

## Migration Control.

How did the Dutch Government react to Surinamese Migration during Decolonization, 1974-1980?



Master Thesis  
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13 October 2017  
Universiteit Leiden

Max Nijman – Adjossi (1974).

Adjossi na wan wortoe die tranga foe takie  
Te mi loekoe, alla ding matie foe mi dja.  
Ma matie, oen no moe broko, no broko mi hati  
Bika mi srefi e sari foe libie oen toe.  
Famirie, mi de begi, oh, oen no moe kre  
Bika mi e go libie oen, foe so wan langa ting.  
Ma mi e go prkserie dat wan gado de na tapoe  
Oen moes begi hem, bika na hem moe troostoe wi.  
Te mi prakserie ding ting die wi bing de makandra,  
ding ting die wi, bing lafoe, bing njang, kre  
So mi e begi joe, foe no moe broko, no broko mi hati  
ika mi srefi e sari, e sari foe troe.  
Ma wi moesoe libie, lekie brada, brada nanga sisa  
So Adjossi mi e bari oenoe now.

Farewell, is a word hard to say  
When I look at all my friends that are here  
My friends, do not break my heart  
Because I am also sad to leave you  
Family I ask you not to cry  
Because I am leaving you for such a long time  
But in my mind there is a god above  
You must pray to him, because He will comfort you  
When I think back of the time, that we were together  
The time we laughed, ate together and cried  
So I ask you, do not break my heart  
Because I am myself very sad  
But we must live together, like brothers and sisters  
So now I say to you farewell!

On 19 January 2016 Surinamese singer and legend Max Nijman (no familial relation) died at 74. Nijman was one of the most important Surinamese artists since he was one of the few singers who sang in the Surinamese language Sranantongo. The lyrics of the song Adjossi show someone saying goodbye to his friends and family; leaving his home for good as so many of his compatriots did in the year the song came out.

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## 1. Introduction.

The lyrics of the song by popular soul singer Max Nijman above show the way Surinamese felt when leaving their family, friends, and country behind. In singing in the Surinamese native language he accelerated the national identity of the Surinamese Republic which saw the light on 25 November 1975.<sup>1</sup> The announced independence was a reason for ten thousands Surinamese to emigrate to the Netherlands, motherland of the colony Suriname since 1667.<sup>2</sup> The migration from Suriname to the Netherlands became prominent and attracted significant debate in the Netherlands. This thesis considers how the Dutch state reacted to extensive Surinamese immigration.

Between 1974 and 1980, up to 100,000 Surinamese traveled to the Netherlands, while migration from the Netherlands to Suriname came close to just 20,000 (see Figure 1). Although they mostly traveled on tourist visas which provided them entry to the country and legal stay for up to three months, the vast majority of Surinamese migrants intended to settle in the Netherlands permanently.<sup>3</sup>




Figure 1. Migration from Suriname to the Netherlands (blue line) and migration from the Netherlands to Suriname (black line).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Star Nieuws, 'Max Nijman overleden (1941-2016)' (19 January 2016)

<http://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/33362> (visited on 19 September 2017).

<sup>2</sup> E. Bakker e.a., *Geschiedenis van Suriname. Van stam tot staat* (Zutphen, 1998) pp. 28-29.

<sup>3</sup> National Archive, 2.09.5027, 871, Meeting of the Work Group Migration (13 August 1980).

<sup>4</sup> CBS Statline; J. Lucassen and L. Lucassen, *Winnaars en verliezers: een nuchtere balans van vijfhonderd jaar immigratie* (Amsterdam, 2011).

This migration wave can in large part be attributed to a government statement made by Henck Arron, premier of Suriname between 1973 and 1980.<sup>5</sup> On 15 February 1974, Arron, speaking on behalf of the newly installed Surinamese government, announced that Suriname would become independent from the Netherlands at no point later than 1975.<sup>6</sup>

Although Prime Minister Joop den Uyl was a strong supporter of Surinamese independence, his government saw the increasing migration from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles to the Netherlands as a major problem.<sup>7</sup> A secret government report said that Surinamese independence would cause an even larger number of Surinamese to move to the Netherlands which should be stopped by introducing strict entrance regulations.<sup>8</sup> He suspected that many Surinamese people might not be so happy with the intention of Prime Minister Arron and would leave Suriname before independence became a fact. This thesis researches the ways the Dutch government reacted to the statement by prime-minister Arron in handling the supposed 'massive migration' from Suriname to the Netherlands in the period 1974-1980. What migration policies did the Dutch government put in place and to what extent can they be deemed to have been successful?

## Context.

Premier Arron's statement was a shock to many Surinamese, as well as many Dutch.<sup>9</sup> Arron was only in power a few months after his party NPK (National Party Combination, a coalition of four different political parties) won the election in November 1973. Over the course of the campaign he never mentioned independence as a goal. The motivations for the independence statement remain debatable up to this day.

Former Dutch top official Ferdinand van Dam said that it was actually the Netherlands who pushed Suriname out of the Kingdom. In his view Arron was convinced that Den Uyl would push for Surinamese independence no matter what. Arron saw no other option than to try to get the best possible deal for his country and put the pressure on the Netherlands.<sup>10</sup> Surinamese officials on the other hand say that Arron did it out of national pride and for the self-confidence of Suriname. Minister De Gaay Fortman of Kingdom Relations said that Arron only had his own interests in mind. He needed to strengthen his political power and moreover he wanted to make history.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> E. M. Dew, *The Trouble in Suriname, 1975-1993* (Westport, 1994) p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>7</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten. Nederland en Suriname 1974-1982* (Amsterdam, 2004) p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> H. Buddings, 'Stroom Surinaamse immigranten veroorzaakte paniek in bestuurlijk Nederland; Rijksgenoten op de stoep, NRC Handelsblad (24-11-1995).

<sup>9</sup> E. Bakker e.a., *Geschiedenis van Suriname*, p. 136.

<sup>10</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>11</sup> Ibidem, p.22.

The biggest problem with finding the motivation for the call for independence was that the majority of people that chose him as Prime Minister the year before were not supporters of independence and that he in fact had no mandate from his constituents.<sup>12</sup> Although income from a newly installed bauxite tax gave the Surinamese government more spending options, Suriname still depended hugely on Dutch development aid.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, the Surinamese people were not confident that their politicians were capable of solving economic and social issues. For instance, racial tension between the different ethnic groups living in Suriname was growing.<sup>14</sup> Indo-Surinamese (or *Hindoestanen* in Dutch) and Javanese Surinamese who made up the majority at the time, were afraid they would be marginalized by the Creoles then in power. In 1971 Indo-Surinamese were the largest ethnic group in Suriname making up 37.0% of the total population, against 30.8% Creoles. Javanese made up 15.3% of the population.<sup>15</sup>

Arron, who was himself Creole, only managed to get the smallest majority in the parliament for independence after a section of dissident Indo-Surinamese supported him. The Javanese and Indo-Surinamese were afraid they would be marginalized after independence and called, unsuccessfully, for a postponement. With independence approaching, tensions between the different ethnic groups increased. There were protests and some ended up in violent clashes. Due to the recent shift in power from Indo-Surinamese to the Creoles, and the latter's unwavering attitude towards independence, the Indo-Surinamese were the largest group migrating to the Netherlands.<sup>16</sup>

The statement by Arron was a shock for the Dutch government as well. Nonetheless, it was received with enthusiasm. Joop den Uyl was Prime Minister of the Netherlands between 1973 and 1977. His government consisted of his own *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA, Labour Party), the Christian parties KVP and ARP, the green party PPR and democratic party D66. It was a time of decolonization and Den Uyl made it one of his goals to release all the colonies from Dutch control. Nevertheless, the statement by premier Arron came as a surprise and Den Uyl would have liked more discussions with the Surinamese government prior to the announcement by Arron. After the announcement was made, however, there was no way back and Den Uyl decided to support Arron in his decision. An important factor was that Den Uyl wanted to make sure that it could not be said that it was the Dutch that prolonged colonialism.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> E. Bakker e.a., *Geschiedenis van Suriname*, p. 137.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 141.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 139.

<sup>15</sup> F.E.R. Derveld, *Politieke mobilisatie en integratie van de Javanen in Suriname: Tamanredjo en de Surinaamse nationale politiek* (Groningen, 1982) p. 16.

<sup>16</sup> H. van Amersfoort, 'How the Dutch Government Stimulated the Unwanted Immigration from Suriname', *IMI Working Papers Series* (2011) No. 47, p. 12.

<sup>17</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 28.

Shortly after the statement of Arron calling for independence within two years, the Dutch government came together to address the issue. Was it possible to keep the Dutch interests in check while at the same time giving the Surinamese government and people the freedom to decide their own future? Most of the discussions related to the costs involved, mainly development aid. Since the Dutch had a military presence in Suriname, the way that Suriname would defend itself in the future was an important aspect as well.<sup>18</sup>

Many discussions related to nationality.<sup>19</sup> Up to the day of independence every Surinamese person had Dutch nationality. Since Suriname would become a sovereign nation people from Suriname would become 'Surinamers'. But would they lose Dutch nationality in the process, or would they be able to attain dual nationality? And what about the Surinamese already living in the Netherlands? Would they lose their Dutch nationality as well?

Migration was also an important topic. At a Ministerial Commission for Surinamese Independence (MICOS) meeting prior to the Dutch-Surinamese talks, the Dutch government discussed its objectives.<sup>20</sup> The most important thing, according to Minister Pronk, was facilitating independence. The second most important thing for the Dutch states was to limit immigration from Suriname to the Netherlands. It was argued that this was not so much a problem for the Netherlands, but even more so for Suriname since it could lose a substantial part of its work force if a large group of schooled Surinamese moved to the Netherlands.<sup>21</sup>

From the start the Dutch government saw the possibility of many Surinamese migrating to the Netherlands. Due to the Oil Crisis of 1973 the Dutch economy experienced rising unemployment (see Figure 2).<sup>22</sup> It was thought that it would be very difficult to embed thousands of Surinamese into Dutch society, who in the minds of the Dutch politicians would be drug dealers, mostly uneducated, and might not even be fluent in the Dutch language.<sup>23</sup> In order to keep the supposed migration from

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<sup>18</sup> B. Ooft, *Het laatste hoofdstuk. Een analytisch verslag van het overleg en de ontwikkelingen rond de onafhankelijkheid van Suriname in 1974 en 1975* (Utrecht, 1976) pp. 36-8.


<sup>19</sup> NA, 2.05.326, 13. Letter of DS'70 on Model Assignment Agreement, (15 July 1975).

<sup>20</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 7298. Letter of Director of Categorical Building to Minister of CRM (27 January 1975).

<sup>21</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 57.

<sup>22</sup> Dutch unemployment, 1970-1975, [www.cpb.nl](http://www.cpb.nl).

<sup>23</sup> H. van Amersfoort, 'How the Dutch Government', p.15.



Suriname to the Netherlands at bay, the government searched for suitable policies to reduce the number of people from coming.

Migration policies were nothing new at that time. Right after the end of the Second World War the Dutch government tried to steer migration away from the Netherlands, because supposedly with a population of nine million the country was full and there were few jobs available.<sup>24</sup> It therefore actively encouraged emigration from the Netherlands to countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Visa requirements were also a commonly used tool to keep migration in check. The idea in 1974 was that the same policies could be used for the Surinamese case, with a few notable differences, like the nationality question.

Migration from Suriname skyrocketed after the government statement by Arron and the Dutch government was unable to reduce migration numbers. With nearly 40,000 Surinamese migrants coming to the Netherlands in 1975, the amount of Surinamese in the country saw an almost 400% increase relative to 1973.<sup>25</sup> In 1966, the population of people with a Surinamese background living in the Netherlands was a mere 33,000. By 1972, this had grown to 51,000. In 1980 this number had nearly tripled to 145,000 while the total population of Suriname was 385,000. As a result, Dutch migration policies for the Surinamese case are widely regarded as having been unsuccessful.<sup>26</sup> Is this really the case? What were the migration policies and why exactly did these policies fail? In this paper I try to answer this question in light of the Gap Theory debate which tries to answer the question why migration policies in Western liberal states do not yield the proposed effects. I use a

<sup>24</sup> H. van Amersfoort, 'How the Dutch Government', p. 7.

<sup>25</sup> CBS Statline.

<sup>26</sup> See H. van Amersfoort, 'How the Dutch Government...'; S. Bonjour, *Grens en gezin. Beleidsvorming inzake gezinsmigratie in Nederland 1955-2005* (Amsterdam, 2009) p. 130-2; R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p.45.

model put forward by Hein de Haas and Mathias Czaika that could help me pinpoint exactly where the policies went wrong. I look at the period from 1974 up until 1980. In 1980 a transition period of five years after independence ended which was a reason for ten thousands of Surinamese to migrate to the Netherlands before it was too late.

On 25 February 1980 a coup d'état took place in Suriname, known as the Sergeant's Coup with Desi Bouterse as its main leader. The coup problematized relations between Suriname and the Netherlands. The coup is outside the scope of this thesis.

## Outline.

Before I dive into the case study, I present a theoretical background. In Chapter 2 I briefly set out the Gap Hypothesis debate, which I want to add to with this piece. I describe the chronological structure of the debate and explain why it is relevant for the case study and why it is still relevant today. The gap debate is discussed in the article '*The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies*' from 2013 by Czaika and De Haas.<sup>27</sup> In the article the authors provide a model that describes the migration policy making process and point out certain moments where policies are in danger of failing. I will use this model as a way to define the Dutch migration policies as either a success or a failure. After I have discussed the migration policies put in to place by the Dutch government I will follow the model to see where in the case of Suriname migration to the Netherlands in the period 1974-1980 things went wrong. I structure the thesis around the model of Czaika and De Haas, using the gaps where policies might fail as chapter topics.

The chapters following the theoretical framework consists of an historical and theoretical analysis of policies that were designed and to a certain degree implemented between 1974 and 1980. I discuss the different policies by their ability to survive the certain stages before they can be deemed successful, rather than using a chronological structure. Chapter 3 is on the so-called discursive gap and identifies the proposed policies that fail to evolve from just an idea to become reality. The centre piece of Chapter 4 is the implementation gap where policies are not put into action in part or at all. Finally Chapter 5 discusses the efficacy gap which shows the difference between the supposed outcomes of the policies and the actual outcomes. The chapters lean largely on the primary sources with secondary literature providing interpretation and discussion.

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<sup>27</sup> M. Czaika and H. De Haas, '*The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies*', *Population and Development Review*, 39, 3 (September 2013) pp. 487-508.

