THE REFUGEE RACE:

BURDEN-SHARING IN EUROPE DURING THE HUNGARIAN REFUGEE CRISIS OF 1956

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Introduction

"Refugee policy has always been at least one part state interest, and at most one part compassion."[1] Yet, in contemporary Europe, compassion sometimes seems hard to find, and the idea of 'burden-sharing' seems to send shivers down the spines of many state leaders. Since 2015, large influxes of refugees from the Middle-East and African regions have made their way to the borders of the European Union (EU), fleeing war, conflict, poverty and climate change. In response, most member states have put enormous efforts into securitizing their borders in order to minimize the number of refugees and asylum seekers entering their countries. Many countries are able to carefully select the maximum numbers of refugees they want to let in, while first countries of arrival such as Greece and Italy often do not have this option. International cooperation has proven to be a difficult task when it comes to dealing with this so-called 'refugee crisis.' However, history tells us that this has not always been the case.

In October 1956, Soviet occupiers brutally put an end to the revolution in Hungary that started earlier that year. For thirteen days, the streets of Budapest were a battlefield with tens of thousands of wounded and in which thousands lost their lives. Approximately 200,000 Hungarians saw no other option than to flee their homes and made the journey to neighbouring countries Austria and Yugoslavia. The burden fell particularly heavily on Austria, which was not able to properly provide shelter to these hundreds of thousands of citizens in need. In just a matter of weeks, the Hungarian refugees were resettled and provided asylum in many other countries that responded with fascinating hospitality and willingness to help, which stands in stark contrast to the current hostile attitude of European states towards refugees. This raises questions about the circumstances under which successful burden-sharing can take place. The research question of this thesis is: *What explains the successful international cooperation and initial welcoming attitude of European governments towards Hungarian refugees after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956?* I will try to answer this question by comparing the response to the Hungarian Revolution and to the following refugee crisis of three countries: Austria, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, on a governmental and international level.

[1] Andrew Shacknove. 1993. "From asylum to containment." *International Journal of Refugee Law* 5(40): p.517.

Historical background

The story of the Hungarian Revolution already started during the Second World War. Unlike Poland, Czecho-Slovakia or other countries in the East Bloc that were under post-war Soviet influence, Hungary was an ally of Germany during the war and had fought against the Soviets. When the war ended and the Soviet Union expelled the last Germans from Hungary, they installed a communist regime that would last for decades. Given the history of violence between the two countries during the war, the occupation of Hungary by the Soviet Union was anything but peaceful. From the late 1940's up until the beginning of the Revolution in 1956, Hungarians faced oppression under the dictatorship of Mátyás Rákosi. Rákosi installed a State Security Department (AVO) whose task it was to purge any opposition. It would become one of the most feared organizations in the country as it was guilty of kidnapping, torture, and murder, amongst other crimes.[2] In a matter of years, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians were deported to the Soviet Union to work in camps, imprisoned, and thousands were executed.[3] Up until the death of Stalin in March 1953, and even subsequently, Hungarians lived under a reign of terror.

On 25 February 1956 in the Kremlin, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave a speech in which he declared Stalin to be a mass murderer, and that he wanted peaceful coexistence with the West.[4] This caused a stir within the Soviet colonies, including Hungary. In the next months, Hungarian students, politicians, and intellectuals began to unite and form a front against their Soviet government, and they chose former prime minister Imre Nagy as their leader. On 23 October 1956, the Revolution began when hundreds of thousands of students and citizens marched through the streets of Budapest and peacefully protested against the government. The following days consisted of constant negotiations between the Soviet leaders and the revolutionaries, and the protests became more and more violent. When the AVO massacred a group of protesters in front of the houses of parliament two days after the peaceful protest march, the war in Budapest had truly started. By the end of October, the Soviets declared that they would consider removing their troops from the Hungarian territory. However, on 4 November , it became clear that the Russian troops had no intention to leave when they overwhelmingly crushed the Revolution and killed an estimated 2500 citizens. The bloodshed continued for several more days, up until 10 November 1956, when the Soviet

[2] Victor Sebestyen. 2006. *Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution*. Pantheon Books.
[3] R.J. Crampton. 1997. *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After.* Psychology Press. p.301.
[4] Victor Sebestyen. 2006. *Twelve Days: The Story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution*. Pantheon Books.

government re-established its full power.[5] Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Hungarian fled the violence and made their way to Austria and Yugoslavia, starting the first major refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War.

Historiography

Much has been written about the reception of Hungarian refugees in European countries after the Hungarian Revolution. First, research on Hungarian refugees in Austria often depicts the crisis as an example where Austria's status as a neutral country was first tested.[6] These scholars describe the political and economic crisis and the chaos within the country, and Austria's call to other countries to share the burden of the refugees. However, they do not address the reasons why other countries actually agreed to help. Second, Becky Taylor is a prominent scholar on the reception of Hungarian refugees in the United Kingdom. She ascribes the willingness of the UK to cooperate to moral pressure from UNCHR[7], and to the discourse among the media, government and public that portrayed the refugees as 'deserving´.[8] Additionally, Alexandre de Aranjo points out the political and economic motives of the British government: it served as propaganda against Soviet communism and enabled Britain to meet certain labour shortages.[9] Third, on Hungarian refugees in the Netherlands, several authors point out how the Hungarian refugees were framed positively by Dutch state authorities and by the media and how this influenced the initial welcoming attitude of the

[5] Ibid.

[6] Andreas Gémes. 2007. "Political Migration in the Cold War: the case of Austria and the Hungarian Refugees of 1956-57." In: *Immigration and Emigration in Historical Perspective,* Ed. Ann Katherine Isaacs. Pisa: Pisa. University Press. Andreas Gémes. 2009. "Deconstruction of a Myth? Austria and the Hungarian Refugees of 1956-57." In: *Time, Memory, and Cultural Change*, Ed. S. Dempsey and D. Nichols. Wien: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences, Vol. 25, Wien. Johanna Granville. 2006. "Of Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda: How Austria Dealt with the Hungarian Crisis of 1956." *History* 91(301): 62-90. Peter Wassertheurer. 2016. "Austria and the Hungarian uprising in 1956: Neutrality being tested, or Neutrality on the Test Stand" *Corvinus Journal of International Affairs*. 1(3): 88-97. Manfried Rauchensteiner. 1981. *Spätherbst 1956: die Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand.* Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag. Maximillian Graf and Sarah Knoll. 2017. "In Transit or Asylum Seekers? Austria and the Cold War Refugees from the Communist Bloc." In *Migration in Austria*, Ed. Günter Bischof, Dirk Rupnow. Innsbruck University Press. Ibolya Murber. 2006. Die österreichischer Bundesregierung: Maßnahmen zur ungarischen Revolution und Flüchtlingsfrage 1956. In *Europäische Aspekte zur ungarischen Revolution 1956.* Eds. Ibolya Murber and Gerhard Wanner. Feldkirch: Rheticus Gesellschaft. 51-80.

[7] Becky Taylor. 2015. "'Everyone here wants to help you': International Co-operation, Refugee Rights, and the 1956 Hungarian Refugee Crisis." *History Workshop Journal.*

[8] Becky Taylor. 2016. "'Their Only Words of English Were 'Thank You": Rights, Gratitude and 'Deserving' Hungarian Refugees to Britain in 1956." *Journal of British Studies* (55): 120-144.

[9] Alexandre G.A. De Aranjo. 2013. "Assets and liabilities: refugees from Hungary and Egypt in France and in Britain, 1956-1960." PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham.

country.[10] They also note how the government, in contrast to what it told the public, they carefully selected the refugees they accepted.[11] Additionally Ten Doeschatte, provides an international overview of the numbers of refugees that other countries took in and gives a useful description of the Dutch political climate in the 1956 that influenced the decision-making on the Hungarian refugees.[12]

What is evident from this body of literature is that most authors picked a single country as their case study. However, in order to explain under what circumstances states comply with international norms on burden sharing, an international comparative approach is needed, as burden-sharing always involves multiple states. With the exception of De Aranjo, who compares Hungarian and Egyptian refugees in France and Britain, such an international and comparative approach with multiple case studies on this subject is missing from the historiography. Therefore, my research will contribute to this debate by providing a comparison between three countries. I will try to find the common denominators of these states that might explain their initial positive response to the refugees. Thus, this research aims to clarify why states were initially so welcoming towards Hungarian refugees. This may provide new insights with regard to what is necessary, on both the national and international level, to achieve successful burden-sharing during a refugee crisis.

Theory

Theories on international cooperation all revolve around the question of when states comply with international norms, in this case the burden-sharing and acceptance of refugees. In his book *A Right to Flee*, Phil Orchard provides a theoretical framework in which he explain the approaches to this question, which can be applied to the issue of burden-sharing during the Hungarian refugee crisis of 1956. According to Orchard, it is generally assumed that when it comes to international state cooperation, governments balance their humanitarian interests (norms-based approach) such as refugee protection, against national interests (cost-benefit

[10] Marlou Schrover and Tycho Walaardt. 2017. "The influence of the media on politics and practices: Hungarian refugee resettlement in the Netherlands in 1956." *Journal of Migration History* (3): 22-53. Daan Bronkhorst. 1990. *Een tijd van komen: De geschiedenis van vluchtelingen in Nederland.* Amsterdam: Federatie Von/ Uitgeverij Jan Mets. Duco Hellema. 1990. *De Nederlandse houding ten aanzien van de Hongaarse Revolutie en de Suezcrisis.* Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Jan Mets. Hans Olink. 2002. *In strijd met de waarheid: De koude burgeroorlog in Amsterdam.* Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bas Lubberhuizen.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Jan Willem Ten Doesschate. 1985 *Het Nederlandse toelatingsbeleid ten aanzien van Hongaarse vluchtelingen (1956 – 1957).* Doctoraalscriptie, Universiteit van Nijmegen.

approach).[13] Traditional rational explanations argue that is unlikely for solidarity and human rights to prevail, and that national interests will be prioritized.[14] This suggests that in most cases, a cost-benefit approach would suffice in trying to explain international cooperation. Yet, the European response to the Hungarian refugee crisis is an event where this is not necessarily the case. The following chapters will illustrate that the humanitarian interests of Austria, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands seemed to be perhaps equally important as national interests. Therefore, in explaining governments' responses to the Hungarian refugee crisis, a cost-benefit approach should be combined with a norm-based approach.

In order to understand the norms-based approach and the process of international cooperation on humanitarian issues, it is necessary to understand two levels of international structure: regimes, and norms.[15] First, Orchard explains how within a political space, a regime bundles together the individual norms of states, and provide "a mechanism through which the appropriate standards of behavior suggested by the individual norms are linked together to create a response within the complexity of the issue area."[16] Thus, a regime provides a space for how states within the international society should deal with a certain problem. Second, norms are the shared understandings of the states within a regime. These norms are not static and can change over time. Orchard argues that crises , such as refugee crises, are usually the causes behind changing norms. Crisis events can force states to rethink their normative beliefs, as they are no longer in line with the changed reality.[17] They provides "a window of opportunity" for "norm entrepreneurs," both domestic and international, to introduce new norms that favour humanitarian interests such as refugee protection.[18] As a result, norm entrepreneurs can have an influence on the internalization of norms in a regime. These entrepreneurs can range from civilians, to (non-)governmental organizations, to state officials.

The Hungarian refugee crisis was the first humanitarian crisis in Europe after the Second World War. States had the tragedy of this war and the problem of Displaced Persons (DPs) still fresh in their mind. Moreover, the crisis took place in the midst of the Cold War in which Western regimes saw communism as their number one enemy. Given this background, it is likely that states felt a strong moral obligation to comply with humanitarian international

[13] Phil Orchard. 2014. *A Right to Flee: refugees, states, and the construction of international cooperation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[14] Ibid. p.2.
[15] Ibid. p.6.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid. p.7.
[18] Ibid.

norms.[19] The crisis was a perfect opportunity for norm entrepreneurs, such as the newly established UNHCR, civilians, civil society groups, and government officials, to push governments into prioritizing humanitarian interests.[20] At the same time, the crisis took place within the post-World War II economic boom. Western European countries were thriving and there was a large demand for labour. In this phase of prosperity, labour shortages may have been an important reason for governments to accept Hungarian refugees, especially to accept those who were male, young, strong, educated, and well-skilled.[21] Thus, when deciding on how to respond to the Hungarian refugee crisis, states had to take into account both their humanitarian- and national interests. In explaining the welcoming attitude of European governments towards the Hungarian refugees, the following chapters will combine a norms-based approach and a cost-benefit approach, and illustrate what interests applied to each country.

