: European Parliament.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (n. d.). *China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence*. Retrieved June 27, 2014, from [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/ziliao\\_665539/3602\\_665543/3604\\_665547/t18053.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml)

Morazán, P., Knoke, I., Knoblauch, D., & Schäfer, T. (2012). *The Role of BRICS in the Developing World*. Brussels: European Union.

OECD. (2012, April 4). *Development: Aid to developing countries falls because of global recession*. Retrieved September 27, 2013, from <http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/developmentaidtodevelopingcountriesfallsbecauseofglobalrecession.html>

Wortmann-Kool, C. (2009). *Trade and Economic Relations with China*. Strasbourg: European Parliament Committee on International Trade.

## Secondary Sources

Abrahamsen, R. (2004). The power of partnerships in global governance. *Third World Quarterly*, 25(8), 1453-1467.

Anshan, L. (2007). China and Africa: Policy and Challenges. *China Security*, 3(3), 69-93.

Carbone, M. (2011). The European Union and China's rise in Africa: Competing visions, external coherence and trilateral cooperation. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29(2), 203-221.

Castillejo, C. (2013). *Engaging China – on development* (No. 151). Madrid: Fride – A European Think Thank for Global Action.

Condon, M. (2012). China in Africa: What the Policy of Nonintervention Adds to the Western Development Dilemma. *PRAXIS The Fletcher Journal of Human Security*, 17, 5-25.

Diez, T. (2005). Constructing the Self and Changing the Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 33, 613-636.

Dunn, K. C. (2008). Historical Representations. In A. Klotz & D. Prakash (Eds.), *Qualitative methods in international relations: a pluralist guide* (pp. 78-92). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and text: linguistic and intertextual analysis within discourse analysis. *Discourse & Society*, 3(2), 193-217.

Farell, M. (2005). A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation Between the European Union and Africa. *Journal of European Integration*, 27(3), 263-283.

Foucault, M. (2002). *L'Archeologie du savoir [The Archaeology of Knowledge]*. London: Routledge.

Frieden, J. A., Lake, D. A., & Schultz, K. A. (2010). *World Politics: interests, interactions, institutions*. New York: Norton & Company.

Goldstein, J. S., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2009). *Principles of International Relations*. United States: Pearson.

Graham, L. J. (2011). The Product of Text and 'Other' Statements: Discourse analysis and the critical use of Foucault. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 43(6), 663-674.

Greißeveci, L. (2011). EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 12(3), 283-303.

Hall, R. (2011). Land grabbing in Southern Africa: the many faces of the investor rush. *Review of African Political Economy*, 38(128), 193-214.

Hengari, A. T. (2012). The European Union and global emerging powers in Africa: Containment, competition or cooperation? *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 19(1), 1-24.

Hook, D. (2001). Discourse, Knowledge, Materiality, History: Foucault and Discourse Analysis. *Theory & Psychology*, 11(4), 521-547.

Huliaras, A. (2012). The Illusion of Unitary Players and the Fallacy of Geopolitical Rivalry: The European Union and China in Africa. *The Round Table*, 101(5), 425-434.

Hyde-Price, A. (2008). A 'tragic actor'? A realist perspective on 'ethical power Europe'. *International Affairs*, 84(1), 29-44.

Kohnert, D. (2008). *EU-African economic relations: Continuing dominance, traded for aid?* (No. 82). Hamburg: GIGA Working Papers.

Langan, M. (2012). Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa-EU Ties: A Conceptual Reorientation of 'Normative Power'. *New Political Economy*, 17(3), 243-270.

Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), 235-258.

Manners, I. (2009). The EU's Normative Power in Changing World Politics. In A. Gerrits (Eds.), *Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion* (pp. 9-24). Den Haag: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

Milliken, J. (1999). The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods. *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(2), 225-254.

Neumann, I. B. (2008). Discourse Analysis. In A. Klotz & D. Prakash (Eds.), *Qualitative methods in international relations: a pluralist guide* (pp. 61-77). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nye, J. S. (2011). *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs.

Sachs, W. (1999). *Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment & Development*. London: Zed Books.

Scheipers, S., & Sicurelli, D. (2008). Empowering Africa: normative power in EU-Africa relations. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(4), 607-623.

Tull, D. M. (2006). China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 44(3), 459-479.

Tull, D. M. (2008). *China in Africa: European Perceptions and Responses to the Chinese Challenge*. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

van Reisen, M. (2007). The Enlarged European Union and the Developing World: What Future? In A. Mold (Eds.), *EU Development Policy in a Changing World: Challenges for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (pp. 29-65). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Wissenbach, U. (2009). The EU's Response to China's Africa Safari: Can Triangular Co-operation Match Needs? *European Journal of Development Research*, 21(4), 662-674.

Younas, J. (2008). Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 24, 661-674.

Youngs, R. (2004). Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(2), 415-435.

Zanger, S. C. (2000). Good Governance and European Aid: The Impact of Political Conditionality. *European Union Politics*, 1(3), 293-317.