## Methodology.

Politicians, and politicians in governments specifically, often are not clear about their motives when writing policies.<sup>28</sup> When it comes to migration, in particular, members of cabinets frequently either talk tough in order to seem in control, or talk soft in order to gloss over sensitive topics, depending on which side of the political spectrum they are affiliated with. It is therefore not enough to look only at the goals set out in the media or in government publications; you need to look for hidden agendas.<sup>29</sup> The hidden objectives of migration policies can become apparent in debates behind closed doors and correspondence between members of cabinet. In this paper I look at those sources as well. History as an academic field holds an advantage over social studies here, as historians research the archives to find the internal workings of government. They then can test theories by delving into case studies, just as I am doing in this thesis.

My empirical work is based on primary sources. I have carried out extensive research in the National Archives in The Hague, looking at documents from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of General Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Cabinet of Surinamese and Dutch Antillean Affairs, and from the Ministers Council.<sup>30</sup> The sources consists of minutes of meetings, letters between departments and commissions, statistics, and parliament debates. Besides these sources I also looked at newspaper publications that covered independence to get a sense of the general mood in the Netherlands and Suriname.

To interpret the sources correctly I use the available secondary literature on the history of the relations between Suriname and its motherland. The independence period is well documented and was the subject of several articles and television shows in 2015 when Suriname celebrated 40 years of independence.<sup>31</sup>

## Historiography.

There are several studies done on Surinamese independence and the Dutch reaction and policies which provide the historical background for my thesis. Most notable is the standard work by Gert Oostindie and Inge Klinkers called *Knellende Koninkrijksbanden*.<sup>32</sup> It provides a thorough historical

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<sup>28</sup> S. Castles, 'Why Migration Policies Fail', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 27, 2 (2004) p. 207.

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>30</sup> I annotate my sources from the National Archive in The Hague as follows: NA, [number of archive inventory], [inventory number], [description of the document], [date].

<sup>31</sup> E. Verschuren, 'Suriname 40 jaar onafhankelijk: reden tot feest? (25 November 2015), <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/11/25/suriname-40-jaar-onafhankelijk-reden-tot-feest-a1405563> (visited on 16 September 2017); E. Lesius, 'Mijn tante was een van de eerste Surinamers die naar Nederland kwamen' (20 November 2015), <https://www.vice.com/nl/article/exyejm/mijn-tante-was-een-van-de-eerste-surinamers-die-naar-nederland-kwamen-764> (visited on 16 September 2017).

<sup>32</sup> G. Oostindie and I. Klinkers, *Knellende Koninkrijksbanden. Het Nederlandse dekolonisatie beleid in de Caraïben, 1940-2000* (Amsterdam, 2001).

reflection of Dutch policies in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom and political struggles that the Netherlands encountered trying to remove itself from its responsibilities to its once conquered peoples.

René de Groot wrote a book on Dutch-Surinamese political relations between 1974 and 1982.<sup>33</sup> He states that although migration between Suriname and the Netherlands was the most important connection between the two countries, it was not integrally part of Suriname-Dutch relations. It merely influenced it. Development aid on the other hand was far more important for political relations. De Groot therefore does not go into detail on migration. The same goes for Edward Dew's book on the economic and in particular the political problems Suriname and its people experienced starting from independence 1975.<sup>34</sup> His study covers the transition to democracy, the coup and the military regime, and back again towards democracy and the Dutch influence on it all without leaving the Surinamese actors in the driving seat.

*Onvoltooid verleden* by Kees Lagerberg provides a more social demographic approach towards the decolonization of Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. Extensive tables on education, occupation, and political involvement set by ethnic group shows the way the Surinamese people were affected by independence.<sup>35</sup> Edited by Glenn Willemsen, *De schele onafhankelijkheid* provides several chapters on different aspects of independence.<sup>36</sup> It provides the colonial background to ethnic tensions and the struggle for nationalism. The chapter of Frank Bovenkerk on the migration between 1970 and 1980 shows neo-Marxist tendencies were not a factor and that the presupposed pull force from the Netherlands did not exist, but that it was actually the push force from Suriname that made tens of thousands of people emigrate.<sup>37</sup> Bovenkerk is one of the few authors trying to fit the exodus of the Surinamese people into a migration theory. In the following chapter I present my course of action to follow his example.

Charlotte Laarman deserves a special mention for her dissertation on discursive strategies by the Dutch government when it comes to migration from (former) colonies to the Netherlands after the Second World War.<sup>38</sup> The discursive strategies were used to include and exclude migrant groups from Dutch society and the rights that come with being part of it. Laarman claims that since Surinamese migrants were Dutch citizens the government used metaphors and "othering" to

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<sup>33</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*.

<sup>34</sup> E. Dew, *The Trouble in Suriname*.

<sup>35</sup> K. Lagerberg, 'Onvoltooid verleden. De dekolonisatie van Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen', *Instituut voor Ontwikkelingsvraagstukken* 40 (Tilburg, 1989).

<sup>36</sup> G. Willemsen (ed), *De schele onafhankelijkheid* (Utrecht, 1983).

<sup>37</sup> F. Bovenkerk, 'De vlucht. Migratie in de jaren zeventig', in Glenn Willemsen (ed), *De schele onafhankelijkheid* (Utrecht, 1983).

<sup>38</sup> C. Laarman, *Oude onbekenden: het politieke en publieke debat over postkoloniale migranten, 1945-2005* (Hilversum, 2013).

legitimize strict admittance policies.<sup>39</sup> She looks more at the words used by politicians in explaining their stance on Surinamese migration rather than the policies that were available to the Dutch lawmakers and to what extent they were successful. The terminology used by politicians and experts in the public discourses serve a purpose, which is to explain and defend policy.<sup>40</sup> Using a migration policy effectiveness theory as the backbone for this case study I try to approach the Surinamese migration from a different angle.

Theoretical backgrounds are often absent in the publications mentioned above. When the authors use theories, they are mostly designed to explain the reasons to emigrate, not to explain the effectiveness of migration policies. The combination of a theoretical framework and a case study as I use in this thesis makes it possible to dissect a migration wave, the policies that (try to) influence it, and the effects they sorted. It then becomes possible to see what the effects of the migration policies actually are and whether or not they comply with the goals set by governments.

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<sup>39</sup> C. Laarman, 'Oude onbekenden', p. 193.

<sup>40</sup> Ibidem, p. 22.

## 2. Migration Theory and Surinamese Emigration to the Netherlands.

Migration theory can help explain why migration policies can fail or give unwanted results. An important academic debate on migration policies and their effectiveness is the so-called 'gap hypothesis' coined in 1987 and expanded on by Saskia Bonjour in 2011 under the name 'Control Gap'.<sup>41</sup> With this paper I research a case study in the light of this debate. I use a model introduced by Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas that can help explain at what point and why migration policies fail.

### What is a migration policy?

First, I briefly discuss what in my view a migration policy consists of. Any action a government undertakes in order to influence migration from and to its territory can be considered a migration policy. Usually these actions come in the form of a law or resolution. But there are other ways in which governments try to influence migration flows. By giving TV interviews, statements in newspapers or nowadays by speaking directly to potential migrants via social media, politicians from opposition parties as well as government parties try to influence migration.<sup>42</sup> For my research I choose the more formal type of policies, specifically migration laws, the treaties between the Netherlands and Suriname and debates in parliament and the appropriate commissions.

How can you judge whether a migration policy was a success or a failure? One option is to look at the previously stated objectives and goals of the policy and see whether after an appropriate amount of time, those objectives and goals were met.<sup>43</sup> You could in the same way say that a migration policy fails when the previously stated objectives and goals of the said policy were not met. You would have to look at the statement made by the government prior to the installment of the policy, take into account the amount of time in which the government projects to achieve the set out goals, and check whether the situation in the country coincides with the statement.

It is also possible that a previously stated objective by the government is met over time, but that it was not the migration policy put into place that enabled it. Sometimes in migration other factors play a larger role than governments like to admit. It is therefore necessary to look critically at the nature of the migration policies and the results of a migration policy and make sure the policy had indeed an influence. Often a migration policy does not just try to achieve one goal, but rather tries to achieve a variety of goals. If some goals are not met, others might well be achieved. What is to say then about the success of the policy? And what if the goals are met but unintended

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<sup>41</sup> S. Bonjour, 'The Power and Morals of Policy Makers: Reassessing the Control Gap Debate', *International Migration Review* 45, 1 (2011) p. 89-122.

<sup>42</sup> A modern example is the 'No Way'-campaign on YouTube by the Australian government where an official of the Australian Border Protection sternly tells boat migrants to forget about trying to get asylum.

<sup>43</sup> M. Czaika H. and De Haas, 'The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies', p. 491.

consequences come in its wake? Did the policy fail as a whole? As Stephen Castles says “policy success or failure is usually not absolute.”<sup>44</sup>

### The Control Gap debate.

With this thesis I want to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of migration policies.

Governments across Europe are anxious to keep unwanted migrants outside their territories as their constituents are afraid their wellbeing is under threat from these outsiders. It used to be primarily a hot topic for right wing political parties, but over the past decades parties on the left side of the political spectrum adopted similar positions with left wing ministers of migration taking radical measures as a consequence.<sup>45</sup> It is mostly actors like Amnesty International, Stichting Vluchteling and other non-governmental organizations that say that migration policies per definition are not working and could actually lead to very different outcomes from the initial policy aims. For instance, blocking off a migration route for refugees and irregular migrants in order to stop smuggling and people drowning in the Mediterranean Sea can actually divert the flow to different and sometimes more dangerous routes allowing smugglers to ask higher prices and more casualties as a result. The so-called ‘Refugee Deal’ between the European Union and Turkey of 19 March 2016 led to an increase in people crossing the Mediterranean from North-Africa, with more fatalities as a result rather than fewer. In 2016 a migrant crossing the Mediterranean had a one in 71 chance of dying, compared to one in 266 in 2015.<sup>46</sup>

Whereas NGO’s question the effectiveness of migration policies as a whole, anti-immigration parties like the Dutch PVV (Freedom Party) reject previous ‘soft’ migration policies, but still believe in the ability of new, harsh legislation. Their belief in the effectiveness of migration policies is unwavering, claiming that closing borders, denying asylum to refugees, and sending back irregular migrants is actually fairly easy to accomplish.<sup>47</sup>

With some migration policies the outcomes are actually the opposite of what the policy makers had in mind. Historian Leo Lucassen has pointed out that by making it harder for people to

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<sup>44</sup> S. Castles, ‘Why Migration Policies Fail’, p. 207.

<sup>45</sup> F.W. Verbaas, *Er is thans geen grond... Het Nederlandse asielbeleid van binnenuit* (Amsterdam, 2005) pp. 20-1. Minister Cohen of the Labour Party designed a new Alien Act in 2000 where he cut short ways for immigration lawyers to object a negative ruling.

<sup>46</sup> In 2016 the IOM counted a total of 5079 deaths on the Mediterranean, compared to 3777 in 2015 even though the total of migrants crossing the sea fell by over 600,000 persons. IOM, ‘Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Top 363,348 in 2016; Deaths at Sea: 5,079’ <https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-top-363348-2016-deaths-sea-5079> (visited on 2 May 2017).

<sup>47</sup> PVV, ‘Begrotingsbehandeling Veiligheid en Justitie: Asiel’, <https://pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article.html?id=7227:begrotingsbehandeling-veiligheid-en-justitie-asiel> (visited on 2 May 2017).

come into Europe, they are much less likely to engage in circular migration.<sup>48</sup> A good example of this phenomenon are the guest workers in the Netherlands of the 1960's and 1970's. Their migration was flexible as they would come to Europe to work and left when the work was finished, knowing that when more work became available they could easily return. But when labor importing countries made it more difficult to come into their territories, these migrants became reluctant to leave Europe since they were afraid they would not be allowed back in. They therefore stayed in Europe and brought their families over, which led to increased migration at a time when states attempted to put a halt to inward movement.<sup>49</sup>

It has also been pointed out that governments are in a large part unable to stop unwanted migrants entering their territories. This led James Hollifield in 1986 to come up with the so-called gap hypothesis.<sup>50</sup> The gap hypothesis states that although states instigate policies to try to stop unwanted migration, unwanted migrants still come. Hollifield said that "in the post-war period, immigration has become one of the most intractable issues on the political agenda in the advanced industrial democracies".<sup>51</sup> The gap hypothesis was the subject of much academic debate in the 1990s, but lost some of its popularity in the 2000s. Saskia Bonjour tried to reassess the Control Gap Debate in 2011.

Bonjour analyzed the effectiveness of Dutch policy on migrant family reunification from the 1950s up to 2000.<sup>52</sup> She argues that not only do material interests like the labor market or housing play a factor in migration policy making, but ideological factors also play a role. Ideas like family unity, equality of Dutch nationals and migrant residents were the basis for migrant family policies in the 1980s.<sup>53</sup> In this sense policy makers were more constrained by their own ideology and morality than they were by court decisions. Catholic members of parliament saw it as a moral obligation to accept the families of labor migrants since Dutch society benefitted from their hard work. Members of the social democratic party pleaded for equal rights of Dutch citizens and migrants in order to create more harmony and social cohesion.<sup>54</sup> She contests Joppke's notion that politicians and civil servants lost their power for making migration policy to the judiciary system. In a recent piece on German migration policy Bonjour identifies the control gap in her case study but shows that judges

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<sup>48</sup> J. and L. Lucassen, 'The Strange Death of Dutch Tolerance: The Timing and Nature of the Pessimist Turn in the Dutch Migration Debate', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 2015), pp. 78-9.

<sup>49</sup> S. Bonjour, *Grens en gezin*, p. 108.

<sup>50</sup> J. Hollifield, 'Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 485, From Foreign Workers to Settlers? Transnational Migration and the Emergence of New Minorities (May, 1986) pp. 113-128.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 127.

<sup>52</sup> S. Bonjour, 'The Powers and Morals'.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 115-6.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 108.

and court cases did not play the central role in making family migration policy.<sup>55</sup> The policy of family reunification was based on inclusive views already existing in German politics and society. In speaking of terms of 'rights' courts did however provide a new tool to the proponents of family reunification. Bonjour suggests we look at court rulings not as simple commands but more as a bedrock from where politicians and civil society derive their claims and construct their policies.<sup>56</sup>

When researching asylum applications by Iranians and Tamils in the 1980s Tycho Walaardt confirms the gap theory and goes a bit further that Bonjour.<sup>57</sup> He claims that the Dutch government used the gap between theory and practice to its advantage. In Walaardt's view the gap exists because it serves both sides of the discourse: national authorities on the one hand and immigration advocacy groups on the other tend to meet in the middle after a stalemate was reached. Asylum seekers were denied a refugee status but were legalized on different ground or their illegal stay was tolerated.<sup>58</sup> Although the Dutch government failed to implement more restrictive asylum legislation the general public felt it was harder for asylum seekers to stay in the Netherlands.<sup>59</sup> Both the government and the advocacy groups were satisfied as the general public was appeased and the asylum seekers were silently admitted.