Methodology

In order to draw conclusions on issues of burden-sharing, it is necessary to use an international comparative approach. For that reason, Austria, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands are this project's case-studies . Austria is the first case study, because it was the first country of arrival and the starting point of the resettlement process. The UK is the second case study because from all European countries, it resettled the largest amount of refugees. The Netherlands is the third and final case study, as it was one of the first countries that made a commitment to share the burden of refugees. Naturally, these three European countries do not speak for all the other countries that were involved in the resettlement process during the Hungarian refugee crisis, as situations might have been different elsewhere. However, by comparing at least three countries and finding out their motives at that time, future research on other countries can be tested using these features as well. The focus of this thesis is on the *initial* welcoming attitude of these three countries towards the Hungarian refugees. On the 14

[19] Niklaus Steiner. 2000. *Arguing about Asylum: The Complexity of Refugee Debates in Europe.* New York: St. Martin's Press. Tally Kritzman-Amir. 2009. "Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility Sharing in Refugee Law." *Brooklyn Journal of International Law.* 34(2): 355-393.

[20] Gil Loescher. 2001. "The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy." *The International Migration Review*. 35(1): 33-56. Marjoleine Zieck. 2013. "The 1956 Hungarian Refugee Emergency, an Early and Instructive Case of Resettlement." *Amsterdam Law Forum*. 5(2): 45-63.

[21] Alexandre G.A. De Aranjo. 2013. "Assets and liabilities: refugees from Hungary and Egypt in France and in Britain, 1956-1960." PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham. James Carlin. 1982. "Significant Refugee Crisis Since World War II and the Response of the International Community." *Michigan Journal of International Law* 3(1): 3-25.

January 1957, the Austrian government decided that it would close the border to Hungary and from then on, the number of refugees diminished significantly.[22] Therefore, I have limited the time-scope of this research from October 1956 to mid-January 1957.

Studying the response of three different countries means that there is an abundance on material and sources available. The sources come from national archives and consist of internal governmental reports, inter-governmental communication between ministries of foreign affairs and embassies, parliamentary debates from each country, and communication between state officials and the United Nations, the UNHCR in particular. In order to reduce the number of sources, I chose to leave out communication with other countries that were involved in sharing the burden. The governmental material can be found in the archives of the ministries of interior and foreign affairs in the Austrian State Archives in Vienna, the National Archives in London, and the National Archive in the Hague. It must be noted that, even though all of the material in these archives consists of governmental documents, it includes government communication with all kinds of non-governmental organizations and individuals as well. So, although this research looks at the Hungarian refugee crisis from a governmental and international governance perspective, it recognizes that governments worked together closely with numerous non-governmental and voluntary organizations who may have influenced governments' decisions. Furthermore, while the role of the media during the Hungarian refugee crisis is important, as discourse analysis on media provides different perspectives on the situation that complement or counter the perspective of governments, it will be too much to include in this paper. Therefore, I will focus on the national and international level of governance.

In order to answer the research question in a structured and coherent way, I will answer three sub questions for each case study: 1) What did the economic and political landscape of country X look like during the crisis? 2) How did country X respond to the repression of the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviet Union 3) How did country X respond to the refugee flow to Austria after the Hungarian Revolution and take part in the resettlement process? The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is on Austria, as Austria was the centre of the crisis. Next, chapter two deals with the United Kingdom. The third chapter is a case study of the Netherlands. Each chapter will answer the three sub questions for that particular country, followed by the chapter's findings. Finally, the conclusion

[22] Murber, Ibolya. 2006. Die österreichischer Bundesregierung: Maßnahmen zur ungarischen Revolution und Flüchtlingsfrage 1956. In *Europäische Aspekte zur ungarischen Revolution 1956.* Eds. Ibolya Murber and Gerhard Wanner. Feldkirch: Rheticus Gesellschaft. p.59

provides a recap of the preceding chapters, a comparison of all three cases, and links the Hungarian refugee crisis to the one the world is facing today.

1. Case study one: Austria

1.1 Austria's political and economic landscape in 1956

For most Hungarian refugees, Austria was the first country of arrival during and after the Hungarian Revolution. In a period of two months, approximately 180,000 refugees crossed the Austrian border, which was a large number of people for a country that was still recovering from the Second World War.[23] In order to understand how and why Austria dealt with the Hungarian Revolution and the following crisis in the way it did, it is necessary to understand the country´s political and economic characteristics at that time. Four main features can be identified that are likely to have influenced the response of the Austrian government to the Revolution and the Hungarian refugees. The first feature is Austria's geographical location and historical relationship with Hungary. Second, only a year before the Revolution, Austria itself was occupied by the Soviet Union. However, it was able to negotiate with the Soviet Union and make them withdraw their troops by signing a declaration of neutrality. Third, there were still large amounts of refugees present in Austria as a result of the Second World War. A fourth and final main feature was that after war, the economy of Austria had not recovered in the same speed as in many other Western European countries, and was only just starting to notice the effects of the Marshall Plan. The next paragraphs will lay out these features in more detail, and explain how they are relevant to the Austrian government's response to the Hungarian Revolution and the following refugee crisis.

First and foremost, Austria is bounded to Hungary geographically and historically. Given Austria's geographical location and the fact that it was the only country bordering Hungary that was not communist, it became the first destination for most of the Hungarian refugees. Ironically, escaping Hungary was quite easy at that time because the Soviet Union had decided to break down the Iron Curtain along the Austria border.[24] Fences and minefields had been removed, and during the revolution there were hardly any border controls.[25] Therefore, there was not much that the Austrian government could do to prevent the Hungarians from crossing the border. An option that was available was to simply receive all refugees and to try to take care of them, which is what Austria did. Additionally, Austria is

[23] Johanna Granville. 2006. "Of Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda: How Austria Dealt with the Hungarian Crisis of 1956." *History* 91(301): 62-90.
[24] Maximillian Graf and Sarah Knoll. 2017. "In Transit or Asylum Seekers? Austria and the Cold War Refugees from the Communist Bloc." In *Migration in Austria*, Ed. Günter Bischof, Dirk Rupnow. Innsbruck University Press. p. 95.
[25] Ibid.

historically connected to Hungary. Already in the sixteenth century, the Austrian dynasty inherited the Hungarian throne. Furthermore, they were both part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, ruled by the House of Habsburg, between 1867 and 1918. In 1956, there were still large numbers of Hungarians, or people with Hungarian heritage, living in Austria, especially in eastern provinces such as the Burgenland.[26] As stated in an appeal from the Austrian government to the Soviet Union: "My country has a long tradition of friendship with the Hungarian people whom we have always respected and admired for their courage and love of independence."[27] This shows that the Austrian population felt closely connected to the Hungarians, which may have influenced the Austrian response to the crisis.

Second, from 1945 onwards, Austria was occupied by the Soviet Union, which ended in 1955 when Austria signed a declaration of neutrality. Since the Austrians had only recently managed to get rid of the Soviet occupiers themselves, they were very sympathetic towards the Hungarians and their struggle for freedom.[28] This may have been a factor that influenced the welcoming attitude of the Austrian government. From 1955 onwards, the Austrian Declaration of Neutrality of 1955 played a large role in Austria's foreign policy. Article 1 of the Federal Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria states:

> For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of her external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, Austria of her own free will declares herewith her permanent neutrality which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at her disposal. In order to secure these purposes Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on her territory.[29]

The issue of neutrality was high on the government's agenda during and after the Hungarian Revolution, and this law would play a large role the decision-making process of government on how to respond to Revolution and Hungarian refugee influx. This will be illustrated by the following paragraphs in this chapter.

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[26] Granville, Johanna. 2006. "Of Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda: How Austria Dealt with the Hungarian Crisis of 1956." *History* 91(301): p.64.

[27] Appeal to USSR in UN General Assembly, 5 November 1956. 511.190. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (from here onwards ÖstA). BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403c, 1956.

[28] Graf, Maximillian and Sarah Knoll. 2017. "In Transit or Asylum Seekers? Austria and the Cold War Refugees from the Communist Bloc." In *Migration in Austria*, Ed. Günter Bischof, Dirk Rupnow. Innsbruck University Press. p. 95.

[29] Federal Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria. ERV_1955_211. *www.ris.bka.gv.at*. Retrieved on 28 April, 2019.

Third, in 1956, Austria still hosted large numbers of refugees that had fled from the war or related issues. When the war ended in 1945, there were about 1,432,000 refugees residing in Austria, among them DPs, German expellees and Jews.[30] In the years after, this number significantly decreased, as many refugees returned to their countries of origin. However, about 500,000 refugees permanently settled in Austria, which is a large number for a country with a population of about 7 million in total.[31] These people placed a burden on the Austrian state.[32] The German expellees in particular were a problem, as they did not fall under the protection and care of the United Nations or the International Refugee Organization. Instead, they relied solely on assistance from the Austrian government.[33] Moreover, there was a persistent housing shortage in Austria due to these refugees. Even in 1956, many of these refugees still lived in camps. Despite these difficulties, the Austrian government decided to take in every Hungarian (unarmed) refugee, knowing that providing them with proper shelter would was going to be a serious challenge.

Fourth, besides the large amount of Second World War refugees that had led to a persistent housing shortage, the Austrian economy had not recovered at the same pace as most other Western European countries. Although the gross domestic product had almost doubled since the end of the war, and Austria was finally beginning to feel the effects of the Marshall Plan, many industries were in poor condition due to the previous Soviet occupation.[34] Furthermore, although the unemployment rate was declining, it was still "high by subsequent standards."[35] So, even though Austria's economy was headed in the right direction, it certainly could not use an influx of refugees as large as the one from Hungary. Nevertheless, the Austrian government took the negative impact that the Hungarian refugees would have on the country for granted, and tried its best to assist them in their basic needs.

[30] Zahra, Tara. 2010. "'Prisoners of the Postwar': Expellees, Displaced Persons, and Jews in Austria after World War II." *Austrian History Yearbook* (41): p.191.
[31] Jandl, Michael and Albert Kraler. 2003. "Austria: A Country of Immigrantion?" *migrationpolicy.org*, 1 March. Retrieved on 28 April, 2019.
[32] Letter from Deputy High Commissioner James Read to foreign governments, 6 November 1956. 511.190 ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[33] Zahra, Tara. 2010. "'Prisoners of the Postwar': Expellees, Displaced Persons, and Jews in Austria after World War II." *Austrian History Yearbook* (41): p.192.
[34] Solsten, Eric. 1994. *Austria: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.
[35] Ibid.

1.2 The Austrian response to the repression of the Hungarian revolt by the Soviet union.

Giving Austria's political and economic landscape and its status as a neutral country, one might expect that it would have tried to recuse itself from the situation, or that it would not openly condemn the Soviet Union for its violent military interventions during the Hungarian Revolution. However, this was not the case. As early as 28 October 1956, the Council of Ministers in Vienna organized a meeting in which they discussed the threatening situation in Hungary and how to respond to it.[36] The meeting started with a speech by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, Leopold Figl. He stated that, because of the close relations between Austria and Hungary, other ambassadors in Budapest believed that any action from the Austrian government against the Soviet Union could have a positive impact on the situation in Hungary, and that it was necessary for the Austrian government to condemn the "bloodshed."[37] However, he also noted that any action will not be appreciated by the Russians, as the Russians believed they had a right to be in Hungary; the Hungarian government asked, or even begged, for the presence of the Russians themselves years earlier.[38] After long discussions about what words to use for the message they would send to the Soviet Union, the Council of Ministers agreed upon the following:

> With great worry, the Austrian people have followed the fate of its neighbour. The Austrian government asks to cease the hostilities, and thereby end the bloodshed … The Austrian government will, in strict execution of their neutrality, protect their borders against every kind of armed transgression to maintain peace, and therefore asks the Soviet Union kindly with the aforementioned appeal.[39]

Besides creating this statement, the ministers also agreed that they would start preparations for hosting large numbers of refugees, and treat any unarmed Hungarian as a refugee, regardless of what caused them to arrive in Austria.[40] Thus, even before the revolution escalated and the massacre begun, the Austrian government already spoke out against the Soviet Union and showed a willingness to help Hungarian refugees. It was the very first

[36] Verhandlungsschrift nr. 12a über die Sitzung des Ministerrates, 28 October 1956. Östa. AdR, BKA/AA, Ministerratsprotokolle Raab II.
[37] Ibid. Original: "Blutvergießen."
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid. Original: "Mit Großer Besorgnis verfolgt das Österreichische Volk das Schicksal seines Nachbarlandes. Die österreichische Bundesregierung ersucht, die Kampfhandlungen sofort einzustellen und damit dem Blutvergießen ein Ende zu setzen … Die österreichische Bundesregierung wird in strikter Handhabung ihrer Neutralität ihrer Grenzen gegen jede bewaffnete Verletzung schützen und richtet in Wahrung ihrer Neutralität, die im Sinne der Aufrechterhaltung des Friedens liegt, obigen Appell an die Sowjetunion."
[40] Ibid.

Western democracy to do so.[41] The reference to "neutrality" indicates that the government did not see its neutral status as a justification to not interfere. Instead, they viewed the country's neutral status as a justification to get involved, as the Soviet Union threatened peace and stability within Austria.

Next, the Austrian Council of Ministers met again on 4 November 1956, which was the bloodiest day of the Hungarian Revolution. Again, the issue of Austria's neutrality was high on the agenda. There were accusations from Moscow, Prague Warsaw and East-Germany and rumors in their media that Austria was violating its neutral status by supplying the Hungarians with weapons and other means, which Chancellor Raab had to refute on the radio as false.[42] So, the statement from Minister Figl from the previous meeting, that the Russians would not appreciate any action from Austria against the Soviet Union, turned out to be true. These accusations worsened the relationship between Austria and the Russians. As Figl stated in the meeting, the Austrian government viewed these rumors and accusations as "unfriendly actions against Austria."[43] Figl stated that he believed that the violence in Hungary did not directly threaten the Austrian territory. However, he continued by saying that the government had to eliminate everything that challenged the country's neutrality, and that it had a duty to take care of the large numbers of refugees that were heading to Austria.[44]

An important point was raised by Minister Drimmel of Education on how the public would view the government's actions. According to him, the government should not show fear after having expressed sympathy for the Hungarians a few days earlier. Moreover, he stated: "We must have courage, and the more careful we appear, the worse the population will take it."[45] Upon this, Minister Helmer of Inner Affairs agreed: "The population is closely following the radio and I don't believe that the government should be silent. We have to show them our stance for fights for freedom."[46] This illustrates how the Austrian government was fully aware of how their actions would appear to the population and that they felt a certain pressure from below to show courage, condemn the Russians, and help the Hungarians. The

[41] Granville, Johanna. 2006. "Of Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda: How Austria Dealt with the Hungarian Crisis of 1956." *History* 91(301): p.66.
[42] Verhandlungsschrift nr. 13a über die Sitzung des Ministerrates, 4 November 1956. Östa. AdR, BKA/AA, Ministerratsprotokolle Raab II.
[43] Ibid. Original: "unfreundlichen Akt gegen Österreich."
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid. Original: "Wir müssen etwas Mut haben und je vorsichter wir zu sein scheinen, desto schlechter wird es von der Bevölkerung aufgenommen werden."
[46] Ibid. Original: "Die Bevölkerung sitzt doch jetzt allgemein beim Lautsprecher und ich glaube nicht, daß die Regierung schweigen soll. Wir müßten unsere Stellung wegen des Freiheitskampfes betonen."

Austrian people were supportive of the Hungarian revolution and already spoke out amongst themselves against the Soviet Union.[47] If the government took a different stance, they would have come across as weak or afraid.

Overall, what becomes clear from the records of these meetings is that, in deciding how to respond to the Soviet's brutal repression of the revolution, the ministers were trying to find a balance between adhering to Austria's status as a neutral country and condemning the atrocities conducted by the Soviet Union. On the one hand, their statement against the Soviet Union, in which they asked the Soviets to cease the hostilities and end the bloodshed, sparked anger in several regions within the Soviet hemisphere, and led to accusations that Austria was in violation of its neutral status by providing the Hungarians with military supplies. These accusations harmed the image of the country and posed challenges for the Austrian government. On the other hand, they felt they had a moral duty to speak out against the bloodshed, as they were supporters of 'fights for freedom.'[48] In addition, pressure from the public pushed the ministers into taking a more active stance on the situation in Hungary. The government wanted to let the people know that it would not turn a blind eye to what was happening across the border.

1.3 Austrian response to the Hungarian refugees and its role in the resettlement process

Unlike the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, Austria was the first country of arrival for the Hungarian refugees, and did not have much choice in who they would or would not let in the country. This meant that the Austrian preparations for taking care of these refugees had to start weeks earlier than the preparations from the other two countries. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the Council of Ministers already began discussing their action plan on hosting the Hungarian refugees on 28 October 1956, and by 4 November 1956, concrete plans were made by Minister Helmer to create large refugee camps. However, the thousands of refugees that the Austrian government was expecting would place an enormous financial burden on the Austrian economy, which was only just becoming stable after World War II. Moreover, the housing shortage that the refugees from WWII had caused would make it difficult for Austria to provide shelter for all the Hungarians. Therefore, while developing

[47] Schreiben des Gesandten Haymerle an Herrn Peinsipp, 31 October 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403c, 1956.
[48] Steiner, Niklaus. 2000. *Arguing about Asylum: The Complexity of Refugee Debates in Europe.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

multiple domestic policies to receive the refugees, Austria did not have any other choice than to seek help within the international community, and call for other countries to share the burden. The next sub-chapter will discuss Austria's domestic policies during the refugee crisis, that is, how the government itself received the refugees. Subsequently, in chronological order, the final sub-chapter of this case study discusses Austria's foreign policies and how the government brought about the resettlement process.

1.3.1 Domestic policies

Although the Austrian government was dependent on foreign aid and the willingness of other countries in and outside Europe to accept refugees, it is useful to discuss the domestic policies they established in order to receive and take care of the Hungarian refugees. After having received several recommendations from the UNHCR on how to deal with the situation in the country,[49] a whole new government unit was created within the Ministry of Inner Affairs that specifically had to deal with the Hungarian refugee crisis: *die Organisation des Referates Ungarn-Flüchtlingshilfe* (Referat 10UH).[50] The unit was led by Dr. Willibald Liehr, and would, among other issues, be in charge of inspections of the refugee camps, healthcare issues, finances, provision of food and beverages, relations with the Red Cross and other organizations, transport, and infrastructure. Per refugee camp, a single person was appointed to be in charge, and a memo of the structure of the 10UH unit was sent to all government departments. Thus, despite the chaos in the country at that time, the Austrian government found a way to tackle the issue of the refugees in a relatively structured manner, in which specific persons were assigned to take the lead for specific matters.

A first concern for the 10UH unit was the provision of shelter for the Hungarian refugees. There were already several refugee camps within the country that were created for the refugees of WWII. However, many of these were still occupied. Therefore, new camps had to be built, and every building that could at least temporarily serve as a home for the Hungarians was transformed into a camp. Again, in many cases, this would not have been possible without the help of the UNHCR and the international community. For instance, the

[49] Recommendations by Deputy Director of UNHCR. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[50] Übersicht über das im Bundesministerium für Inneres errichtete Referat 10 UH, 23 November 1956. 190.092. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.

government turned a hotel in Bad Kreuzen into a refugee camp.[51] This hotel used to belong to a Norwegian owner, and with the help of the UNHCR, the Austrian government was able to get in contact with the owner and buy it from him.[52] Similarly, Austria received a message from the Austrian embassy in the Netherlands that a Dutch travel organization was willing to lend its hostel in Tirol to the Austrian government so that it could temporarily serve as a refugee camp.[53] In similar ways, in the next weeks, schools, hospitals, hotels and other kinds of buildings were bought from private owners, emptied and transformed into refugee camps. Of course, the government needed large amounts of money to make this happen. But with the financial assistance they received from the international community, as the following paragraphs will explain in more detail, it became feasible.

Second, besides the issue of where to place the refugees, the 10UH unit also needed to guarantee the well-being and safety of the refugees once they were placed in a camp. Although not without difficulties, this was made possible with the help of international organizations such as the Red Cross and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), nowadays the International Organization for Migration (IOM). For instance, in order to keep unwanted visitors who aimed to recruit refugees for whatever kind of purposes away from the camps, the government worked together with the ICEM to create special identity cards for personnel that would give them permission to enter the camps.[54] Furthermore, in order to let the refugees without money or a job participate in Austrian society, it was decided that they would not have to pay fees for bureaucratic administrative issues.[55] This would help them with: "the issuing of drivers licenses, requests to let Hungarian refugee children go to school, documents and certificates regarding marriages, translations, issuing of passports, and so on."[56] Letting go of strict bureaucratic rules made it a lot easier for both the government and the refugees to deal with the situation, as procedures that would usually take a lot of time were now either skipped or shortened.

[51] Besuch des Kurhauses Bad Kreuzen, 10 December, 1956. RE 190.556. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Angebot eines Heimes für Flüchtlinge in Österreich durch die Niederländische Reisevereinigung, 6 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[54] Ausgabe von Ausweisen der Internationale Kommission zum Besuch der ungarischen Flüchtlingsläger, 23 November. EA 190.085. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[55] Abgabebefreiung anlässlich der Ungarnhilfe, 4 December 1956. 190.307. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[56] Ibid. Original: "Anträge auf Aufnahme ungarischer Flüchtlingskinder in Schulen, in Heiratsangelegenheiten auszustellende Schriftstücke und Zeugnisse, Übersetzungen, Ausstellung von Fremdenpässen usw."

Overall, the reports from the 10 UH unit give the idea that the Austrian government truly tried its best to give Hungarian refugees the warmest welcome possible. From letting go of bureaucratic rules in order to relieve some of the refugees' stress, to sending Christmas and New Year's messages to the Hungarians in refugee camps in Hungarian language,[57] Austria's domestic policies during the refugee crisis demonstrate a combination of efficiency and hospitality. The refugees themselves recognized this too, as the Austrian (and German and Dutch) government received a statement on behalf of all Hungarian refugees in which they expressed their "eternal gratefulness" for allowing them to start a new life in Western Europe, after having endured "large physical and mental hardships."[58]

1.3.2 Foreign policies

Austria's domestic policies during the Hungarian refugee crisis were closely intertwined with its foreign policies, as many of their measures on Austrian territory could not have been made possible without foreign help. The main focus of Austria's foreign policies during the crisis would be "to get the refugees from Austria to other countries as quick as possible."[59] With help from the UNHCR and strategic diplomacy by Austrian ambassadors, the Austrian government was able to get the international community on its side. On 5 November 1956, the day after the second meeting of the Austrian Council of Ministers on the crisis, the UNHCR received a telegram from Oskar Helmer, the Minister of Interior of Austria, in which he asked for assistance. He pointed out the efforts that Austria had made to accommodate the refugees that had already crossed the Austrian border and asked the following:

> I ask you urgently to inform the member governments of the UNREF executive committee and other governments and authorities who may be concerned by this situation and to convey a request of the federal government for help. Financial aid is very necessary in order to ensure humane care and maintenance for these refugees during the coming winter months. Furthermore, early temporary acceptance of as great a number as possible of these

[57] Weihnachts- und Neujahrsbotschaft für die Flüchtlinge, 24 December 1956. 190.756. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[58] Nachricht an die Staatsoberhaeupter von Oesterreich, Deutschland und Holland. 18364-A. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[59] Massnahmen der Bundesregierung zur Meisterung des Flüchtlingsproblems. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403c, 1956.

> refugees by European states is urgently requested. The federal government appeals to the feelings of solidarity in helping refugees which has so often been evidenced in the past. [60]

Interestingly, in just a matter of hours James Read, the Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees answered to Austria's call for help by sending a telegram to all members of the UN Refugee Fund in which he called upon the international community to contribute. He copied most of the words that Helmer had used, and urgently requested the governments that were "sympathetic to trials of the Hungarian people" to "give at least temporary asylum to greatest possible number of genuine refugees," in addition to financial aid.[61] The references to 'humane care,' 'solidarity,' 'sympathy,' and 'winter months' in these telegrams illustrate that in one of the very first days of the crisis, both Austria and the UNHCR used humanitarian and moral arguments in order to convince other governments to participate in the burden-sharing. In turn, the UNHCR expressed its "deep appreciation" for the "humanitarian attitude shown by the Government of the Austrian Federal Republic in granting asylum to the refugees from Hungary.[62] Additionally, the Austrian ambassadors that were residing in several European countries did not sit still either. They were actively pointing out the situation in Austria to foreign governments while trying to convince them that help was urgently needed.[63]

Fascinatingly, in the following days, help was offered from all corners of the world. A report from the Ministry of Foreign affairs states that already 6 November 1956, a day after the UNHCR had sent the telegram, the Austrian government received offers from Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden and the Netherlands to accept certain numbers of refugees.[64] A few days later, the United Kingdom also answered, and sent the first British delegates that would select 2500 refugees.[65] On 14 November, another Austrian 'Aide Mémoire' was sent into the world, which remined the international community of the previous one and asked the receiving governments to "accept refugees with minimum registration selection and without

[60] Telegram from Austrian government to UNHCR, 5 November 1956. Nationaal Archief (from here onwards NA) Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 12776..
[61] Telegram from the UNHCR to members of the UNREF, 5 November 1956. NA Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 12776
[62] Letter from UNHCR to Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 7 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[63] Letter from Austrian embassy in London to Selwyn Lloyd of House of Commons, 5 November 1956. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[64] Ausländische Angebote zur Aufnahme von ungar. Flüchtlingen, 6 November 1956. 519.959. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[65] Aufnahme von ungarischen Flüchtlingen durch Grossbritannien, 12 November 1956. 190.242. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.

any separation of families or limitations to young people or workers."[66] Again, they called upon the governments "who share the belief in the principles of humanity to continue to contribute to the burdens thus arising, in proportion to their economic possibilities."[67] Next, on 21 November, the Ministry of Inner Affairs received a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs that Chili had offered to take in one thousand refugees,[68] and not long after, the government received the message that Colombia was prepared to accept one thousand refugees.[69] These are just a few examples of the numerous offers that Austria received from foreign governments to take in Hungarian refugees. Thus, the Austrian and UNHCR's call upon the international community's humanity, solidarity and ability to sympathize seemed to have an effect on European countries, as well as on countries in the rest of the world.