When Christina Boswell looks at the gap paradox she sees two distinguished sides.<sup>60</sup> The first relates to the effectiveness of migration policies. Migration policies often do not succeed in attaining their aims, as established above. Second, governments sometimes choose not to put into place restrictive migration policies, although their position is that immigration is unwanted. Bonjour says that the true paradox lies not in the first side Boswell distinguishes, since "several authors have argued that there is 'no significant control crisis', but a steadily higher sophistication in terms of flow control and internal surveillance."<sup>61</sup> She also says that it is not just migration policies that are sometimes not as efficient as desired, but that there are numerous other fields where policies do not yield the proposed results. The paradox therefore lies in the second side which poses the question why states allow unwanted migration and at the same time introduce policies that make immigration possible.

The question then becomes what do the policies actually entail? In this case study, the Dutch government did in fact attempt to impose laws intended to control migration during the time of

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<sup>55</sup> S. Bonjour, 'Speaking of Rights: The Influence of Law and Courts on the Making of Family Migration Policies in Germany', *Law and Policy* 38, 4 (October 2016) p. 332.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 345.

<sup>57</sup> T. Walaardt, 'Patience and Perseverance. The Asylum Procedure of Tamils and Iranians in the Netherlands in the Mid-1980s', *The Low Countries Journal of Social and Economic History* 8, 3, (2011) p. 5.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 30.

<sup>60</sup> C. Boswell, 'Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way?', *The International Migration Review*, 41, 1 (2007), pp. 75-100.

<sup>61</sup> S. Bonjour, 'The Powers and Morals', p. 91.

Surinamese independence, as I will point out in the next chapter. But did these policies actually stop migration and to what extent had these policies the opposite effect?

### Pessimists and optimists.

In researching the debate on the effectiveness of migration policies, I found two groups which I like to call pessimists and optimists. The pessimists are a group of scholars who claim that the more that governments try to influence migration the less they succeed. Stephen Castles in 2004 wrote that history shows how strong efficient states like the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France, Australia and the Netherlands, fail to achieve their goals. An important aspect of these failed migration policies is that their failure only became apparent after a considerable time. According to Castles, this shows that “migration policies may fail if they are based on a short-term view of the migratory process”.<sup>62</sup> He also points out that “factors inherent in the experience of migration can lead to outcomes which were not expected or wanted by the participants.”<sup>63</sup>

Jagdish Bhagwati claims that “Paradoxically, the ability to control migration has shrunk as the desire to do so has increased.”<sup>64</sup> In the United States there remains a high demand for high skilled workers students from the South and they then remain in the US because of the opportunities available for them and their children. Illegal immigrants and asylum seekers are not stopped by imposing penalties on their countries of origin, nor is stronger border control stopping them from entering American territory. Most of them are entering the US legally, for instance on tourist visas. If developed countries cannot stem the flow of unwanted migrants and are unable to stop them at their borders, then they need to put policies into place that will help them integrate newcomers and make sure that they can benefit society.<sup>65</sup>

The optimists on the other hand claim that nations over the course of the previous decades have actually been quite successful in securing their borders and keep unwanted migration at bay. Although unwanted migration is not completely shut down, the tools to enforce border control and to send irregular migrants back to their country of origin have increased significantly. Political scientist Gary Freeman wrote that in his view the tools that states have and use to control wanted and unwanted migration is definitely growing over time, both in qualitative terms and in quantitative terms.<sup>66</sup> Compared to twenty or fifty years ago the means that liberal states use to control their borders are more sophisticated technologically wise. There are however major

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<sup>62</sup> S. Castles, ‘Why Migration Policies Fail’, p. 207.

<sup>63</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>64</sup> J. Bhagwati, ‘Borders Beyond Control’, *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 1 (2003) p. 99.

<sup>65</sup> Ibidem, p. 103.

<sup>66</sup> G. Freeman, ‘Can Liberal States Control Unwanted Migration?’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 534 (1994) p. 17.

differences between liberal states. Great Britain has an easier job, geographically speaking, to control its borders than for instance Germany because it is an island and it opted out of the Schengen system of open internal borders within the EU. Therefore, in claiming that migration policies are insufficient or are not working at all one has to look at the specific factors that come in to play in each country.

Dennis Broeders and Godfried Engbersen also claim that the means for states to control their borders and to find illegal immigrants residing in their country have grown over time.<sup>67</sup> Policies include deterrence, detention, exclusion and expulsion. It has become easier for countries to identify undocumented migrants. The effectiveness of migration policies has increased, in particular the identification process. This is a major blow to illegal migrants because keeping your identity a secret keeps you from being deported. At the same time state Broeders and Engbersen note that the whole deportation aspect of migration policy is the weakest part since it would take decades to deport every single illegal migrant from Europe. The practice of detention that is intrinsically linked to deportation does not help either since the costs are huge when compared to the relatively small number of deportations.

Jørgen Carling speaks of “involuntary immobility” when assessing the situation in Cape Verde.<sup>68</sup> He describes the restrictions that people with migration aspirations come across and concludes “that the times have changed for the worse in terms of emigration.”<sup>69</sup>

Christian Joppke’s piece “Why liberal states accept unwanted immigration?” compares unwanted illegal immigration to the United States to unwanted family reunification migration in the United Kingdom and Germany.<sup>70</sup> Joppke concludes that Western liberal states by definition accept unwanted migration due to their liberalness.<sup>71</sup> It is not the case that Western liberal states lose their sovereignty to decide who they let in and who they refuse, but their belief in human rights and the rule of law makes them open to migrants who are officially not welcome. Legal constraints, moral obligations and the positive influence migrants have on the economy are what stop Western liberal states from closing borders altogether.

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<sup>67</sup> D. Broeders and G. Engbersen, ‘The fight against illegal migration: Identification policies and immigrants’ counterstrategies’, *American Behavioral Scientist* 50 (2007) p. 1592.

<sup>68</sup> J. Carling, ‘Migration in the age of involuntary immobility: Theoretical reflections and Cape Verdean experiences’, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28, 1 (2002) p. 5.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 39.

<sup>70</sup> C. Joppke, ‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration’, *World Politics*, 50, 2 (January, 1998) pp. 266-293.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 292.

## Czaika and De Haas.

To see exactly where policies go wrong I use a model established by Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas. In their paper called 'The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies'<sup>72</sup> De Haas and Czaika look at the debate surrounding the effectiveness of migration policies in general. They devise a model in which they incorporate three gaps where migration policies can possibly falter.

In their view there are three moments when migration policies are in danger of failing. The first moment is when after politicians state their objectives, be it in parliament, in the media or in commission debates, they incorporate their suggested ideas into policy instruments. Czaika and De Haas call this the *discursive gap*. Through advocate groups like NGO's, but also institutional constraints like international legislation, the sometimes harsh rhetoric on migration gets toned down when it is written down on paper. Migration policies are usually the outcome of a compromise between the many different parties involved.

The second moment is called the *implementation gap* which shows the differences between the migration policies as they have been written down and put into place by the government, and the way they are implemented by politicians, civil servants and private companies.<sup>73</sup> A lot of laws and regulations are not as crystal clear as one might expect. The international definition of a refugee for instance leaves a lot of room for subjective interpretation. According to the definition written in the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951 says that "A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." A well-founded fear is a subjective emotion that can be interpreted in different ways, just as being a member of a particular social group can be explained in multiple ways.

The last gap is called the *efficacy gap* which shows the discrepancy between the implemented migration policy and the actual effect of the policy on migration outcomes. To what extent were the implemented migration policies able to achieve their goals? Were the policies able to direct the quantity, timing, direction and composition of the migration flow?<sup>74</sup>

An important aspect De Haas pointed out in a 2011 article relates to the unintended effects of a migration policy he called substitution effects.<sup>75</sup> He conceptualized four substitution effects that

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<sup>72</sup> M. Czaika and H. de Haas, 'The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies'.

<sup>73</sup> Ibidem, p. 496.

<sup>74</sup> M. Czaika and H. de Haas, 'The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies', p. 497.

<sup>75</sup> H. de Haas, 'The determinants of international migration. Conceptualizing policy, origin and destination effects', IMI Working Papers, 32 (2011), p. 27.

had to do with the changing of the final location where migrants end up, or the change in markup of the migration population. For this thesis I take especially into account the so-called inter-temporal substitution effects or 'now-or-never' migration. When migrants fear a border is to be shut for them indefinitely they can feel the urge to set aside doubts or do not take the time they would like to prepare for such a drastic move and just pack up and go before it is too late. I look for migration policies where the Dutch government invoked an inter-temporal substitution effect where Surinamese people felt the need to migrate before it was too late and the Dutch border would be shut to them.

When looking at the effectiveness of the migration policies discussed in this thesis, it is important to consider the multiple characteristics of the migration wave I am analyzing. De Haas distinguished five components<sup>76</sup>:

1. The volume of migration
2. The spatial orientation of migration
3. The composition of migration
4. The timing of migration.
5. Reverse (return) migration.

From the context discussed above the volume of migration and reverse migration were the most important aspects in the eyes of Den Uyl and his colleagues, but I take a close look at all the components the Dutch government tried to influence when discussing and writing migration policies.

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<sup>76</sup> Ibidem, p. 25.




Figure 2. Conceptual framework of migration policy effects and effectiveness.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>77</sup> M. Czaika and H. De Haas, *The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies*, p. 495.

### 3. Discursive Gap: Impossible Plans and Window Dressing.

This chapter focuses on the discursive gap. I look at the migration goals and policies that were discussed in the government commissions and to what extent the migration policies were actually written down and implemented. Did certain aspects of the debates not make it to the official migration policies? What aspects were lost in the discursive gap? What were the reasons for these aspects being sidelined?

As discussed in the introduction of this thesis the aim of the Dutch government was to restrict immigration from Suriname to the Netherlands up to and after the independence of Suriname on 25 November 1975.<sup>78</sup> First I analyze the deliberations that took place in special commissions installed by the Dutch government and make clear the motivations to restrict migration. The advice given by the commissions proved to be of great influence for the policy makers as will become apparent in this chapter. The results of the discussions are the subject of the second part of this chapter which relates to the bilateral treaties created between the Netherlands and Suriname on migration and Dutch national laws and policies.

#### Back room discussions and newspaper articles.

In order to make sure the Dutch government could react in the best way possible to the shocking call for independence by Henck Arron, Dutch Prime Minister Joop Den Uyl sought the advice of three different commissions, one of which was headed by himself. These commissions had little time to confer and deliberate the best positions and tactics the Dutch government should take and use in relation to their Surinamese counterpart, because the deadline for independence was firmly set and approaching rapidly. It was the wish of Den Uyl to meet the deadline set by Arron in order to show Suriname, and the rest of the world, that the Netherlands was progressive and did not want to linger in the old colonial world.<sup>79</sup> At the same time Den Uyl needed to make sure that the independence of Suriname from the Netherlands would run smooth and that it would become a success after the chaotic independence of Indonesia from the Netherlands in the late 1940s.<sup>80</sup> For the commissions the heat was on.

First, I take a look at a report by a special work group put into place to advise the Dutch government on positions to take in the discussions with Surinamese delegates. Their job was to predict the wishes and reaction of the Surinamese diplomats and other government officials that would be present at the bilateral talks. These were followed by two different commissions containing several Dutch ministers. The first consisted of the existing *Koninkrijkscommissie* that dealt with

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<sup>78</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 30.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 27.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibidem*.

relations between the colonies and the 'motherland'. The last commission (MICOS) was formed after the call for independence and consisted of multiple Dutch ministers whose departments had an interest in independence or the results thereof.

#### Work Group on Migration Affairs.

In May 1974 the so called Work Group Migration Affairs wrote a report for the Dutch government on Surinamese independence and the possible consequences this would have for the Netherlands.<sup>81</sup> The workgroup was put into place in March 1974 and had the objective to prepare positions for the Dutch government for the upcoming conference of the Prime Ministers of the Netherlands, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles in May 1974. The workgroup consisted of multiple civil servants of ministries that were to have a special interest in Surinamese independence, including General Affairs, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs, Finance, Culture, Recreation and Social Work, and the Cabinet for Surinamese and Dutch Antilles Affairs. The topics of the report included the question of nationality, passport administration in Suriname, schooling in the Netherlands for Surinamese children, and recruitment by Dutch companies. Because of the limited amount of time in which the workgroup had to produce the report, it was only able to look at previous discussions or agreements between the Netherlands and Suriname on the topics concerned.<sup>82</sup> Below I address only the migration related topics.

The Netherlands had spoken with Suriname and the Dutch Antilles in 1973 about nationality in the so-called Kingdom Commission.<sup>83</sup> The Surinamese position at that time was that all people with Dutch nationality should be able to opt for the three available nationalities: Dutch, Surinamese or Dutch-Antillean. Their motive was that the Netherlands should not be able to take away Dutch nationality. The Dutch-Antilles at that time stated that they wanted their inhabitants to be able to claim dual nationality. The Netherlands had other ideas on the matter. The Dutch wanted to make the place of birth the primary criterion. In a previous discussion in 1973 the Dutch proposed to make it an option for people living in a country different from their birth place to change nationality with 1 January 1973 as the cutoff date. This meant that all people of Surinamese origin living in the Netherlands before 1973 could either keep their Dutch nationality, or change it to Surinamese.

Dual nationality was not an option for the Dutch government for a couple of reasons. It did not want to become embroiled in internal difficulties. Dutch-Antillean people with Dutch nationality

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<sup>81</sup> NA, 2.05.326, 11: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MICOS and ISOS (May 1974).

<sup>82</sup> The Dutch positions would not be very different from previous discussions. The Workgroup had to predict Surinamese positions on the basis of previous reports. The position of the Dutch Antilles was also taken into account, since they might follow the example of Suriname and become independent soon. Because the Antilles were to get a new sovereign neighbor, their voices should be heard as well.