After a period of about two weeks in which Austria received several offers from countries to accept refugees, and in which the first numbers of refugees were resettled, the government was standing on a crossroads. Either more countries would have to contribute and increase the amount of refugees they would take in, or Austria would be weighed down by the burden that the Hungarians placed on the country. By 23 November 1956, already 147,467 Hungarians had entered Austria since 23 October, and more were to come.[70] Therefore, on the 23 November, the Minister of Inner Affairs sent a letter to the office of the UNHCR, in which he stated that without the efforts of the UNHCR, Austria would not have been financially able to take care of the refugees and would not have received offers from other countries to share the burden, and expressed Austria's satisfaction and gratefulness for their help so far.[71] However, he also noted that many refugees were likely to stay for longer periods of time, and that they expected many more refugees to come. They did not have another choice but to appeal to the UNHCR again, in order to get other countries to take in more refugees and receive more financial assistance.[72] This letter illustrates that the Austrian government realized that without more help from the international community, they would not be able to

[66] Telegram from ICEM to Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 November 1956. 520.593. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[67] Österreichisches Aide Mémoire, 14 November 1956. 511.190ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[68] Übernahme 1000 Flüchtlinge durch Chile, 21 November 1956. 190.045. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[69] Columbien, Aufnahme ungarische Flüchtlinge, 15 December 1956. 190.640. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[70] Das Problem der Neufluechtlinge aus Ungarn, 21 December 1956. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[71] Letter from Ministry of Inner Affairs to UNHCR, 23 November 1956. 190.148. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[72] Ibid.

keep up with the amount of refugees that was arriving. It seemed as if this call for help had an effect, because in the next days, several countries agreed to accept larger numbers of refugees. Again, the role of the UNHCR as a mediator within the international community proved to be extremely important in the process of burden-sharing.

In the next weeks, more and more countries contacted the Austrian government through the office of the UNHCR, to let them know they were willing to accept certain amounts of refugees or that they would increase the maximum amount they had established earlier. For instance, on 26 November, Victor Beermann, the representative of the High Commissioner of the UNHCR in Austria, let the government know that Switzerland was willing to take in 6000 more refugees, under the condition that when they were not resettled to other countries within six months, they would have to return to Austria.[73] Next, on the second of December, Minister Pickersgill, the Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, flew to Austria in order to see for himself what the situation was like in Austria, and to visit the refugee camps.[74] He established that in general, the Hungarian refugees were very positive about their stay in Austria, but expressed wishes to move somewhere else.[75] The report states that "Pickersgill was very impressed by the visit."[76] As a result, he decided that Canada would take in 6000 refugees, and that the focus of Canada's immigration policies in the next month would be on Austria and the resettlement of the Hungarian refugees.[77] Thus, by inviting a representative of a foreign government to visit the refugee camps, the Austrian government was able to expand the burden-sharing 'network' and resettle a large part of the refugees to a different continent. In later chapters, it will become clear that the willingness of Canada to cooperate and participate in the burden-sharing of refugees stimulated other countries, for instance the UK and the Netherlands, to accept more refugees as well.

1.4 Findings

This chapter has laid out the policies of the Austrian government, both domestic and foreign, towards the Hungarian Revolution and the following refugee crisis. In trying to explain the country's welcoming attitude and willingness to accept the refugees, one cannot ignore the

[73] Übernahme von 6.000 Ungarn-Flüchtlinge durch die Schweiz auf 6 Monate. 190.139. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[74] Besichtigungsfahrt des kanadischen Einwanderungsministers am 2. Dezember 1956, 2 December 1956. 190.313. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid. Original: "Pickersgill war von der Besichtigung sehr beindruckt."
[77] Ibid.

Austria's geographical location, which did not leave the government with many other options than to just receive the Hungarians. However, much can be said about the manner in which Austria did receive the Hungarians, and about the way the government managed to turn its domestic problem into an international problem, in which many countries felt a responsibility to help out and share the burden.

Coming back to Orchards's theoretical framework on international cooperation and burden-sharing, the chapter provides evidence that in the case of Austria, the norms-based approach seems to be more useful than the cost-benefit approach. In 1956, Austria was still hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees from World War II, and was only just starting to become economically stable. Therefore, it did not have an economic interest in hosting another large amount of refugees. The only national interest that Austria had in accepting the Hungarians was that the country's image within the international community would get a boost, which the country definitely needed after its role in World War II. However, although Austria's image within the international community probably did have an influence the decision-making process of the Austrian government during the crisis, it was never explicitly mentioned in any of the documents from the Austrian State Archive. This leads me to conclude that a norms-based approach is more suitable to explain the Austrian response to the Hungarian refugee crisis than a cost-benefit approach.

In the case of Austria, it is possible to detect several norm entrepreneurs. First, the Austrian citizens were norm entrepreneurs as they put pressure on the Austrian government to condemn the Soviet Union and help the Hungarians. Second, the Austrian government and the newly established UNHCR adopted the role of norm entrepreneurs as they tried to convince the international community to prioritize their humanitarian interests over their national interests. The UNHCR proved to be perhaps the most important factor that enabled the Austrian government to deal with this influx of migrants. It was able to exert significant pressure on other states by reminding them of their humanitarian and moral obligations. Additionally, the Austrian government's and the UNHCR's unbureaucratic attitude, that is, letting go of the usual immigration policies and regulations, positively influenced the reception of the Hungarians.[78] In sum, within the Western regime, Austria set the first example of how to respond to the Hungarian refugees, and the Austrian government was able to start a process of resettlement and burden-sharing that would be one of the most successful ones up until today.

[78] Meeting UN General Assembly, 10 December 1956. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn. Karton 403c, 1956.

2. Case study two: the United Kingdom

2.1 The political and economic landscape of the United Kingdom in 1956.

Whereas Austria (together with Hungary) can be seen a sending-country during the Hungarian refugee crisis, the United Kingdom was one of the countries on the receiving end. The UK would turn out to be the country within Europe that resettled largest share of refugees: approximately 20,000 in total. In order to have a better understanding of why this was the case, the following paragraphs will lay out the key characteristics of the country's political and economic landscape at that time. Three characteristics can be identified which were of importance to the government's decision-making during the Hungarian refugee crisis: 1) The flourishing British economy, which produced labour shortages, 2) the UK's prominent role in the United Nations, particularly its position in the UN Security Council, and 3) the government's involvement in the Suez crisis in Egypt. The next paragraphs will lay these characteristics out in more detail.

First, as in many other European countries, the economy of the United Kingdom in the mid-fifties was booming. The economic situation in the country is well captured by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in a speech from 1957: "Go around the country, go to the industrial towns, go to the farms and you will see a state of prosperity such as we have never had in my lifetime - nor indeed in the history of this country."[79] At the time, the United Kingdom was one of the most industrialized and urbanized countries the world, and one of the biggest producers of coal and steel.[80] The country relied on coal both for the residential heating of over 50 million citizens and the generation of energy.[81] This reliance on coal, combined with a flourishing economy, resulted in large labour shortages in the mining industry. A report from the British Ministry of Inner Affairs pointed out "continuing gap in the manpower needed to get the coal which the country requires," and stated that there were "12,000 vacancies in the pits."[82] These vacancies were difficult to fill, as the mining industry was not the most popular employment sector among British citizens. From this perspective, the Hungarian refugee crisis happened at a convenient time for the British government, as the Hungarian refugees could potentially fill the labour shortages.

[79] "1957: Britons 'have never had it so good.'" 20 July, 1957. *BBC News.* Retrieved on 5 March, 2019.
[80] Roland Quinault. 2001. "Britain in 1950." *History Today* 51(5).
[81] Ibid.
[82] Report from 25th meeting of the Home Affairs Committee, 19 December, 1956. The London National Archives (from here onwards: TNA). PREM 11/1715: Hungarian Refugees. 11735163. 4W138.

Second, after World War II, the United Kingdom took on a prominent position in the (European) international community and demonstrated cooperativeness within international organizations. It was one of the founding members of the United Nations in 1945, and has had a permanent seat in the UN Security Council since then, next to China, France, Russia and the United States. Furthermore, it signed the Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and ratified the European Convention of Human Rights in 1951. This cooperativeness was also visible in the British acceptance rate of refugees. Before the Second World War, the country accepted 80,000 refugees, and "some 220,000 refugees of various nationalities" followed after the war had ended.[83] Furthermore, the position of the country in the UN Security Council was of importance for the situation in Hungary. The UK was one of the first countries to attend the Council of the Hungarian Revolution, after which the situation in Hungary and Austria became one of the United Nations´ focus points. Yet, despite the country's prominent role in the European community, its status as a world power was changing. More and more British colonies were gaining independence. In combination with the Suez Crisis, the country's image had been severely damaged.

The Suez Crisis occured at the same time as the Hungarian refugee crisis. In short, the Suez Crisis was a battle over the Suez Canal. The Egyptian leader Nasser had announced the nationalization of the Canal. As a response, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom, who all had interests in the Canal, joined forces against Egypt to retake it. By getting involved in this conflict, the UK angered both the Soviet Union and the United States. A report from the British embassy in Vienna pointed out that it was difficult to make an accurate assessment of inter-relations between the situation in Hungary and Egypt, but also noted that "apparent stiffening in Soviet behavior in Hungary had closely followed on the British action at Suez."[84] Moreover, the Soviet Union warned it would sent nuclear missiles to Western Europe if the British did not withdraw. Similarly, President Eisenhower of the US was furious, and threatened the UK with economic sanctions if it continued its actions.[85] Eventually, the British government agreed to withdraw its troops by the end of December 1956. However, the UK's actions were strongly condemned by the international community, the US in particular. The Suez Crisis has often been recognized as the definive end of the British empire, and the end of

[83] 23d meeting of the Home Affairs Committee, 18 December 1956. TNA. PREM 11/1715: Hungarian Refugees. 11735163. 4W138.
[84] Letter from Vienna to the Foreign Office, 4 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122382. 11737680. 4N538.
[85] "Suez Crisis." 2018. 21 November. Retrieved from www.history.com on 22 May, 2019.

the country's status as a great power.[86] The Hungarian refugee crisis was an opportunity for the British government to boost its image after the fiasco in Egypt, and to demonstrate to the international community that the country still had moral and humanitarian standards. Thus, it is likely that the UK´s involvement in the Suez Crisis influenced their welcoming attitude towards the Hungarian refugees.

2.2 The United Kingdom's response to the repression of the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviet Union

During the course of the Hungarian Revolution, the British government was very occupied with its involvement in the Suez Crisis. At the same time, as the British Ambassador sent regularly reports to the Foreign Office in London, the government was also very much aware of what was happening in Budapest. Parliamentary debates during that time illustrate that the government felt a responsibility to speak out against the Soviet Union and to show support for the Hungarian people. Moreover, the UK was one of the first countries to bring the violence in Hungary to the attention of the United Nations, and to propose that the UN should draft a condemnation addressed to the Soviet Union. The next paragraphs will lay out the response of the British government to the Hungarian Revolution in the period before they decided to take part in the resettlement of the Hungarian refugees

The British Ambassador in Budapest was an important and reliable source of information for the British government, as he was at the forefront of the Hungarian Revolution. This position allowed him to exert some influence on the positioning of the government towards the event. From 23 October 1956 onwards, the Ambassador sent many reports back to London in which he tried to explain what was happening in Hungary. The heroic but tragic fate of the Hungarian people was a theme of most of the reports, and he described the violent outbreaks in much detail. For instance, he noted how he was able to see the Soviet tanks shoot at citizens "indiscriminately" from his office, and that the city would end up in ruins without a United Nations intervention or the withdrawal from the Russians.[87] The Ambassador continuously referred to the need for the involvement of the UN, and explained that he sent these details in order for the UK Delegation in the UN to use them in

[86] Ian Black. 2006. "A Painful Lesson in Diplomacy." *The Guardian*, 31 October. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com on 22 November, 2019. Simon Smith. 2016. "Suez Crisis and the End of the Empire." In *The Encyclopedia of Empire*." p.227-6.
[87] Letter from Budapest to Foreign Office, 5 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122382. 11737680. 4N538.

the debates.[88] Additionally, he pointed out that the Hungarians were "disappointed beyond words" by the British "inability to help them in their agony."[89] All in all, it seems as if the British Ambassador in Budapest was trying to push the government into helping the Hungarians and into taking an active stance against the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, both at the international and national level, the government of the United Kingdom was discussing how to handle the situation. At the international level, the UK was indeed the first country to bring up the issue to the Security Council of the United Nations, and proposed to draft a condemnation against the Soviet Union, together with the United States and France.[90] On the national level, Members of the British House of Commons referred to the Revolution as a "terrible tragedy," "shocking," and pointed out "the great sympathy which everyone in the House feels for these poor people."[91] They recognized the strain that the Hungarian refugees would place upon the Austrian economy. Additionally, it was pointed out that the British people were very eager to give help to the Hungarian people, which shows that the government was aware of the reactions of the public and had this in mind during discussions.[92] Although the British were sympathetic to the fate of the Hungarians in Hungary and Austria, the debate also makes clear that the government believed that the situation in Austria would only last for a short period of time, and that large-scale help would not be necessary. This shows that the British government did not foresee how substantial the Hungarian refugee crisis would become.