<sup>83</sup> NA, 2.05.326, 11: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MICOS and ISOS (May 1974).

could ask the Dutch government for protection. States could encounter legal difficulties because different laws applied to someone with double nationality. Also, the workgroup thought that it would remain problematic for other countries in the world to acknowledge the sovereignty of Suriname when their people remained nationals of the old mother country.<sup>84</sup>

It was difficult for the workgroup to assess whether the Surinamese position had changed since the meeting in March 1973, since a new government was in charge, but it was optimistic that it would be receptive to the notion of the option that people would have the right to change their nationality if they were living in a country different from the country in which they were born (the so-called *optierecht*). The workgroup imagined that the Surinamese government could not deny that a sovereign country needed a population with a corresponding nationality.<sup>85</sup> Also, the Surinamese government stated previously that it was the duty of every Surinamese person, wherever they should be, to do his or her part for the development of Suriname. It was therefore assumed that the Surinamese government would be willing to welcome return migrants to Suriname and counteract the causes of migration.<sup>86</sup>

The workgroup saw two potential consequences stemming from the proposed position. First, it would be an incentive for a definitive arrangement between the Netherlands and Suriname. Second, and more importantly, it could help stem the flow of Surinamese migrants to the Netherlands between then and the moment of independence. By making the nationality option only available to people of Surinamese origin living in the Netherlands since before January 1973, nationality would not be an incentive for new migrants to travel to the Netherlands.

The workgroup realized that the Netherlands was dependent on the cooperation of Suriname on this topic. Nationality was a sensitive subject and the workgroup advised the Dutch government to tread lightly in the discussions. In order to prevent statelessness, people to which the Surinamese government refused to give Surinamese nationality should not have their Dutch nationality revoked.<sup>87</sup> In this sense they were trying to prevent illegality.

The second topic related to passport administration. As in other foreign countries the Dutch embassy or consulate was authorized to process passport applications. In Suriname it was a Dutch governor who bore that responsibility. The workgroup noted that Dutch passports were handed out quite easily without too much vetting.<sup>88</sup> The Surinamese authorities for instance made no inquiries with the police before providing an applicant with a passport. There was also a limited exchange of data between Suriname and the Netherlands. Only after repeated requests did the Dutch Ministry of

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<sup>84</sup> NA, 2.03.01, 9686, Rapport of the Work Group (May 1974).

<sup>85</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>86</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>87</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>88</sup> Ibidem.

Foreign Affairs receive summaries of passport distribution, the consequence being that the Dutch government was unable to know exactly which individuals born in Suriname would stay in the Netherlands with a Dutch passport.

The workgroup therefore advised the Dutch government to make sure that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be able to travel to Paramaribo and photocopy the Surinamese passport administration's files and to install a monthly transcript detailing who received passports.<sup>89</sup> In order for the Dutch government to know who entered the Netherlands from Suriname with a Dutch passport the Workgroup advised the government to start strict passport controls at Schiphol airport. Every person that entered the Netherlands who had traveled from or via the so-called Zanderij airport in Paramaribo should have their passport photocopied by the Royal Marechaussee (KMar) and needed to fill in a card with their passport information in which they stated the reason for their stay in the Netherlands. This would fall under the responsibilities of the Minister of Justice.

This proposal would enlarge the bureaucratic regime of passport applications as well as travel between Suriname and the Netherlands. It would be hard to find Surinamese backing for these proposals without funding from the Dutch government since it would hamper Surinamese people visiting family and friends and also would impose costs on the Surinamese government; two things the Surinamese wanted to avoid by all means.<sup>90</sup> The costs would have to be covered by the Dutch government.

A special paragraph was dedicated to traveling minors.<sup>91</sup> The work group suggested that the Dutch government should try to regulate the migration of Surinamese minors traveling alone to the Netherlands. In the view of the Workgroup, Surinamese minors should not be able to obtain a Dutch passport without the consent of the Surinamese Guardianship Council. Only if it was clear that the minor was under the control of a guardian for a reasonable amount of time and after consulting with the Dutch Council for the Protection of Children should a Surinamese minor be able to receive a Dutch passport and travel to the Netherlands. The Workgroup expected that an arrangement like this would not be completely watertight, therefore it advised the Dutch government to refer unaccompanied minors to the Council for the Protection of Children when they arrived at Schiphol.

At that time foreign labor migrants working in the Netherlands who wanted to return to their country of origin could receive a bonus of 5,000 guilders (€7,161<sup>92</sup>) in order to make their return more comfortable. The bonus was also used as an incentive to leave the Netherlands since the opinion of the government was that the Netherlands was too full and unemployment was a

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<sup>89</sup> NA, 2.03.01, 9686, Rapport of the Work Group (May 1974).

<sup>90</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, pp. 61-2.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>92</sup> <http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/calculate2-nl.php> (This is a tool that calculates the equivalent of guilders in 1974, to euros in 2015.)

persistent problem. The bonus for leaving was not available to Surinamese and Dutch-Antilleans because up until independence they could travel freely within the kingdom.<sup>93</sup> The Workgroup advised the government to make it possible for Surinamese people living in the Netherlands to receive the bonus in order to stimulate return migration. The bonus should be separate from the nationality option in order to make it appealing for people to migrate back to Suriname. Surinamese people who chose Dutch nationality however, would not be able to qualify for the bonus since that could fuel migration from Suriname to the Netherlands.

On education the Workgroup firstly acknowledged that there were push and pull factors behind the migration from Suriname and the Netherlands. The scarcity of available work in Suriname pushed people out of the country and pulled them towards the Netherlands where supposedly work and social services were available in abundance. It was advised that policies should be created to improve the labor market in Suriname which in turn would make migration to the Netherlands less necessary. Education was one of the instruments identified to potentially enrich the Surinamese labor market with trained workers. According to the Workgroup there was a demand for schooled labor and at the same time a surplus of unschooled people.<sup>94</sup> Dutch education programs could solve both problems at the same time.

Since 1972 there was an information desk in Paramaribo funded by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs. Its task was to inform those Surinamese intending to move to the Netherlands. The effect of the desk was negligible, since only a relatively small number of people ever even used the facility. The Workgroup suspected that if the capacity of the desk was to be enlarged, it could not counter the huge amount of information people got from friends and family already living in the Netherlands, who usually painted a much more optimistic picture than the actual reality. The Workgroup therefore proposed that new means of spreading awareness of the situation in the Netherlands should be installed in Suriname via media like television, newspapers and cinemas. It would be emphasized that Suriname was a great place to live and that multiple new projects, funded by the Netherlands, would be starting soon to improve living standards in Suriname.

The positions of the Workgroup regarding the different subjects mentioned above all took into account the ways they would influence the migration behavior of the Surinamese people. The Workgroup advised the Dutch government to use the positions to limit migration from Suriname to the Netherlands as much as possible while at the same time make it appealing to return to Suriname.

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<sup>93</sup> NA, 2.03.01, 9686, Rapport of the Work Group (May 1974).

<sup>94</sup> Ibidem.

### Kingdom Commission.

The rapport by the Kingdom Commission for the preparation of the independence of Suriname was published in October 1974.<sup>95</sup> Its mission was to discuss upcoming problems and to find solutions that would be acceptable to all the parties involved. In this way the Commission would pave the way for a smooth independence process and minimize problems in the wake of independence. The Commission addressed several topics including the issue of nationalities.

In the report the Commission emphasized that it did not concern itself with migration since the problems that were affiliated with migration should be addressed by the two nations in bilateral talks. The Commission did however look at the possible effects of the nationalities settlement, especially whether it could function as an incentive for Surinamese to migrate to the Netherlands. It had been put forward to incorporate a deadline that would mean that new Surinamese coming to the Netherlands after a particular date would not be eligible to keep their Dutch nationality. The Commission's opinion was that using the nationalities settlement for migration limitation was not virtuous and should not be practiced.<sup>96</sup> As Saskia Bonjour notes, it shows that Dutch migration policy making was affected by morals. For instance at the start of the 1970's, policy on family reunification for labor workers was relaxed significantly. It became possible for labor migrants to let family members come over to the Netherlands. After 1975 labor migrants rights became similar to Dutch citizens, making it even easier for them to bring their families to the Netherlands. The basis for these policy changes were the evolving morals on family, non-marital relationships, sexuality, and gender roles stemming from the cultural revolution of the 1960's.<sup>97</sup>

The Commission claimed that there were no reliable data available on motives to migrate from Suriname to the Netherlands and opinions were merely assumptions. Furthermore, the nationalities settlement envisaged that a large number of Dutch nationals would lose their nationality and would become aliens in the process. Aliens could only be addressed by using the Aliens Act and should therefore be judged individually. Collective deportations were prohibited by the European Convention on Human Rights.<sup>98</sup> Aliens had furthermore the right to apply for benefits in the Netherlands since most of the social laws stipulated that no distinction could be made between Dutch nationals and aliens. Lastly, Dutch law made it possible for former Dutch people to reapply for Dutch nationality without the condition that the person needed to live in the Netherlands for a minimum of five years. This meant that when a Surinamese person would lose their Dutch

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<sup>95</sup> Koninkrijkscommissie, *Rapport ter voorbereiding op de onafhankelijkheid van Suriname* (The Hague, October 1974).

<sup>96</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 14.

<sup>97</sup> S. Bonjour, *Power and Morals of Policy Makers*, p. 98.

<sup>98</sup> European Convention on Human Rights, Protocol 4, Article 4, [http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf) (visited on 14 August 2017).

nationality due to the nationalities settlement, he or she could reapply right away and his or her request should be granted quite easily. To deviate from this law would, in the eyes of the Commission, be discriminatory.<sup>99</sup> This law was eventually secretly changed so it was no longer applicable to Surinamese citizens.<sup>100</sup>

Since the draft settlement that accompanied the report that the Commission wrote was quite similar to the eventual settlement it suggests that the Dutch government found the opinions of the Commission of great worth, but more factors could have been at play. Article 2 of the Treaty stated that people who received Surinamese nationality would lose their entitlement to Dutch nationality and vice versa, so as to prevent dual nationalities.<sup>101</sup> Article 3 stated that adults born in Suriname and living in Suriname at the moment that the settlement became active would receive Surinamese nationality.

#### MICOS.

The reports from the Workgroup and the Kingdom Commission helped the Dutch government to establish a position on the multiple aspects that would arise from the independence of Suriname, but in the end it was mere intelligence and background information. It was the task of the Dutch government to set the agenda, goals, and breaking points for the upcoming debates. Prime Minister Den Uyl did not want every minister to be involved in the decision making process since it would make it more difficult to reach a consensus. Besides, not all departments would be directly affected by independence. The upcoming independence of Suriname was still a talking point in the Ministers Council that convened every week on Friday, but most of the topical discussions were held in a special commission where all the relevant ministries were represented. Den Uyl selected the Ministerial Commission on Surinamese Independence (MICOS), which consisted of himself and the ministers of the Cabinet of Surinamese and Dutch Antillean Affairs (Kab. SNAZ), Education and Sciences, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Housing and Spatial Development, Social Affairs, Culture, Recreation and Social Work, and Development.<sup>102</sup> It was mostly Den Uyl, Pronk and De Gaay Fortman, however, who did the talking and showed real enthusiasm for the subject.<sup>103</sup>

In December 1974, Pronk outlined what in his opinion the goals were in the upcoming talks with the Surinamese officials.<sup>104</sup> First and foremost was the realization of the actual independence of

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<sup>99</sup> Koninkrijkscommissie, *Rapport ter voorbereiding*.

<sup>100</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 45.

<sup>101</sup> Toescheidingsovereenkomst inzake nationaliteiten tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Republiek Suriname, Paramaribo, 25-11-1975.

<sup>102</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 7298, List of members of MICOS (27 January 1975).

<sup>103</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 1585, Minutes of MICOS meeting (20 September 1974).

<sup>104</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 57.

Suriname. Nothing should be placed in the way of the creation of the sovereign state of Suriname. The Dutch delegation should however be cautious in its approach, because the Surinamese could use Dutch eagerness as blackmail. The second priority of Pronk was to minimize Surinamese immigration to the Netherlands. He stated that immigration would pose a problem for Suriname as much of its highly educated workforce could leave the country in favor of the Netherlands.<sup>105</sup> This would leave Suriname in dire need of development. His remarks do not show if Pronk found the influx of Surinamese to the Netherlands also problematic for Dutch society, however the fact that Pronk mentions immigration instead of emigration or migration is a sign for historian René de Groot that Pronk indeed did see problems for the Netherlands.<sup>106</sup> I would argue that Pronk looked at the situation from the Dutch perspective, seeing immigrants coming to the Netherlands.

The third goal for the upcoming talks was the creation of a reasonable standard of living in Suriname. As the Minister of Development at the time, this was a topic close to Pronk's heart. He suggested that independence should be accompanied with a sizeable development donation. This would also help to reduce the willingness of Surinamese people to migrate to the Netherlands. Pronk's fourth and final goal was to reduce ethnic tensions between various groups in Suriname. Since the elections and especially since the call for independence by Arron, the atmosphere in the capital Paramaribo was tense as Indo-Surinamese and Javanese citizens felt they would become marginalized by the Creoles then in power. Demonstrations and riots became more frequent as worries about an independent and underdeveloped Suriname became greater. Although the third and fourth priorities were high on the agenda, it never led to many concrete policies, mostly because Den Uyl felt they would be meddling too much in Surinamese domestic affairs.<sup>107</sup> Den Uyl and De Gaay Fortman were major supporters of Pronk's proposed goals. Den Uyl was weary though that if they would look too eager to let Suriname become independent, the Surinamese could take offense as it would look like the Netherlands was happy to get rid of its colony.

#### [Addressing concerns of the public in newspapers.](#)

We have seen what happened behind the scenes, but what kind of discussions were held before the eyes of the public? What message did the government want to send out to the Dutch public concerning their migration policies? To answer this I take a look at various newspaper articles from the period 15 February 1974 (day of the declaration) up to 25 November 1975 (day of independence) to look at the themes that were apparent in the written media.

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<sup>105</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 57.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 58.