A speech from the United Kingdom Delegation during the UN General Assembly of 9 November 1956 clearly summarizes the overall position of the country regarding the situation in Hungary. The speech starts by stating that the U.K. saw the Revolution as a fight against "Soviet domination," and as an "heroic nation-wide bid to achieve freedom and independence."[93] Next, the Delegation felt the need to defend the British involvement in Egypt. They attacked the Soviet Union for their "misrepresentation of the attempt of Britain and France to save the peace in the Middle East."[94] They were also aware of the accusations against the U.K. that their involvement in Egypt prompted the Soviet action in Hungary,

[88] Telegram from Budapest to Foreign Office, 6 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122382. 11737680. 4N538.
[89] Letter from Budapest to Foreign Office, 7 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122382. 11737680. 4N538.
[90] Telegram from British UN Delegation, 27 October 1956. TNA. FO 371/122382. 11737680. 4N538.
[91] Extract from House of Commons Debates, 7 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122387. 11737682. 4N538.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Speech from United Kingdom Delegation in UN General Assembly, 9 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122387. 11737682. 4N538.
[94] Ibid.

which they refuted as nonsense. Instead, they presented both the Suez Crisis and the repression of the Hungarian Revolution as examples of "Soviet imperialism."[95] After a long lecture in which they compared the situation in Egypt and Hungary, the British Delegation ended on the note that they recognized "the humanitarian side of the problem," and that "the United Nations must not relax in its attempts to secure the people of Hungary the right to express themselves in freedom and determine their own affairs as a sovereign state." All in all, the speech suggests that the British government felt that it had to defend itself and protect its image in front of the international community. Moreover, it illustrates that the anti-communist position of the United Kingdom was an important factor that shaped the country´s response to the Hungarian Revolution.

In the final days of the Revolution, several issues were brought to the attention of the British government which may have contributed to its eventual decision to become actively involved. On 7 November, the Foreign Office received a message from Vienna which stated that the Austrian press had published the offers made by several European states to take in specific numbers of refugees, and that none of them mentioned the United Kingdom.[96] This message intended to let the government know that, in comparison to other countries, the United Kingdom was not active enough. On 10 November, a report from the embassy in Vienna points out that refugees were continuing to enter from all parts of Hungary in "considerable numbers."[97] Next, a telegram from Budapest to the Foreign Office on 11 November confirmed the anti-communist stance of the British government. It reported that machine-gun fire was still heard in Budapest, and summarizes a long speech that was given by Kadar as "communist clap-trap."[98] Additionally, as the Revolution unfolded, the government regularly received letters from British civilians, civil society groups, labour organizations, and other individuals, who requested that the government take immediate humanitarian action.[99] Thus, more and more pressure was put on the government to speak out and help Hungary.

In sum, these reports and documents from the National Archive in London have painted a picture of the reaction of the British government to the Hungarian Revolution. Within the

[95] Ibid.
[96] Telegram from Vienna to Foreign Office, 7 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122382. 11737680. 4N538.
[97] Telegram from Vienna to Foreign Office, 10 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122387. 11737682. 4N538.
[98] Telegram from Budapest to Foreign Office, 11 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122387. 11737682. 4N538.
[99] Letter from civilian to Foreign Affairs, 2 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122382. 11737680. 4N538. Letter from Southhampton Labour Organization to Foreign Affairs, 8 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122387. 11737682. Letter from Count Pejacsevich to Buckingham Palace. 1 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122382. 11737680. 4N538. 4N538. Letter from Vienna to Foreign Office, 29 October 1956. TNA. FO 371/122382. 11737680. 4N538.

United Nations, the UK took on a prominent role, and also on the national level, parliamentarians realized they had an obligation to take action. One can draw several conclusions from the previous paragraphs. First, the British government and its citizens were strongly opposed to Soviet communism, which largely explains their outspoken reaction against the actions of the Soviet Union in Hungary. This coincided with sympathetic feelings towards the Hungarians. Second, the government was aware that the international community viewed the UK's involvement in the Suez-crisis negatively, and felt a need to defend itself and protect the country's image. The Hungarian Revolution was an opportunity to enhance this image. Third, there was pressure from the international community, and pressure from below to take an active stance against the Soviet Union. These factors, however, are not sufficient to explain the welcoming attitude of the British government towards the Hungarian refugees. The following paragraphs will elaborate on the British motivation to grant asylum to the thousands of refugees.

2.3 The response of the United Kingdom to the refugee flow to Austria after the Revolution and its role in the resettlement process.

Reports and documents from the Secretary of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the British government illustrate the decision-making process of the United Kingdom on the Hungarian refugees. Moreover, during the course of the crisis in Austria, the Austrian embassy in the London sent multiple updates on the decisions of the British governments to the Austrian government. The following paragraphs combine these two perspectives and will chronologically lay out how the British government responded to the refugee flow to Austria, and how it took part in the resettlement and burden-sharing process.

Although the UK was one of the first countries that brought the violence in Hungary to the attention of the United Nations, it did not demonstrate a willingness to share the refugee burden straight away. A letter from the Austrian ambassador in London to the Austrian government states that already on 29 October 1956, the Austrian ambassador had tried to call the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs' attention to the issue of Hungarian refugees in Austria.[100] The letter states that Sir Selwyn Lloyd, member of the House of Commons, replied in an "evasive, but not opposed" manner, when asked if the British government was willing to take over refugees from Austria. This shows that at the early stage of the refugee crisis, the British government was not sure at all whether it would take part in the burden-sharing of the

[100] Uebernahme seitens Grossbritannien von ungarischen Fluechtlingen, 5 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn. Karton 403d, 1956.

Hungarian refugees. However, over the next few days, the situation in Hungary escalated. The Austrian government and the UNHCR had sent Aide Mémoires to the international community, including the U.K., in which they called upon countries' humanitarian principles and asked for help. These triggered extensive debates within the British parliament, and made the parliamentarians rethink the possibility of granting the Hungarian refugees asylum.[101] Thus, the humanitarian aspect of the refugee crisis may have motivated the British government to reconsider their stance towards the Hungarian refugees.

On the 12 November 1956, the Austrian government received the message from the ICEM that the British government was willing to take in 2500 refugees.[102] The British Council for Aid to Refugees (BCAR) would be responsible for the reception of the refugees, financially assisted by the British government.[103] Indeed, a few days later, the representative of the BCAR and a first team of doctors and immigration officers made their way to Austria to inspect the refugees and prepare the transport.[104] Negotiations on this offer already started a few days earlier, and the number of 2500 was based on the following assumption: "if those other countries who have the chance of doing so roughly what we are doing with our 2500, the problem should be solved."[105] Although the Austrian government was grateful for this offer, it put pressure on the British government to accept a higher number, as the refugee flow had increased significantly. The Austrian Ambassador in London laid out the following comparison to Sir Dodds-Parker, the British Under-Secretary of State on 22 November: "Great-Britain has circa 50 million inhabitants, which is 7 times the population of Austria. One should imagine what would happen if England suddenly had to deal with an influx of 300.000 people."[106] In turn, Dodds-Parker replied that the British government was hesitant because of accusations by some Hungarian refugees' that the U.K. itself had brought about the catastrophe in Hungary due to its involvement in the Suez Crisis in Egypt.[107] Nonetheless, the next day, the British government had decided to concede to Austria's appeal.

[101] Extract from House of Commons Debates, 7 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122387. 11737682. 4N538.
[102] Aufnahme von ungarischen Flüchtlingen durch Grossbritannien, 12 November 1956. 190.242. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Telegram to Vienna from London, 15 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn. Karton 403d, 1956.
[105] Extract from House of Commons Debates, 7 November 1956. TNA. FO 371/122387. 11737682. 4N538.
[106] Appell an die britische Regierung wegen dringender Fluechtlingshilfe, 22 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn. Karton 403d, 1956.
[107] Ibid.

On the 23 November 1956, the Austrian government received a statement from the British embassy in Vienna which confirmed that the U.K. would waive its limit of 2500 refugees. It stated the following: "In view of the appeal made by the Austrian government for emergency arrangements to be made … Her Majesty's government have decided to waive the limit of 2500 persons whom they had agreed to accept in this country. Her Majesty's government have also agreed that in view of the urgency and of the number to be accommodated here, it will no longer be possible to insist on individual interviews."[108] Thus, there was no longer a limit on the amount of refugees the government would grant asylum. This statement insinuates that it was the "urgency" of the situation in Austria and Austria's appeal that convinced the British government to take such an active stance.

The Austrian government saw the U.K. as "a shining example for all the other countries.[109] On 4 December 1956, the U.K. sent a cheque of almost 15 million shillings to the Austrian Government's Fund for Hungarian relief,[110] and about 11.000 refugees had entered the UK.[111] These numbers were seen as "proof of the cooperativeness of the British people."[112] It is safe to say that the British government had indeed been generous up until that time. Yet, despite earlier statements from the British government that they had waived the limit on the amount of refugees that they would accept, the Austrian government had reasons to be worried. The United Kingdom argued that its capacity to care for the refugees was about to be exhausted.[113] This was already visible from the transportation records, as fewer and fewer numbers of refugees were put on trains to the UK.[114] For this reason, on 6 December 1956, the British government decided to temporarily suspend the further entry of refugees. Interestingly, this suspension was put in place at the time when the number of Hungarian refugees in the U.K. was almost as high as the number of vacancies in the mining industry. The following paragraph will show that the motives of the British government behind their welcoming attitude up until then were never purely humanitarian.

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[108] Statement from British Embassy in Vienna, 23 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[109] Übernahme ungarischer Flüchtlingen durch Grossbitannien, 11 December 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956. Original: "für alle anderen Staaten ein leuchtendes Beispeil."
[110] Spende der britischen Regierung, 4 December 1956. 511.190 ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[111] Aufnahme von ungarischen Flüchtlingen durch Grossbritannien, 12 December 1956. 190.641. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[112] Aufnahme von ungarischen Flüchtlingen durch Grossbritannien, 12 December 1956. 190.641. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959. Original: "Beweis für die Hilfsbereitschaft des britischen Volkes."
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.

The labour shortage in the mining industry played a crucial role in the initial willingness of the United Kingdom to accept the Hungarian refugees. As mentioned before, there was a great reliance on coal in the country, and the Hungarian refugees were very suitable to fill the gap in the manpower that was needed to produce the coal required. While the United Kingdom had communicated to the world that they had temporarily suspended the further entry of refugees, reports from the Secretary of State and the Ministry of Labour illustrate that the recruitment of mining workers continued during this supposed suspension. A report from the British Home Affairs Committee states the following:

> The National Coal Board plan to continue recruiting miners in Austria and expect to bring men over at the rate of up to 150 a day. There are 12,000 vacancies in the pits and the Board is optimistic and determined to recruit men up to that number. (The Board do not wish to wish these figures to be disclosed publicly as this might jeopardize the arrangements.)[115]

A reason why the British government was not eager to disclose these plans to the public was the fact Hungary at the time had a coal shortage itself, and the British were very much aware of this.[116] They recognized that given Hungary's "much more serious shortage of coal," their actions "might be difficult to justify."[117] Nevertheless, they continued their plans, and kept recruiting Hungarian miners during the suspension period.

On 17 December 1956, the visit of the Canadian Minister Pickersgill to Austria was on the agenda of British Home Affairs Committee, which contributed to the eventual decision of the U.K. to lift the suspension on the intake of refugees. The report of this meeting describes how Pickersgill reminded the British government of the economic burden and political danger that the Hungarian refugees posed to Austria, and that he urged the British government to relieve Austria of this burden.[118] At that time, Canada had already taken in 7500 refugees, and they were willing to accept more. However, winter in Canada was harsh and therefore not the best period to host refugees. As a solution to this problem, Canada had already made deals with France and the Netherlands that these countries would temporarily host a certain

[115] 23rd meeting of the Home Affairs Committee, 18 December 1956. TNA. PREM 11/1715: Hungarian Refugees. 11735163. 4W138.
[116] 25th meeting of the Home Affairs Committee, 19 December 1956. TNA. PREM 11/1715: Hungarian Refugees. 11735163. 4W138.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, 17 December 1956. TNA. PREM 11/1715: Hungarian Refugees. 11735163. 4W138.

numbers of refugees, who would be resettled in Canada after six months when the weather was more suitable.[119] Pickersgill made a similar deal with the British government. He proposed that the UK should take in an additional 5000 refugees from Austria, who would then be resettled to Canada in spring. Canada would pay the costs of transport, and the British government would be in charge of the selection of refugees (of those who expressed the wish to go to Canada). In the eyes of Secretary of State for the Home Department, this was an attractive offer: "In any event, it is of course very desirable to do everything possible to keep the Canadian government in its present mood of enthusiast co-operation."[120] Moreover, given the fact that France and the Netherlands had already agreed to do so as well, the Committee believed that they were not in a position to refuse the offer: "The committee were in agreement with this proposal, it was justified on humanitarian grounds, and we could scarcely follow a less generous practice than the French and the Dutch in the matter."[121] The Committee noted that "For a day or two, it may be possible to stave of inquiries by indicating that the matter is still under discussion, but before long the lack of an agreement similar to that arrived with the French could be made the subject of criticism that might be damaging to us."[122] These lines illustrate that the government was very aware of its image, and how a wrong decision on this matter could worsen this image. This meeting is a fascinating example of how pressure from the international community, in combination with the wish of the British government to present a positive image, resulted in the decision to continue accepting Hungarian refugees and sharing the burden.