On 16 February 1974, one day after Henck Arron called for independence, minister De Gaay Fortman said in the *NRC Handelsblad* that although the timeframe was too narrow, he welcomed the proposal of the Surinamese government. In the same article Th. van Lier of the Kingdom Commission gave his opinion on the independence and the consequences for the Surinamese people. He said that it would probably be the case that nationality would be decided on by referring to the place of birth, but that those born in Suriname and living in the Netherlands for some time would be able to choose their nationality. He was not in favor of sending people back.<sup>108</sup>

The Dutch government reacted to concerns from social services about an increase in Surinamese migrants coming to the Netherlands. In *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, Den Uyl stated that although the Netherlands shared the concerns about an exodus from Suriname, the Dutch government felt no need to actively stop the migration.<sup>109</sup> Den Uyl saw it as the task of the Surinamese government to make sure their people would stay. Not only would it be judicially difficult for the Netherlands to put in place restrictive measures, they could be deemed discriminatory. Here we see the discursive gap in action: Den Uyl claims to play no part in policies designed to keep Surinamese people 'home', while in fact he and his cabinet were doing the opposite.

On the other side Henck Arron was doing the same. He told Den Uyl during his visit to Paramaribo that he wanted to bring back all 70,000 Surinamese living in the Netherlands. Den Uyl reacted cheerfully to the news according to the *Leeuwarder Courant*.<sup>110</sup> We know Arron never wrote policy on this topic and was in fact adamant that the borders between Suriname and the Netherlands should remain open. He also replied indifferently to a question about the sudden increase of migration of Indo-Surinamese to the Netherlands. He stated that it used to be only Creoles who moved to the motherland instead of Indo-Surinamese but that their migration was stable for the past three years.<sup>111</sup>

One newspaper took the opportunity to sensationalize the events. *De Telegraaf* wrote an article called 'Den Uyl to army of Surinamese living in our country: Go back!'", while Den Uyl is only quoted as saying that he found it important that Surinamese living in the Netherlands should try and find work in Suriname and that he was worried that tolerance in the Netherlands might be reduced due to a possible influx of Surinamese.<sup>112</sup>

Criticisms about the short timeframe Arron wanted for Surinamese independence were frequently made by Dutch politicians. Even members from coalition parties were skeptical that it could be done on time. Member of Parliament Piet van Zeil (KVP) said in the Catholic newspaper *De*

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<sup>108</sup> NRC Handelsblad, De Gaay: Akkoord, 16 February 1974.

<sup>109</sup> Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 'Suriname moet zelf leegloop indammen', 18-02-1974.

<sup>110</sup> Leeuwarder Courant, 'Volgens premier Den Uyl: Surinamers naar land terug', 27-02-1974.

<sup>111</sup> NRC Handelsblad, "Arron: Termijn voor onafhankelijkheid is niet te kort gekozen", 17-05-1974.

<sup>112</sup> De Telegraaf, 'Den Uyl tot leger Surinamers in ons land: "Keer terug!'", 21-02-1974.

*Tijd* that there would not be enough time for Suriname to make a sustainable independence possible.<sup>113</sup> It had not started writing its constitution, the budget was unbalanced, and it had no means to defend itself without Dutch military aid. Only a military alliance with partners in the region could make Suriname independent of Dutch military aid. Van Zeil said however that even though the deadline would not be met, the Dutch and Surinamese should still aim to have everything completed by 1975 in order to keep the pressure on the negotiations. If the deadline would be postponed the actual independence might be pushed too far back.

Not all of van Zeil's colleagues felt this way. After a meeting between Dutch and Surinamese parliamentarians in Curacao, members of the Dutch delegation were happy the Surinamese chairman of the *Surinaamse Staten* (parliament), Emile Wijntuin, said that in his view the deadline of 1975 was not as strict as Arron had initially announced.<sup>114</sup>

The question of nationality should in the eyes of J. van der Hoeven (Dutch delegate of the Kingdom Commission) not be used as a tool to influence migration in any way.<sup>115</sup> The topic was too sensitive and too complicated to use as a migration policy. The Dutch government should be careful to avoid creating families with mixed nationalities, for instance. Also when say a doctor living in the Netherlands wanted to go back to Suriname, he or she should not have their Dutch nationality automatically revoked. This would understandably hamper the willingness to help rebuild Suriname. This article echoes the report of the Kingdom Commission that said it was not virtuous to use nationality as a tool to influence migration.

The government of Den Uyl sought to give a voice to the problems that had arisen because of the immigration from Suriname, but wanted at the same time to show that it was taking action. In the *Troonrede* of 17 September 1974, Queen Juliana told the members of the *Staten Generaal* that the large increase of Suriname immigration caused problems in the areas of shelter, housing, and employment.<sup>116</sup> Without going into detail the Queen assured people that the government was working on solutions and would confer with the Surinamese government to tackle these problems. In the Dutch parliament, political parties were up until independence day not all as enthusiastic as Den Uyl and Pronk. As late as on 28 October 1975, the Dutch liberal party VVD announced that it would vote against the changing the Statute officially making Suriname a sovereign country. Similarly, the Christian reformed party SGP and the communist party CPN stated that they did not feel that Suriname was ready to become independent.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> De Tijd, 'Kamerlid Van Zijl: Voor verdediging Antillen bondgenootschap nodig', 26-04-1974.

<sup>114</sup> NRC Handelsblad, 'Lachmon: Suriname over 8 of 10 jaar los van Nederland', 13-04-1974.

<sup>115</sup> NRC Handelsblad, "'Nationalisatie niet gebruiken met oog op Surinaamse migratie'", 13-08-1974.

<sup>116</sup> De Telegraaf, 'Troonrede', 18-09-1974.

<sup>117</sup> De Waarheid, 28-10-1975.

### The treaties as results.

What elements of the above mentioned discussions and statements made it into the legislation and what elements were left out and why? To answer this question I look at the treaties Suriname and the Netherlands agreed upon leading up to November 1975, as well as national legislation.

Comparing the positions and the actual outcomes will deliver us the discursive gap.

Ten treaties were signed on 25 November 1975 between Suriname and the Netherlands (some were also signed by Belgium and Luxembourg as Benelux-partners of the Netherlands).<sup>118</sup> Four were on military issues such as the repatriation of personnel and goods. Other topics were civil air transport, taxes, and development aid. Three treaties are important for this study. The first, on nationalities, I already discussed above.

The second relates to visas. The treaty concerning the abolishment of visa requirements stipulated that during a transition period of five years the now alien Surinamese could travel to the Netherlands without a visa.<sup>119</sup> In this sense Surinamese would receive more favorable treatment than other aliens. There was however a requirement to apply for an *mvv* (temporary stay permit) which would secure a legal stay for up to three months or longer in the event the person would find appropriate housing and work.

The third was on residence and settlement.<sup>120</sup> It was relatively easy for Surinamese to enter the Netherlands without a visa. As long as they found a job, however menial or temporary, they could apply for a permanent residence permit. Not only that, but they could let their family come over from Suriname as long as they were able to provide them with suitable housing. There was no requirement as regards to income. Even if they became unemployed and their Surinamese family members had no income, they were still welcome. And not just their spouse or direct blood relatives, but even people they had a serious and exclusive relationship with or family members that were dependent on them.<sup>121</sup> These criteria accommodated Surinamese citizens and were not at all what the Dutch policy makers had in mind at the beginning of the negotiations.

### Conclusion.

The Dutch government had relatively little time to discuss and decide what positions to take in the upcoming negotiations with the Surinamese officials. The stakes were high as Den Uyl and Pronk were poised to make the independence of Suriname a post-colonial success in contrast with the

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<sup>118</sup> Benny Ooft, *Het laatste hoofdstuk*, p. 63.

<sup>119</sup> Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1975, nr. 139.

<sup>120</sup> Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1975, nr. 133.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibidem*.

sloppy job done with Indonesia in the 1940's and 1950's.<sup>122</sup> The goals they set out were, in order of importance, 1) to make sure Suriname would indeed become independent, 2) to ensure that the migration flow from Suriname to the Netherlands would be minimized, 3) to improve living conditions in Suriname, and 4) to reduce ethnic tensions in Suriname.

The government of the Netherlands reluctantly agreed to keep the borders between the two countries open for a transition period of five years. Surinamese people could travel to the Netherlands (and vice versa) without a visa and stay there for three months. After that period it was possible to get a temporary working permit. All people of Surinamese descent living in the Netherlands would maintain their Dutch nationality, but could quite easily apply for the Surinamese nationality. All people of Surinamese descent living in Suriname would get Surinamese nationality and lose their Dutch nationality. It would become harder for people who had lost their Dutch nationality to regain it.

What was lost in the discursive gap? First and foremost the Dutch policy makers were unable to realize their position on nationality. They had to compromise and settle for the deal that the place of residence on the day of independence would determine nationality. The Dutch were unable to force a stricter settlement on moral reasons. Second the Dutch government was unable to create visa requirements for Surinamese aliens after independence. Morality due to their duty to the colony, the guilt of being a colonial power, and the large Dutch population group of Surinamese descent were the major factors explaining why the Dutch government had to comply with Surinamese demands for unrestrictive travel and residence policy.

The tough policies that could slow down or stop migration from Suriname to the Netherlands quickly and effectively like shutting down borders or changing one's nationality and thereby withholding benefits and entitlements were unavailable to the Dutch government. Still there was hope that migration could be kept to a minimum via other ways. In the next chapter we will see to what extent these measures were actually implemented and what difficulties officials encountered during the implementation phase.

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<sup>122</sup> H. van Amersfoort, *How the Dutch Government*, p. 5.

## 4. Implementation Gap: Policing Surinamese Migration to the Netherlands.

According to Czaika and De Haas, the first real moment migration policies might fail is at the implementation stage.<sup>123</sup> After discussions have been conducted, interests have been balanced, and policies have been written down in the form of legislation they need to be put into action. The public must be made aware of changes, civil servants will be assigned new tasks, the police are informed of the new rules, and the KMar (Royal Dutch military police) gets new border control instructions. This is the moment where policies make the transition from theory to practice, from paper to reality. As often is the case the theory can be significantly different from the reality, especially in cases where public servants have a relatively large degree of discretion and wiggle room, policies can be interpreted in varying ways and subsequently yield different results.

At the implementation stage it is also the first time the public experiences the new migration policies in real life. Antje Ellermann has shown that as public awareness of immigration restrictions rises and people are able to see the impact these have on migrants, the mandate of civil servants to implement restrictive policies shrinks.<sup>124</sup> The supposed preference of Western societies for harsh and strict immigration laws tend to be more nuanced, especially when the restrictive measure has a face. In the Netherlands we see this often, especially when it involves migrant children who after many years of growing up in the Netherlands are to be deported with their families to their country of origin. Czaika and De Haas identified the discretion of civil servants as one of the key factors of the implementation gap.<sup>125</sup> In this chapter I therefore look especially at the problems that surfaced when new policies were introduced.

I discuss the policies that the Dutch government implemented for migration from Suriname to the Netherlands (and with the goal of keeping it to a minimum) but never really put into practice. The first and maybe the most important one was the fact that the borders remained open for Surinamese citizens and Netherlands allowed them to legally enter and stay for up to three months.<sup>126</sup> In that time period they could officially change their reason for staying in the Netherlands from tourism to education or work if they were enrolled in a university or if they found a job. They would then get an mvv (authorization for provisional stay) for twelve months which could easily be

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<sup>123</sup> M Czaika and H. de Haas, 'The Effectiveness', p. 496.

<sup>124</sup> A. Ellermann, 'Street-Level Democracy: How Immigration Bureaucrats Manage Public Opposition', in: Virginie Guiradon and Gallya Lahav (eds), *Immigration Policy in Europe: The Politics of Control* (New York, 2007) p. 94.

<sup>125</sup> M. Czaika and H.de Haas, 'The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies', p. 496.

<sup>126</sup> Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1975, nr. 139.

renewed. Even with a low income temporary job Surinamese migrants could make their stay in the Netherlands permanent.<sup>127</sup>

Another tool the Dutch government used to influence migration was the settlement on nationality.<sup>128</sup> People of Surinamese origin living in the Netherlands before independence on 25 November 1975 kept their Dutch nationality, whereas people of Surinamese origin living in Suriname lost their Dutch nationality and in turn received the new Surinamese nationality. Although the Kingdom Commission stated that it would be unvirtuous to use the nationality settlement to influence migration and therefore make it a migration policy, the Dutch government did look at the influence the nationality settlement could have on migration.<sup>129</sup>

The implementation of the nationality settlement by its nature had two sides: a Dutch one and a Surinamese one. Although the Surinamese side was the hardest part for the Netherlands to control it was equally difficult to oversee the Dutch side, as civil servants proved to be not as compliant as the government had hoped.<sup>130</sup> They were given the task to check whether Surinamese people who applied for a Dutch passport were in fact eligible and report those who tried to apply for social benefits whilst they were actually Surinamese nationals.

The Dutch government also tried to make an arrangement with KLM to keep the number of flights between Paramaribo and Schiphol low, making it impossible for Surinamese people to physically make the trip to the Netherlands. And when they did arrive at Schiphol and were given legal entry, the Dutch government tried to use housing as a tool to influence migration. The specially formed Central Bureau for the Implementation of Settlement Policy for Compatriots (discussed in further detail in chapter 5) was designed to find housing for Surinamese migrants in sober accommodations and subsequently spread across the Netherlands. The rationale behind this was that it would both benefit the integration of the migrants and prevent ghetto formation in large cities.<sup>131</sup>

Finally massive new development aid allocations were used to improve conditions in Suriname itself to counter the idea that migration to the Netherlands was the only available option for those Surinamese who could not see a future for themselves in their home country (discussed further in chapter 5).<sup>132</sup> This chapter explores the policies that did 'survive' the discursive gap but failed to be implemented fully or not at all.

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<sup>127</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 871, Controlling Surinamese Migration (17 January 1980); H.A. Amhad Ali, *De Vestigingsovereenkomst tussen Nederland en Suriname. Een analyse uit de praktijk* (Utrecht 1979) p. 40.

<sup>128</sup> Toescheidingsovereenkomst inzake nationaliteiten tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Republiek Suriname (Paramaribo, 25 November 1975).

<sup>129</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 1874, Notes of Preparation for Nationality Treaty, (8 August 1974).

<sup>130</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 919, Benefits for Aliens (6 December 1979).

<sup>131</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 1873, Proposals by Commission De Vos (20 September 1974).

<sup>132</sup> G. Oostindie and I. Klinkers, *Het Koninkrijk in de Caraïben*, 163.

## KMar.

The Assignment Agreement on Nationalities between Suriname and the Netherlands concerning the question of nationality meant that Surinamese citizens traveling from Suriname and settling in the Netherlands became aliens and the Dutch Alien Act of 1965 could be applied to them.<sup>133</sup> The responsibility for the protection of the Dutch borders and for keeping unwanted migrants out of the Netherlands lay with KMar. This special police organization controlled the international airport at Schiphol as well as other border posts such as the Rotterdam harbor. KMar was directly involved with the implementation of the special rules for Surinamese entering the Netherlands.