At the same time, an issue that the British government encountered during the reception of all the refugees was that many of the Hungarians expected they would end up settling in North America, the United States in particular, and that the United Kingdom was only a transit country. According to a survey that was held among the refugees in the Austrian refugee camps, and according to reports from the British government, the United States was indeed the preferred destination for most of the Hungarian refugees.[123] As earlier explained, travelling to Canada would be relatively easy for the refugees. However, this was not the case

[119] Ibid.
[120] Ibid.
[121] 25th meeting of the Home Affairs Committee, 19 December 1956. TNA. PREM 11/1715: Hungarian Refugees. 11735163. 4W138.
[122] Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, 17 December 1956. TNA. PREM 11/1715: Hungarian Refugees. 11735163. 4W138.
[123] James Niessen. 2016. "Hungarian Refugees of 1956: From the Border to Austria, Camp Kilmer, and Elsewhere." *Hungarian Cultural Studies*. e-Journal of the American Hungarian Educators Association (9): p.126. 25th meeting of the Home Affairs Committee, 19 December 1956. TNA. PREM 11/1715: Hungarian Refugees. 11735163. 4W138.

for the United States. It was not that the US was not willing to take over refugees from the United Kingdom or other European countries. They were simply hindered by legal obstacles. The American Immigration Act of 1921 only allowed 865 Hungarians annually, and the McCarren Walter Act of 1952 put in place strict screening and security requirements for migrants from communist countries. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 allowed the American government to grant asylum to 5000 Hungarian refugees that still resided in Austria, and thirty thousand would follow in the next months. This took some time because the American government had to find a way to get around the obstacles their legislation posed.[124] Meanwhile, the Hungarian refugees in the UK faced disappointment when they found out it was not possible to subsequently migrate again to the US, and the British government worried about the unrest this would cause. Therefore, they created a pamphlet addressed to the refugees already residing in the UK, in which they explained the situation and put forward other suggestions for re-migration.[125] Although the American involvement in the crisis was of great importance, in the earlier stage of the crisis, the involvement of Canada in the burden-sharing (of refugees) proved to be of more value than that of the US. Because of the refugees' apparent misunderstanding of the regulations between the United Kingdom and other countries, in the following weeks, the British government decided they would continue to accept an unlimited number Hungarian refugees, under the condition that they actually wanted to settle in the United Kingdom.[126] In the end, this led to the acceptance of over 20,000 refugees.

2.4 Findings

Although hesitant at first, the United Kingdom demonstrated considerable generosity and hospitality during the Hungarian refugee crisis of 1956. Out of all European countries that resettled refugees, it ended up granting asylum to largest share of refugees, and it was at the forefront of the discussions within United Nations regarding the situation in Hungary. So what explains their initial welcoming attitude towards the Hungarian refugees? In this case, the answer is a combination of the cost-benefit approach and the norms-based approach.

[124] James Niessen. 2016. "Hungarian Refugees of 1956: From the Border to Austria, Camp Kilmer, and Elsewhere." *Hungarian Cultural Studies*. e-Journal of the American Hungarian Educators Association (9): p.129
[125] Pamphlet from the Home Office on emigration, 20 December 1956. TNA. PREM 11/1715: Hungarian Refugees. 11735163. 4W138.
[126] Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, 23 January 1956. TNA. FO 371/127703. 11735168. 4N549.

First, the cost-benefit approach would ascribe the British government's -welcoming attitude towards the Hungarians to the country's flourishing economy and labour shortages. In contrast to Austria, the economy of the United Kingdom was booming. This coincided with a large shortage of labour in the British mining industry: 12,000 vacancies had to be filled. The Hungarian refugees were a perfect solution to this problem, and the government decided to actively recruit workers in the Austrian refugee camps. Thus, the government had a clear national economic interest in granting asylum to the Hungarians. Moreover, similar to Austria, the United Kingdom's image needed improving. The British involvement in Egypt had severely damaged the country's image within the international community, and accepting a large number of Hungarians would help to restore this image. The archival sources indeed have shown that the United Kingdom was very aware of how its actions would affect its image. The calculation that the British government made then was the following: although the commitment to take care of thousands of refugees would be costly, the benefit was that the labour shortage in the mining industry could largely be solved, and that the image of the country would get a boost.

However, a cost-benefit approach is not enough to explain the British willingness to share the burden of refugees. Although the United Kingdom had a clear national and economic interest in receiving the Hungarian refugees, there was also a moral and humanitarian aspect at play. Through a norms-based approach, one can identify several factors that explain the response of British government towards the Hungarian refugee crisis. Because the Soviet communists were a clear enemy of the United Kingdom, the British government naturally felt an obligation to condemn their actions. They were very sympathetic to the fate of the Hungarians, who were seen as the victims of communism, and the decision to help them was largely justified on moral and humanitarian grounds. Furthermore, many other European countries shared this belief and had made commitments to share the burden. Western states had internalized the norm which proscribed states to grant asylum to refugees fleeing from communism. Given this fact, the British government knew that it could not lag behind. From the archival sources becomes clear that with almost decision it made, the UK had the policies of other governments in mind. If other countries complied with international and moral norms, the British made sure that they did the same. The role of Canada as a norm entrepreneur was an important factor that helped convince the British government to conform to the Western norm. These factors, combined with the British cost-benefit calculations, explain why the United Kingdom responded to the Hungarian refugee crisis in such a positive way.

3. Case study three: the Netherlands

3.1 The political and economic landscape in the Netherlands in 1956.

Similar to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands was a country on the receiving end during the refugee crisis. Although eventually it did not grant asylum to a number of refugees as large as the number that the UK took in, the Netherlands was one of the first countries to respond. In order to understand the position of the Netherlands during the Revolution of 1956 and its attitude toward the Hungarian refugees, it is useful to lay out the characteristics of the country in this period. Four key characteristics can be identified which are likely to have influenced the decision-making process of the Dutch government. First, the Netherlands in this period was very anti-communist. Second, the Dutch both had a history of strong relations with Hungary, and had also adopted a cooperative position within the international community and international organizations. Third, the economy of the Netherlands was flourishing, which produced labour shortages. Finally, there existed a housing shortage that was largely caused by the arrival of Dutch-Indonesian migrants. The next four paragraphs will explain these characteristics in more detail.

First, the Dutch foreign political climate after the Second World War was characterized by pro-Western policies and by complete loyalty to the United States and the NATO.[127] This meant that the Dutch government´s behavior towards communism in the Cold War period was the same as that of the United States: distrustful, cautious and hostile. Given this position, and the fact that the Hungarian revolution was a battle against Soviet communism, the Dutch people stood with the Hungarians with full sympathy.[128] Other anti-communist countries in the Western bloc such as the UK and the United States had spoken out against the Soviet violence and were making commitments to the Austrian government. This put pressure on the Dutch government to take part in sharing the burden as well. Yet, government officials were also worried about the communists that were present among the refugees.[129] Overall, they had to find a balance between international pressure and their internal worries.

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[127] Baehr, P.R. 1978. "The foreign policy of the Netherlands," in *The foreign policy of the Netherlands*, ed. J.H. Leurdijk. Alphen aan de Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff. Van Staden, Alfred. 1989. "The changing role of the Netherlands in the Atlantic alliance." *West European Politics.* 12(1): 99-111.

[128] Die Vorgänge in Ungarn, von Holland aus gesehen, 5 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.

[129] Letter from Craandijk to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (from here onwards: MFA), 20 November 1956. NA, Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 12775.

Second, the Dutch government up until than has had strong relations with Hungary. Dutch-Hungarian relations date back to the seventeenth century, when Hungarian students came to study in the Netherlands. Since then, relations had always been good. These good relations were confirmed after the First World War, when 30,000 Hungarian children came to the Netherlands where they resided with foster families in order to recover from the war.[130] . Moreover, similar to the UK, it demonstrated an active and cooperative attitude within the international community and international organizations. In 1948, the Netherlands signed the Declaration of Human Rights, followed by the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. According to Hellema, the foreign policy of the Netherlands should be considered as small but influential, and this was also how the Dutch government viewed itself.[131] On the one hand Dutch citizens could be described as activists. Yet, on the other hand, they could also be characterized as hesitant and shy of grand gestures.[132] The Prime-Minister of the Netherlands at the time of the Revolution, Willem Drees, can be seen as the personification of the latter. This chapter will illustrate how his government took an active stance towards the Hungarian refugees and the resettlement process in the beginning, but ended up granting asylum to only a limited number of people.

Third, the economy of Netherlands in the mid-fifties was booming, as it was in most other European countries. With the help of the Marshall Plan, the country was able to rebuild itself in relatively fast period of time after the Second World War. By the end of the fourties, the industrial and agricultural production was on the same level as it was before the war.[133] From the fifties onwards, the reconstruction of the country was followed by unprecedented economic growth. In 1956, the real wage of Dutch citizens was increased by six percent.[134] So, the Dutch had more to spend, existing industries were growing, and new industries were created in order to satisfy the demand in this new consumption society.[135] Similar to the situation in the United Kingdom, the Dutch economic growth naturally coincided with large demands for labour in sectors such as the mining industry. Many of the Hungarians were

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[130] Leo van Bergen. 2017. "Humanitarianism (the Netherlands)." *International Encyclopedia of the First World War.* 22 June.
[131] Hellema, Duco. 1990. *De Nederlandse houding ten aanzien van de Hongaarse Revolutie en de Suezcrisis.* Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Jan Mets. p.59.
[132] Everts, P and G. Walraven. 1989 *The Politics of Persuasion; implementation of foreign policy by the Netherlands.* Aldershot: Avebury. p.21.
[133] Kromhout, Bas. 2007. "De Wederopbouw van Nederland." *Historischieuwsblad.nl.* Retrieved on 28 April, 2019.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.

young, male workers that were suitable to fill this labour shortage. The rest of the chapter will show how this had an influence on the willingness of the Netherlands to grant asylum to the refugees.

Fourth, although the Dutch economy performed well at the time of the Hungarian Revolution, there were problems on the housing market. Since 1949, the Dutch government had taken in approximately 160,000 Dutch-Indonesian migrants, which contributed to a housing shortage.[136] It is questionable to what extent this housing shortage was truly an obstacle to accepting larger numbers of refugees. Yet, as a report from the Austrian embassy in The Hague states, Prime-Minister Drees conveniently used the shortage as an argument to put a limit on the number of Hungarian refugees the government would allow.[137] Knowing the economic state of the Netherlands, and understanding the country's political characteristics, will add to the understanding of the response to the Hungarian refugee crisis. The next paragraphs will reflect on the actual Dutch response to the Hungarian revolution and the following refugee crisis, by analyzing archival documents from the National Archive in The Hague and the Austrian State Archive in Vienna, that provide insight into the decision-making process of the government.

3.2 The Dutch Government's response to the repression of the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviet Union

During the course of the Revolution, the Dutch ambassador in Hungary, F.W. Craandijk, was always in close contact with the Minister Luns, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, and kept him updated on the development of the situation in Budapest. Craandijk tried to send daily reports to the Netherlands, and these reports provide insight into what information was available to the Dutch government about the situation in Hungary. The first letter arrived at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 24 October 1956, in which Craandijk described the uprising of thousands of students against the Soviets and that the statue of Stalin in Budapest had been pulled down. He noted that the city was filled by Russian tanks that quickly ended this first attempt at rebellion.[138] The letter ends on this note: "And so, this heroic attempt to

[136] Bronkhorst, Daan. 1990. *Een tijd van komen: De geschiedenis van vluchtelingen in Nederland.* Amsterdam: Federatie Von/ Uitgeverij Jan Mets.
[137] Ungarnflüchtlinge Österreichische Gesandtschaft Den Haag, 22 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[138] Letter from Craandijk to the MFA. 1902/739. 24 October 1956, Budapest. NA, Ambassade Hongarije, 1946-1974, 2.05.184, inv.nr. 320.

shake off the communist yoke sadly failed, but this can only be ascribed to the presence of Russian troops and tanks. … Tuesday afternoon can be seen as a referendum in which the entire population proved its distaste of communism." [139] This letter indicates that in Craandijk's eyes, the Revolution was something to be applauded and that the revolutionaries who fought against the Soviet communists were to be considered heroes. His view can be as representative for the Dutch government's view on the Revolution.