As stated in the previous chapter the Dutch government decided to grant the Surinamese special treatment between 1975 and 1980. They were therefore exempt from traveling with a visa to the Netherlands and were granted legal entry as tourists for up to three months as was enacted in the treaty on settlement.<sup>134</sup> This did not mean that Surinamese migrants simply passed through immigration control at Schiphol Airport however; there were strict passport controls. It was the responsibility of Suriname to take in the Dutch passports of the Surinamese who obtained Surinamese nationality after 25 November 1975. The Dutch government was unhappy with the way the Surinamese government handled their responsibility. There was little documentation and almost no communication with the Netherlands.<sup>135</sup>

Furthermore, KMar was burdened with the task of asking Surinamese migrants the reason for their visit. If it looked as if the migrants were not only visiting family, but actually were looking to settle in the Netherlands permanently KMar could refuse entry, detain them and send them back to Suriname on the next available flight. According to the treaty, Surinamese migrants were only allowed to enter if their stay did not exceed a period of three months.<sup>136</sup> If it was apparent for KMar that the migrant was actually coming to the Netherlands for permanent settlement and did not carry a visa for a longer stay (a so-called *machtiging voorlopig verblijf, mvv*), entrance should be denied and they were to be send back. KMar examined the amount of clothing, furniture items and money that people were carrying. This practice however was strongly discouraged by the Interdepartemental Commission Policy Coordination Compatriots (ICBR).<sup>137</sup> Their argument was that the refusal of Surinamese migrants at Schiphol could have a huge impact on the Surinamese community in the Netherlands as whole families would come to Schiphol to come to greet and pick up their families and friends. If it became apparent that they were being held by KMar and would be

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<sup>133</sup> Toescheidingsovereenkomst inzake nationaliteiten tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Republiek Suriname, (Paramaribo, 25 November 1975).

<sup>134</sup> B. Ooft, *Het laatste hoofdstuk*, p. 71.

<sup>135</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 928, Concept Agreement MICOS (9 October 1975).

<sup>136</sup> Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1975, nr. 139.

<sup>137</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 919, ICBR (19 November 1975).

send back to Paramaribo, sometimes even on the same day, huge consternations could become a daily practice in the arrival hall. Plus, so argued the ICBR, the number of people it concerned was relatively small so it was hardly worth all the fuss.<sup>138</sup> In a MICOS-meeting the recommendation was made that migrants who KMar estimated would probably be able to get a long staying permit whilst in the Netherlands should be allowed to enter.<sup>139</sup>

What we see happening here is quite interesting as the policy seemed to be in limbo; on the one hand we see the Dutch government using strict measures to ensure that Surinamese migrants entered the Netherlands under certain strict conditions while on the other hand two committees advised the Minister of Justice and his KMar colleagues to be lenient towards Surinamese migrants who appeared to circumvent the migration policy in place. There was a combination of both the discursive gap and the implementation gap at play that distorted the effectiveness of the migration policy. Although implemented the strictness of the policy was already lessened by the government before it was enforced.

Nevertheless, the officials of KMar took their job seriously and on occasion Surinamese migrants were detained and sent back. As predicted by the ICBR this practice caused a stir in the Surinamese community in the Netherlands.<sup>140</sup> There were often discussions between the Dutch government and Surinamese interests groups. The National Federation of Surinamese Welfare Foundation was an umbrella organization for Surinamese interests groups in the Netherlands.<sup>141</sup> It looked at the actions of the Dutch government with a critical eye and often gave its opinions on migration policies. The Federation had its eyes and ears close to the Surinamese community so it was no surprise that when some incidents at Schiphol took place, the Federation got word of it.

Often the Federation reminded the Minister of Justice of its agreement that Surinamese people would be subject to a flexible interpretation of the law and they would receive special treatment.<sup>142</sup> None of that was visible according to the Federation. In a feisty letter, the Minister of Justice reacted to the criticisms of the Federation on these points.<sup>143</sup> He argued that the Surinamese people did in fact receive special treatment, although no laws or treaties specified that Surinamese migrants would be subject to such a flexible interpretation of the law.<sup>144</sup> Considering that almost all the migrants lied about the reasons for their visit to the Netherlands and that a huge number of people were given entry to Dutch territory, the Minister really saw no reason why the Federation

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<sup>138</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 919, Advice ICBR (19 November 1975).

<sup>139</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 928, Letter MICOS Concept Agreement on Settlement (9 October 1975).

<sup>140</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 919, Advice ICBR (19 November 1975).

<sup>141</sup> H. A. Ahmad Ali, *Toelating en verblijf van Surinamers in Nederland* (Utrecht, 1981).

<sup>142</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 874, Letter Ministry of Justice (06 September 1978).

<sup>143</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>144</sup> Ibidem.

should be whining all the time. The Minister even held the Federation responsible for the fact that Surinamese migrants were so uninformed about the Dutch economy and housing scarcity before they traveled to the Netherlands. Their unwillingness to educate the Surinamese about the Dutch circumstances was, in the eyes of the Minister, part and parcel of the attitude of the Federation towards the Dutch government and society as a whole.<sup>145</sup>

In a summary of their work the Federation wrote in 1981 that migration grew enormously and that horrific scenes took place at Schiphol.<sup>146</sup> Whole families with small children were held up at the airport regularly, they claimed, and were subject to intense interrogations. According to the Federation, Surinamese people were also detained and sometimes sent back right away. It shows that both parties had a different view on the matter with different interests and different constituents. KMar held a position in the middle of this conflict and tried to find the best possible way to do its job. KMar was authorized to be much stricter in its job to control the borders and in deciding who entered the territory of the Netherlands, but after listening to the advice of the ICBR and seeing the implementation of the policies in real life, KMar decided to be lenient in many cases.

The KMar was one of the first organizations that felt the implementation of new policies and was burdened with one of the most important and at the same time difficult and delicate tasks. KMar was supposed to uphold the law and follow strict migration rules, whilst at the same time it had to use its discretion in order to avoid possible political and societal tensions. The implementation gap as described by De Haas and Czaika clearly played a role through the discretion of government officials.<sup>147</sup> The new rules intended to restrict Surinamese migrants coming to settle in the Netherlands, not only to avoid economic and social problems but also to avoid a brain drain in Suriname. KMar had the resources and the authority to stop this exodus, but could use its own discretion, with backing from the Ministry, against it. The result was that the policy's objectives were impossible to achieve. The fact that the government and the Ministry downplayed the strictness tells us that also on the discursive level the effectiveness of the policy was hampered.

### Immigration Police.

Whereas KMar was responsible for guarding the Dutch borders, the Dutch police was burdened with the task of finding illegal migrants already living in the Netherlands. The police played a vital role in combatting illegality throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as is the case today. A special task force within the police, the so-called Immigration Police was (and still is) specifically burdened with the task of

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<sup>145</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 874, Letter Ministry of Justice (06 September 1978).

<sup>146</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 919, Summary of the work done by The Foundation National Federation of Surinamese Welfare Foundations, 1981.

<sup>147</sup> M. Czaika and H. de Haas, 'Effectiveness of Immigration Policies', p. 494.

upholding the Alien Act.<sup>148</sup> This means that immigration police researched individuals regarding their legal status in the Netherlands and could arrest people suspected of illegally remaining. Also the police had the authority to inspect businesses and their employees regarding illegal labor. The police could only ask for someone's identification papers if they had a valid reason. For instance, only when someone broke the law or behaved suspiciously could the police hold, question, and arrest them.<sup>149</sup> If it became clear that the person was staying in the Netherlands illegally, immigration detention could then initiate deportation proceedings.

This is where the problem lay for the police. In contrast to other ethnic groups, the Immigration Police generally had a hard time finding illegal Surinamese migrants living in the Netherlands, which was already predicted in a MICOS meeting.<sup>150</sup> Immigration Police officials were at all times allowed to check someone's nationality who they reasonably expected to be aliens. In the case of Surinamese people this tool was almost impossible to use. Since they usually spoke Dutch and looked and acted no different than Surinamese people with Dutch nationality, Immigration Police officials found it therefore difficult to make a case to justify their suspicion. Holding them and asking for their papers was therefore discriminatory and it was quite easy for lawyers to convince the judge to release their clients.<sup>151</sup>

Between 1975 and 1980 the Netherlands deported several dozen Surinamese nationals to Suriname every year. In 1981, after the transition period, the Netherlands sent 175 Surinamese migrants back.<sup>152</sup> It is hard if not impossible to give an estimate of how many illegal Surinamese were living in the Netherlands in that time period. Looking at the thousands of migrants entering the Netherlands on questionable grounds between 1975 and 1980, however, it is safe to say the Immigration Police was able to only deport a fraction of illegal Surinamese nationals. Just as was the case with KMar, the Ministry advised the police to take caution in asking Surinamese people for identification papers in order to prevent lawsuits built on discrimination charges.<sup>153</sup> In general, illegal Surinamese nationals living in the Netherlands had little to fear from the police as long as they did not encounter any problems with the law.

Since no new policies were introduced for their staff, the implementation gap did not play as critical a role for the Immigration Police as it did for KMar. The laws existing prior to Surinamese

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<sup>148</sup> Politie, Vreemdelingenpolitie, <https://www.politie.nl/themas/vreemdelingenpolitie.html> (Visited on 17 September 2017).

<sup>149</sup> Basic Rights, Aanhouding, <https://www.basicrights.nl/nl/glossary/aanhouding-nl/>, (visited on 17 September 2017).

<sup>150</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 928, Letter MICOS Concept Agreement on Settlement (9 October 1975).

<sup>151</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>152</sup> C. van Eijl, *Tussenland. Illegaal in Nederland 1975-2000* (Hilversum, 2012) pp. 137-8.

<sup>153</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 928, Note from Director Alien Affairs to Minister of Justice on Illegal Surinamese in the Netherlands (10 December 1976).

independence were not suitable for their needs as the police was unable to perform nationality checks on a large scale, but it proved to be difficult to write new policies specifically designed to target Surinamese citizens illegal living in the Netherlands.

### Civil Servants.

For a large part the police was unable to help achieve the Dutch government's goal of combatting the illegal residence of Surinamese nationals, as I have shown above. Other ways of finding illegal Surinamese migrants were discussed in MICOS.<sup>154</sup> In order to find Surinamese illegals, the government envisaged that that civil servants in the social welfare branch would play a crucial role.

Without quoting any sources the State Secretary of Justice suspected that a large amount of illegal Surinamese would seek social welfare.<sup>155</sup> This was problematic since only Dutch nationals were eligible for government aid. The State Secretary therefore requested that civil servants working at the social welfare office check whether an applicant of Surinamese decent was in fact a legal resident of the Netherlands and to report to the Ministry of Justice the names of those who were not.<sup>156</sup> A person applying for social welfare would be required to hand in additional proof of his or her nationality and the legality of his or her stay in the Netherlands. This required an adjustment to the existing General Assistance Act (Algemene Bijstandswet) and the General Retirement Act (Algemene Ouderdomswet) since the Justice department also felt that people applying for state pensions should be required to hand over more proof.<sup>157</sup>

The civil servants were strongly opposed to this kind of vetting since they felt ill prepared for the task.<sup>158</sup> They lacked the manpower as well as the expertise. Furthermore the government was unwilling to give the social institutions funds for extra staff and proper training.<sup>159</sup> The directors of the social services did not want to place an extra burden on their employees by requiring them to take up the role of the police or Marechaussee. This was all to the displeasure of the Ministry of Justice and resulted in another tool which the Minister wanted to use to influence migration proving to be useless.

Here the implementation gap is clearly visible. Policy explicitly designed to identify illegal Surinamese on Dutch soil in order to be able to deport them was officially implemented, but was

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<sup>154</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 928, Letter MICOS Concept Agreement on Settlement (9 October 1975).

<sup>155</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 919, Letter from State Secretary of Justice to the Director of MICOS on Welfare for Surinamese (7 November 1975).

<sup>156</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>157</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>158</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 928, Note from Director Alien Affairs to Minister of Justice on Illegal Surinamese in the Netherlands (10 December 1976).

<sup>159</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 928, Meeting at Ministry of CRM with Directors of Social Services (8 October 1975).

never actually used as civil servants refused to act like gatekeepers instead of trying to help vulnerable people. What is also apparent is the fact that the Dutch government did not provide civil servants with the resources they needed to tend to their new objectives successfully.<sup>160</sup> Czaika and De Haas pointed out that politicians frequently pay lip service to strict migration policies but fail to offer the right structures and finances in order to make the implementation of new rules successful.<sup>161</sup> This begs the question to what extent did the Dutch government want to find Surinamese illegals? The lack of funding is a good indication that the government did not think the policy would be a huge success.

### KLM.

The main means of transport for Surinamese migrants was by air. Every day, the Dutch national airline, KLM, flew directly between Zanderij (Paramaribo) and Schiphol (Amsterdam). Already in 1974 the ICBR saw a particularly important role for KLM in order to influence migration between Suriname and the Netherlands. It stated that the Dutch government needed the full cooperation of KLM to concentrate the flow of migrants and to regulate who was coming to the Netherlands and who would return to Suriname.<sup>162</sup> From the moment Arron announced the intention of the Surinamese government to become a sovereign nation, KLM saw increasing numbers of passengers on its flights. This meant that the airline could increase its ticket prices and maybe increase the frequency of aircrafts per week in order to make more profit. In January 1974 the airline increased its prices by 6%.<sup>163</sup> The Dutch government supported KLM's decision to increase its prices. Higher prices for tickets meant that less people could afford to move to the Netherlands. The sudden price hike was much to the displeasure of Surinamese interests groups in the Netherlands, but instead of giving in to societal pressures KLM increased their ticket prices even further by 12% in May.<sup>164</sup>

The second idea, increasing the number of flights between Paramaribo and Amsterdam, did not meet with the same government approval. More airplanes meant more migrants and that was exactly what the government wanted to avoid. In the Minister Council the point was raised that the government should try to force KLM to decrease the number of passengers it would allow to board the plane.<sup>165</sup> In other words KLM was supposed to sell fewer tickets to passengers than their aircrafts were capable of transporting. This would mean that KLM would lose large amounts of income which Minister Elzerman felt it was the government's duty to compensate. In the end the costs were too

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<sup>160</sup> T. Walaardt, 'Patience and Perseverance', p. 5.