The following days, Craandijk kept sending letters to his colleagues in the Netherlands in which he describes the development of the Revolution in Budapest. A letter from 26 October 1956 draws attention to the bloodiest episode from the Revolution at that point, in which the AVO killed hundreds of unarmed protestants in front of the houses of parliament.[140] The next letter from 27 October stated that the violence was growing worse, and that the faith of Hungary is in the hands of the Russians. Craandijk provided a list of the newly declared government members, but doubts that this new government will be an effective one.[141] On the 30th of October, Craandijk pointed out that the Soviets had announced to draw their troops from Budapest, but he viewed this announcement with large distrust. In the next days, the Dutch government kept receiving similar reports, but did not act on it until 4 November 1956, the bloodiest day of the revolution.

A report from the Austrian Ambassador in the Netherlands to the Austrian government captures the position of the Netherlands towards the Hungarian people during the Revolution. It was important for Austria to have an estimation on which countries might have been willing to help them out with the refugee problem, and the Austrian Ambassador gave several examples of how the Dutch responded to the Revolution.. First, he noted that, given the Netherlands' position in World War II, they stood by the Hungarians with full sympathy.[142] He continued by saying that as the events in Budapest and Hungary unfolded, there was "a wave of exasperation" that went through the country.[143] Next, he pointed out that Prime-Minister Drees gave a speech on national radio in which he condemned the behavior by the

[139] Original: "Zo is deze heldhaftige poging om het communistische juk af te schudden jammerlijk mislukt, maar dit is alleen toe te schrijven aan het gebruik der Russische tanks en troepen… Dinsdag middag kan beschouwd worden als een referendum waarbij de hele bevolking het bewijs heeft geleverd van de afkeer van het communisme." (ibid.)

[140] Letter from Craandijk to MFA. 1902/739 (vervolg). 26 October 1956, Budapest. NA, Ambassade Hongarije, 1946-1974, 2.05.184, inv.nr. 320.

[141] Letter from Craandijk to MFA. 1902/739 (vervolg). 27 October 1956, Budapest. NA, Ambassade Hongarije, 1946-1974, 2.05.184, inv.nr. 320.

[142] Die Vorgänge in Ungarn, von Holland aus gesehen, 5 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.

[143] Ibid. Original: "eine Woge der Empörung."

Soviet Union, and that there were several organizations that had already organized fundraisers to help the Hungarians.[144] Finally, the Ambassador noted that all flags throughout the Netherlands were lowered to half mast, and that the embassy had already received several messages of Dutch citizens who were willing to provide shelter for Hungarian children.[145] This report suggests that, from an Austrian perspective, the Netherlands had great potential to become involved in the burden-sharing process because of its anti-communist attitude. Especially the public showed great sympathy for the Hungarians, and the next sub-chapter will illustrate that this put pressure on the Dutch government to take an active stance towards the Hungarian refugees as well.

In sum, as earlier established, the position of the Netherlands during the Cold War was very much anti-communist. Given this position, one might expect that the Dutch government, and other countries on the Western front, would have had an interest in providing the Hungarians political or at least financial support during the Revolution. However, this was not the case. The Dutch government did not have much respect for Imre Nagy, the leader of the revolution, as he was regarded a loyal communist himself.[146] From the communication between Ambassador Craandijk and Minister Luns of Foreign Affairs, it becomes clear that that the Ambassador was not completely able to grasp the situation in Hungary. The first days of the revolution, he pointed out the growing unrest and violence in Budapest. Later on, however, he reported that the Soviet occupiers had agreed to remove their troops from Budapest and already discussed the implications of the newly established government. Although he watched these developments happen with distrust, it seems like he did not foresee what was about to happen. Similarly, Prime-Minister Drees admitted that before the climax of the Revolution, he never viewed the Soviet communists as a serious threat.[147] All in all, it can be argued that the Dutch government underestimated the seriousness of the situation in Hungary as the Revolution developed, and did not condemn or speak out against the Soviet Union until it was too late. Nevertheless, as illustrated by the report of the Austrian embassy in the Netherlands, from November onwards, the entire country, including the Dutch government, demonstrated full support and sympathy for the Hungarians. The

[144] Ibid.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Hellema, Duco. 1990. *De Nederlandse houding ten aanzien van de Hongaarse Revolutie en de Suezcrisis.* Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Jan Mets. p.172.
[147] Ibid.

following sub-chapter will chronologically lay out the Dutch response to the Hungarian refugee crisis and explain how it took part sharing the burden.

3.3 The response of the Netherlands to the refugee crisis in Austria after the Revolution and its role in the resettlement process.

As stated in the first chapter on Austria, the Austrian government sent its first cry for help to the international community on 5 November 1956. With the help of the UNHCR, this message was quickly received by most countries, including the Netherlands.[148] A day later, the House of Representatives in the Netherlands organized a meeting in which the situation in Hungary was discussed. In the meeting, Minister-President Drees gave a speech in which he stated that the Netherlands probably had stronger feelings regarding the fate of the Hungarians than any other country in the free world, because of the strong relations between the two countries.[149] Furthermore, he pointed out that the Netherlands had supported a resolution from the UN General Assembly which condemned the Soviet Union and recognized the right of the Hungarians to establish their own government. One of the conclusions of the meeting was that, although there was not much that the Dutch government could do, they were also not completely powerless.[150] At that point in time, about 15,000 refugees had entered Austria. Having that number in mind, and recognizing that the Dutch citizens were already "taking every opportunity to do what is possible to express sympathy in a positive way," Drees decided that the Netherlands would grant asylum to a thousand refugees.[151] Furthermore, a code message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Dutch embassy in Vienna states that the Dutch policy regarding helping the Hungarian refugees "is, and will stay aligned with the policy of the UNHCR."[152] From this meeting and code message, one can derive that the government's decision was motivated by multiple factors: the involvement of the UNHCR, the strong relationship between the two countries, the Dutch anti-communist position, pressure from the citizens, and the simple fact that the government did not expect the crisis to become much larger.

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[148] Telegram from UN High Commissioner James Read to the Netherlands, 6 November 1956. NA, Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 12775.
[149] Netherlands, Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1956-1957, 6th meeting 6 November 1956, p. 103-142. Retrieved from www.politicalmashup.nl on 19 May, 2019.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Code message MFA to Vienna, 8 November 1956. NA, Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 12775.

On 9 November 1956, the Austrian government had the pleasure of receiving a letter from the Austrian embassy in The Hague which confirmed that Dutch government had decided to take in a thousand Hungarian refugees, and an additional thousand if this would be needed.[153] The same letter stipulates the emotions of the Dutch population regarding the events in Hungary. It said that on 8 November 1956, the government organized a three-minute silence as a tribute to victims of the Revolution.[154] Moreover, it mentions that that no one less than Queen Juliana, Princess Wilhelmina and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands openly spoke out in favor of the Hungarian refugees and were at the forefront of fundraising and charity events.[155] Thus, from the perspective of this letter, the Dutch government responded quite quickly to the refugee crisis in Austria, and this can largely be ascribed the emotional reaction of the Dutch citizens and their sympathy for the Hungarians, including the reaction and sympathy of the royal family.

In the next few weeks, the government had to weigh up the negative aspects of accepting more refugees against the benefits. Two main concerns existed. A first concern for the government was that they could allow dangerous communists into the country who allegedly were present among the refugees. A letter from Ambassador Craandijk in Budapest from the 20th of November states the following:

> "As much as one must praise the willingness of the free world to receive large numbers of Hungarian refugees, there are also dangers attached to this hospitality. Among the flow of Hungarians, who crossed the Austrian border, are highly undesirable elements. In the first place members of the AVO, who, after … hundreds of AVO-men were massacred by the population, ran off … One can assume that among the refugees who cross and crossed the border in the second period are much more decent elements. These are those who are truly anti-communist."[156]

Thus, the possible presence of communists among the Hungarian refugees was an obstacle to the further acceptance of refugees by the Dutch government. A second concern for the government was the effect that the Hungarians would have on the housing market, as there was already a housing shortage in the country, partly caused by the arrival of the Dutch-Indonesian migrants. Prime-Minister Drees, who could be characterized as quite reticent

[153] Die Vorgänge in Ungarn, Reaktion in Holland, polizeiliches Hilfsangebot, 9 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Letter from Craandijk to MFA, 20 November 1956. NA, Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 12775.

regarding the crisis, used this argument multiple times as a justification for why the Netherlands supposedly was not capable of hosting more refugees.[157]

On the other hand, several events came to the attention of the Dutch government that pressured them into reconsidering their initial offer of granting asylum to 2000 refugees. First, on 24 November 1956, the Dutch ambassador in Budapest sent a letter to the Dutch government in which he said that that thousands and thousands of Hungarians in need of help were still leaving Budapest and fleeing to Austria, under harsh winter circumstances.[158] He pointed out that there were several refugees who did not want to leave Hungary without valid papers and had come to the Dutch embassy to ask for visas, which he would give whenever the people were known to have clean records.[159] Moreover, the Ambassador stated that under the circumstances, it was not possible for the embassy to adhere to all the regular procedures and regulations.[160] As mentioned in the previous chapters, the Austrian government and the UNHCR had called for states to follow the Austrian example and abandon certain bureaucratic rules, as they believed it would smoothen the resettlement process. The report illustrates that the Dutch ambassador in Budapest recognized this call, and that he attended the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the necessity of helping them.

Furthermore, several reports different reports illustrate that the 27th of November was a day in which the Dutch government received local and international pressure to take in more Hungarian refugees. First, the Ministry of Foreign affairs received pressure from above via a radio message from the UNHCR. It was an "urgent appeal" that called upon governments to consider accepting more Hungarian refugees.[161] The message states includes the following excerpts: "Complete understanding of the Dutch difficulties. Yet, the situation in Austria is indescribable … Seventy-thousand are waiting in unimaginable circumstances … Several West-European countries have made new commitments."[162] These lines illustrate that the UNHCR wanted the Dutch government to put the difficulties in the Netherlands into

[157] Ungarnflüchtlinge Österreichische Gesandtschaft Den Haag, 22 November 1956. 511.190. ÖstA. BMf/AA. Sektion II-Pol Ungarn 403d, 1956. Netherlands, Tweede Kamer Handelingen 1956-1956. 12th meeting, 9 January 1956. p.103-128. Retrieved from www.politicalmashup.nl on 20 May, 2019.
[158] Toestand in Hongarije, 24 November 1956. NA, Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 12775.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Beroep aan Nederland van UNHCR, 27 November 1956. NA, Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 12775. Original: "dringend beroep."
[162] Ibid. Original: "Volkomen begrip Nederlandse moeilijkheden, doch toestand in Oostenrijk onbeschrijfelijk … zeventigduizend wachten in onvoorstelbare omstandigheden … verschillende West-Europese landen nieuwe toezeggingen gedaan.

perspective. Moreover, since other countries had made new commitments, the Netherlands should do so as well. Second, pressure from below came from Dutch "Utrechts Committee for Austrian Children." The Committee had sent a letter to the Austrian Ministry of Inner Affairs, in which they asked questions on what the current state of affairs was on the acceptance of Hungarian refugee children by the Dutch government.[163] The literal question they asked was: "have you already made plans with the Dutch government to send more Hungarians and/or children from the Austrian refugee camps to the Netherlands," after which the Austrian government reached out to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[164] This is one example of many that illustrates how civilians and civil society groups were indirectly able to put pressure on the Dutch government.

A report from the meeting of the House of Representatives on the 27th of November makes clear that these messages did not go by unnoticed. Although the government had already raised the number of refugees they would accept from a thousand to two-thousand,[165] many members of the Chamber were still not satisfied by the government's actions so far.[166] For instance, Van Lier from the Labour Party pointed out how "initially, it seemed like the Netherlands would completely fulfill its obligation."[167] However, he feared that the government would fall short. Similar to the appeal from the UNHCR, he made a comparison between the situation in the Netherlands and the situation in Austria, and concluded that, "given the distress of the refugees in Austria and given the sympathy and willingness of our citizens," the government should "continue accepting Hungarian refugees in an liberal manner."[168] This shows that the government felt a humanitarian obligation towards the refugees and that it was in line with the Dutch principles of liberalism to continue helping Austria and the Hungarian refugees. Moreover, because the Dutch citizens were taking such an active stance, the government felt pressure to live up to the expectations of the people.