<sup>161</sup> M. Czaika and H. de Haas, 'Effectiveness of Immigration Policies', p. 494.

<sup>162</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 1873, Meeting MICOS with ICBR Recommendations (20 September 1974).

<sup>163</sup> De Waarheid, 'KLM verhoogt tarieven op Suriname', 09 May 1974.

<sup>164</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>165</sup> NA, 2.05.326, 16, List of decision of ISOS meeting to MICOS, (24 April 1975).

high and it would have been a dirty trick played by the government to decrease migration which did not fit the ideal of Den Uyl of a smooth and open independence.<sup>166</sup> They did, however, manage to convince KLM to limit their number of flights to one per day (discussed further in the next chapter).<sup>167</sup>

### Conclusion.

The Dutch government implemented several policies to influence the migration flow from Suriname to the Netherlands but these were not actually applied properly, as I have shown. The implementation gap of Czaika and de Haas was visible in numerous fields. Consider, for example, the implementation of strict passport checks and the fact that KMar officials were supposed to send whole families back on the next plane to Suriname if they did not comply with the regulations. Although the government put the policies officially into place and it instructed the KMar officials to act on them, it also instructed KMar to keep in mind the human dimension of Surinamese migrants and to consider the possible public outrage of their actions. In this way the discursive gap also played a role in this particular migration policy.

For the Immigration Police other problems were at hand. The government also asked them to keep the public in mind and to avoid discrimination and racism at all costs. Without ethnic profiling it was hard to identify Surinamese illegally resident in the Netherlands and without new tools they could not force Surinamese to return, let alone influence migration. The civil servants of the Benefits Desk were also hampered as they did not have the means to perform large scale checks on social benefits applicants. Besides, they felt like it was not their job in the first place.

The one group that could actually have made a significant impact on migration numbers was KLM since it was the prime carrier of migrants, but the Dutch government failed to push the airline hard enough to reduce the number of passengers. In keeping the number of flights low it did however manage to prevent even larger crowds arriving at Schiphol. The implementation gap here is visible as the large economic consequences the Dutch government would have faced in buying up empty seats was considered to be too much. The implementation gap has multiple faces and the Surinamese case study shows that although discussing migration policies is difficult, putting policies into action is even harder.

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<sup>166</sup> NA, 2.05.326, 16, List of decision of ISOS meeting to MICOS, (24 April 1975).

<sup>167</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 45.

## 5. Efficacy Gap: Goals versus Outcomes.

In this chapter I take a look at those migration policies that made it past the discursive gap as well as the implementation gap. The policies discussed below were written down by the policy makers and actually implemented by the civil servants, but failed to deliver the proposed outcomes or had significant side effects. Czaika and De Haas describe the efficacy gap as “the extent to which implemented policies are able to affect migration”.<sup>168</sup> The authors state that we need to look at the supposed effect of the policies on the characteristics of the migration flow they were designed to target. The characteristics of the migration flow Czaika and De Haas identified are volume, timing, direction, and composition.<sup>169</sup> Are these characteristics all relevant for the Surinamese case?

As I have shown in previous chapters, for the Dutch government all of these characteristics were important. They wanted to limit the volume of the migration flow from Suriname to the Netherlands. It is fair to say that this was their main concern, as the uncertainty of what the impact would be of a large influx of migrants on Dutch society grew among mayors and citizens as the end of 1975 came closer.<sup>170</sup> As tolerance in the Netherlands declined and racism grew, a large ethnically different group adding to the population of an already receding economy could be damaging.<sup>171</sup> The supposed brain drain would also hamper Surinamese development which in turn would fuel further migration.<sup>172</sup> The Dutch government also wanted to influence the timing of migration by keeping the borders relatively open for Surinamese migrants for five years after independence. This would remove the necessity to come to the Netherlands before independence.<sup>173</sup> To influence the direction of migration the Dutch government tried to make it attractive for Surinamese people living in the Netherlands to return to Suriname by supporting development projects and even handing out departure bonuses. It is hard to argue that the Dutch government tried to adjust the composition of the migration wave between Suriname and the Netherlands. I did not come across any sources suggesting the Dutch government preferred a certain ethnic group above the other. There were, however, discussions about the age group most migrants belonged to and their education level, but the Dutch government did not seem to hold one group back while making it easier for others to migrate.<sup>174</sup>

The efficacy gap is the second and final moment a migration policy can fail according to Czaika and De Haas. For my case study I look in this chapter for those migration policies that made it

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<sup>168</sup> M. Czaika and H. de Haas, ‘Effectiveness of Immigration Policies’, p. 494.

<sup>169</sup> Ibidem, 497.

<sup>170</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 57.

<sup>171</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 1585, Recommendations from Prof. Dr. Köbben (24 October 1974).

<sup>172</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 871. Rapport of the Work Group Immigration from Suriname, (August 1979).

<sup>173</sup> F. Bovenkerk, ‘De vlucht’, p. 170.

<sup>174</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 874, Emigration to the Netherlands 1975-80, (20 March 1979).

through the discussion phase and the implementation phase, but failed to achieve their intended results.

### Central Bureau for the Implementation of Settlement Policy for Overseas Citizens.

In 1974 it was decided in the Ministers Council to create a national bureau that had the specific task of facilitating all accommodation necessary for incoming Surinamese migrants who lacked the means for proper housing.<sup>175</sup> The so-called Central Bureau for the Implementation of Settlement Policy for Overseas Citizens (*Centraal bureau uitvoering vestigingsbeleid rijksgenoten*), or Central Bureau for short, became in a relatively short period of time responsible for the accommodation of thousands of unprepared migrants who left everything behind to create a new home in the Netherlands.

The creation of the Central Bureau was in this sense more a policy designed to advance the integration of migrants settling in the Netherlands and not a policy to influence the migration flow. The Dutch government, however, was aware of the influence the Central Bureau could have on migration from Suriname and so was eager to control its inner workings. The Dutch government, as well as its Surinamese counterpart, was afraid that a too luxurious and successful shelter program by the Central Bureau could increase migration from Suriname.<sup>176</sup> On the other hand, local governments and mayors were ringing alarm bells as they feared overcrowding, unemployment, poverty and crime.<sup>177</sup> I think it is therefore just to qualify the creation of the Central Bureau as a migration policy since some activities of the Central Bureau were modified to influence migration, even though its main priority was integration.

The ideal situation according to the ICBR was that Surinamese migrants would first visit a travel agency in Suriname where Dutch civil servants would be stationed and conduct interviews.<sup>178</sup> In these interviews the migrants would have to answer questions regarding their plans for their stay or settlement in the Netherlands. Which city would they like to live in? Did they have family members already living in the Netherlands? What level of education had they completed? What line of work were they in and what kind of work would they try to get in the Netherlands? The reports from these interviews would be sent to the Central Bureau in the Netherlands to prepare for the arrival of the migrants months in advance.

The real situation was quite different, however. The Surinamese government did not want any Dutch civil servants occupying travel agencies and migrants did not want to be interviewed. They merely visited the travel agency to buy an airline ticket. Migrants also did not feel the need to get

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<sup>175</sup> Tweede Kamer, zitting 1974-1975, 13473, pp. 8-9.

<sup>176</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 1585, Minutes of MICOS meeting (20 September 1974).

<sup>177</sup> H. Buddings, 'Stroom Surinaamse immigranten veroorzaakte paniek.

<sup>178</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 919, ICBR (19 November 1975).

information about the Netherlands. Generally every migrant had family and friends living in the Netherlands who provided them with all the information they needed.

The tasks of the Central Bureau therefore remained focused on the Netherlands. The Central Bureau was present at Schiphol in order to assist arriving migrants who lacked accommodation. The Central Bureau transferred such migrants first to a convention center in Putten for eight days. Thereafter they would be spread throughout the Netherlands in contracted guesthouses. The spreading of the migrants was meant to improve integration and minimize ghetto forming in the big cities of the Netherlands. A large concentration of Creole Surinamese already lived in the Bijlmer area of Amsterdam which caused unrest among Dutch citizens.<sup>179</sup> In The Hague and Rotterdam problems with housing of Surinamese migrants had caused riots in early 1970's as well.<sup>180</sup>

The first 35 families the Central Bureau was ready to assist on 4 January 1975 were not interested in their services however, since they made plans to stay with their families already living in the Netherlands.<sup>181</sup> As of 2 June 1975 the Central Bureau provided shelter for 759 migrants in 15 different centers.<sup>182</sup> Together with an education organization from Leiden (Leidse Onderwijsinstellingen, LOI) the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (CRM) provided a basic course on Dutch society and what to expect about living and working in the Netherlands, which shows how focused the government was on ensuring these migrants integrated as soon as possible.

Another tool the Central Bureau used to enable Surinamese migrants to integrate as rapidly as possible was to spread them across the Netherlands in smaller groups.<sup>183</sup> This way, large concentrated neighborhoods filled with immigrants like the Bijlmer would be avoided and migrants would have to mingle with native Dutch people. At the same time, Surinamese migrants were supposed to keep their identity and would not have to assimilate like the Dutch-Indies migrants of the 1950s.<sup>184</sup> Surinamese were to remain an allochthone (immigrant) community at the periphery of Dutch society. Although the Dutch government felt it necessary to provide shelter and permanent housing for those Surinamese migrants who would otherwise end up on the street, it was anxious not to create a large pull effect and attract more migrants. Therefore the facilities were sober and minimal. Paradoxically it was the Surinamese government that urged the Dutch to keep the provided

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<sup>179</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 1873 Letter from VNG, 13 September 1974 to Prime Minister. 'Opvang en begeleiding Surinamers.'

<sup>180</sup> T. Walaardt, *Geruisloos inwilligen. Argumentatie en speelruimte in de Nederlandse asielprocedure, 1945-1994* (Hilversum, 2012) p. 136.

<sup>181</sup> Reformatisch Dagblad, Opvang rijksgenoten op Schiphol geen succes, (4 January 1974).

<sup>182</sup> Tweede Kamer, zitting 1975-1976, 13600.

<sup>183</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 1873, MICOS Meeting (20 September 1974).

<sup>184</sup> G. R. Jones, *Tussen onderdanen, rijksgenoten en Nederlanders. Nederlandse politici over burgers uit Oost en West en Nederland, 1945-2005* (Amsterdam, 2007) p. 262.

assistance to the bare minimum. It felt that providing too much help and luxurious facilities would convince more Surinamese to make the journey to the Netherlands.<sup>185</sup>

The comments made by the Surinamese government were supported by the Surinamese newspaper *De Vrije Stem*, which heavily criticized the Dutch government.<sup>186</sup> It said that for 50 percent of the people living in Suriname the accommodation the Central Bureau was offering would be considered regal compared with their current living conditions. The newspaper also claimed that all the young and bright Surinamese youths who the country so direly needed were fleeing to the Netherlands in order to keep their Dutch nationality, not worrying about finding a job, a house or even the growing hostility from the Dutch natives towards Surinamese migrants.

So what about the implementation gap? It was difficult to use the Central Bureau and its objectives and workings to influence migration. The Dutch government and local councils to an even greater extent had a duty to assist those migrants who needed accommodation while at the same time make sure they would integrate into Dutch society as quickly as possible. All that the Dutch government could do was to try to make it not so convenient for the migrants to move or settle in order to prevent a pull effect. This was hard because like the article in *De Vrije Stem* said, a lot of Surinamese were badly off in their home country and even a basic hostel and a small allowance in the Netherlands were of a higher standard than they were used to.

Here we see the efficacy gap at work. Even though the Central Bureau was not designed to be used as a tool to influence migration from Suriname to the Netherlands and vice versa, it still had an impact on it. Both governments were aware of the effect and tried to alter the inner workings of the Central Bureau. Although the Dutch government and even the civil servants were willing to keep emergency accommodation simple, there were minimum standards they needed to uphold. The policy did not yield the results the government was hoping for.

## KLM.

Transport and carrier companies, such as airlines and shipping companies, play a large role in migration since they facilitate travel and make it possible for people to migrate over long distances. The role of KLM in the years surrounding Surinamese independence is quite interesting. Surinamese migrants were not looking for asylum and were traveling with proper documents since no visa was required.<sup>187</sup> There were no legal grounds upon which KLM could stop Surinamese people from traveling with them. Additionally, they had no incentive to deter passengers because they needed to

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<sup>185</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 1585, Minutes of MICOS meeting (20 September 1974).

<sup>186</sup> S.W. Wolf, Zuigkracht Nederland dodelijk voor Suriname. Rijp en groen staan te dringen voor de Bijlmer-Expres, *De Vrije Stem* (13 June 1975).

<sup>187</sup> Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1975, nr. 139.

make money. The only way that KLM could help the government to influence migration was by purposely selling fewer tickets, which be counterintuitive for a company looking to maximize profits.

KLM could have doubled the number of planes that flew between Zanderij airport in Suriname and Schiphol and consequently experienced a notable increase in profits but because the Dutch government placed the company under serious pressure, they decided against it. Prices were raised due to higher demand, so the airline still saw an increase in revenue. This made it harder for people with a small budget to make the trip forcing them to take out loans and sell their properties and goods.

Surinamese businesses were creative to help their compatriots to travel to the Netherlands. An advertisement was put out in Surinamese newspapers with the slogan “Fly now, pay later” by *Verenigde Assurantiën Kantoren* (VAK). The company gave the migrants an advance for their ticket, which they could then repay with Dutch benefits checks.<sup>188</sup> Over 2000 migrants had traveled via the company by October 1975 with another 2000 in progress and 7000 more who signed up and on the waiting list. The Dutch government expected another 10,000 migrants to move due to this company’s practices alone. If just half of those people arrived in the Netherlands, the pressure to accommodate them would be huge. Still, the Dutch government was powerless since everything the VAK was doing was completely legal. In an attempt to please the Dutch government and be of better service to its costumers VAK asked the Dutch government if it could work together with the Central Bureau for the Implementation of a Settlement Policy for Overseas Citizens so it could coordinate the migration. Klaas Laansma of the Ministry of CRM advised against because he claimed that it would allow VAK to exploit the services of the Central Bureau.<sup>189</sup>

The Dutch government restrained KLM from expanding their service and at the same time encouraged the airline to increase their prices in September 1975, only two months before independence.<sup>190</sup> According to De Groot this was the most effective policy introduced by the government to influence migration in the short term, but how effective was it? What was lost in the efficacy gap?

Between 18 September and 1 December 1975 fifty-two flights flew between Paramaribo and Amsterdam, with the possibility of 9,200 migrants arriving at Schiphol.<sup>191</sup> At that moment 40 to 50% of all Surinamese migrants who arrived at Schiphol signed up for assistance at the Central Bureau, which was working in overdrive.<sup>192</sup> CBS figures for the months of October and November showed

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<sup>188</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 7298, Letter Laansma of Ministry of CRM on Verenigde Assurantiën Kantoren to MICOS. (16 October 1975).

<sup>189</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>190</sup> R. de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 45.

<sup>191</sup> NA, 2.05.326, 16, KabSNa Rapport on ISOS Meeting (17 September 1975).

<sup>192</sup> Ibidem.

that 13,290 Surinamese migrants arrived in the Netherlands.<sup>193</sup> This shows that the migrants found different ways into the Netherlands than via KLM; they traveled via Belgium and Germany and by boat. So even though the Dutch government managed to keep KLM from increasing the frequency of flights they could not prevent record numbers of immigrants arriving in the Netherlands.

Nevertheless, an extra 9,200 migrants could have arrived by air had the KLM pushed their plans through. It is impossible to know for sure if all those extra planes would have been full. Interestingly, in the months following independence migration from Suriname dropped significantly, from 6,755 in November to 1,688 in December and just 462 in January. This shows that the urgency which the Surinamese escaped independence seemed to disappear.

### Aid Allocations.

In contrast to the Dutch government's goals for upcoming independence, the Surinamese government was out to get the best possible financial deal.<sup>194</sup> As we have seen in the MICOS-discussions, Minister of Development Pronk ranked the development of Suriname into a stable and sustainable nation as his third priority. He did not mind giving a large hand-out to the Surinamese government, as long as the Netherlands was going to be 'freed' from its colony.

Arron and his colleagues practiced client politics and lobbied for a sizeable hand-out from the Dutch for Surinamese development to strengthen their position of power. According to Van Dam the focus on money stemmed from the colonial relationship between the two countries. The nature of a colonial power is to exploit the country and the people of the colony.<sup>195</sup> Arron was highly aware of the feelings of colonial guilt his counterpart Den Uyl felt and knew exactly how to make use of it in their discussions.<sup>196</sup>

The focus on increasing the amount of development aid the Netherlands would give to the new state of Suriname was clearly visible in the treaty discussions in May 1975 when Surinamese officials constantly accused the Netherlands of paternalism and colonialism.<sup>197</sup> The hunger for a large paycheck was apparent to Minister Pronk who was responsible for designing a new and futureproof development aid agreement. In March of that year, Pronk had said that he was willing to give Suriname one and a half to two billion guilders, but urged the government to increase the aid allocations just for the sake of the negotiations. The new budget was set at three billion guilders to be spent in ten to fifteen years, which would be the maximum amount the Surinamese could get. In the final discussions in June no further increase was possible, but the Surinamese government

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<sup>193</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 871. Rapport of the Work Group Immigration from Suriname, (August 1979).

<sup>194</sup> René de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 61.

<sup>195</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>196</sup> Ibidem, pp. 65-6.

<sup>197</sup> Ibidem, p. 65.

remained unsatisfied. It needed to bring a successful deal back to Paramaribo, so the Dutch changed some allocations to make it look like the budget increased. The Dutch newspapers were not so easily fooled though and stated that although the Surinamese announced a final severance package of 4.2 billion guilders, the actual amount was no larger than the three billion already agreed upon in May.<sup>198</sup>

According to Benny Ooft, the final sum of development aid showed that the Dutch government persisted in its view of what was acceptable to the Dutch parliament and the Dutch public instead of actually looking at what Suriname needed to become a stable sovereign state.<sup>199</sup> This has to be looked at in the framework of a Dutch economy in recession as well. In order to make sure the development aid would be put to good use a commission was installed, the so-called Commission for the Development of Cooperation of Netherlands Suriname (CONS) that would examine all projects the Surinamese government proposed.<sup>200</sup> CONS consisted of six people: three Surinamese and three Dutch

Although the Dutch economy experienced recession and rising unemployment at the time, the economic situation in Suriname remained significantly underdeveloped by comparison. According to the Dutch government the large difference in prosperity was one of the key reasons why Surinamese people moved to the Netherlands, although Pronk warned his colleagues that most people migrated for political reasons, not for social economic reasons.<sup>201</sup> It was thought that by increasing living standards in Suriname, migration could be slowed down. So although the rather large golden handshake of three billion guilders had to do with colonial guilt and moral obligations, it was in this sense also linked to migration policy since it could influence movement between Suriname and the Netherlands and vice versa. By showing the Surinamese public the large investments the Dutch government was planning to make, the building of housing complexes and strengthening the Surinamese economy as a whole, the Dutch government hoped to make it look more appealing to a) stay in Suriname and not leave for the Netherlands, and b) for people from Suriname based in the Netherlands to return.<sup>202</sup>

It is hard to identify the effect the large sum of aid had on the willingness of the Surinamese to either stay in Suriname or return from the Netherlands to their home country. The projects to be realized with the aid donations would take years to be completed and the economy as a whole would take some time to show improvements. It is therefore strange that the Dutch government expected a rapid response to the migration dynamic. Nonetheless, the amount of people that chose not to stay

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<sup>198</sup> René de Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 42.

<sup>199</sup> B. Ooft, *Onvoltooid verleden*, p. 104.

<sup>200</sup> R. De Groot, *Drie miljard verwijten*, p. 79.

<sup>201</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 1585, Minutes of MICOS meeting (20 September 1974).

<sup>202</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 913, Tweede Kamer, 1974-1975, 13 467, nr. 1. Independence Suriname, (20 June 1975).

in Suriname and the motives they held for their move tell us something about the way they looked at the promises of both governments.

### Nationality and visas.

The agreements on the nationality question and free travel between the Netherlands and Suriname had some unintended consequences that actually increased migration before independence. Czaika and De Haas spoke of policies or “policy externalities” working in unforeseen ways or influencing migrants in making unsuspected choices.<sup>203</sup>

The agreement on the assignment of nationalities had the effect of Surinamese people migrating to the Netherlands before independence so as not to lose their Dutch nationality. This proved to be a strong force that was hard to curtail with migration policies.

The treaty concerning the abolishment of visa requirements was a real migration policy in that it was designed to influence migration between the two countries. Given the fact that the treaty gave citizens of both countries the right to travel freely for the transition period of five years, it should have removed the “now or never” migration but it failed to deliver. As shown above the months up to independence showed the highest migration numbers during the whole period of 1974-1980.<sup>204</sup> Throughout 1976 monthly migration numbers fluctuated between 400 and 500 Surinamese migrants. The now-or-never migration had passed and even though the Surinamese could no longer attain Dutch nationality instantly they still came in significant numbers.

### Conclusion.

The efficacy gap has multiple faces and can be hard to distinguish. So many things can go wrong when it comes to migration policies as many factors play a role. I showed how an institution such as the Central Bureau, designed to facilitate shelter and improve the integration process, also had an influence on migration and how both governments tried to alter its working, but to little effect. There were standards that the Central Bureau had to comply with even if they were significantly higher than those in Suriname and still could pull people from Suriname to the Netherlands.

In dealing with KLM the Dutch government was successful in keeping the number of airplanes between the two countries low, but numbers showed that the Surinamese who made up their mind to come to the Netherlands found a way either by taking up high loans to pay for high ticket prices, or finding ways to get into the Netherlands via another country. There were multiple factors that played a role in motivating Surinamese to migrate to the Netherlands, but the difference in welfare

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<sup>203</sup> M. Czaika and H. de Haas, ‘Effectiveness of Immigration Policies’, p. 497.

<sup>204</sup> NA, 2.03.01, 9686, Rapport of the Work Group (May 1974).

was certainly one of them. The Netherlands would not be able to close the gap in welfare in such a short period, but the large aid allocations should have been a sign to the Surinamese that better times were coming and that the mother country would not leave them behind completely.

In the case of Surinamese migration it proved hard to distinguish exactly what policy can be considered a success. Czaika and de Haas said we need to compare the proposed and the actual outcomes to see if the goals were met. It is problematic that the Dutch government did not mention exactly what it wanted to achieve in relation to migration. The government did not set exact goals but spoke in terms of “minimalizing” migration.<sup>205</sup> This makes it impossible to objectively state if migration goals were met. I argue that it is possible to take a close look at the migration trend comparing monthly migration numbers. When the government said it wanted to minimize migration up to independence and the three months up to 25 November showed record numbers of Surinamese migrants, it is fair to say that that goal was not met. Those policies implemented to achieve it were not effective and other factors that played a role in the migration flow proved to be more powerful.

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<sup>205</sup> NA, 2.03.01, 9686. Minutes Meeting in Hotel Torarica, Paramaribo (31 January 1975).

## 6. Conclusion.

In this thesis I tried to answer the question: what migration policies did the Dutch government introduce when reacting to the message delivered by Prime Minister Arron to make Suriname an independent nation and to what extent the policies can be deemed successful? I tried to answer this question by researching the nature of the migration policies, the motives behind them, and the results. To add to the historiography existing on the Surinamese exodus between 1974 and 1980 and to pinpoint exactly where certain policies failed I used the model of Czaika and de Haas as the theoretical framework for my thesis. This helped to distinguish between failed policies, semi-failed policies, and successful policies. Furthermore, by incorporating the case study into the Control Gap Debate I tried to put it into a broader perspective and give a good example of why liberal states accept unwanted migration.

The use of theories from the social sciences can benefit historical case studies like mine in a number of ways. It can present a fresh look on subjects that were considered to be obvious, but more importantly it can help explain events instead of just describe them. It also works the other way around. Case studies like this one challenge the theories designed by migration scholars and bring about the need to change them. The model of Czaika and De Haas is helpful in dissecting migration policies, but certainly has its limitations. The model does not account for the fact that governments are vague about the goals of their migration policies and how governments are limited by liberal and moral constraints.

Freeman argues that liberal states can control unwanted migration, but he notes that this depends on what type of migration liberal states are experiencing.<sup>206</sup> Post-colonial migration is a unique kind of migration since it brings with it distinct emotions, responsibilities, and shame that differs from labor migration, family reunification, or asylum. All these factors play a role in the way a government wants to implement policies and control unwanted migration. In the words of Joppke the Dutch government laid unto itself a 'self-limiting sovereignty'.<sup>207</sup> Discussions between and moral obligations towards the former colony and its people tied the hands of the Dutch government in enforcing strict migration policies.

My empirical study shows the problem with asserting the effectiveness of migration policies that Castles identified: governments often do not state clearly what the goals or targets of their migration policies exactly are.<sup>208</sup> I believe there are two reasons for this: on the one hand governments are purposely vague so they cannot be judged on the outcomes. Governments do not know whether the policies will work or are uncertain what their effects will be. On the other hand

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<sup>206</sup> C. Joppke, 'Why Liberal States', pp. 291-2.

<sup>207</sup> Ibidem, p. 292.

<sup>208</sup> S. Castles, 'Why Migration Policies Fail', p. 207.

governments under pressure from the public or opposition parties feel the need to present policies that sound tough but are actually more symbolic.<sup>209</sup> In this case study it was slightly different. The Dutch government wanted to introduce strict policies to hinder Surinamese migrants coming to the Netherlands but was unable to implement and enforce them for three reasons: first, because the strict policies would problematize relations with the Surinamese government and could potentially prevent Suriname from becoming independent altogether. Second, they would make the Netherlands look bad at the international level. Finally, some policies would infringe on ethics and morals associated with a Western liberal state that tries to undo itself of its colonial ties with respect for its former citizens.

When looking at different policies in more detail, their characteristics seem to have had a significant influence on their successfulness. ‘Tough’ policies like closing borders for Surinamese migrants altogether or taking away their Dutch nationality did not even make it into written policies as they were lost in the discursive gap. Strict border controls and finding illegal Surinamese in the Netherlands and deporting them were mostly lost in the implementation phase. The government implemented these policies, but officials were unable (and in some cases unwilling) to enforce them. What the government was left with were soft policies focused on making the future of an independent Suriname look more appealing by investing in development projects and offering only minimal shelter accommodations in the Netherlands.

It is remarkable that despite all efforts to reassure the Surinamese people that no strict entry arrangement would be imposed during the five years transition period, the now-or-never type of migration took place. I think it shows that migrants had no trust in the promises of the Dutch government that it would honor the five year transition period and that the nationality arrangement had more weight than anticipated.

It is telling that even in January 1980 after five years of relatively little migration from Suriname to the Netherlands, but with the end of the transition period arriving rapidly, officials of the Ministry of Justice still had not developed a successful method to stop migration.<sup>210</sup> Controlling the housing requirements for a temporary residence permit was deemed unrealistic as the Ministry of Social Affairs still lacked the proper apparatus to conduct research and they wanted to avoid raids with the everlasting lurking threat of discrimination and racism. The same went for the ‘faux touristes’, Surinamese people pretending to be tourists even though they were in fact looking to settle in the Netherlands permanently. KMar was still unable and unwilling to reject these migrants on a large scale as they traveled with the required documentation. The only option the officials saw

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<sup>209</sup> M. Czaika and H. de Haas, ‘The Effectiveness of Migration Policies’, p. 491.

<sup>210</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 871, Controlling Surinamese Migration (17 January 1980).

to keep migration down at that moment was to unilaterally suspend or end the treaty on visa-less travel.<sup>211</sup> In their eyes this would, however, be considered a declaration of powerlessness and a breach of trust between the Netherlands and Suriname, but would make it clear that the treaty was too favorable to the Surinamese and would have to be adjusted in order to protect Dutch interests. Still the overall sentiment was that the Dutch government made its bed and now had to sleep in it. They called it a 'taxation-error' that the Netherlands was held by the conditions of the treaties and at the same time was unable to adjust or terminate them.<sup>212</sup> In this sense the transition period of five years was the biggest mistake the government made, because during that time they were fighting a running battle.

To answer the question whether the migration policies of the Dutch government was successful I think the numbers speak for themselves. Between 1974 and 1980 over 100,000 Surinamese migrated to the Netherlands, out of a Surinamese population of around 350,000.<sup>213</sup> In the end the question remains whether the Netherlands could have done more to prevent this migration. I think the answer is that the Dutch government could have only stopped it, had it pushed aside the ethics and morals which it valued so highly. Perhaps the biggest error Den Uyl and his colleagues made was the presumption that this unwanted migration could be controlled at all.

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<sup>211</sup> NA, 2.09.5027, 871, Controlling Surinamese Migration (17 January 1980).

<sup>212</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>213</sup> CBS Statline.

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