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[163] Utrechts Comité voor Oostenrijkse Kinderen, 27 November 1956. 190.237. ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959.
[164] Ibid. Original: "haben sie mit der Niederländischen Regierung schon Pläne gemacht um weitere Ungarische oder/und Kinder aus den Österreichischen Flüchtlingenlager nach Holland zu schicken?"
[165] Letter from Ambassador Star Busmann to Salzburg, 22 November 1956. NA, Ambassade in Oostenrijk (1955-1974), 2.05.235, inv.nr. 208.
[166] Netherlands, Tweede Kamer Handelingen 1956-1957, 17th meeting on 27 November 1956. p.3221-3254. Retrieved from www.politicalmashup.nl on 19 May, 2019.
[167] Ibid. Original: "Aanvankelijk leek het dat Nederland volledig zijn plicht zou doen."
[168] Ibid. Original: "Gezien de nood van deze vluchtelingen in Oostenrijk en gezien het medeleven en de offerbereidheid van ons volk." "Op onbekrompen wijze voort te gaan met de toelating van de Hongaarse vluchtelingen."

After much deliberation, the government decided to give in to the pressure of granting more refugees asylum. First, on the 29 November 1956, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the Dutch Embassy in Vienna that the government had decided they would accept another 3000 refugees, but that that these could only stay for a period of six months.[169] The number of refugees that could permanently stay would remain a 2000. However, on the 1 December 1956, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent another telegram in which they announced that the previous decision had been adjusted.[170] The Dutch government had realized that it would not be feasible to resettle 3000 refugees in such a short period, as multiple governments had responded in dismissive manner to this proposal. As a result, on 6 December 1956, the Austrian government received a confirmation from the Dutch ambassador in Vienna that the Netherlands had agreed to permanently grant asylum to an additional 1000 refugees, and temporarily to 2000 refugees , who would be resettled in other countries within six months.[171] Thus, the total number of Hungarians that would be allowed to stay permanently was raised from 2000 to 3000.

The Austrian government saw this offer as an example of the "European spirit of solidarity."[172] However, the Dutch government did not make this offer purely out of generosity or for humanitarian reasons. Another two factors can be identified which influenced the decision-making of the Dutch government: 1) the involvement of Canada in the burden-sharing process, and 2) the shortage of mine-workers in the Netherlands. First, in the chapters on Austria and the United Kingdom was demonstrated how the Austrian government invited a Canadian minister into the country, which resulted the participation of Canada in the burden-sharing process. This did not only had an impact on Austria and the UK, but also on the decision-making process of the Dutch government in deciding on the amount of refugees they would take in. The Dutch offer of taking in this additional amount of refugees was made

[169] Telegram MFA to Vienna, 29 November 1956. NA, Ambassade in Oostenrijk (1955-1974), 2.05.235, inv.nr. 208.
[170] Telegram MFA to Vienna, 1 December 1956. NA, Ambassade in Oostenrijk (1955-1974), 2.05.235, inv.nr. 208.
[171] Ständige Aufnahme von 3.000 ungarischen Flüchtlingen durch die Niederlande, 6 December 1956. 791.421. . ÖstA. AdR/BMI. 10UH Referat, 1956-1959. Original: "Hoezeer men de bereidheid der vrije landen om grote getalen Hongaarse vluchtelingen te ontvangen moet prijzen, aan deze gastvrijheid zijn ook gevaren verbonden. Onder de stroom Hongaren, die de Oostenrijkse grens overschreden, bevinden zich immers zeer zeker ongewenste elementen, in de eerste plaats leden der AVO, die, na … honderden AVO-mannen door de bevolking gemassacreerd werden, de benen hebben genomen … Aangenomen kan dus worden, dat zich onder de vluchtelingen die in de tweede periode over de grens kwamen en komen, zich veel meer fatsoenlijke elementen bevinden. Dit zijn zij die werkelijk anti-communist zijn."
[172] Ibid. Original: "Geiste der europäischen Solidarität."

four days after Canada had taken it upon itself to grant asylum to of thousands of refugees. Canada and the Netherlands then came to an agreement that the 2000 refugees that could temporarily stay in the Netherlands would be granted asylum in Canada.[173] Thus, this decision of the Netherlands, arguably ´in the spirit of solidarity,´ would probably not have happened without the prominent role of Canada in the burden-sharing process. This interplay between Canada and the Netherlands (and many other European countries for that matter) illustrates how the generosity of one country can have a spill-over effect on other countries. The more one contributes, the more others will be willing to give in as well.

Second, as earlier established economy in the Netherlands in 1956 was booming. Similar to the situation of the .K, this produced a large demand for labour in certain sectors, the mining industry for instance. Among the Hungarian refugees were many unmarried, skilled, young men that would be suitable for filling these positions. Officially, the Dutch recruiting team in the Austrian refugee camps was not allowed to select refugees; they were to recruit refugees from all backgrounds, skilled and unskilled.[174] However, behind closed doors, the Dutch government instructed the selection team in Austria to select at least an additional 600 Hungarian refugees that were to be employed as miners when they arrived in the Netherlands.[175] The total number of refugees the Netherlands would grant asylum would then be 3600. These 600 men had to meet certain conditions. For instance, they had to have previous experience in the mining industry in Hungary. They needed to be unmarried, and they were only allowed to bring someone with them if it was a widower with a child, or a fiancé.[176] This means that, although the Dutch government communicated to the public and the international community that they randomly selected Hungarian refugees, at least a few hundred were specifically selected for economic reasons and according to their background and skills. Thus, one can add 'labour shortage in the Netherlands' to the list of motives behind the government's initial willingness to grant asylum to the Hungarian refugees.

[173] Hulpverlening aan Hongaarse vluchtelingen, 21 January 1957. NA, Buitenlandse Zaken / Code-Archief 55-64, 2.05.118, inv.nr. 12775.
[174] Schrover, Marlou and Tycho Walaardt. 2017. "The influence of the media on politics and practices: Hungarian refugee resettlement in the Netherlands in 1956." *Journal of Migration History* (3): 35.
[175] Telegram to Dutch Embassy in Vienna, 21 December 1956. NA, Ambassade in Oostenrijk (1955-1974), 2.05.235, inv.nr. 208
[176] Ibid.

3.4 Findings

In the first weeks of the crisis Netherlands adopted an extremely cooperative attitude towards Austria and the Hungarian refugees. In the first days after the worst violence in Hungary, and after Austria and the UNHCR had sent out cries for help into the international community, the Netherlands was very committed to share the burden. It was one of the first countries that confirmed to accept a number of refugees in order to relieve Austria of the burden, and actively spoke out against the Soviet Union to the Dutch citizens and in the United Nations. Similar to the case of the United Kingdom, a combination of a norms-based approach and a cost-benefit approach explains this positive attitude.

First, studying the response of the Netherlands to the Hungarian refugees through a norms-based approach reveals several factors which influenced the government's decision-making process. Meetings from the Dutch House of Representatives and communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassies in Budapest and Austria illustrate that this welcoming attitude of the Dutch government can be ascribed to the Dutch principles of liberalism, and the fact that the government felt they had a moral and humanitarian obligation to help out. These feelings of solidarity stemmed from the self-proclaimed strong Hungarian-Dutch relations, but most importantly, the country's strong anti-communist stance. Furthermore, serving as a norm entrepreneur and as a mediator between Austria and the Western regime, the UNHCR contributed to the policy-making of the Dutch government. The Dutch explicitly stated they would follow the policy of the UNHCR, thereby conforming to international humanitarian norms. Similarly, Canada as a norm entrepreneur had an influence on the number of refugees that the Netherlands took in. Moreover, since the Dutch citizens were so outspoken and sympathetic to the fate of the Hungarians, the government felt pressure to adopt a similar stance. Thus, the government experienced both pressure from norm entrepreneurs on a local level: the Dutch population, and from an international norm entrepreneur: the UNHCR.

The cost-benefit approach reveals the economic interests of the Dutch government in accepting the Hungarian refugees. After about two weeks, the Hungarian refugee crisis escalated and more and more pressure was given on countries to reconsider their initial offers, including the Netherlands. From this point onwards, the government became more hesitant: the cooperative attitude of the Dutch government proved to have a time limit. However, similar tot the United Kingdom, the Netherlands had labour shortages in the mining industry. This, together with the pressure from norm entrepreneurs, eventually convinced the

government decide to accept another batch of refugees. In sum, while national economic interests were important in the willingness of the Netherlands to accept the refugees, the commitments and compliance of other countries in the Western regime to international norms proved to be key.

4. Conclusion

By providing an international comparative approach, this thesis adds a different perspective to the body of literature on the Hungarian refugee crisis of 1956. In order to understand the process of burden-sharing, and explain the international community's welcoming attitude towards Hungarian refugees in 1956, it is necessary to adopt an international perspective. After all, burden-sharing always involves multiple states. Yet, when studying the response of states to this crisis, most previous authors picked a single country as their case study. As a result, they did not sufficiently take into account the international arena in which governments make decisions, even though this proved to be of great importance during the Hungarian refugee crisis. For instance, previous studies on Austria describe the crisis in the country after the Hungarian revolution, but do not properly address the reasons why other countries actually agreed to share Austria's burden. Furthermore, studies on the United Kingdom mainly ascribe the country's welcoming attitude to labour shortages and its involvement in the Suez Crisis. However, they often overlook or downplay the pressure of the international community the British government felt to comply to international humanitarian norms, and the interplay between British policies and other countries' asylum policies, such as those of Canada, France, or the Netherlands. Similarly, previous studies on the Netherlands often ascribe its welcoming attitude to labour shortages, and the positive framing of refugees by the media and/or politicians. However, again, pressure from the international community also proved to have significant influence on the Dutch government's decision-making. Thus, while this thesis and the previous studies have detected the national characteristics of states that are conducive to burden-sharing, this thesis has also revealed what is necessary on the international level to achieve successful burden-sharing and international cooperation.

The Cold War was a period in which the world was caught up in an arms race between the East and the West. However, during the Hungarian refugee crisis of 1956 in Europe, one could also speak of a refugee race. After many days of violence, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians sought asylum in other countries. These countries almost seemed to be in a competition for who would take in the most refugees; Austria, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands being three examples. The reasons for these countries' welcoming attitude and willingness to share the burden vary. Whereas Austria was not left with much choice other than to accept the refugees and take care of them out of moral and humanitarian interests, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands also had national economic interests in granting the Hungarians asylum. What all three countries had in common, however, was that they felt an

obligation to comply with international humanitarian norms that the Western regime had internalized; the norm being to show compassion and take care of refugees fleeing from Soviet communism. A snowball effect took place the moment the first few countries in the international community made commitments to help the government of Austria: the more one state gave, the more other states were willing to give as well. Norm entrepreneurs, such as the UNHCR, NGOs and the citizens of each state, positively influenced the process of burden-sharing. Together, they were able to pressure governments into adopting a cooperative stance. Overall, the political and economic circumstances under which the Hungarian refugee crisis took place provided a window of opportunity for norm entrepreneurs to make states prioritize humanitarian interests over national interests.

So what can this historical event tell us about the problems that the Western world faces in sharing the burden of today's refugees? A first obstacle that hinders current international cooperation is the lack of a clear 'enemy'. In 1956, states in the Western regime were all in agreement that the refugees fleeing from Soviet communism were worthy of protection, which enabled them to create a united front. However, many of today's refugees flee from disasters and conflicts that are extremely intricate and involve many different parties. The reasons people flee have diversified, and it has become more difficult for governments to determine which parties are 'good' and which ones are 'bad.' In 1956, the norm to grant asylum to refugees fleeing from communism was straightforward and relatively simple. Today, the numerous types of disasters and conflicts have made it difficult for a regime to internalize a norm that proscribes states to grant asylum to a certain type of refugee.

This is strongly related to the second obstacle to international cooperation: the lack of support from citizens. In 1956, most Austrian, British, and Dutch citizens adopted the role of norm entrepreneurs. They actively spoke out in favor of granting asylum to the Hungarian refugees and were at the forefront of fundraising actions. Today, there are still numerous local norm entrepreneurs, that is parties, NGOs and citizens, that also support open asylum policies. However, they have to deal with obstacles created by the increasing presence of nativist populist parties. The xenophobic discourse of these parties attracts substantial parts of the voters of many European countries, which makes it more difficult for humanitarian norm entrepreneurs to establish open asylum policies. Thus, the massive pressure that governments experienced from the population to welcome refugees in 1956 is not as prevalent in contemporary times.

Finally, the chapters have illustrated that an economic boom would be conducive to successful international cooperation and burden-sharing. States always make cost-benefit

calculations when they make decisions. If states determine that they have economic national interests in accepting refugees, international cooperation and burden-sharing is likely to take place. In 1956, this was indeed the case for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. With the exception of Austria, many economies in Europe were flourishing. Large labour shortages existed in the UK and the Netherlands, and Hungarian refugees were seen as a solution to this problem. However, this no longer applies to most current economies. The effects of the 2008 economic crisis still linger in many countries, resulting in less labour shortages, and less to gain for states if they accept refugees. Even if a country within the EU does face a labour shortage, it is more likely that it will try to fill this shortage with workers from another EU country instead of refugees. Thus, today's labour market does not provide the same opportunities as the one back in 1956. If it is somehow possible to tackle these three obstacles, the chances of achieving successful burden-sharing during a refugee crisis would increase significantly, and compassion could start to become the norm again.

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